

Now know ye, that We, reposing great trust and confidence in your knowledge and ability, have authorised and appointed, and do by these Presents authorise and appoint you, the said John Poynder, Baron Islington (Chairman); Lawrence John Lumley Dundas (commonly called Earl of Ronaldshay); Sir Murray Hammick; Sir Theodore Morison; Sir Valentine Chirol; Mahadev Bhaskar Chaubal; Abdur Rahim; Gopal Krishna Gokhale; Walter Culley Madge; Frank George Sly; Herbert Albert Laurens Fisher and James Ramsay Macdonald to be Our Commissioners for the purposes of the said inquiry.

And for the better effecting the purposes of this Our Commission, We do by these Presents give and grant unto you, or any three or more of you, full power, at any place in Our said United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, or in India, to call before you such persons as you shall judge likely to afford you any information upon the subject of this Our Commission; and also, whether in Our said United Kingdom, or in India, to call for, have access to and examine all such books, documents, registers, and records, as may afford you the fullest information on the subject, and to inquire of and concerning the premises by all other lawful ways and means whatsoever.

And We do by these Presents authorise and empower you, or any three or more of you, to visit and personally inspect such places as you may deem it expedient so to inspect for the more effectual carrying out of the purposes aforesaid.

And We do by these Presents will and ordain that this, Our Commission, shall continue in full force and virtue, and that you, Our said Commissioners, or any three or more of you, may from time to time proceed in the execution thereof, and of every matter and thing therein contained, although the same be not continued from time to time by adjournment.

And We do further ordain that you, or any three or more of you, have liberty to report your proceedings under this Our Commission from time to time, if you shall judge it expedient so to do.

And Our further will and pleasure is that you do, with as little delay as possible, report to Us under your hands and seals, or under the hands and seals of any three or more of you, your opinion upon the matters herein submitted for your consideration.

Given at Our Court at Balmoral, the thirty-first day of August, one thousand nine hundred and twelve, in the third year of Our Reign.

By His Majesty's Command,

R. McKENNA.

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# REPORT.

7

TO THE KING'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY.

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR MAJESTY,

WE, the undersigned Commissioners, appointed to examine and report upon the following matters in connection with the Indian civil service, and other civil services, imperial and provincial :—

- (i) The methods of recruitment, and the systems of training and probation;
- (ii) The conditions of service, salary, leave, and pension;
- (iii) Such limitations as still exist in the employment of non-Europeans, and the working of the existing system of division of services into imperial and provincial;

and generally to consider the requirements of the public service, and to recommend such changes as may seem expedient, humbly desire to submit to Your Majesty the following report, together with the record of the evidence<sup>2</sup> taken by us in the course of our inquiry.

2. *Scope of the present inquiry.*—Your Majesty's Commission was issued on the 31st August 1912. In obedience thereto we assembled in India, at Madras, on the 31st December of the same year, and have continued in session ever since, with such intervals as were necessary for the arrangement of the material which we had collected. On the 19th February 1915 we suffered an irreparable loss in the death of our colleague, Mr. Gokhale. He had been ill for some months, but with characteristic fortitude and self-sacrifice had not hesitated to take a prominent part in our proceedings. We owe much to the ripe experience gained by him in the lifelong service of his country and are confident that in many of our recommendations the spirit of his counsels will be found reflected. We deeply deplore his loss. In the season of 1912-13 we inquired into the Indian and provincial civil services. We decided to take up only these services during that season, as the material for their investigation was readily available, and the whole field of our inquiry was too large to permit of our covering it in one season. We also wished for an opportunity of considering on the spot the extent to which we should extend our investigations into the other departments during the season of 1913-14. We subsequently determined to exclude from our scope all special or isolated appointments, and such services as were either not strictly of a civil character, or appeared to raise no question of importance, which would not adequately be covered by our findings on some kindred department. In particular we decided not to extend our investigations to appointments in the political departments of the Government of India or of the local governments. We also excluded from our consideration the various subordinate and upper subordinate services and ministerial establishments, except in so far as their circumstances had a direct bearing on the question of recruitment for the services which we decided to keep within our purview. Where no classification into subordinate and other services existed we endeavoured to draw a line so as to include only such officers as had an initial salary of about Rs. 200 or Rs. 250 a month. We also settled to deal only with the officers employed either directly in the imperial departments under the Government of India or in the nine presidencies or provinces of Madras, Bombay, Bengal, the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, the Punjab, Burma, Bihar and Orissa, the Central Provinces and Berar, and Assam. This left us with 24 departments and 9,949 officers, as set out in the following table.† From this it will be seen that the Indian and provincial civil services account for 3,983, the medical and kindred services for 1,387, the public works and railway (engineering) departments for 928, the police force for 926, and the education department for 633 officers, making 7,857 in all, or 79 per cent. of the combined total for all the departments.

Department.	Number of officers in each service.	Total number of officers in the department.
1. Agricultural—Imperial service - - - - -	62	—
Provincial services - - - - -	56	118
2. Civil veterinary—Imperial service - - - - -	34	—
Provincial services - - - - -	36	70
3. Customs - - - - -	—	20

\* Volumes II. to XI. contain the evidence relating to the Indian and provincial civil services taken in India in each of the nine provinces in the early part of 1913, and also that taken with regard to the same services in England. Volumes XII. to XX. contain the evidence taken similarly in 1913-14 with regard to the remaining services and departments. The evidence in volumes II. to XI. was recorded verbatim. This was found inconvenient, and in 1913-14 a précis was substituted. The précis was accepted as correct by each witness before being embodied in the record.

† The figures quoted differ in several respects from those referred to in paragraph 34, and for the reasons there stated.

Department.	Number of officers in each service.	Total number of officers in the department.
4. Education—Imperial service	199	—
"    Provincial services	386	—
"    Women's appointments	48	633
5. Factory and boiler inspection	—	38
6. Indian finance	—	163
7. Military finance	—	57
✓ 8. Forest—Imperial service	213	—
"    Provincial services	208	421
9. Geological survey	—	21
✓ 10. Indian civil service	1,411	—
Provincial civil services—Executive branches	1,527	—
"    "    Judicial branches	1,045	3,983
11. Land records (Burma)	—	48
12. Medical (including jail and sanitary)—		
Superior appointments	566	—
Appointments of minor importance	821	1,387
13. Mines	—	5
14. Mint and assay	—	7
15. Pilots (Bengal)	—	74
✓ 16. Police—Imperial service	671	—
"    Provincial services	255	926
✓ 17. Post office and telegraph—Post office	247	—
"    "    Telegraph (traffic)	40	—
"    "    (engineering)—Imperial service,	46	333
"    "    Provincial service	—	—
18. Public works, including railway (engineering)—Imperial service	648	—
"    "    Provincial services	280	928
19. Railway (revenue)—Management	7	—
"    "    Traffic	112	—
"    "    Locomotive	60	—
"    "    Carriage and wagon	17	—
"    "    Stores	18	214
20. Registration	—	21
21. Northern India salt revenue	—	45
22. Salt and excise	—	267
23. Survey of India—Imperial service	51	—
"    "    Provincial service	96	147
24. Survey (Madras)	—	23
Total	—	9,949

We visited all the provinces except Assam, and during our first tour held private conferences with the members of the Government of India, with the local Governments of Madras, Bengal, the United Provinces, the Punjab, Bihar and Orissa, and Burma, and with the local Administrations of the Central Provinces and Berar, and Assam.\* Our inquiry was an open one except when the public interests necessitated our holding it in private. Our sittings for the examination of witnesses occupied 126 days. During this period we took evidence from 418 officials; from 114 in the first year and 304 in the second. We also examined in the first year 124 and in the second 40 members of the public.† We had the further advantage of receiving the written opinions of 957 individuals or associations,‡ who, in response to a special or a general invitation, answered our preliminary interrogatories, but whom we did not orally examine, and whose answers, therefore, have not been included in our published record. Every criticism or proposal of any importance contained in these communications has been covered by the evidence personally presented to us. Of these communications 341 were submitted by non-officials. Included in this number were 276 dealing with the Indian and provincial civil services and 65 with the departments and services embraced by the second year's inquiry. Throughout our investigation we received the assistance both of the Government of India and of the nine local Governments and administrations, and to each and all of them, and to their officers with whom we came in contact, we desire to express our obligations. We were also much helped by the assistant commissioners,§ whom, in consultation with the Government of India, we co-opted in each province in respect to the services we were

\* The itinerary followed is given in volume I., appendix I.

† The names of the witnesses, who were orally examined, will be found in each of the volumes II. to XX. A composite table is also given in volume I., appendix II.

‡ Further details will be found in volume I., appendix III.

§ The names of the assistant commissioners are given in volume I., appendix IV.

investigating, for the purpose of raising points for discussion, evoking evidence and examining witnesses. Finally, we owe a debt of gratitude to all those, officials and non-officials alike, who, at the expense often of much time and labour, gave oral evidence or formulated their views in writing for our benefit.

## CHAPTER II.

### PUBLIC SERVICES COMMISSION OF 1886—1887.

3. *Scope of the inquiry of the Public Services Commission of 1886-87.*—The public services in India were last made the subject of inquiry in 1886-87, when a Commission was appointed by the Government of India under the presidency of Sir Charles Aitchison, then lieutenant-governor of the Punjab. The Commission did not extend their investigations to Burma, nor were they asked to report on the systems of probation and training in force in the various departments, nor on the prevailing conditions of service, salary, leave and pension. At first their attention was directed to the conditions under which Indians should be employed in the posts ordinarily reserved for members of the covenanted service—as the Indian civil service was then termed—and also to the regulations relating to the admission of Indians and Europeans to those branches of the uncovenanted service—the present provincial and subordinate civil services—which were directly engaged in the executive and judicial administration of the country. As regards the covenanted service the Commission were instructed to consider specially the extent and grounds of dissatisfaction felt by Indians at the system which then existed, by which appointments of natives of India were made to offices ordinarily reserved for members of the Indian civil service in accordance with rules framed under the Government of India Act, 1870 (33 Vict., cap. 3, sec. 6). They were also to examine the facilities afforded to Indians to proceed to England to compete for the Indian civil service, and to consider the desirability of establishing a competitive examination in India for Indians and the advantages and disadvantages of competitive selection there. All questions connected with the conditions under which British candidates were admitted to the Indian civil service examination in England were excluded from their inquiry. Subsequently they were asked to investigate questions relating to most of the other branches of the public service connected with the civil administration of India; for example, the regulations as to admission to the various grades and ranks, the conditions of service in the various departments, and the capacity for rendering efficient service therein of the various classes who put forward claims to employment. At that time there was little direct recruitment of Indians to the higher branches of the civil administration. In some places on the judicial side subordinate judgeships were filled to a certain extent by practising pleaders, but generally speaking these posts were occupied by selected munsifs of approved merit. Similarly on the executive side the deputy magistrates and collectors were ordinarily appointed by selection from persons who had acquired experience in subordinate posts, though in certain provinces some of these appointments were filled directly from amongst young men of good character and approved educational qualification, either by nomination or after the test of an examination.

4. *Recommendations of the Public Services Commission of 1886-87 with regard to the Indian and provincial civil services.*—The main recommendations of the Commission with regard to the covenanted and uncovenanted services were as follows:—

- (i) that the system of filling certain appointments in what was then known as the statutory civil service by officers selected in accordance with the rules made under section 6 of the statute of 1870 (33 Vict., cap. 3) should be abolished;
- (ii) that the number of appointments reserved in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Civil Service Act, 1861 (24 & 25 Vict., cap. 54) for members of the Indian civil service should be reduced, and that the appointments so set free should be transferred to a local service, to be called the provincial civil service, and to be separately recruited for in India in each province\*;

\* The Commission in paragraph 81 of their report (C. 5327 of 1887) wrote as follows:—"It is only by a careful and uniform system of recruitment . . . that a due proportion of high appointments can come in time to be filled by native agency, without sudden dislocation of the existing administration or injury to the just expectations of officers now in the covenanted service. But this object must be kept steadily and perseveringly in view. As one means of tending to secure it the proportion of judicial and revenue appointments excluded from the schedule should be gradually amalgamated with the higher appointments in the executive and judicial departments of the present uncovenanted service and recruited locally as part of that service, which the Commission has already recommended should be called the provincial civil service."

- (iii) that the cadre of the Indian civil service should be reduced accordingly ;
- (iv) that the law should be amended to give effect to these proposals and to enable appointments to all the specified offices to be made on account of exceptional merit and ability proved in the public service, and appointments to the judicial offices to be made on account of special merit and ability proved in actual service as a barrister, advocate or pleader ;
- (v) that members of the imperial and provincial civil services should, as far as possible, be put on a footing of social equality, and when holding similar offices be graded together on the official precedence list ;
- (vi) that below the provincial civil service a lower service should be formed, which should be called the subordinate civil service ;
- (vii) that the rules for recruitment to the subordinate civil service should be carefully revised, and that recruitment to the provincial civil service should be made partly by promotion from the subordinate civil service and partly by examination as regards the executive service, and direct nomination as regards the judicial service ; and finally
- (viii) that the salaries of members of the provincial civil service should be fixed on independent grounds, and have no relation to those attached to appointments in the imperial civil service.

5. *Other recommendations of the Public Services Commission of 1886-87.*—With regard to the special departments the Commission recommended generally the adoption, so far as practicable, of rules as to preliminary qualification, recruitment, probation, and general conditions of service similar to those proposed for the provincial civil services. In particular they suggested the formation, where possible, in each department of a provincial service, and the adoption in it of regular conditions of pay, furlough, and pension, with regular rules as to recruitment and periods of probation. The Commission also recommended that the control of certain departments should be retained in the hands of members of the Indian civil service, so as to secure that the operations of those departments should be conducted in conformity with the principles governing the general administration, and to avoid inter-departmental friction. They proposed further that it should be left to the Government of India to determine the extent to which Indian or other local agency should be employed in certain departments to which such agency was at the time too sparingly admitted. The Commission also dealt in detail with each department, and made specific suggestions to give effect to their general principles.

6. *Action taken on the report of the Public Services Commission of 1886-87.*—The recommendations of the Commission were approved generally by the Government of India and by the Secretary of State. But the latter considered that the proposals with regard to the covenanted and uncovenanted services which involved fresh legislation were inadvisable and unnecessary. He also held that the suggestion to throw open to persons who were not members of the Indian civil service certain appointments previously reserved for members of that service by the schedule to the statute of 1861, and to amalgamate them unconditionally with the provincial civil service appointments, was not consistent with the idea that such posts should be occupied by specially selected officers of proved merit and ability. He observed that the Commission's proposal involved the suggestion that certain posts, now reserved for members of the Indian civil service, could properly be held in future by members of a service recruited in the main with reference to the qualifications required to fill posts of a less responsible and less independent character, and he expressed himself as opposed to the establishment by the general body of members of the provincial civil services of any vested rights in these higher appointments. His conclusion was that the legislation proposed, while in itself of doubtful expediency, would not really facilitate the scheme of the Commission, because the obstacles to any immediate and permanent redistribution of the public offices were due to the circumstances of the case and not to the law. He was of opinion that the ends contemplated would be attained in practice by requiring each provincial Government to place on a separate classified list in each province certain posts and by declaring them publicly to be offices to which members of the provincial civil services might, subject to certain conditions, properly be appointed. The general scheme of the Commission was modified accordingly before being put into operation.

7. *General conclusions with regard to the changes made as a consequence of the report of the Public Services Commission of 1886-87.*—The foregoing summary will have made it clear that the intention of the Commission of 1886-87 was to meet the claims

of Indians to higher and more extensive employment in the civil services by reducing the strength of the Indian civil service and by transferring a corresponding number of appointments to provincial civil services to be recruited separately in each province in India. They expected that the provincial civil services thus formed would secure for the various races and communities in India a fair representation in the administration of the country. They hoped also that the use of the term "provincial" in place of "uncovenanted" in the designation of the lower service would put an end to the complaints on this subject, and that to a great extent the members of the imperial and provincial civil services would be on a footing of social equality. Their proposals with regard to the special departments were based on similar principles. They desired generally to see imperial and provincial branches created, and the former materially reduced and recruited for exclusively in England. The latter, they thought, would afford careers sufficiently honourable to attract the best Indian talent and to satisfy the claims made by the Indian witnesses who appeared before them. The reforms which they introduced undoubtedly resulted in a great improvement in the standard of every service. The provincial civil service officers, in particular, upon whom devolves the greater part of the administrative and judicial work in which the people at large are most interested, have given general satisfaction in the limited sphere allotted to them. We are also satisfied that the abolition of the statutory civil service, which had not fulfilled the expectations with which it was formed, was expedient, and that, generally speaking, the officers promoted from the provincial civil services to hold Indian civil service posts have done efficient work. On the other hand the expectations formed as to the status which these officers would enjoy have to a great extent been falsified and there is no doubt that the provincial service system generally has not proved successful as a means of meeting the claims which have continuously been put forward on behalf of Indians to employment of the higher type. The inferiority in status and social position which has always attached to the provincial services, aggravated to some extent since the reforms were introduced by subsequent changes, has been felt by the Indian public as a real grievance, particularly in the case of the more important services such as the civil, educational, and public works. We shall discuss in subsequent chapters of our report and in its annexures the measures required to remedy this condition of things. Here we need only say that we have found it necessary to abandon the attempt to provide for the growing demand for equality of opportunity as between Europeans and Indians by the means which commended themselves to the Commission of 1886-87.

### CHAPTER III.

#### CHANGED CONDITIONS OF INDIA.

8. *Changed conditions of India since 1886-87.*—We have emphasised in the foregoing chapter our opinion that a change is needed in the idea underlying the scheme of the Commission of 1886-87. It must not, however, be inferred from this that we wish to imply that the decision then come to was not at the time appropriate. The India of 1886-87 was very different from the India of to-day. Indeed, it would be no exaggeration to say that no period of India's connection with Great Britain has witnessed such far-reaching changes, both material and intellectual, as those which have occurred during the last quarter of a century. In most of these changes the public services have directly or indirectly played an important and often a leading part, and they have been affected profoundly in almost every branch in so doing. This has been the more marked because in India the functions of Government have always embraced a larger and more detailed sphere of action than is the case in Great Britain, whilst with the development of the country there has been a considerable growth of specialisation in the departments, some of which are commercial or quasi-commercial in character. Before, therefore, proceeding to set forth our recommendations, we think it necessary to describe as briefly as possible the most striking features of the evolution which has taken place and its general bearing on the problem before us. We propose to deal in the first place with the material progress achieved.

9. *Material progress. Population, public revenue and expenditure.*—Amongst the tests of material progress which can be applied to a country are the growth of its population and of its public revenue and expenditure. The population of the Indian empire, inclusive of Native States, as shown in the census of 1891, was 287 millions. In 1911, the year of the last census, it was 315 millions. In British India the relative

increase in the same period has been even larger, namely, from 221 millions to 244 millions. In 1889-90 the total revenue of India was in round figures 57 millions sterling, and the total expenditure charged against revenue 55 millions sterling.\* The corresponding figures of the revised budget estimate for 1913-14 were 84 millions and 83 millions. But the growth is much more striking than these figures indicate, as the railway revenue of to-day represents the net amount actually received by Government after deducting the heavy working expenses, whereas in 1889-90 such expenses were placed under expenditure and gross receipts under revenue. Moreover, by another recent change, the figures of revenue and expenditure have been reduced by the exclusion of between two and three millions sterling on account of local funds. It must further be remembered that during the same period reductions of taxation have brought down the salt revenue from  $5\frac{1}{2}$  to  $3\frac{1}{2}$  millions, whilst the surrender of the opium trade with China in deference to moral obligations has diminished the receipts from opium from  $5\frac{3}{4}$  to less than 2 millions sterling.

10. *Growth in the means of communication. Railways.*—The last quarter of a century has been conspicuous for the great development of means of communication. The mileage of the railways, which have played a social as well as a material part in the progress of India by bringing into closer contact populations separated by immense distances, has been more than doubled. On the 31st March 1889 there were 15,245 miles open to traffic. On 31st March 1913 there were 33,599 miles. The traffic itself had quadrupled within the same period. The total number of passengers carried had risen from 111 to 437 millions, and the freight tonnage from  $22\frac{1}{4}$  to 87 millions. These results explain the large outlay of capital, which from just under 197 millions at the close of 1888 reached over 314 millions in 1912-13, without taking into account the heavy premiums paid by Government in acquiring the leased lines. They also explain the profits which now accrue from these properties. In 1889-90, and for many subsequent years, the railways were being worked at a loss, sometimes exceeding one million sterling. In 1913-14 they brought in a net revenue of  $4\frac{3}{4}$  millions sterling over and above interest and miscellaneous charges amounting to  $12\frac{3}{4}$  millions.

11. *Development of postal and telegraphic facilities.*—The extension of the postal and telegraphic systems in India has been equally remarkable. In 1890-91 there were only 8,394 post offices and 11,999 letter boxes, as compared with 18,789 and 48,524 in 1912-13. The total number of letters and postcards carried has gone up from  $280\frac{3}{4}$  millions to 892 millions, newspapers from 25 millions to nearly 55 millions and other postal articles from  $19\frac{1}{2}$  millions to 68 millions. Of special interest as an illustration of increasing contact between India and the west is the increasing volume of correspondence with the United Kingdom and foreign countries, favoured by the reduction of the letter rate from  $4\frac{1}{2}d.$  to  $2\frac{1}{2}d.$  the half ounce at the beginning of 1891, and still more by the introduction of the  $1d.$  rate between India and the United Kingdom towards the end of 1898. In the last ten years the number of letters and postcards exchanged between India and the United Kingdom has risen from  $8\frac{1}{2}$  millions in 1901-02 to over 27 millions in 1911-12. The Indian telegraph department, now amalgamated with the post office, has a similar record of expansion. In 1890-91 there were some 37,000 miles of line, with 114,000 miles of wire, and 949 signal offices. At the end of 1912-13 there were 78,000 miles of line and 303,000 miles of wire with nearly 7,854 signal offices open to the public, including 4,739 railway and canal offices. The number of paid telegrams in 1890-91 was under  $3\frac{1}{2}$  millions and their value 345,000*l.* The total number of messages in 1912-13 was  $15\frac{1}{2}$  millions, and their value 717,000*l.*

12. *Spread of irrigation.*—The growth of irrigation in recent years has also contributed largely to the material prosperity of the country. Large tracts of uncultivated land have thus been opened up, particularly in the Punjab, and colonies of prosperous cultivators settled upon them. According to the decennial report on the progress and condition of India, 1891-92, the state canals and their distributing channels had reached a mileage of 26,000 in the case of major works, and of 1,200 in the case of minor works, the area irrigated being just under 11 million acres. On 31st March 1912, the mileage had risen to over 42,000 for major works and to 4,300 for minor works, and the area had risen to 17 million acres. The capital outlay up to 1911-12 on works in actual operation was roughly  $41\frac{1}{2}$  millions sterling.

\* These figures are not absolutely accurate owing to the fluctuations of exchange before the closing of the Indian mints, when the Government accounts were not set forth in sterling as well as in rupee currency. They are, however, sufficiently accurate for purposes of general comparison.

13. *Industrial development.*—The period under review has witnessed a parallel expansion of Indian industry which, if it cannot be quite so exactly measured, is none the less remarkable, and, within the areas to which it is mainly confined, is profoundly affecting the lives and habits of the people. The large textile industries have grown by leaps and bounds. Between 1890–91 and 1911–12 the number of cotton mills, which are chiefly in Indian hands, rose from 125 to 258, and the capital invested in them from  $7\frac{3}{4}$  to just over 15 millions sterling, whilst jute mills, which are chiefly in European hands, rose from 26 to 59, with a corresponding increase of capital. Still more astonishing is the growth in the production of Indian coal, which rose from a little over two million to  $12\frac{3}{4}$  million tons, and the number of workpeople employed in the collieries from 33,000 to 116,000. These are amongst the significant illustrations of a growing industrial activity which is finding a no less healthy outlook in the development of many smaller local industries on modern lines and in the revival of some of the older indigenous arts and crafts by the application of improved methods.

14. *Growth of trade and commerce.*—To the vast increase of Indian agricultural and industrial production and to the enlarged facilities which the state has provided for their distribution, the trade and commerce of India have responded fully. There are no data available to determine the volume of internal trade, but the growth of external trade is easily ascertained. Indian exports were valued in 1887–88 at about 60 millions sterling, and imports at  $43\frac{1}{2}$  millions. In the year 1913–14 the value of exports had increased to 166 millions, and of imports to 127 millions. During the same period the total tonnage of vessels engaged in the foreign trade which entered and cleared at Indian ports rose from about 7 to nearly  $17\frac{1}{2}$  million tons.

15. *Expansion of public and private credit.*—A proportionate expansion of both public and private credit has naturally ensued. The average value of Government currency notes in circulation throughout India in 1890–91 was  $15\frac{1}{4}$  millions sterling; in 1910–11 it was  $36\frac{1}{4}$  millions. In the former year the banks of deposit, exchange, and discount had a capital and reserve of under  $3\frac{1}{2}$  millions sterling and private deposits of  $11\frac{1}{2}$  millions; while in 1911–12 the corresponding figures were nearly  $7\frac{1}{2}$  millions and 40 millions. The exchange banks had deposits in India of just 5 millions in 1890–91, and these had grown by 1911–12 to nearly 19 millions. The joint-stock companies registered in India rose in the same period from 928 to 2,464, and their paid-up capital from  $16\frac{1}{4}$  to  $46\frac{1}{4}$  millions, figures which leave out of account the vast sums invested in India by companies having their registered offices in the United Kingdom. The figures for the Indian savings banks returns are also significant. In 1890–91 there were in round figures 56,000 European and 391,000 Indian depositors in the post office savings bank, the deposits inclusive of interest amounting to just over 2 millions sterling, and the total balance of deposits at the end of the year to under 5 millions. In 1910–11 the number of depositors had grown to 128,000 Europeans and 1,302,000 Indians. The deposits of the year were  $4\frac{1}{2}$  millions and, after withdrawals, the balance of deposits, inclusive of interest, was over 11 millions. In 1890–91 the value of money orders issued and paid was under 11 millions, whereas in 1912–13 it was over  $31\frac{1}{2}$  millions. In every intervening year, even in years of relative depression, there has been continuous increase, amounting in some years to as much as 8 per cent. The co-operative credit societies, which are rendering valuable services to Indian agriculture, also belong entirely to the period now under review, and indeed to the latter part of that period. At the end of 1905–06 there were 283 societies, of which only 37 were urban with some 28,000 members, and a working capital of 31,548*l.* At the end of 1912–13 there were 251 central societies alone. The non-agricultural societies had a membership of 76,000 and a working capital of 380,000*l.*; while the agricultural societies had a membership of 467,000 and a working capital of close on two millions sterling. The total working capital of all the societies was over  $3\frac{1}{2}$  million pounds, and their membership 573,000.

16. *Effect of material development on the condition of the people of India.*—Valuable light on the general effect of this material development on the condition of the people of India has been thrown by the recently issued report of the committee of inquiry which the Government of India appointed to investigate the course of prices during the two previous decades. The conclusion there reached is that a remarkable growth of national prosperity has taken place, which has been accompanied by a rise in prices. This rise in prices has affected adversely the position of all those classes

whose incomes are more or less fixed, but has not meant increasing poverty amongst the wage-earning classes, because it has been accompanied by great advances in wages.\*

17. *Intellectual progress.*—We now turn to the question of the intellectual progress achieved during the same period. In 1888 there were rather less than  $3\frac{1}{2}$  million pupils, of whom 278,000 were females, in about 133,000 state and recognised private institutions throughout India. The corresponding figures for 1912-13 had risen to over 7 millions, of whom nearly 1 million were females. The number of university students had risen likewise from 13,000 to over 40,000. The total expenditure on education from public funds, which amounted in 1888 to little more than  $1\frac{1}{4}$  millions sterling, reached  $5\frac{1}{4}$  millions in 1912-13, and a Government resolution, issued in February 1913, announced a policy of active expansion, particularly in the field of primary education, with the declared object of doubling the number of pupils ( $4\frac{1}{4}$  millions) in the primary schools. Another very striking feature, closely connected with commercial and industrial development, has been the demand of recent years for technical education, which a generation ago was almost entirely confined to the requirements of the legal and medical professions. In 1912 there were 6,205 "special" schools with 180,000 pupils, and 46 professional colleges with over 6,600 students. It is also to be noted that within the decade covered by the census of 1911 literacy in English increased by 50 per cent., and was claimed by nearly  $1\frac{3}{4}$  million persons. These bald figures, however, convey but a very faint impression of the extent to which the spread of western education, despite all its existing deficiencies, has tended not only to enlarge the circle of Indians more or less directly familiar with western thought and western methods, but to break down, however slowly, the barriers which social and religious customs interpose between the different Indian communities and castes as well as between Europeans and Indians. Western

\* In paragraphs 439-446 of the report which was prepared by Mr. K. L. Datta, Fellow of the Royal Statistical Society, the following passages occur :—

"439. There has, undoubtedly, been a real progress, an increase of wealth and a general diffusion of it, in consequence of an increase in the profits of agriculture and a remarkable increase in wages, greater than the cost of living, in almost all parts of India during the period of rising prices. There has, indeed, been a very great increase in the annual income of India. Dr. Marshall defines a country's income as 'the net aggregate of commodities and capital, material and immaterial, including services, produced annually by the labour of the country acting upon its natural resources.' It is beyond all doubt that in recent years there has taken place with the development of the resources of the country and the growth of enterprise on the part of the community as a whole, a very considerable increase in this annual income. A noticeable sign of this improvement is the enormous increase in India's power of absorbing the precious metals and the large expansion of her import trade, all of which are paid for by her produce . . . . Material welfare, as is well known, depends on many factors, such as quantity of food consumed, clothing, housing accommodation, facilities for travel, and other comforts of life, and on the equitable distribution of such means of enjoyment. From this point of view also the material welfare of the country as a whole has increased remarkably, especially during the last 15 years.

"440. India has now to part with much less of her produce than formerly to meet her foreign obligations. The surplus of her produce available for export is now, owing to the rise of prices, very much more valuable than it was 20 or even 10 years ago. India's exports have thus grown considerably in value in consequence of the rise of prices and only a part of this increase goes towards meeting the increased cost of her imports. There has also been a considerable increase in the volume of the imports of almost all classes of goods required for consumption and the increase in the imports of many classes of goods which were formerly considered as luxuries but are now recognised as necessities, bear eloquent testimony to a standard of living which is rising higher and higher with the rise of prices and the material prosperity of the country.

"441. The classes which have benefited from the rise of prices are cultivators and all producers of commodities which have risen in price faster than the cost of production . . . . In every province the price of land has increased and in many parts this increase has been considerable. The labouring classes are better off everywhere, wages having risen much more than the cost of living, and in times of scarcity labour being much more mobile than formerly.

"443. The standard of living among all classes of the population, especially among landholders, traders, and ryots, has increased very considerably in recent years, and extravagance on occasions of marriage and other social ceremonies has seriously increased. The average villager lives in a better house and eats better food than did his father. Brass and other metal vessels have taken the place of coarse earthenware, and the clothing of his family in quality and quantity has improved. We may also say that the increase in passenger miles travelled predicates the existence of spare money to pay for railway fares.

"445. The wage-earners of all classes and in all circles have secured an increase in wages commensurate with the rise in the cost of living. . . . .

"446. In summing up the general conclusion of the effects of the rise of prices on the country as a whole we may agree with Jevons when he says : 'I cannot but agree with Maculloch that, putting out of sight individual cases of hardship, if such exist, a fall in the value of gold must have, and as I should say, has already a most powerfully beneficial effect. It loosens the country, as nothing else could, from its old bonds of debt and habit. It throws increased rewards before all who are making and acquiring wealth. . . . . It excites the active and skilful classes of the community to new exertions and is, to some extent, like what a discharge from his debts is to the bankrupt long struggling against his burdens. All this is effected without a breach of national good faith, which nothing could compensate.'"

education may, indeed, be said to have produced a body of Indian opinion which, through the medium of the English language, has brought the communities of the vast Indian peninsula not only into closer communion of thought amongst themselves, but also into closer contact with the minds of the British people. We need only mention in this connection the Indian national congress. With its political activities we are not concerned. But it brings together periodically from all parts of India a large body of Indians who have been educated on western lines, and whose discussions are conducted in English because it is the only language they all have in common. Founded four years before the Public Services Commission of 1886-87 issued its report, this body has since assumed considerable importance, and in the evidence given before us we have had proof of the influence which it exercises over the public opinion of the educated classes in every quarter of India. Another very significant indication of the stimulating effect of western education is the rapid increase of literary and journalistic activity. In 1890-91 there were only 1,484 printing presses, 547 newspapers, and 330 periodicals, whereas in 1911-12 the totals were 2,851 presses, 659 newspapers and no less than 2,269 periodicals. The number of books published in European languages—the vast majority in English—rose from 664 at the earlier to 1,596 at the later date, and of books published in Indian languages from 6,395 to 9,988. Indians in rapidly growing numbers have gone into the legal profession. But the study of the higher branches of science, for medicine, for engineering, and for other technical purposes, has likewise come into growing repute, whilst the urgent demands for the improvement of industrial and commercial education indicate a realisation of the part which the development of the vast natural resources of India on modern lines must play in the progress of the Indian people. Financial and economic questions have also attracted increasing attention and, as we have already noted, there has been a growing appreciation of the value of organisation especially for agricultural purposes. In a word the value of a liberal education is being more and more widely recognised; more and more men who have made contributions to science and literature, or have achieved distinction in other walks of life, are being produced; and amongst the boons announced at the Delhi durbar during the royal visit to India none was more gratefully appreciated than the promise of a generous grant for educational purposes.

18. *Extent to which the western educated classes represent the masses of the people.*—How far the western educated classes reflect the views or represent the interests of the many scores of millions in India who are still untouched by western influences is a question upon which opinions differ. Even amongst the educated the conflicting traditions of Hindus and Muhammadans are still constantly reflected in their respective attitudes towards social and political questions of the first order, whilst, in addition to this main line of religious cleavage, there are other important communities such as Sikhs, Parsis, Buddhists (chiefly in Burma) and Indian Christians, who are all more or less widely separated from the bulk of the population, either Hindu or Muhammedan. Nor does religion constitute the only line of cleavage. Geographical and climatic as well as social conditions have also helped to preserve down to our own times differences originally imported into India by successive waves of conquest and migration. Of all these considerations it would be unwise not to take cognisance. But it would be equally unwise to ignore that growing body of western educated opinion which is gradually creating a new atmosphere all over India. Even those who most strongly deprecate some of its manifestations realise that it has contributed largely to the great social and religious movements which are aiming at giving a new direction to old beliefs and at harmonising ancient doctrines with the teachings of science. It is reflected in that new sense of unity which is displacing the idea of ordained separation hitherto prevalent in Indian society.

19. *Growth of opportunities for the participation of Indians in public life. Municipalities and district boards.*—Thus in many and different fields of activity the last twenty-five years have witnessed a large increase in the number of Indians qualified to take their part in the affairs of their country. This has been recognised in all branches of public life, municipal, provincial, and imperial. In the municipal sphere the acts of 1883-84, which had themselves greatly altered the constitutional powers and functions of the previous municipal bodies, gave a wide extension to the elective system, with the result that out of a total of 9,642 members 4,890 are now chosen by their fellow citizens, whilst 7,758 are non-officials. The importance of the work done by the municipalities has also increased in recent years. In 1888-89 their income throughout

India amounted to about 2,257,200*l.* compared with 5,012,736*l.* in 1911-12, whilst their expenditure in the former year was about 2,364,200*l.*, and in the latter 4,844,734*l.* There has been, too, a steady advance in the initiation and execution of schemes for water supply and drainage, sometimes financed by loans raised in the local markets. In 1911-12, 961,981*l.* were spent on these works, while the amount now required to pay interest on debt incurred chiefly on such works has risen from about 160,000*l.* in 1888-89 to about 450,000*l.* in 1911-12. Equally encouraging has been the development of district and local boards in rural areas. In 1888-89 the report on moral and material progress in India disposed of the subject in one short paragraph. The figures for 1912-13 showed that there were then 198 district and 533 local boards, and that of their members 4,699 were elected. Their aggregate income amounted to about 3,434,000*l.*, and their expenditure to about 3,303,000*l.* Besides having the care of roads, primary education, water-supply, sanitation, medical help, and markets, some of the boards in Bengal and Madras have developed light railways. In Madras enterprise in this direction has been particularly active and financially most successful.

20. *Development of imperial and provincial councils.*—Still more momentous has been the development of the opportunities for Indian participation in the imperial and provincial legislative councils during the last quarter of a century. The councils act passed in 1892 is a scarcely less notable landmark at the beginning of that period than is the councils act of 1909 at its close. The act of 1892 made possible the enlargement of the Indian legislative bodies and amplified their powers by permitting under restrictions the asking of questions and the discussion of the annual financial statement. As the result of the act of 1909 the councils were again and very considerably enlarged, the numbers being in most cases more than doubled; the elective principle was recognised and freely applied, and the right of introducing resolutions was developed so as to enable members to bring the administration under effective criticism. It was also provided that in the provincial councils the official members should no longer constitute a majority. Only in the imperial legislative council was an official majority preserved. This striking development in the constitutional history of the country has been further emphasised by the appointment of Indian members to the executive councils of the Governor-General and of the local Governments which have a council system of administration.

#### CHAPTER IV.

##### GENERAL STATEMENT OF THE EXISTING PROBLEM.

21. *Progress made in the employment of Indians in the public services.*—We have shown in the preceding chapter the increasing extent to which Indians have been playing a part in various branches of public life. In the public services, however, as will be seen from the figures which we shall quote in detail in a later chapter, the progress achieved by them has been less marked. This position of affairs has been vigorously discussed in India for some years. On the European side the objection is not so much to the larger employment of Indians as to the form in which the demand for their employment is often put forward. It is also claimed that the number of Europeans admitted to the public services is small compared with the area and population of the country, and that the maintenance of British rule has its corollary in the employment of a European element in the more important services. Attention is also drawn by Europeans to the practical necessity of obtaining from Europe recruits for many of the scientific and technical services owing to the lack of educational facilities for producing candidates with the required qualifications in India. Doubt is expressed as to whether there is as yet in India a sufficient supply of young men with the capacity for administration to justify anything more than a slow and cautious advance in the utilisation of an indigenous agency in the highest ranks of the public services, and stress is laid on the point that the maintenance of a high level of efficiency in those services is necessitated by the conditions of government in India. The reply on the Indian side is that Indians are not wanting in the qualities required for administrators and that such deficiency as may have been proved against individuals is largely due to their being persistently relegated to subordinate positions in which those qualities have little chance of being developed. It is urged that even when in theory Indians are supposed to enjoy the same status as their European colleagues, and are often actually performing the same duties, they are

subjected in various ways to differential treatment, and that this produces a galling sense of inferiority, which reacts on the quality of their work. Thus they are practically debarred from admission to the higher branches of certain of the public services, whilst in others they suffer under serious disabilities. They must in some cases proceed to England in order to pass the necessary examinations or to receive the educational training which cannot at present be obtained in India. All this, it is urged, is a breach of the spirit, if not of the letter, of the statute of 1833 (3 & 4 Will. 4, cap. 85), and of Queen Victoria's proclamation of 1858. Indians contend that their familiarity with the peculiarities of Indian character and customs and ways of thought, as well as with the vernacular languages, constitute in the discharge of administrative duties an inherent advantage which hardly any European ever acquires in the same degree. A further point which they urge is that however valuable may be the services of the European official so long as he remains in India, the experience he has acquired is lost to that country as soon as he retires and goes back to Europe; whereas the experience acquired by an Indian official endures in many ways to the benefit of his fellow countrymen even after he has retired from the service. Whilst, therefore, admitting the necessity, on various grounds, of retaining an adequate European element, the Indians hold that the time has come when, if properly qualified, they should be admitted in substantial numbers and on terms of equality with Europeans to the higher as well as to the lower branches of the administration. This, then, is one of the main problems which have been submitted for our consideration. In the nature of things no final solution of it is possible, but in subsequent chapters of this report we have endeavoured to indicate what in our opinion is the most suitable line of advance to meet the situation.

22. *Questions of salary, leave, pension and prospects in the services.*—The other main branch of our inquiry raises less controversial issues, but is of great importance for the well-being and efficiency of the services. It deals with the material problems of salary, leave, pension and prospects generally. This question has of recent years taken an acute form largely owing to the considerable rise of prices which has occurred all over India during the last two decades, and especially since 1905. We have already had occasion to refer in another connection to the report of the committee of inquiry into this subject. This shows that for 13 groups of the principal commodities the general price-level had risen from 100, taken as a basic figure, for 1890 to 1894, to 132 in 1910 and 141 in 1912. "If fluctuations," Mr. Datta writes, "due to famine and other temporary causes be excluded, the general price-level would show a steady increase from an average of 100 in 1890-94 to 137 in the quinquennium 1908-12. The rise has been specially marked since the year 1905. In the quinquennium 1905-09 the general average was 31 per cent. higher, and in the triennium 1910-12, 36 per cent. higher than in the basic period." That this rise must have affected officials with fixed salaries, and particularly those on low salaries, is obvious. This, it was claimed by Europeans, was one of the causes which had contributed to render certain of the Indian public services less attractive to them than before, particularly in view of the fact that conditions of employment in the corresponding services and professions in England had materially improved during the same period. It was also stated that the expenses of travelling to and from India told especially on Europeans, and particularly on those who were married. These grievances were aggravated by the consideration that in almost all ranks the work had grown heavier and that the time available for touring and other opportunities of establishing personal contact with the people of the country had thereby been diminished, thus taking away much of the interest of a life spent in India. European members of the Indian civil service were moreover inclined to grudge the increasing importance of special services as this tended to circumscribe the range and restrict the interest of their own administrative work. Members of the special services, on the other hand, were apt to think that their work received neither sufficient support nor sufficient recognition from members of the Indian civil service. The claims of Indians were equally distinct. They too had been affected by the general rise in prices and they, too, had their own special financial burdens. Moreover, amongst educated Indians new standards of living were gaining general acceptance. Already many of the higher officials had come to live in European style either from preference or because of the obligations imposed upon them by their official position. All officers alike complained of blocks in promotion in several services, whilst there was a general feeling that the problems raised had never been treated as a whole and that steps

were needed to clear away inequalities of treatment as between similar services and similar groups of officers.

23. *Summary.*—We have now set out the general considerations underlying the two main questions which we have had under inquiry; both those relating to the limitations which exist in the employment in the public services of India of non-Europeans, and those concerned with the pay and prospects of the members of those services themselves. We have also given our careful consideration to the other subjects raised by our terms of reference. With regard to all these matters the Indian and the European points of view have been placed fully before us, and if we have not considered it necessary to accept or to reject either of them in their entirety, it is because, in spite of divergencies, which may seem at first sight formidable, there is not, in our opinion, any insuperable antagonism between them. The differences which exist are mainly differences of degree and not of kind, and our object has been to reduce them to a common denominator which, whilst maintaining the high standard of the civil administration of India and safeguarding the paramount interests of British rule, will give adequate satisfaction to the reasonable aspirations of Indians and promote between the two races the goodwill and harmonious co-operation indispensable to good government. We shall explain in detail our recommendations on the various questions under the following main heads:—

Organisation, with special reference to the system of division of services into imperial and provincial (chapter V.);

Methods of recruitment, including the limitations, where they exist, in the employment of non-Europeans (chapter VI.);

Systems of probation and training (chapter VII.);

Conditions of salary (chapter VIII.);

Conditions of service (chapter IX.);

Conditions of leave (chapter X.);

Conditions of pension (chapter XI.);

Summary of recommendations (chapter XII.).

In these chapters we have embodied our findings on the questions which appear to us to be common to all the services or to groups of services. The application of these findings to the various services has been made in annexures to our report, of which we have prepared one for each service, numbered to correspond with the list given in paragraph 2 above. We have also dealt in these annexures with such points of detail peculiar to each service, as have seemed to us worthy of consideration.

## CHAPTER V.

### ORGANISATION.

24. *Position of the services which are not divided into imperial and provincial branches, and recommendation.*—In point of organisation the various services fall for our purposes into two main groups, according as they have imperial and provincial branches or their equivalents, or form single homogeneous units. In the latter category should be placed the post office and the customs, factory and boiler inspection, Indian finance, military finance, geological survey, land records (Burma), mines, mint and assay, pilots (Bengal), telegraph (traffic), railway (management, traffic, locomotive, carriage and wagon, stores), registration, Northern India salt revenue, salt and excise, and survey (Madras) departments. The arrangement by which these services are constituted as single homogeneous units has our approval.

25. *Position of the services which are divided into imperial and provincial branches.*—In the remaining services, that is to say, in the Indian and provincial civil services, and in the agricultural, civil veterinary, education, forest, medical, police, telegraph (engineering), public works, railway (engineering), and survey of India departments there are imperial and provincial branches or their equivalents. The term “provincial,” however, does not always mean the same thing. In certain services the provincial branch has been recruited to do work of a definitely lower order than

that entrusted to the imperial branch. For example, the Indian civil service, which is the imperial branch of the civil services, is organised to carry on the higher work of the civil administration, and its members perform duties of minor importance only as part of their training. For the performance of the duties of minor importance the provincial civil services are constituted, and their members are given work of a higher character only in exceptional cases. This holds good also of the imperial and provincial branches of the police department, and a similar conception runs through the agricultural, civil veterinary and medical services. In the public works department and in the engineering branches of the railway and telegraph departments, on the other hand, a totally different idea prevails. Here the two services are parallel, and the provincial officer does work in no way inferior to that done by his imperial colleague. The names of both are borne on a single list and the seniority of each is determined by the date of his recruitment. The difference of nomenclature connotes merely a difference of pay given to officers recruited in Europe and India respectively. At the same time in the public estimation the term, owing to its use for a different purpose in the case of well-known departments like the provincial civil and police services, has come to carry with it some idea of inferiority. It is particularly inappropriate as applied to the engineering branches of the railway and telegraph departments, which operate over the whole of India, and are under the control of the Government of India and not of the provincial Governments. The position of the education department is somewhat different. Here, theoretically, the same conditions prevail as in the public works department, but there is no joint list of officers, and in practice the provincial branch has drifted into a definitely inferior position, notwithstanding that it contains a number of officers who are doing work of no less importance and value than that done by members of the imperial service. None the less the two services are regarded officially as being of equal status, and provincial officers are not admitted to the imperial service. In the forest and survey of India departments no very clear theory has been enunciated. In practice a proportion, which in the case of the forest department is considerable, of the senior officers of the provincial service is appointed to hold charges equal in responsibility with those held by imperial service officers, and to this extent there are parallel services. But such officers are shown on a separate list, and in the eyes of the public and in the department itself have a distinctly lower status. The remaining members of the provincial branches of these two departments occupy minor posts and are clearly in an inferior position.

26. *Recommendation with regard to the division of services into imperial and provincial.*—Where there is a large body of work of a less important character to be done, though of a kind which cannot be performed by a subordinate agency, it would obviously be extravagant to recruit officers to do it on the terms required to obtain men for a higher class of duty. In such circumstances there must be two services or two classes of one service, and the lower service or class must occupy a position inferior to that of the higher one. These conditions exist in the civil service and in the agricultural, civil veterinary, education, forest, medical, police, and survey of India departments. We recommend, therefore, that lower and higher branches of these services be maintained or constituted over and above the subordinate branches. In the public works department and in the engineering branches of the railway and telegraph departments, on the other hand, the superior duties are performed by one class of superior officers, recruited on a single standard of qualifications. We therefore recommend the amalgamation of the present imperial and provincial sections into a single service. In this way we should achieve an organisation of the services based on the work which they are required to do, and not on the race of, or the salaries drawn by, their members or any such artificial distinction.

27. *Position of officers who are promoted from a lower into a higher service, and recommendation.*—We have dealt, so far, with the main lines of cleavage into imperial and provincial branches. In the services in which promotion takes place from the latter to the former a further distinction may be noticed. In such services the practice ordinarily is to treat the promoted officer as something apart from either branch. In the civil service officers promoted from the provincial branches are appointed to fill only certain specified posts or classes of posts, known as listed posts, and these do not include any of the higher administrative appointments. In the medical department the civil surgeons, who have been promoted from amongst the assistant

surgeons, are shown on separate lists, and in more than one province are relegated to certain of the less popular districts. In the police force promoted deputy superintendents can occupy only a fixed number of superintendships of the second and lower grades. Similarly, in the forest and survey of India departments there is no clear field for promotion for everyone. The officers selected from the provincial service in each case to hold major charges are confined to these charges throughout their careers. We think this arrangement not only indefensible in principle but mischievous in practice. Though the system is applied to all alike without any distinction of race, it is in the nature of things that the bulk of the officers promoted in this manner should be statutory natives of India, and the discrimination exercised to their prejudice is widely misinterpreted. This is the more marked as no such arrangement is found necessary in the case of officers promoted from the subordinate to the provincial services. The practice also tells against efficiency, for, with the lower status, there is a danger that a lower standard will be established, and that individuals will be promoted not so much on the ground of marked capacity as of general worthiness combined with seniority. We recommend generally, therefore, that promoted officers be given in future the same opportunities as officers who have been directly recruited. Both should be shown on the same list and take seniority amongst themselves from their date of entry on the list. Promoted officers should also be eligible on their merits for appointment to any post in their service. Except in the case of the Indian civil service we also propose that all promoted officers be made full members of the service into which they are promoted.

28. *Mixed or borrowed cadres. Position of military officers.*—We turn now to the subject of mixed or borrowed cadres. In the early days of the administration it was a common practice to draw upon the officers of the army for civil work, and the names of military officers are still found in the civil service lists of the Punjab, Burma, the Central Provinces and Berar, and Assam. The practice of recruiting them, however, has now been abolished except in Burma. Similarly, a few such names still appear on the rolls of the police. They are more frequent in the civil veterinary, military finance and assay departments, but in all of these it has recently been decided to employ in future only civilians, and we endorse the wisdom of this decision. We would develop it further and throw the mint department open to all comers, but would not forbid the appointment of a qualified military candidate. We do not think it necessary that the small amount of military recruitment to the civil service in Burma should at once be discontinued, but it should not be extended, and as conditions there develop should be allowed to come to an end. In the medical, public works, railway, and survey of India departments, on the other hand, the military element is introduced not necessarily for the sake of the service itself but for military reasons. Thus the war reserve of officers of the Indian medical service and of the Indian subordinate medical department is utilised in peace time on civil duties, and the civil medical is thus made to depend on the military medical organisation. Similarly the survey of India, though increasingly useful from a civil standpoint, has, as in other countries, primarily a military object. The public works and railway departments for similar reasons also carry a complement of military officers. In so far as the two last-named departments are concerned the military element is so small that it raises no question of principle, and we are agreed that it should be continued. We are also agreed that in view of the nature of the work to be done the survey of India department should continue to have a military element, which, however, should not exceed military requirements. With regard to the medical department, we think that self-contained civil medical departments should be created, but that provision should be made by which military officers will be seconded to them for civil duty in the way that has hitherto been customary in the civil service in the regulation provinces and in the public works department. We have not come to any finding as to the extent to which such seconding should be permitted, as we feel that this can be done only in the light of the experience obtained in the present war. But we have suggested in annexure XII. certain safeguards which will prevent the undue subordination of civil to military interests.

29. *Employment of members of the Indian civil service in other departments.*—It is not, however, only from the army that officers are borrowed. It is also the practice for some of the higher posts in certain departments to be filled by the

transfer of officers from the Indian civil service. This arrangement takes several forms. In the post office and the Northern India salt revenue department members of the Indian civil service are on the ordinary strength of the cadre; in the former as postmasters-general or as the director-general, and in the latter as the commissioner. Both these services are recruited in India, and, though they are now beginning to produce officers fitted for the higher positions, are still in need of a strengthening element. We approve of the existing arrangement, under which officers are obtained for certain of the higher appointments from outside, but we have proposed in annexures XVII. and XXI. such measures as will improve the quality of the recruits to the department. In another group of services, for example, the land records (Burma), registration, salt and excise, and survey (Madras) departments, members of the Indian civil service do not form part of the cadre, but hold posts in their own cadre from which they control the staffs of the departments. In several cases they are only part-time officers. There are also a few posts in the civil service cadres connected with certain of these departments which are training posts for officers who will eventually control the departments. For example, the commissioner of settlements in Burma is commissioner of land records and has a member of his own service in training under him as deputy director of land records. Again, the inspector-general of registration has usually several other minor departments under him, as has the commissioner of excise in certain provinces. Some system of this kind appears to us to be necessary in order to keep the work of the minor services in touch with the general machinery of the administration, and we recommend no change in this respect. Members of the Indian civil service are also employed as directors in the department of agriculture. They do not ordinarily possess the necessary technical knowledge, and we have recommended in annexure I. that the practice of appointing them be discontinued. But in order to provide for the effective organisation and co-ordination of the various agencies concerned with the rural development of the country we have recommended the appointment of a rural commissioner to control the work of the agricultural and civil veterinary departments, the co-operative credit movement, and the measures taken for the improvement of arts and crafts in provinces where effective control is not already or cannot otherwise be provided. These officers should be drawn from the Indian civil service. We have also advised that inspector-generalships of police should no longer be borne on the Indian civil service cadre, not because members of that service do not in the performance of their regular duties obtain experience of police administration, but so as to make it easier to appoint police officers, where anyone duly qualified is available. In this way, if a police officer of suitable standing and experience is fit he will naturally be taken. If not, someone will be borrowed from outside, ordinarily a member of the Indian civil service. There remain the Indian finance and customs departments. Here, apart from the officers recruited in India, it has been customary to employ both officers recruited from Europe and members of the Indian civil service. In the case of the Indian finance department we have recommended that recruitment from Europe be discontinued. This being so, the Indian civil service element should be retained, pending the further development of indigenous talent. We anticipate that a similar course will in time be possible in the customs department. For the present, owing to the large share in the trade of the seaports held by Europeans, we have, for reasons of administrative convenience, recommended the continuance of recruitment both from India and from Europe, as well as from the Indian civil service.

30. *Designation of the services which lie between the higher and the subordinate services.*—We have also considered the question of the designation of the lower services under our revised scheme of classification. The term "provincial," in so far as it is applied to services organized provincially under the various local Governments, is accurate, but the evidence taken by us shows that it is misunderstood, and we recommend that it should not form the official designation of any service. Instead, the name of the province concerned should be utilised: for example, the Madras civil service, the Bombay police service, the Bengal veterinary service, and so on, leaving the term Indian for the higher service as at present. For services under the Government of India, on the other hand, class I. and class II. should be used; for example, class I. and class II. of the survey of India. We would also use these terms in the department of education.

## CHAPTER VI.

## METHODS OF RECRUITMENT.

31. *Place of appointment. Present position.*—In discussing the question of recruitment we shall deal, first, with the place of appointment; secondly, with the limitations which exist in the employment of non-Europeans; thirdly, with the relative advantages of the direct appointment of young men and the promotion of experienced officers from a lower service; and fourthly, with the best means to be adopted for filling the various appointments in the services and the qualifications to be required of the candidates for them. Ordinarily recruitment for the public services of any country might reasonably be expected to take place within its own borders, but the circumstances of British rule in India introduce special considerations in the case of certain services. At present, with the exception of a small number of specialist appointments, recruitment is made in India for the post office and the telegraph (traffic), land records (Burma), railway (stores), registration, Northern India salt revenue, salt and excise, and survey (Madras) departments. On the other hand, in the military finance, geological survey, mines, mint and assay, and railway (locomotive and carriage and wagon) departments it is customary to indent upon Europe for practically the whole of the personnel. In the civil services and the agricultural, civil veterinary, education, forest, medical, police, telegraph (engineering), public works, railway (engineering), and survey of India departments recruits for the imperial branches are obtained ordinarily from Europe, and for the provincial branches or their equivalents ordinarily from India. In the customs, Indian finance, pilots (Bengal), and railway (traffic) departments, which are not organised on an imperial and provincial basis, officers are drawn from both countries in varying proportions. This also holds good in a technical sense with regard to the factory and boiler inspection department, but here the recruitment in India is ordinarily from amongst Europeans temporarily resident in that country, so that in essentials recruitment to this service is wholly from Europe. No question arises as to the management branch of the railway department, as this contains only a few administrative posts which are filled by the most capable officers already in the department.

32. *Place of appointment. Classification of services, and recommendation.*—There is thus considerable disparity of practice. If, however, the services which are recruited in whole or in part from Europe are examined in detail, it will be possible to classify the bulk of them into three main groups. In the first we place the Indian civil service and the police department, in both of which the nature of British responsibility for the good governance of India requires the employment in the higher ranks of a preponderating proportion of British officers. To the second group belong those services in which, on grounds of policy and efficiency, it is desirable that there should be an admixture in the personnel of both western and eastern elements. Such are the education, military finance, medical, telegraph (engineering), public works, railway (engineering and traffic), and survey of India departments. In the third group come certain scientific and technical services, such as the agricultural, civil veterinary, factory and boiler inspection, forest, geological survey, mines, mint and assay, pilots (Bengal), and railway (locomotive and carriage and wagon) departments. In these there are no grounds of policy for any considerable admixture of officers imported from Europe, and all that limits recruitment in India is the lack of facilities in that country for technical instruction and the consequent deficiency of properly qualified officers. There remain the customs and Indian finance departments. In these, also, no considerations of policy appear to exist for going to Europe, and the officers recruited are not required to possess any technical qualifications which are not procurable in India. None the less in the customs department, owing to the large part played by the European non-official community in the trade of the seaports with which this department deals, we think it necessary, as already noted, to continue for the present to recruit in part from Europe. For the finance department, as we have already indicated, recruitment in the future should be made wholly in India. We think, further, that if military considerations do not require that recruitment should be made in Europe, there

is nothing in the nature of the work to be done in the military finance department which officers recruited in India would not be able to perform. For the rest, we accept as suitable the principles underlying the three-fold grouping set out above. In the cases of the Indian civil service and of the police department, and of the other services in which grounds of policy for some recruitment in Europe exist, no general or final solution of the problems involved is possible, and we have confined ourselves to investigating the extent to which appointments should be made in Europe and in India respectively. Towards the third group of services, for which requisition is made on Europe so as to obtain officers with the necessary technical knowledge, our attitude is different. In these, we think that a determined and immediate effort should be made to provide better educational opportunities in India, so that it may become increasingly possible to recruit in that country the staff needed to meet all normal requirements. This will require an initial expenditure of a considerable sum of money, but not probably as much as would at first sight be expected. For instance, up-to-date institutions already exist at Pusa and Dehra Dun which can be utilised for the purposes of the agricultural and forest departments. Large railway workshops are also already in existence to supply the needs of the locomotive and carriage and wagon branches. It is only for the civil veterinary, geological survey, and mines departments that the existing provision is wholly inadequate. In any case the outlay would be more than repaid, not only by the additional facilities which such institutions would give to young men to qualify themselves for direct appointment to the higher branches of the public services, but by the contribution they would make to the industrial progress of the country.

33. *Limitations which exist in the employment of non-Europeans. Explanation of terms used.*—We have dealt so far with the place of appointment without reference to the limitations which exist in the various services in the employment of non-Europeans. Legally the only racial distinction now drawn is between “natives of India” on the one hand and persons who are not “natives of India” on the other. This term is defined in section 6 of the Government of India Act, 1870 (33 Vict. cap. 3), to “include any person born and domiciled within the dominions of Her Majesty in India, of parents habitually resident in India, and not established there for temporary purposes only.” The expression thus covers both Indians and Burmans of unmixed Asiatic descent and members of the domiciled community, whether Europeans or Anglo-Indians. In practice this classification is of value only in those services which are recruited largely in Europe, where the point to be watched is that an excessive number of officers should not be brought in from outside India. In other services it is more important to know the extent to which Indians, including Burmans, of unmixed Asiatic descent, as opposed to persons of mixed or unmixed European descent, are employed under Government. This consideration appears to have weighed with the Government of India when, in 1904, they compiled and issued statistics to show for the years 1867, 1877, 1887, 1897, and 1903 the total number of appointments, and the proportion of appointments, on Rs. 75 a month and upwards held, not according to the distinction of birth and domicile contained in the statute, but according to communities or race. The classification actually adopted was into Europeans, Anglo-Indians, Hindus, and Muhammadans. We have maintained this in essentials for the statistics which we have had prepared for 1913, but in place of Hindus and Muhammadans have shown separately the totals for Brahmans (including Shenvis), Kshatriyas, Kayasthas (including Prabhus), Baniyas and Vaisyas, Sudras, other Hindus, Sikhs, Parsis, Muhammadans, Indian Christians, and Buddhists.\* We have also interpreted the term “non-European” used in our terms of reference as referring primarily to Indians and Burmans of unmixed Asiatic descent. But in making our recommendations with respect to individual services and groups of services we have not lost sight of the fact that Anglo-Indians constitute one of the communities into which the population of India is divided. To cover all persons who are natives of India under the statute of 1870 we have employed the phrase “statutory natives of India.” Where we have used the term Indians we have meant Indians or Burmans of unmixed Asiatic descent, except where the context shows that Burmans are not intended to be included. We would

\* The general figures will be found in volume I., appendices V. and VI. The detailed figures for the Indian and provincial civil services will be found in volume I., appendices VII. and VIII. The detailed figures for the remaining services are given in the appendices to the record of each service.

add that our statistics differ from those issued by the Government of India in 1904 in that they relate only to those services into which we have inquired. We have also started them at a level of Rs. 200 instead of Rs. 75 a month, as it is only at or about this point that European or Anglo-Indian competition begins to make itself felt.

34. *Analysis of the statistics relating to the employment of non-Europeans.*—According to the statistics thus obtained there were on the 1st April 1913, 11,064 officers in receipt of salaries of Rs. 200 a month and over. This figure differs somewhat from that given in paragraph 2 above for the number of officers on whose cases we should come to a definite finding, owing to the fact that we did not adhere rigidly in our inquiry to the Rs. 200 limit of salary, but sought for each service the point at which its higher duties commenced. Thus we have included in our scope the large body of civil and military assistant surgeons who draw salary at rates below Rs. 200 a month on account of the income which it was expected they might obtain from private practice. On the other hand, we have excluded a considerable body of customs officers, and the members of the upper subordinate staffs of the public works, railway, and telegraph departments, many of whom draw Rs. 200 a month or over. We have similarly omitted from our investigations a considerable class of police inspectors, belonging to the subordinate police service, and several members of the education department whose salaries bring them within the range of the statistical tables. This does not, however, vitiate the general accuracy of the position, which is set out in the following statement :—

Department.	Europeans and Anglo-Indians.			Indians and Burmans.	Grand Total.	Percentage of Indians and Burmans to Grand Total.
	Europeans.	Anglo-Indians.	Total.			
1. Agricultural - - - - -	59	3	62	50	112	45
2. Civil veterinary - - - - -	35	3	38	14	52	27
3. Customs - - - - -	104	115	219	27	246	11
4. Education - - - - -	273	61	334	493	827	60
5. Factory and boiler inspection - - - - -	17	4	21	—	21	—
6. Indian finance - - - - -	76	51	127	59	186	32
7. Military finance - - - - -	68	8	76	3	79	4
8. Forest - - - - -	239	62	301	96	397	24
9. Geological survey - - - - -	19	—	19	3	22	14
10. Indian civil service - - - - -	1,305	3	1,308	63	1,371	5
Provincial civil service (executive) - - - - -	54	141	195	1,308	1,503	87
" " " (judicial) - - - - -	2	12	14	915	929	98
11. Land records (Burma) - - - - -	1	38	39	6	45	13
12. Medical (including jail and sanitary) - - - - -	380	142	522	238	760	31
13. Mines - - - - -	5	—	5	—	5	—
14. Mint and assay - - - - -	7	—	7	—	7	—
15. Pilots (Bengal) - - - - -	39	16	55	—	55	—
16. Police - - - - -	821	87	908	450	1,358	33
17. Post office - - - - -	106	39	145	132	277	48
Telegraph - - - - -	162	441	603	61	664	9
18. Public works - - - - -	608	80	688	378	1,066	35
19. Railway - - - - -	330	72	402	45	447	10
20. Registration - - - - -	—	1	1	63	64	98
21. Northern India salt revenue - - - - -	16	15	31	5	36	14
22. Salt and excise - - - - -	110	98	208	130	338	38
23. Survey of India - - - - -	53	100	153	28	181	15
24. Survey (Madras) - - - - -	9	1	10	6	16	38
Total - - - - -	4,898	1,593	6,491	4,573	11,064	42

From this it will be gathered that out of the existing 11,064 appointments on Rs. 200 a month and upwards, only 42 per cent. were held by Indians or Burmans of unmixed Asiatic descent on the 1st April 1913. The percentage held by members of this community also diminishes as the value of the salaries attached to the various appointments rises. Thus, as shown in the following statement, out of 4,984 posts carrying salaries of Rs. 500 a month and upwards, 942, or 19 per cent., were filled by Indians and Burmans, as against 4,042, or 81 per cent., in the hands of Europeans or Anglo-Indians :—

Department.	Europeans and Anglo-Indians.			Indians and Burmans.	Grand Total.	Percentage of Indians and Burmans to Grand Total.
	Europeans.	Anglo-Indians.	Total.			
1. Agriculture - - - - -	50	—	50	—	50	—
2. Civil veterinary - - - - -	31	1	32	—	32	—
3. Customs - - - - -	28	6	34	3	37	8
4. Education - - - - -	215	8	223	45	268	17
5. Factory and boiler inspection - - - - -	12	1	13	—	13	—
6. Indian finance - - - - -	66	47	113	45	158	28
7. Military finance - - - - -	55	8	63	2	65	3
8. Forest - - - - -	183	30	213	26	239	11
9. Geological survey - - - - -	15	—	15	2	17	12
10. Indian civil service - - - - -	1,212	3	1,215	59	1,274	5
Provincial civil service (executive) - - - - -	20	47	67	332	399	83
" " " (judicial) - - - - -	2	2	4	234	236	98
11. Land records (Burma) - - - - -	1	12	13	3	16	19
12. Medical (including jail and sanitary) - - - - -	341	34	375	36	411	9
13. Mines - - - - -	5	—	5	—	5	—
14. Mint and assay - - - - -	7	—	7	—	7	—
15. Pilots (Bengal) - - - - -	32	14	46	—	46	—
16. Police - - - - -	488	19	507	28	535	5
17. Post office - - - - -	32	9	41	5	46	11
Telegraph - - - - -	71	8	79	9	88	10
18. Public works - - - - -	471	22	493	85	578	15
19. Railway - - - - -	257	42	299	19	318	6
20. Registration - - - - -	—	1	1	3	4	75
21. Northern India salt revenue - - - - -	5	2	7	—	7	—
22. Salt and excise - - - - -	32	13	45	5	50	10
23. Survey of India - - - - -	53	22	75	1	76	1
24. Survey (Madras) - - - - -	7	—	7	—	7	—
Total - - - - -	3,691	351	4,042	942	4,984	19

Similarly, out of the 2,501 posts carrying salaries of Rs. 800 a month and upwards, Indians and Burmans, as shown in the following statement, held 242, or 10 per cent., as against 2,259, or 90 per cent., filled by Europeans or Anglo-Indians :—

Department.	Europeans and Anglo-Indians.			Indians and Burmans.	Grand Total.	Percentage of Indians and Burmans to Grand Total.
	Europeans.	Anglo-Indians.	Total.			
1. Agricultural - - - - -	30	—	30	—	30	—
2. Civil veterinary - - - - -	13	—	13	—	13	—
3. Customs - - - - -	10	—	10	1	11	9
4. Education - - - - -	90	1	91	2	93	2
5. Factory and boiler inspection - - - - -	2	—	2	—	2	—
6. Indian finance - - - - -	47	26	73	16	89	18
7. Military finance - - - - -	30	—	30	—	30	—
8. Forest - - - - -	120	2	122	6	128	5
9. Geological survey - - - - -	6	—	6	1	7	14
10. Indian civil service - - - - -	741	2	743	29	772	4
Provincial civil service (executive) - - - - -	6	7	13	36	49	73
" " " (judicial) - - - - -	2	2	4	75	79	95
11. Land records (Burma) - - - - -	—	2	2	—	2	—
12. Medical (including jail and sanitary) - - - - -	218	10	228	9	237	4
13. Mines - - - - -	4	—	4	—	4	—
14. Mint and assay - - - - -	7	—	7	—	7	—
15. Pilots (Bengal) - - - - -	20	11	31	—	31	—
16. Police - - - - -	262	4	266	3	269	1
17. Post office - - - - -	25	—	25	2	27	7
Telegraph - - - - -	51	1	52	3	55	5
18. Public works - - - - -	247	15	262	45	307	15
19. Railway - - - - -	155	17	172	11	183	6
20. Registration - - - - -	—	1	1	1	2	50
21. Northern India salt revenue - - - - -	2	1	3	—	3	—
22. Salt and excise - - - - -	18	2	20	2	22	9
23. Survey of India - - - - -	43	2	45	—	45	—
24. Survey (Madras) - - - - -	4	—	4	—	4	—
Total - - - - -	2,153	106	2,259	242	2,501	10

In some of the services, such as the forest, telegraph (engineering), public works, and railway (engineering) departments, the figures for the posts carrying salaries of Rs. 800 a month and upwards need, to a certain extent, to be discounted by the fact that lower rates of salary are in force for Indians and Burmans. Certain high offices, such as memberships of executive councils and high court judgeships, other than those reserved for members of the Indian civil service, to which Indians in increasing numbers have been appointed in recent years, have also been excluded from the statistics. It is also true that, as compared with 1887, there has been an advance from 34 to 42, from 12 to 19, and from 4 to 10 per cent. in the three groups, as will be seen from the following table. But in view of the progress made by the country in the interval this appears to us to be inadequate.

	Europeans and Anglo-Indians.			Indians and Burmans.	Grand Total.	Percentage of Indians and Burmans to Grand Total.
	Europeans.	Anglo-Indians.	Total.			
Officers drawing Rs. 200 and over :—						
1887 - - - - -	4,836	1,001	5,837	3,003	8,840	34
1913 - - - - -	4,898	1,593	6,491	4,573	11,064	42
Officers drawing Rs. 500 and over :—						
1887 - - - - -	3,163	83	3,246	427	3,673	12
1913 - - - - -	3,691	351	4,042	942	4,984	19
Officers drawing Rs. 800 and over :—						
1887 - - - - -	1,637	7	1,644	77	1,721	4
1913 - - - - -	2,153	106	2,259	242	2,501	10

35. *Means to be adopted for extending the employment of non-Europeans. Objections to state scholarships and to fixing definite proportions for Indians.*—We have considered very carefully how best to find a remedy for this condition of affairs. One of the suggestions made to us was to grant state scholarships to promising young men to go to Europe to qualify themselves for the services which are there recruited. At present the scholarships given by the state are of three kinds. In the first place, young men who have shown proficiency in oriental learning are given financial assistance to enable them to go to Europe and there get into touch with the best-known teachers in their own special subjects. Again, efforts are made through this means to get young Indians to study technical subjects like weaving, mining, or metallurgy with a view to developing industrial enterprise on their return to India. Such a system has certain advantages in the earlier stages of a country's development, and there is still scope for it to-day in India. But it should be recognised that it is more profitable to spend money on indigenous institutions with a view to equipping them on a scale which will make India self-supporting in this respect. The third kind of state scholarship is that now enjoyed by the Indian government scholars, two of whom are appointed each year on the nomination of the universities with a view to facilitating the education in Europe of the most promising young men in India. Several of these have found their way into the public services, but we hesitate to recommend the extension of the system in any general form for purely service purposes, both because of the objection of principle to the employment of state funds for the benefit of individuals, and also of the misunderstandings to which it must give rise. However many warnings may be issued, a young man sent to Europe at an early age with such a mark of recognition naturally tends to regard himself, and to be regarded, as having received the promise of employment, and this becomes embarrassing at the stage of actual appointment when he does not come up to expectation. It is also a hardship to the scholar himself when this failure is due to lack of ability and to no fault of his own. We have also gone into a proposal to fix for every service in which the question arises a definite minimum number or proportion of places to be reserved for Indians. This at first sight appears a simple solution, and we have adopted it as a temporary palliative in a few of the services recruited in India in which technical qualifications are not needed, and where Indians are clearly not being employed in sufficient numbers. We have, however, avoided it as a universal measure, partly because of the general undesirability of proportions based on race, but mainly because we recognise the tendency of a minimum to become a maximum, and wish to establish nothing which will prevent qualified Indians, where available, from being appointed in any number on their merits.

36. *Measures recommended for extending the employment of non-Europeans.*—

We have accordingly dismissed the idea of any single solution of the problem and have attacked it in detail in the various annexures to our report. Speaking generally, however, in the services in which we contemplate that recruitment will be made partly in Europe and partly in India we have indicated approximately the representation which we wish to see given to the European and non-European elements by the proportions which we have allotted as suitable to each country. Thus, in the Indian civil service, which with the police department we have placed separately in our first group as likely to require for many years to come a preponderating proportion of British officers, we have proposed that roughly three-quarters of the superior posts be recruited for in England and one-quarter in India. It is true that Indians will be eligible for appointment in England as well as in India, whilst all statutory natives of India, whether Europeans, Anglo-Indians, or Indians, will be eligible in India. But in the nature of things the bulk of the candidates successful in England will be Europeans, and in India Indians. We have followed a similar procedure for regulating the number of non-European members in the services contained in our second group, in which we do not contemplate that Europeans will continue indefinitely to hold a preponderating share. In the public works and railway (engineering) departments, for example, we have proposed that provision be made for obtaining half of the staff from India. Again, in the education department we have recommended that the posts of a superior character now in the provincial service be combined with those now in the imperial service into a class I. of a new service, and that to the extent of the cadre so formed recruitment be made in India and in England in the proportion which the element promoted from the provincial service bears to the element taken from the old imperial service. As the department grows with the creation of new posts we have proposed a half-and-half distribution of the additional appointments over the two countries. On the other hand, in the services included in our third group which are now recruited in Europe through the lack of educational facilities in India we have recommended, wherever possible, the immediate provision of such opportunities as will secure in due time an adequate number of officers from India to meet the normal requirements of those departments. This, as already explained, will necessitate the creation or expansion of various technical institutions. In order that these may attract from the first a good class, we think it desirable that an undertaking should be given that not less than half of the recruits each year will be chosen from amongst those students who have most distinguished themselves, provided that, in the opinion of the selection committee, or other responsible authority, their work has been such as to justify their appointment. We have also proposed changes of organisation in certain departments, which will lead to the increased employment of non-Europeans. In the public works and railway (engineering) departments in particular we have not only recommended an increase in the proportion of vacancies to be filled in India, but have also sensibly reduced the European element by diminishing the period of service in the grade of assistant engineer through which all officers are obliged to pass. We have also endeavoured to secure the due consideration of the claims of Indians by advising for several services that all vacancies be advertised, whilst we have provided that there shall be Indian representation on the committees which, as we shall explain later, we desire to see created to advise on the selection of direct recruits in those services in which appointment is to be made by nomination. Finally, we lay stress on the desirability of keeping up to date the statistics relating to the employment of members of the various communities in the higher branches of the public services. These should be reissued every ten years after such readjustment as is necessary to preserve their significance. We attach importance to this, as we believe that in the long run the surest security for the employment of a due number of Indians lies in publicity and in the watchfulness of the representatives of their interests in the various legislative councils.

37. *Relative merits of direct recruitment of untried officers and the promotion of selected officers from an inferior service.*—The next question with which we have to deal concerns the relative merits of the direct recruitment of untried officers and of the promotion of selected officers from the ranks of an inferior service. Here again it is difficult to find any general solution. At present in the services in which technical qualifications are required a large measure of direct appointment already prevails; for example, in the agricultural, civil veterinary, education, factory and boiler inspection, geological survey, mines, mint and assay, pilots (Bengal), telegraph (engineering), public works and railway (engineering) departments. In certain other services or

branches of services, where the higher work of supervision demands a more intimate experience of the duties of the lower branches—for example, amongst the postmasters in the post office and in the telegraph (traffic) and registration departments—the predominant note is promotion from below. This feature is also present in some of the services recruited in India, like the salt and excise departments, but in this group a tendency towards a half-and-half distribution has been manifested in those services which, like the provincial police department, have come under reorganisation in recent years. As worked hitherto the chief complaint made against the system of promotion from below has been that officers have been promoted at so late a stage in their careers that they have been unable in the ordinary course to reach the higher administrative posts before the time for their retirement. This has created discontent in that necessarily nearly all such officers must be statutory natives of India. Whilst this may not be a valid objection against such a system when it is designed as a special reward for a few distinguished members of a lower service towards the end of their careers, it militates against its utility where it is, if not the sole, at any rate the main, method of recruitment in India to the higher service. Complaint is also made that the officers so selected have often found it difficult to adapt their outlook to their new positions of responsibility after long service in an inferior position. On the other hand, the advantages of recruiting tried men are obvious, whilst it would be impossible to keep any inferior service contented or efficient which had not some outlet of promotion for those who proved their merits. In dealing, therefore, with the problems of each service we have endeavoured to strike a balance between these two methods, but in every case have aimed at securing that young men shall have adequate opportunities. Ordinarily we have arranged for this by providing for some measure of direct recruitment, and, as explained in detail in the various annexures, have favoured an extension of this method wherever possible. Where, however, for special reasons, as in the police department, we have preferred to rely in India mainly on promotion from below, we have recommended the selection from the lower service of young men of promise as well as of meritorious officers of mature experience. In this way ordinarily more than one avenue of approach will be opened up to the superior services. It is in a variety of opportunity that we see the best hopes for success. In matters of this sort the way of safety lies not in adhering rigidly to one rule, but in developing on different lines, and leaving it to the future to work out what is best suited to the changing conditions of the country.

38. *Means to be adopted for filling the various appointments in the services.*—We now turn to the question of the best means to be adopted for filling the various appointments in the services, and the qualifications to be required of the candidates for them. In so far as officers promoted from a lower service are concerned no special remarks are needed. The Government, or other responsible authority, should be allowed, as now, to select the best men available. In the case of direct recruits the alternatives suggested to us have been competitive examination on the one hand, and nomination on the other. The former has been pressed upon us as having the advantage of securing the widest field of candidates and absolute impartiality in their selection. In favour of the latter has been urged the power which it gives of allowing for qualities in applicants which can only imperfectly be tested by a literary examination; such as common sense, resolution, and resourcefulness. We are satisfied that one or other of these methods, or some combination of the two, presents the only course possible, and shall therefore examine them in the light of experience and explain the conditions in which they can most suitably be employed.

39. *Competitive examinations. Experience in England.*—Experience of the competitive system has been obtained principally in England. Two important branches of the Indian administration, the Indian civil service and the Indian police service, are now recruited by an open competitive examination held in London, and a similar method is followed in the case of the Indian medical service. Moreover, since the abolition of the system of purchase, commissions in the army in England have ordinarily been given upon the results of such a test. Since 1870 also the British civil service, to the extent, directly or indirectly, of 20,000 posts, has been recruited in this manner. The results of these arrangements have been encouraging. The Indian civil service has achieved a distinction equal to that of any other service in the world. The Indian medical service has a widely established reputation. The Indian police service, we were told in India, has been much improved, though how far this is to be ascribed to the merits of competition itself,

and how far to the abolition of the specially unsatisfactory form of nomination which preceded it in this service, is a point on which full agreement has not been reached. Again, those branches of the army in which the element of competition is strongest, such as the Royal Engineers and the Royal Artillery, occupy a high place in public esteem. To the beneficial effect of competition upon the English civil service, the Royal Commission presided over by Lord MacDonnell has recently given emphatic testimony.\*

40. *Reasons for the success of the competitive system in England.*—If, however, the conditions under which the competitive system has achieved success in England are analysed it will be found that, where the best results have been obtained, they have been got by arrangements which have secured for the service of the state the best products of the educational system of the country; for example, by holding the examinations for entry to the services at times which coincide with the termination of definite stages in the educational courses of the candidates, and by basing them upon the curricula of the schools and colleges at which the bulk of the young men of the country have been trained. It will also be observed that England is a country in which facilities for education are sufficiently widespread and sufficiently used to permit all classes from which good public servants are likely to be forthcoming to compete. The reasons why such conditions must exist to make competitive examinations a success are not far to seek. Conformity with the regular educational machinery of the country is desirable, partly because under such conditions a larger number of candidates will be forthcoming than would be the case if the examination required special preparation, but mainly because a well-organised school or university course is the most likely means of producing the mental and moral characteristics which are required in a public servant. Such courses have an educative value much superior to that acquired during a course of special preparation, because in every good school and university there are formative influences, both inside and outside the class-rooms, which help to mould and develop character. A high general level of education throughout the country is also necessary, because without it certain classes will be excluded from the public services, and where this takes place they have a legitimate ground of complaint against the state; whilst the public services are the poorer by the exclusion from effective competition of every individual who might become a valuable officer.

41. *Competitive examinations. Experience in India.*—We now turn to the case of India. Here competitive examinations have had a more chequered career than in England. The Public Services Commission of 1886–87 tentatively recommended their introduction for the executive branches of the civil services “wherever the Government of India thinks it not inexpedient.” The system was accordingly tried, but it was abandoned after a short experience. The only province in which any form of competition still prevails for the provincial civil services at the present day is in the Punjab, where out of the total number of candidates annually recruited two are appointed on the results of a competitive examination among nominated candidates. We gathered that certain sections of Indian opinion were not satisfied that the system had been abandoned for good reasons, but it is easy to see why it failed to satisfy the Government. The development of education in India has not yet been such as to satisfy the second condition which we have recognised as necessary to the success of the competitive system. In the last generation English education has been greatly extended in India, but this extension has been made irregularly in the different provinces, as will be seen from the figures which we have given in detail in appendix X. to volume I. of our report. This consideration is of importance in the

\* After tracing the development of the competitive system of recruitment for the civil service the majority report concludes as follows (*Fourth report—Cd. 7338 of 1914—chapter III., paragraph 8 page 31*):—

“With the progress of this development the efficiency of the service has grown until at the present time the state possesses a body of public officers who are far more competent and zealous than their predecessors, appointed under the regime of patronage, are stated on official authority to have been. We have no doubt whatever that to this highly satisfactory result the system of competitive examination has mainly contributed. The system has, in our opinion, entirely justified the expectations of its originators. It is true that it has never been, and is not now, exempt from hostile criticism, and we do not affirm that the written examination is an infallible or a final test of the best results of education. But the defects attaching to the system, which we shall in due place examine, are, perhaps, susceptible of some mitigation. In existing political conditions, and in such developments of them as can be reasonably anticipated, we believe that the advantages of the system of competitive examination as a means of recruitment for the civil service far outweigh any defects which have come to our notice, and we are convinced of the importance not only of adhering to the system, but of extending it whenever possible.”

imperial departments, which operate over the whole of India, as it is desirable that each portion of the country should obtain adequate representation in the public services. English education has also been diffused unequally among the different communities. It has spread more rapidly in those which have had from early days an hereditary association with learning. Other classes, of which the Muhammadans are the largest, are still backward in this respect. As long as these conditions prevail the result of recruiting by means of competitive examinations alone must be to exclude from the public services important sections of the Indian population. It should also be noted that the first condition which we have laid down is only partially satisfied in India. The Anglo-Indian community, from which a considerable number of public servants has been drawn in the past, has special schools of its own which follow a curriculum differing materially from that followed in the ordinary schools and colleges affiliated to the universities of the country. We were also told by some witnesses that the course of an Indian school or college did not give the same guarantee of the moulding and development of character as is afforded by English schools and colleges. The view was further expressed in many quarters that there were already more examinations in India than was good for the development of true education.

42. *Recommendations with regard to the competitive system.*—To estimate the value of these last-mentioned criticisms would have entailed a minute examination of the whole educational system of India, which we were not authorised to undertake, and we therefore offer no finding on this point. We also realise that the arguments against competitive examinations, which we have developed above, are valid only in the present condition of education in India. When schools and colleges there are improved, and when education is more equally diffused among all communities, it may well be possible to introduce a system of competitive examinations in India with the same good results as in England, particularly in those services in which a large number of appointments have to be filled, and where the candidates are young, and general ability rather than special qualifications are required. Meanwhile we are of opinion that, whilst competitive examinations should ordinarily be continued where they are now held, the time is not yet ripe for the general adoption of any such system. We shall deal with the possibilities of this method in relation to particular services, and especially to the civil services, in the appropriate annexures.

43. *Recruitment by nomination.*—We now turn to the consideration of recruitment by nomination. In England nomination suffers in popular esteem from the abuses of the past, when it was often synonymous with nepotism. In India official patronage has been free from this sort of reproach, but a suspicion undoubtedly exists that individual officers are swayed by personal prejudices against, or prepossessions for, particular classes of the community. It is also urged that the officer with whom nomination now lies is often not in touch with the educational centres of the country, and that in consequence he often fails to make the vacancies in his department widely known in the circles from which a large field of candidates could be drawn. A system of nomination, it is also urged, encourages a spirit of servility among the applicants, and is at the root of the prevailing hunting for certificates which every self-respecting Indian, anxious for the maintenance and development of a spirit of manly independence in the youth of his country, now denounces. But, even in India, all forms of nomination do not appear to be equally open to this criticism. Nomination was favoured for recruitment to the education department and to the higher judiciary from the bar, and was not called in question in several of the departments in which officers are enrolled at a mature age because they possess certain technical qualifications. In England also we observed that a system of selection with the advice of a committee, which is a form of nomination, had recently been developed by the Secretary of State for India to assist him in the exercise of his patronage in services recruited in whole or in part from Europe.\* This kind of nomination, which is also in force in Madras in connection with recruitment of deputy superintendents for the police service of that presidency, has met with a large measure of acceptance.

44. *Recommendations with regard to recruitment by nomination.*—We therefore conclude that, though recruitment by nomination is liable to certain abuses, it may afford an effective method of admitting officers to the public services, provided that safeguards are introduced to secure, first, that the impartiality of the selecting

\* Volume I., Appendix IX.

agency is above challenge; secondly, that publicity is given to the vacancy to be filled, in order that a large field of candidates may be secured; thirdly, that the credentials of the candidates are submitted to expert scrutiny; fourthly, that outside pressure is not brought to bear on the authorities responsible for making the choice; and, fifthly, that all recruits possess a minimum educational qualification. We accordingly recommend that, as a general rule, where vacancies are to be filled by nomination in any department in India, a selection committee be formed, containing an official majority, to advise the Government or other appointing authority. These committees should not be purely departmental in character, but should contain persons in touch with educational institutions, and should have a non-official and an Indian element. Moreover they should be responsible for giving publicity to the vacancies as they occur by advertisement in the papers, by application to the appointments boards of the various universities, where such exist, and by any special measures which may seem appropriate in each case. The committees should interview all likely candidates and place them in order of merit with reference both to their educational career and to the impression which they have created at their interview, and it should be a definite instruction to them to count against any candidate any attempt made to secure on his behalf, through the medium of certificates or otherwise, the goodwill of any individual member of the committee. As regards the procedure in England we approve of the continuation on its present basis of the arrangement which, as explained above, now prevails there, but think that there too an Indian element should be added to each committee. We would also lay down that the representative on the committee of the department in each case should not have left India for more than five years. We have suggested in the annexures for most of the services which are recruited in India from candidates not possessing technical qualifications the further safeguard of a minimum educational qualification. This need not be identical for all candidates, but the standard should be the same, and there should be no question of young men being appointed who have passed no examination, solely because they belong to a particular community. In the provincial civil services (executive side), and the post office (superintendents), the salt and excise and such-like departments, we have suggested as a suitable test the degree of a university or an examination of a corresponding standard to be prescribed by Government for the European schools. The only exceptions we have made to this have been in educationally backward provinces, such as Burma, where it will take time to work up to this level.

45. *Recruitment of specialists.*—Finally we desire to lay stress on the importance of recognising in every service, in which there are duties of a specialist character to be performed, the possibility and even the desirability of looking outside as well as inside the ranks of the service when making appointments. This appears to us to be particularly expedient in cases in which there is a considerable supply of qualified candidates available who have achieved distinction in a non-official capacity. These conditions exist, for example, in the education and medical departments and on the judicial side of the Indian civil service, and we have explained in the annexures concerned the extent to which we recommend that this method of recruitment be followed in each case.

46. *Communal representation in India.*—There remains the cognate question of communal representation as amongst the various communities in India. The figures\* for all appointments carrying salaries of Rs. 200 a month and over on 1st April 1913 are exhibited in the two following tables, designed to show separately the percentages, according as Anglo-Indians are or are not included.

Table I.—*Inclusive of Anglo-Indians.*

	Number of posts.	Percentage of posts.
Brahmans (including Shenvis) -	1,455	24
Kshatriyas - - - - -	220	3
Kayasthas (including Prabhus) - -	725	12
Baniyas and Vaisyas - - - - -	218	3
Sudras - - - - -	154	2
Other Hindus - - - - -	427	7
Total Hindus - - -	3,199	51

\* Volume I., Appendix V. A. (ii).

	Number of posts.	Percentage of posts.
Brought forward - - -	3,199	51
Sikhs - - - - -	67	1
Parsis - - - - -	159	3
Muhammadans - - - -	771	13
Indian Christians - - -	179	3
Buddhists - - - - -	198	3
Anglo-Indians - - - -	1,593	26
Grand total - - -	6,166	100

Table II.—Exclusive of Anglo-Indians.

Brahmans (including Shenvis) -	1,455	32
Kshatryas - - - - -	220	5
Kayasthas (including Prabhus) -	725	16
Baniyas and Vaisyas - - - -	218	5
Sudras - - - - -	154	3
Other Hindus - - - - -	427	9
Total Hindus - - -	3,199	70
Sikhs - - - - -	67	1
Parsis - - - - -	159	4
Muhammadans - - - -	771	17
Indian Christians - - -	179	4
Buddhists - - - - -	198	4
Grand total - - -	4,573	100

We have not found it possible to show exactly the population figures for all the foregoing communities, nor yet the extent to which their members are literate and literate in English. But assuming that all Europeans and Anglo-Indians are literate in English, and that the balance of persons returned as literate Christians and Christians who are literate in English are Indian Christians, and including Jains with Hindus, the position for the main communities according to the census of 1911 is as shown in the following tables:—

	Population.			Percentage of population in each class to grand total.		
	Total	Literate.	Literate in English.	Total.	Literate.	Literate in English.

Table I.—Inclusive of Anglo-Indians.

Hindus - - - - -	218,835,074	12,380,649	1,050,494	72	68	72
Sikhs - - - - -	3,014,466	201,443	11,728	1	1	1
Parsis - - - - -	100,096	71,213	33,681	—	—	2
Muhammadans - - - -	66,647,299	2,527,573	179,991	22	14	12
Indian Christians - - -	3,574,770	*539,432	*63,801	1	3	4
Buddhists - - - - -	10,721,453	2,451,719	23,150	4	13	2
Anglo-Indians - - - -	101,657	*101,657	*101,657	—	1	7
Grand total - - -	302,994,815	18,273,686	1,464,502	100	100	100

Table II.—Exclusive of Anglo-Indians.

Hindus - - - - -	218,835,074	12,380,649	1,050,494	72	68	77
Sikhs - - - - -	3,014,466	201,443	11,728	1	1	1
Parsis - - - - -	100,096	71,213	33,681	—	—	2
Muhammadans - - - -	66,647,299	2,527,573	179,991	22	14	13
Indian Christians - - -	3,574,770	*539,432	*63,801	1	3	5
Buddhists - - - - -	10,721,453	2,451,719	23,150	4	14	2
Grand total - - -	302,893,158	18,172,029	1,362,845	100	100	100

\* These are assumed figures.

We have already explained, when dealing with the figures for Europeans and Anglo-Indians on the one hand and Indians and Burmans on the other, the steps which we think should be taken to secure that in future a larger number of persons of unmixed Asiatic descent shall be recruited. Concerning the distribution of posts as amongst Indians and Burmans themselves much evidence was placed before us, and stress was laid on the importance of this matter. In our opinion the changing conditions of India render any hard and fast rule as to proportions unsuitable. Moreover, if the measures which we have recommended in the foregoing paragraphs are carried out, they will suffice to meet the situation. Under the carefully safeguarded system of nomination proposed it will rest with the Government, where the qualifications of candidates are adequate, to utilise their powers to give representation to all legitimate interests.

## CHAPTER VII.

### SYSTEMS OF PROBATION AND TRAINING.

47. *Probation.*—In most of the services included in our inquiry it is the practice to appoint officers who have been directly recruited on probation. This is as it should be, and we advise that a similar provision be introduced into all the departments, whether recruited in England or in India, where it does not exist at present. Except where otherwise stated in the annexures, two years should suffice for this purpose. In certain services candidates, after a preliminary selection, used to be made to undergo a special course of preparation for their duties under Government supervision, and were finally appointed only when they had become fully qualified. This practice was commoner than it now is in the days when the educational institutions of the United Kingdom did not specialise in technical subjects. In recent years the tendency has been to take advantage of existing facilities and to go into the open market for the personnel required. Thus the Royal engineering college at Coopers Hill was abandoned, and the system now survives only in the Indian civil and Indian forest services. Schools of forestry, however, have now been set up at the leading universities, and before long it should be possible to draw wholly on their students for Indian purposes in so far as it may be necessary to recruit in Europe. We have accordingly recommended that these schools should be utilised to the extent now possible, but pending the development of an adequate field have advised the maintenance of the existing system of probation for forest officers as a supplementary measure. We consider, however, that this condition of affairs will itself be transitional, and we look forward eventually to meeting the normal requirements of the forest department in India from the improved and enlarged school at Dehra Dun, and we have made in annexure VIII. special recommendations to enable officers recruited in India to receive practical training in European forests. In the case of the Indian civil service a period of probation in the United Kingdom under Government control will always be necessary. We have explained in detail in annexures VIII. and X. how the probationary period in these two services should be spent. Speaking generally, our aim has been to give a more pronounced orientation to the probationary course so as to afford officers a better equipment for their life's work. For the Indian civil service we have recommended a probationary course extending over three years, and specially devised to prepare the probationer for his future Indian career, and more particularly for the important legal work which he will be called upon to perform. This course should be taken at a university, and should be sufficiently broad in scope and conception to fulfil the essentials of a liberal education.

48. *Training.*—Generally speaking we are satisfied that due attention is being paid to the important question of the training of young officers for their duties. Officers of the Indian civil and Indian forest services and of other services which have major and minor charges, for example, the Indian police and public works departments, are trained in the minor until they are fitted for the major charges. We think this suitable, but would lay stress on the importance of not employing a young officer at once on routine duties. A period should be allowed to lapse in each case during which recruits should receive definite training, and pending this they should ordinarily not be regarded as available for employment. In services like the geological survey, factory and boiler inspection, medical, salt and excise, and education departments, which are not organised on a basis of major and

minor charges, a grade of probationers is sometimes provided, but as a rule recruits commence their work without any initial preparation and acquire their experience whilst performing their duties. All that is required of them is to pass some departmental test and to qualify as necessary in the vernacular of their province. In cases in which the present system has appeared to us to be open to objection we have proposed either the creation of a grade of probationers, as in the local police services and other departments recruited in India, or of minor charges. For the rest the only recommendation of a general character which we desire to make is in favour of inter-provincial conferences of officers responsible for the training of recruits. More good can be done by letting the men on the spot see each other's methods than by any elaboration at one centre of the present codes of instruction.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### CONDITIONS OF SALARY.

49. *Principles on which salaries should be calculated.*—In paragraph 22 of our opening remarks we have referred to the extraordinary rise which has taken place in prices in recent years, and especially since 1905. This has affected all classes of public servants in India, and particularly those in receipt of the lower salaries, with the result that a demand has been made for a general increase of emoluments. It is obvious that such a demand has not the same force in the case of services in which salaries have been increased during the period of the rise in prices. In not a few departments the scales of remuneration had only just been revised when they were submitted for our consideration. In other cases this step has been taken whilst we ourselves in pursuance of the terms of our reference have been recording or considering the evidence on the subject. It would, indeed, be difficult to unravel the extent to which such readjustments have taken place. Except in so far as they have taken the form of exchange compensation allowance they have, as a rule, been piecemeal in character, and have been spread over many years and through many ramifications. Nor is it necessary that such calculations should be made, as they depend ultimately on the assumption that salaries should be kept at the same level for all time irrespective of the operation of the law of supply and demand. Such a position is untenable. The only safe criterion is that Government should pay so much and so much only to their employés as is necessary to obtain recruits of the right stamp, and to maintain them in such a degree of comfort and dignity as will shield them from temptation and keep them efficient for the term of their service. Whilst, therefore, we have noted the rise in prices which has taken place, we have not based on this any general recommendation. Where we have advised changes of salary it has been to meet inequalities of remuneration prejudicial to efficiency, to fulfil expectations reasonably founded on formal announcements made by Government, and to improve recruitment, where the existing terms have been shown to be insufficient to obtain a satisfactory personnel.

50. *Defects of the graded system of remuneration.*—But, though we have not advised any general increase of salary, we have been struck by the difficulties connected with the payment of salaries under what is known as the graded system. Under this there are so many officers of each class in the first grade on a certain rate of pay, so many in the second on something less, and so many in the third, and so on, on something less again in each case. Increase of salary without change of duties is obtained as vacancies occur in the higher grades and officers in the lower ones are promoted to fill them. In most of the services, in which this system is in force, this step is given only when a permanent vacancy occurs, but members of the Indian civil service are entitled in leave and other temporary vacancies to draw a portion of the difference between the pay fixed for the grade in which they are permanent and that in which they happen to be officiating. This system conflicts with the interests of Government in that it leads to constant manipulation of the numbers in the various grades to mitigate blocks as they occur in the flow of promotion. This tends to conceal what is being done in the matter of salaries and so weakens financial control. The arrangement is also productive of constant correspondence about the various cadres, which not only wastes time but has an unsettling effect on the minds of officers. It is also unduly extravagant when the cadres for any reason become depleted, as happened in the Indian civil service in the nineties of last century. Moreover, the system is wholly unsuited either to a growing service or to one which has been newly formed.

As an example of the former reference can be made to the post office, where every new post created has involved uncalled-for additional expense by increasing proportionately the number of appointments to be placed in the higher grades. As an instance of the latter the provincial police service is in point. Here in some provinces the top grades, which were intended for officers at the end of their careers, were filled up at once on the formation of the new cadres. This was not only extravagant in itself but has set a wrong standard of expectations in the department. The system is also unpopular with the bulk of the officers, and concrete instances were quoted to us to show how embarrassing it is, and to what complications it gives rise.\* Under it no one can ever be sure of his financial position, and to officers with families to provide for this is a serious consideration. The hardship is especially great when any service comes to be over-recruited, or when leave is stopped to meet an emergency, as blocks in promotion then occur for which there is little or no redress. The only advantage claimed for the existing arrangement was that it provided an incentive to work, because promotion from grade to grade was, or should be, dependent on merit. We have satisfied ourselves, however, that in practice grade promotion is now ordinarily given automatically, and that only in obvious cases of inefficiency are officers denied such advancement. Thus worked, and it is hard to see how it could be worked otherwise in any but the smaller services, where each man is equally well known to his superiors, the graded system is in fact an incremental system disguised by the increments falling due at irregular instead of regular intervals of time.

51. *Introduction of the incremental system of remuneration recommended.*—We accordingly recommend that, where it still exists, the graded system be abandoned and that all salaries be paid in future, except where we have expressly provided otherwise, in accordance with an incremental scale, subject always to the proviso that no increment be given as a matter of right. Full power should rest with Government to stop the increments of the obviously inefficient in the same way that they can now stop grade promotion in similar circumstances. We are also of opinion that the best form of scale is that which is framed under what is known as the compartment system. Under this separate scales are fixed for separate groups of officers in each department, and a process of selection takes place before an officer can pass from one scale to another or from any scale into a selection post. We prefer this to the form of time scale now prevailing in the public works department. In that department officers holding minor and major charges are both on the same continuous scale, and there is only a charge bar between them to prevent the payment of the higher salaries to those who are not actually doing the higher forms of work. In theory this should achieve results similar to those obtained under the compartment system, but experience with the political department scale, which is framed on such lines, has shown that in times of pressure the charge bar is not maintained, when the descent into a pure time scale without safeguards for efficiency becomes perilously close. The introduction of incremental scales for separate classes of officers will make it necessary to revise the rules now governing the payment of acting allowances, and we recommend that this should be put in hand. When this is being done the opportunity should be taken to establish more uniformity in the treatment of the various services than is now the case. We have indicated in certain of the annexures to our report the detailed steps which we think should be taken in this matter.

52. *Exchange compensation allowance.*—We have also dealt as a general question with exchange compensation allowance. This was introduced in 1893 for the benefit of European and Anglo-Indian officers in India, not being statutory natives of India; that is to say, for those classes of which the members, or the majority of them, being under the necessity of making regular remittances to England for the maintenance of their families, had suffered from the decline in the sterling value of the rupee. The allowance payable to each officer is calculated on the difference between the gold value of half salary at the market rate of exchange and its value at a privileged rate which, for the present, is fixed at 1s. 6d. per rupee, and is limited to a sum not exceeding in any quarter the amount of rupees by which 250l. converted at the privileged rate falls short of the equivalent of 250l. converted at the market rate. Now that the exchange value of the rupee has settled down approximately to 1s. 4d. the concession represents an addition of  $6\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. to all salaries of Rs. 2,222 a

\* Volume VIII., 38151 and Appendix II. of the same volume.

month and under. To salaries in excess of this amount a fixed addition of Rs. 138-14-3 a month is made. This arrangement has now become obsolete, and with each revision of salary which has taken place the opportunity has been taken to absorb the allowance, but it is still drawn in some services, for example, the Indian civil service and the education department, in which no recent general revision of emoluments has occurred. In these services we have recommended that the allowance should be abolished and that, except in certain cases, which appeared to us to require special treatment, its loss should be made good by a corresponding increase of salary.

53. *Rates of salary to be drawn by Europeans and statutory natives of India respectively. Present position.*—We have also made detailed proposals in the annexures to our report with regard to the rates of salary which should be drawn by Europeans and statutory natives of India respectively. At present in the services recruited in India, namely, the post office and the land records (Burma), telegraph (traffic), railway (stores), registration, Northern India salt revenue, salt and excise, and survey (Madras) departments, and in the provincial branches or their equivalents of the agricultural, civil veterinary, forest (minor charges), medical, police, and survey of India departments, and in the provincial civil services, all officers are paid alike, to whatever race they belong, and at rates calculated to secure statutory natives of India with suitable qualifications. Similarly, in the agricultural (imperial), civil veterinary (imperial), customs, factory and boiler inspection, Indian finance, military finance, geological survey of India, mines, mint and assay, and railway (locomotive and carriage and wagon) departments, equal pay is the rule, but this is framed in each case at rates calculated to attract suitable Europeans from Europe. In the pilots (Bengal) department equality is also enforced, but here only fees are earned and no question of salary arises. In the Indian civil, Indian medical, Indian educational, and imperial forest services, on the other hand, and in the imperial branch of the police department, subject to certain exceptions of detail into which we need not enter, only statutory natives of India who are directly recruited get equal pay with their European colleagues. The same applies to statutory natives of India directly recruited in England to the public works department or the engineering branches of the railway and telegraph departments. Officers promoted from the provincial civil, medical, and police services and from the provincial branch of the survey of India department get less pay, whilst members of the provincial education, forest (major charges), and public works departments, and of the provincial sections of the engineering branches of the railway and telegraph departments, however they may be recruited, likewise receive differential treatment. The principle of differentiation is also in force in the railway (traffic) department. There is a further complication in the different forms of differentiation enforced. For promoted officers of the provincial civil services a rate is fixed which is two-thirds of that enjoyed by their colleagues, whether European or Indian, who have been selected at the open competition in London, and a similar idea runs through the incremental scales in force in the imperial and provincial branches respectively of the public works department and of the engineering branches of the railway and telegraph departments. It can also be traced in the scale fixed for members of the provincial forest service. In the railway (traffic) department statutory natives of India are kept throughout their careers one or two grades behind Europeans of the same standing. For promoted officers of the provincial medical, police, and survey of India departments rates have been arranged which bear no fixed proportion to those in force for direct recruits. Similarly no proportion is maintained between the rates paid to members of the provincial and Indian educational services respectively.

54. *Analysis of the principles underlying the present arrangements for fixing the rates of salary to be drawn by Europeans and statutory natives of India.*—There is thus on the surface great disparity of practice. In reality, if the actual figures are analysed, it will be seen that the actual number of statutory natives of India who receive equal pay at European rates is extremely limited. For example, in the agricultural (imperial), civil veterinary (imperial), customs, factory and boiler inspection, military finance, geological survey of India, mines, mint and assay, and railway (locomotive and carriage and wagon) departments there would appear to be only five such individuals, whilst there are only three and two respectively in the Indian educational and Indian forest services. In the imperial branch of the police service the number is not known, but it is inconsiderable. In these departments the principle of equal or unequal remuneration does not appear to have

been deliberately settled on its merits, probably owing to the small financial interests involved. Similarly, in the Indian civil and Indian medical services the position of equality has been reached almost insensibly. These services are recruited by a system of examination open to all comers, and this practice dates from a time when statutory natives of India, though eligible, scarcely endeavoured to compete. No differentiation of salaries had thus originally to be considered. Since then conditions have changed and statutory natives of India now hold 66\* places in the former, whilst in the latter 19† have found their way into civil employment. In the public works department and in the engineering branches of the railway and telegraph departments and in the Indian finance department the principle of equality seems to have been conceded of set purpose. But in the former group its application has been limited to statutory natives of India appointed in England, and extends only to about 26 individuals. In the latter the concession has been complete and is now enjoyed by some 82 officers without any distinction between direct recruits and officers promoted from the lower ranks. There are also indications of a movement towards the extinction of disparity in the highest posts. Statutory natives of India holding from the Crown, such as members of council and high court judges, already draw the same pay as Europeans in the same appointments, and this privilege is also enjoyed by such as become chief court judges, judicial commissioners, and chief engineers.

55. *General principle to be followed in future in fixing the rates of salary to be drawn by Europeans and statutory natives of India.*—The advantages of equal pay for all officers, who do the same work, are obvious. Under such a system there can be no suspicion that Europeans are favoured at the expense of Indians, whilst the danger of racial friction in the services is reduced to a minimum. On the other hand, to set in India for the public services a standard of remuneration which is in excess of what is required to obtain suitable Indian officers is to impose for all time on the country a burden which she ought not to bear. What this burden would be it is difficult to say. For the services in which we have proposed to draw a distinction, and for which it is possible to frame an estimate, we have calculated that the expenditure involved in giving equal pay to all alike would come approximately to Rs. 22,63,568 a year, as set out in the following table :—

Departments.	Number of annexure.	Increased expenditure per annum involved in giving officers appointed in India equal pay with officers appointed in Europe.
		Rs.
Agricultural . . . . .	I.	2,29,404
Civil veterinary . . . . .	II.	1,44,748
Customs . . . . .	III.	28,284
Education . . . . .	IV.	1,19,505
Factory inspection . . . . .	V.	23,327
Forest . . . . .	VIII.	4,63,035
Geological survey . . . . .	IX.	47,566
Indian civil service . . . . .	X.	3,29,701
Mines . . . . .	XIII.	9,600
Telegraph (engineering) . . . . .	XVII.	65,149
Public works, including railway (engineering) . . . . .	XVIII.	7,63,060
Railway (revenue)—(traffic) . . . . .	XIX.	15,353
Survey of India . . . . .	XXIII.	24,834
Total . . . . .		22,63,568

Note 1.—In the military finance, mint, railway (locomotive) and railway (carriage and wagon) departments extra expenditure will also be incurred if officers appointed in India are given equal pay with those appointed in Europe. This will amount to Rs. 2,536, 1,200, 290, and 290 per annum respectively for every appointment held by an officer appointed in India.

Note 2.—There will also be extra expenditure if officers appointed in India to the assay department and as distillery experts in the salt and excise departments are given equal pay with officers appointed in Europe.

Note 3.—No estimate has been framed for the medical services in view of the fact that the proposals made with regard to the salaries of Indian medical service officers are of a purely temporary character.

But this would not cover the whole ultimate cost. If young men, who are statutory natives of India, are paid at European rates owing to the accident of their electing for a service in which a certain number of Europeans are required, then similar

young men, who elect for other services, like the post office, for which Europeans are not imported, will need to be paid similarly, if recruits of the same class are to be obtained as at present. The circle of financial obligation will thus go on widening and will finally touch the private market, particularly in the engineering and educational fields. The choice is thus between the two evils of inequality on the one hand and disregard of economy on the other. Those who are impressed with the necessity of rooting out all suspicion of the former are prepared to face almost any financial loss which may be necessary to secure this result. We sympathise with the sentiment which underlies this attitude, but think that the desired results can be obtained by less costly means. In the first place, in those services the normal requirements of which will eventually be met in India, for example, in the agricultural, civil veterinary, factory inspection, forest, geological survey and mines departments, we would mark the essential position by fixing the standard salaries at rates calculated to obtain the required recruits in India, and by suggesting higher rates for officers imported from Europe during the transitional period. Secondly, we would organise the services, not on racial lines, as is the case in certain departments at present, but as we have proposed, on the basis of the work done. Thirdly, as we have also already suggested, we would have common lists for all officers with seniority dependent on the date of appointment without reference to the actual salary drawn by each individual, and so remove doubts as to status. We think that the grievances which now exist are due rather to the prevailing differences of dignity than of pay, and that harmony can exist in a service even without absolute equality of emoluments. We are fortified in this belief by the example presented by the political department, in which members of the Indian civil service are paid more than officers borrowed from the army, even though all are doing the same work. European officers on duty in the United Kingdom also draw two-thirds of their Indian emoluments; whilst differentiation is also made in favour of officers of the Indian as opposed to officers of the British army serving in India. The distinctions in salaries which now exist are, therefore, not racial but are based on economic considerations. They arise naturally out of the adoption of the principle that Government should pay so much and so much only to their employés as is necessary to obtain recruits of the right stamp, and to maintain them in such a degree of comfort and dignity as will shield them from temptation and keep them efficient for the term of their service.

56. *Considerations affecting the determination of the rates of salary to be paid to statutory natives of India.*—It does not, however, follow from the acceptance of this general principle that statutory natives of India must at all times and in all circumstances get less pay than their European colleagues, or that the difference between British and Indian rates can be measured by an identical amount or proportion in every service. Such a conclusion would rightly be regarded as derogatory to India. In general, no doubt, the salaries received by Europeans in the Indian services will be higher than those received by statutory natives of India, partly because the cost of production of a European officer in Europe is higher than that of a statutory native of India in India, and partly because no European will serve away from his own country without an exceptional inducement. But there may be a service in which suitable Europeans can be obtained from Europe at a very modest cost, either because the standard of preliminary education required is comparatively low, or because the qualities needed are very generally possessed by British schoolboys, or for both these reasons; and yet this same service may be one into which no statutory native of India should be admitted without having given guarantees of the highest qualities. In such a service the salary of the statutory native of India required may well be as high in relation to the general run of Indian salaries as the salary of the European officer is low in relation to the general run of British salaries. In the police service, for instance, the European comes out at a comparatively low salary, but the salaries paid to the deputy superintendents in the provincial service are for good reasons no lower than those paid to other provincial service officers. The rates, therefore, at which European and Indian members of the imperial police service should be paid cannot greatly differ, and thus might, without departing from our general principle, be identical. Nor would an identical rate imply that the British police officer was receiving no special consideration for his Indian service, for, unless he were already receiving that, he would not be out in India at all. Again, it is quite reasonable that a statutory native of India, possessing a monopoly quality, should be paid a monopoly rate, higher than that received by Europeans of ordinary attainments.

57. *Extent to which the special circumstances of departments require a departure from the general principle prescribed for fixing the salaries of Europeans and statutory natives of India.*—Such is the general position which we desire to adopt towards this difficult question. But we would not make a fetish of our principle. We recognise, for example, that account must be taken of existing facts; for example, the equality which for years has prevailed as between members of the Indian civil and Indian medical services who have passed the open competitive examinations for these two services. We also see that service conditions make it desirable that a superior officer should not draw less pay than an officer who is actually working under his orders. We feel, moreover, that the reasons of sentiment which suggest equality of payment are stronger in the case of the administrative posts generally; and of the educational service in particular, where the officers affected are in such close touch with the youth of the country that it is specially important to avoid any element of suspicion about their treatment. These considerations will be found reflected in our detailed proposals, where we have recommended equal rates for all direct recruits to the Indian civil and Indian medical services and for both direct recruits and officers promoted from the provincial services to the imperial police force. We have also suggested that equality be conceded in the administrative posts detailed in each of the annexures to this report. In the case of the superior educational service we have gone further and have put forward an arrangement by which a distinction of pay will be maintained in the earlier years of service, but all will end on the same rate, whilst all will be treated alike in the selection posts. In the other services we have drawn up separate scales for Europeans and statutory natives of India respectively, based not on any arbitrary rule of proportion, but on what is necessary in each case to obtain the desired results. We are also of opinion that no logical ground can be found for treating statutory natives of India who are recruited in England otherwise than those who are recruited in India. Obvious objections can be urged to offering higher rewards to men educated abroad than are offered to those who have passed through the educational institutions of their own country. Such a policy must tend to retard the development of Indian education and appears to give official recognition to the view that the universities of India are inferior to those of Europe. We are, however, assured by our Indian colleagues that public opinion in India attaches importance to securing absolute equality between Europeans and Indians who have been through the same educational course. The number of persons concerned is not large, and in view of the strength of the sentiment expressed we are not prepared to recommend a departure from existing practice.

58. *Rates of salary.*—It remains to explain the rates which we have actually put forward. In so far as those for Europeans are concerned we have followed no general principle, but have been guided solely by what is required in each case to get officers of the right stamp. This is easily done in the United Kingdom, where the ordinary well-educated individual in search of a career has a wide choice of alternative employments, the remuneration of which can safely be taken as a standard above which salaries for service in India must certainly be fixed. In India the economic or competitive element of the problem is much less salient. Here, with the two exceptions of law and medicine, there is no calling the average earnings of which may be taken as an indication of the kind of salary which the Government ought to pay in order to obtain service of the required type. Instead of being one of a number of rival competitors the Government in India is practically in the position of a monopolist employer, who is unembarrassed by a trade union, supplied with an abundant labour market, and by reason of these factors free to fix his own rate. This being so, we have been unable, in fixing our rates for statutory natives of India, to proceed solely on principles governed by the ideal of cheapness. We have had to consider the responsibilities attaching to the appointments concerned, the necessity of placing officers above the reach of temptation, and of enabling them to maintain the position in society which the Government may wish them to occupy in each case. The result has been that, whilst we have not hesitated to propose special rates where such were needed, we have aimed at a general incremental scale of Rs. 250-40/3-450-50/3-500 a month for all the services recruited from the ordinary graduate class, or their equivalent amongst members of the domiciled community. For services requiring higher initial qualifications we have proposed higher scales, for example, one of Rs. 300-50/2-500-50-1,050 a month in the case of the Indian finance department. These scales should be enjoyed by all officers. Beyond them we have provided selection scales or posts suitable to the circumstances of each service.

59. *Estimate of cost.*—It remains to exhibit the financial effect of our recommendations under this head. The amount of the immediate increases and decreases of expenditure for the various services cannot satisfactorily be calculated, as these must depend on several uncertain factors; for example, on the rapidity with which the reorganisations we have suggested can be carried out, and on the dates on which the institutions, which we have proposed for producing qualified recruits, who are statutory natives of India, for the scientific and technical services can come into being. We have, therefore, prepared an estimate of the ultimate increases and decreases which will occur when all our proposals have taken effect. This estimate in its turn depends, in certain services, on certain assumptions, as explained in the various annexures, and should not be regarded as final or complete. In the case of the medical services in particular it is to a large extent based on the suggestion we have put forward for the grant of temporary allowances, pending the conclusion of the present war. But it should be near enough to give a general idea of the scope of our proposals. The net increase of expenditure which it brings out is Rs. 42,25,760 a year, as shown in the following table. In cases where this seemed necessary we have added remarks to explain the factors which have operated to bring about the results indicated.

Department or Service.	Number of annexure.	Net increase or decrease of expenditure per annum.	Remarks.
		Rs.	
Agricultural - - -	I.		
Imperial service - -		— 31,284	The decrease is due to the fixing of a standard Indian scale of pay and to the withdrawal of house rent; set off to some extent by increased local allowances to officers employed under the Government of India.
Provincial services		38,798	
Civil veterinary - -	II.		
Imperial service - -		— 98,866	The decrease is due to the fixing of a standard Indian scale of pay.
Provincial services		32,608	
Customs - - - -	III.	— 19,078	The decrease is due to reserving half the vacancies for recruitment in India and to laying down a lower scale of salary for such officers. The decrease has been slightly set off by raising the pay of the officers appointed in Europe during the first two years of service.
Education - - - -	IV.		
Men's appointments		9,11,476	The increase is due to a general improvement of prospects in classes I. and II., and to the transfer of 65 appointments from class II. to class I.
Women's appointments - -		39,712	
Factory inspection - -	V.	— 1,844	The decrease is due to the fixing of a standard Indian scale of pay; set off by the increased cost of an additional appointment in Bombay.
Boiler inspection - -	V.	8,496	
Indian finance - -	VI.	— 3,11,319	The decrease is due to the provision for entire recruitment in India, and the fixing of a standard Indian scale of pay; slightly set off by the increased cost on account of some adjustment of numbers in the various ranks and the introduction of an incremental scale of pay for accountants-general.
Military finance - -	VII.	4,953	
Forest - - - -	VIII.		
Imperial service - -		— 2,11,342	The decrease is due to the fixing of a standard Indian scale of pay; set off by the increased cost on account of improving the pay in the administrative ranks, the substitution of 25 appointments in the imperial service for a similar number in the provincial service, and the transfer of 24 more appointments from the latter to the former.
Provincial services		50,960	
Geological survey - -	IX.	8,048	A standard Indian scale of pay has been laid down for this service. None the less there is an increase as the new scale is not much lower than the old one, whilst an increase has been made in the pay of the director.
Indian civil service - -	X.		
Superior appointments - -		8,00,788	This includes Rs. 1,65,973 on account of converting 20 appointments hitherto held by members of the provincial services on a lower scale of pay into appointments to be held by members of the bar on full pay. It also includes Rs. 1,07,651 on account of improving the pay of 41 appointments to be held by members of the provincial services.
Inferior appointments - -		2,92,051	This takes into account a saving of Rs. 2,70,300 on account of the decrease in numbers due to throwing open 20 superior appointments to members of the bar and to excluding inspectors-general of police and directors of agriculture from the cadre. It also takes into account a saving of Rs. 4,46,476 due to the introduction of a fixed acting allowance of Rs. 350 for officiating promotion from inferior to superior appointments instead of the acting allowances admissible under present rules.
Total - - - -		10,92,839	
Carried forward - -		15,14,157	

Department or Service.	Number of Annexure.	Net increase or decrease of expenditure per annum.	Remarks.
Brought forward	-	Rs. 15,14,157	
Provincial civil services - - -	X.		
Executive branches		7,15,904	This includes Rs. 45,900 on account of probationers, Rs. 28,457 for provision of a leave reserve in Bombay, and Rs. 6,41,547 on account of improvement of prospects.
Judicial branches -		14,16,000	This includes Rs. 2,03,400 on account of probationers, Rs. 1,77,440 for provision of a leave reserve, and Rs. 10,35,160 on account of improvement of prospects.
Total - - -		21,31,904	
Land records (Burma)	XI.	30,159	
Medical (including jail and sanitary)	XII.		
Indian civil medical service—			
Officers belonging to the Indian medical service		3,09,204	
Officers not belonging to the Indian medical service - -		1,63,464	
Local civil medical services—			
Civil branches -		5,89,640	
Military branches		67,627	
Professors, chemical examiners, &c. -		83,770	
Bacteriological department -		48,587	
Sanitary department -		1,01,239	
Jail department -		62,170	
Total - - -		14,25,701	
Mines - - -	XIII.	— 6,277	The decrease is due to the fixing of a standard Indian scale of pay.
Mint - - -	XIV.	— 49	
Pilots (Bengal) -	XV.	—	Pilots do not receive salaries but are paid by fees.
Police - - -	XVI.		
Imperial service -		— 17,214	The decrease is due to the substitution of provincial service appointments for assistant superintendships. This is necessary on account of the increase in the number of superintendships to be held by members of the provincial services.
Provincial services -		1,33,691	
Post office and telegraph - - -	XVII.		
Post office - - -		1,09,508	
Telegraph (engineering) - -		3,385	
Total - - -		1,12,893	
Public works including railway (engineering) - -	XVIII.	— 10,80,900	The decrease is due to the substitution of upper subordinates for a large number of assistant engineers and to the increase in the percentage of recruitment to be made in India; set off by improvement of pay in the administrative ranks, the grant of full pay in those ranks to officers appointed in India, and the improvement of pay of such officers in executive ranks.
Railway (revenue) -	XIX.		
Traffic - - -		9,000	
Stores - - -		— 9,900	The decrease is due to the withdrawal of exchange compensation allowance
Total - - -		— 900	
Registration - - -	XX.	246	
Northern India salt revenue - - -	XXI.	49,283	
Salt and excise - -	XXII.	86,015	
Survey of India Class I. - - -	XXIII.	— 1,60,222	The decrease is due to the lowering of the general average pay of officers in this department, and to the decrease in numbers, due to allotting a larger number of charges to members of the provincial service; set off by the increased cost of transferring such officers from the provincial to the imperial service.
Class II. - - -		—	
Survey (Madras) -	XXIV.	7,273	
Total - - -		42,25,760	

60. *Effect of proposals on the salaries of officers.*—The foregoing figures are, however, incomplete, in that they show only the effect of our suggestions on the revenues of the country as a whole. They give no clue as to how the officers of each service or classes of officers inside any service will fare. To illustrate this we have had worked out for all direct recruits the average present salaries for each main class of officer and the average rates proposed, together with a note of the increase or decrease per cent. The results are given in the following table. From this we have excluded the superior civil medical appointments of all classes in view of the temporary character of our recommendations with regard to these posts.

Department or Service.	Number of annexurc.	Average pay.					
		Officers appointed in Europe.			Officers appointed in India.		
		Present scale.	Proposed scale.	Increase per cent.	Present scale.	Proposed scale.	Increase per cent.
		Rs. A. P.	Rs. A. P.		Rs. A. P.	Rs. A. P.	
Agricultural - - - -	I.	817 8 7	1,066 14 11	30·5	—	850 2 2	—
Imperial service - - -		—	—	—	315 7 0	357 9 9	13·4
Provincial services - -		—	—	—	—	—	—
Civil veterinary - - -	II.	947 1 10	1,007 13 3	6·4	—	704 12 8	—
Imperial service - - -		—	—	—	—	—	—
Provincial services—		—	—	—	345 3 1	415 8 8	20·4
Burma - - - -		—	—	—	300 1 2	365 8 8	21·8
Other provinces - - -		—	—	—	—	824 5 5	—
Customs - - - -	III.	944 11 4	950 12 6	·6	—	—	—
Education - - - -	IV.	—	—	—	—	—	—
Men's appointments—		—	—	—	—	—	—
Class I. - - - -		*970 7 11	*1,043 1 1	7·5	—	*948 0 8	—
Class II. - - - -		—	—	—	—	—	—
Burma - - - -		—	—	—	450 8 6	(a)590 4 1	11
Other provinces - - -		—	—	—	551 0 1	(a)439 2 11	25·1
Women's appointments—		—	—	—	—	—	—
Class I. - - - -		494 15 11	621 15 1	25·7	—	—	—
Class II. - - - -		—	—	—	274 11 1	311 13 3	13·5
Factory inspection - - -	V.	680 3 8	735 8 0	8·1	—	624 10 2	—
Indian finance - - - -	VI.	—	—	—	—	768 9 11	—
Military finance - - -	VII.	967 12 0	974 15 10	·7	—	—	—
Forest - - - -	VIII.	—	—	—	—	—	—
Imperial service - - -		924 5 1	937 9 8	1·4	—	808 14 2	—
Provincial services—		—	—	—	—	—	—
excluding Burma allow-		—	—	—	505 0 0	(a)521 6 5	3·2
ance or Burma rate of		—	—	—	—	—	—
pay - - - -		—	—	—	—	—	—
including Burma allow-		—	—	—	524 6 0	(a)538 2 5	2·6
ance or Burma rate of		—	—	—	—	860 11 7	—
pay - - - -	IX.	821 14 11	1,009 2 2	22·8	—	—	—
Geological survey - - -	X.	—	—	—	—	—	—
Indian civil service - -		—	—	—	—	—	—
Superior appointments -		2,400 7 4	†2,454 6 5	2·2	—	—	—
Inferior appointments -		†862 13 10	†944 14 7	9·5	—	—	—
All appointments - - -		1,587 7 11	†1,653 2 3	4·1	—	—	—
Provincial civil services	X.	—	—	—	—	—	—
Executive branches—		—	—	—	(a)489 14 6	(a)522 4 6	6·6
Burma - - - -		—	—	—	(a)435 0 11	(a)473 0 1	8·7
Other provinces - - -		—	—	—	—	—	—
Judicial branches—		—	—	—	(a)510 12 0	(a)641 8 4	25·6
Burma - - - -		—	—	—	(a)414 0 6	(a)496 7 11	19·9
Other provinces - - -		—	—	—	—	—	—
Executive and judicial		—	—	—	(a)493 9 10	(a)545 13 8	10·6
branches—		—	—	—	(a)424 9 6	(a)484 15 7	14·2
Burma - - - -		—	—	—	432 3 7	492 1 9	13·9
Other provinces - - -		—	—	—	—	—	—
Land records (Burma) -	XI.	—	—	—	—	—	—
Medical (including jail and	XII.	—	—	—	—	—	—
sanitary) - - - -		—	—	—	—	—	—
Local civil medical services—		—	—	—	—	—	—
Civil branches—		—	—	—	(a)334 9 2	(a)372 10 8	11·1
Burma - - - -		—	—	—	(a)190 5 1	(a)276 15 3	45·5
Other provinces - - -		—	—	—	—	—	—
Military branches—		—	—	—	(a)402 3 5	(a)470 15 5	17·1
Burma - - - -		—	—	—	(a)281 14 3	(a)352 8 4	25·1
Other provinces - - -		—	—	—	—	989 6 3	—
Mines - - - -	XIII.	1,094 0 0	1,134 6 1	3·7	—	—	—
Mint - - - -	XIV.	2,256 5 10	2,255 0 0	—	—	—	—
Police - - - -	XVI.	—	—	—	—	—	—
Imperial service - - -		§726 4 8	§738 7 7	1·7	—	—	—
Provincial services (ex-		—	—	—	(a)405 2 3	(a)474 3 4	17·1
cluding Burma) - - -		—	—	—	—	—	—
Post office and telegraph -	XVII.	—	—	—	—	—	—
Post office (administrative		—	—	—	489 13 7	535 7 10	9
branch) - - - -		—	—	—	—	—	—

\* Excluding directors of public instruction.

† Excluding inspectors-general of police and directors of agriculture.

‡ Including acting allowances.

(a) Including officers promoted to the imperial service

§ Excluding inspectors-general of police.

Department or Service.	Number of annexure.	Average pay.					
		Officers appointed in Europe.			Officers appointed in India.		
		Present scale.	Proposed scale.	Increase per cent.	Present scale.	Proposed scale.	Increase per cent.
Telegraph (traffic) - - -		Rs. A. P.	Rs. A. P.	—	Rs. A. P.	Rs. A. P.	—
Telegraph (engineering) - -		974 6 8	974 6 8	—	795 14 3	795 15 2	—
Public works, including rail- way (engineering) - - -	XVIII.	†986 10 7	†1,001 3 7	1·5	636 10 9	814 11 4	27·8
Railway (revenue) - - -	XIX.	711 11 1	717 13 3	·9	714 13 9	722 3 5	1
Traffic - - - - -		—	—	—	779 2 2	733 4 10	—5·9
Stores - - - - -		—	—	—	399 4 11	501 1 0	25·5
Northern India salt revenue -	XXI.	—	—	—	—	—	—
Salt and excise - - - -	XXII.	—	—	—	—	—	—
Madras - - - - -		—	—	—	436 2 2	475 0 8	8·9
Bombay - - - - -		—	—	—	485 8 2	536 13 6	10·6
Burma - - - - -		—	—	—	479 5 0	509 14 7	6·4
Other provinces - - - -		—	—	—	—	459 3 9	—
Survey of India - - - -	XXIII.	—	—	—	—	—	—
Class I. - - - - -		1,230 15 11	1,094 10 5	—11·1	—	—	—
Class II. - - - - -		—	—	—	469 5 0	(a)471 12 0	·5
Survey (Madras) - - - -	XXIV.	—	—	—	480 2 6	513 12 6	7

† Excluding Royal engineers.

(a) Including officers promoted to the imperial service.

## CHAPTER IX.

## CONDITIONS OF SERVICE.

61. *Strength of the cadres and the systems on which they are built up.*—In the opening chapters of our report we have drawn attention to the development which has taken place in India in the last twenty years. All this has meant a great increase in the amount of work to be done. To a certain extent account has already been taken of this by the authorities, and the cadres of the services have been expanded from time to time to meet the growing needs of the country. Whether sufficient has been done in this way is a problem which we have not been able to attack in any detail. Nor does it come within our province to do so. But we have indicated in general terms in the annexures to our report the places where we think that there are signs of overstrain on the present staffs. Where this is the case, we suggest that Government should arrange for the appropriate remedies. But although we have made no detailed inquiry into the need for specific additions to the cadres, we have examined with some care the systems on which they are built up. The method in certain services is to count the actual number of the important appointments of which the incumbents perform duties of independent responsibility and control. These are known sometimes as superior posts and sometimes as major charges. To the number so arrived at is added a reserve in some form or other for leave and training, and also, where this seems necessary, for deputation. The requirements of deputation are often a serious consideration, particularly in departments and services from which officers are borrowed for employment in Native States. In other services the methods are more rough and ready. For example, on the collegiate side of the education department there are so few professors in each of the special subjects that it is not thought worth while to provide understudies for them on the off chance of vacancies occurring. In other services, again, officers come to their duties ready trained and no reserve for training is required. So far as the present method goes it has our approval, but it needs to be worked out with more precision than is now customary. To such extent as was possible in each case we have commented on the prevailing situation in the various annexures to our report, but we recommend generally that there should be for each service, for which a reserve is maintained, separate calculations of the requirements for leave, training, and deputation respectively, and that these should be revised at least every five years on the basis of actuals. It can only lead to trouble if the proportions are allowed to remain fixed over considerable periods, whilst in the meanwhile the foundations on which they originally rested are shifted. This difficulty has recently been experienced in the Indian medical service, owing to the introduction of study-leave facilities without any increase in the reserve to meet the drain of officers thereby caused. Some readjustment will also be necessary when our revised leave rules come into operation. We also think that at the quinquennial revisions care should be taken to see that all superior posts, which have been shown to be permanent or practically permanent in character, are brought on to the cadre. The practice by which in certain services appointments are maintained over several

years on temporary sanctions is harmful in itself, and militates against the successful working of any estimate.

62. *Leave and training reserves.*—We propose further that in making leave calculations regard should be had not only to the number of officers who are actually given leave, but also to the number of those who have applied for leave which is due to them, but have not been allowed to take it on account of a shortage in the personnel available. Whilst we agree with the principle enunciated in article 197 of the civil service regulations that leave of absence cannot be claimed as a right, and that Government should have power to refuse and revoke it at any time according to the exigencies of the public service, we feel that in the ordinary course of the administration such refusal or revocation should be the exception, and that normally there should be a reserve large enough to give each officer the leave to which his service entitles him. In dealing with the questions of probation and training we have already given our views on most of the points which arise with regard to training-reserve posts. Here we would merely add that the number of officers under training should be limited to the number which can be absorbed in the higher appointments open to them in the allotted period. No reserve of this sort is needed in the case of appointments which are to be filled by the promotion of selected officers from an inferior service.

63. *Annual rate of recruitment.*—More precision is also required in fixing the annual rate of recruitment for the various services. In the Indian civil service this is based on the observed rate of decrement over a period of fifty years from 1st April 1854 to 1st April 1904, and amounts to 4·17 per cent. This figure is also applied arbitrarily to the imperial branch of the police force, despite the very different conditions of employment in the two services. The rate of recruitment for the imperial forest service is 4·86 per cent. of the total strength. This is based on a service table, prepared in 1888 on certain assumed data. For the imperial branch of the public works department the annual recruitment is also based on a special service table and the rate is 4·75 per cent. of the strength of the cadre. For the provincial branch of the public works department again there is a special service table, and the rate of recruitment, based on this table and making allowance for the promotion of a proportionate number of subordinates at a more advanced age, is 5·02 per cent. For certain other services recruited in India a rate of 3·82 per cent. is taken. This is based on service tables worked out in 1888. In other services no rule prevails and recruitment is made whenever a vacancy occurs. In so far as a service is large enough and old enough to have a reliable rate of decrement we regard it as important that this should be followed in fixing the annual rate of recruitment. The advantages of regular recruitment year by year are unmistakable. But the calculations must be kept up to date if they are to carry conviction. At present, for example, the 4·17 rate is viewed with suspicion by those who have had practical experience of its working. This is due partly to the fact that it appears to give more recruits than are needed, and partly to the belief that it is swollen by the casualties of the 1857 disturbances and by the greater mortality which is believed to have prevailed fifty years ago under less hygienic conditions. It is also suggested that the rise in prices which has taken place and the increased cost of living in India and England induces officers to serve for longer periods than used to be the case. Similarly, the 3·82 rate has been found to be fallacious in that it does not allow for the different conditions of many of the cadres to which it is applied, due to the different ages at which officers are recruited, and the different proportions in which officers, promoted from an inferior service, enter a superior service. Moreover the service table, on which the rate is based, was not prepared from the actual service experience of any service or group of services, but was compiled from the life table of the uncovenanted service family pension fund of 1879 with some rough and ready corrections. These doubts can be set at rest only by a careful check of the latest actuarial data available. We recommend that this should be undertaken and service tables prepared for each service or group of services, and formulæ drawn up which will take into account the special conditions of any service, including the average ages of enlistment, for the purpose of fixing the annual rate of recruitment. Measures should also be taken every ten years to bring these tables up to date. Something of the sort had, we were told, recently been attempted in Bengal for the provincial civil service of that province.\* We regard this as a step in the right direction.

64. *Variations in the annual rate of recruitment.*—It is also necessary in recruiting for services organised on an actuarial basis to take account of the actual present state

\* Volume III., 15633.

of the cadre. Circumstances occur in which an unexpected excess or deficiency of strength is brought about. In a scientifically organised cadre like that of the Indian civil service this error is corrected by adding to or diminishing from the annual rate of recruitment up to a thirty per cent. limit each year until an equilibrium is reached. This system provides, it is true, for an equilibrium of numbers, but it does not touch the question of the proper distribution of those numbers over the whole cadre. Thus, when a great shortage of Indian civil service officers occurred in the nineties of last century heavy recruitment was made at the foot of the cadre until after a few years the full complement of the service was reached. As, however, all these officers were of the same age and had their full time to serve, a block has since been caused in several provinces as retirements from the top have not taken place to the extent required. Later, when these excess officers come to the end of their service, retirements under the present system will be excessive, a rush of recruitment will again take place, and the vicious cycle be perpetuated. To meet this danger we recommend that in all such services distribution lists be maintained to show by groups of years the number of officers which there should be and the number actually in service. Reference should then be made to these tables before any variation from the prescribed rate of recruitment is allowed, and efforts should be made to correct the error observed at the point of its occurrence. Thus, if there is a plethora of officers of from fifteen to twenty years' service, retirements from that group should be preferred to an arbitrary reduction of the first-year men or to the removal of officers of twenty-five years' seniority. It should also be seen whether it would not be possible to relieve the block by transferring some of the officers to a kindred service or to the same service in some other province. Similarly, if there is a shortage at the same point it should be seen whether it would not be feasible to bring in someone of that standing from a kindred service or from the same service in another province, or to promote someone from an inferior service as a temporary arrangement. It will not always be practicable to do this, but only after it has been established that it is not feasible should any alteration be allowed in the fixed rate of recruitment.

65. *Blocks in promotion.*—This introduces the subject of blocks in promotion. To a certain extent such conditions are inherent in the system and right themselves over an average of years. Within reasonable limits there is little harm in this, and by no plan which we can suggest can the possibility of such a state of affairs entirely be eliminated. But where blocks are prolonged, take place at low rates of pay, and keep an officer out of responsible work until the edge of his enthusiasm has been worn off, they are detrimental to efficiency and require remedial measures. The remedies which we recommend generally are, first, the establishment of incremental scales of salary on the compartment system, as explained in paragraph 51 above. This will effectually prevent blocks as amongst officers in the same compartment. Thus, once a member of the Indian civil service becomes an assistant collector, his salary will rise automatically to the highest level allowed for officers of that class. There will be no more grade blocks within that class. But such an officer may still be blocked from passing into a higher class. To meet this in services where it was appropriate we have carried up the scale of salaries for the junior officers to a point beyond that which is now in force. This will mean that, if there is a block, it will be experienced at a higher rate of salary than would now be the case, thus mitigating the hardship. Beyond this we recommend that the excess be attacked at the point of its greatest magnitude by the offer to selected officers of proportionate pensions or analogous inducements to retire. Failing this remedy, which must depend on the willingness of officers to leave the service, the only solution is special allowances to be worked out to meet the merits of each case. The alternative of a continuous time scale of salary, based solely on the length of an officer's service, and regardless of the nature and responsibility of his duties, should unhesitatingly be rejected.

66. *Travelling allowances.*—We now turn to the subject of travelling allowances. These are designed to cover the actual travelling expenses incurred by officers in the course of journeys or voyages taken in the interests of the public service, whether in the course of everyday work or on transfer from one station to another. Numerous complaints were made to us that the amounts permissible for the former purpose

were inadequate, but, on the evidence before us, we are unable to come to any positive decision. We think, however, that a case was made out for the appointment of an expert committee to investigate the whole question, and at the same time to prepare a scheme for the simplification of the rules. These in their present form are too complicated, and much of the discontent to which the witnesses who came before us gave expression can be attributed to the fact that at many points they are unintelligible to the ordinary officer. It should also be within the reference to the committee to report as to the desirability of establishing separate travelling allowance regulations for women employed by Government. The existing regulations were drawn up with reference to men only, and before they can be applied to women, appear to stand in need of modification.

67. *Allowances on transfer.*—Complaints were also made with regard to the allowances payable to an officer on his transfer from one station to another. At present a non-gazetted officer on a salary not exceeding Rs. 400 a month is allowed travelling expenses within the following limits whenever he is transferred to another station more than 200 miles away for a period of more than three months :—

- (a) For a journey by steamer or railway actual expenditure on fares, subject to a maximum of four full fares for himself and his family and a maximum of three full fares of the lowest class for his servants, and subject also to certain prescribed limits the cost of the removal of his personal effects.
- (b) For a journey by road actual charges of locomotion for himself, his family, and three servants up to a maximum of three times the rate of mileage to which he is normally entitled, and, subject to the prescribed limits, the cost of carriage of personal effects.

By a recent decision of the Secretary of State it has been laid down that officers to whom the foregoing regulations do not apply may recover within certain limits the cost of conveying their goods and horses from one station to another, but in other respects such officers are merely entitled to the same rates of travelling allowance as they would receive for official journeys not involving a change of station. We have received ample evidence to show that members of the service suffer considerable loss by the restriction of travelling allowances in these cases to an amount which is insufficient to cover more than an officer's own expenses. The hardship is especially felt in those departments in which officers are liable for service all over India, and may at any time be obliged to remove their homes from one end of the country to the other. This is not right. Transfers from station to station are made in the interests of the public service, and such being the case we regard it as incumbent on Government to meet all reasonable charges of removal, whether these are personal to the officer himself or incurred on behalf of his family and household establishment. The principle that travelling expenses must not be treated as a source of profit has its necessary corollary in the principle that such expenses should not be a source of loss. Exactly what provision should be made to meet such charges is a question for the decision of Government. We would, however, urge that immediate measures be taken to remove what undoubtedly is a widespread and, in our opinion, a legitimate grievance.

68. *Classification of officers for purposes of travelling allowances.*—Objection was also raised to the way in which officers are classified for purposes of travelling allowances. At present different rates are payable according as an officer belongs to one or other of four main classes. It is only with officers in the first two classes that our present inquiry is concerned. The first class normally includes officers holding appointments which carry a pay or maximum pay in excess of Rs. 500 a month. In the second are included officers in superior service not belonging to the first class, whose pay or maximum pay exceeds Rs. 100 a month. The grouping of officers, however, in these two classes is not invariably determined by the criterion of salary. Thus, provincial civil servants in subdivisional charges with separate headquarters, and superintendents of post offices, are entitled to the higher rates authorised for the first class, whilst, on the other hand, certain extra assistant conservators of forests and extra assistant superintendents in the survey of India department are included in the second class, notwithstanding the fact that they are on scales of salary rising beyond a maximum of Rs. 500 a month. The broad principle underlying the present system of classification appears to us to be on

the whole fair and reasonable, and we do not recommend any fundamental change. We desire, indeed, to record our dissent from the view commonly put before us by many of the officers to whom the second class rates of allowances are applicable that they suffer loss of prestige through being obliged to travel by the same class as officers of somewhat inferior status. If this view were once accepted, the process of discrimination between various grades of officers would be endless. But the frequency of the complaints submitted to us on this point suggests the need for revision, under expert advice, of the list of exceptions which have been made to the general rule of classification, and we recommend that this be undertaken.

69. *House accommodation.*—Representations were also made to us by a number of witnesses as to the insufficiency of the existing provision in respect of house accommodation, house allowances, and tentage. Most of the questions raised were of a kind which can best be settled after inquiry by the local Governments concerned. In this connection we need only refer to the complaints urged against the exclusion of provincial service officers from the benefit of the Calcutta, Bombay, and Rangoon house allowance schemes, and against the rule by which this allowance is not payable to unmarried officers, or even to married officers if their families are not living with them. We understand that the allowance was withheld from provincial service officers mainly on the ground that house rents had not increased to the same extent in the Indian as in the European quarters of the presidency towns. This assumption is not borne out by the facts. Statistics collected by the prices enquiry committee regarding house rents in Calcutta and Bombay tend to prove that the percentage of increase in house rents is not less in the Indian than in the European quarter. That being the case, we think that the question should again be considered of including provincial service officers within the scope of the scheme. We would further suggest that the rule prohibiting the payment of the allowance to married officers during the absence of their families should be revoked. The rule was, no doubt, established on the ground that at such times an officer can make arrangements for closing down his establishment. But this is not always possible; in many cases an officer has to keep up his house whether his family is with him or not. We therefore recommend that the allowance should continue to be payable for so long as an officer is able to certify that he is still in occupation of the house or flat which he customarily occupies.

70. *Local allowances.*—In many of the departments under inquiry it is also customary to grant allowances in addition to salary, either as compensation for special expenses or as payment for special work. These are known as local allowances. It would be impossible for us to examine minutely the reasons which have been held to justify the grant of a local allowance in each case where such an allowance is now payable, or to discuss the further question whether these allowances are on an adequate scale. These are matters for local determination. We would, however, refer particularly to the allowance which is now granted to certain officers in Burma in consideration of the relatively high cost of living in that province. This has recently been the subject of inquiry by a committee appointed by the Burma Government. We understand that no decision has yet been taken on the committee's recommendations, and we have therefore thought it desirable to state in general terms the conclusions to which we have been led by the evidence presented to us on the subject. In the first place, we are of opinion that the allowance should not be payable to officers belonging to departments or branches of departments which are recruited in Burma for service solely in Burma, such, for example, as the provincial civil service, the Burma land records department, and the Burma police force. In such cases salaries should be fixed on the basis of the cost of living, and at such amounts as are likely to be sufficient to attract local recruits of the right class. Secondly, we consider that in all other departments officers should be paid an allowance, irrespective of any maximum rate of salary. At present, except in the forest and survey of India departments, where the limits are Rs. 1,250 and Rs. 1,500 a month respectively, no allowance is payable to officers in receipt of a higher pay than Rs. 1,000 a month, but we agree with the committee that no good reason can be found for making this distinction. We also agree that the allowance should be proportionate to pay, but that the proportion should tend to diminish as salaries increase. At present the rate of allowance for imperial officers is Rs. 100, and for officers recruited in India generally Rs. 65. The scale proposed by the committee is as follows:—

Pay	Amount of allowance.	Percentage of allowance on the lowest pay on which it is granted.
Rs.	Rs.	
200- 299 - - - - -	60	30
300- 399 - - - - -	75	25
400- 499 - - - - -	90	22·5
500- 599 - - - - -	100	20
600- 699 - - - - -	110	18·3
700- 799 - - - - -	120	17·1
800- 899 - - - - -	130	16·2
900- 999 - - - - -	140	15·6
1,000-1,199 - - - - -	150	15
1,200-1,399 - - - - -	160	13·4
1,400-1,599 - - - - -	170	12·1
1,600-1,799 - - - - -	180	11·2
1,800-1,999 - - - - -	190	10·6
2,000 and upwards - - - - -	200	10

This scale appears to us to go somewhat beyond the requirements of the case.  
 • Allowances at the following rates should, in our opinion, be sufficient :—

Pay.	Amount of allowance.	Percentage of allowance on the lowest pay on which it is granted.
Rs.	Rs.	
200- 299 - - - - -	50	25
300- 399 - - - - -	60	20
400- 499 - - - - -	75	18·7
500- 599 - - - - -	90	18
600- 799 - - - - -	105	17·5
800- 999 - - - - -	120	15
1,000-1,499 - - - - -	135	13·5
1,500-1,999 - - - - -	150	10
2,000 and upwards - - - - -	165	8·2

71. *Passage allowances.*—Free first-class passages to India are provided at the expense of Government for officers recruited in England to the following services, viz., the agricultural service, the civil veterinary department, the educational service, the finance and customs departments, the geological survey, the police department, and the public works and railway departments. Recruits for the Indian civil service, on the other hand, are not allowed first-class passages, but are given allowances amounting to 41*l.* 5*s.* to cover the cost of passages to Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, and of 46*l.* 5*s.* to cover the cost of passage to Rangoon. Probationers for the Indian forest service are similarly treated. Officers entitled to free first-class passages are allowed, on satisfactory reasons being given, to make their own arrangements, and in such cases they receive the ordinary rates of passage allowance. Officers appointed in England to the Bengal pilot service receive free second-class passages. It will thus be seen that no fixed principle is observed in the arrangements made to assist officers proceeding to India on their first appointment. We recommend that steps be taken to establish uniformity of procedure. It should be laid down that officers will be provided, on their first appointment, with a free first-class passage from London to their port of disembarkation in India. Officers of the Bengal pilot service should be allowed a second-class passage as at present. The practice of granting an allowance in lieu of a free passage should be discontinued.

72. *Compulsory retirement of inefficient officers.*—The question of the retirement of inefficient officers has recently formed the subject of recommendations by the Royal Commission on Decentralisation, and of correspondence between the Government of India and the Secretary of State. The orders passed by the Secretary of State referred especially to the Indian civil service. They enunciated his power to order the retirement of any officer of proved incompetency, and particularly of such

officers as proved themselves unfit for advancement to the grade of collector or district judge; and as regards the latter, they laid down the rule that retirement should be on a pension not usually exceeding and not necessarily so great as the annuity which would be payable to an invalided officer of the same seniority. The Secretary of State also accepted the view expressed by the Government of India that no attempt should be made to define any method of procedure of trial by commission, or absolute insistence upon the concurrence of the superior officers under whom the person to be retired had served, and that it should be open to the local Government to adopt any method it pleased of justifying its opinion and producing evidence in support of it. With all these conclusions we are in agreement, and need only place on record our sense of the importance to the service of a strict and regular application of the principles to which the Secretary of State has given his sanction. We would also endorse the recommendation of the Royal Commission on Decentralisation that similar principles should be applied throughout all Government departments.

73. *Age for superannuation.*—Some complaint was made to us regarding the operation of article 459 of the civil service regulations, which lays down the conditions as to the compulsory retirement of officers who have reached the age of 55. The actual wording of the rule, so far as it is in dispute, is as follows:—

- (a) An officer who has attained the age of 55 may be required to retire by the local Government under which he is employed.
- (b) The rule should be worked with discretion in order to avoid depriving the State of the valuable experience of really efficient officers and adding unnecessarily to the non-effective charges. In the case of officers holding superior appointments, the standard of efficiency by which retention is to be decided is above the standard required in lower appointments. In every case in which the rule is enforced the reasons for enforcing it should be recorded.
- (c) Each such officer's case should be taken up when he is 55 years old and before the expiry of each extension of service. In every case the extension should be given for not more than one year at a time.

In these provisions there is some ambiguity due to the conflicting interpretations which are now given to subsections (a) and (b) of the article. The wording of these subsections should be so amended as to make it clear that an officer shall retire at the age of 55 unless Government in their sole discretion decide to grant him an extension of service.

## CHAPTER X.

### CONDITIONS OF LEAVE.

74. *Short leave.*—There are two main classes of leave known respectively as "short leave" and "long leave." The commonest form of short leave is privilege leave, which is leave on full pay, and is allowable to the extent of one month in each year of active service. Such leave is cumulative up to a maximum of three months after not less than 33 months' service, and may be taken either in India or outside India; payment in the latter case being normally made on the basis of an exchange value of 1s. 4d. to the rupee. Privilege leave may also be granted to officers employed in departments which enjoy regular vacations, but in these cases is ordinarily on half pay. Another form of short leave is the leave which is given to officers in order to enable them to appear at examinations. This also is on full pay.

75. *Long leave.*—Long leave, on the other hand, is always on reduced pay. It takes the form of ordinary furlough, of leave or furlough on medical certificate, of special leave on urgent private affairs, and of the subsidiary leave which is granted to an officer proceeding on or returning from leave out of India, or on retirement, to enable him to reach the port of embarkation or to rejoin his appointment. It is subject to prescribed conditions as to the amount which may be taken in all, as to the periods which may be taken at any one time, and as to the rates of allowance payable during its duration. Long leave can also be taken in combination with privilege leave, but this form of leave, which is known as combined leave, may not be of less duration than six months, nor, except when extended on medical certificate, of longer duration than two years.

76. *European and Indian service leave rules. Present position.*—All officers of Government are subject to the same conditions of short leave. For purposes of long leave there are separate sets of rules known as the European service and Indian service leave rules respectively, and officers are under one or the other, in some cases by virtue of the place of their recruitment, in others of their rank, and in others of their salaries. Between the two sets of rules the main points of divergence are the following :—

- (a) An officer under the European service rules, in the course of his full qualifying period of employment, may obtain altogether six years (in the case of the Indian civil service  $6\frac{1}{2}$  years') leave with allowances. The aggregate for an officer under the Indian service rules is five years. In each case the total figure includes furlough in the ordinary sense, leave on medical certificate, and leave on private affairs.
- (b) Under the European service rules furlough in the ordinary sense may be taken after the first eight years of service and subsequently, if due, after three years of continuous service. If otherwise admissible, the amount taken at one time may extend to two years. Under the Indian service rules the privilege is much less liberal. Furlough may only be taken after the first ten years of an officer's employment, and subsequently at intervals of not less than eight years. The amount which may be taken at any one time may not exceed one year unless the officer has refrained from taking furlough in the first eighteen years of his service, in which case he may take up to two years at a time. Furthermore, if an officer has taken leave on private affairs, he cannot get furlough until ten years afterwards.
- (c) Under the European service rules, furlough on medical certificate may be extended up to a total period of three years at one time; whereas under the Indian service rules leave on medical certificate, which corresponds to furlough on medical certificate under the European service rules, is not available for more than two years at a time. On the other hand, in the European service rules there are certain restrictions upon sick leave if the officer has not rendered three years' continuous service before taking it; whereas under the Indian service rules leave on medical certificate may be taken at any time and without any restriction beyond the limitation of the total period to two years.
- (d) Under the European service rules special leave on urgent private affairs may be granted for six months at any time, subject only to the provision that leave of the same kind has not been taken for the last six years. Under the Indian service rules the conditions for leave on private affairs are similar; but they are subject to the further restrictions that the officer must not previously have taken furlough, and that he must have had six years' service before he takes his first leave of this kind. These drawbacks are counterbalanced, however, by an advantage explained in (g) below, which the Indian service rules give in the matter of allowances.
- (e) The usual allowance for furlough in the ordinary sense is half the officer's average salary; but under the European service rules it is limited to a maximum of 800*l.* a year, or Rs. 666 $\frac{2}{3}$  a month if paid in India (in the case of the Indian civil service 1,000*l.* a year or Rs. 833 $\frac{1}{3}$  a month), whereas the maximum under the Indian service rules is only 600*l.* a year (Rs. 500 a month if paid in India).
- (f) The allowances for furlough or leave on medical certificate are the same as stated in (e) above; but if the leave is prolonged, the allowances are reduced to one-quarter of the officer's average salary, subject, roughly, to a maximum in all cases of 480*l.* or Rs. 400 a month, and a minimum of 100*l.* or Rs. 83 $\frac{1}{3}$  a month. In the case of the Indian civil service reduced allowances are payable of Rs. 250 to Rs. 400 a month according to length of service. This reduction, however, takes place under the European service rules after the first two years of medical leave, whereas under the Indian service rules it is enforced after the first fifteen months.
- (g) In the first six months of urgent leave on private affairs, an officer under the European service rules gets furlough pay, but no allowances at all for any further period of such leave which he may take. On the other hand an

officer under the Indian service rules draws furlough pay for all leave which he gets on private affairs.

- (h) An officer under European service leave rules may spend his leave anywhere. But in the Indian service rules there is a special provision that leave on medical certificate is not to be taken more than twice out of India.

77. *Maintenance of separate European and Indian service leave rules approved.*—We have considered whether it would not be possible to do away with this distinction and to have only one set of rules for all officers. In such case it would be necessary that all should come under the European service rules, as these admittedly afford the minimum required by European officers who are recruited from Europe. A proposal of this nature was put forward by the Government of India in December 1908, when it was urged that the officers then under the Indian service rules were not in the habit of utilising the leave due to them even under those rules, so that it would make no practical difference if they were allowed the wider benefits of the European service regulations. Stress was also laid on the difficulties which were experienced in classifying officers and on the obsolete nature of some of the detailed restrictions. With the first of these arguments we are no more in sympathy than was the Secretary of State for India when he refused to sanction the scheme in July 1909. Conditions of service in India are rapidly changing, and because leave is not much taken by Indians at present, it does not follow that this will be the case in future. Moreover, if the view is correct that the assimilation of the rules would lead to no appreciable change of practice in taking leave on the part of officers under the Indian service rules, it follows that there is no appreciable hardship in the existing distinction. We therefore approve in principle the maintenance of a double set of regulations. In subsequent paragraphs we shall suggest appropriate remedies for the existing defects of each. These defects, we think, were at the root of the dissatisfaction voiced by the Government of India in 1908.

78. *Classification of officers for purposes of leave rules.*—Before, however, we enter on this discussion it will be desirable to clear up the present difficulties with regard to the classification of officers. At present, as has been already noted, there is no single criterion. Sometimes the place of recruitment, sometimes the rank, and sometimes the pay of the officer has been made the test. This confusion has its origin, we believe, in the lack of a clear definition of the principles which justify recruitment in Europe and the grant of European conditions of salary. These we have discussed in detail when dealing with the subjects of salary and recruitment, and we would apply the same principles here also. Thus where we have framed separate rates of salary in the same department for officers recruited in India and Europe respectively, the former should be under Indian and the latter under European service rules as to leave, and there should be no transfer from one to the other as at present in certain departments. Where, however, we have recommended equal pay from the outset for all alike, we recommend generally that European or Indian service rules should be applied according as the salaries are framed on the scale to attract Europeans from Europe or to secure statutory natives of India in India. We have worked out this principle in detail in the various annexures to our report and are satisfied that the number of anomalies which it will produce will be less than under any other possible system, and that once established it will put an end to the present constant discussion of individual cases.

79. *European service leave rules. Simplification approved.*—We now turn to the detailed consideration of the European service leave rules. In dealing with this subject we were met at the outset by the fact that it had only recently been considered by the Royal Commission on Decentralisation, and that the Government of India, within a few days of our appointment, had forwarded for the consideration of the various local Governments redrafts of certain of the leave articles of the civil service regulations to give effect to their recommendations. These were designed to simplify, as far as possible, the existing orders and to get rid of all unnecessary restrictions in accordance with the following main principles :—

- (a) The existing rules as to the amount of privilege leave and furlough "earned" and "due," and the maximum amount of leave which can be taken at a time or throughout an officer's service, should remain unchanged.
- (b) Privilege leave (or vacation) and furlough due should be allowed to be combined without any restrictions.

- (c) All leave, whether privilege or furlough, should be granted at the discretion of the local Government, subject to—
- (i) the paramount claim of the public service, and
  - (ii) the condition that the total number of officers absent at any time on leave of any description granted otherwise than on medical certificate should not exceed a proportion to be fixed by the Government of India for imperial services, and by the local Government, subject to the approval of the Government of India, for other services.
- (d) Special leave should disappear as a rule, and in its place it should be prescribed that once in his service an officer might be given furlough not exceeding six months altogether, notwithstanding that it was not due, and the proportion of men on leave might thereby be exceeded.
- (e) Subsidiary leave, which is a survival from the days when moving from place to place in India was a far more difficult undertaking than it is now, should be abolished.

From the replies which have been furnished by the local Governments it is evident that a simplification of the regulations on the lines suggested will be generally acceptable, and that, but for the inclusion of the subject in our terms of reference, a settlement might ere now have been reached. We are in agreement with the findings of the Royal Commission on Decentralisation in this matter, and regret the delay which has been caused in giving effect to their suggestions. We recommend, therefore, that the issue raised by them be pressed to a decision without waiting for the discussion of our other proposals. If the redraft prepared by the Government of India is sanctioned, officers will no longer be subject to the condition that they cannot take furlough before the expiry of eight years' service. In our opinion this restriction is unnecessary and exercises a prejudicial effect on recruitment.

80. *Extension of period of leave permissible on higher pay to officers subject to the European service leave rules.*—The Royal Commission on Decentralisation also suggested that officers might be allowed the option of commuting periods of furlough on reduced pay for shorter periods of leave on higher pay. The object of this proposal was to make it possible financially for officers to take leave in England without compelling anyone who could afford at any time to take furlough on the existing terms to forego a privilege in which he had a vested interest. The scheme had this further advantage that with a minimum of dislocation of the existing rules it was likely gradually to break down the practice of taking two years' leave at a time; a practice which has come down from an age when there were fewer railways and the sea journey to India took longer than it now does. It was also a natural extension of the steps which had already been taken in this direction, first, by permitting privilege leave to be accumulated, and later by allowing privilege leave to be taken in combination with furlough. The Government of India, however, in circulating the scheme to the local Governments, stated categorically that it could not be accepted unless it could be brought into operation without any extra expenditure. They also made two further conditions, first, that the existing calculations relating to the leave reserves in the various services should remain unchanged, and, secondly, that there should be no modification in the system by which officers receive officiating allowances when their seniors are on leave. The result of imposing these conditions was that this particular scheme was stillborn. The drawbacks of the existing system, however, remained, and to meet them a fresh proposal for the removal of the restrictions on the accumulation of privilege leave was developed. The objection to this as a solution lies in the inducement it holds out to an officer to postpone his holiday unduly. A married man with a family requires to be able to take at least six months' leave to make it worth his while to go to Europe; and it is undesirable that an officer should remain at work for six years without relaxation. The scheme has a further disadvantage that it does nothing to reduce the present periods of furlough, which, as we have already indicated, tend to be excessive. We are therefore unable to do more in this connection than to recommend that privilege leave should be cumulative up to four months. For this there is the support of existing commercial practice in the presidency towns, where European assistants are encouraged to take leave to Europe once every four years. This concession, however, will not meet the necessities of the case as we think they should be met in the interests both of the state and of officers, and with this object we desire to revive the

suggestion of the Royal Commission on Decentralisation. We recommend that officers be permitted to commute in all two years' ordinary furlough into one year's furlough on full pay, but not more than six months' ordinary furlough should be so commuted at any one time. This will make it possible, by combining commuted furlough with privilege leave, to take seven months' leave on full pay. Furlough commuted in this manner should be on full pay at an exchange of 1s. 4d. to the rupee or on double maximum furlough allowances, whichever is less. It should further be laid down that all periods of furlough so taken on full pay or double furlough allowances should reckon at twice the amount against the maximum limit of furlough admissible during total service.

81. *Leave allowances for officers subject to the European service leave rules.*—There remains the question of the amount of the leave allowances. At present these are subject to the following maximum and minimum limits, the sterling limits being applicable in cases where leave allowances are drawn in gold-using countries :—

		Rs.	£
(A) <i>Indian civil servants and military officers under civil leave rules :—</i>			
Maximum during ordinary furlough and special leave - - - - -		10,000	1,000
Minimum during ordinary furlough and special leave - - - - -		5,000	500
(B) <i>Other officers subject to European service leave rules :—</i>			
Maximum during ordinary furlough and special leave - - - - -		8,000	800
Minimum during ordinary furlough and special leave out of India granted on grounds of health -		2,000	200
Maximum during furlough other than ordinary -		4,800	480
Minimum during furlough out of India other than ordinary granted on grounds of health - -		1,000	100

Having regard to the concession which we have proposed in the matter of commutation of furlough and the accumulation of privilege leave, we do not think it necessary to recommend any increase in the present maximum and minimum limits as fixed in sterling. In view, however, of the fact that furlough allowances paid in gold-using countries are normally granted at the rate of 1s. 6d. instead of 1s. 4d. to the rupee, we are of opinion that the table of equivalence set forth above should be re-calculated so as to provide that the sterling amount of maximum furlough allowance in each case shall stand to the rupee amount in the same proportion. This should be done by substituting Rs. 1,333½ for Rs. 1,000 as the equivalent of each 100L., as shown in the following statement :—

		Rs.	£
(A) <i>Indian civil servants and military officers under civil leave rules :—</i>			
Maximum during ordinary furlough and special leave - - - - -		13,333½	1,000
Minimum during ordinary furlough and special leave - - - - -		6,666½	500
(B) <i>Other officers subject to European service leave rules :—</i>			
Maximum during ordinary furlough and special leave - - - - -		10,666½	800
Minimum during ordinary furlough and special leave granted on grounds of health - - -		2,666½	200
Maximum during furlough other than ordinary -		6,400	480
Minimum during furlough other than ordinary granted on grounds of health - - -		1,333½	100

82. *Indian service leave rules. Simplification approved.*—We now turn to the case of the Indian service leave rules. To the main features of these we have already referred in paragraph 76 above. In their case also, as the result of the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Decentralisation, a redraft was made by the Government of India and circulated to local Governments shortly after our appointment. Action has also been deferred in their case owing to the reference to us. As redrafted by the Government of India the rules now make no distinction between leave on medical certificate and other long leave, and subject to the

restriction that an officer affected by them will not be allowed to take more than five years' furlough during his total service and will earn furlough to the extent only of one-sixth of his active service, follow in the main the European service model. The local Governments generally accept this as suitable and we recommend that immediate effect be given to the changes proposed. For the rest, we are of opinion that officers under Indian service rules, equally with those under European service rules, should be permitted to accumulate their privilege leave up to a maximum of four months. Beyond this we do not think it necessary to go. The reasons which exist for allowing commutation of furlough to officers under the European service rules are not applicable to the case of those who are under the Indian service regulations.

83. *Furlough allowances for officers subject to the Indian service leave rules.*—Finally we have considered the amount of the furlough allowances. At present officers under the Indian service leave rules are subject to the following maximum and minimum rupee and sterling limits, the sterling limits being applicable in cases where leave allowances are drawn in gold-using countries :—

<i>Maximum during—</i>	Rs.	£
Furlough, and leave on medical certificate when period does not exceed fifteen months - - - -	6,000	600
Leave on medical certificate in excess of fifteen months	4,800	480
<i>Minimum during leave out of India on medical certificate—</i>		
When the period is within the limit of fifteen months (and during furlough and leave on private affairs when granted on grounds of health) - - - -	2,000	200
In excess of a period of fifteen months - - - -	1,000	100

In this case the effect of calculating the rupee-limits on the basis of an exchange value of 1s. 6d. would be substantially to increase the present rupee limits, and a considerable concession would thus be made in favour of officers under the Indian service rules who would normally take their furlough in India. Thus, under the revised scheme for the Indian service leave rules set out in the preceding paragraph, all officers drawing a salary of more than Rs. 1,000 a month would be entitled to an increase in the present maximum allowances during ordinary furlough, and officers drawing a salary of more than Rs. 1,600 a month would similarly be entitled to an increased allowance during furlough other than ordinary. We think that an increase is justified on the merits, particularly in view of the fact that under our proposal the Indian service rules will apply to many services, the officers of which under existing regulations are given the benefit of the European service rules at some stage of their career. We accordingly recommend that the rupee-limits should be fixed on the basis of an exchange value of 1s. 6d. instead of 2s. The maximum and minimum limits would then be as shown in the following statement :—

<i>Maximum—</i>	Rs.	£
During ordinary furlough - - - - -	8,000	600
During furlough other than ordinary - - - - -	6,400	480
<i>Minimum during furlough granted on grounds of health—</i>		
During ordinary furlough - - - - -	2,666 $\frac{2}{3}$	200
During furlough other than ordinary - - - - -	1,333 $\frac{1}{3}$	100

84. *Study leave.*—It remains to consider the question of study leave, the importance of which can hardly be overrated if the services in India are to be kept abreast of the latest developments in research in other countries. At present it is provided\* that officers of scientific and technical departments may take extra furlough on certain prescribed conditions to enable them to undergo courses of study outside India. It is not, however, clearly laid down which these departments are, and there are indications that the taking of such leave is not sufficiently encouraged. To a certain extent this is no doubt due to the rigidity of the system under which leave reserves are provided for in the various services. In so far as this is the case the proposals we have made to secure the maintenance of an adequate reserve in each service will provide an appropriate remedy. But we think that the rules themselves should be revised in detail under expert advice, and that the opportunity should at the same time be taken to settle definitely the departments to which they should be applied. They should be those which require from their officers such original work as can only be stimulated by a course of study under the best expert guidance available. Such, for example, would be the agricultural, civil veterinary, geological survey, and medical departments, and the collegiate branch of the education department. The

\* Appendix No. 32 to the civil service regulations.

rules should also provide for the possibility of study leave within as well as outside of India.

85. *Deputation of officers.*—We also think it desirable to emphasise the importance of elasticity in the arrangements which now prevail for deputing officers, whether during their leave or otherwise, to study particular problems connected with their technical duties. This need exists or may exist not only in those services for which we have recommended the grant of study leave facilities, but also in others; for example, on the judicial side of the Indian civil service and in the forest, telegraph (engineering), public works, and railway (engineering) departments. For such cases it is not possible to lay down any general rule. Each must be treated on its own merits.

86. *Facilities for voluntary study for officers on leave.*—There is a further class of case in which we do not recommend any concessions, but where we think something could be done to make profitable to himself and to the state the time spent by an officer on leave in England. For example, cases may well arise in which an officer belonging to the executive branch of the Indian civil service will wish during his leave to examine the system on which large corporations in the United Kingdom are organised for municipal work, or the latest trend of the co-operative credit movement; an inspector of factories might be concerned to know the most recent developments of Home Office practice; and an inspector of European schools might welcome an opportunity of acquiring an insight into the procedure for inspection in the United Kingdom. To meet such cases, we recommend that the India Office should formally undertake to advise officers of the various services as to the best means of getting into touch with institutions or persons who would be able and willing to assist them in carrying out their inquiries.

## CHAPTER XI.

### CONDITIONS OF PENSION.

87. *Scope of the present general pension rules.*—Deputy sanitary commissioners, who are not members of the Indian medical service, and members of the railway department, other than those belonging to or transferred from the engineering branch, do not receive pensions but enjoy the benefits of a provident fund. We shall deal with their cases in annexures XII. and XIX. to our report. We shall also deal separately in annexure XV. with the pensions which should be given in the pilots (Bengal) department. In the same way we shall explain separately in annexure X. the steps which we think should be taken with regard to the annuity system now in force in the Indian civil service. The conditions of pension of military officers in civil employ are determined by army regulations and therefore lie beyond the scope of our reference. With these exceptions all the officers into whose cases we have inquired are under the same or very similar rules as to pension, and it will be convenient to explain generally the action which we recommend.

88. *Classes of pension.*—Pensions are of four kinds, namely:—

- (a) compensation pensions, awarded to officers discharged after the completion of not less than ten years' qualifying service, because, on a reduction of establishment, their appointments have been abolished and other suitable employment cannot be found for them;
- (b) invalid pensions awarded, on their retirement after not less than ten years' qualifying service, to officers who by bodily or mental infirmity are permanently incapacitated for the public service or for the particular branch of it to which they belong;
- (c) superannuation pensions granted to officers entitled or compelled by rule to retire at a particular age; and
- (d) retiring pensions granted to officers who voluntarily retire after completing a prescribed period of qualifying service.

89. *Conditions of pension applicable to different services.*—These pensions are calculated on the basis of the average emoluments of the pensioned officer during the three years previous to his retirement, and in accordance with a scale of so many sixtieths of such emoluments. The ordinary scale is ten-sixtieths after ten years' completed service, fifteen-sixtieths after fifteen years, twenty-sixtieths after twenty years, and so on up to twenty-four years. For twenty-five years and over the full scale of thirty-sixtieths or one-half is granted. In view, however, of the fact that this scale of

sixtieths would give unduly large pensions in the case of the more highly paid officers, maximum limits on the total amount of pension which can be earned have been fixed for each year of completed service. Thus, ordinarily no pension in excess of Rs. 2,000 a year can be earned by an officer who has not completed more than ten years' service, whilst for fifteen and twenty years' service the limits are Rs. 3,000 and Rs. 4,000 a year respectively. These scales of sixtieths and maximum limits are, however, varied in the case of officers appointed in England to the public works department, to the engineering branches of the railway and telegraph departments, and to the forest and geological survey departments. These officers are also allowed to retire on full pension after twenty-five years, and on a proportionate pension after twenty years' qualifying service, whereas other officers have to serve thirty years before any retiring pension can be paid to them. Members of the Indian educational service recruited after the 23rd July 1896 are also entitled, if they were over twenty-five years of age at the time of their appointment, to reckon as service qualifying for superannuation but not for any other class of pension, the number of completed years not exceeding five by which their age at the time of appointment exceeded twenty-five. The position as regards the scales of sixtieths and the maximum limits is exhibited in the following tables :—

Years of completed service.	TABLE A. Scale and maximum limits normally in force.			TABLE B. Scale and maximum limits prescribed for officers appointed in England to the public works department, the engineering branches of the railway and telegraph departments, and the forest and geological survey departments.		
	Scale of pension (sixtieths of average emoluments).	Maximum limits of pension.		Scale of pension (sixtieths of average emoluments).	Maximum limits of pension.	
		Rs. per annum.	£ s. d.		Rs. per annum.	£ s. d.
10	10	2,000	175 0 0	20	1,000	87 10 0
11	11	2,200	192 10 0	21	1,400	122 10 0
12	12	2,400	210 0 0	22	1,800	157 10 0
13	13	2,600	227 10 0	23	2,200	192 10 0
14	14	2,800	245 0 0	24	2,600	227 10 0
15	15	3,000	262 10 0	25	3,000	262 10 0
16	16	3,200	280 0 0	26	3,000	262 10 0
17	17	3,400	297 10 0	27	3,000	262 10 0
18	18	3,600	315 0 0	28	3,000	262 10 0
19	19	3,800	332 10 0	29	3,000	262 10 0
20	20	4,000	350 0 0	30	4,000	350 0 0
21	21	4,200	367 10 0	30	4,000	350 0 0
22	22	4,400	385 0 0	30	4,000	350 0 0
23	23	4,600	402 10 0	30	4,000	350 0 0
24	24	4,800	420 0 0	30	4,000	350 0 0
25 and over }	30	5,000	437 10 0	30	5,000	437 10 0

\* Pensions are fixed in rupees, but if they are drawn at or through the Home Treasury or in colonies where the Indian Government rupee is not legal tender, they are converted into sterling at a minimum rate of exchange of 1s. 9d. to the rupee. The sterling amounts shown under "maximum limits of pension" represent the equivalent on a 1s. 9d. basis of the several rupee maxima prescribed.

90. *Analysis of the conditions of pension applicable to the different services.*—An analysis of these two tables gives somewhat curious results. At first sight it would appear that officers under table B, who retire with less than twenty-five years' service would draw a much larger number of sixtieths of their average emoluments than officers under table A. In practice this is not the case, owing to the fact that officers of the table B services are ordinarily in receipt of emoluments against which the maximum limits operate. For example, the maximum of Rs. 1,000 a year for officers of ten years' service represents at twenty-sixtieths an annual salary of Rs. 3,000 a year or Rs. 250 a month, and all table B officers will be drawing more than this after that period. Similarly, the Rs. 5,000 a year limit for officers with twenty-five years' service at thirty-sixtieths gives an annual salary of Rs. 10,000 or Rs. 833½ a month, and after twenty-five years all table B officers will be getting more than this. In consequence the pensions actually awarded to table B officers are always at the maximum rates and never in accordance with the scale of sixtieths, and, except as regards officers retiring at the end of their fifteenth or twentieth year of service, or after the completion of twenty-five years' service, the maximum limits of pension are

higher in table A than in table B. Thus the only real privilege which table B officers enjoy is that of optional retirement after fewer years' service. In the amount of their pensions they are, on the whole, less liberally treated than officers coming under the ordinary table A conditions. The privilege of earlier retirement was first conceded to officers of the public works department some thirty years ago in order to get rid of a temporary block of promotion. Subsequently it spread into the other departments in which it is now found, in the way that temporary concessions are so apt to do. The result has been unfortunate as officers in other services now feel that they have been unjustly treated in being denied a similar concession, and the matter has been discussed as if the decision turned on the question whether one particular set of officers had more or less arduous conditions of employment than another. We are unable to recognise any distinctions of this sort. Each kind of work has its own peculiar hardships and attractions, and the capacity to perform it is, for the most part, a matter of training and habit. The real test in such matters is not this, but the age of recruitment. In all the services now under review the rule is that an officer will ordinarily be superannuated when he reaches the age of 55, and the main object of a satisfactory pension scheme should be to ensure that normally an officer who has served the state until he reaches that age should be able to retire on a full pension.

91. *Recommendations with regard to conditions of pension.*—The existing scale allows a full pension to all officers superannuated after not less than twenty-five years' service. Thus an officer recruited at the age of thirty will be able to take a full pension after twenty-five years' service, because by then he will be 55 and thus liable to superannuation. An officer recruited at the age of twenty-eight, on the other hand, will have to serve for twenty-seven years before he is 55 and eligible for a full pension, and so on. To this extent there is already a sliding scale in force in favour of officers recruited at a late age. But difficulties arise over time spent on furlough, which only to a limited extent counts towards pension, and in the case of officers recruited over the age of thirty. To meet these the provision to which we have already alluded was introduced into the Indian educational service. Here, without any sacrifice of the thirty-year period for service for a full retiring pension, officers, who are appointed when they are over twenty-five years of age, are entitled to reckon as service qualifying for superannuation pension the number of completed years, not exceeding five, by which their age at the time of appointment exceeded twenty-five. We consider this to be the right solution. We would, therefore, enforce the thirty-year period for a full retiring pension against all future entrants to the table B services, thus securing uniformity for everyone, but would allow the rebate, now permitted in the Indian educational service, in all departments in which recruitment is likely to take place after twenty-five. We have specified in detail to whom this concession should be made in the various annexures to our report, and would allow it only in the services there noted. We would do nothing to encourage its grant in favour of individual officers who may be appointed on personal grounds at a late age in services in which younger men are available to do the work. We think, however, that the total loss of pension which officers now incur who retire before completing thirty years' service is too great a penalty. We would, therefore, let all officers who had completed as much as twenty-five years' qualifying service retire optionally on pensions calculated in accordance with the following reduced scale:—

Years of service.	Scale of pension.			Maximum limits of pension.		
				Rs. per annum.	£	s. d.
25	20-sixtieths of average emoluments	-	-	4,000	350	0 0
26	21 " " "	-	-	4,200	367	10 0
27	22 " " "	-	-	4,400	385	0 0
28	23 " " "	-	-	4,600	402	10 0
29	24 " " "	-	-	4,800	420	0 0

As a return for this privilege Government should take full power to place any officer on the retired list at any time after the completion of twenty-five years' service and without having to give reasons. But in this case the pensions awarded should be calculated at the full rate provided in the ordinary scale now recommended. These measures will go far towards securing that general uniformity of treatment without which jealousies and heartburnings are bound to occur. Moreover, they can be

adopted without diminishing, to any serious extent, the attractiveness of the table B services. But to remove any grievance and to complete the amalgamation of the two systems we recommend that the scales of sixtieths and the maximum limits in table B be abandoned for all future entrants to those services, and that all officers be brought eventually under the same conditions.

92. *Maximum limits of pension. Increase proposed.*—We have also considered whether the maximum limits prescribed in table A are adequate. In this connection it has been represented to us that the maximum ordinary pension now payable to officers, namely, Rs. 5,000 a year, was fixed so long ago as 1855 and that this figure was adopted as the equivalent of 500*l.* at the then rate of exchange. Now, however, that pensions are converted into sterling at the rate only of 1*s.* 9*d.* to the rupee, the ordinary maximum pension of to-day is worth 62*l.* 10*s.* less to the officers who draw it in sterling than the amount originally intended. As in the case, however, of salaries we attach little importance to arguments founded on a comparison between present and past conditions. What affects us more is the consideration of the amount needed to make Government service reasonably attractive to recruits. In so far as the main body of officers is concerned we see no reason to doubt that the present terms of pension are adequate. It is only in the case of highly placed officers that we see ground for reasonable complaint. Under table A the maximum limits are operative against all officers with less than twenty-five years' service whose average emoluments are in excess of Rs. 1,000 a month at the time of retirement, and against all officers with twenty-five years' service or over whose average emoluments at the time of retirement exceed Rs. 833½ a month. Hence it follows that, the higher an officer's rank in the service, the greater becomes the difference between his actual pension, as determined by the maximum limit, and the pension he would have received if it had been determined in accordance with the scale of sixtieths without any maximum limit. Apart from this general consideration we are impressed by the strong feeling of dissatisfaction with the present limits which is everywhere prevalent, and we are satisfied that from the point of view of recruitment some improvement of the existing conditions is needed. After taking into account the concessions which we have recommended in regard to salary and leave, we have come to the conclusion that the present maximum of Rs. 5,000 a year is sufficient for such officers as are retired with not more than twenty-five years' service to their credit but is less than sufficient for those who are retired after a longer term of employment. In their case we recommend that the present maximum of Rs. 5,000 a year should be replaced by the following graduated limits. The cost of this concession will amount approximately to 9¼ lakhs of rupees a year.

Years of service.	Maximum limits of pension.		
	Rs. per annum.	£	s. d.
26	5,200	455	0 0
27	5,400	472	10 0
28	5,600	490	0 0
29	5,800	507	10 0
30 and over	6,000	525	0 0

93. *Special additional pensions.*—We also think that the special additional pensions paid to certain highly placed officers are in need of revision. At present officers holding any of the appointments enumerated below are allowed an additional pension of Rs. 1,000 (87*l.* 10*s.*) a year provided that they have rendered not less than three years' effective service in these appointments, and provided also that in each case during such service such special energy and efficiency has been shown as to be considered deserving of the concession. In the case of officers who entered Government service after 31st December 1909 the grant of the additional pension is subject to the further condition that they must, in the event of voluntary retirement, have completed twenty-eight years' qualifying service. For this purpose the term voluntary retirement covers cases of retirement at the age of 55.

*Agricultural Department.*—The agricultural adviser to the Government of India and director of the Pusa research institute.

*Customs Department.*—Collectors.

*Education Department.*—Directors of public instruction under local Governments and administrations.

*Finance Department.*

- (a) Comptroller and auditor-general, accountants-general and chief examiners.
- (b) In the case of officers of the general list who elected the scales of pay sanctioned in 1906 and 1909—appointments in class I. of the list.
- (c) In the case of officers of the general list who did not elect the scales above referred to—deputy comptroller-general, deputy auditors-general, comptroller, India Treasuries, comptroller, Central Provinces, and examiners, class I., superior accounts branch, public works department.

*Forest Department.*—Inspector-general of forests and conservators.

*Geological Survey Department.*—Director.

*Civil Services.*—Commissioners of divisions and divisional judges of the first grade in Burma, not being members of the Indian civil service.

*Land Records (Burma) Department.*—Settlement commissioner and director of land records in Burma.

*Medical Department.*—Inspectors-general of jails under local Governments, but not under chief commissioners, not being members of the Indian medical service.

*Police Department.*—Inspectors-general and deputy inspectors-general under local Governments and administrations, and the commissioners of police, Calcutta, Madras, Rangoon and Bombay.

*Post Office and Telegraph Department.*—Director-general, deputy director-general, postmaster-general, chief engineer (telegraphs), director (telegraph engineering).

*Public Works Department.*—Secretary to the Government of India, under secretary to the Government of India, chief engineers and superintending engineers, first class, and officers of corresponding rank.

*Railway Department.*—Officers of corresponding rank to those shown under the public works department.

*Registration Department.*—Inspectors-general under local Governments, but not under chief commissioners, not being members of the Indian civil service.

*Survey of India Department.*—Surveyor-general, deputy surveyor-general and superintendents.

We have examined this list in detail and consider it suitable, but would add the following in order to secure uniformity of treatment :—

*Education Department.*—Officers in the grade of Rs. 1,500—1,750.

*Military Finance Department.*—Military accountant-general, controllers of military supply accounts, military deputy auditor-general, military deputy accountant-general, military accountants, 1st class.

*Civil Services.*—Officers promoted from the provincial civil services to hold Indian civil service posts.

*Medical Department.*—Professors in the Government medical colleges, not being members of the Indian medical service or otherwise specially provided for, and inspectors-general of jails in the Central Provinces and Berar.

*Mines Department.*—Chief inspector.

*Mint and Assay Departments.*—Mint masters and assay masters.

*Public Works and Railway Departments.*—Superintending engineers.

*Registration Department.*—Inspector-general in the Central Provinces and Berar, not being a member of the Indian civil service.

We also think that the privileged officers, instead of getting an all-round rate of Rs. 1,000 a year, should get an addition at the rate of Rs. 300 a year for each year of service in one or other of the scheduled appointments, subject to a total maximum limit of Rs. 1,500 a year. Thus the highest pension that an officer could receive would be Rs. 7,500 or 656l. 5s. a year, and this would be payable only to such officers as had completed thirty years' qualifying service, including at least five years' service in a privileged appointment. We would add that these additional pensions should be awarded in future as they have been in the past only to officers who have given proof of special energy and efficiency, and that the rule which debars from the award of an additional pension officers retiring of their own option at the age of 55 with less than twenty-eight years' service should continue to be enforced. We also think that the officers

of the table B services should not be allowed to participate in these or any other of the benefits which we have proposed in the way of pensions, unless at the same time they are willing to renounce the special privileges in respect of optional retirement which they at present enjoy. The increased expenditure on account of this concession will be approximately 2½ lakhs of rupees a year.

94. *Time spent on leave when to count for pension.*—Under existing rules time spent on privilege leave or subsidiary leave counts in full as service for pension, and other time passed on leave with allowances counts for service as follows :—

If the total service of the officer is not less than—	He counts as service a period of leave—	
	in India not exceeding—	out of India not exceeding—
15 years - - -	1 year	1 year
20 " - - -	2 years	1 "
25 " - - -	3 "	1 "
30 " - - -	4 "	2 years
35 " - - -	5 "	2 "

Representations were made to us that these periods should be increased, but on the whole we consider that they are sufficient, and that no change need be made in them.

95. *Commutation of pension.*—Commutation of pension can be allowed by local Governments up to an amount which will leave the pensioner in receipt of at least three-fourths of the pension originally issued to him. Applicants for commutation are obliged to attend before a medical board and the lump sum payable on commutation is the amount admissible according to the table of present values given in the civil service regulations. These arrangements, which have recently been revised, appear to be suitable and we do not propose any change.

96. *Family pensions.*—At present the Indian civil service is the only civil service the members of which are obliged by Government to contribute to an official family pension fund. In other civil departments European and Anglo-Indian officers have to subscribe 6½ per cent. of their salaries to what is known as the general provident fund, but the benefits payable from the fund to the family of a deceased officer are limited to a lump sum consisting of the officer's own subscriptions with four per cent. compound interest added by Government. This cannot, therefore, be regarded as an efficient substitute for a family pension fund, which provides equal benefits for all alike irrespective of the amount subscribed by each individual officer. Other funds, of which one, the Bengal and Madras service family pension fund, is under Government management, have, it is true, been established with the express purpose of enabling officers to make provision for their families. But to none of these is contribution obligatory. It was made clear to us that throughout the various branches of the administration there was a widespread desire for the institution of an official family pension fund or funds on the model of the Indian civil service fund to which all officers alike would be compelled to subscribe. We think this desirable, but are not in a position to work out a scheme in detail. This will need careful actuarial calculation. We recommend, therefore, that the matter be taken in hand at an early date. We recognise that it may be necessary owing to differences of family customs and conditions of service to establish separate funds for separate classes of officers. We would also add that any fund or funds which may be established should be self-supporting, and that the responsibility of Government should be limited to providing the machinery of management and a guarantee of solvency.

## CHAPTER XII.

### SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS.

97. At the end of the various annexures to our report we have summarised in detail the recommendations which we have made with regard to each service. The proposals we have put forward for increased expenditure have been framed without regard to the prior claims of the present war on the resources of the country, and may need to be given effect to gradually. Otherwise we have taken into account the existing situation. The main conclusions to which we have come are as follows :—

- (i) Where it is necessary to organise the public services into higher and lower branches, this should be arranged on the basis of the work which they are

required to do, and not, as is now in some instances the case, of the race of, or the salaries drawn by, their members, or any such artificial distinction (paragraphs 24 to 26).

- (ii) Officers promoted from a lower into a higher service should ordinarily be given the same opportunities as officers who have been directly recruited, and should be eligible on their merits for appointment to any post in their service. Both classes of officers should be shown on the same list and should take seniority amongst themselves from their date of entry on the list. Except in the case of the Indian civil service all promoted officers should also be made full members of the service into which they are promoted (paragraph 27).
- (iii) The practice of employing military officers on civil duties should be continued in the medical, public works, railway, and survey of India departments, and subject to the conditions stated. Military officers should also be eligible for appointment to the mint department. Elsewhere the practice of recruiting them should be allowed to die out, but this should take place gradually in the case of the civil service in Burma (paragraph 28).
- (iv) The practice of employing members of the Indian civil service in other departments should be continued in the post office, and in the Northern India salt revenue, Indian finance and customs departments. Such officers should also continue to supervise the work of the land records (Burma), registration, salt and excise, and survey (Madras) departments. They should no longer be appointed directors of agriculture, but rural commissionerships should be created and be manned from their ranks. The inspector-generalships of police should no more be recruited for in the Indian civil service, but Indian civil servants should continue to be eligible for these appointments subject to the claims of qualified police officers (paragraph 29).
- (v) The services which lie between the higher and the subordinate services should no longer be designated "provincial" services. If they are organised provincially they should ordinarily bear the name of their province; for example, the Madras civil service, the Bombay police service, and so on. If they are under the Government of India the terms class I. and class II. should be used for the two services. These terms should also be used in the education department (paragraph 30).
- (vi) The services for which recruitment is now made normally in India should continue to be recruited for in that country. The Indian finance department should be added to this category. The military finance department should be similarly treated, if there are no military considerations to the contrary. Eventually, similar action should be taken with the customs department, but for the present some recruitment in Europe for this department should be permitted. The remaining services for which recruitment is now made wholly in Europe, or partly in Europe and partly in India, should be divided into three main groups. In the first should be placed the Indian civil service and the police department, in which it should be recognised that a preponderating proportion of the officers should be recruited in Europe. In the second should come services like the education, medical, public works and so on, in which there are grounds of policy for continuing to have, in the personnel, an admixture of both western and eastern elements. For these services arrangements should be made for recruitment in both countries. In the third should be placed certain scientific and technical services, such as the agricultural and civil veterinary departments, &c., for the normal requirements of which it should be the aim to recruit eventually in India. To this end educational institutions should be developed in India on a level with those now existing in Europe so as to produce the necessary supply of candidates (paragraphs 31 and 32).
- (vii) No system of state scholarships will provide a suitable method for increasing the number of non-Europeans in the public services (paragraph 35).

- (viii) In certain services arrangements should be made for the appointment of a minimum number of Indians, but this should not be made a general practice for fear that the minimum may come to be regarded as a maximum (paragraph 35).
- (ix) To secure an increase in the number of non-Europeans employed, so far as this is not obtained automatically by the proposals made with regard to organisation and the place of appointment, different methods should be followed in different services, as detailed in the annexures. Speaking generally, technical institutions in India should be created or expanded; provision should be made for advertising vacancies; Indian members should be appointed to serve on the committees which will advise on the selection of recruits; and, finally, the statistics relating to the employment of members of the various communities should be published every ten years (paragraph 36).
- (x) The question of the extent to which the services should be manned by the direct recruitment of untried officers and by the promotion of experienced officers from an inferior service should be settled separately for each service, as explained in the various annexures. But in every case opportunities should be created for young men, and direct recruitment should be encouraged wherever possible (paragraph 37).
- (xi) In the present conditions of India no general system of competitive examinations as a means of entry to the public services is suitable, but where such a method exists it should ordinarily be maintained (paragraph 42).
- (xii) When nominating direct recruits for admission to the services the authorities in India should act with the advice of committees, which should not be purely departmental in character, but should contain persons in touch with educational institutions, and should also have a non-official and an Indian element. Publicity should be given to all vacancies, and applicants should be forbidden to bring outside pressure to bear on individual members of the committees. A similar procedure should be followed in England. Candidates for services recruited in India should ordinarily possess a minimum educational qualification. This need not be identical for all candidates, but the standard for all should be the same (paragraph 44).
- (xiii) In recruiting specialists care should be taken to draw upon the widest possible field (paragraph 45).
- (xiv) Arrangements can best be made for communal representation in India by the exercise of the powers of Government under the system of nomination proposed. No hard and fast rule of proportions is suitable (paragraph 46).
- (xv) Except where otherwise provided, direct recruits should be on probation for two years. A probationary course in England should be given only to recruits for the Indian civil and forest services, and in the latter only for so long as recruits are taken from Europe. As the schools of forestry in the United Kingdom are developed, recruits from Europe should be taken from them (paragraph 47).
- (xvi) The question of training requires to be considered for each service separately, as explained in the various annexures. Inter-provincial conferences of officers responsible for the training of recruits should be encouraged (paragraph 48).
- (xvii) In fixing the salaries of their employés, Government should pay so much and so much only as is necessary to obtain recruits of the right stamp, and to maintain them in such a degree of comfort and dignity as will shield them from temptation and keep them efficient for the term of their service (paragraph 49).

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- (xviii) Except where otherwise expressly provided, officers should be remunerated by an incremental scale of salaries on the compartment system. Where this is done the rules with regard to acting allowances should be revised (paragraphs 50 and 51).
- (xix) Exchange compensation allowance should no longer be paid, but generally speaking the amounts now drawn on this account should be added to the salaries of officers (paragraph 52).
- (xx) The salaries to be paid to Europeans and statutory natives of India respectively should be settled for each service separately and ordinarily in accordance with the principle set out in item xvii above, and not on any general consideration of race or place of recruitment. In services in which different rates are found to be suitable they should be fixed on the merits of each case, and no proportion should be laid down generally as between the amounts payable to the two classes of officers. In services the normal requirements of which will eventually be met in India, the standard scale of salaries should be that considered suitable for statutory natives of India, and special rates should be fixed for Europeans for so long as they are recruited. In certain services in which equality of pay has long been an established practice this should be maintained. In other services officers should be brought to an equality in the administrative ranks, and earlier in the education department. As a special case statutory natives of India recruited in Europe should be paid as Europeans (paragraphs 53 to 57).
- (xxi) The salaries to be paid to officers should be as stated in the various annexures. For recruits in India from the ordinary graduate class, or their equivalent amongst members of the domiciled community, a general scale rising from Rs. 250 to Rs. 500 a month should be introduced. Beyond this there should be selection scales or posts suitable to the circumstance of each service. For services requiring higher initial qualifications higher rates should be adopted (paragraph 58).
- (xxii) The necessary steps should be taken to keep the cadres of the services up to a strength sufficient to cope with the work to be done (paragraph 61).
- (xxiii) The calculations in accordance with which recruitment is made should be worked out with greater precision, and should be revised periodically with due regard to the requirements of leave and training. More precision is needed in fixing the annual rate of recruitment, and service tables should be prepared and kept up to date for each service or group of services. Distribution lists should be maintained for all services, which are recruited on a system, to show by groups of years the theoretical and actual number of officers present. Excesses or defects should be dealt with at the point where they occur. If in spite of these measures blocks in promotion are experienced, special allowances should be given on the merits of each case (paragraphs 61 to 65).
- (xxiv) An expert committee should be appointed to simplify the present travelling allowance rules, to consider their sufficiency for everyday purposes, and to revise the classification of officers. Immediate measures should be taken to reimburse officers for all reasonable charges incurred by them on transfer from one station to another, whether personal to themselves or on behalf of their families and household establishments (paragraphs 66 to 68).
- (xxv) The rules as to house allowances should be revised on the lines indicated (paragraph 69).
- (xxvi) A Burma allowance should be given on the terms stated (paragraph 70).
- (xxvii) Free passages should be given to officers of the services specified (paragraph 71).
- (xxviii) Inefficient officers should be compulsorily retired (paragraph 72).

- (xxix) Officers who are subject to the operation of article 459 of the civil service regulations should be retired at the age of 55, unless Government, in their sole discretion, decide to grant an extension of service (paragraph 73).
- (xxx) There should be separate European service and Indian service leave rules to regulate the taking of long leave. Speaking generally, officers recruited under European conditions of salary should be subject to the European, and others to the Indian service leave rules (paragraphs 77 and 78).
- (xxxi) The European service leave rules should be simplified, and greater facilities for leave on higher pay should be given by allowing privilege leave to be accumulated up to four months and furlough to be commuted subject to the restrictions stated (paragraphs 79 and 80).
- (xxxii) The sterling amounts of the allowances payable under the European service leave rules should stand to the rupee amounts in the proportion of 18 to 16 (paragraph 81).
- (xxxiii) The Indian service leave rules should be simplified ; officers subject to them should be allowed to accumulate privilege leave up to four months, and the allowances permissible should be increased to the extent stated (paragraphs 82 and 83).
- (xxxiv) The rules relating to study leave should be revised ; the arrangements for deputing officers to study particular problems should be made more elastic, and facilities should be given to officers on leave to study voluntarily such problems as interest them (paragraphs 84 to 86).
- (xxxv) With the exceptions specified all officers should be under the same pension rules ; all should serve normally for thirty years, but those recruited after the age of twenty-five in the services noted should be granted the concessions indicated, and all should be able to retire optionally on a reduced pension after twenty-five years' service. Government should be able to retire any officer after this period (paragraphs 87 to 91).
- (xxxvi) The maximum limits of pension should be increased on the conditions stated, and special additional pensions of the amount stated should be drawn by the officers noted (paragraphs 92 and 93).
- (xxxvii) A scheme for a general family pension fund, or for separate funds for different classes of officers, should be worked out on a self-supporting basis (paragraph 96).

98. In submitting our report we desire to place on record our great indebtedness to the skilled and devoted assistance which we have received throughout our inquiry from the secretaries to the Commission—Mr. Montagu Butler of the Indian civil service and Mr. R. R. Scott of the Admiralty. Our labours have been arduous and protracted. We have investigated twenty-four branches of the Indian public services, have examined several hundred witnesses, and have undertaken two extensive tours through India and Burma, but every member of the Commission is sensible of the degree to which the general burden has been lightened by Mr. Butler's exact and comprehensive knowledge of Indian conditions, by his great capacity for organisation, and by the resource and energy which he has displayed in draftsmanship. Mr. Scott did not possess the initial advantage of official experience in India, but rapidly obtained a mastery of every department of the work entrusted to him, and could always be relied on for accurate knowledge. To both these gentlemen we owe a sincere debt of acknowledgment for their ungrudging labours and unfailing courtesy and consideration.


99. We also wish to express our appreciation of the services rendered to us, both in England and in India, by our assistant secretary, Mr. J. Putnam of the India Office, and by Mr. S. D. Gupta of the Indian finance department. In England Mr. J. W. Steadman of the India Office, and in India Rai Bahadur Abinas Chandra Koar of the home department of the Government of India, each in his own sphere, also did excellent work. The proceedings of the Commission were reported by Messrs. T. A. Reed and Co. of London. Their work was done, particularly during the first tour, under very arduous conditions, and gave satisfaction throughout.

All of which we humbly submit for Your Majesty's gracious consideration.

(Signed) ISLINGTON (*Chairman*).  
 RONALDSHAY<sup>\*(a)</sup>.  
 MURRAY HAMMICK<sup>\*(b)</sup>.  
 THEODORE MORISON<sup>\*(c)</sup>.  
 VALENTINE CHIROL<sup>\*(d)</sup>.  
 M. B. CHAUBAL<sup>\*(e)</sup>.  
 W. C. MADGE<sup>\*(f)</sup>.  
 F. G. SLY<sup>\*(g)</sup>.  
 H. A. L. FISHER<sup>\*(h)</sup>.  
 J. RAMSAY MACDONALD<sup>\*(i)</sup>.

M. S. D. BUTLER } *Joint Secretaries.*  
 R. R. SCOTT }

DATED THE 14TH DAY OF AUGUST, 1915.



\* Signatures subject to the remarks contained in the minutes which are appended. The references to the several minutes are given below :—

(a) See page 371 ; also pages 86, 120 and 152. (b) See pages 76, 152 and 229.

(c) See page 371 ; also page 229. (d) See page 371 ; also pages 152 and 230.

(e) See page 373 ; also pages 77, 86, 92, 120, 153, 160, 230, 281 and 316.

(f) See page 386 ; also pages 238, 316 and 366.

(g) See page 371 ; also pages 76, 86, 87, 120, 138, 154 and 229. (h) See pages 121 and 239.

(i) See page 391 ; also pages 121 and 239.

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## ANNEXURE I.

### Agricultural Department.

(The evidence relating to this department will be found in volume XV.)

#### CHAPTER I.

##### INTRODUCTORY.

1. The agricultural department of the Government of India was first constituted in 1871, and shortly afterwards local Governments began to establish agricultural departments of their own under the superintendence of members of the Indian civil service who usually combined their agricultural duties with those of other posts and in some cases were aided by special agricultural assistants. But for many years these departments, both in the Government of India and in the provinces, confined their attention to matters connected with famine and land revenue, and the great problem of the improvement of Indian agriculture was hardly touched. In 1892 two agricultural chemists were appointed. An inspector-generalship of agriculture was created in 1901, and this was followed during the next three years by the appointment of a few agricultural experts for service under the Government of India and in the provinces. In its present form the agricultural department may be said to have been started in 1905. A research institute and college had been established at Pusa in 1903, but it was not until 1905 that a complete scheme was adopted for the introduction of an expert agency for carrying out scientific and education work and the practical duties connected with the development of agricultural methods throughout India.

#### CHAPTER II.

##### ORGANISATION.

2. *Division of the services into imperial and provincial.*—As now constituted the department includes an imperial branch of sixty-one officers exclusive of the agricultural adviser to the Government of India, of whom thirty-six are engaged in research and teaching and eighteen in field experiment and practical work. This latter is often referred to as the agricultural branch. The remaining seven officers are supernumeraries. There are also in the department fifty-six officers of whom twenty-five are employed as assistant professors or assistants in the research branch and thirty-one in field experiment and practical work. The position of these fifty-six officers is equivalent to that of officers belonging to provincial services in departments which have a higher and a lower superior service. They have been appointed from time to time during recent years as occasion demanded, many of them on terms of service personal to themselves.\* We are agreed that there is room in the agricultural department, both in the research and teaching section and in the agricultural branch, for the employment, under the general direction of the imperial staff, of bodies of officers possessing higher educational and technical qualifications than are ordinarily to be found among members of a purely subordinate establishment. We therefore approve of the steps which have already been taken in this direction, and recommend that as soon as possible these officers should be organised into regular services subject to uniform terms of employment.

3. *The inspector-generalship of agriculture.*—The inspector-generalship of agriculture was abolished in 1912, and since then the director of the Pusa agricultural research institute has become the senior officer of the department. This officer holds the collateral title of agricultural adviser to the Government of India. He has no provincial control, but inspects the work in various provinces from time to time and offers advice.† The existing arrangement appears to be suitable and we recommend no change.

4. *Arrangements to be made in the provinces for the control of the agricultural and kindred departments.*—The agricultural department in each province is in charge of an officer having the title of director of agriculture. The directors have hitherto been drawn exclusively from the Indian civil service, but the Secretary of State has recently decided that agricultural officers should be given opportunity of proving their fitness for the appointments.‡ With this decision we agree. We would go

\* Volume XV., 68051.

† Volume XV., 68070.

‡ Volume XV., 68050.

## ANNEXURE I.—AGRICULTURAL DEPARTMENT—(continued).

further and recommend that the practice of appointing Indian civil service officers be discontinued. At the same time we are of opinion that better provision than now exists should be made for the effective organisation and co-ordination of the various agencies in each province which are concerned in one way or another with the rural development of the country. What is required is that these agencies, which include besides the agricultural department, the civil veterinary department, co-operative credit societies, and the department of arts and crafts, should be supervised in each province by a specially-selected officer of wide administrative experience. This officer should have direct access to Government, and thus be in a position to combine inside knowledge with outside control. He would be able in virtue of his position to gain considerable first-hand knowledge of the objects and methods of the several departments under him, whilst leaving the responsibility for details to their heads. His position in relation to Government would enable him on the one hand to insist that the specialists in each branch paid due consideration to economic and administrative requirements in framing their proposals, and on the other to secure continuity of policy in the working out of the larger problems of rural development. Under present conditions the four branches referred to are in some provinces under the board of revenue, and in others under the financial commissioner, whilst in Bombay, where there is neither a board of revenue nor a financial commissioner, each branch is directly subordinate to Government. It may be found that in some provinces effective control is already provided for, or can be secured by a readjustment of duties, or else that the amount of work involved in the general direction of the four branches is not of a character to justify the creation of an extra post. But we are satisfied that in many provinces the pressure of other business makes it impossible for the board of revenue or the financial commissioner to gain that close knowledge of the working of each branch which is required for their due co-ordination. In these provinces a special officer should be appointed with the title of rural commissioner, either as an additional member of the board of revenue or as an additional financial commissioner. A similar appointment is also needed in Bombay. The officers selected to fill these posts should be drawn from the Indian civil service and should be men intimately acquainted with the agricultural conditions of their provinces. They should also have been through the agricultural diploma course of a British university.

5. *Provincial agricultural colleges.*—Representations were made to us that the agricultural colleges in some provinces, notably Bihar and Orissa, the United Provinces, and the Punjab, have failed in their purpose. This is primarily an administrative problem but it has a direct bearing also on the organisation of the service for the work it has to discharge. We recommend that the staff and equipment of each provincial college should be maintained on a scale adequate not only for the instruction of students up to the standard required for direct admission to the provincial service, but also for the effective prosecution of research, including the necessary experimental work relating thereto. It should be recognised that a great part of the research work in India can best be accomplished in the provincial centres where conditions of climate and soil are suitable. The development of provincial research work and experiment should be encouraged, and such work should not be regarded as necessarily of less importance than the work which is being carried out at Pusa. Each college should be regarded as an integral factor in the scientific development of the industry on which the prosperity of India mainly depends.

6. *Central research institute at Pusa.*—We have also recorded a considerable body of evidence regarding the proper functions of the central research institute at Pusa and its relation to the provincial departments. The weight of opinion is in favour of maintaining Pusa principally for research work. It seems undesirable to lay down strict conditions regulating the kind of research work to be undertaken. If Pusa is left free to develop by natural process, it may be anticipated that the establishment there will become in course of time a centre of advanced research, occupied mainly with problems of wider scope and of a more purely scientific character than will ordinarily be dealt with by the provincial departments. In the present stage there is more than room for expansion along the lines of research, and the dangers of overlapping between Pusa and the provincial departments are less than the dangers of a hard and fast regulation of the duties of the Pusa staff. In regard to the appointment of officers for service at Pusa we think it desirable to

leave the discretion of Government unfettered. For the highest kinds of research work it is essential to secure the best experts available, and the Government of India should be free to fill vacancies in the Pusa establishment either from the service or directly from Europe.

### CHAPTER III.

#### METHODS OF RECRUITMENT.

7. *Qualifications to be required of candidates for the imperial branch.*—In the selection of candidates for recruitment to the imperial branch of the department, weight is given to (a) a university degree in science or the diploma of a recognised school of agriculture, or other like distinction, (b) qualifications in a special science according to the nature of the vacancy to be filled, and (c) practical experience. Candidates must, as a rule, be not less than twenty-three nor more than thirty years of age.\* These regulations are generally suitable. We would, however, lay down that officers who are to be employed as deputy directors of agriculture should be recruited from among persons whose life has been spent in agricultural surroundings, and who, after obtaining a university degree in science or the diploma of a recognised school of agriculture, have had at least two years' experience of practical farming. For the research branch of the service, candidates should be required not only to possess a suitable qualification in the particular science relating to the appointment, but also to have spent a period of at least two years in research work in a laboratory under a scientist of established reputation in their own subject. It is desirable also that this training should have had a bent towards agriculture. Candidates who are over thirty years of age should not be eligible for appointment.

8. *Place of appointment.*—Hitherto the personnel of the imperial branch has been obtained almost entirely in Europe. There are, however, no considerations of policy which make recruitment in Europe necessary, and the Government of India have frequently declared that the object to be kept steadily in view is to reduce to a minimum the number of experts appointed in England and to train up indigenous talent so as to enable the country to depend on its own resources for the recruitment of its agricultural staff in the higher branches. With this principle we are in accord. In no department of Government are the advantages of employing indigenous agency to the fullest possible extent more conspicuous than they are in the agricultural department, where success depends so much on intimate knowledge of local conditions and ability to appreciate the needs of the cultivator. Such being the case we cannot regard it as satisfactory that at present only two appointments in the imperial branch of the department are held by statutory natives of India.

9. *Creation in India of facilities for technical training for the research and teaching side of the imperial service recommended.*—We were informed that the practice of recruiting officers from Europe was attributable, first, to the difficulty experienced in finding in India persons with the necessary educational qualifications among the agricultural portion of the community, and secondly, to the fact that facilities for technical training in India have only recently been established. As regards the first point, we recognise the importance of securing for the posts of deputy director men with practical agricultural experience, and we were therefore glad to learn that efforts are now being made to select boys from the land-cultivating classes and to give them sufficient education to enable them later on to train for the service. Practical agricultural experience, however, is not demanded of candidates for appointment to the highest posts on the research and teaching side of the department. In these branches, as we have already stated, the chief requisite is a good science qualification supplemented by a term of post-graduate training in agricultural research. We accordingly recommend that facilities for such training be developed in India and that the standard be brought up to the level of the best equipped agricultural institutions of Europe and America. The training classes should be established at Pusa, such additions being made to the staff of that institution as may be necessary for the purpose. We are satisfied that there is no incompatibility between the two functions of teaching and research, but that, on the contrary, both gain by being conducted in close association, always provided that the staff is

\* Volume XV., Appendix XVI. (page 276).

## ANNEXURE I.—AGRICULTURAL DEPARTMENT—(continued).

large enough to cope with the twofold task. We anticipate that a proportion of the students selected for the Pusa course will be nominated by their respective local Governments or universities, and hold some sort of bursary or fellowship; but we do not advise that the doors of the institute should be closed to other well-equipped students who come of their own initiative, and the best of the passed students of the provincial agricultural colleges and qualified provincial service officers who are young enough to complete their training before reaching the age of thirty should also be admitted to the course. Students who satisfactorily complete the prescribed training should be eligible as vacancies arise for direct appointment to the imperial branch of the department. For those who do not succeed in getting Government appointments there will be opportunity for useful work outside Government service. Once the advantages to be gained from the improvement of agricultural practice by the application of scientific methods have been thoroughly demonstrated, it may be expected that large landowners will be prepared to undertake scientific farming on their estates and that they will look for the expert assistance they require to the passed students of Pusa. Finally, we recommend, in order that Pusa may from the first attract a good class of students, that the Government of India should announce that not less than half the recruits required for the research and teaching side of the imperial branch of the department will be chosen from among statutory natives of India who have been through the Pusa course, provided that, in the opinion of an expert committee, duly qualified candidates are available for appointment. This committee should consist of (i) the director of the research institute at Pusa, (ii) a senior officer of the agricultural department of high reputation in the particular science required for the special appointment to be made, (iii) a science professor of the education department, and (iv) and (v) two non-officials. Two of the five members should be Indians.

10. *Procedure to be adopted in recruiting for the agricultural branch of the imperial service.*—As regards the agricultural branch of the department, we recognise that in the present circumstances of India candidates fulfilling all the conditions laid down in paragraph 7 above will rarely be obtainable. We would, therefore, make it a rule that experience in the provincial service on the staff of a deputy director of agriculture should be regarded as equivalent to practical farming experience. This would give an opportunity for well qualified men who had been through the course of a provincial agricultural college and had afterwards put in two years' work or more in the provincial service to come forward as candidates for the imperial branch before reaching the age of thirty. We also recommend that, from the outset, provided candidates approved by the selection committee and complying with the conditions laid down for recruitment in Europe were forthcoming, not less than half the vacancies in the agricultural branch of the department should be filled by statutory natives of India appointed in India.

11. *No limit should be placed on the number of officers to be recruited in India for the imperial service.*—In recommending that a minimum proportion, if found competent, should be taken from among the passed students of Pusa and the provincial agricultural colleges, we do not wish to suggest that the Government of India should be content with this minimum or should confine their inquiries solely to these sources. On the contrary, we are of opinion that every effort should be made to discover and recruit competent men in India wherever they may be found, and that it should be possible to meet the whole of the normal requirements of both branches of the department in India within a reasonable period of time.

12. *Procedure to be adopted for announcing vacancies and for considering the claims of candidates for the imperial service.*—It remains to deal with the procedure to be adopted for announcing vacancies and for considering the claims of candidates. All prospective vacancies should be advertised in the Indian press and in the various colleges throughout India. The selection committee referred to in paragraph 9 above should subsequently scrutinise the applications, and after interviewing the likely candidates and making such further inquiries as may be necessary, should report to the Government of India whether there are any qualified candidates, and if so, who is the fittest for appointment. If there is any suitable candidate the Government of India should select him, and only in the event of no such candidate being available, should application be made to the Secretary of State for the appointment of a candidate in England. In making their report to the Government of India the selection committee

should also take into account the claims of any members of the provincial services whose names have been brought to their notice. In cases where it is necessary to resort to recruitment in England the present procedure should be maintained, but appointments should be made by the Secretary of State on the advice of a specially constituted selection committee consisting of five members, namely, (i) a representative of the India Office, (ii) a representative of the board of agriculture, preferably an officer with practical agricultural experience, (iii) a senior officer of the Indian agricultural service, being either an officer on the active list of the department or an officer who has been for not more than five years on the retired list, (iv) an agricultural expert of high reputation in the particular science required for the special appointment to be made, who should be selected *ad hoc*, and (v) a non-official Indian who is in touch with Indian students at the British universities.

13. *Procedure to be adopted in filling vacancies in the various local services.*—In the local services no well-defined system of recruitment has hitherto been developed. In some cases men holding the diploma of the local agricultural college have been appointed direct. Similar direct appointments have been made of men who either at their own charges or with assistance from the state have gone to Europe or America and there taken a course in scientific agriculture. Other members of the provincial services have received their appointments after a term of service in the subordinate ranks of the department.\* We recommend that for the future direct appointment should be the general procedure but that qualified subordinates should be regarded as eligible for promotion in exceptional cases. As we have already said, each provincial college should be able to arrange at least for a sufficiently good course up to the standard required for direct admission to the provincial service. We, therefore, recommend that the practice of sending prospective candidates abroad for a course of training at Government expense should be discontinued. We are satisfied that better results will be achieved if officers are sent abroad for study after they have had some experience of Government service.

## CHAPTER IV.

### SYSTEMS OF PROBATION AND TRAINING.

14. *Probation.*—The period of probation in the imperial service is now fixed at three years.† This is suitable. In the provincial services no uniform rules have yet been established in regard to probation. We recommend that in these services as in the imperial branch of the department, directly recruited officers should be on probation for three years.

15. *Training.*—Officers recruited to the imperial branch are appointed as supernumeraries, and as such are available for duty wherever assistance is specially required.‡ We are of opinion that during their first year of service such officers should not be regarded as available for duty in an independent charge, but should be kept strictly under training. This period should be spent by research officers ordinarily in the laboratories at Pusa. Supernumeraries on the agricultural side of the department are now as a rule posted to Pusa for their training.§ This procedure is not satisfactory. Their training is intended to enable them to acquire an insight into Indian conditions and some knowledge of the language and of the general methods of administration, and can more efficiently be given under experienced deputy directors, preferably in the provinces in which they are likely to serve. We recommend that arrangements be made accordingly. In the provincial services no definite rules as to training have yet been framed. We recommend that agricultural officers directly recruited to this service should be employed during the probationary period under the supervision of deputy directors and should not be given an executive charge, and that research workers should spend a part of the probationary period in a course of post graduate training either in the agricultural college of their province or at Pusa as may be deemed most effective in each case.

\* Volume XV., Appendices III. (page 260), IV. (page 261), V. (page 262), VII. (page 262), X. (page 267), XII. (page 271), and XIII. (page 272).

† Volume XV., Appendix XVI. (page 276).

‡ Volume XV., 68046.

§ Volume XV., 68087.

## ANNEXURE I.—AGRICULTURAL DEPARTMENT—(continued).

## CHAPTER V.

## CONDITIONS OF SALARY.

16. *Standard salaries in the imperial service.*—The present scale of salary in the imperial branch of the service, which applies to all officers alike, whether statutory natives of India or not, has been fixed on the assumption that the personnel of the higher branches of the department will be drawn mainly from Europe. Under our proposals the normal requirements of the staff will ultimately be met from India, and the normal scale of salaries should therefore be assessed on that basis. We recommend accordingly that an incremental scale of Rs. 350–35–1,050 a month, exclusive of allowances, be established and made applicable to all officers who are recruited in India to the department in future. The allowances of Rs. 100 a month now payable to the principals of colleges should be continued. As regards the Pusa staff, we agree with the opinion expressed to us that the importance of the duties discharged by these officers is insufficiently recognised in the existing scale of allowances, which are Rs. 100 from the fourth to the tenth year of service, Rs. 150 from the eleventh to the fifteenth year, and Rs. 200 a month for officers of more than 15 years' service, and we recommend that the allowances be increased to Rs. 150, 225, and 300 a month. For the officer selected to fill the appointment of agricultural adviser to the Government of India and director of the Pusa research institute we propose an inclusive salary of Rs. 2,000–50–2,250 a month. Directors of agriculture selected from the staff of the department should receive a salary of Rs. 1,500–50–1,750 a month. On the assumption that the department will be recruited for entirely in India there will be a saving on the present cost of the staff of approximately Rs. 31,284 a year, as shown in the following table :—

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
61	Officers - - - - -	Rs. 400-30-460-40-500-50-1,000.	Rs. A. P. 47,445 6 0	61	Officers - - - - -	Rs. 350-35-1,050.	Rs. A. P. 44,606 4 0
	9 local allowances to officers under the Government of India.	100-150-200.	1,120 2 10		9 local allowances to officers under the Government of India.	150-225-300.	1,774 0 10
	House rent to officers during the first 3 years of service.	(a)	421 12 0				
61	Total - - - - -		48,987 4 10	61	Total - - - - -		46,380 4 10
					Present cost - - - - -		48,987 4 10
					Net savings per mensem - - - - -		2,607 0 0
					" " per annum - - - - -		31,284 0 0

(a) Free quarters are provided. The value of this concession has been taken at 10 per cent. of salary.

17. *Special salaries for officers recruited in Europe for the imperial service.*—For the present, however, a considerable number of officers will need to be obtained from Europe. The present scale of salary fixed for them is Rs. 400–30–460 with free quarters during the first three years of service, then Rs. 500–50–1,000 a month. This has been found to be insufficient to secure and retain the services of men of the required calibre, largely because it provides for no increase of salary after the fourteenth year of service. With the exception of the Governments of Madras, the United Provinces and the Punjab, who either make no recommendation or desire to reserve judgment, all local Governments are in favour of a substantial improvement of the present rates of salary. It is of the first importance that any officers who may be appointed from Europe to the department should be of the highest quality, and that their conditions of employment should be such as to make it reasonably certain that they will remain in India for a full term of service. Having regard to these considerations we recommend that officers in the imperial branch who are recruited in Europe, whether statutory natives of India or not, be placed on a scale of Rs. 500–50–1,500 a month, and that the concession of free accommodation during the first three years of service be withdrawn. We also think

## ANNEXURE 1.—AGRICULTURAL DEPARTMENT—(continued).

it desirable that there should be an efficiency bar in the scale at Rs. 1,100 a month, beyond which no officer should be allowed to proceed unless he is granted a special certificate of competency.

18. *Salaries in the various local services.*—We are of opinion that the emoluments at present payable in the provincially recruited services, combined with the absence of assured prospects of promotion to better paid posts, are inadequate to attract a good class of recruits and that there should be a substantial improvement of salaries so as to bring them more closely to the level of those sanctioned for other similar services. We recommend accordingly that the normal scale of salary of an assistant professor or assistant director should be Rs. 250-40/3-450-50/3-500 with a probationary rate of Rs. 150 a month, and that a limited number of selection posts carrying higher rates of salary should be created both at Pusa and in the various provinces as the need for them is felt. The increased cost of this reorganisation will amount approximately to Rs. 38,798 a year as shown in detail in the following table:—

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
		Rs.	Rs. A. P.				Rs. A. P.
	<i>Under the Government of India:</i>				<i>Under the Government of India:</i>		
1	First assistant to chemist -	250-10-300	283 5 4		First and 2nd assistants to chemist, 1st assistant to botanist, 1st assistant to entomologist, 1st assistant to mycologist, and 1st assistant to bacteriologist.		2,145 10 6
5	Second assistant to chemist, 1st assistant to botanist, 1st assistant to entomologist, 1st assistant to mycologist, and 1st assistant to bacteriologist.	200-10-250	1,166 10 8				
	<i>Madras:</i>				<i>Madras:</i>		
2	Assistant directors -	250-15-400	718 3 4	2	Assistant directors -		715 3 6
	<i>Bombay:</i>				<i>Bombay:</i>		
1	Extra deputy director -	350-50/2-550	407 13 3	11	Extra deputy director, inspectors, and assistant professors.		3,933 11 3
10	Inspectors and assistant professors.	200-30/2-350	3,039 3 8				
	<i>Bengal:</i>				<i>Bengal:</i>		
1	Superintendent of sericulture.	300-20-500	445 7 6	3	Superintendent of sericulture and supervisors.		1,072 13 3
2	Supervisors -	200-10-400	606 8 0				
	<i>United Provinces of Agra and Oudh:</i>				<i>United Provinces of Agra and Oudh:</i>		
1	Assistant director -	400-100/3-700	566 6 0	4	Assistant directors -		1,430 7 0
3	" -	200-50/2-250-20-500	1,077 12 0				
	<i>Punjab:</i>				<i>Punjab:</i>		
1	Assistant director -	300-10-400	358 12 6	7	Assistant directors and assistant professors.		2,503 4 3
1	" -	150-10-300	195 7 7				
5	Assistant professors -	150-12 1/2-400	1,395 5 10				
	<i>Bihar and Orissa:</i>				<i>Bihar and Orissa:</i>		
5	Assistant professors, superintendent Sabour farm, and assistant economic botanist.	250-10-400	1,610 13 0	9	Assistant professors, superintendent Sabour farm, assistant economic botanist, assistant agricultural chemist and travelling inspector.		3,218 7 9
4	Assistant professors, assistant agricultural chemist and travelling inspector.	150-10-250	758 4 0				
	<i>Central Provinces and Berar:</i>				<i>Central Provinces and Berar:</i>		
12	Extra assistant directors -	100-50-200-10-250-30-400	3,686 15 5	13	Extra assistant directors and assistant agricultural chemist.		4,648 14 9
1	Assistant agricultural chemist.	100-10-200	172 11 9				
	<i>Assam:</i>				<i>Assam:</i>		
1	Supervisor -	200-10-400	303 4 0	1	Supervisor -		357 9 9
56	Total -		16,792 15 10	56	Total -		20,026 2 0
					Deduct present cost -		16,792 15 10
					Net extra expenditure per mensem -		3,233 2 2
					" " " per annum -		38,797 10 0

Rs. 250-40/3-450-50/3-500 (Rs. 150 during the first three years which will be the probationary period).

## CHAPTER VI.

## CONDITIONS OF SERVICE.

19. *Strength of the cadre of the imperial service.*—We are satisfied that a considerable addition should be made to the imperial branch of this department. In most provinces an increase of deputy directors is the most urgent requirement, but in others (such as Burma) the great need for investigation demands an early increase of the scientific staff. The material improvement of agricultural methods, the growth in the value of crops, and the constant development of new and improved varieties of crop can be traced to the operations of the agricultural department, and furnish sound reasons for acceding to the demand for an early and substantial expansion of the service.

20. *Leave and training reserve and annual rate of recruitment for the imperial service.*—The cadre of imperial officers is too small to admit of the formation of a leave and training reserve for each province, and the existing system, under which officers are appointed as supernumeraries and regarded as available for employment in any province where additional assistance is temporarily required, should be allowed to continue. Seven supernumerary officers are at present included in the cadre, but this number is insufficient and should be increased. Certain witnesses also represented that, instead of recruiting for each vacancy or new appointment as it occurs, a definite number of candidates should be recruited annually according to a liberal estimate of future requirements. Whilst this may be possible in regard to the recruitment of deputy directors whose numbers will become considerable, it may be difficult to settle in advance the recruitment of research officers; but even in the research branch there is ample scope for the useful employment of additional officers, and we think that, if a specially good candidate comes forward, he should be secured for the service at once, provided that there is a prospect of being able to absorb him in the authorised cadre within a reasonable time. So soon as the strength of the service permits, a definite scheme of annual recruitment should be instituted. This would have the effect of inducing suitable candidates to adapt their training to the requirements of the service in India.

21. *Leave and training reserve for the local services.*—In the provincially recruited services no reserve is at present allowed for leave and training. The existing system under which leave and training vacancies are filled by officers of the subordinate services should be allowed to continue for the time being, but as the provincial services develop they should be made self-contained.

22. *Designation of the local services.*—We recommend that the term “provincial” as applied to the agricultural services recruited in India should be abolished. For the future officers appointed to these services should be known as belonging to the Madras agricultural service, the Bombay agricultural service, and so on. Officers similarly employed at the Pusa research institute and college should be described officially as belonging to the service of that establishment.

## CHAPTER VII.

## CONDITIONS OF LEAVE.

23. *Leave rules.*—Officers of the imperial branch are now subject to the European service leave rules. We recommend no change as regards officers already serving. For the future it should be laid down that officers who, when they enter the department, are paid salaries at the higher rates laid down in paragraph 17 above, should be subject to the European service leave rules. All other officers in the department should be subject to the Indian service leave rules and should continue under them throughout their career.

24. *Study leave.*—The existing rules provide that extra furlough may be granted to officers of the agricultural department for the purpose of study, but it would appear that such leave is taken only in exceptional cases. We consider it desirable that officers in this department should be encouraged to keep abreast of the most recent developments of agricultural science, and we recommend that the present arrangements

for the grant of study leave be revised under expert advice and that such further facilities be offered as may be necessary to achieve this object. We recommend further that provision be made to enable officers to study in India as well as in other countries.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### CONDITIONS OF PENSION.

25. *Pension rules.*—The general rules as to pension now apply, and should continue to apply to officers in this department. The post of agricultural adviser to the Government of India and director of the Pusa research institute should continue to be included in the schedule of appointments entitling their holders to a special additional pension. We also think that the members of the imperial branch of the agricultural department should be allowed, subject to the general provisos in cases of this nature, to reckon as service qualifying for superannuation pension the number of completed years by which their age at the time of appointment exceeded twenty-five years.

## CHAPTER IX.

### SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS.

26. The changes which we have recommended in the agricultural department are as follows :—

- (i) Regular services should be established to do the work lying between that done by members of the imperial service on the one hand and of the subordinate services on the other (paragraph 2).
- (ii) Rural commissioners should be appointed for charge of the agricultural, veterinary, co-operative credit and arts and crafts departments (paragraph 4).
- (iii) Deputy directors of agriculture should be recruited from among persons whose life has been spent in agricultural surroundings and who, after obtaining a university degree in science or the diploma of a recognised school of agriculture, have had at least two years' experience of practical farming, or, alternatively, at least two years' experience in the provincial branch of the department on the staff of a deputy director (paragraphs 7 and 10).
- (iv) Candidates for the research branch of the imperial service should be required not only to possess a suitable qualification in the particular science relating to the appointment, but also to have spent a period of at least two years in research work under a scientist of established reputation in their own subject. This training should have had a bent towards agriculture (paragraph 7).
- (v) Candidates who are over thirty years of age should not be eligible for appointment to the imperial branch of the department (paragraph 7).
- (vi) Facilities should be provided at the Pusa research institute for the training of selected students in agricultural research up to the highest standard (paragraph 9).
- (vii) Students who satisfactorily complete this course of training should be eligible for direct appointment to the imperial branch (paragraph 9).
- (viii) The Government of India should announce that not less than half the recruits required for the research and teaching side of the imperial branch will be chosen from among statutory natives of India who have been through the Pusa advanced course, provided that, in the opinion of an expert committee, duly qualified candidates are available for appointment. Similarly, not less than half the vacancies in the grade of deputy director should be filled by statutory natives of India appointed in India, provided that duly qualified candidates approved by the selection committee are forthcoming (paragraphs 9 and 10).
- (ix) Every effort should be made to discover and recruit competent men in India wherever they may be found, and the whole of the normal requirements of the staff should be met from India within a reasonable period of time (paragraphs 11 and 12).

ANNEXURE I.—AGRICULTURAL DEPARTMENT—(*continued*).

- (x) Vacancies should be advertised in the Indian press and in the various colleges throughout India (paragraph 12).
- (xi) The claims of provincial service officers to promotion should be considered by the selection committee (paragraph 12).
- (xii) In cases where it is necessary to resort to recruitment in Europe appointments should be made by the Secretary of State with the advice of a specially constituted selection committee containing an Indian member (paragraph 12).
- (xiii) Appointments to the provincial services should ordinarily be by direct recruitment (paragraph 13).
- (xiv) The practice of sending prospective candidates for the provincial services for courses of training outside India should be discontinued (paragraph 13).
- (xv) Officers directly recruited to the provincial services should be on probation for three years (paragraph 14).
- (xvi) Both in the imperial and in the provincial branches improved facilities for training should be provided (paragraph 15).
- (xvii) Supernumerary officers on the agricultural side of the imperial branch should be posted to the provinces, not to Pusa (paragraph 15).
- (xviii) The normal scale of salaries in the imperial branch should be fixed on the basis of recruitment in India, and the rates of salary for officers recruited in India and in Europe respectively should be as stated (paragraphs 16 and 17).
- (xix) The salaries of provincial service officers should be increased to the extent stated (paragraph 18).
- (xx) The cadre of the imperial branch should be increased (paragraph 19).
- (xxi) If specially good candidates for the imperial branch come forward, they should be appointed at once, provided that there is a prospect of absorbing them in the authorised cadre within a reasonable time (paragraph 20).
- (xxii) The provincial services should provide for their own leave and training reserve when they become sufficiently developed (paragraph 21).
- (xxiii) The provincially recruited services should be known as the Madras, Bombay, etc., agricultural services, the term "provincial" being abolished (paragraph 22).
- (xxiv) In future officers who, when they enter the department, are paid salaries at the higher rates fixed for officers recruited in Europe, should be subject to the European service leave rules. All other officers in the department should be subject to the Indian service leave rules (paragraph 23).
- (xxv) The arrangements for the grant of study leave should be revised under expert advice (paragraph 24).
- (xxvi) Subject to the general provisos, officers of the imperial branch should be allowed to reckon as service qualifying for superannuation pension the number of completed years by which their age at the time of appointment exceeded twenty-five years (paragraph 25).

MINUTE BY SIR MURRAY HAMMICK AND MR. F. G. SLY.

*Paragraphs 9, 10 and 26 (viii).*—We are unable to support the recommendation that not less than half the recruits in both the research and agricultural branches should be statutory natives of India appointed in India, provided that in the opinion of an expert committee duly qualified candidates are available.

2. Whilst we agree that every effort should be made to discover and recruit competent men in India, we are opposed to fixing at present any definite proportion. The agricultural department is still in its infancy, and with the enormous field to be explored and the great and promising possibilities of its work for the advancement of Indian agriculture, it is most important that the limited staff should be most carefully selected from candidates of the highest qualifications. The evidence clearly shows that, with few exceptions, the right material has not yet been secured in India, and cannot be secured until higher education is more widely diffused amongst the agricultural classes. We place little reliance on the proviso that the candidate in India must be certified by an expert committee to be duly qualified.

Whilst this may result in the rejection of a candidate obviously unfit, it will, in practice, be impossible to enforce rigidly the high standard required. The acceptance of the recommendation will result in an obligation that cannot be fulfilled at the present stage of education in India without sacrifice of the future work of the department. We do not anticipate that for many years to come it will be possible to recruit in India any substantial number of suitable candidates, and our recommendation is that no proportion should be fixed; but on the occurrence of a vacancy the Government of India should ascertain, with the assistance of a selection committee, whether a fully qualified candidate is available in India, and if such candidate is available his appointment should be recommended to the Secretary of State. The general body of evidence makes it clear that, in the present stage of agricultural advancement in India, recruitment from the provincial service is more likely to prove successful than direct recruitment.

3. Still less do we think it suitable to recommend that the whole of the normal requirements of the department should be met from India within a reasonable period of time. Whilst this position may be the ultimate goal to be aimed at, it will be clearly necessary for an indefinite period to maintain in the department a strong element of men trained in the best methods of western science. Agricultural education in India cannot reach the highest stage of development until Indian agriculture has been thoroughly studied and surveyed by competent scientific experts.

MURRAY HAMMICK.  
F. G. SLY.

MINUTE BY MR. M. B. CHAUBAL.

*Paragraph 17.*—This is one of the services in which the advantages of employing indigenous agency to the fullest possible extent are freely admitted. It has, therefore, been recommended that the scale of salaries for the whole of this department should be the Indian scale. Apparently, therefore, the time during which recruitment in Europe would have to be resorted to ought to be a transitional period, and with the facilities for technical training and the development of Pusa, it ought to be possible to meet with the whole of the normal requirements of both branches of the department in India within a reasonable time. In my opinion, this wished-for consummation will not be accelerated by standardising the European and imperial branch of the service on a scale of salaries higher than the present. I think, therefore, that it should be practically recognised that this is a purely Indian service, and there should be no incremental scale drawn up for the imperial branch of the service. I admit that a large number of officers will need to be obtained from Europe during this transitional period, but instead of retaining the present imperial branch on higher salaries, each appointment as it falls vacant should be treated on its own merits, and the salary for the officer should be regarded as a personal salary and adjusted by Government in its discretion to suit any suitable candidate that may be available. If a figure for annual recruitment on the strength of the present imperial branch is once fixed, it will in practice be difficult to discontinue such recruitment. The appointments to be recruited for in Europe should be treated like expert appointments for which the salaries should vary according to the qualifications and wants of the expert needed for the time being. I would not, therefore, fix any scale, and much less an increased scale like the one proposed.

2. I have in my general note of dissent disapproved of the proposal to create the new posts of rural commissioners, and I would therefore leave the directors of agriculture as the heads of the department, but drawn from within the department itself, and fix their salary on an incremental scale of Rs. 1,200—50—1,500.

3. In any event I do not see why the salaries of the European officers in this department need be higher than for the forest department.

M. B. CHAUBAL.

## ANNEXURE II.

### Civil Veterinary Department.

*(The evidence relating to this department will be found in volume XV.)*

#### CHAPTER I.

##### INTRODUCTORY.

1. The civil veterinary department is of comparatively recent origin. When first constituted it was placed in charge of all work outside the army connected with horses, mules, and cattle, and for some years the duties relating to horse-breeding occupied its chief attention. Since 1903 the bulk of the horse-breeding has been taken over by the army remount department, and the civil veterinary department has been occupied mainly with questions relating to cattle. Like the agricultural department, the civil veterinary department is engaged in teaching as well as in practical work, and colleges and schools for the training of veterinary officers are established at Madras, Bombay, Calcutta, Lahore, and Rangoon.

#### CHAPTER II.

##### ORGANISATION.

2. *Division of the services into imperial and provincial.*—As now constituted, the department is divided into an imperial service of professors and principals of colleges, superintendents and their assistants, and bacteriological and other experts, and provincially recruited services of professors, assistant professors, lecturers, and, for outdoor work, deputy superintendents and inspectors. The latter date from the year 1895, when it was decided to organise a staff of senior veterinary assistants, afterwards called inspectors, in each province. The grade of deputy superintendent was established ten years later. The arrangements thus made for the employment of a locally recruited agency intermediate between the imperial and the subordinate services are well adapted to the requirements of the department and should be further developed. We recommend, however, that the provincial services should consist only of deputy superintendents and of officers of corresponding position on the teaching staff of the veterinary colleges. Inspectors and officers of a similar standing on the college staffs should be regarded as belonging to the subordinate establishments of the department.

3. *The inspector-generalship.*—There was formerly an inspector-general in the department, attached to the Government of India, but the appointment was abolished in 1912.\* Complaint was made to us that as a result the prospects of officers in the department had been seriously curtailed. It was represented also that, in the absence of a professional head, the Government of India could not adequately be informed either as to the relative merits of individual officers for advancement or as to the best means of supplying the requirements of the several provinces; and that for the efficient conduct of the purely professional work of the department some co-ordinating authority was needed. The personal grievance has to some extent been met, so far as the military officers in the department are concerned, by a recent decision to increase the number of colonelcies and lieutenant-colonelcies from three to four, and our recommendations in regard to salaries should be sufficient to dispose of any grievance on the part of the civilian staff. For the rest, no specific evidence was forthcoming to prove that the absence of a professional head had militated against the efficiency of the work of the department. In these circumstances we see no need to recommend the re-establishment of the post.

4. *General control of the department.*—From some quarters a suggestion was made that with the abolition of the inspector-generalship there can no longer be any justification for keeping the imperial branch of the department under the general control of the Government of India, and that each province should maintain its own self-contained establishment of imperial officers. This proposal is, however, open to the objection that extra expense would be caused if each province had to make separate arrangements for a leave and training reserve; and in the absence of administrative reasons we do not consider that the change would be justified.

\* Volume XV., 69247.

5. *Headship of the department in the various provinces.*—Under the present system the director of agriculture, a member of the Indian civil service, is also the head of the veterinary department in each province.\* This will not be suitable when the appointment of director of agriculture comes to be filled by officers of the agricultural service. The present arrangement also leads to inconvenience in provinces employing more than one veterinary officer. We recommend, therefore, that, where the scope of veterinary work in a province justifies the step, one of the officers should be appointed veterinary adviser and granted an allowance for acting in that capacity. He should work under the rural commissioner, where such an officer is appointed, as recommended by us in annexure I. relating to the agricultural department.

### CHAPTER III.

#### METHODS OF RECRUITMENT.

6. *Qualifications to be required of candidates who are recruited in England for the imperial service.*—The imperial branch of the service was formerly recruited from the army veterinary department, but this system was abandoned in 1900, and since then vacancies in the cadre have been filled by civilians from the veterinary colleges of Great Britain and Ireland. According to the present rules candidates for appointment must hold a diploma of the royal college of veterinary surgeons. Evidence of a knowledge of bacteriology and of capacity for carrying out original research is taken into account. Except on special grounds, to be approved by the Secretary of State, candidates must not be over twenty-six years of age.† These conditions are generally suitable for candidates who are recruited in England, and the only change we need recommend is that candidates who are over thirty years of age should not, in any case, be eligible for appointment.

7. *Place of appointment. Creation in India of facilities for technical training for the imperial service recommended.*—Hitherto the personnel of the imperial branch has been obtained entirely from Europe. There are, however, no considerations of policy which make recruitment in Europe necessary, and we cannot regard it as satisfactory that at the present time the cadre of the imperial branch does not include a single officer who is a statutory native of India. We were informed that this state of things was due to the fact that the courses of training in the Indian veterinary colleges fall short of the standard for admission to the imperial service. Also, for a variety of reasons, the department has hitherto failed to attract candidates in India possessing good educational qualifications, and it has not yet been found possible even to work up to the cadre of deputy superintendents authorised for the provincial services. There is, however, a growing demand in various parts of India for the highest forms of veterinary training, and it is of importance that the instructional facilities provided by Government should keep pace with the demand, and that steps should be taken to enable India to rely on her own resources in this, as in other scientific services. We recommend accordingly that as soon as possible classes teaching up to the highest standard should be established in India, and that the passed students of these classes should constitute the normal field of recruitment for the imperial branch of the department. We anticipate that a proportion of the students selected for this advanced course of training will be nominated by their respective local Governments or universities and hold some sort of bursary or fellowship; but no well-equipped student who comes of his own initiative should be excluded, and the best men of the provincial veterinary colleges and qualified provincial service officers who are young enough to complete their training before reaching the age of thirty should also be admitted to the course. Students who satisfactorily complete the prescribed course should be eligible as vacancies arise for direct appointment to the imperial branch of the department. For those who do not succeed in getting Government appointments there will be an increasing opportunity for useful work outside Government service. Finally, we recommend, in order that the higher course of training may from the first attract a good class of student, that when the higher course of training has sufficiently developed, the Government of India should announce that not less than half the recruits required for the imperial branch of the department will be chosen from among statutory natives of India who have been

\* Volume XV., 69252. † Volume XV., Appendix XIV. (page 342).

## ANNEXURE II.—CIVIL VETERINARY DEPARTMENT—(continued).

through the course, provided that in the opinion of an expert committee duly qualified candidates are available for appointment. This committee should consist of three officials and two non-officials and should include two Indians.

8. *No limit should be placed on the number of officers to be recruited in India for the imperial service.*—In recommending that a minimum proportion, if found competent, should be taken from among the students who have been through the higher course of training in India, we do not wish to suggest that the Government of India should be content with this minimum or should confine their inquiries solely to this source of recruitment. On the contrary we are of opinion that every effort should be made to discover and recruit competent men in India wherever they may be found, and that it should be possible to meet the whole of the normal requirements of the department in India within a reasonable period of time.

9. *Facilities to be offered to statutory natives of India pending the creation in India of facilities for technical training for the imperial service.*—Until the higher courses of training are established two avenues of admission to the highest ranks of the service should be thrown open to statutory natives of India. In the first place, opportunities should be provided for the promotion to the imperial branch of the best officers in the provincial services. These services are now for the most part filled by officers who started their career as veterinary assistants on low rates of pay and slender professional qualifications, and who could seldom be expected to become fitted for employment in the highest ranks of the department. This, however, may be remedied by raising the standard for admission to the veterinary colleges for a certain proportion of the students and by offering some of these students, on completion of their course, a definite prospect of immediate employment in a higher grade than that of veterinary assistant or inspector. The college course for such students should be longer and more advanced than the ordinary course. Officers recruited with the higher qualification would in many instances become qualified for advancement to the imperial branch after a short term of employment in the provincial service, supplemented by a course of post-graduate study in Europe. This would normally consist of a year's attendance at the final course of instruction at one of the British veterinary colleges, followed by a short special course in pathology and bacteriology. In the second place, statutory natives of India should be eligible, as they now are, for appointment to the imperial branch on the nomination of the Secretary of State. Pending the development of a complete scheme of training in India, a system of state scholarships should be instituted by which likely young men would be enabled to proceed to Europe with the object of gaining the diploma of the royal college of veterinary surgeons. This would make them formally eligible to apply for an appointment to the imperial branch of the department, but it should be made clear that the fact of having won a scholarship and obtained the British diploma should not give anyone a preferential claim to be selected by the Secretary of State. The need for veterinary practitioners is so great in India that, even if a state scholar were not selected for Government employment, he would still find openings for private practice and thus make use of the knowledge which he had acquired at the expense of the state.

10. *Procedure to be adopted for announcing vacancies and for considering the claims of candidates for the imperial service.*—It remains to deal with the procedure to be adopted for announcing vacancies and for considering the claims of candidates. All prospective vacancies should be advertised in the Indian press and in the various colleges throughout India. The selection committee referred to in paragraph 7 above should subsequently consider the applications, and, after interviewing the likely candidates and making such further inquiries as may be necessary, should report to the Government of India whether there are any qualified candidates, and, if so, who is the fittest for appointment. If there is any suitable candidate the Government of India should select him, and only in the event of no such candidate being available should application be made to the Secretary of State for the appointment of a candidate in England. In making their report to the Government of India the selection committee should also take into account the claims of any members of the provincial services whose names have been brought to their notice. In cases where it is necessary to resort to recruitment in England appointments should be made by the Secretary of State on the advice of a specially constituted

selection committee, consisting of (i) a representative of the India Office, (ii) a representative of the board of agriculture, (iii) a veterinary surgeon of standing in Great Britain, (iv) a senior member of the Indian veterinary service, who should be either an officer on the active list or an officer who has been on the retired list for not more than five years, and (v) a non-official Indian who is in touch with the Indian student community in the United Kingdom.

11. *Procedure to be adopted in filling vacancies in the various local services.*—The present rules for appointment to the provincially recruited services prescribe that vacancies in the grade of deputy superintendent may be filled either by direct recruitment or by promotion, but in practice the latter method has usually been followed. A diploma from a veterinary college is an essential qualification for appointment, and this has ordinarily to be supplemented by a post-graduate course of study, for which arrangements are now made in some of the colleges.\* A somewhat similar method of recruitment has been adopted in making appointments to the teaching staff of the colleges. The teaching officers are sometimes graded as deputy superintendents, but in other cases are maintained as a separate establishment. The existing system of recruitment has so far given as satisfactory results as could reasonably be expected. But really efficient provincial services cannot be mainly recruited from persons of a relatively low standard of education who entered the service as subordinates, and the true line of advance will be to raise the level of training in the veterinary colleges, and at the same time to offer such prospects in the department as will suffice to attract students of good educational qualifications to the colleges. The necessity for providing a higher course of training for direct recruits in the grade of deputy superintendent has already been recognised by local Governments. We approve this and also recommend that for the future not less than half the vacancies arising in the provincial services should be filled by direct recruitment.

## CHAPTER IV.

### SYSTEMS OF PROBATION AND TRAINING.

12. *Probation.*—The period of probation for imperial officers is now five years.† This should be reduced to three years for future entrants. In the provincial services no uniform rules for probation have as yet been framed. We recommend that, after completing a post-graduate course of study, officers directly recruited to the provincial services should be kept on probation for three years.

13. *Training.*—No definite rules exist for the training of officers, but it is usual for newly joined members of the imperial branch to get some training immediately after their arrival in India, partly in the bacteriological laboratory at Muktesar and partly under a superintendent in the provinces, before being entrusted with responsible work.‡ It is important that these officers should at the outset of their career acquire a sound knowledge of Indian conditions and of the local vernacular, and in view of these considerations we recommend the establishment of a two years' course of training, during which an officer would not be regarded as available for departmental duties. In the provincial services directly recruited officers should undergo a course of two years' training in a veterinary dispensary. This is already the rule in the Bombay presidency.

## CHAPTER V.

### CONDITIONS OF SALARY.

14. *Salaries of military officers in the imperial services.*—Practically all the military officers still employed in the departments have now reached the time when they may retire of their own option on pensions amounting to 400*l.* a year and over, and such of them as decide to remain beyond the age of optional retirement will do so on terms which, taken over the whole period of service, compare favourably with the terms offered to their civilian colleagues. We, therefore, do not recommend any increase in their case in the existing rates of pay and allowances.

\* Volume XV., Appendices IX. (page 336), and X. (page 338), and 69244 (5).

† Volume XV., Appendix XIV. (page 342).

‡ Volume XV., Appendix III. (page 329).

## ANNEXURE II.—CIVIL VETERINARY DEPARTMENT—(continued).

15. *Standard salaries for civilian officers in the imperial service.*—The present scale of salaries for civilian officers in the imperial service, which applies to all officers alike, whether statutory natives of India or not, has been fixed on the assumption that the personnel of the higher ranks of the department will be drawn mainly from Europe. Under our proposals the normal requirements of the staff will ultimately be met from India, and the normal scale of salaries should therefore be assessed on that basis. We recommend accordingly that an incremental scale of Rs. 300-30-600-50-1,000 a month be established, and made applicable to all officers who are recruited in India to the department in future. On the assumption that the department will be recruited for entirely in India, there will be a saving on the present cost of the staff of, approximately, Rs. 98,866 a year, as shown in the following table :—

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
34	Civil veterinary department officers.	Rs. 500-40-1,100-100/5-1,200	Rs. A. P. 30,307 10 2	34	Civil veterinary department officers.	Rs. 300-30-600-50-1,000	Rs. A. P. 23,962 15 11
	Exchange compensation allowance.		1,804 3 8				
34	Total - - - -		32,201 13 10	34	Total - - - -		23,962 15 11
					Present cost - - - -		32,201 13 10
					Net savings per mensem - - - -		8,238 13 11
					" " per annum - - - -		98,866 7 0

16. *Special salaries for officers recruited in Europe for the imperial service.*—For the present, however, a considerable number of officers will need to be obtained from Europe. The present scale of salary fixed for them is Rs. 500-40-1,100-100/5-1,200 a month, with exchange compensation allowance. This scale was laid down in 1901 and was based on the scale of pay and allowances then in force for military officers, which has since been increased in consequence of a general improvement in the emoluments of the army veterinary corps. The general demand from officers themselves is for a maximum salary of Rs. 1,500 a month, exclusive of allowances. Of the local Governments and administrations, those of Madras and Bengal consider that the present scale is sufficient, whilst those of Bombay and the Central Provinces either express no opinion on the subject or desire to reserve judgment. On the other hand the United Provinces and the Punjab Governments are satisfied with the necessity for improving the present scale; the Government of Bihar and Orissa recommend an increased maximum of Rs. 1,400 for ten per cent. of the members of the service, subject to the completion of 23 years' service, the Government of Burma an allowance of Rs. 150 a month for the senior administrative officer in each province, and the chief commissioner of Assam a maximum salary of Rs. 1,450 with, or of Rs. 1,600 without, private practice, together with an allowance of Rs. 100 a month to superintendents.\* In this connection we may refer to the recent report of the departmental committee appointed to inquire into the requirements of the public services with regard to officers possessing veterinary qualifications. It is there stated that owing to the small number of appointments that have had to be made in recent years no great difficulty has been experienced in securing properly qualified men for the vacancies that have occurred, but that the difficulty of obtaining suitable candidates is much greater now than it was ten years ago, and that, if a larger number had been required, it might have been impossible to secure men with the necessary qualifications. It is also in evidence that the best men now qualifying in the United Kingdom prefer the army veterinary corps to the Indian civil veterinary department, and that during recent years many officers have resigned from the department in order to take up better paid employment elsewhere. We regard it as of importance that any officers who may be appointed from Europe to the department should have the highest qualifications, and that

\* Volume XV., Appendices I. (page 328), II. (page 329), III. (page 330), IV. (page 330-1), V. (page 331), VIII. (page 333), IX. (page 336), X. (page 338), and XI. (page 339).

## ANNEXURE II.—CIVIL VETERINARY DEPARTMENT—(continued).

their conditions of service should be such as to make it reasonably certain that they will remain in India for a full term of service. Having regard to these considerations we recommend that officers in the imperial branch who are recruited from Europe be placed on a scale of Rs. 500-50-1,400 a month, with an efficiency bar at Rs. 1,100 a month, beyond which no officer should be allowed to proceed unless he is granted a special certificate of competency. Exchange compensation allowance should be abolished for future entrants.

17. *Salaries in the various local services.*—The rates of pay for deputy superintendents vary between limits of Rs. 150 and Rs. 500. In Burma there is a graded scale of Rs. 200 to Rs. 500. In Madras and Bombay the scale runs from Rs. 200 to Rs. 400, and in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, the United Provinces, and the Central Provinces the limits of salary are Rs. 150 and Rs. 400.\* If the object is to be achieved of attracting to the service candidates of similar qualifications to those employed in similar services, it will be necessary to offer some improvement in the present scales of salary. We accordingly recommend an incremental scale for deputy superintendents of Rs. 250-40/3-450-50/3-500, with a probationary scale of Rs. 150 a month. For Burma the scale should be Rs. 300-40/3-500-50/3-550 with a probationary rate of Rs. 200. The increased cost due to the adoption of these proposals would amount to Rs. 32,608 a year as shown in the following table:—

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
3	<i>Madras:—</i> Deputy superintendents	Rs. 200-25-400	Rs. 1,070 4 9	3	<i>Madras:—</i> Deputy superintendents	Rs. 250-40/3-450-50/3-500(a)	Rs. 1,067 2 0
	<i>Bombay:—</i>				<i>Bombay:—</i>		
1	Deputy superintendent	400	400 0 0	8	Deputy superintendents	250-40/3-450-50/3-500(a)	2,815 10 8
2	" "	350	700 0 0				
2	" "	275	550 0 0				
3	" "	200	600 0 0				
	<i>Bengal:—</i>				<i>Bengal:—</i>		
1	Deputy superintendent	250-15-400	318 12 6	6	Deputy superintendents	250-40/3-450-50/3-500(a)	2,134 4 0
2	" "	200-10-250	466 10 8				
3	" "	150-10-200	550 0 0				
	<i>United Provinces of Agra and Oudh:—</i>				<i>United Provinces of Agra and Oudh:—</i>		
2	Deputy superintendents	150-25/2-400	557 5 0	2	Deputy superintendents	250-40/3-450-50/3-500(a)	711 6 8
	<i>Punjab:—</i>				<i>Punjab:—</i>		
3	Appointments	200-20-400	1,042 15 0	3	Appointments	250-40/3-450-50/3-500(a)	1,067 2 0
	<i>Burma:—</i>				<i>Burma:—</i>		
1	Deputy superintendent	500	500 0 0	6	Deputy superintendents	300-40/3-500-50/3-550 (b)	2,434 4 0
1	" "	400	400 0 0				
2	" "	300	600 0 0				
2	" "	200	400 0 0				
	<i>Bihar and Orissa:—</i>				<i>Bihar and Orissa:—</i>		
2	Deputy superintendents	150-400	557 5 0	2	Deputy superintendents	250-40/3-450-50/3-500(a)	711 6 8
	<i>Central Provinces and Berar:—</i>				<i>Central Provinces and Berar:—</i>		
6	Deputy superintendents	150-10-250-20-400	1,674 13 8	6	Deputy superintendents	250-40/3-450-50/3-500(a)	2,134 4 0
36	Total	- - -	10,388 2 7	36	Total	- - -	13,105 8 0
					Deduct present cost	- - -	10,388 2 7
					Net extra expenditure per mensem	- - -	2,717 5 5
					" " " per annum	- - -	32,608 1 0

(a) Rs. 150 during probation.

(b) Rs. 200 during probation.

\* Volume XV., Appendices III. (page 330), IV. (page 331), VIII. (page 333), IX. (page 337), X. (page 338), and XI. (page 339).

## CHAPTER VI.

## CONDITIONS OF SERVICE.

18. *Private practice.*—A general complaint was made that civilian officers of the department are not allowed, under existing regulations, to undertake paid private practice. It was urged that the restriction has proved embarrassing both to members of the public and to veterinary officers. In localities where no other veterinary expert is available horse owners are obliged to ask civil veterinary department officers to do gratuitous work for them as a favour and the veterinary officer complies with these requests because there is no other agency available. We recognise, however, that there are important reasons for not acceding to the application. There would be the danger of officers allowing their private practice to interfere with their official duties : and sooner or later the Government would find itself in the position of having to decide between the vested interests of the service and the claims of the outside practitioner. In view of these considerations it would be inadvisable to abandon the present rule. So long as the supply of independent practitioners is unequal to the demand, it will be necessary for officers of the civil veterinary department to undertake private treatment, in addition to ordinary hospital and dispensary practice. But the scale of salaries recommended by us is intended to be sufficient to compensate officers in the department for any work they may be called on by the Government to perform, and it would be for the local Governments to decide in what cases and to what extent work should be done without payment of a fee. In cases where payment was exacted the fees chargeable should be credited not to the officer doing the work, but to the Government.

19. *Leave and training reserve and annual rate of recruitment for the imperial service.*—The authorised cadre of the imperial branch of the department includes five officers as a reserve for leave. The reserve is under the control of the Government of India, by whom officers are temporarily allotted to the various provinces as necessary. This arrangement is suitable and should continue until the department is wholly or mainly recruited for in India, when the question will need to be reconsidered. No reserve is maintained for training at present, but an addition of three officers will be needed to provide for keeping officers under training during the first two years of service. The number of officers in the imperial branch is too small to justify a fixed annual rate of recruitment.

20. *Leave and training reserve and annual rate of recruitment for the local services.*—No provision is at present made in the cadres of the provincially recruited services for a leave and training reserve. We suggest no immediate change in these arrangements, but as the services become more developed, they should be organised so as to contain a regular margin for leave and training. No annual rate of recruitment is fixed at present for these services, nor would this be practicable.

21. *Designation of the local services.*—The term “provincial” as applied to officers of the provincially recruited veterinary services should be abolished. Officers appointed to these services should for the future be described officially as belonging to the Madras civil veterinary service, the Bombay civil veterinary service, and so on.

## CHAPTER VII.

## CONDITIONS OF LEAVE.

22. *Leave rules.*—Officers of the imperial branch are now subject to the European service leave rules. We recommend no change as regards officers already serving. For the future it should be laid down that officers who, when they enter the department, are paid salaries at the higher rates laid down in paragraph 16 above, should be subject to the European service leave rules. All other officers in the department should be subject to the Indian service leave rules and should continue under them during their careers.

23. *Study leave.*—The existing rules provide that extra furlough may be granted to officers of the civil veterinary department for the purpose of study, but it would appear that such leave has hitherto been taken only in exceptional cases. We consider

it desirable that officers in this department should be encouraged to keep abreast of the most recent developments of veterinary science, and we recommend that the present arrangements for the grant of study leave be revised under expert advice, and that such further facilities be offered as may be necessary to achieve this object. We recommend further that provision be made to enable officers to study in India as well as in other countries.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### CONDITIONS OF PENSION.

24. *Pension rules.*—The general rules as to pension now apply, and should continue to apply to officers in this department. There is no post in the department which should be included in the schedule of appointments entitling their holders to a special additional pension. The only change we recommend under this head is that the members of the imperial branch of the department should be allowed, subject to the general provisos in cases of this nature, to reckon as service qualifying for superannuation pension the number of completed years by which their age at the time of appointment exceeded twenty-five years.

## CHAPTER IX.

### SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS.

25. The changes which we have proposed in the civil veterinary department are as follows :—

- (i) Regular services should be established to do the work lying between that done by members of the imperial service on the one hand and of the subordinate services on the other. They should consist of deputy superintendents and officers of corresponding status on the college staffs (paragraph 2).
- (ii) One of the veterinary officers in the larger provinces should be appointed veterinary adviser and given an appropriate allowance (paragraph 5).
- (iii) Candidates who are over thirty years of age should not be eligible for appointment to the imperial branch of the department (paragraph 6).
- (iv) Classes teaching up to the highest standard of veterinary science should be established in India (paragraph 7).
- (v) Students satisfactorily completing a course of training in these classes should be eligible for direct appointment to the imperial branch (paragraph 7).
- (vi) When the higher course of training has sufficiently developed the Government of India should announce that not less than half the recruits required for the imperial branch will be chosen from among statutory natives of India who have been through the course, provided that in the opinion of an expert committee duly qualified candidates are available for appointment (paragraph 7).
- (vii) Every effort should be made to discover and recruit competent men in India wherever they may be found, and the whole of the normal requirements of the staff should be met from India within a reasonable period of time (paragraphs 8 and 10).
- (viii) Pending the establishment of the higher course of training, opportunities for the appointment of statutory natives of India to the imperial branch should be provided in the form of the promotion of officers who have served for a time in the provincial branch and have subsequently been through a course of post-graduate study in Europe. A system of state scholarships should also be instituted to enable likely young men to proceed to Europe with the object of gaining the diploma of the royal college of veterinary surgeons ; but in such cases it should be made clear that the fact of having won a scholarship and obtained the British diploma should not give anyone a preferential claim to be selected by the Secretary of State (paragraph 9).

## ANNEXURE II.—CIVIL VETERINARY DEPARTMENT—(continued).

- (ix) Vacancies should be advertised in the Indian press and in the various colleges throughout India (paragraph 10).
- (x) The claims of provincial service officers to promotion should be considered by the selection committee (paragraph 10).
- (xi) In cases where it is necessary to resort to recruitment in Europe appointments should be made by the Secretary of State with the advice of a specially constituted selection committee (paragraph 10).
- (xii) Not less than half the vacancies in the provincial services should be filled by direct recruitment (paragraph 11).
- (xiii) The period of probation for officers of the imperial branch should be shortened from five to three years (paragraph 12).
- (xiv) Officers directly recruited to the provincial services should be on probation for three years after completing their post graduate course (paragraph 12).
- (xv) Officers in the imperial and provincial branches should be kept under training for two years (paragraph 13).
- (xvi) The normal scale of salaries in the imperial branch should be fixed on the basis of recruitment in India, and the rates of salary for officers recruited in India and in Europe respectively should be as stated (paragraphs 15 and 16).
- (xvii) The salaries in the provincially recruited services should be increased to the extent stated (paragraph 17).
- (xviii) The provincially recruited services should provide for their own leave and training reserve when they become sufficiently developed (paragraph 20).
- (xix) The provincially recruited services should be known as the Madras, Bombay, etc., civil veterinary services, the term "provincial" being abolished (paragraph 21).
- (xx) In future officers who, when they enter the department, are paid salaries at the higher rates fixed for officers recruited in Europe, should be subject to the European service leave rules. All other officers in the department should be subject to the Indian service rules (paragraph 22).
- (xxi) The arrangements for the grant of study leave should be revised under expert advice (paragraph 23).
- (xxii) Subject to the general provisos, officers of the imperial branch should be allowed to reckon as service qualifying for superannuation pension the number of completed years by which their age at the time of appointment exceeded twenty-five years (paragraph 24).

## MINUTE BY THE EARL OF RONALDSHAY AND MR. F. G. SLY.

*Paragraph 16.*—We dissent from the recommendation to grant natives of India appointed in Europe terms of service superior to those accorded to natives of India appointed in their own country for reasons set out in our minute of dissent to paragraph 57 of the main report.\* Further, in the case of this service, the discrimination recommended becomes even more invidious in view of the fact that those who are appointed in England will be men who have already enjoyed a special measure of state favour. Through the agency of scholarships they will have been educated in England by the state; and it will have been due to state favour, therefore, that their place of appointment will be England and not their own country. The Indian members of the service appointed in India may well ask, why this state-subsidising of particular individuals, and still more why these further favours for those already unduly blessed?

RONALDSHAY.  
F. G. SLY.

## MINUTE BY MR. M. B. CHAUBAL.

*Paragraph 16.*—I do not agree to the raising of the special salaries for officers recruited in Europe for the imperial service, on grounds similar to those mentioned in my dissenting note to the annexure on agriculture.

M. B. CHAUBAL.

\* See page 371.

## MINUTE BY MR. F. G. SLY.

*Paragraphs 7, 8, 10 and 25 (iv)–(vii).*—I cannot support recommendations (iv) to (vii) in paragraph 25, which are based on the proposal that a college, teaching up to the highest standard of veterinary science, should be established in India. Whilst agreeing in principle with the policy of providing good technical institutions in India that will lessen its dependence on a European-recruited agency, the practical steps to be taken to further this policy must have relation to the needs of the country, and each case must be considered on its merits.

2. The existing colleges and schools teach veterinary science of a simple standard only, and the proposal involves the creation of a new institution with a separate and large staff. The expense will be very large, and the available funds could be spent to much greater advantage in other forms of veterinary work. Even if started on a liberal scale, it cannot be equal to the British colleges, which attract to their professional appointments the most distinguished members of a large and progressive profession. The Indian demand for veterinary surgeons is minute. The annual recruitment to the civil veterinary department averages about two officers a year. There is no scope for highly qualified veterinary surgeons as private practitioners outside the presidency towns, and there only to a limited extent. Veterinary work is not a popular profession in India, and is hampered by social and religious customs. The existing institutions with their free instruction and scholarships attract only students desirous of Government service, and their general educational qualifications are inferior to those of candidates for other branches of Government service with equal prospects. The proposed college will, therefore, only attract an extremely small number of students, and this small number can be more cheaply and better met by sending some Indian students to British colleges under a scholarship system. I am not prepared to recommend the creation of a high-grade college in India until a large expansion of the civil veterinary department demands a considerably larger annual recruitment, and until the progress of the country can absorb veterinary surgeons as private practitioners. For the present I would confine the recommendations to those contained in paragraph 9 of the annexure for a system of scholarships and the promotion of provincial service officers who can undergo additional training in post-graduate courses in Great Britain.

F. G. SLY.

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## ANNEXURE III.

### Customs Department.

*(The evidence relating to this department will be found in volume XVIII.)*

#### CHAPTER I.

##### INTRODUCTORY.

1 The staff of the imperial customs service is engaged in supervising the operations of the various branches of the department at the ports of Madras, Calcutta, Bombay, Rangoon, Karachi and Chittagong. Of these branches the two most important are the preventive, which is occupied with the prevention of smuggling and the inspection of baggage, and the appraisers', which is responsible for the valuation of cargo. There are also statistical and audit branches, and a special section dealing with the chemical analysis of dutiable commodities.\*

#### CHAPTER II.

##### ORGANISATION.

2. *Constitution of the department.*—Before 1906 the customs department was organised on a provincial basis. In that year a scheme was introduced for the constitution of an imperial service under the direct control of the Government of India. The officers of this service are liable to be transferred from one port to another. In addition, each maritime province maintains a subordinate customs staff consisting of appraising, preventive, and ministerial establishments. These are entirely under the control of the local Governments. The present organisation appears to be working efficiently, and we do not recommend any change.

#### CHAPTER III.

##### METHODS OF RECRUITMENT.

3. *Place of appointment. Limitations in the employment of non-Europeans.*—The statistics supplied to us show that on the 1st April 1913 out of 246 posts in the customs department carrying salaries of Rs. 200 a month or over, 219 were held by Europeans or Anglo-Indians and 27 by Indians.† These figures include a large number of posts under the control of local Governments, with which we have not dealt. From other sources we gathered that on the 1st January 1914, the imperial customs service contained four officers who had been promoted from the subordinate grades or transferred from the local custom service at the time of, or subsequently to, the reorganisation of 1906. These, and an officer transferred from the opium department, had been recruited in India. There were also in the imperial branch of the department eight officers recruited from outside Government service, of whom seven had been appointed in England and one, an Indian of unmixed Asiatic descent, had been appointed in India; and there was also one officer who had been transferred from the British customs department. The remaining posts were filled partly by Indian civil service officers and partly by members of the old provincial services who had not been admitted to the imperial service and were still drawing pay and allowances at the old rates. Excluding the six appointments reserved for Indian civil service officers there are in the department twenty posts of collector and assistant collector, of which, on the 1st January 1914, eleven were filled by officers recruited in India, eight by officers recruited in England, and one was vacant. Of the eleven officers recruited in India nine were Europeans or Anglo-Indians.

4. *Minimum proportion of vacancies to be filled in India.*—No technical qualifications are required of recruits for the customs service, nor are there any considerations of policy which make it essential that the staff of the department

\* Volume XVIII., 79053.

† Volume XVIII., Appendix II. (page 130).

should be recruited from Europe. At the same time, the evidence of European and Indian witnesses alike was in favour of maintaining a considerable proportion of European officers, especially for duty in the preventive branch of the department. In view of the large part played by the European non-official community in the affairs of the great Indian seaports we are satisfied that, on grounds of administrative convenience, recruitment from Europe for a portion of the cadre must for some time to come continue. There is, however, nothing to warrant the conclusion that the proportion of recruitment in India could not be increased in the immediate future without prejudice to departmental efficiency, and we recommend accordingly that not less than one-half of the vacancies hereafter arising should be filled in India by statutory natives of India.

5. *Relative merits of direct recruitment of untried officers and the promotion of selected officers from an inferior service. Recommendations. Institution of a selection committee in India recommended.*—The evidence suggests that the ordinary method of recruitment in India should be by direct appointment, and by certain witnesses a preference was expressed for the selection of men with previous commercial experience. It was generally admitted that the subordinate service offered a very limited field. We recommend that it be left to the Government of India to decide each case on the merits, subject only to the conditions that ordinarily not more than half the vacancies shall be filled by promotion and that candidates for direct recruitment shall be required to possess a high educational qualification similar to that thought suitable for the Indian finance department. We further recommend that direct appointments in India should be made with the advice of a selection committee consisting of three officials and two non-officials, and including two Indians. The personnel of the committee should be changed from time to time so as to ensure that the claims of candidates in the different provinces are duly considered.

6. *Method of selection in England.*—Appointments in England are made by the Secretary of State with the advice of a selection committee. The educational qualifications prescribed are a university degree with honours, a good place in the open competition for the Home and Indian civil services, or other evidence of a high standard of education. A knowledge of modern languages and proficiency in chemistry and physics are regarded as desirable qualifications.\* The present procedure appears to have secured to the service an efficient body of officers and we do not recommend that it should be changed.

7. *Extent to which members of the Indian civil service should be employed in the department.*—The general trend of the evidence was in favour of maintaining the present arrangement by which three collectorships of customs are reserved to selected members of the Indian civil service. This arrangement does no injustice to the claims of officers now in the department who entered on the explicit understanding that only two collectorships would be open to them.\* Moreover, the proposal to recruit to a larger extent in India has been put forward on the assumption that the upper ranks of the department will continue to be reinforced from the civil service. We recommend accordingly that appointments be made in future subject to the condition that three collectorships will be reserved to Indian civil servants, and that two collectorships will be filled from within the department.

## CHAPTER IV.

### SYSTEMS OF PROBATION AND TRAINING.

8. *Probation.*—Under present rules probationers are posted ordinarily to a presidency town or to Rangoon, and at the end of their first year of service they are required to undergo a departmental examination in Hindustani, customs work, and law and procedure. Their appointment is subject to confirmation by the Government of India at the end of two years' service, and may be cancelled for failure to pass the departmental examination.\* The present regulations are satisfactory and we recommend no change.

9. *Training of members of the Indian civil service.*—Indian civil service officers entering the department are ordinarily of four or five years' seniority, and, as a rule, they are required to remain in the department for a period of at least four years'

\* Volume XVIII., Appendix I. (page 129).

## ANNEXURE III.—CUSTOMS DEPARTMENT—(continued).

training as assistant collector before they become eligible for promotion to the grade of collector. At the time of our inquiry one of the three posts of collector reserved to the Indian civil service was filled by an officer who had had no previous training in customs work, and another was being held temporarily by a departmental officer. These facts suggest that the present arrangements for the training of Indian civil service officers are not satisfactory, and we advise that the Government of India should take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that on the occurrence of vacancies in the reserved posts of collector there will always be civil service officers available in the department with a sufficient experience of customs procedure to qualify them for promotion.

## CHAPTER V.

## CONDITIONS OF SALARY.

10. *Salaries of officers recruited in Europe.*—At present the collectors of customs are in three grades, on Rs. 2,500, 2,250, and 2,050 a month respectively. Assistant collectors drawn from the Indian civil service are on a scale of Rs. 1,000–100–1,300–50/2–1,400 a month, and other assistant collectors on a scale of Rs. 300–50–1,150–50/2–1,400 a month. For collectors of customs we propose an incremental scale of Rs. 1,750–75–2,500. This works out as nearly as possible at the same average cost as the present graded system and should apply to all officers alike, whether recruited in Europe or in India. We propose also that assistant collectors drawn from the Indian civil service should in future receive their substantive pay with an appropriate allowance in lieu of the special scale of salary now in force. With regard to that portion of the staff which is recruited in Europe, the only other changes we recommend are the substitution of a salary of Rs. 400 a month for the present rates of Rs. 300, 350, and 400 a month, payable during the first three years of service, and the establishment of an efficiency bar in the incremental scale at Rs. 1,000 a month, beyond which no officer should be allowed to proceed unless he is granted a special certificate of competency.

11. *Salaries of officers recruited in India.*—The present rates of salary have been framed with the object of securing the services of honours graduates of British universities and are higher than need be offered in order to attract to the department well-qualified officers in India. For the finance department, which requires to be recruited from men possessing high educational qualifications, we have recommended as suitable an incremental scale of Rs. 300–50/2–500–50–1,050 a month with a probationary rate of Rs. 200 a month. This scale should apply also to assistant collectors of customs appointed in India in future. On the assumption that half the staff has been recruited in India subject to these terms of salary, the financial effect of the changes recommended by us will be as shown in the following table :—

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
1	Collector, class I. - -	Rs. 2,500	Rs. 2,500 0 0	5	Collectors - - -	Rs. 1,750–75–2,500	Rs. 11,041 10 8
2	" " II. - -	2,250	4,500 0 0				
2	" " III. - -	2,050	4,100 0 0				
18	Assistant collectors - -	300–50–1,150–50/2–1,400	14,454 2 10	18	Assistant collectors recruited in Europe.	400–50/3–450–50–1,150–50/2–1,400	6,822 5 4
					Assistant collectors recruited in India.	200–100/2–300–50/2–500–50–1,050	6,100 5 6
					Total - - -	- - -	23,964 5 6
					Present cost - - -	- - -	25,554 2 10
23	Total - - -	- - -	25,554 2 10	23	Net savings per mensem - - -	- - -	1,589 13 4
					" " per annum - - -	- - -	19,078 0 0

NOTE.—The three civil service assistant collectors have been excluded from the calculation.

## CHAPTER VI.

## CONDITIONS OF SERVICE.

12. *Leave and training reserve.*—A general complaint was made as to the inadequacy of the present provision for leave and training. We recommend that, so soon as sufficient experience has been gained of the new conditions of recruitment, an estimate of the number of officers required for the purposes of a reserve should be calculated in the light of actual facts, and that the number thus arrived at should be subjected thereafter to a periodical check.

## CHAPTER VII.

## CONDITIONS OF LEAVE.

13. *Leave rules.*—Under present conditions officers appointed by the Secretary of State in England and other officers on pay of not less than Rs. 900 a month are entitled to leave under the European service rules. This arrangement should continue for all officers now in the service, but for future entrants it should be laid down that officers who, when they enter the department, are paid salaries at the higher rates specified in paragraph 10 above, should be subject to the European service leave rules. All other officers in the department should be subject to the Indian service leave rules and should continue under them throughout their career.

## CHAPTER VIII.

## CONDITIONS OF PENSION.

14. *Pension rules.*—The department is subject to the pension rules ordinarily in force, and collectors of customs, not being members of the Indian civil service, are eligible for a special additional pension. We do not recommend any change in the present conditions.

## CHAPTER IX.

## SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS.

15. The changes which we have proposed in the customs department are as follows :—

- (i) Not less than one-half of the vacancies hereafter arising in the department should be filled in India by statutory natives of India (paragraph 4).
- (ii) At least half the appointments made in India should be by the direct recruitment, with the advice of a selection committee, of candidates possessing a high educational qualification (paragraph 5).
- (iii) The arrangements made for the training of Indian civil service officers in customs procedure should be such as to ensure that there will always be such officers qualified for appointment as collector of customs when vacancies arise (paragraph 9).
- (iv) An incremental scale should be established for collectors of customs; the pay of probationary assistant collectors recruited in Europe should be as stated; and an efficiency bar should be inserted in the incremental scale for assistant collectors (paragraph 10).
- (v) Officers appointed in India, whilst holding the rank of assistant collector, should receive the same scale of salary as has been proposed for similar officers in the finance department (paragraph 11).
- (vi) The requirements for a leave and training reserve should be calculated (paragraph 12).
- (vii) Officers who, when they enter the department, are paid salaries at the higher rates fixed for persons appointed in Europe, should be subject to the European service leave rules. Other officers should be subject to the Indian service leave rules and should continue under them throughout their career (paragraph 13).

ANNEXURE III.—CUSTOMS DEPARTMENT—(*continued*).

MINUTE BY MR. M. B. CHAUBAL.

Though we have not inquired into many posts under the local Governments carrying a salary of Rs. 200 and above, I would draw the attention of the authorities concerned to the disproportionately large number of posts held by the Anglo-Indian community in this department, for out of 246 posts only 27 are held by Asiatic Indians and Burmans while Europeans and Anglo-Indians hold respectively 104 and 115. This feature of the service by which one community has practically the monopoly of it ought not to be lost sight of, and I do not think that a larger employment of Asiatic Indians will in any way be prejudicial to departmental efficiency.

M. B. CHAUBAL.



## ANNEXURE IV.

### Education Department.

(The evidence relating to this department will be found in volume XX.)

#### CHAPTER I.

##### INTRODUCTORY.

1. There is a separate education department in each of the provinces included in the scope of our inquiry. But all are modelled on the same general lines and can thus conveniently be dealt with in a single annexure. We propose, however, to give separate consideration to appointments held by men and women respectively. The tendency hitherto has been to graft the arrangements for instruction and inspection by women on to those which have been developed for men. In the initial stages this was not open to objection, but the time has now come when the claims of women should be considered separately and on their merits.

#### PART I.—MEN'S APPOINTMENTS.

#### CHAPTER II.

##### ORGANISATION.

2. *Separation of the department into administrative, collegiate, and special branches. Present position.*—The education departments of the various provinces comprise two main groups of officers. One consists of the headmasters of the model Government high schools, the higher officials of the training colleges, where schoolmasters are taught their work, and the inspectors of the state or state-aided schools. Their duties are thus primarily administrative. These officers constitute a service in the ordinary sense of the term, in that their functions are similar in kind, and permit of individuals being moved from one post to another without any necessary loss of efficiency. The other main group of officers is employed on purely teaching work in the various Government colleges and can hardly be said to constitute a service at all. Each officer is recruited to teach a particular subject, one for English, one for history, one for science, and so on, and no interchangeability between any two teachers is ordinarily possible. The only link which binds together the college professors and lecturers is their common interest in the college and their common subordination to the principal. It has also been found convenient to have a common standard rate of salary, but in practice this has been departed from in several instances. Individuals are also found who are engaged on other kinds of educational work of an isolated and special character. Such officers are either treated on their own merits as outside any service, or are grouped arbitrarily with the administrative or collegiate body, more with a view to establishing their status or bringing them on to a standard scale of salaries than with any regard to the nature of their duties.

3. *Recommendations with regard to the different branches.*—The present organisation of the department is the natural outcome of the existing condition of education in India and of the peculiar relations of the state to the educational machinery of the country. But the lines of cleavage need to be made clearer than they now are, whilst the tendency to reduce everything to the dead level of ordinary service conditions requires to be resisted. We therefore recommend, as the groundwork of the reforms which we desire to see introduced, that the officers now serving in each province be regrouped into separate bodies, according as they belong (i) to the administrative branch, or (ii) to a particular college—each college being regarded as a separate unit for this purpose—or (iii) hold special appointments not comprised in either of these two classes. This done, they should be shown separately in all official publications, and should receive separate treatment in all questions relating to their organisation. We also recommend that no change from one group to another be permitted, except under the sanction of Government and to meet the public interests. Between the main groups sanction for such transfers should be given only in exceptional cases. But transfers from the staff of one college to that of another, where there is more than one in any province, would be less open to objection. The directorship of public instruction in each province should not be included in any group, but should be treated separately. Subject to these reservations, the unity of interest of all officers in the advance of knowledge should continue to be recognised by their common inclusion in one department of education as at present.

4. *Division of the services into imperial and provincial.*—The next point which arises relates to the organisation of the staffs which will be needed to perform

## ANNEXURE IV.—EDUCATION DEPARTMENT—(continued).

efficiently the functions allotted to the three different branches of the department. In so far as the officers in the special class are concerned, no further remarks are necessary. In the nature of things each isolated appointment, however important in itself, must be treated on its own merits. The rest of this chapter will, therefore, exclusively refer to the cases of officers either on the administrative side or on the staff of some particular college. At present, in theory, there is only one service over and above the subordinate service. This higher service is divided into an imperial and a provincial branch; theoretically equal and parallel in status, but the first recruited in Europe and the second in India. The original object of this distinction was to find some means by which different rates of salary for Europeans and Indians could conveniently be enforced. This device might have proved workable had the provincial been kept as much a corps d'élite as the imperial section. But it broke down completely when the provincial ranks were opened to officers with ordinary educational qualifications. The inevitable result has been that the provincial section has in practice drifted into a definitely inferior position, to the detriment of the men of really high standing in it, who under the theory of parallel services have been unable to find escape by promotion into what has in fact become the higher service. This has led to heartburnings, and scarcely one of the witnesses who came before us was in favour of maintaining the existing position. We are entirely in sympathy with this attitude. To organise a department on the basis of the accident of differences of salary is to court confusion. We recommend that this idea be abandoned. In its place we would substitute the surer test of the work to be done.

5. *Reorganisation of the appointments on the administrative side into classes I. and II. proposed.*—Starting from this basis, and excluding from consideration the subordinate service, we are satisfied by the evidence which we received from all quarters that there are in fact two kinds of work, one superior and one inferior, to be performed by educational officers, both on the administrative and on the collegiate side. On the administrative side this is particularly clear. Here the superior work is that of general supervision and control, and the inferior that of ordinary inspection or teaching. For the former a highly and for the latter a less highly qualified type of officer is necessary. We recommend that this difference of fact be recognised and that the administrative service be divided into an upper and a lower class to give effect to this decision. The details of this reorganisation should be worked out by each local Government, for the lines of classification will vary from province to province. But speaking generally, and to indicate what we have in mind, we would place in class I. the principals, and in most cases the vice-principals, of the training colleges, the headmasters of the specially important high schools and the present inspectors of divisions, but we would call the last-named chief inspectors so as to emphasise the importance of their position. We would also take the opportunity of the reorganisation to abolish the present class of additional inspectors and to create new chief inspectorships in their place, until ultimately there shall be at least one chief inspector to each revenue division. In class II. we would place the present assistant inspectors, whom we would call inspectors, and the vice-principals of the training colleges and the headmasters of the important high schools who had not been admitted into class I. We also think that a case has been made out, particularly in the educationally advanced provinces, for raising the deputy or district inspectors out of the subordinate services into class II. of our new service, and for increasing their numbers, as their duties develop, until there is at least one such officer in each revenue district. Where this is done the possibility of a reduction in the numbers of the present assistant inspectors, where these exist, should be considered. With a chief inspector in each division and someone for inspection work in each district there should be no need for many officers of an intermediate status.

6. *Reorganisation of the appointments on the collegiate side into classes I. and II. proposed.*—There are also two kinds of work to be performed on the collegiate side requiring separate sets of officers, one of class I. and the other of class II. calibre. An Indian college is unlike a college at Oxford or Cambridge in that a considerable portion of its students are boys between the ages of 16 and 18 who have received an education inferior to that given in English secondary schools. And with this far wider range of proficiency among the students there goes a wider range of proficiency among the teachers. Whilst some of the college lecturers must be

capable of educating students up to a high university standard, others need only have the qualifications required for effective teaching in the upper forms of an English secondary school. The line between the two classes of teachers cannot be settled without numerous reservations. It may no doubt safely be asserted that the principal and the vice-principal of every well-equipped college should be in class I., as should at least one teacher of English and history, and so on. But beyond this the decision becomes a matter of detailed consideration, and depends partly on the character of the college and the subjects in which it is specialising, and partly on the degree of distinction achieved by individual teachers. It is quite possible, for example, that a subject like Sanskrit or botany could be taught adequately for ordinary purposes by an officer belonging to class II. of the service, but if that officer produced original work and obtained a widespread reputation it would clearly be expedient to place his post on personal grounds, and for so long as he held it, in class I., and to make a corresponding deduction from the cadre of class II. Similarly the standing of the pupils, who are actually being taught by any particular officer, is no safe guide to any classification. A distinguished teacher may well think it expedient to take a first-year class so as to get in touch with his future pupils from the outset; a less experienced member of the staff may equally well be given relief from the routine of elementary instruction by being allowed to lecture under guidance on a portion of the course prescribed for M.A. students. None the less the distinction is clear enough when the constitution of any college is examined in detail, and we recommend that such an examination be undertaken by the local Governments as in the case of the administrative branch. Speaking generally, we contemplate that as a result of this reorganisation all the posts in the present Indian educational service will be included in class I., and that from the present provincial service will be moved up such specific posts as will always have to be filled by officers of superior attainments. Where there are posts in the present provincial service the importance of which varies with the attainments of their incumbents, and it is impossible to say whether at any particular moment they should or should not be in class I. of the new service, a number should be fixed on the basis of experience for inclusion in the cadre of that class, and up to that number the authorities in India should have power, without previous reference to the Secretary of State, to make appointments from time to time as occasion arises. But this number should be kept fluid, and there should be no hesitation in increasing it in case of necessity, or of leaving vacancies unfilled when there is no one with suitable qualifications to fill them.

7. *Number of appointments likely to be affected by the reorganisation proposed.*—For both branches, therefore, of the department we can only indicate the general lines of advance and leave it to the local authorities to fill in the details of the scheme. But, to crystallise matters, we can safely assume that the number of appointments to be added to the cadre of the present Indian educational service to form the new class I. will not be less than about one-third of the number of posts already included in that service. It will not follow that this addition will be made evenly in each province or each main branch of the department. Some areas may take more and some less, or it may be easier to add to one branch than to another, but the total amount is not likely to fall below the figure we have indicated. For the appointments in class II. it is not possible to assume any minimum. They should be as numerous as the work to be done requires.

8. *Nomenclature of officers on the college staffs.*—On the collegiate side of the present Indian educational service officers are now called indiscriminately professors. This title is also freely bestowed—in some provinces more freely than in others—on members of the provincial services. The incongruity of this was felt by many of the witnesses who came before us. They pointed out, as we have already noted, that owing to the early age of matriculation in India a large part of the work of the colleges is of the nature of that performed in the upper forms of a secondary school in England. To call such teachers professors was, it was asserted, to put them in a false position, and to expose them to the charge of not reaching a professorial standard of distinction as understood in Europe. To this they made no claim. They also thought that qualifications of this high order were not required for the efficient performance of the bulk of the work of college instruction. It was stated, further, that the incongruity had been emphasised in recent years by the practice which was being developed by the older universities of appointing their own professors, who were not Government servants, to do the sort of work which is done by a professor in Europe. We are impressed by the force of these arguments. Had it been possible, we should have preferred to have seen

## ANNEXURE IV.—EDUCATION DEPARTMENT—(continued).

members of the college staffs, belonging to class I. of our new service, called fellows of their respective colleges. This would have given rise to no misconception, and have emphasised the point, which we have already made, that, on the collegiate side, officers belong to a particular college rather than to a general collegiate service. But the term fellow has been appropriated by the universities in India for the members of their governing bodies and has legislative sanction. We therefore recommend that class I. officers be called lecturers of their respective colleges in their particular subject. For class II. officers we would use the term assistant lecturer or demonstrator, according to the nature of their duties, leaving the term teacher in their respective subjects for members of the subordinate services. The title "professor" should be reserved for the professors appointed by the universities, but it might also be conferred by Government on the advice of the university authorities as a personal distinction on any officer who had done any striking original work, even though he did not happen to hold a university chair in the subject. For such a distinction members of the staffs of private colleges should be equally eligible.

9. *Need for the creation of professorial appointments.*—It must not be supposed, however, that by recognising the fact that professorial qualifications are no more required for ordinary college work in India than they are in England we are not alive to the importance of encouraging a high intellectual tone in the staffs of the Government colleges, and in particular of promoting research work. This is everywhere essential, and more especially under a system of affiliated colleges, where it may well happen that the most distinguished teachers have no place on the board of studies of their university, and where, in consequence, the whole course of instruction in a great department of knowledge may be imposed on the most competent scholars by teachers of inferior attainments. To meet this need we think that a strong case has been made out for the creation of a certain number of professorial chairs—we suggest twenty in the first instance—the holders of which should expressly be liberated from the ordinary work of preparation for the B.A. examinations. These chairs should be outside the college staffs, should be open to all alike, whether Europeans or Indians, and whether Government servants or not, on the same terms, and should carry a rate of pay sufficiently high to attract men of distinction who have already established their reputation in Europe or India. Care should also be taken that no chair is created save in a subject capable of being pursued to the point of originality in India. Thus it would be wrong to establish chairs of English literature or English history; right to create those of physics, geology, and Indian archaeology.

10. *Position of the professorial appointments in the machinery of higher education.*—It remains to consider what the relation of these chairs should be to the existing machinery of higher education in India. Three courses were suggested to us. The first was to make the professors Government servants and to attach them to the Government colleges. The principal argument in favour of this course was that, since the main work of the higher education of the youth of India was performed in the colleges, it was necessary to strengthen the college staffs to the utmost degree possible, and that the best way to do this was to secure the presence on the staffs of distinguished professors, whose influence would react on the teaching given in the colleges generally. Under the second scheme the professors would also be Government servants, but instead of being scattered over different colleges in different parts of India they would be concentrated in one place in a central institute of arts and sciences. Through this academy all who aspired to a life of university teaching would be encouraged to pass, and to it teachers desirous of keeping abreast with the march of knowledge would be able periodically to return. To such an institute, with its certain promise of congenial intellectual society, with its spirit of research, and its freedom from the hampering control of boards of studies and examinations, it would, it was hoped, be easy to attract distinguished men. Under this arrangement also it was claimed that the ground to be covered by the new chairs could be determined irrespective of the field already covered in the universities and colleges, and with a sole eye to the direction of the best intellect of the country into the most fruitful lines of original research. The third scheme was on rather different lines. Under this the professors were not to be Government servants, but Government were to make grants in aid to the universities to enable them to create or increase their own professorial staffs. Such a course would be in accordance with the present trend of educational policy in India, which aims at the establishment of universities as teaching bodies and might also be combined with a requirement that the professors should take a limited part in college teaching. We have carefully considered each of these

schemes. We feel, however, a difficulty in recording a finding as between them, in view of the fact that the terms of our reference cover only the public services and do not extend to the university organisations, which, though subject in various ways to Government influence and control, are still private institutions. We prefer, therefore, to note that we see advantages in each of the proposals, and to leave the decision in the matter to the constituted authorities, for whose information we attach notes by certain of our colleagues. These will be found in schedules I., II., III., and IV. to this annexure.

### CHAPTER III.

#### METHODS OF RECRUITMENT.

11. *Place of appointment. Class I.*—Hitherto the Indian educational service has been recruited for wholly in Europe, whilst the provincial services have obtained their personnel in India. We have already condemned this basis for the organisation of the department, and can turn at once to the arrangements which we think suitable for the classes I. and II. of our proposed educational service. The position of the education department in India is peculiar in view of the important part which it is playing, and which it is destined to play, in the experiment of blending eastern and western culture into a harmonious whole. This being so, grounds of policy suggest that the staff should contain officers who are typical of what is best in both civilisations, and that in the initial stages the European element should be substantial. Under our scheme of reorganisation the cadre of class I. of the educational service will contain, approximately, 264 posts, of which, roughly, three-quarters will actually be held by officers who have been recruited in Europe and one-quarter by those who have been recruited in India. We do not think that the number of Europeans now employed is excessive, and, provided that suitably qualified candidates are forthcoming, we would keep the present proportions in the future for the existing number of posts taken as a whole, though we do not think they need be adhered to slavishly in each branch and in each province. But we recognise the importance of keeping the standard of European recruits high, and if no candidate of sufficient merit applies for any particular vacancy there should be no hesitation in making the appointment for that occasion only in India, provided that a better candidate is there forthcoming. We also recommend that, as the cadre of class I. is increased, and the need of increase is urgent now and is certain to develop hereafter as education spreads, recruitment in Europe and India should be so adjusted that the additional officers will be taken half from the one country and half from the other. In this way the percentage recruited in India will go on increasing, and that taken from Europe will diminish in proportion.

12. *Place of appointment. Class II. and special posts.*—In the case of class II. of our service, whether on the administrative or the collegiate side, no such considerations exist. All officers of this standing should be recruited in India. The cases of the special posts, in which we would include such of the less important headmasterships as it may for any reason, to be justified in each case, be thought necessary to fill from Europe, should be treated on their merits, but with due regard to the principles which we have laid down for the other branches. If the twenty new professorships which we have recommended are made Government appointments they should be filled by the best persons available, irrespective of whether they come from India or from Europe.

13. *Limitations which exist in the employment of non-Europeans.*—According to the figures supplied to us there were on the 1st April 1913 827 posts in the education department carrying salaries of Rs. 200 a month and upwards, of which 334, or 40 per cent., were filled by Europeans or Anglo-Indians, and 493, or 60 per cent., by Indians of unmixed Asiatic descent.\* These proportions are, however, reversed if the figures for appointments on Rs. 300 a month and upwards are taken. These show a total of 460, out of which 283, or 62 per cent., are Europeans or Anglo-Indians, and 177, or 38 per cent., Indians of unmixed Asiatic descent. The number of appointments in the present Indian and provincial educational services, of which we have taken cognisance, comes to 585, which is 242 short of the larger total of 827. This difference is due partly to the special appointments and the appointments held by women, and partly to the fact that we have not adhered closely to the Rs. 200 limit. We know, however, from other sources† that only three Indians have been appointed to the present Indian educational service since 1897. It can safely, therefore, be assumed that the present Indian educational service is manned almost exclusively by Europeans. The latest civil lists which we have been able to consult also show that the present provincial services have a greatly preponderating Indian

\* Volume XX., Appendix XIV. (page 280).

† Volume XX., Appendix XV. (page 283).

## ANNEXURE IV.—EDUCATION DEPARTMENT—(continued).

element. The work of the college staffs in India lies mainly amongst Indian students, whilst the inspectorate is concerned chiefly with the schools designed for the same community. The Anglo-Indian in India has a separate curriculum and is interested in the ordinary governmental agency of instruction and inspection only to a limited extent. Whilst, therefore, the claims of officers of this community to be employed on educational work should be treated on their merits, no case exists for reserving for them any share in the appointments. The bulk of these should go, as at present, either to Europeans from Europe or to Indians of unmixed Asiatic descent. In the case of class II. of our new service no question of any proportion as between these two communities arises. Class II. should be recruited for in India and from amongst statutory natives of India. In the case of class I. we recommended, in dealing with the question of the place of recruitment, that three-quarters of the basic 264 posts should be recruited for in England and one-quarter in India, but that as new posts were created recruitment should be so adjusted that the additional officers would be obtained half from Europe and half from India. This will secure for India an initial minimum of one-quarter, and this proportion will go on increasing as the cadre develops. There will also be a certain number of Indians who will have qualified themselves by undergoing a course of education in Europe for appointment by the Secretary of State in England, and their numbers will go to swell the Indian percentage on the total account. We think that this will suffice to secure for Indians a fair start in the department, and we would go no further in the direction of stereotyping racial proportions. These are always best avoided, and particularly in a body of officers entrusted with the work of education. For special appointments we would lay down no rule. Such cases should be decided on their individual merits, with due regard for the principles which we have enunciated for the two main branches of the service. For the twenty new professorships the best candidates available should be taken, irrespective of race.

14. *Communal representation in India.*—A similar question arises with regard to the representation of the various Indian communities as between themselves. On the 1st April 1913, out of the 493 Indians of unmixed Asiatic descent in receipt of salaries of Rs. 200 a month or over, 358, or 73 per cent., were Hindus, 66, or 13 per cent., Muhammadans, and 69, or 14 per cent., Sikhs, Parsis, Indian Christians, or Buddhists. Again, out of the 358 Hindus, 164, or 46 per cent., were Brahmans (including Shenvis), and 82, or 23 per cent., Kayasthas (including Prabhus).<sup>\*</sup> It was represented to us that these figures did not correspond with the population returns for the same communities, and that steps should be taken, in the interests of the spread of education, to secure a closer approximation in this respect. The Muhammadans in particular asked for the appointment of a special officer, preferably a Muhammadan, to advise the director of public instruction on the particular problems of Muhammadan education in each province. We sympathise with the desire of the educationally backward communities for special treatment, and consider that it would be wise to meet their wishes in every way which is not prejudicial to the general efficiency of the department. But we think that the ill-feeling which would be caused by any rule of proportions would not be worth the satisfaction which it would give. We recommend, therefore, that the matter be left to the discretion of the selecting authorities, but in so far as this is compatible with efficiency special efforts should be made to provide for the due representation of the various communities on the administrative side of the class II. staff.

15. *Proportion of officers to be appointed directly and by promotion from class II.*—Hitherto all recruits to the Indian educational service have been chosen directly. There has been no promotion from any lower service because there has been no lower service except the subordinate service, which is not sufficiently qualified, from which this could be done. With the creation of our new superior service with its two classes the question arises of the extent to which promotion from class II. to class I. should be allowed. On the administrative side we see advantages in giving to experienced inspectors of mature age a considerable share in the chief inspectorships. We therefore recommend that of the appointments made in India half be filled by such officers, provided that suitable candidates are available, and half by direct recruits. On the collegiate side other considerations prevail, and we advise that two-thirds of the vacancies to be recruited for in India be filled by direct recruits and one-third from class II. officers, provided that suitable candidates are forthcoming. For the appointments to class II. it is not safe to lay down any fixed proportion until some

<sup>\*</sup> Volume XX., Appendix XIV. (page 280).

decision has been arrived at as to the exact point where class II. is to end and the subordinate service is to begin. This will be known only when the local Governments have made a detailed examination of their posts in the manner already suggested. Should this result in the dividing line being kept high, the proportion of the vacancies to be filled by promotion from the subordinate service should be high also. On the other hand, should a considerable number of the present subordinate posts be brought into class II., the case for a large percentage of direct recruitment will be strengthened. We recommend, therefore, that this point be left to be decided by the authorities in India after the completion of the reorganisation schemes.

16. *Constitution of the committee for the selection of direct recruits in the United Kingdom.*—At present the appointments which are filled by selection in Europe are made by the Secretary of State for India, with the advice of a committee presided over by the director of special enquiries and reports at the board of education in England. The other members include permanent representatives of the India Office and of the Scottish education department, and occasional members nominated either on account of their local knowledge or to give expert advice, where technical questions are involved. An officer of the board of education also acts as secretary to the committee and maintains a permanent register of applicants for employment. Carefully thought-out arrangements also exist for keeping the various teaching institutions throughout the United Kingdom informed of all vacancies, and where these measures fail to secure an adequate field resort is had to advertisement. This machinery has been in force only since March 1910, and appears to us well fitted to secure the removal of those drawbacks in the system previously in force, about which complaint was made to us by witnesses in India. The changes which we recommend are, first, that the officers who are invited to sit on the committee to represent local experience should not have left India more than five years beforehand; secondly, that an Indian who is in touch with the Indian student community in the United Kingdom should be added to the committee; and, thirdly, that more personal touch should be established between the committee and individuals interested in the cause of Indian education in the various universities and educational institutions in the United Kingdom. It should also be an instruction to the committee to interview and place on record their views about likely Indian candidates who were returning to India, irrespective of whether there was a vacancy at the moment or not.

17. *Institution of committees for selecting direct recruits in India.*—In the same way direct appointments in India, whether to class I. or to class II., should be made on the advice of committees. Such bodies should be set up in each province. They should consist of three officials and two non-officials and should include two Indians. In the case of appointments requiring technical qualifications in their holders the committee should also have power to co-opt or consult specialists in the subject under their consideration. Where there is a vacancy in class II. the committee should advise the local Government, which would make the selection. In the case of a vacancy in class I. the Government of India should appoint, on a consideration of the names submitted by the local Governments after consultation with their local committees. But in the case of appointments involving technical qualifications the Government of India should also consult specialists in the subject if they are in doubt as to the rival merits of particular candidates. The committees should also be utilised in like manner in making special appointments which are filled directly in India. Officers should be promoted from class II. to class I. under the orders of the Government of India on the recommendation of the local Governments, and from the subordinate service to class II. under the orders of the local Governments.

18. *Qualifications of direct recruits.*—At present the officers appointed to the Indian educational service in Europe are selected at an average age of about 28 after acquiring experience in teaching or in further study subsequent to taking their degrees. We attach importance to this preliminary training, and advise that a similar procedure be followed in the case of the recruits from Europe to class I. of our new service. It follows that if the officers to be appointed directly to class I. in India are to come in on an equal footing with their colleagues from Europe, they must have had a similar experience. Some of them will be able to obtain this through the medium of the research fellowships, which have already been created in certain academic centres, and which might be multiplied with advantage. Others will no doubt take service in private colleges

after taking their degrees, and apply for admission to class I. on the basis of the experience in teaching gained in them. But in the present state of education in India it will not be safe to depend solely on these two sources of recruitment. Pending their development, it will be necessary to accept as candidates a certain proportion of untrained and younger men. The number of these will vary from province to province and must be settled locally in the light of local needs. Such officers should not, however, be admitted permanently to class I. until they are of the same age as their colleagues arriving from Europe and have had a similar experience. Pending this, they should be regarded as probationers, and there should be no hesitation in not confirming them if they do not come up to the expectations formed at the time of their original selection. There will be no hardship in this, as, if their conduct has been good, they can be found places in class II. or allowed to seek employment in private institutions. Officers appointed directly to class I. in India will in many cases, no doubt, also have received some education in a European university, but where this is not the case, power should be taken at the time of the selection to require the recruit to go to Europe for a term of post-graduate work on such conditions as to study leave as may be considered appropriate in each case. Officers appointed directly to the administrative side of class II. should be at least graduates of an Indian university or of a university in the United Kingdom, or should hold an equivalent qualification, and where it is found practicable to insist on a higher standard of education this should be done. Officers appointed directly to the collegiate side should possess ordinarily the M.A. or an equivalent degree. In the case of the special appointments similar principles should be followed.

## CHAPTER IV.

### SYSTEMS OF PROBATION AND TRAINING.

19. *Probation.*—Officers selected in England for educational work are kept on probation in India for a period of two years after their appointment. This is satisfactory. Officers appointed directly in India to class I., if of the same age and of the same experience as the officers recruited from Europe, and all officers appointed directly to class II. or to any special appointment, should be kept similarly on probation for two years. The officers appointed to class I. as probationers in the manner set out in the preceding paragraph should be kept on probation for the period there indicated.

20. *Training.*—We also think that some reforms are needed in the matter of training. It is undesirable that the important duties of a chief inspector should be entrusted to inexperienced recruits, and in particular to those who are new to the country and to its system of education. This error is avoided in Bombay by selecting such officers from amongst the headmasters of the bigger high schools. We approve of this arrangement, provided that steps are taken at the same time to prevent detriment to the continuity of control in these institutions, and provided that it is understood that all headmasters need not necessarily become chief inspectors. We therefore recommend that, before taking over independent charge as a chief inspector, a directly appointed officer on the administrative side of class I. of our new service should have worked under the supervision of a headmaster for a period of one year, and thereafter as a headmaster for a further period of four years, and the cadre of the administrative branch should be adjusted accordingly. We also observed indications that the present European inspectors of the Indian educational service were not compelled to master the language of their province. This should be remedied by the institution of a practical departmental test which will ensure that every administrative officer in class I. of the new service is able to test the teaching of a class in the vernacular. On the collegiate side of class I., provided that all officers have had previous teaching experience, as we have recommended, no period of preliminary training need be regarded as essential. But so far as possible directly appointed officers from Europe should be given opportunities of seeing how experienced teachers conduct their classes under Indian conditions. For such officers also a less severe colloquial test in the provincial vernacular will suffice, and local Governments should have power to exempt anyone who has been recruited to each a specialist subject from passing any such test at all. To meet the case of directly appointed class II. officers we advise that the training colleges in India be developed.

## CHAPTER V.

## CONDITIONS OF SALARY.

21. *Incremental system of remuneration recommended.*—Officers of the Indian educational service are paid on an incremental scale. This is satisfactory so far as it goes, but the scale is faulty in that it terminates with the tenth year, after which the only prospect of pecuniary advancement for the bulk of the officers is to be found in the grant of allowances. To this is largely due the tendency, which is so marked in this service, for officers to retire before completing their full time. In the provincial services a graded system ordinarily prevails. For general reasons we recommend that the incremental method be followed in both classes of the new service, and that the increments be so arranged as to remove any inducement to premature retirement.

22. *Rates of salary proposed.*—The rates hitherto paid, both in the Indian and provincial educational services, have not only been calculated on a faulty system but have been inadequate in themselves. Great difficulty is now being experienced in obtaining suitable recruits from Europe, whilst in India the counter attractions of the bar and the other services are preventing the department from getting a large enough supply of the best men. This calls for immediate remedy. We therefore propose that for class II. of the new service the same general scale be adopted as has been proposed for the provincial civil and police services and other such-like services, which are recruited in India. This will give a scale of Rs. 250-40/3-450-50/3-500 (for Burma 300-40/3-500-50/3-550) a month for the main body of officers, with selection grades of Rs. 500-40-700 (for Burma 550-40-750) a month for 15 per cent. of the total cadre. For class I. officers who are recruited in India, we recommend a general scale of Rs. 350-50-1,250 a month, whilst for those who are recruited in Europe, whether statutory natives of India or not, we would allow Rs. 550-50-1,250 a month. This will bring all officers, irrespective of any selection, on to equal rates of pay after, at latest, 18 years' service, which in this department appears to us desirable. We would also provide for selection grades for all alike, wherever recruited, and whether statutory natives of India or not, of ten per cent. of the cadre on Rs. 1,250-50-1,500, and of a further ten per cent. on Rs. 1,500-50-1,750 a month in all the provinces except Assam, where the cadre is at present too small to carry this addition. Efforts should also be made to earmark a share in these selection appointments for officers who are performing particular duties, for example, principals of colleges and the like, but a share should also be kept as a reward for those who have done important original work. We also contemplate that in the distribution of these posts over the two branches account will be taken of whether the director of public instruction is an administrative or a collegiate officer. Directors, whether originally recruited in Europe or India, and whether statutory natives of India or not, should receive Rs. 2,250-100-2,750 a month in the seven major provinces, and Rs. 1,750-100-2,250 and Rs. 1,500-50-1,750 a month respectively in the Central Provinces and Berar, and Assam. We also recommend that the principal of each college be given an allowance of Rs. 150 a month, and that one principal in each province, to be selected by the local Government, receive an allowance of Rs. 250 a month. The salaries affixed to the special appointments should be decided on the merits of each case, but with due regard to the principles laid down for the class I. and class II. appointments.-

23. *Estimate of cost.*—In calculating what will be the cost of this reorganisation it is necessary to proceed on several rather arbitrary hypotheses. In the first place, pending the reconstruction in detail by the local Governments, we have had to treat all the officers as belonging to one service instead of to separate administrative and collegiate branches, with their separate avenues of preferment to their own selection posts. Similarly, we have assumed that only 65 posts will be taken out of the provincial services and included with the old Indian educational service posts in class I. of the new service. We have also had to spread these proportionately over the various provinces. Again, we have neglected the possibility that when the detailed reconstruction is made large numbers of officers may be moved up from the subordinate service to class II. We have also computed that half the recruits to class II. will come in by promotion and half direct, though we have not been able

## ANNEXURE IV.—EDUCATION DEPARTMENT—(continued.)

specifically to recommend this or any other proportion at the present stage. Finally, we have been unable to deal at all with the numerous special appointments. The estimate given in schedule V. to this annexure is thus of a speculative character. For what it is worth it shows that the net additional cost for both classes will be, approximately, Rs. 9,11,476 a year.

## CHAPTER VI.

## CONDITIONS OF SERVICE.

24. *Increase of staff needed.*—We have already indicated the need for a special additional staff of about twenty highly qualified professors. In other respects also the trend of the evidence was that the existing cadres were too weak, particularly on the administrative side. The joint secretary to the Government of India in the education department told us that within the next few years the superior inspecting staff would have to be increased by about 50 per cent.\* Complaint was also made as to the inadequacy of the training staffs. It was also pointed out that without a determined effort to improve the teaching in the high schools by the provision of better qualified headmasters, the problem of Indian education would not properly be tackled. To a lesser degree the same difficulty was said to exist on the collegiate side. We are in full accord with these views. The spread of education in India in recent years has been enormous, and everything points to its having caught up and outstripped the existing staff. We are not in a position to make detailed recommendations as to the number of posts to be added to classes I. and II. of the new service, but feel that the matter is urgent and should receive the immediate attention of the local Governments.

25. *Leave, training, and deputation reserves.*—The cadres are also ordinarily devoid of leave, training, and deputation reserves. Only in Bengal does any provision appear to have been made in the Indian educational service on this account, and there it has not been possible to utilise the officers provided for the purpose for which they were sanctioned.† On the administrative side of class I. of the new service this can and should be remedied at once by additions to the cadre based on the actual requirements of the last five years. A small training reserve is also needed on the administrative side of class I. to give effect to our recommendation that every direct recruit shall serve for a year under a headmaster before he takes over the duties of a headmaster himself. On the collegiate side of class I. it is more difficult to provide a reserve, as the officers are not all doing the same work, whilst the need is not so great, as everyone gets the benefit of a long vacation. Still there are certain subjects, like English, for lecturers in which there is always a demand in one college or another throughout India, and we recommend that a small reserve of such officers be kept by the Government of India to fill unexpected vacancies. Should none occur the reserve officers can usefully be employed as assistants to officers of experience in the bigger colleges. For class II. no provision need be made at present either for leave or deputation or training. Vacancies can be filled as now either by promoting officers from the subordinate service or by temporarily appointing persons not in Government employment. Of these on the collegiate side the supply appears to be adequate. Similarly, no annual rate of recruitment is now fixed either for the Indian or for the provincial educational service. We recognise that this must continue for both classes of the new service, but as these grow in size and become more normal in point of distribution a regular inflow of officers should be established. We feel that this would facilitate in a special degree the task of the selection committee for class I. in England.

26. *Directorships of public instruction.*—Representations were made to us that the directorships of public instruction should be reserved absolutely for members of the education department. We are not in favour of any such restriction, particularly at the present moment, when the cadres have been so greatly depleted by retirements and so large a proportion of the members are of quite junior standing. The present orders on the subject appear to us to be generally suitable, but should be qualified to lay stress on the need for local experience and adequate seniority. We also think that the directorship should be open to both branches of the service, but should be reserved for neither. It may be that the administrative branch will

## ANNEXURE IV.—EDUCATION DEPARTMENT—(continued).

get a larger share of the actual posts, as the duties to be performed are mainly administrative in character. But any disabilities of this kind under which collegiate officers will labour can be met, as we have provided, by the allotment of a rather larger share of the selection posts and by the grant of allowances to the principals of colleges. We have also considered whether directors of public instruction should be secretaries to their Governments. Though this has a bearing on recruitment it is primarily an administrative matter. But so far as we can judge, the needs of the case will be met if these officers are given, as they are now in several places, regular and direct access to the head of the province, or to the member in charge of education where there is a council form of government.

## CHAPTER VII.

## CONDITIONS OF LEAVE.

27. *Leave rules.*—All officers of the Indian educational service are subject to the European service leave rules. Officers of the provincial services are under the Indian service leave rules. As elsewhere, we are of opinion that in future officers of class I. who, when they enter the service, draw salary at the higher of the two rates propounded, should come under the European service regulations. Other officers should be under the Indian service rules and should continue under them throughout their careers. Class II. officers should be under the Indian service leave rules. It should be decided at the time of selection what leave rules should be applied in the case of special appointments.

28. *Study leave.*—We also think that officers on the collegiate side, whether in class I. or class II., and those holding kindred special appointments, should be encouraged to take study leave with a view to keeping their knowledge up to date. With this object the existing regulations should be revised under expert advice. Officers on the administrative side, who are required to study any particular educational problem, should be deputed for the purpose. In their case no general scheme of study leave appears necessary.

## CHAPTER VIII.

## CONDITIONS OF PENSION.

29. *Pension.*—All officers, whether of the Indian or provincial services, are under the ordinary rules as to pension, except that members of the Indian service are allowed, subject to certain provisos, to count towards superannuation pension the number of completed years by which their ages at appointment exceeded 25. We would extend this privilege to both classes of the new service. Otherwise all officers should remain under the general rules as revised by us. Directors of public instruction are now entitled to a special additional pension. They should continue to enjoy this privilege, which should be extended to all officers who are selected to fill posts in the grade of Rs. 1,500–50–1,750 a month.

## PART II.—WOMEN'S APPOINTMENTS.

## CHAPTER IX.

30. *Organisation and methods of recruitment.*—We have already indicated that women should be placed in a separate service from men. This will mark the fact that they are engaged on problems of their own, and will facilitate changes of organisation to meet the developments which are sure to arise as their work increases in extent and importance. For the present, however, and until the new situation which we anticipate arises, we would keep to the form of organisation which we have recommended for men. Thus there should be a women's subordinate service, and a women's Indian educational service which should comprise class I., class II., and special appointments, and the authorities in India should allot the existing posts accordingly, as has been proposed in the case of the posts for men. In matters of recruitment the rules laid down for men should also be followed as closely as may be, but it should be recognised that the supply of women from India, who are fitted to fill appointments in class I., or special

ANNEXURE IV.—EDUCATION DEPARTMENT—(*continued*).

appointments of a kindred character, is more limited than in the case of men, and that the same high educational qualifications cannot for the present be insisted upon for any class of appointment. As in the case of men, we attach great importance to the possession by all women, who are brought out from England, of previous teaching experience.

31. *Systems of probation and training.*—Women recruited in England should come out, in the first instance, for five years. In other respects the rules relating to probation and training laid down for men recruited in England should be followed as far as may be. In particular it should be secured that every woman should have a sufficient knowledge of the language to test the teaching of a class. Women recruited in India should be on the same footing as regards probation as men similarly recruited. Facilities for training women holding class II. and kindred special appointments are urgently required and should be developed.

32. *Conditions of salary.*—There is also need for a general revision of emoluments. Class I. appointments should carry a salary of Rs. 400–20–500 a month for the first five years. On re-engagement after five years a salary of Rs. 500–25–800 a month should be paid. Under present conditions these rates should be enjoyed by all alike, wherever they are recruited, and whether they are statutory natives of India or not. Class II. appointments should be paid at the rate of Rs. 200–10–400 a month. The pay of the special appointments should be decided on the merits of each case. It is difficult to calculate exactly the probable cost of such a reorganisation, as the data are insufficient, but the table given in schedule VI. to this annexure brings out a total of approximately Rs. 39,712 a year for the 48 appointments which appear to fall naturally into classes I. and II. respectively.

33. *Conditions of service.*—The present cadres are in their infancy, and will need to be increased to keep pace with the spread of female education. There is an immediate need everywhere for a leave reserve which should be provided. In some provinces there is no one to officiate for the senior inspectress during her absence. The work is developing so rapidly that the extra establishment would always usefully be employed even if no leave vacancy actually occurred. Complaints were also made to us that the existing rules as to travelling and accommodation were not sufficiently elastic to afford adequate facilities and protection to women when on tour. We recommend that this matter be examined with the aid of expert advice together with the questions relating to leave and pension.

34. *Conditions of leave.*—The leave rules at present applicable to women are the same as for men. We think that a case was made out for a special inquiry with the aid of experts into this matter. In several respects the needs of women differ from those of men, and we are not convinced that the present regulations are sufficiently elastic.

35. *Conditions of pension.*—Similarly, the present pensionary system appears to work hardly in the case of those women who, owing to marriage or otherwise, desire to retire early. We therefore recommend that this question also be made the subject of expert inquiry. From the evidence we received we are inclined to think that many women would prefer the certain benefits of a provident fund to the uncertainties of a pension. If so, a scheme should be worked out and established for future entrants. If the present pension system is kept, the present period of service for full pension should be reduced to 25 years, and it should be possible for anyone to retire on a reduced pension after 20 years.

## PART III.

## CHAPTER X.

## SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS.

36. The arrangements which we have recommended in the education department are as follows :—

- (i) The present educational officers in each province should be regrouped into separate bodies, according as they belong either to the administrative branch or to a particular college or lie outside these two groups in a special class. No change from one main group to another should ordinarily be permitted, but transfer from the staff of one college to that of another should be allowed (paragraph 3).

- (ii) Both the administrative and the collegiate branches of the department should be organised on the basis of the work to be done into two classes. The present division into imperial and provincial services should be abandoned. The details of this reorganisation should be worked out by each local Government (paragraphs 4 to 6).
- (iii) The cadre of the present Indian-educational service should be increased by at least one-third to form the new class I. Class II. should be as large as the work to be done requires (paragraph 7).
- (iv) Members of the college staffs who are class I. officers should be called lecturers; those who are class II. officers assistant lecturers or demonstrators, and members of the subordinate services teachers in their particular subject. The use of the title "professor" should be restricted to university professors or to persons specially authorised to use it as a reward for original work (paragraph 8).
- (v) Twenty professorships should be created for the higher branches of study, either through the medium of grants in aid to the universities or by additions to the college staffs, or through the formation of a central institute of arts and sciences (paragraphs 9 and 10).
- (vi) Approximately three-quarters of the number of posts in class I., as reorganised, should be recruited for in Europe, provided that suitable candidates are forthcoming, and one-quarter in India. As new posts are created, recruitment in Europe and India should be so adjusted that the additional officers will be taken half from the one country and half from the other (paragraph 11).
- (vii) Class II. should be recruited for in India (paragraph 12).
- (viii) Special posts, in which category should be included any headmasterships not of class I. standing which it may be desired to fill from Europe, should be treated on their merits. The proposed twenty new professorships should be filled by the best persons available, whether from India or from Europe (paragraph 12).
- (ix) Special efforts should be made to provide for the due representation of the various communities on the administrative side of the class II. staff, so far as this is compatible with efficiency (paragraph 14).
- (x) On the administrative side half the class I. posts which are to be filled in India should be reserved for direct recruits and half given to class II. officers, provided qualified candidates are available. On the collegiate side the proportions should be two-thirds and one-third respectively. The proportion of class II. posts to be filled by promotion from the subordinate service should be left to be determined by the local authorities (paragraph 15).
- (xi) The member nominated to represent local experience on the committee which advises on selections for the Indian educational service in the United Kingdom should not have left India more than five years beforehand. An Indian in touch with the Indian student community in the United Kingdom should be added to the committee, and more personal touch should be established between the committee and individuals interested in the cause of Indian education in the various universities and educational institutions in the United Kingdom. The committee should interview likely Indian students before their return to India, even though there may be no vacancy to be filled (paragraph 16).
- (xii) Committees of five members should be set up in each province to advise on the selection of candidates for direct appointment in India to class I. or class II. of the service. Appointments in India to class I. should be made by the Government of India, and to class II. by the local Governments. In cases involving technical qualifications specialists should be consulted if necessary (paragraph 17).
- (xiii) Promotion from class II. to class I. should be made under the orders of the Government of India on the recommendation of local Governments, and from the subordinate service to class II. under the orders of the local Governments (paragraph 17).

## ANNEXURE IV.—EDUCATION DEPARTMENT—(continued).

- (xiv) Where an officer appointed directly to class I. in India has not had full teaching experience or training in research methods, he should be treated as a probationer, and not be confirmed until he has acquired the same experience and is of the same age as his colleagues from Europe. Where such an officer has not been educated in a European university, power should be taken to require him to go to Europe for a term of post-graduate work. Officers appointed directly to the administrative side of class II. should be graduates of an Indian university or of a university in the United Kingdom, or should hold an equivalent qualification. Officers appointed directly to the collegiate side should possess ordinarily the M.A. or an equivalent degree (paragraph 18).
- (xv) Recruits to the Indian educational service who are selected in England should be on probation for two years. Officers, other than the probationers referred to in paragraph 18, who are appointed to class I., class II., or any special appointment in India, should also be on probation for two years (paragraph 19).
- (xvi) Before taking over independent charge as a chief inspector, a directly appointed officer on the administrative side of class I. should have worked under the supervision of a headmaster for one year, and thereafter as a headmaster for four years (paragraph 20).
- (xvii) A departmental test should be instituted to ensure that every administrative officer in class I. is able to test the teaching of a class in the vernacular. A less severe test will suffice for collegiate officers, and the local Governments should have power to exempt teachers of specialist subjects from passing any language test. Training colleges should be developed so as to provide adequate training for officers of the administrative branch appointed directly to class II. (paragraph 20).
- (xviii) Incremental scales of pay should be adopted both for class I. and class II. In class I. there should be different scales for about the first 18 years of service for recruits who are appointed in England and in India respectively. Salaries should be increased to the extent stated both in class I. and class II. (paragraphs 21 to 23).
- (xix) Local Governments should at once consider the additional staff required in both class I. and class II. to meet the increased needs of education (paragraph 24).
- (xx) On the administrative side of class I. additions should be made to the cadre for leave and deputation reserves based on the actual requirements of the last five years. A small training reserve should also be provided. On the collegiate side of class I. a small reserve should be kept by the Government of India to fill unexpected vacancies in the more popular chairs (paragraph 25).
- (xxi) The orders regarding the selection of directors of public instruction should be qualified to lay stress on the need for local experience and adequate seniority (paragraph 26).
- (xxii) The directorships of public instruction should be open to both branches of the service (paragraph 26).
- (xxiii) Directors of public instruction should be given regular and direct access to the head of the province, or the member in charge of education where there is a council form of government (paragraph 26).
- (xxiv) All future entrants to class I. who, when they enter the service, draw salary at the lower of the two rates propounded, should come under the Indian service leave rules, and should continue under them throughout their careers. Other officers should come under the European service leave rules. Class II. officers should be under the Indian service leave rules. A separate decision should be taken on the merits in the case of special appointments. The taking of study leave should be encouraged in the collegiate branch (paragraphs 27 and 28).

## ANNEXURE IV.—EDUCATION DEPARTMENT—(continued).

- (xxv) Members of class I. and of class II., subject to the general provisos, should be permitted to reckon as service qualifying for superannuation pension the number of completed years by which their age at the time of appointment exceeded 25. Directors of public instruction and officers selected to fill posts in the grade of Rs. 1,500–50–1,750 a month should be eligible for special additional pensions (paragraph 29).
- (xxvi) There should be a women's educational service to comprise class I., class II., and special appointments, and the rules for recruitment laid down in the case of men should be followed as closely as possible (paragraph 30).
- (xxvii) Women who are selected in England should be recruited in the first instance for five years, and the salaries paid to women should be enhanced to the extent stated (paragraphs 31 and 32).
- (xxviii) More women are needed for educational work. In particular a leave reserve should be provided (paragraph 33).
- (xxix) A special inquiry should be made as to the adequacy of the travelling allowances and arrangements for women, the suitability of their leave rules, and the working of their present pensionary system. If the present pensionary system is kept, the period of service for full pension should be reduced to 25 years, and optional retirement should be allowed on reduced pension after 20 years (paragraphs 33 to 35).

## SCHEDULE I.

NOTE BY THE EARL OF RONALDSHAY, SIR VALENTINE CHIROL AND  
MR. H. A. L. FISHER.

In framing proposals for the educational service in India we are conscious that we touch the outskirts only of a great and difficult problem. We trust that our recommendations may have the effect of attracting into educational work many of the abler students of the British and Indian universities, that they will promote a feeling of harmony and co-operation between the educationalists of both races, and that in more ways than one they may assist the efficient working of the service on its administrative as well as on its collegiate side. Beyond this we make no claim. We cannot expect simply by improving the material prospects of the whole service or by raising the professional status of that part of it which is recruited in India to cure the grave evils of the existing system. Indeed, we realise that our proposals can only fully effect their desired result if those evils are attacked and defeated by the collected and persistent efforts of British and Indian reformers working upon lines wider than those permitted by the terms of our reference.

2. The problem of educating a young Indian in western learning through the medium of the English tongue is in itself beset with the peculiar difficulty that the culture which the student picks up in the classroom bears little or no relation to the facts of his ordinary experience. But this obstacle to true intelligence, which is inherent in our educational policy, is aggravated by defects which are not irremediable. At present the level of English teaching in the high schools is so low that the majority of the students on their arrival at college have a most imperfect comprehension of the lectures. This is a fault which can certainly be very largely cured. It would, of course, be impossible to provide English masters for all the high schools, for the schools are too numerous and the masters are too expensive. But the English element in the high schools should certainly be strengthened, and it appears to us that the training college might be made a more valuable instrument than it has yet become, if its English teaching were considerably fortified and if some system were devised by which members of the English staffs of the training colleges might visit the schools in their region for purposes of instruction, and *vice versâ* teachers in the high schools might be required periodically to return to the training college for a course of English given from English lips.

3. The second acknowledged defect of the present system of education in India is the low age of matriculation. Boys enter the university at the age of 16, and the first two years of a college course are expended on school work imperfectly assimilated

## ANNEXURE IV.—EDUCATION DEPARTMENT—(continued).

by reason of the scholar's insufficient acquaintance with the language through which the whole of the teaching is conveyed. It is not, however, possible to provide an immediate remedy for this state of things, since were the age raised to 18, the high schools would be entirely unable at present to take on the work which would be devolved on them. What is wanted is a steady upward pressure of the school and matriculation standards and of the age at which boys may be admitted to the universities. Meanwhile the schools being as weak as they are, and the colleges alone offering the prospect of a respectable education, it is not wonderful if the low age of matriculation continues to receive a great deal of support.

4. If the two changes indicated were effected, if the teaching of English in the high schools were improved, and if the colleges were relieved of all work up to the standard of the intermediate examination, which is commonly taken about the age of 18, the career of a teacher in an Indian college would be rendered far more attractive to a really able man than it can be in the present circumstances. A college consisting of young men of university age and already adequately trained in the use and comprehension of the English tongue, would be a place in which the true academic spirit might have a chance of thriving. The most irksome and elementary part of the teaching would be removed. The lecturing could proceed at a normal pace with some chance of its content being intelligently absorbed. There would be more thought and less cram.

5. Yet even these beneficial changes do not meet all the needs of the situation. A careful revision of the curricula with the view of making the teaching more practical and more closely related to the facts of Indian experience is rightly regarded by many experts as desirable. We are not in a position to give detailed advice upon a matter which requires prolonged consideration, but all changes in the direction of substituting a more practical discipline in the use of the English language for the present obligatory courses of English literature, of developing the study of Indian history and economics, and of bringing the history of Europe into direct relation with the course of events in the east, and of giving an Indian turn to such sciences as zoology, botany and geology, are to be earnestly welcomed.

6. Such developments are, however, for the present greatly impaired by the system of the federated or examining university which in India as in Great Britain, wherever it has prevailed, tends to reduce all intellectual energy to the level of the worst equipped college of the affiliated group, and to substitute success in a competition for that preparation for the higher purposes of life which is the supreme end of education. We do not deny that the federal university has performed, and still performs, a useful function. It has helped to level up backward colleges and to kindle the ambition of many poor and scattered students who, but for its assistance, would have been condemned to work without direction. For these reasons federation and affiliation will probably continue for some time to come to be features of the educational system of India. But it cannot be denied that a teacher whose main task it is to prepare boys for an examination devised by an external board to suit the needs of a great number of scattered colleges, many of them seriously starved for books and appliances, is at a serious disadvantage. The more original he is the less likely are his boys to succeed in their examinations. He dare not suggest an out-of-the-way book. He has not the courage to open out a new avenue of study. The cast-iron discipline of the examination coerces his mind to a course of childish drudgery, almost as withering to the intelligence of his pupils as it is harmful to himself. Under such a system there is very little scope for intellectual enterprise, and if here and there a pupil or a teacher achieves originality, it is not so much because of the system as in spite of it. The tyranny of the degree examinations, coupled with the size of the classes and the strangeness of the medium of instruction, makes it almost impossible to do justice to the really brilliant students. The system turns out a great number of young men with a tincture of western knowledge, but always at a sacrifice of excellence to mediocrity. The B.As. are manufactured in their thousands, but the real life of science has hardly begun.

7. One of the remedies suggested and in part applied is the creation of teaching universities. Another is the encouragement of post-graduate research. All this is to the good, but it must be remembered that the federal system, though ultimately destined to disappear, cannot be replaced for many years to come, and as to research work, the question arises how many teachers there are in India fit and free to direct it.

8. This brings us to the point. The business of an Indian college is to prepare young men to pass examinations, the highest of which, the M.A., is equivalent to a moderate honours degree at a British University. All the college teachers are involved in the machinery of these examinations, and inasmuch as the Indian college contains schoolboys as well as young men, the professors are largely concerned with work of a character more elementary than any which is undertaken in the universities of the west. The professor of an Indian college, though he may be a man of great intellectual eminence, is not a professor in the sense in which that term is employed in the universities of Great Britain and Germany. He is part school-master, part college lecturer, and, save in rare instances, lacks the leisure or the appetite for original work.

9. It follows that the Indian college is wanting in the essential spirit of a university. The way to influence students at a university most powerfully is by becoming as learned as possible, but the system in India is adverse to learning. If the true university spirit is to be created something much more radical is required than an alteration in salaries, an improvement in the teaching of English, a raising of the matriculation age or the establishment of some fellowships for research. It must be considered how best to create and sustain a passion for learning among the university teachers. All true reform in education must begin from above. If the university teachers are good, everything else will follow. If they are bad, no money spent on secondary or primary education can retrieve the disaster.

10. First then, India should possess a body of teachers who have the root of original work in them. Then these teachers should be given facilities for the highest forms of intellectual development and influence. They should have the use of good libraries and laboratories. They should work to the stimulus of a congenial intellectual society. The bulk of college drudgery should be taken from their shoulders and whatever teaching of a more popular nature they may be called upon or may desire to give should be regarded as a minor feature of their activities. The main part of their teaching energy should be expended upon a few selected pupils desirous of fitting themselves for the life of study. It is not too much to say that such a body of professors working under favourable conditions would in the course of a generation raise the whole intellectual tone of the Indian universities.

11. So long as the conditions mentioned above are realised, it is a matter of educational indifference whether the new chairs recommended are given to the universities or attached to particular colleges, or gathered together in one or two central institutions. The really important point is to bring the ablest students in each subject under the influence of an eminent teacher working freely and in the most favourable environment.

12. A central institute would possess certain obvious advantages. It would be raised right out of the atmosphere of degree examinations. It would probably be more attractive to eminent Europeans. Its museums, libraries, and laboratories would be placed under the favouring eye of the Government of India, and it might be established in a climate permitting of vigorous work through every month of the year so that students who had passed on to college or school work might return to it during vacations, and so regain their touch with the life of learning. Nor would it be necessarily disjoined from the normal college or university activities, for members of the institute might from time to time be invited to visit one or other of the principal colleges, to give short courses of lecture or to hold a seminar in some subject which they had made their own. Such an institute would undoubtedly be expensive, but it might be built up department for department and the cost spread over a considerable term of years. "Nothing great" as the Greek philosopher said, "is done without time."

13. The objections which will naturally occur to this particular solution of the problem are first the geographical extent of India and, second, the desirability of placing the highest learning in some large thoroughfare of student life from the point of view alike of teachers and taught. Scatter the professors through the colleges and universities and every part of India will obtain some share of learned eminence. Isolate them and there arises the danger of pedantry, conceit and lack of just perspective. These are certainly considerations in favour of dispersal to which we should be disposed to attach considerable weight if we could be assured that professors, so disseminated, would be freed from the bondage of the official curriculum placed in

## ANNEXURE IV.—EDUCATION DEPARTMENT—(continued).

an atmosphere congenial to true learning and discovery and adequately endowed with leisure and opportunity for the most effective use of their talents. It may also be argued that the establishment of a small model university for advanced study would discourage the existing universities of India by withdrawing the flower of the students from the operation of their influence. Yet the German universities thrive despite the attractive force of Berlin, and the Collège de France and the École des Hautes Études have not impeded, but on the contrary have powerfully promoted the movement of higher education throughout the country to which they belong.

14. Whatever may be the course ultimately preferred, it is clear that any chairs created to promote the highest learning in India must be concerned with subjects which admit of original work being done upon them under Indian conditions and preferably with subjects for the study of which India offers special advantages. Western knowledge is valuable in itself; but for young minds in India the most fruitful discipline is afforded by those branches of learning in which western ideas and methods are brought to the interpretation and criticism of eastern things.

## SCHEDULE II.

NOTE BY SIR MURRAY HAMMICK, SIR THEODORE MORISON, MR. M. B. CHAUBAL AND MR. J. RAMSAY MACDONALD.

We are of opinion that the professorial chairs, the creation and endowment of which is recommended in the report, should be attached to the existing universities. For some time past there has been in India a strong body of opinion, which aims at the reform of the present university system. The movement towards this change was emphasized by the passing of the present universities act (viii. of 1904) which recognised the wider functions of the Indian universities by declaring that their purpose was (among others) the provision of instruction for the students, with power to appoint university professors and lecturers, and the erection, equipment and maintenance of university laboratories and museums. It would, we consider, be a matter for regret if the advance which has already been made in the direction of developing the teaching side of the universities were to be retarded as we think it would be by the concentration of the proposed professorial staff in a central institute outside the university organisation. We cannot recommend that course. If instead of creating a special central institute the professorial chairs were placed at the disposal of the universities, the transition from federal to teaching universities would be stimulated. This transition it may be noted is by no means easy to effect. A scheme must be evolved which will reconcile the legitimate claims of the local colleges with the concentration of higher teaching in one locality. The Indian universities are already moving in this direction. Certain cities have shown a capacity to attract to themselves students from a distance; in them colleges and hostels multiply, libraries and laboratories are founded, and inter-collegiate lectures become possible; these cities contain the nucleus of a teaching university and the senates have generally recognised the possibilities which these conditions disclose and appointed university professors for longer or shorter terms. The endowment of chairs upon the lines of our recommendation will give a powerful impetus to this centripetal tendency and thus hasten the evolution of teaching universities.

2. Again we may point out that the main volume of Indian education must for a long while to come be directed by these universities, and the enhancement of their standards of both teaching and examination is the most direct method of improving higher education in India. To this the new professors may contribute if they form an integral part of the universities. If they are chosen by the universities it is reasonable to suppose that they will not be kept from exercising the influence to which their learning will entitle them. On the contrary we assume that the senates which select them for their eminence in certain branches of learning will at once appoint them to the appropriate boards of examiners and boards of studies and that they will thus be in a position to exercise a powerful influence upon the character of the examination and courses of study. Being relieved of the hack work which necessarily falls to a college lecturer, they will have leisure to prepare lectures of a more scholarly type than has hitherto been possible; this will not only benefit their own pupils but will react beneficially upon the higher lecturing in the colleges.

3. A third consideration in favour of attaching these professorships to the universities is that this course will secure the most economical use of the educational power available. The universities being intimately acquainted with the educational resources of the area which they control will be able to vary the use of the endowment from time to time according to the needs of the province. This elasticity in the finances of higher education will be as beneficial to learning as to economy, but it can only be secured by universities which are working in close co-operation with both Government and private colleges.

4. Fourthly, we are of opinion that the universities are the best bodies to whom can be entrusted the task of selecting persons to fill their chairs. It is advisable that their appointment should not be made by the Government, and a central institute such as that suggested in the report, established, directly financed, and managed by Government would inevitably be exposed to bitter criticism to which the control by the existing universities would not be so liable. The universities have hitherto given satisfaction in the delicate task of appointing the professors they have employed and it is among the fellows of the university that the persons most competent to estimate the value of the scholarly and scientific work achieved by the several candidates for the chairs will be found. In the senates are collected the most prominent English, Indian, and foreign representatives of all the highest colleges in the country, whether Government or private, and it may be confidently expected therefore that there will be no ground for charges of racial bias in the carrying out of the responsibilities attached to these bodies, if to them is assigned the duty of appointing to the professorial chairs. We feel that in the peculiar circumstances of India appointments made by Government to a central institute will always be liable to public criticism whether just or unjust, which will necessarily have a prejudicial effect on its influence.

5. Finally we cannot support any scheme which would even remotely tend to overshadow the importance of the existing universities or render their work inferior. We believe that the policy should be to strengthen the existing universities. They are not too many for the needs and conveniences of India. Their influence upon the education in their areas will be stimulating in proportion as the work done by them is important and their status high.

### SCHEDULE III.

#### ADDITIONAL NOTE BY MR. M. B. CHAUBAL.

I agree with my colleagues, Sir Murray Hammick, Sir Theodore Morison and Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, that the professorial chairs, the creation of which has been recommended in the report, would be better utilised by attaching them to the existing universities than by locating them in one central institution under Government for the whole of India and Burma, but I think that the number of these chairs should be at least thirty, looking at the number of universities over which they have to be distributed. This note of my colleagues, with which I have agreed so far as it goes, only touches higher education in India; but the point which struck me most in the evidence of educational experts during our inquiry was the point that university and college education was not as effective as it ought to be, owing to a great part of the present college course being taken up with what should more appropriately be in the secondary schools course. The development of secondary education up to its legitimate high standard, and the steps necessary to be taken in order to effect that, are no doubt questions outside the scope of our inquiry, but if the whole object for the constitution of a department of education in the state fails owing to this flaw in the present system, it ought to be our duty to direct the attention of the authorities concerned to it.

2. The last education commission was more than 30 years ago. There have been so many changes since, and there has been so much advance in science and all branches of education during that time, that the appointment of an educational commission which will take evidence and settle the proper lines on which secondary and higher education should be run under the altered conditions of the country and to suit the present time would be very desirable. The two stages of education

## ANNEXURE IV.—EDUCATION DEPARTMENT—(continued).

are so intimately connected that it would hardly be possible to effect any reform in one without affecting or altering the other. And no time for a full and proper consideration of the whole subject could be more appropriate than the present, as a beginning is now sought to be made in the direction of a conversion of the present universities into teaching universities. Any delay only creates further difficulties in the way of reform. For instance, if it is desirable to have universities modelled like those in the United Kingdom, where the higher teaching in all branches of science and education should be centred, if possible, in each university, and thus create a real university atmosphere, we are only drifting wider away from the goal by starting affiliated colleges in different parts of a province, necessitating separate staffs for each affiliated institution and thus frittering away resources, and only deadening and deteriorating the level of education all over the country. I therefore think that the appointment of a commission forthwith to settle this large and difficult problem as to higher and secondary education is necessary. If it is found that the work at present done in the first two years in colleges should be relegated to the high schools, then no time should be lost in carrying out that reform and settling the lines on which it should be done. Any attempt at improving the colleges can only be successful, in my opinion, if secondary education is fixed on the proper lines.

## SCHEDULE IV.

NOTE BY MR. W. C. MADGE.

I desire to submit certain remarks on the reform of Indian education, which, though I am an amateur, are the fruit of deep interest and long study extending over many more years than the age of this Commission. Experts are agreed that Indian education has not succeeded in its main object by having been misdirected towards passing examinations which have encouraged cramming of subjects often forgotten after being ingested, instead of proving a preparation for life work. In order to correct any grave miscarriage, it must be traced to its causes, and responsibility fixed on its authors, with a view to the abandonment of the one and the reform of the other.

2. It was held early in last century by the authors of the filtration theory that, if English education was given to the middle and higher classes, it would gradually filter down to the masses. It has done nothing of the sort. The great dispatch of 1854, known as the charter of Indian education, laid down clear lines of procedure ; and these, as more than one resolution of the Government of India has, at different times, pointed out to provincial administrations, have been ignored or neglected by the education department, on whom therefore the responsibility for want of success must be fixed.

3. To begin any large work designed to embrace the several peoples of a vast continent on the top, will recall the legendary Irishman who wished to begin by building an upper storey and trusting to Providence to supply the foundation. Of many shallow conceits this one has perhaps the least depth. The wistful glances cast by many ripe British statesmen in India on the panchayat—which, though crippled by some of our legislation, has still much vitality in it, and provides a solid foundation for any real self-government to take root in—furnishes, in its close relations with the real life-interests of the people, an analogy which ought not to be ignored in the education problem.

4. Any earnest and sincere recognition of *the grave evils of the existing system and the peculiar difficulties of educating a young Indian in a foreign literature which bears no relation to the facts of his ordinary experience* will disclose a strange inconsistency should it be followed by proceeding to confirm and aggravate this system without eradicating its essential vice, that of its foreign nature and power of alienating impressible young minds from their natural entourage.

5. It may be wisdom after the fact, but it remains wisdom all the same, to insist that, because the industrial development of India is its first and greatest secular need, the paramountcy of foreign literature should be abandoned and give place to studies in agriculture, mineralogy, mining, chemistry, and other allied sciences, while English literature, inspired by influences wholly foreign to the Indian mind and rarely

awaking genuine response, should not be excluded but take its proper subordinate place in the curricula of university and high school.

6. Serious attention is due to the remarkable debate in the vice-regal legislature on the 17th March last, when a resolution to make Indian vernaculars the media of instruction in secondary schools, "not only indirectly but directly," with a concurrent study of English in its right place and at the proper period, was withdrawn after placing on record many solid reasons why it should not have been withdrawn under official pressure. Space does not admit of quotations here from these powerful reasons which are available for reference to all earnest students of the subject. This resolution was supported in telling speeches by such men as Sir R. R. Venkataranga, Sir Subramania Iyer, Mr. Sivaswami Iyer, Sir Gurudas Banerji, Pandit Madan Mohun Malaviya, and Sir Aushutosh Mukherji, whose political ideals need not be accepted in order to give its right place to their informed interpretation of the Indian mind, its potentialities and its accessibilities. I find one of these gentlemen quoting Professor Monier Williams, the court of directors and even the Government of India in support of their contentions. I also find our able colleague Sir Valentine Chirol mentioned as one of their supporters. I remember an Indian M.A., a Government servant of real ability and originality, who told me 30 years ago that, when suddenly invaded by a question, he subconsciously received it in his native vernacular and rapidly translated it into English with his reply. This is by no means a rare phenomenon. In one of the greatest crises of human history, the incident known as the Pentecost, when an appeal had to be made to the highest region in the soul of the audience, the speakers made the appeal, not in the Hebrew tongue, nor in the Aramaic dialect of Greek in which the learned of the day exchanged their thoughts, but in the provincial vernaculars of the several Asiatic provinces from which their listeners came. *Verbum sapientibus*. No miracle is needed now-a-days to acquire a vernacular language. I readily stake what little reputation I may enjoy in any quarter on the prophecy that—unless incalculable harm is to be done in India, and some more thousands of discontented graduates are turned out yearly, deprived of their own moral sanctions and equipped with none other, often with no definite purpose in life and sometimes no enthusiasm in life itself, at a period in life at which youth of British birth and breeding face the varying calls of duty with courage and hope—vernacular teaching will some day, and if so the earlier the better, compel its introduction into secondary schools at its proper level, whatever that may be.

7. It is true that in the legislative debate already mentioned, the talented head of the education department doomed the resolution moved to failure by insisting on the predominance of English teaching in state institutions; but he made the remarkable admission that "*there is a markedly greater intelligence in the boy whose education has been conducted through the medium of the vernacular until the highest classes of the school are reached than the boy who has had his education conducted in English . . . . That also was the conclusion to which the education commission of 1882 came with regard to Bengal.*" One would imagine that a special education commission, fortified with wide and varied Indian experience, would come at least as near the truth in speculating on vital Indian needs as any other body not so favourably placed. But though the education member declined to accept this verdict, he omitted to give any valid reason (beyond his "own experience," which, though doubtless very valuable, had not been very extensive in educational regions) for preferring a course in which a typical youth, who had made a safe and promising journey along one line of mental railway, should be forced into another of greater peril and less promise.

8. But whether any single suggestion thus far unfolded above be accepted or not, I would earnestly urge that, in considering the control of provincial education departments in future, two facts ought to be borne constantly in mind.

9. The first is that, even in scientific departments, there are needed for their control and direction both statesmanship and professional aptitudes; and the former scarcely ever less than the latter. In proof of which, I cite the earliest plague prophylactic measures resorted to in India, in which our splendid Indian medical service nearly created rebellion in some parts of India, until civilian statesmanship was called in to disinfect them of their danger. Which it did.

10. The second fact is that, although there is no absolute reason why statesmanship should not disclose itself in professors and inspectors of the education department, as it has sometimes, if not too often, done, statesmanship, relatively speaking, is

## ANNEXURE IV.—EDUCATION DEPARTMENT—(continued).

naturally better created or developed in the wider responsibilities shouldered throughout their service by members of the Indian civil service. No one will deny or doubt that the conditions of that service, which bring its members into closer contact than any other class of officials with all sections of the populace, urban and rural, are more favourable for the development of statesmanship than Indian classrooms in which contact with only one side of the student's mind, and that not always the highest or most receptive, is usually brought about under artificial conditions calculated to arouse neither enthusiasm nor the responsive trust of friendship. The conclusion of all which is that the director of public instruction in every Indian province should be a real statesman from whatever quarter chosen; and that any preference hitherto shown for promoted pedagogy by rule of thumb might well be held in restraint, though by no means abandoned. I desire to say here that, though bound to state my convictions on a matter of imperial importance, I impute no motives to members of the education department, whose devotion to their duty as they have understood it, and their earnestness in fulfilling it, it would be cruel and unjust to gainsay; though vested interests seem to have stood in the way of some obvious reforms.

11. No doubt, agriculture, veterinary, chemistry, and other applied sciences have advanced much further in Europe than in India. But while, on the one hand, Dr. Bose has shown what the Indian mind is capable of under favourable conditions, on the other, more than one expert witness told the Commission that there was a great deal in Indian agricultural and veterinary conditions which European experts had to assimilate before they could be truly useful in India. Where this discipline involves some unlearning as much as some learning, the danger of inexperience is obvious. The finest educated capacity of one region may sometimes prove fruitless in another of entirely different conformation, and may even prove injurious before it has breathed the atmosphere in which it is to work and receive leading and guidance. It is no emotional, but a practical physical quantity, that is here dealt with; such as is indicated in the qualities and capacities of varying breeds of cattle used in ploughing, the amount of energy available in handling ploughs in different provinces, the moulding of art by caste, the tempering of habit by heredity and other peculiarities of soil, climate, animals and men, which may or may not demand radical change, but do demand informed intelligence in forcing or withholding reform, and in deciding where and how to introduce it, where necessary.

12. Finally, if any other member should feel that it "is not so much because of the system as in spite of it" that some successful Indians have done so very well, I am naturally satisfied at having anticipated the words quoted by many years in different portions of the Indian press. I have, also naturally, some difficulty in understanding why, if this belief is shared by others, it should not produce its only logical result in our report.

## SCHEDULE V.

## INDIAN EDUCATIONAL SERVICE—CLASS I.

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
1	<i>Madras :</i> Director of public instruction.	Rs. 2,000-100 2,500	Rs. A. P. 2,333 5 4	1	<i>Madras :</i> Director of public instruction.	Rs. 2,250-100- 2,750	Rs. A. P. 2,533 5 4
27	Members of the Indian educational service.	500-50- 1,000*	23,509 11 10	3†	Appointments - - -	1,500-50- 1,750	5,000 0 0
	2 Personal allowances -	250-50-500	833 5 4	4†	" - - -	1,250-50- 1,500	5,666 10 8
	2 " " -	200-10-250	466 10 8		{ Appointments (held by officers recruited in Europe).	550-50- 1,250	20,034 11 4
	Exchange compensation allowance.	- - -	1,689 8 0	29†	{ Appointments (held by officers recruited in India).	350-50- 1,250	5,463 9 0
					Allowance to one Principal.	250	250 0 0
					Allowance to three Principals.	150	450 0 0
28			28,832 9 2	37			39,448 4 4
28	Carried forward -	- - -	28,832 9 2	37	Carried forward - - -	- - -	39,448 4 4

\* A personal allowance of Rs. 100 is granted after 15 years' service to officers whose total salary does not exceed Rs. 1,000.

† For the purposes of the estimate it is assumed that nine of these appointments will be held by officers recruited in India.

ANNEXURE IV.—EDUCATION DEPARTMENT—(continued).

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
		Rs.	Rs. A. P.			Rs.	Rs. A. P.
28	Brought forward -	- -	28,832 9 2	37	Brought forward -	- -	39,448 4 4
	<i>Bombay:</i>				<i>Bombay:</i>		
1	Director of public instruction.	2,000-100-2,500	2,333 5 4	1	Director of public instruction.	2,250-100-2,750	2,583 5 4
1	Deputy director of public instruction (temporary).	1,500	1,500 0 0	4	Appointments - - -	1,500-50-1,750	6,666 10 8
28	Members of the Indian educational service.	500-50-1,000*	24,096 1 2	4	" - - -	1,250-50-1,500	5,666 10 8
	2 Personal allowances -	250-50-500	833 5 4		{ Appointments (held by officers recruited in Europe).	550-50-1,250	21,124 0 4
	3 " " -	200-10-250	700 0 0	31	{ Appointments (held by officers recruited in India).	350-50-1,250	5,969 11 8
	Exchange compensation allowance.	- - -	1,834 7 8		Allowance to one Principal.	250	250 0 0
					Allowance to two Principals.	150	300 0 0
30			31,297 3 6	40			42,560 6 8
	<i>Bengal:</i>				<i>Bengal:</i>		
1	Director of public instruction.	2,000-100-2,500	2,333 5 4	1	Director of public instruction.	2,250-100-2,750	2,583 5 4
49	Members of the Indian educational service.	500-50-1,000*	42,860 1 8	6	Appointments - - -	1,500-50-1,750	10,000 0 0
	3 Personal allowances -	250-50-500	1,250 0 0	7	" - - -	1,250-50-1,500	9,916 10 8
	4 " " -	200-10-250	933 5 4	53	{ Appointments (held by officers recruited in Europe).	550-50-1,250	36,238 13 11
	Exchange compensation allowance.	- - -	2,954 1 8		{ Appointments (held by officers recruited in India).	350-50-1,250	10,436 0 0
					Allowance to one Principal.	250	250 0 0
					Allowance to seven Principals.	150	1,050 0 0
50			50,330 14 0	67			70,474 13 11
	<i>United Provinces of Agra and Oudh:</i>				<i>United Provinces of Agra and Oudh:</i>		
1	Director of public instruction.	2,000	2,000 0 0	1	Director of public instruction.	2,250-100-2,750	2,583 5 4
29	Members of the Indian educational service.	500-50-1,000*	25,396 2 9	4	Appointments - - -	1,500-50-1,750	6,666 10 8
	1 Personal allowance -	250-50-500	416 10 8	4	" - - -	1,250-50-1,500	5,666 10 8
	2 " " -	200-10-250	466 10 8	31	{ Appointments (held by officers recruited in Europe).	550-50-1,250	21,124 0 4
	Exchange compensation allowance.	- - -	1,767 7 6		{ Appointments (held by officers recruited in India).	350-50-1,250	5,969 11 8
					Allowance to one Principal.	250	250 0 0
					Allowance to one Principal.	150	150 0 0
30			30,046 15 7	40			42,410 6 8
	<i>Punjab:</i>				<i>Punjab:</i>		
1	Director of public instruction.	1,750-50-2,000	1,916 10 8	1	Director of public instruction.	2,250-100-2,750	2,583 5 4
15	Members of the Indian educational service.	500-50-1,000*	12,991 4 8	2**	Appointments - - -	1,500-50-1,750	3,333 5 4
	1 Personal allowance -	250-50-500	416 10 8	2**	" - - -	1,250-50-1,500	2,833 5 4
	1 " " -	200-10-250	233 5 4	16**	{ Appointments (held by officers recruited in Europe).	550-50-1,250	10,994 13 2
	Exchange compensation allowance.	- - -	972 6 0		{ Appointments (held by officers recruited in India).	350-50-1,250	2,924 7 6
					Allowance to one Principal.	250	250 0 0
16			16,530 5 4	21			22,919 4 8
154	Carried forward -	- - -	1,57,037 15 7	205	Carried forward -	- - -	2,17,813 4 3

\* A personal allowance of Rs. 100 is granted after 15 years' service to officers whose total salary does not exceed Rs. 1,000.  
 || For the purposes of the estimate it is assumed that 10 of these appointments will be held by officers recruited in India.

" " " " 17 " " " "  
 \*\* " " " " 5 " " " "

ANNEXURE IV.—EDUCATION DEPARTMENT—(continued).

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
		Rs.	Rs. A. P.			Rs.	Rs. A. P.
154	Brought forward -	- - -	1,57,037 15 7	205	Brought forward -	- - -	2,17,813 4 3
1	Burma : Director of public instruction.	1,500-100-2,000	1,833 5 4	1	Burma : Director of public instruction.	2,250-100-2,750	2,583 5 4
15	Members of the Indian educational service.	500-50-1,000*	12,891 5 3	211	Appointments - - -	1,500-50-1,750	3,333 5 4
	1 Personal allowance -	250-50-500	416 10 8	211	" - - -	1,250-50-1,500	2,833 5 4
	2 " -	200-10-250	466 10 8		Appointments (held by officers recruited in Europe).	550-50-1,250	10,994 13 2
	Exchange compensation allowance.	- - -	975 8 0	1611	Appointments (held by officers recruited in India). Allowance to one Principal	350-50-1,250 250	2,924 7 6 250 0 0
16			16,583 7 11	21			22,919 4 8
1	Bihar and Orissa : Director of public instruction.	2,000	2,000 0 0	1	Bihar and Orissa : Director of public instruction.	2,250-100-2,750	2,583 5 4
12	Members of the Indian educational service.	500-50-1,000*	10,411 10 8	18	Appointment - - -	1,500-50-1,750	1,666 10 8
	1 Personal allowance -	200-10-250	233 5 4	28	" - - -	1,250-50-1,500	2,833 5 4
	Exchange compensation allowance.	- - -	790 5 0		Appointments (held by officers recruited in Europe). Appointments (held by officers recruited in India). Allowance to one Principal Allowance to one Principal	500-50-1,250 1,250 350-50-1,250 250 150	8,981 13 8 2,351 12 7 250 0 0 150 0 0
13			13,435 5 -	17			18,816 15 7
1	Central Provinces and Berar : Director of public instruction.	1,500-100-2,000	1,833 5 4	1	Central Provinces and Berar : Director of public instruction.	1,750-100-2,250	2,083 5 4
10	Members of the Indian educational service.	500-50-1,000*	8,625 3 4	18	Appointment - - -	1,500-50-1,750	1,666 10 8
	1 Personal allowance -	200-10-250	233 5 4	28	" - - -	1,250-50-1,500	2,833 5 4
	Exchange compensation allowance.	- - -	668 3 10		Appointments (held by officers recruited in Europe). Appointments (held by officers recruited in India). Allowance to one Principal Allowance to one Principal	550-50-1,250 1,250 350-50-1,250 250 150	7,139 12 2 2,216 1 3 250 0 0 150 0 0
11			11,360 1 10	15			16,339 2 9
1	Assam : Director of public instruction.	1,250-50-1,500	1,416 10 8	1	Assam : Director of public instruction.	1,500-50-1,750	1,666 10 8
4	Members of the Indian educational service.	500-50-1,000*	3,365 15 10	11	Appointment - - -	1,250-50-1,500	1,416 10 8
	Exchange compensation allowance.	- - -	298 14 8		Appointments (held by officers recruited in Europe). Appointments (held by officers recruited in India). Allowance to one Principal Allowance to one Principal	550-50-1,250 1,250 350-50-1,250 250 150	2,851 5 0 486 6 8 250 0 0 150 0 0
5			5,081 9 2	6			6,821 1 0
199	Total—Indian educational service -		2,03,498 7 6	264	Total—Class I. - - -		2,82,709 12 3

INDIAN EDUCATIONAL SERVICE—CLASS II.

Madras :				Rs.	Rs.	A. P.	Madras :				Rs.	Rs.	A. P.		
3	Officers, 1st grade	-	-	700	2,100	0	0	5	Appointments	-	-	500-40-700	3,166	10	8
3	" 2nd "	-	-	600	1,800	0	0	27	"	-	-	250-40/3- 450-50/3- 500	8,745	7	10
3	" 3rd "	-	-	500	1,500	0	0								
3	" 4th "	-	-	450	1,350	0	0								
4	" 5th "	-	-	400	1,600	0	0								
5	" 6th "	-	-	350	1,750	0	0								
6	" 7th "	-	-	300	1,800	0	0								
6	" 8th "	-	-	250	1,500	0	0								
8	" 9th "	-	-	200	1,600	0	0								
41					15,000	0	0	32					11 912	2	6
41	Carried forward	-	-	-	15,000	0	0	32	Carried forward	-	-	-	11,912	2	6

\* A personal allowance of Rs. 100 is granted after 15 years' service to officers whose total salary does not exceed Rs. 1,000.

†† For the purposes of the estimate it is assumed that 5 of these appointments will be held by officers recruited in India.

11	11	11	4	11	11	11	11
11	11	11	1	11	11	11	11

ANNEXURE IV.—EDUCATION DEPARTMENT—(continued).

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
41	Brought forward -	Rs.	Rs. A. P.	32	Brought forward -	Rs.	Rs. A. P.
	<i>Bombay :</i>		15,000 0 0		<i>Bombay :</i>		11,912 2 6
1	Professor - - - -	700	700 0 0	5	Appointments - - -	500-40-700	3,166 10 8
1	" - - - -	550	550 0 0	26	" - - - -	250-40/3-450-50/3-500	8,361 12 6
2	" - - - -	400	800 0 0				
1	" - - - -	350	350 0 0				
1	" - - - -	300	600 0 0				
1	" - - - -	250	250 0 0				
1	" - - - -	300-50-500	446 10 8				
1	Assistant professor - -	250	250 0 0				
4	Lecturers - - - -	250	1,000 0 0				
3	" - - - -	200	600 0 0				
1	Inspector - - - -	700	700 0 0				
4	Principals, training colleges	400	1,600 0 0				
1	Vice-principal, training colleges for teachers.	250-50-500	416 10 8				
3	Headmasters - - - -	500	1,500 0 0				
3	" - - - -	400	1,200 0 0				
2	" - - - -	350	700 0 0				
3	" - - - -	300	900 0 0				
2	" - - - -	250	500 0 0				
3	" - - - -	200	600 0 0				
1	Head assistant to the director of public instruction.	250	250 0 0				
1	Headmaster, training school, Dhulia.	300	300 0 0				
41			14,213 5 4	31			11,528 7 2
	<i>Bengal :</i>				<i>Bengal :</i>		
5	Officers, class I. - - -	700	3,500 0 0	18	Appointments - - -	500-40-700	11,400 0 0
8	" " II. - - -	600	4,800 0 0				
9	" " III. - - -	500	4,500 0 0				
12	" " IV. - - -	400	4,800 0 0	100	" - - - -	250-40/3-450-50/3-500	32,951 4 10
15	" " V. - - -	350	5,250 0 0				
21	" " VI. - - -	300	6,300 0 0				
32	" " VII. - - -	250	8,000 0 0				
43	" " VIII. - - -	200	8,600 0 0				
145			45,750 0 0	118			44,351 4 10
—10	Deduct appointments held by women.		3,155 2 9				
135			42,594 13 3				
	<i>United Provinces of Agra and Oudh :</i>				<i>United Provinces of Agra and Oudh :</i>		
1	Inspector - - - -	700	700 0 0	5	Appointments - - -	500-40-700	3,166 10 8
2	" - - - -	600	1,200 0 0				
3	" - - - -	500	1,500 0 0	28	" - - - -	250-40/3-450-50/3-500	9,066 10 0
1	Assistant inspector - -	400	400 0 0				
3	" " - - -	300	900 0 0				
5	" " - - -	200	1,000 0 0				
1	Professor - - - -	400	400 0 0				
2	" - - - -	300	600 0 0				
4	" - - - -	250	1,000 0 0				
8	" - - - -	200	1,600 0 0				
1	Professor of Sanskrit, Queen's College, Benares.	200	200 0 0				
1	Assistant professor, Muir Central College.	200	200 0 0				
6	Headmasters - - - -	400	2,400 0 0				
1	Principal, training college, Lucknow.	400	400 0 0				
1	Special inspector of science and oriental languages.	400	400 0 0				
1	Special inspector of science and oriental languages.	300	300 0 0				
2	Special inspectors of science and oriental languages.	200	400 0 0				
43			13,600 0 0	33			12,233 4 8
	<i>Punjab :</i>				<i>Punjab :</i>		
1	Officer - - - -	700	700 0 0	5	Appointments - - -	500-40-700	3,166 10 8
1	" - - - -	600	600 0 0				
3	" - - - -	500	1,500 0 0	26	" - - - -	250-40/3-450-50/3-500	8,518 0 8
4	" - - - -	400	1,600 0 0				
2	" - - - -	350	700 0 0				
4	" - - - -	300	1,200 0 0				
6	" - - - -	250	1,500 0 0				
15	" - - - -	200	3,000 0 0				
36			10,800 0 0	31			11,684 11 4
296	Carried forward - - -		96,208 2 7	245	Carried forward - - -		91,709 14 6

## ANNEXURE IV.—EDUCATION DEPARTMENT—(continued).

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
296	Brought forward -	Rs. - -	Rs. A. P. 96,208 2 7	245	Brought forward -	Rs. - -	Rs. A. P. 91,709 14 6
1	<i>Burma :</i> Assistant director of public instruction.	500-40-700	633 5 4	1	<i>Burma :</i> Appointments - - -	550-40-750	683 5 4
1	Inspector of schools - -	500-40-700	633 5 4	9	" - - -	300-40/3-500-50/3-550	3,367 11 9
1	Professor of mathematics, Rangoon College.	300-50-600	496 10 8				
1	Professor of Pali, Rangoon College.	300-40-500	433 5 4				
1	Headmaster - - -	400-20-500	466 10 8				
2	" - - -	400	800 0 0				
1	Lecturer in mathematics and physics, Rangoon College.	300-20-400	366 10 8				
7	Assistant inspectors of schools	300-20-400	2,566 10 8				
15			6,396 10 8	10			4,051 1 1
1	<i>Bihar and Orissa :</i> Officer, class I. - - -	700	700 0 0	5	<i>Bihar and Orissa :</i> Appointments - - -	500-40-700	3,166 10 8
2	" " II. - - -	600	1,200 0 0				
2	" " III. - - -	500	1,000 0 0	27	" - - -	250-40/3-450-50/3-500.	8,901 9 8
3	" " IV. - - -	400	1,200 0 0				
3	" " V. - - -	350	1,050 0 0				
5	" " VI. - - -	300	1,500 0 0				
12	" " VII. - - -	250	3,000 0 0				
14	" " VIII. - - -	200	2,800 0 0				
42			12,450 0 0	32			12,068 4 4
-6	Deduct appointments held by women.		1,778 9 2				
36			10,671 6 10				
1	<i>Central Provinces and Berar :</i> Inspector - - -	500-40-700	633 5 4	2	<i>Central Provinces and Berar :</i> Appointments - - -	500-40-700	1,266 10 8
1	" - - -	250	250 0 0				
3	Assistant inspectors (temporary).	200	600 0 0	13	" - - -	250-40/3-450-50/3-500	4,260 14 11
1	Professor - - -	300-20-400	366 10 8				
1	" - - -	250-10-300	283 5 4				
2	" - - -	200-10-250	466 10 8				
4	" - - -	150 10-200	733 5 4				
1	Vice-principal, training college.	200-20-500	335 15 8				
3	Professors, training college	200-20-500	1,007 15 0				
2	Assistant professors, Victoria College of Science.	100-20-200	333 5 4				
19			5,010 9 4	15			5,527 9 7
1	<i>Assam :</i> Officer, class II. - - -	600	600 0 0	3	<i>Assam :</i> Appointments - - -	500-40-700	1,900 0 0
1	" " III. - - -	500	500 0 0				
1	" " IV. - - -	400	400 0 0	16	" - - -	250-40/3-450-50/3-500	5,325 0 2
2	" " V. - - -	350	700 0 0				
2	" " VI. - - -	300	600 0 0				
3	" " VII. - - -	250	750 0 0				
10	" " VIII. - - -	200	2,000 0 0				
20			5,550 0 0	19			7,225 0 2
386	Total (Provincial service) - - -		1,23,836 13 5	321	Total, Class II.		1,20,581 13 8
585	Grand total (Indian educational and provincial services).		3,27,335 4 11	585	Grand total—Classes I. and II.		4,03,291 9 11
					Deduct present cost - - -		3,27,335 4 11
					Net extra expenditure per mensem -		75,956 5 0
					" " per annum -		9,11,475 12 0

## ANNEXURE IV.—EDUCATION DEPARTMENT—(continued).

## SCHEDULE VI.

## WOMEN'S INDIAN EDUCATIONAL SERVICE.

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
	<b>MADRAS :</b>				<b>MADRAS :</b>		
	<i>Indian Educational Service :</i>	Rs.	Rs. A. P.			Rs.	Rs. A. P.
1	First Inspectress - -	500-20-600	566 10 8	3	Appointments, Class I. -	400-20-500-25-800	1,865 13 3
1	Second " - -	450-10-500	483 5 4				
1	Third " - -	400-10-450	433 5 4				
	Exchange Compensation Allowance. - - -	- - -	92 11 4				
	<i>Provincial Educational Service :</i>						
1	Assistant Inspectress of Schools. - -	250	250 0 0	3	Appointments, Class II. -	200-10-400	935 7 9
2	Assistant Inspectress of Schools. - -	200	400 0 0				
	<b>BOMBAY :</b>				<b>BOMBAY :</b>		
	<i>Indian Educational Service :</i>						
2	Lady Superintendents - -	350-30-500	900 0 0	5	Appointments, Class I. -	400-20-500-25-800	3,109 11 5
1	" Superintendent - -	250-10-300	283 5 4				
2	Inspectresses - -	300-40-500	866 10 8				
	Exchange Compensation Allowance. - - -	- - -	128 2 0				
	<b>BENGAL :</b>				<b>BENGAL :</b>		
	<i>Indian Educational Service :</i>						
1	Inspectress - - -	400-20-500	575 4 2	2	Appointments, Class I. -	400-20-500-25-800	1,243 14 2
	50/3-750 - - -	- - -	- - -				
1	" - - -	400-20-500	466 10 8				
	Exchange Compensation Allowance. - - -	- - -	65 1 11				
	<i>Provincial Educational Service :</i>						
10	Appointments in the Graded Service. - - -	- - -	3,155 2 9	10	Appointments, Class II. -	200-10-400	3,118 4 6
	<b>UNITED PROVINCES OF AGRA AND OUDH :</b>				<b>UNITED PROVINCES OF AGRA AND OUDH :</b>		
	<i>Indian Educational Service :</i>						
1	Chief Inspectress - -	400-20-500	466 10 8	1	Appointment, Class I. -	400-20-500-25-800	621 15 1
	Exchange Compensation Allowance. - - -	- - -	29 2 8				
	<b>PUNJAB :</b>				<b>PUNJAB :</b>		
	<i>Provincial Educational Service :</i>						
1	Inspectress - - -	400	400 0 0	6	Appointments, Class II. -	200-10-400	1,870 15 6
3	" - - -	250-10-300	850 0 0				
2	" - - -	150-10-200	366 10 8				
	<b>BURMA :</b>				<b>BURMA :</b>		
	<i>Indian Educational Service :</i>						
1	Inspectress - - -	400-20-500	466 10 8	1	Appointments, Class I. -	400-20-500-25-800	621 15 1
	Exchange Compensation Allowance. - - -	- - -	29 2 8				
	<i>Provincial Educational Service :</i>						
1	Assistant Inspectress - -	200-10-250	233 5 4	1	Appointments, Class II. -	200-10-400	311 13 3
	<b>BIHAR AND ORISSA :</b>				<b>BIHAR AND ORISSA :</b>		
	<i>Indian Educational Service :</i>						
1	Inspectress of Schools - -	400-20-500	466 10 8	2	Appointments, Class I. -	400-20-500-25-800	1,243 14 2
1	Lady Principal, Ravenshaw Girls' School. - -	400-20-600	544 10 10				
	Exchange Compensation Allowance. - - -	- - -	63 3 4				
	<i>Provincial Educational Service :</i>						
6	Appointments in the Graded Service. - - -	- - -	1,778 9 2	6	Appointments, Class II. -	200-10-400	1,870 15 6
40	Carried forward - -	- - -	14,361 2 10	40	Carried forward - -	- - -	814 11 8

## ANNEXURE IV.—EDUCATION DEPARTMENT—(continued).

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
40	Brought forward -	Rs. - -	Rs. A. P. 14,361 2 10	40	Brought forward -	Rs. - -	Rs. A. P. 16,814 11 8
	CENTRAL PROVINCES AND BERAR : <i>Indian Educational Service :</i>				CENTRAL PROVINCES AND BERAR :		
2	Inspectresses - - -	400-20-500	933 5 4	2	Appointments, Class I. -	400-20-500-25-800	1,243 14 2
	Exchange Compensation Allowance.	- - -	53 5 4				
	<i>Provincial Educational Service :</i>						
1	Assistant Inspectress - -	200-10-250	233 5 4	4	Appointments, Class II. -	200-10-400	1,247 5 0
3	" " - -	150-10-200	550 0 0				
	ASSAM : <i>Indian Educational Service :</i>				ASSAM :		
1	Inspectress - - -	400-20-500	466 10 8	1	Appointment, Class I. -	400-20-500-25-800	621 15 1
	Exchange Compensation Allowance.	- - -	29 2 8				
	<i>Provincial Educational Service :</i>						
1	Assistant Inspectress - -	200-10-350	298 5 6	1	Appointment, Class II. -	200-10-400	311 13 3
	Total - - -	- - -	16,930 5 8		Total - - -	- - -	20,239 11 2
					Deduct present cost - - -	- - -	16,930 5 8
					Net extra expenditure per mensem		3,309 5 6
48				48	" " per annum		39,712 2 0

## MINUTE BY THE EARL OF RONALDSHAY AND MR. F. G. SLY.

Paragraph 22.—We dissent from the recommendation to grant natives of India appointed in Europe terms of service superior to those accorded to natives of India appointed in their own country for reasons set out in our minute of dissent to paragraph 57 of the main report.\* Further, in paragraph 18 of this annexure, we give expression to our belief that “officers appointed directly to class I. in India” will in many cases, no doubt, also have received some education in a European “university.” Whether an officer is granted the special privilege of European terms of service or not will depend, therefore, not upon any inherent difference in ability or upon the place of his education, but upon the mere accident of his having been appointed by the Secretary of State instead of by the Government of India—a state of affairs surely appropriate only to *opera bouffe*.

RONALDSHAY.  
F. G. SLY.

## MINUTE BY MR. M. B. CHAUBAL.

I think this is peculiarly a department in which Indian and European officers should work together in harmony, and I think the proportion of each should at least in the near future be half and half. The annexure recommends that 65 officers from the provincial service should immediately be transferred to the Indian educational service. But the evidence adduced before us shows that several posts now held by imported Europeans could be efficiently and capably held by Indians. If the recommendation stands as it is, the obvious criticism in India on it will be that though a number of European officers imported into the department are not of the required ability and fitness, and though there is not much chance of the quality of the men in class I. improving in the future, and notwithstanding men of the required qualifications would be increasingly available in India, the Commission have kept the present number of Indian educational service men (199) intact. I think criticism of this kind should, if possible, be avoided. The further recommendation that for future appointments the proportion may be half and half rather strengthens this criticism. The recommendation that 65 provincial educational officers should be immediately

\* See page 371.

transferred to class I. shows, if anything, that there are at least 65 men at the present day whose attainments and work is of a quality which justifies their promotion. I do not propose, however, that in order to get the equal proportion 130 men should be at once put into class I. instead of the 65 proposed. I propose that this proportion should be worked out gradually. The quarter, *i.e.*, 65, should be promoted at once as proposed, and as regards the remaining quarter it should be made up by filling, in India, the posts of the present Indian educational service men as they retire from service. The alternate appointments, one European and one Indian, should be made as now proposed after this proportion is reached.

2. *Paragraph 22.* I agree with Mr. Macdonald's dissenting minute\* to the recommendation for a further 10 per cent. on Rs. 1,500–50–1,750, and for the allowance of Rs. 250 a month to one principal in each province. The first is in my opinion unnecessary, and as the work of all principals is much of the same kind I do not see any advantage in singling out one of these gentlemen only for the higher allowance. The one proposed for all, *viz.*, Rs. 150, is adequate for the administrative work which a principal has to do as compared with the professors working under him.

3. For the directors in the seven major provinces I consider the present salary and scale of Rs. 2,000–50–2,500 adequate.

M. B. CHAUBAL.

MINUTE BY MR. H. A. L. FISHER AND MR. J. RAMSAY MACDONALD.

*Paragraph 26.*—The present system under which an Indian civil service secretary to Government minutes on the work submitted by the director of public instruction has been criticised as involving an unnecessary duplication of work which is aggravated by the rapidity with which secretaries to Government are apt to come and go. The weight of this argument, already to our thinking considerable, will be increased by any addition to the volume of educational business in the country. It must also be borne in mind that if the proposals of the Commission for lowering the age of entrance into the Indian civil service are carried into effect, there will always be a certain number of university men of marked administrative capacity who under the existing system would have taken a high place in the Indian civil service examination, but who will be excluded under the proposed system. There can be no doubt in our minds that such men would be more likely to be attracted into the educational service of India, if effect were given to the proposal to make the director of public instruction a secretary to Government; and in view of India's need for educational administrators of the highest capacity this seems to us to be an important consideration.

H. A. L. FISHER.

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\* See page 393.

## ANNEXURE V.

### Factory and Boiler Inspection Departments.

(The evidence relating to these departments will be found in volume XVIII.)

1. The functions of the factory and boiler inspectors are not necessarily interchangeable. In fact in most of the provinces the two sets of officers have no connection with each other, and are recruited separately for separate duties and on separate terms. We have decided, therefore, to deal with their cases separately, but in one annexure, as in certain of the less industrially developed provinces the staffs have not yet been differentiated.

#### PART I.—FACTORY INSPECTION DEPARTMENT.

##### CHAPTER I.

###### INTRODUCTORY.

2. *Origin of the department.*—The arrangements for inspecting factories in India are in their infancy. Until quite recently the work was largely done by *ex-officio* inspectors, who had neither the time nor the special knowledge required. Then, as the result of the labours of the Indian factory labour commission, which reported in 1908, proposals for a complete reorganisation were submitted by the Government of India to the Secretary of State in despatch No. 38, dated 15th February 1912, and sanctioned by him in a despatch, No. 37, dated the 26th April of the same year.\* The new scheme had thus been only for a few months in operation when it was submitted to us for inquiry, and we have taken account of this in dealing with the situation.

##### CHAPTER II.

###### ORGANISATION.

3. *Maintenance of the existing organisation approved.*—The main idea of the factory commission was that the periodical inspection of factories by district magistrates, civil surgeons, and other *ex-officio* inspectors should be abandoned, and that the staff of whole-time inspectors should be increased to a strength sufficient to cope with the work of inspecting all the factories in India. They also submitted detailed proposals as to the number of inspectors who should be appointed in the different provinces, the qualifications which they should possess, and the salaries which should be granted to them. As a result chief inspectors were allotted to Bombay on the one hand, and to Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, and Assam jointly on the other, together with four and two inspectors respectively; whilst Madras, the United Provinces, the Punjab, and Burma each got one inspector. The inspectors in the United Provinces and the Punjab were also required to supervise boiler inspection work. In the Central Provinces and Berar a joint factory and boiler staff was allowed to continue, consisting of a senior and a junior inspector. In this way there was to be a separate service for each province or group of provinces, and each was to be homogeneous in structure with no distinction into imperial and provincial branches. This arrangement has resulted in the creation of several small services, the members of which suffer from the disadvantages incidental to all small cadres. This has led to the suggestion in certain quarters that the department should be made a single one for all India, and be placed like the customs department under the control of the Government of India. At first sight such a course would appear to have advantages. We are of opinion, however, that in the long run provincial control will be more efficacious, whilst the evils of the present system will tend to disappear as factory work develops and the staffs of inspectors are increased. It would also be unwise to uproot an experiment which after due deliberation has only just been started. We, therefore, make no recommendations under this head.

##### CHAPTER III.

###### METHODS OF RECRUITMENT.

4. *Place of appointment.*—There is no fixed rule as to the place of appointment for factory inspectors. When the new scheme was brought into force the local

\* Volume XVIII., Appendix XVII, (pages 197 et seq.).

Governments of Bombay, the Punjab, and Burma asked for one inspector each to be obtained from Europe. The rest of the new staff was secured in India. On grounds of policy there is no reason why officers should be imported from Europe to do the work of the department, but no hard and fast rule as to this can be laid down, as the supply of statutory natives of India with the necessary qualifications is not large, whilst in certain centres considerations of administrative convenience suggest that European or Anglo-Indian officers should be employed for the inspection of factories which are owned or managed by members of these communities. It will suffice, therefore, to prescribe that recruitment should ordinarily be made in India, and that only if no qualified candidate is procurable there should application be made for the selection of an officer in the United Kingdom. In the circumstances of this department, we are also of opinion that selection in India need not be confined necessarily to statutory natives of India. Local Governments should be at liberty to recruit Europeans who may happen to be temporarily in India, and who are qualified for the work.

5. *Limitations in the employment of non-Europeans.*—At present, out of the 21 Government officers in the various provinces in receipt on the 1st April 1913 of salaries of Rs. 200 and over in the factory and boiler inspection departments, 17 were returned as Europeans and 4 as Anglo-Indians.\* This number includes 14 of the appointments on the factory side, with which we have dealt, and also the post of certifying surgeon in Bengal, which has been excluded from our consideration. The remaining six posts are boiler inspection appointments. The various factory services are thus predominantly European, whilst no one of unmixed Asiatic descent has as yet obtained a footing. This appears to us to be unsatisfactory. The question has recently been the subject of a special inquiry, when the suggestion was made that one or more posts of probationary factory inspector in Bengal and Bombay, where the staffs are largest, should be created for the benefit of Indians. The evidence on this point was conflicting. In Bihar and Orissa, and Assam, no objection was taken to the idea. In Bengal, which was more nearly affected, it was resisted. The Bombay Government took the same view, but the representative of the millowners' association in that presidency expressed the opinion that, so long as efficiency was secured, it did not matter what agency was used, and that efficient Indians could be found for the work. The chief inspector of factories was also willing to make the experiment.† In view of the extent to which factories are owned and worked by Indians in the Bombay presidency, we think it desirable that an opening should be created there for inspectors of this community, and that encouragement should thereby be given to the idea that factory inspection work is not such as necessarily to demand the appointment of Europeans. There also seems to be no doubt that qualified Indians are available. This being so, we recommend that one inspectorship, which on general grounds has been pronounced by the local Government to be necessary, should be added to the Bombay cadre, and that someone with the necessary qualifications, who is of unmixed Asiatic descent, should be appointed to it, and should enjoy the same status in this position as any other inspector. This will secure a minimum representation, and should be regarded in this light, and not as a maximum. It should in no way debar the appointment of other qualified Indians to vacancies as they occur in the existing posts. This would seem a better solution than to create for Indians a new grade, which would come to be regarded as of an inferior status, and would thus defeat its own purpose. With regard to Bengal, where the great majority of the mills are owned and managed by Europeans, and the field for the selection of qualified Indians is not large, we do not feel justified in fixing any minimum. There, as in the other provinces, the applications of such candidates should be considered on their merits with those of the members of other communities.

6. *Qualifications of candidates.*—All appointments to inspectorships are made direct, and no other course appears to us to be possible. There is no inferior service from which promotion can be given. It is also the general practice to recruit only such persons as are not more than 30 years of age. In order that officers may be able to earn their pensions in the normal way we would make this an absolute rule.

\* Volume XVIII., Appendix XIX. (pages 202-3). The statistics for both departments have been compiled jointly.

† Volume XVIII., Appendix XVII. (pages 197-201). Also 80050, 80060, 80070, 80170, 80191, 80195, 80196, 80202, 80203.

ANNEXURE V.—FACTORY AND BOILER INSPECTION DEPARTMENTS—(*continued*).

We also approve of the existing arrangement by which all candidates for employment are expected to have had a liberal education and, in addition, a good theoretical training in engineering and a thorough practical training in mechanical engineering. They should also possess a general knowledge of the principles of sanitation. In the case of selections in India we also think that it will suffice if candidates have had practical experience of factories in that country. We do not consider that in their case experience in Europe is in any way necessary.

7. *Procedure to be adopted for announcing vacancies and for considering the claims of candidates.*—We also recommend that whenever a vacancy occurs it should first be advertised in India, both in the press and in centres from which candidates are likely to be forthcoming. The head of the department should then consider the applications, and after interviewing the possible candidates and making such further inquiries as may be required, should report to the local Government whether there is any one suitable and, if so, who is the fittest for the appointment. If no qualified candidate is available and application has to be made for an officer from Europe, the selection there should take place with the advice of the Home Office as at present, and after the issue of advertisements in the manner suggested for appointments in India. In the case of the factory services we see no need for selection committees.

## CHAPTER IV.

## SYSTEMS OF PROBATION AND TRAINING.

8. *Probation and training.*—All officers should pass through a period of two years' probation before being confirmed in their posts. No special remarks seem called for about training. All recruits when appointed will already have the necessary technical knowledge, and will rapidly acquire their local experience under the supervision of their superiors in their daily work. But it should be laid down that all officers should pass a colloquial test in the vernacular of a higher character than is ordinarily enforced at present, so as to enable them to converse with the operatives in their own language.

## CHAPTER V.

## CONDITIONS OF SALARY.

9. *Rates of salary proposed.*—Salaries are now paid on the incremental system. This is suitable and should continue. At present the rates are the same for all officers, whether recruited in Europe or in India, and whether statutory natives of India or not. In conformity with our general decision on the subject we think that in the case of future entrants there should be different rates for officers recruited in Europe and India respectively. We also think that in this department officers who are not statutory natives of India should be classed with officers recruited in Europe, even though they may happen to have been appointed in India. We also consider that the standard rates should be those fixed for statutory natives of India recruited in India, so as to mark the fact that this is not a service in which grounds of policy exist for recruiting in Europe. We recommend accordingly the establishment of scales of Rs. 300–25–800 a month for inspectors in Madras, the United Provinces, the Punjab and Burma; of Rs. 300–25–700 a month for the junior inspectors in Bombay, and in the Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, and Assam area; and of Rs. 550–25–800 and Rs. 300–25–550 a month for the senior and junior inspector respectively in the Central Provinces and Berar. To officers recruited in India who are not statutory natives of India and to all officers recruited in Europe it will be necessary to offer somewhat better terms, and we recommend the following scales, namely, the present scale of Rs. 400–30–1,000 a month for the inspectors in Madras, the United Provinces, the Punjab and Burma; the present scale of Rs. 400–30–900 a month for the junior inspectors in Bombay and the same scale for the junior inspectors in the Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, and Assam area; and Rs. 700–30–1,000 and Rs. 400–30–700 a month for the senior and junior inspector respectively in the Central Provinces and Berar. In the grade of chief inspector all officers should be paid alike, wherever recruited and whether statutory natives of India or not. The

## ANNEXURE V.—FACTORY AND BOILER INSPECTION DEPARTMENTS—(continued).

scale of Rs. 1,000–50–1,250 a month now authorised for the chief inspector in Bombay is suitable, and a similar scale should be sanctioned for the chief inspector in the Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, and Assam area. His work is not less important than that of the chief inspector in Bombay, and his present scale of salary was fixed on the understanding that he would draw an additional allowance of Rs. 250 a month from the boiler commission, which he no longer does. Assuming that all the posts are filled by statutory natives of India recruited in India, there will be an annual saving on this reorganisation of Rs. 1,844, as shown in the following table :—

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
1	<i>Madras :</i> Inspector - - -	Rs. 400-30- 1,000.	Rs. A. P. 707 10 4	1	<i>Madras :</i> Inspector - - -	Rs. 300-25-800	Rs. A. P. 579 9 1
1	<i>Bombay :</i> Chief inspector - -	1,000-50- 1,250.	1,166 10 8	1	<i>Bombay :</i> Chief inspector - -	1,000-50- 1,250.	1,166 10 8
4	Junior inspectors - -	400-30-900	2,545 14 6	5	Junior inspectors - -	300-25-700	2,625 15 10
1	<i>Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, and Assam :</i> Chief inspector - -	800-50- 1,000.	946 10 8	1	<i>Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, and Assam :</i> Chief inspector - -	1,000-50- 1,250.	1,166 10 8
2	Junior inspectors - -	400-30-700	1,151 0 10	2	Junior inspectors - -	300-25-700	963 0 2
1	<i>United Provinces of Agra and Oudh :</i> Inspector - - -	400-30- 1,000.	707 10 4	1	<i>United Provinces of Agra and Oudh :</i> Inspector - - -	300-25-800	579 9 1
1	<i>Punjab :</i> Inspector - - -	400-30- 1,000.	707 10 4	1	<i>Punjab :</i> Inspector - - -	300-25-800	579 9 1
1	<i>Burma :</i> Inspector - - -	400-30- 1,000.	707 10 4	1	<i>Burma :</i> Inspector - - -	300-25-800	579 9 1
1	<i>Central Provinces and Berar :</i> Senior inspector* -	400-20-600	515 11 0	1	<i>Central Provinces and Berar :</i> Senior inspector* -	550-25-800	699 15 5
1	Junior inspector* -	300-20-400	366 10 8	1	Junior inspector* -	300-25-550	428 15 11
14	Total - - -		9,523 3 8	15	Total - - -		9,369 9 0
					Present cost - - -		9,523 3 8
					Net savings per mensem - -		153 10 8
					„ per annum - -		1,844 0 0

\* Are also inspectors of boilers.

## CHAPTER VI.

## CONDITIONS OF SERVICE.

10. *Strength of the staff.*—Additional staff was asked for in Bombay and Bengal. We have already suggested that one new inspectorship should be created in the former presidency. For the rest, we desire to record the opinion that the factory inspection establishment is one which should be expanded promptly to keep pace with the industrial development of the country. It would be false economy to allow bad habits to take root in factories for the want of adequate machinery for inspection purposes.

11. *Leave, deputation and training reserves. Annual rate of recruitment.*—The various factory inspection services are at present too small to carry a regular leave and deputation reserve. As they grow in size it will be time enough to consider this question. No training reserve is needed, as officers come ready trained to their work. Similarly, it is not practicable to fix any annual rate of recruitment. New appointments must be made as vacancies occur.

12. *Cotton excise duties in the Bombay presidency.*—Objection was raised in Bombay to the system under which the factory inspectors also have cotton excise duties to perform, and a case was alleged in which the needs of this work had led to the appointment of an officer who was not qualified for ordinary factory duties. On

## ANNEXURE V.—FACTORY AND BOILER INSPECTION DEPARTMENTS—(continued).

general grounds we consider this particular duplication of functions to be undesirable, and recommend that the local Government be asked to consider whether some other machinery could not be employed.

## CHAPTER VII.

## CONDITIONS OF LEAVE.

13. *Leave rules.*—In future all the officers who, when they enter the service, draw salary at the higher of the two rates set out in paragraph 9 above should come under the European service leave rules. Other officers should come under the Indian service leave rules, and should continue under them throughout their careers.

## CHAPTER VIII.

## CONDITIONS OF PENSION.

14. *Pension rules.*—The ordinary pension rules should apply to all the factory inspection departments. There is no appointment which should carry a special additional pension. The members of the factory services, subject to the usual provisos, should be allowed to reckon as service qualifying for superannuation pension the number of completed years by which their ages at the time of appointment exceeded 25 years.

## PART II.—BOILER INSPECTION DEPARTMENT.

## CHAPTER IX.

## INTRODUCTORY.

15. *Origin of the department.*—The boiler inspection departments in the various provinces have grown up from very small beginnings out of the necessities imposed by the different steam boiler and prime movers acts, and have only become of much importance in comparatively recent years with the industrial development of the country. Even now they contain only 24 whole-time officers, eight and six of whom are employed in the Bombay and Bengal presidencies respectively. The work of these departments is of a very specialised character, and its efficient performance depends on the possession by the inspectors of a definite technical experience of a restricted kind. Integrity of conduct is also a prime consideration in the members of the staffs.

## CHAPTER X.

## ORGANISATION.

16. *Maintenance of a separate department for each province or group of provinces approved.*—As now arranged, each province or group of provinces ordinarily has its own staff of boiler inspectors. Only in the Central Provinces and Berar is factory and boiler inspection work done by the same officers. But in the United Provinces and the Punjab the inspectors are under the general supervision of the factory inspectors of those areas. As in the case of the factory inspection departments, we have considered proposals for an all-India organisation as well as suggestions for amalgamating everywhere the factory and boiler staffs. But we are of opinion that the existing arrangement is the right one, and that the difficulties now being experienced will pass away as the cadres grow in size and importance. We are also satisfied that the present overlapping in the United Provinces, the Punjab, and the Central Provinces and Berar is for the time being unavoidable. But as those provinces develop industrially the organisation prevailing in the other provinces should be adopted.

17. *Defects in the existing organisation.*—In other respects there are also signs that the boiler inspection organisation is in an undeveloped condition. For example, the inspectors are not everywhere Government servants. In Bengal, Bihar and Orissa and Assam, which have a joint staff, these officers work under a boiler commission. This is made up of the commissioner of police, Calcutta, as president, a member of the factory department as vice-president and secretary, and a third Government official, together with three non-official nominees of the chamber of commerce, chosen to represent the iron trades association, the jute mills association, and the colliery interest. The salaries of the inspectors and the fees of the commissioners are paid out of the funds of the commission, which are derived from fees for inspecting boilers. There is a similar arrangement in force in Burma, where the commission consists of the deputy commissioner, Rangoon town, as chairman, the superintending engineer and shipwright surveyor, as secretary, and two other members nominated from time to time by the local Government. This commission administers a fund constituted from inspection fees, and out of it pays for the salaries and allowances of the inspectors and the fees and allowances of the commissioners. There is also a commission in Bombay, but it has now no administrative powers. Its three members, who are nominated by the local Government, merely sit as a board of appeal in any case in which a boiler owner is dissatisfied with the decision of an inspector. The administrative charge of the staff is vested in the collector of Bombay, a member of the Indian civil service, who is advised by the chief inspector of boilers in all technical matters. The collectors of the districts also exercise certain controlling powers. The fees for inspections are, however, credited to a special boiler fund out of which all expenses are met, including the pensions of the inspectors, but Government has guaranteed all amounts earned since 1911. Payment for any pension earned prior to that year is dependent on the solvency of the fund, which is becoming exhausted. In the remaining areas, namely, the United Provinces, the Punjab and Madras, there is no boiler fund or commission, and the staff is paid out of general revenues and is pensionable on the ordinary terms. The same applies to the joint factory and boiler inspection staff in the Central Provinces and Berar.

18. *Reorganisation proposed.*—These arrangements appear to us on general grounds to be unsuitable. We are also satisfied that they have given and are giving rise to justifiable complaint on the part of the public affected. We therefore recommend that early steps be taken by the various local Governments, under the guidance of the Government of India, to review the organisation of their departments, so as to bring them up to date. To a large extent the action taken must depend on expert advice, but we think that the four following principles should be laid down for general guidance. In the first place, the time has come to make the boiler inspectors Government servants in every respect, like the factory inspectors, and to pay from general revenues both their salaries and their pensions, irrespective of the amount of fees earned. Secondly, expert supervision of the inspecting staff is essential. Police officers and members of the Indian civil service do not possess the necessary technical qualifications. Thirdly, the present system, by which in certain places representatives of the interests to be inspected have a voice in the management of the inspection department, is unsound, and should be abolished. Fourthly and finally, there should be one officer in each of the larger provinces who should be responsible for the effective working of the inspection staff. He should be called either a chief or first inspector according as the work to be done is on a large or small scale.

## CHAPTER XI.

### METHODS OF RECRUITMENT.

19. *Place of appointment.*—The department is not one for which it is necessary on grounds of policy to go outside India for recruits. Nor is it necessary to do so in order to obtain candidates with the necessary qualifications. There is an ample supply in India of suitable persons. We therefore recommend that recruitment continue to be made as now in that country. But, as in the case of the mines and factory inspection departments, we would not limit the choice to statutory natives of India. Europeans temporarily residing in the country should also be eligible for appointment.

## ANNEXURE V.—FACTORY AND BOILER INSPECTION DEPARTMENTS—(continued).

20. *Limitations in the employment of non-Europeans.*—The statistical returns which we had prepared for all Government officers in receipt of salaries of Rs. 200 a month and over on the 1st April 1913\* include the cases of only the six whole-time officers employed in Madras, the United Provinces, and the Punjab. All of these were either Europeans or Anglo-Indians. The same holds good of the two part-time officers in the Central Provinces and Berar. We have no exact information with regard to the remaining 18 officers with whom we have dealt, as they have not been regarded as Government servants, but we have no reason to suppose that they are not also Europeans or Anglo-Indians. Indians of unmixed Asiatic descent do not appear to have obtained entry to the departments. We do not, however, see our way to laying down any minimum number of appointments for members of this community. One of the essential qualifications in recruits is that they should have had practical experience of marine boilers. Such men are ordinarily obtained from the marine service, into which Indians seldom go, and over which the Government have no control. We therefore confine ourselves to laying down that in whatever rules are adopted when the departments are reorganised it should be made clear that Indians are eligible as at present. It should also be arranged that any who may qualify themselves get a fair chance of having their claims considered.

21. *Qualifications of candidates and procedure to be adopted for their selection.*—All appointments are made direct. This is suitable. There is no inferior service from which promotion could be given. At present candidates are required ordinarily to hold a first-class board of trade certificate. This is generally regarded as satisfactory, and it was only in Bombay that any suggestion was made that it was not enough. There it was asserted by the millowners' association that special experience of land as well as of marine boilers was necessary. In the United Kingdom boiler inspection is conducted by insurance companies, which insist upon inspectors holding the extra certificate of the board of trade, which is granted only after two years' experience at sea. Inquiries into boiler accidents are conducted by the board of trade, which employs engineer surveyors for that purpose. These surveyors must have marine experience. The point, however, is one of technical detail, and we would leave it for the consideration of the local Governments and their expert advisers when they take up the reorganisation of their departments. There is no fixed age for recruitment. As in the case of the factory inspection department, we would impose a limit of 30 years with a view to avoiding pensionary difficulties. We also recommend, as in similar departments, that all vacancies be advertised before any selection is made. In this highly technical department we see no need for any selection committee.

## CHAPTER XII.

## SYSTEMS OF PROBATION AND TRAINING.

22. *Probation and training.*—All appointments should be made for two years in the first instance. No special training is required, as officers come ready trained to their work.

## CHAPTER XIII.

## CONDITIONS OF SALARY.

23. *Rates of salary proposed.*—Salaries are now paid on the incremental system. This is suitable and should be continued. At present, excluding the Central Provinces and Berar, where, as already explained, the two inspectors do both factory and boiler work, and have special scales, ranging up to Rs. 600 a month, and also Burma, where a scale of Rs. 450–10–600 a month has been sanctioned specially for four officers to meet local conditions, there are altogether twenty posts in the various provincial departments. Of these, two, six, three and six are on salaries rising up to Rs. 350, 400, 450, and 500 a month respectively, whilst in Madras there is one appointment to which a salary of Rs. 500–40–700 a month is attached. There are also two posts in Bombay, one on Rs. 500–10–600, and the other, which, however, is non-pensionable, on Rs. 1,000–

\* Volume XVIII., Appendix XIX. (pages 202–3).

## ANNEXURE V.—FACTORY AND BOILER INSPECTION DEPARTMENTS—(continued).

100-1,500 a month. At present suitable men are not being secured, but to what extent this is due to faulty organisation and to doubts as to pensionary status, and to what extent to insufficiency of pay, we are not certain, and we would prefer to leave the final decision to the authorities in India after taking further expert advice when they reconstitute their departments. We do, however, recommend that the salary of the chief inspector of Bombay be reduced for future incumbents to Rs. 1,000-50-1,250 a month, and that exchange compensation allowance be no longer given, but that the post be made pensionable. A chief inspectorship on the same scale should also be created for Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, and Assam, whilst first inspectors, on Rs. 700 a month, should be allotted to Madras and Burma. The cost of these adjustments would be approximately Rs. 8,496 a year, as shown in the following table. We would also lay down that any improvements of pay which may be found necessary by the local Governments to attract a better class of recruit should be confined to such officers, and that the cases of the existing staff both as regards salary and pension should be treated individually on their merits.

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
	<i>Madras:</i>	<i>Rs.</i>	<i>Rs. A. P.</i>		<i>Madras:</i>	<i>Rs.</i>	<i>Rs. A. P.</i>
1	First inspector - - -	500-40-700	633 5 4	1	First inspector - - -	700	700 0 0
1	Second inspector - - -	350-20-450	—	1	Second inspector - - -	*	—
1	Third inspector - - -	300-10-350	—	1	Third inspector - - -	*	—
	<i>Bombay:</i>				<i>Bombay:</i>		
1	Chief inspector - - -	1,000-100-1,500.	1,333 5 4	1	Chief inspector - - -	1,000-50-1,250	1,166 10 8
	Exchange compensation allowance.	—	83 5 4				
1	First inspector - - -	500-10-600	—	1	First inspector - - -	*	—
6	Inspectors - - -	300-10-500	—	6	Inspectors - - -	*	—
	<i>Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, and Assam:</i>				<i>Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, and Assam:</i>		
4	Inspectors - - -	400-10-450	433 5 4†	1	Chief inspector - - -	1,000-50-1,250.	1,166 10 8
	" - - -	350-10-400	—	1	Inspector - - -	*	—
	<i>United Provinces of Agra and Oudh:</i>			4	Inspectors - - -	*	—
1	Assistant inspector - - -	300-20-400	—	1	Assistant inspector - - -	*	—
1	" " - - -	250-20-350	—	1	" " - - -	*	—
1	Inspector - - -	350-10-400	—	1	Inspector - - -	*	—
4	<i>Burma:</i>			1	<i>Burma:</i>		
	Inspectors - - -	450-10-600	541 15 11†	1	First inspector - - -	700	700 0 0
	<i>Central Provinces and Berar:</i>			3	Inspectors - - -	*	—
	1 Senior inspector† - - -	400-20-600	—		<i>Central Provinces and Berar:</i>		
	1 Junior inspector† - - -	300-20-400	—		1 Senior inspector† - - -	§	—
					1 Junior inspector† - - -	§	—
4	Total (four posts) - - -		3,025 5 3	24	Total (four posts) - - -		3,733 5 4
					Deduct present cost (four posts) - - -		3,025 5 3
					Net extra expenditure per mensem (four posts).		708 0 1
					Net extra expenditure per annum (four posts).		8,496 1 0

\* The determination of a suitable rate of salary for this post has been left to the authorities in India.

† Cost of only one appointment, a change in the rate of pay of which has been proposed, has been shown.

‡ Are also inspectors of factories.

§ Rate of pay has been shown under factory inspection department.

## CHAPTER XIV.

## CONDITIONS OF SERVICE.

24. *Strength of the staff.*—As in the case of the factory inspection department, we desire to draw attention to the need for expanding the cadre of this department to keep pace with the work to be done.

25. *Leave, deputation and training reserves. Annual rate of recruitment.*—The cadres are at present too small to carry any fixed leave and deputation reserve, but as they grow this should not be lost from sight. No training reserve is needed. Similarly, no annual rate of recruitment can be established. Vacancies must be filled as they occur.

## CHAPTER XV.

## CONDITIONS OF LEAVE.

26. *Leave rules.*—Officers are now ordinarily under the Indian service leave rules. We would make this absolute for all future entrants to the department. The service is recruited wholly in India and should be treated accordingly. No distinction in favour of officers who are not statutory natives of India should be made.

## CHAPTER XVI.

## CONDITIONS OF PENSION.

27. *Pension rules.*—The ordinary pension rules should apply. There is no appointment which should carry a special additional pension. The department is one the members of which, subject to the general provisos, should be allowed to reckon as service qualifying for superannuation pension the number of completed years by which their ages at the time of appointment exceeded 25 years.

## PART III.

## CHAPTER XVII.

## SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS.

28. The changes which we have recommended in the factory inspection departments are as follows :—

- (i) Officers should ordinarily be selected in India after the issue of advertisements upon a report from the head of the department on the applications submitted. Only if no qualified candidate is procurable in India should an officer be brought from the United Kingdom. Selection in India should not necessarily be confined to statutory natives of India (paragraphs 4 and 7).
- (ii) In the case of recruitment in the United Kingdom officers should be selected after the issue of advertisements with the advice of the Home Office (paragraph 7).
- (iii) An addition of one appointment should be made to the Bombay cadre of inspectors, and this should be filled by an officer of unmixed Asiatic descent who possesses the necessary qualifications (paragraph 5).
- (iv) The maximum limit of age for recruits should be fixed at 30 years (paragraph 6).
- (v) All newly appointed officers should be on probation for two years. Officers should be required to pass a colloquial test in the vernacular of a higher character than is ordinarily enforced at present (paragraph 8).
- (vi) All officers should draw the same pay as chief inspectors. Below that rank the standard scale of pay should be fixed so as to secure statutory natives of India in India. Higher rates should be offered to officers appointed in Europe or to persons who are not statutory natives of India who are appointed in India (paragraph 9).
- (vii) The salaries of certain officers should be raised to the extent stated (paragraph 9).
- (viii) Factory inspectors in the Bombay presidency should, if possible, be relieved of work in connection with the cotton excise duties (paragraph 12).
- (ix) In future all the officers who, when they enter the service, draw salary at the higher of the two rates specified should come under the European service leave rules. Other officers should come under the Indian service leave rules and continue under them throughout their careers (paragraph 13).

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
 ANNEXURE V.—FACTORY AND BOILER INSPECTION DEPARTMENTS—(continued).
 

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- (x) Subject to the usual provisos, members of the factory services should be allowed to reckon as service qualifying for superannuation pension the number of completed years by which their ages at the time of appointment exceeded 25 years (paragraph 14).

29. The changes which we have recommended in the boiler inspection department are as follows :—

- (i) The local Governments should reorganise and bring up to date their departments. They should settle details with the help of expert advice, but should arrange generally for the officers to be government servants; for expert supervision of the department; for the removal of any share in the control of the department from the persons whose boilers have to be inspected; and finally, for a responsible head in all the major provinces (paragraph 18).
- (ii) The maximum age limit for recruitment should be 30 years (paragraph 21).
- (iii) All vacancies should be advertised (paragraph 21).
- (iv) Officers should be on probation for two years (paragraph 22).
- (v) The changes stated should be made in the salary and prospects of the chief inspector, Bombay. A chief inspector should be appointed for Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, and Assam jointly, and first inspectors for Madras and Burma on the salaries stated. Other questions of salary should be determined by the local Governments when they reorganise their departments (paragraph 23).
- (vi) All future entrants to the service should be under the Indian service leave rules (paragraph 26).
- (vii) Subject to the general provisos members of the department should be allowed to reckon as service qualifying for superannuation pension the number of completed years by which their ages at the time of appointment exceeded 25 (paragraph 27).



## ANNEXURE VI.

## Indian Finance Department.

(The evidence relating to this department will be found in volume XIV.)

## CHAPTER I.

## INTRODUCTORY.

1. The main function of the Indian finance department is to bring to account and audit the expenditure of all branches of the civil administration. It has also to deal with questions relating to paper currency, loan operations, and coinage. The financial advice required by local Governments and administrations is, in the main, supplied by their own financial secretaries and financial secretariat establishments, but the accounts officer of the province is also referred to when necessary, and especially in regard to questions of expenditure where it is doubtful whether the local government has or has not full power of independent sanction. The heads of civil accounts offices also act as treasurers of charitable endowments and are responsible for the custody of the securities vested in them in that capacity, and also for the custody of most of the securities taken from Government servants throughout India. The accountant-general of each province is also responsible for the movements of funds from one treasury to another and for the check by local inspection, performed by officers of the department working under him, of the accounts of local bodies such as port trusts, municipalities, and district boards.\*

## CHAPTER II.

## ORGANISATION.

2. *Constitution of the department.*—The department is under the direct control of the Government of India, and officers of the superior staff are liable for employment in any part of India or Burma.† At the head of the department is the comptroller and auditor-general. Its superior staff numbers 172 officers, including in the higher ranks the controller of currency, who is directly responsible to the Government of India, and nine accountants-general. The office of controller of currency was recently created for the purpose of relieving the comptroller and auditor-general of the currency and finance work which he has hitherto discharged in addition to his primary duties as chief officer of account and audit. Of the nine accountants-general seven are employed as chief accounting officers in the larger provinces and two are in charge of the railway accounts section and the postal and telegraph accounts section respectively. The department is not divided into imperial and provincial branches. Below the superior staff there are 34 officers, designated chief superintendents and chief accountants and receiving salaries ranging from Rs. 450 to Rs. 750 a month, whose position in relation to the superior staff of the department is equivalent to that of a provincial service in departments which are so divided.‡ We consider that the present constitution of the department is suitable and should continue.

## CHAPTER III.

## METHODS OF RECRUITMENT.

3. *Place of appointment.*—Prior to 1899 the department was recruited entirely in India. In that year, when it was found that the supply of suitably qualified Europeans and Anglo-Indians was unequal to the demand, the Government of India decided that at least four out of every nine vacancies should be filled from Europe.§ Since then the Indians in the department have proved their fitness, and this was recognised in 1909, when it was decided that half the appointments to be filled in future should be reserved for them. There are no grounds of policy which make it necessary to go to Europe; nor are recruits required to possess technical qualifications which cannot be procured in India. In the post office, where, not less than in the finance department, it is essential in the upper ranks to employ officers possessing a high degree of administrative capacity, the problem has been successfully solved, without recourse to the expedient of

\* Volume XIV., 64444.

† Volume XIV., 64447.

‡ Volume XIV., 64444, 64451.

§ Volume XIV., 64445.

recruitment in Europe, by a judicious blending of officers belonging to the various communities in India, and by reserving a proportion of the administrative posts for selected members of the Indian civil service. We see no reason why, in the finance department, the same policy should not be pursued with equally satisfactory results. We recommend accordingly that the present system of recruitment of Europeans should be abandoned, and that for the future the department should look to India to supply its needs. At the same time, so soon as the vested interests of the present members of the department have been satisfied, the Indian civil service element should be strengthened, and five of the eleven accountant-generalships, which we have proposed, should be reserved for such officers. The remaining six posts should then be filled by members of the department, provided that suitably qualified officers are forthcoming.

4. *Maintenance of the competitive system as a means of obtaining a proportion of the candidates recommended. Institution of a selection committee for nominating candidates proposed.*—The statistics supplied to us show that, on the 1st April 1913, out of 186 appointments in the department carrying salaries of Rs. 300 and over, 127 were held by Europeans or Anglo-Indians, and 59 by Indians.\* These figures include not only the members of the superior staff, but also chief superintendents and chief accountants. From other sources we learned that the proportion of Indian officers in the superior cadre is gradually increasing. Appointments to this staff are now made in India partly by competitive examination among candidates nominated by the Government of India and partly by promotion; and for some time past hardly any but Indian candidates have been directly recruited. Of 19 appointments filled by competition during the ten years from 1904 to 1913 inclusive, no less than 18 were secured by Indian candidates, and those for the most part Hindus from either Madras or Bengal. To this some objection was taken, and the matter is now under the consideration of the authorities. We recognise the difficulties of the situation, but should deprecate the abandonment of the competitive system, which constitutes a valuable experiment in recruitment and has produced a highly qualified body of officers. We therefore recommend that in future three out of every five vacancies to be filled by direct recruitment should be thrown open to competition among candidates nominated without distinction of race. The remaining two-fifths of the vacancies should be filled by the direct appointment without examination of candidates possessing an educational qualification at least equivalent to the bachelor degree. Such appointments should be made by the Government of India on the advice of a selection committee consisting of five members, namely, (i) the comptroller and auditor-general, (ii) a senior officer of the department, (iii) a member of the collegiate branch of the education department, and (iv) and (v) two non-officials. The committee should include two Indian members and its personnel should be changed from time to time, so as to ensure that the claims of the various provinces are adequately represented. In the nomination of candidates for appointment efforts should be made, subject to the maintenance of a high standard of qualification, to obtain officers from the different communities.

5. *Extent to which subordinate officers should be promoted.*—Formerly it was the practice to lay down a maximum proportion of appointments for which subordinates should be regarded as eligible, but under present rules the Government of India merely reserve the right to promote in exceptional cases. The comptroller and auditor-general regarded this arrangement as inconvenient from the point of view of the administration of the department, and proposed that it should be laid down for the future that subordinates should be assigned an average of one-sixth of the vacancies arising in the superior cadre.† This is admittedly a smaller proportion than has been recommended for other departments recruited in India. The higher work of the finance department, however, requires for its efficient discharge special qualifications which cannot be expected ordinarily to be found among men whose life has been spent on purely routine duties, and we therefore support the comptroller and auditor-general's proposal as offering a fair basis of compromise between the interests of Government and the reasonable claims of the subordinate officers. In this connection we may refer to a proposal made by some witnesses for adding to the superior service the posts of chief superintendent and chief accountant. We are satisfied that this change is not justified either by the nature of the duties of these posts or by the qualifications of officers holding them for performing the higher duties of the department.

\* Volume XIV., Appendix VI. (page 64).

† Volume XIV., 64445, 64462.

## ANNEXURE VI.—INDIAN FINANCE DEPARTMENT—(continued).

6. *Conditions under which members of the Indian civil service should be employed in the department.*—As regards the recruitment of officers from the Indian civil service, we were informed by the comptroller and auditor-general that the present system is not entirely satisfactory.\* He represented that the number of training posts was greater than was needed in order to provide for the necessary supply of qualified civil servants to fill vacancies occurring in the grade of accountant-general ; that civil servants should not be brought into the department until they had gained some years' experience of general administration ; and that once appointed, they should not, as a rule, revert to executive duties. At the present time provision is made in the cadre for only four such training posts ; and in view of the evidence which we received from the customs department, where, notwithstanding the fact that the number of training posts is equal to the number of reserved collectorships, the supply of trained officers has not always proved equal to the demand, we should hesitate to recommend a definite reduction in this number. We advise that the number be kept as at present, but that the Government of India should leave one or more of the posts unfilled, as may from time to time seem desirable. Finally, we are of opinion that Indian civil servants of less than ten years' seniority should not ordinarily be brought into the department, and we agree with the comptroller and auditor-general that after they have once been transferred they should normally remain there for the rest of their service.

## CHAPTER IV.

## SYSTEMS OF PROBATION AND TRAINING.

7. *Probation and training.*—The rules as to training provide for the passing of lower and higher departmental examinations within three years from the date of first appointment, and until they have successfully passed these examinations officers are regarded as under probation. We were also informed that a scheme was on foot for the establishment in Calcutta of a school for the training of young officers.† The main features of the scheme are that lectures should be delivered on the subjects set for the departmental examinations and that the training should be practical as well as theoretical. Two senior officers who came before us regarded this proposal with considerable misgivings.‡ According to them, the only satisfactory form of training is to entrust recruits with the actual handling of accounts, and they urged that if it was intended to combine practical work in Calcutta with courses of lectures the result would be seriously to embarrass the working staff of the Calcutta accounts offices. What is evidently required is that each recruit should get a reasonable amount of training in the various branches of the department, and such a training, if given under careful supervision, should be more effective than a quasi-academic course in a training school. We are of opinion that the present system of probation and training is generally suitable and we advise no change.

## CHAPTER V.

## CONDITIONS OF SALARY.

8. *Rates of salary proposed.*—The rates of salary now authorised have been framed with the object of obtaining the services of honours graduates of British universities, and, subject to the acceptance of our proposal to recruit for the department in future entirely in India, we would recommend that they be reduced for future entrants. It is necessary, however, in the interests of efficiency, that the finance department should continue to secure candidates of the highest educational qualifications, and this object can only be achieved by offering salaries substantially in excess of those authorised for the provincial civil services and for departments which draw their personnel from the ordinary graduate class. We therefore propose no change in the pay of the administrative grades beyond the conversion of the graded salaries now payable to accountants-general into an incremental scale of Rs. 2,000–125–2,750. For officers in class I. a scale of Rs. 1,200–60–1,500, and for officers in class II. (the present class III.) a scale of Rs. 300–50/2–500–50–1,050 a month, with a probationary rate of Rs. 200 a month, should be adequate, under the altered conditions of recruitment, to attract candidates

\* Volume XIV., 64444, 64467.

† Volume XIV., 64446, 64469, 64470, 64480.

‡ Volume XIV., 64538, 64631.

## ANNEXURE VI.—INDIAN FINANCE DEPARTMENT—(continued).

of the M.A. class to the department. For Indian civil servants under training we recommend a scale of Rs. 1,500-60-1,800 a month. This scale is already in force for one out of the four officers so employed, and should be extended to the remaining three officers, in view of the necessity for obtaining the services of well-qualified officers of considerable seniority. For officers now in the department the present scales of salary are ample, and no change need be made beyond the establishment of an incremental scale for accountants-general in place of the present grading. Our proposals under this head, as will be seen from the following statement, will result in an ultimate saving of approximately Rs. 3,11,319 a year. This takes into account the expense of adding to the number of higher posts as recommended in paragraph 9 below.

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
		Rs.	Rs. A. P.			Rs.	Rs. A. P.
1	Comptroller and auditor-general.	4,500	4,500 0 0	1	Comptroller and auditor-general.	4,500	4,500 0 0
1	Controller of currency -	3,000-125-3,500.	3,366 10 8	1	Controller of currency -	3,000-125-3,500.	3,366 10 8
2*	Accountants - general, class I.	2,750	5,500 0 0	11	Accountants-general -	2,000-125-2,750.	27,408 5 4
3*	Accountants - general, class II.	2,500	7,500 0 0				
4*	Accountants - general, class III.	2,250	9,000 0 0				
2	Chief examiners - -	2,000	4,000 0 0	2	Chief examiners - -	2,000	4,000 0 0
1	Chief examiner - -	1,800	1,800 0 0	1	Chief examiner - -	1,800	1,800 0 0
10†	Officers, class I. - -	1,500-60-1,800.	17,000 0 0	4‡	Officers, class I. - -	1,500-60-1,800.	6,800 0 0
				8	Officers, class I. - -	1,200-60-1,500.	11,200 0 0
3‡	Officers, class II. - -	1,000-100-1,200-50-1,250-50/2-1,500.	3,601 5 0				
14§	Officers, class III. - -	§300-50-1,250-50/2-1,500.	1,23,472 10 2	14§	Officers, class II. - -	300-50/2-500-50-1,050. (200 during period of probation.)	91,722 6 6
172	Total - - -	- - -	1,79,740 9 10	172	Total - - -	- - -	1,53,797 6 6
					Deduct present cost - - -	- - -	1,79,740 9 10
					Net savings per mensem - - -	- - -	25,943 3 4
					" " per annum - - -	- - -	3,11,318 8 0

\* One appointment in each class reserved for members of the Indian civil service.

† One appointment reserved for members of the Indian civil service.

‡ All reserved for members of the Indian civil service.

§ For Indian officers the scale of pay is Rs. 200-100-400-50-1,250-50/2-1,500.

|| Five appointments reserved for members of the Indian civil service.

## CHAPTER VI.

## CONDITIONS OF SERVICE.

9. *Strength of the staff.*—In the joint memorial submitted by officers of the department proposals were made for a large increase in the number of superior posts.\* As to many of these the comptroller and auditor-general expressed no opinion, but he thought that cause could be shown for the conversion into accountant-generalships of the two posts of comptroller, India treasuries, and comptroller, Central Provinces, and for the inclusion in class I. of the comptroller, Assam, the deputy accountant-general for railways inspection, and the senior officer of the North-Western railway under the chief examiner. He also thought that, if the number of posts of accountant-general was increased, a fourth grade on Rs. 2,000 a month might be created, and

## ANNEXURE VI.—INDIAN FINANCE DEPARTMENT—(continued).

that in any case no reduction should be made in the number of posts in class I.\* In view of all the circumstances we recommend that the number of accountants-general should be increased from nine to eleven, this class to include the chief accounting officer in each province except Assam, and, in addition, the accountant-general, railways, the accountant-general, posts and telegraphs, and the comptroller, India treasuries. As regards appointments included in class I., it was stated by the comptroller and auditor-general that at present only seven posts can be positively identified as belonging to this class, viz., one deputy comptroller-general, two deputy auditors-general, the comptroller, India treasuries, the comptroller, Central Provinces, and on the public works side, the examiner of military works services and the examiner, Punjab. We recommend accordingly that the number of class I. posts, exclusive of training posts held by officers of the Indian civil service, should be fixed at eight, this number to include the deputy comptroller-general, two deputy auditors-general, the examiner of military works services, and the examiner, Punjab; and, in addition, the comptroller, Assam, the deputy accountant-general for railways inspection, and the senior officer of the North-Western railway under the chief examiner.

10. *Leave, training, and deputation reserves.*—Under present conditions a margin of thirty per cent. is allowed in the finance department to provide for leave, training, and deputation. This percentage was stated to be too small, but the financial secretary to the Government of India was of opinion that the difficulties now experienced in providing for leave and other vacancies were due rather to the fact that the cadre was incomplete, than to any deficiency in the authorised margin.† The adoption of our recommendation to recruit for the department entirely in India will, in any case, make it necessary to recalculate the leave requirements, and inquiry should at the same time be made into the sufficiency of the margin now allowed for training and deputation.

11. *Position of public works accounts officers.*—Formerly there was a separate organisation for the accounts work of the public works department, and when this was amalgamated with the civil accounts branch in 1910 the Government of India decided that officers already in the service should remain on their own lists for purposes of pay and promotion. This decision was adversely criticised by witnesses representing the public works side of the department. It appears, however, that at the time of the amalgamation the prospects of officers in the public works branch were substantially improved, and that the effect of placing the existing personnel of the two branches on a common list would be to deprive civil accounts officers of prospects which were open to them before the amalgamation. In these circumstances we see no reason for suggesting a different course of action from that already taken by the Government of India, or for endorsing the proposal that public works accounts officers now in the department should be granted the special privilege of optional retirement after twenty years' service. It should, however, be made clear that officers recruited subsequent to the amalgamation will be regarded as junior for purposes of promotion to higher offices in either branch to officers already serving prior to the amalgamation.

12. *Deputy secretaryship to the Government of India in the finance department.*—In the joint memorandum submitted by officers of the department it was represented that the post of deputy secretary to the Government of India in the finance department should be filled by a finance department officer instead of by an Indian civil servant. The claim to this appointment was made on the ground that an officer trained in accounts was better fitted for the post than members of the Indian civil service who had never received any training in accounts. It appears, however, from the evidence that the deputy secretary has nothing whatever to do with accounts, and very little to do with audit, and that the essential qualification for the post is an intimate acquaintance with the inside working of the various branches of the administration. Such being the case, the present arrangement cannot be regarded as open to objection or as unfair to officers of the finance department, and we recommend no change.

\* Volume XIV., 64448.

† Volume XIV., 64471.

## CHAPTER VII.

## CONDITIONS OF LEAVE.

13. *Leave rules.*—At present officers appointed in England by the Secretary of State and officers appointed in India who are drawing pay of not less than Rs. 800 a month are entitled to the privileges of the European service leave rules; the remaining officers are subject to the Indian service leave rules. Under our proposals the department will be recruited for entirely in India, and all officers alike should be subject to the Indian service rules. Officers now in the department should be allowed to retain their existing privileges.

## CHAPTER VIII.

## CONDITIONS OF PENSION.

14. *Pension rules.*—Officers in this department are, and should continue to be, subject to the ordinary pension rules. Under present conditions appointments in class I. and higher appointments are included in the list of posts entitling their holders to a special additional pension. This is suitable and we advise no change.

## CHAPTER IX.

## SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS.

15. The changes which we have proposed in the Indian finance department are as follows:—

- (i) The department should in future be recruited for entirely in India (paragraph 3).
- (ii) Under the new system of recruitment the Indian civil service element should be increased. So soon as vested interests are satisfied, five of the eleven posts of accountant-general should be reserved for Indian civil service officers (paragraph 3).
- (iii) Three-fifths of the vacancies in the superior staff should be filled by means of competition among nominated candidates, and the remainder by nomination of candidates possessing an educational qualification at least equivalent to the bachelor degree. Such appointments should be made on the advice of a selection committee, with due regard to the claims of different provinces and communities (paragraph 4).
- (iv) One-sixth of the vacancies arising in the superior cadre should be filled by promotion (paragraph 5).
- (v) The number of training posts for Indian civil service officers should remain as at present, but one or more of the posts should be left unfilled if this is deemed desirable (paragraph 6).
- (vi) Indian civil service officers transferred to the department should ordinarily be of at least ten years' seniority and should, as a rule, remain in the department for the rest of their service (paragraph 6).
- (vii) The salaries of the department should be reassessed on the basis of what is necessary to attract statutory natives of India and Indian civil service officers possessing the requisite qualifications (paragraph 8).
- (viii) An incremental scale should be established for accountants-general (paragraph 8).
- (ix) The number of accountants-general should be increased from nine to eleven, and the number of class I. posts held by departmental officers should be reduced from nine to eight (paragraph 9).
- (x) The requirements for leave, training, and deputation should be recalculated (paragraph 10).
- (xi) It should be laid down that officers recruited subsequent to the amalgamation of the public works and civil accounts branches are junior for purposes of promotion to higher offices in either branch to officers serving prior to the amalgamation (paragraph 11).
- (xii) All future entrants to the department should be subject to Indian service leave rules (paragraph 13).

## MINUTE BY Mr. F. G. SLY.

I cannot support the recommendation that the Indian finance department should be entirely recruited in India. This service has hitherto been predominantly European. The Indian element has been increased from time to time, and a marked advance was made in 1909 when the Government decided to recruit Europeans and Indians in equal proportions, which will in due course result in the service being constituted in these proportions. Whilst agreeing that in the specially favoured conditions of service, with the high rates of salary attracting the best products of the Indian universities, the employment of Indians has been fully justified by the results, the department in my opinion still continues to require an admixture of Europeans, for the reasons given by the comptroller and auditor-general (volume XIV., 64,452 and 64,457). The proposed increase from six to nine in the number of Indian civil service officers to be employed in the department is quite inadequate to provide the European element, which can best be secured by the present system of recruitment. The advance made so late as 1909 was made with the full knowledge of the good work done by Indians, and should be tested by its results in practice before any complete change is made in the method of recruitment.

2. The change recommended would result in lowering the status of the finance department, which is of special importance in India under its system of British rule, which demands a strong and effective audit over the expenditure of public moneys. A service exercising independent powers of audit and of the interpretation of financial rules; responsible that the limitations on expenditure imposed by the Government of India and the Secretary of State are observed, demands officers with independent breadth of view who will perform their duties strictly and also not unduly embarrass the local Governments in their administration.

3. The proposal is entirely unsupported by any evidence. Not a single witness suggested it, and only one recommended any increase in the proportion of Indians. The service has admittedly worked well and given satisfaction under its present system of recruitment. The Royal Commission on Decentralisation, after a detailed inquiry into its workings, recorded the opinion (paragraph 165 of their report) that 'in its general lines the present organisation of the accounts and audit work appears "to us entirely satisfactory," and I find no sufficient justification for changing a system that has produced this result.

F. G. SLY.

## ANNEXURE VII.

### Military Finance Department.

(The evidence relating to this department will be found in volume XIV.)

#### CHAPTER I.

##### INTRODUCTORY.

1. The function of the military finance department is to make payments on behalf of the army in India and to bring such payments to account and audit.

#### CHAPTER II.

##### ORGANISATION.

2. *Constitution of the department.*—The staff of the department was formerly allocated to four circles, each under the direction of a controller of military accounts, and designated respectively the northern circle, the eastern circle, the western circle, and the Madras circle. The last named also included Burma. In 1908, with the object of bringing the organisation of the department into line with the revised army arrangements, the Government of India decided to substitute the division for the circle as the unit of administration, but no immediate change was made in the position of the controllers of military accounts except in Madras, where the controllership was abolished in consequence of the creation of two independent divisions. At the same time an office was established in Calcutta for the transaction of all business connected with technical accounts. This was placed under the direction of an officer known as the controller of military supply and marine accounts. The process of development was carried a stage further in 1913 when it was decided finally to abolish the circle controllerships and to make the controllers of the ten military divisions directly responsible to the military accountant-general.\* Under this scheme the superior cadre consists of the military accountant-general, the controller of military supply accounts, two military deputy auditors-general for inspection duties, and 53 other officers, including ten controllers of military accounts for the nine divisions in India and the Burma division. These officers are liable for duty in any part of India or Burma. The department, which is under the direct control of the Government of India, is not divided into imperial and provincial branches. In a lower branch of the department there are 42 deputy examiners and superintendents on salaries ranging from Rs. 400 to Rs. 800 a month, whose position in relation to the superior staff is equivalent to that of a provincial service in departments which are so divided.†

#### CHAPTER III.

##### METHOD OF RECRUITMENT.

3. *Position of military officers in the department.*—The superior staff of the department was formerly recruited from British officers of the Indian army, but in 1909 the Secretary of State decided that it should be manned for the future by civilians appointed by him in England.‡ At the time of our inquiry there were still 43 military officers remaining in the department, but so far as it had gone the change to a civilian organisation was said to have given entirely satisfactory results, and we recommend that the present policy of employing civilians be continued.

4. *Limitations in the employment of non-Europeans.*—The only exception to the rule of recruitment established in 1909 has been the appointment in India, in November 1912, of a civilian gazetted officer from the opium department.‡ No Indian is at present employed on the superior staff, presumably for military reasons. The military accountant-general represented to us that, as the department had now been placed on a civilian basis, the time had come for making the experiment of appointing Indians. He stated further that the question of promoting subordinate officers to the superior cadre was already engaging attention, and that, if his recommendations on the subject were approved by Government, there would in future be

\* Volume XIV., 65158. † Volume XIV., Appendix III. (page 95). ‡ Volume XIV., 65144.

## ANNEXURE VII.—MILITARY FINANCE DEPARTMENT—(continued).

no bar to the promotion of an Indian officer.\* We are of opinion that Indians can be found, as they are now for the finance department, who would be in all respects qualified for carrying out the duties of an accounts officer in this department, and recommend that they be given opportunities of employment, if no military reasons exist to the contrary. Their appointment, as we explain later, would enable a considerable reduction to be made in the cost of the staff.

5. *Qualifications of candidates recruited in England.*—Appointments in England are made by the Secretary of State with the advice of a selection committee. The qualifications demanded of candidates are a university degree with honours, a good place in the open competition for the Home and Indian civil services, or other evidence of a high standard of education. Preference is given to candidates who are proficient in mathematics. The age limits are 22–25.† It appears from the evidence before us that under these regulations a satisfactory type of officer is being recruited, and we do not suggest any change in the present procedure.

## CHAPTER IV.

## SYSTEMS OF PROBATION AND TRAINING.

6. *Probation and training.*—A civilian selected as a probationer is, on arrival in India, posted to the headquarters of a controller's office for instruction, and after about six months he has to appear for an examination in the divisional system of military accounts. He is then transferred to the office of the controller of military supply accounts for a further period of about six months' training, at the end of which time he is examined in the system of military supply accounts. Thereafter the probationer, whether he has passed his examinations or not, is employed on the regular duties of the department. An officer failing in either or both examinations is allowed further time in which to pass. There is no fixed term of probation, but repeated failure to pass the departmental examinations within a reasonable period involves loss of appointment.‡ The present regulations are suitable and we advise no change.

## CHAPTER V.

## CONDITIONS OF SALARY.

7. *Salaries of military officers.*—At the time of our inquiry in India the forty-three military officers still remaining on the strength of the department included the military accountant-general on Rs. 2,500 a month, four controllers of military accounts on Rs. 2,200 a month, twenty military accountants on graded pay ranging from Rs. 1,000 to Rs. 1,650 a month, and eighteen assistant military accountants on graded pay ranging from Rs. 500 to Rs. 750 a month. A scheme had just been sanctioned by the Secretary of State for the amelioration of the prospects of junior officers who were suffering, or about to suffer, from the effects of a block in promotion. Briefly, the scheme is to substitute for the present graded system in the lower ranks of the department, including that of military accountant, fourth class, a time scale running from Rs. 500 to Rs. 1,000 a month with periodic increments so arranged that officers will reach the position of military accountant, fourth class, after ten years' departmental service. As the introduction of the time scale will result in the immediate promotion of four officers to the grade of military accountant, fourth class, it has further been decided to add within the next three years two appointments in the grade of military accountant, third class, on Rs. 1,200 a month, and two more in the grade of military accountant, second class, on Rs. 1,400 a month. Finally, in order to provide against undue acceleration of promotion through the higher grades later on, it has been decided that there shall be a minimum period of three years' service in each of the three grades on Rs. 1,200, 1,400 and 1,600 a month.§ The scheme does not satisfy officers in the department, but on the evidence before us there appears to be no sufficient reason for recommending further concessions.

\* Volume XIV., 65144, 65165, 65176.

† Volume XIV., Appendix I. (page 93).

‡ Volume XIV., 65145. § Volume XIV. Appendices IV. (page 98), V. (page 112), VI. (page 115).

## ANNEXURE VII.—MILITARY FINANCE DEPARTMENT—(continued).

8. *Salaries of civilian officers recruited in England.*—We consider that the conditions of salary now in force for civilian officers are generally suitable, and we suggest no improvement beyond allowing to junior officers a salary of Rs. 400 a month during the first three years of service instead of the rates of Rs. 300, 350, and 400 a month now payable. This change, as will be seen from the following statement, will involve an additional expenditure of approximately Rs. 4,953 a year. We recommend, also, that for new entrants there should be an efficiency bar at Rs. 1,000 a month, beyond which no officer should be allowed to proceed unless he is granted a special certificate of competency.

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
		Rs.	Rs. A. P.			Rs.	Rs. A. P.
1	Military accountant-general.	2,500	2,500 0 0	1	Military accountant-general.	2,500	2,500 0 0
1	Senior controller of military supply accounts.	2,200	2,200 0 0	1	Senior controller of military supply accounts.	2,200	2,200 0 0
2	Military deputy auditors-general.	2,200	4,400 0 0	2	Military deputy auditors-general.	2,200	4,400 0 0
1	Military deputy accountant-general.	1,900	1,900 0 0	1	Military deputy accountant-general.	1,900	1,900 0 0
1	Junior controller of military supply accounts.	1,900	1,900 0 0	1	Junior controller, military supply accounts.	1,900	1,900 0 0
3	Military accountants, 1st class.	1,650	4,950 0 0	3	Military accountants, 1st class.	1,650	4,950 0 0
48	Military accountants, 2nd class.	300-50-1,250-50/2-1,500.	37,311 10 4	48	Military accountants, 2nd class.	400-50/3-450-50-1,250-50/2-1,500	37,724 5 8
57	Total		55,161 10 4	57	Total		55,574 5 8
					Deduct present cost		55,161 10 4
					Net extra expenditure per mensem		412 11 4
					" " per annum		4,952 8 0

9. *Salaries of civilian officers recruited in India.*—The foregoing rates of salary have been framed with the object of securing the services of honours graduates of British universities, and are higher than need be paid to secure the services of fully qualified officers recruited in India. These, if appointed, should be paid at the same rates as officers recruited from Europe after promotion to the rank of military accountant, first class, or higher rank, but whilst holding the rank of military accountant, second class, they should be allowed an incremental scale of Rs. 300-50/2-500-50-1,050 a month with a probationary rate of Rs. 200 a month. This corresponds with the scale proposed by us for class II. officers of the finance department.

## CHAPTER VI.

## CONDITIONS OF SERVICE.

10. *Leave, training and deputation reserves.*—The cadre of the department includes a margin of twenty-five per cent. for leave, and of seven per cent. for training.\* It was agreed that this was adequate. We would, however, recommend that, so soon as sufficient experience has been gained of the effect of the revised conditions of recruitment, the percentage should be recalculated in the light of actual facts and kept up to date thereafter by means of periodical checks.

11. *Extensions of service allowed to administrative officers.*—Complaint was made to us of the hardship to which the large majority of military officers in the department have been subjected owing to the practice of reappointing officers in the administrative grades for further terms of service. We were informed, however, that one of the main causes of the impending block in promotion is to be found in the addition of eleven officers to the staff of the department some ten years ago, and that the frequency with which reappointments have been

\* Volume XIV., Appendix III. (page 95).

## ANNEXURE VII.—MILITARY FINANCE DEPARTMENT—(continued).

granted in recent years has been due partly to the necessity for retaining the services of highly placed officers pending the establishment of the various schemes of reorganisation and partly also to the fact that the officers now filling the administrative posts were promoted to them at a comparatively early age. It appears also that the policy of granting extensions to administrative officers has been established for many years, and was actually in force prior to the entry into the department of all but one of the officers signing the joint memorial.\* In these circumstances, we see no reason for objecting to the action which Government have taken in the matter.

## CHAPTER VII.

## CONDITIONS OF LEAVE.

12. *Leave rules.*—Military officers in the department are granted leave under the rules applicable to officers of the Indian army. Civilian officers are subject to the European service leave rules. These arrangements are suitable and should continue in force. In the event, however, of officers being appointed to the department in India, they should be brought under the Indian service rules and should continue under them throughout their career.

## CHAPTER VIII.

## CONDITIONS OF PENSION.

13. *Pension rules.*—Military officers are entitled to pension under army rules, and other officers under the rules generally applicable in civil branches of the administration. We recommend no change except that all civilian officers down to and including military accountants, first class, should be regarded as eligible on retirement for a special additional pension.

## CHAPTER IX.

## SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS.

14. The changes we have proposed are as follows :—

- (i) If there is no military objection, Indians should be given opportunities for employment on the superior staff (paragraph 4).
- (ii) The salaries of civilian officers during the probationary period should be improved (paragraph 8).
- (iii) For new entrants there should be an efficiency bar at Rs. 1,000 a month (paragraph 8).
- (iv) Military accountants, second class, if appointed in India, should draw the same scale of salary as class II. officers in the finance department (paragraph 9).
- (v) The percentage allowed for leave, training and deputation should be recalculated and kept up to date (paragraph 10).
- (vi) Officers who may be appointed to the department in India should be subject to Indian service leave rules (paragraph 12).
- (vii) All officers down to and including military accountants, first class, should be eligible for a special additional pension (paragraph 13).

## ANNEXURE VIII.

### Forest Department.

(The evidence relating to this department will be found in volume XV.)

#### CHAPTER I.

##### INTRODUCTORY.

1. The establishment of the forest department includes about 400 officers and between 12,000 and 13,000 subordinates. The functions of this large staff are, on the one hand, to preserve from denudation the forest-clad tracts which form the catchment areas of rivers and streams, and to prevent the short-sighted destruction of forests; and, on the other hand, to provide timber and fuel for the population of India, and so to administer the forests that their annual produce may be made to yield a substantial margin of profit.

#### CHAPTER II.

##### ORGANISATION.

2. *Division of the services into imperial and provincial.*—As at present constituted the department includes an imperial branch of 213 officers, comprising that part of the upper controlling staff which is recruited in England; and a provincial branch of 208 officers, comprising the rest of the upper controlling staff and the whole of the lower controlling staff. Posts held by officers of the two branches are classified, according to the degree of their importance, as major and minor charges. Such posts are either territorial, *e.g.*, posts of chief conservator and conservator and ordinary divisional and subdivisional charges, or of a special character, *e.g.*, posts held by working plan officers and personal assistants, and by officers employed on exploration, settlement, and other special operations.\* The system of division into imperial and provincial services is based on the principle that imperial officers after a short term of preliminary training are always employed in major charges, whilst provincial officers occupy the minor charges, for which a lower standard of professional qualification is sufficient, and are also eligible for promotion to 49 of the 216 charges classed as major. We are agreed that for the work of the forest department two classes of officers are required and that the division of the superior staff into higher and lower branches should be maintained. The present system, however, is faulty in that the major charges thrown open to provincial service officers are shown as part of the provincial service, despite the fact that officers holding them are engaged on duties of the same importance and responsibility as those discharged by imperial officers.† We recommend that such posts be transferred to the imperial service, and that officers appointed to them be regarded as eligible for further promotion equally with officers directly recruited to the imperial service. At the same time we are of opinion that too high a proportion of the total number of major charges is assigned to members of the provincial branch of the department. Promotion to the higher service should be the reward of the exceptional man, but under the conditions which have been created in the forest department every provincial service officer may look forward to being promoted to an imperial service post at some stage of his career. In a later paragraph we propose the inauguration of a system of direct appointment to the imperial branch in India, and we think that under such conditions the number of major charges thrown open to provincial service officers should be reduced to twenty-four. This change should, however, apply only to new entrants. Existing members of the provincial service should continue to be eligible for promotion to the whole of the forty-nine major charges.

3. *The inspector-generalship of forests.*—At the head of the department is the inspector-general of forests, whose duties are to advise the Government of India on all forestry questions, to exercise a general control over the preparation of working plans, and to inspect the work of the department in all parts of India except Madras and Bombay. In these presidencies the inspector-general has no official status, and he is not concerned with the work done there unless his advice is specially invited.‡ The present arrangement appears to be working satisfactorily and we do not recommend any change.

\* Volume XV., Appendix VIII. (page 137).

† Volume XV., 66087.

‡ Volume XV., 66085.

## CHAPTER III.

## METHODS OF RECRUITMENT.

4. *Procedure to be adopted in recruiting for the imperial service in India.*—The imperial branch of the department has been recruited hitherto entirely in England, and at the time of our inquiry included only two statutory natives of India. There are no considerations of policy which make it necessary to recruit in England, and the existing state of things cannot be regarded as satisfactory. Some improvement will be effected by the transfer to the imperial branch of provincial service officers holding major charges. This, however, will not be sufficient. The time has now arrived when, in our opinion, a beginning should be made with the system of direct recruitment to the imperial branch in India. With this object we would make use of the facilities which have recently been established at the forest research institute at Dehra Dun for giving higher instruction in forestry subjects. We recommend that a course of training be established at Dehra Dun up to the highest European standard, and that the syllabus of the course be framed and kept up to date by the president of the institute after consultation with the best authorities in Europe. It should be laid down that candidates for the advanced course must hold the degree of bachelor of science. A proportion of the students would no doubt be nominated by their respective local Governments or universities, and would hold some form of bursary or scholarship; but we do not advise that the doors of the institute should be closed to other well-equipped students who come of their own initiative. We anticipate that, in the first year of the course, during which instruction would be given in the elements of forestry, it might be convenient for the students selected for the advanced course to be trained in the same classes as the students attending the course for admission to the provincial services. But whether this is practicable or not, we advise that an intermediate examination be held to test the progress of the advanced course students, and that those who do not reach the prescribed standard be either transferred to the provincial service class or discharged from the college. Students who satisfactorily complete the advanced course should be eligible as vacancies arise for direct appointment to the imperial branch of the department. Those who are unsuccessful in obtaining such appointments should be eligible for admission to the provincial branch. We also recommend, in order that the Dehra Dun advanced course may from the first attract a good class of student, that the Government of India should announce that not less than half the recruits required for the imperial branch of the department will be chosen from among statutory natives of India who have been through the course, provided that, in the opinion of an expert committee, duly qualified candidates are available for appointment. This committee, which should include two Indians, should consist of (i) the inspector-general of forests, (ii) the president of the Dehra Dun institute, (iii) one other official, and (iv) and (v) two non-officials. We would add that officers so recruited in India should be appointed subject to the condition that it will be open to the Government of India to send them for a course of practical training in European forests at any time during their career and under such terms as may be deemed appropriate in each case.

5. *No limit should be placed on the number of officers to be recruited in India for the imperial service.*—In recommending that a minimum proportion, if found competent, should be taken from among the passed students of the Dehra Dun institute, we do not wish to suggest that the Government of India should be content with this minimum or should confine its inquiries solely to Dehra Dun. On the contrary we are of opinion that every effort should be made to discover and recruit competent men in India wherever they may be found, and that it should be possible to meet the whole of the normal requirements of the imperial branch in India within a reasonable period. All prospective vacancies should be duly advertised in the Indian press. The selection committee referred to in the preceding paragraph should subsequently scrutinize the applications, and after interviewing the likely candidates and making such further inquiries as may be necessary, should report to the Government of India whether there are any qualified candidates, and if so, who are the fittest for appointment. If there are suitable candidates the Government of India should select them, and only in the event of a deficiency of suitable candidates should application be made to the Secretary of State to appoint in England.

6. *Procedure to be adopted in recruiting for the imperial service in England.*—In the method of recruitment in England frequent changes have been made in recent years. Under the existing regulations, which came into force in 1911–12, appointments are made by the Secretary of State on the advice of a selection committee. Should the number of qualified candidates exceed the number of vacancies to be filled, the Secretary of State reserves the right to require them to compete among themselves at an examination conducted by the civil service commissioners, but hitherto it has not been found necessary to hold an examination. Candidates must not be less than nineteen or more than twenty-two years of age. They must have obtained a degree with honours in some branch of natural science in a university of England, Wales, or Ireland, or have passed the final B.Sc. examination in pure science at one of the Scottish universities. Before joining their appointments in India selected candidates are put through a probationary course in England and on the continent, which ordinarily extends over a period of two years.\* This method of recruitment was adversely criticised by witnesses who came before us, mainly on the ground that it has the result of unduly delaying the age of arrival in India. We cannot, however, endorse the proposal which was made to us that candidates should be recruited in future at the school-leaving age and sent out to India after a probationary course of two or three years in the theory and practice of forestry. This, no doubt, would have the effect of lowering by a year or two the age of arrival in India, but at the same time would tend to perpetuate the present system of a probationary training in England under Government supervision and at Government expense. In so far as it may be necessary to recruit in Europe, we think it desirable that, as the forest schools of Great Britain develop, the practice should be introduced of recruiting ready-trained foresters who could be sent out to India without undergoing a term of probationary training in Great Britain. In the meantime the existing procedure for recruitment, which has only just come into operation and is said to be securing a good type of officer, should be maintained. We would, however, recommend that the selection committee at the India office should include an officer of the Indian forest service, being either an officer on the active list or an officer who has not been on the retired list for more than five years, and a non-official Indian who is in touch with the Indian student community. We think it desirable also that, other things being equal, preference should be given by the selection committee to candidates who have already had some training in forestry. In such cases it should normally be possible for an officer to complete his probationary training in one year, and thus to reach India by the age of about twenty-three.

7. *Distribution of recruits to the imperial service by provinces.*—Imperial service probationers are now permitted to select the provinces in which they desire to serve according to their standing in the final order of merit. The result of this has been that in certain provinces—notably, Madras, Bombay, and Bengal—vacancies have generally been filled by men from the bottom half of the list, and several witnesses represented that in the interests of these provinces a change in the present procedure was necessary.† The existing procedure differs from that prevailing in the Indian civil service, where it is laid down that selected candidates will be allotted to the various provinces on a consideration of all the circumstances, including their own wishes, but that the requirements of the public service will take rank before every other consideration. We recommend that a similar rule be applied to the Indian forest service.

8. *Procedure to be adopted in recruiting for the provincially recruited services.*—Appointments to the provincial forest services are now made from among candidates nominated by the various local Governments to undergo the provincial service course of training at Dehra Dun. It is left to the local Governments to prescribe what educational qualifications they please in making their selections, but the president of the forest research institute is authorised to test the proficiency of selected candidates in English and mathematics and to reject such as he deems to be insufficiently qualified.‡ These arrangements have only recently come into operation and we recommend no change except that in future nomination should be given on the advice of selection committees consisting in each province of three officials and two non-officials, and including two Indians. We are agreed that under present

\* Volume XV., Appendix XIII. (page 156).

† Volume XV., 66073.

‡ Volume XV., Appendices I., II., III., IV., V., VII., VIII., IX., and X. (pages 118 *et seq.*)

## ANNEXURE VIII.—FOREST DEPARTMENT—(continued).

conditions no specific educational qualification should be fixed; but we desire to lay emphasis on the necessity for nominating men of good general education with a substantial knowledge of one or more branches of natural science in addition to an adequate knowledge of English and mathematics.

9. *Extent to which officers of the subordinate services should be promoted.*—It remains to consider to what extent appointments to the provincial services should be made by direct recruitment and by promotion respectively. No fixed rule of common application to all provinces has hitherto been laid down on this point, and the practice of local Governments varies. Of the witnesses who came before us some were in favour of abolishing the system of recruitment by promotion as soon as vested interests had been satisfied, whilst others, including the inspector-general of forests, thought that both methods of appointment should be employed. Having regard to all the circumstances we recommend that it be left to the local Governments to determine on the merits of each case whether vacancies should be filled direct or by promotion, but we would lay down the rule that the latter method should not be employed for filling more than thirty-three per cent. of the posts.

## CHAPTER IV.

## SYSTEMS OF PROBATION AND TRAINING.

10. *Probation. Imperial service.*—Candidates selected in England are appointed on probation, and during the probationary period are required to go through a course in forestry at either Oxford, Cambridge, or Edinburgh university, becoming members of the university, if not so already; to obtain the degree or diploma in forestry which the university grants; and to satisfy such other tests of proficiency as may be deemed necessary. In the college vacations the probationers are given practical instruction, under the supervision of an Indian forest service officer appointed as director of Indian forest studies, in such British or continental forests as may be selected for the purpose. Probationers satisfying the prescribed tests are given appointments as assistant conservators of forests.\* The evidence of official witnesses was in favour of sending all the probationers to one and the same institution. They represented that under present conditions it was impossible to carry out the details of the training on uniform lines, and that the number of probationers was too small to make it worth while for more than one institution to provide a special course of training adapted to Indian requirements. That a system of concentration in one university would offer advantages is obvious. On the other hand we recognise that there are also advantages in the present system. Probationers will undoubtedly tend to go for their special training to the university which provides the best teaching, and as each of the recognised universities is naturally anxious to secure as many probationers as possible there can be little danger of their neglecting the special needs of the Indian forest service. Indeed, it is clear from the evidence that all three universities have already made arrangements for giving instruction in such special subjects as Indian geology, Indian silviculture and working plans. For the practical course the director of Indian forest studies is responsible, and it should be one of his principal duties to see that all the probationers get the right sort of practical training, and, so far as possible, a training on uniform lines. The present system has only been on trial for the last two or three years, and in our opinion it would be undesirable to make any change of principle until the time arrives when it will become practicable to do away with the system of training probationers in Great Britain. We think, however, that in certain directions the detailed arrangements now made by the three universities for the training of Indian forest service probationers are capable of improvement. We recommend, accordingly, that it be made a condition of recognition by the Secretary of State that a forest school should undertake to provide instructors with Indian experience to lecture to the probationers in Indian subjects, viz., Indian forestry, silviculture, forest botany and working plans, Indian geology, and Indian forest law. It should also be laid down that proper courses of instruction should be given in forest engineering and surveying. Arrangements should also be made so as to provide that not less than a quarter of the time spent on probation will be occupied in practical training on the continent.

\* Volume XV., Appendix XIII. (page 156).

11. *Training. Imperial service.*—The following general principles have been laid down by the Government of India for the regulation of the training in India of junior officers appointed to the imperial service :—

(a) during the first year of service in India forest officers should be under training and should not be regarded as available for the ordinary purposes of forest administration ;

(b) the training should be under a selected officer or officers ;

(c) it should include both actual work in a division and a period of work at the headquarters of a forest circle ; and

(d) some arrangement should be made for officers under training to tour in their own provinces and, possibly, to visit selected forests in other provinces.\*

These arrangements are generally suitable, and the only change we recommend is that officers should be kept in their own provinces during the first year after their arrival in India. What an officer mainly requires at this stage is a thorough practical training in the work of one well-developed forest division and sufficient time in which to acquire an adequate acquaintance with the local vernacular.

12. *Stage at which imperial service officers should be given charge of a division.*—Frequent reference was made in the course of evidence to the practice of appointing imperial officers to the charge of a division after little more than a year's service in India. Thus in Bengal three assistants were recently appointed to divisional charges after fifteen to eighteen months' service in India, and another assistant after only four months' service was placed in charge of one of the largest divisions in Bengal for seven or eight months.† The general view was that officers did not become qualified for such charges until after at least two or three years' training in less responsible positions. The inspector-general gave it as his opinion that normally an officer should not be given charge of a division until after four years' service.‡ This seems reasonable, and we suggest that the Government of India should scrutinize the cadres of the various provinces in detail so as to see what measures should be taken to provide for a four years' period of training.

13. *Probation. Provincially recruited services.*—We have already dealt with the subject of forestry training for provincial service candidates. As regards probation in the provincial services, we desire to draw the attention of local Governments to the importance of estimating future requirements for these services on a more correct basis, so as to ensure that normally there will be appointments available in the cadre of extra assistant conservators by the time that newly entered officers complete their term of probation. We recommend that in any event provincial officers certified to be fit for confirmation should not be kept on probation for more than two years, and that, at the end of this period, if no vacancy exists in the authorised cadre, they should be appointed as supernumeraries.

## CHAPTER V.

### CONDITIONS OF SALARY.

14. *Rates of salary. Imperial service.*—The present scale of salaries in the imperial service, which applies to all officers alike, whether statutory natives of India or not, has been fixed on the assumption that the personnel of the higher ranks of the department will be drawn mainly from Europe. Under our proposals the normal requirements of the staff will ultimately be met from India, and the normal scale of salaries should therefore be assessed on that basis. We recommend accordingly that an incremental scale of Rs. 300–50/2–500–50–1,050 a month be established for assistant and deputy conservators, and made applicable to all officers who are recruited to the department in India. For officers who are recruited from Europe the present scale of Rs. 380–40–700–50–1,250 a month is adequate and should not be increased. In the administrative grades there should be no difference between the pay of officers who are, and are not, recruited in India. We consider also that the present rates for administrative officers are inadequate. We were informed that officers had occasionally declined promotion to the highest grades of the service on the ground that the increased salary of the higher rank was insufficient to compensate them for the additional expense involved. With the exceptions of the Governments of Madras

\* Volume XV., Appendix IX. (2), (page 145). † Volume XV., 66241. ‡ Volume XV., 66086.

## ANNEXURE VIII.—FOREST DEPARTMENT—(continued).

and Bombay, all local Governments and Administrations expressed themselves in favour of a substantial addition to the present rates.\* In view of this evidence and of the importance of the duties devolving on highly-placed officers in this department, we recommend that for the future the salaries be fixed at Rs. 3,000 a month for the inspector-general, at Rs. 2,250-50-2,500 a month for chief conservators, and at Rs. 1,500-100-2,000 a month for conservators. On the assumption that the department will be recruited for entirely in India, there will be a saving, on the present cost of the staff, of approximately Rs. 2,11,342 a year.

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
	<b>IMPERIAL SERVICE.</b>				<b>IMPERIAL SERVICE.</b>		
1	Inspector-general - -	Rs. 2,650	Rs. 2,650 0 0	1	Inspector-general - -	Rs. 3,000	Rs. 3,000 0 0
2	Chief conservators - -	2,150	4,300 0 0	2	Chief conservators - -	2,250-50-2,500.	4,833 5 4
7	Conservators, 1st grade -	1,900	13,300 0 0				
8	" 2nd " -	1,700	13,600 0 0	22	Conservators - -	1,500-100-2,000.	40,333 5 4
7	" 3rd " -	1,500	10,500 0 0	237	Deputy and assistant conservators.	300-50/2-500-50-† 1,050.	1,65,321 1 5
	Add probable acting allowances for grade to grade officiating promotion within the class of conservators.	—	1,250 0 0				
188	Deputy and assistant conservators.	380-40-700-50-1,250.	1,51,279 10 6				
	<b>PROVINCIAL SERVICE.</b>						
49	Extra deputy conservators -	575-25-600-50-700-100/3-800-50/3-850.	34,219 15 0				
262	Total - - -	- - -	2,31,099 9 6	262	Total - - -	- - -	2,13,487 12 1
					Present cost - - -	- - -	2,31,099 9 6
					Net savings per mensem - -	- -	17,611 13
					" " per annum - -	- -	2,11,342 1 0

† Officers promoted from the provincially recruited services will enter this scale at the point next above the rate of salary drawn by them immediately before promotion.

15. *Rates of salary. Provincially recruited services.*—According to the present scale of salary for the provincial services, which came into force in 1911, extra assistant conservators are entitled to a salary of Rs. 250 a month, rising by annual increments of Rs. 20 a month to Rs. 550 a month in the 16th year of service. It is further provided that an extra assistant conservator who is declared fit for holding a major charge, but for whom there is no such charge available, may rise after three years' service to Rs. 600 a month, and after four years' service on Rs. 600 a month to Rs. 650, and after a further four years' service to Rs. 700 a month. Extra deputy conservators start on Rs. 575 a month, rising by Rs. 25 annually to Rs. 650 a month. After one year's service on Rs. 650 a local Government may, by special order in each case, promote an officer to a salary of Rs. 700 a month for a period of three years, and again to a salary of Rs. 800 a month for a further period of three years, and finally to a salary of Rs. 850 a month. Extra assistant conservators temporarily holding a major charge receive a local allowance of Rs. 50 a month, but no officiating allowances are given.† Under the revised scheme of organisation proposed by us, provincial officers promoted to the imperial service will be allowed the same scale of salary as has been recommended for officers directly recruited in India to the imperial service and will enter the scale at the point next above the rate of salary drawn by them immediately before promotion. For the rest, we recommend that the normal scale for extra assistant conservators up to Rs. 550 a month should be left unchanged except in Burma, where the practice of paying a Burma allowance should be discontinued for new entrants, and a scale of Rs. 300-20-600 a month, with a probationary rate of Rs. 200 a month, should be fixed. The present arrangement by which special rates of salary are provided for extra assistant conservators who are declared

\* Volume XV., Appendices I., II., III., IV., V., VII., VIII., IX., X. (pages 118 et seq.)

† Volume XV., Appendix VIII. (27) (page 141).

## ANNEXURE VIII.—FOREST DEPARTMENT—(continued).

fit for holding a major charge, but for whom there is no major charge available, should be abandoned. Instead of this, we would establish a selection grade on Rs. 600-20-700 a month for ten per cent. of the members of the provincial service.

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
159	Extra assistant conservators	Rs. 250-20-550-50/3*-600-50/4*-700.	Rs. 62,444 3 8	16	Extra assistant conservators	Rs. 600-20-700	Rs. 10,666 10 8
	Allowance to probationary extra assistant conservators	150 (175 in Burma).	2,675 0 0	143	" " "	250-20-550†	60,519 3 7
	Burma allowance	- - -	3,770 0 0		Allowance to probationary extra assistant conservators.	†150	1,950 0 0
	Total	- - -	68,889 3 8		Total - - -	- - -	73,135 14 3
					Deduct present cost	- - -	68,889 3 8
					Net extra expenditure per mensem	- - -	4,246 10 7
159	Total	- - -	68,889 3 8	159	" " " " annum	- - -	50,959 15 0

\* These increments are allowed only to those officers who are considered fit to hold major charges but for whom no vacancies in the grade of extra deputy conservators are available.

† For Burma the scale of pay should be Rs. 300-20-600 (Rs. 200 during probation).

## CHAPTER VI.

## CONDITIONS OF SERVICE.

16. *Strength of the cadre*—Special attention was drawn by several witnesses to the inadequacy of the present cadre. It appears also from the memoranda supplied by local Governments that proposals for substantial increases of staff have already been put forward in several provinces. These should be dealt with in detail on their merits. In this connection we would observe that one of the main objects of forest conservancy in India is to provide for the commercial development of a large and valuable property, and that a further increase of profits will depend mainly on the introduction of more intensive methods of cultivation and on the results of special investigations into the employment of forest products for trade purposes. Development along these lines will only be possible if prompt measures are taken to anticipate requirements for expert staff and equipment; and, as a sure means of increasing the revenues of India, we desire to emphasise the importance of allowing for a considerable expansion of the present establishment of the department.

17. *Leave and training reserves and annual rate of recruitment. Imperial service.*—The strength of the imperial service is calculated on the basis of the total number of major charges less such of these as are transferred to the provincial service, and is fixed by adding to the number of imperial major charges an allowance of twenty-five per cent. for leave and training. This allowance will need to be revised in the light of actual experience and with reference also to our recommendations to recruit for the imperial service in India and to transfer to the imperial service provincial officers holding major charges. It should also be scrutinized, as suggested by us in paragraph 12, from the point of view of its adequacy to provide for the needs of training. The allowance as revised on this basis should be checked at intervals of five years. The annual rate of recruitment for the imperial branch has been fixed at ten, this number representing 4·8 per cent. of the sanctioned strength. In practice this rate has proved to be much in excess of requirements, and at present the annual recruitment has been temporarily reduced to five officers. We are of opinion that fresh service tables should be prepared, and that the decremental rate should be recalculated and kept up to date.

18. *Leave reserves. Provincially recruited services.*—In the provincially recruited services a margin of fourteen per cent. is now allowed as a reserve for leave. This is somewhat higher than the similar margin in other services, and some reduction should be possible. It will be necessary also to reduce the number of officers included in the leave reserve for the provincial services in consequence of the transfer of provincial officers holding major charges to the cadre of the imperial

## ANNEXURE VIII.—FOREST DEPARTMENT—(continued).

service. We recommend that the necessary calculations be made accordingly and kept up to date by means of a quinquennial check.

19. *Designation of the provincially recruited services.*—We recommend that officers appointed to minor charges in the various provinces should be officially described as belonging to the Madras forest service, the Bombay forest service, &c., and that the designation 'provincial' forest service should no longer be used.

20. *Designation of members of the provincially recruited services.*—A general demand was made by officers of the provincial branch for the abolition of the prefix 'extra' now applied to officers in the grades of assistant and deputy conservator. This will no longer be used in the case of extra deputy conservators transferred to the imperial branch. In the case of extra assistant conservators, on the other hand, it would appear to be necessary to retain some difference of nomenclature, and we can suggest no more suitable designation than the one now adopted.

## CHAPTER VII.

## CONDITIONS OF LEAVE.

21. *Leave rules.*—Officers of the imperial branch are now subject to the European service leave rules. We recommend no change as regards officers now serving. For the future it should be laid down that officers who, when they enter the department, are paid salaries at the higher rates fixed for persons recruited in Europe, should be subject to the European service rules. All other officers in the department should be subject to the Indian service leave rules and should continue under them throughout their careers.

22. *Study leave.*—The existing rules provide for the grant of concessions to selected officers of the forest department to enable them, when on furlough, to study the latest developments of European forestry, but it would appear that advantage is taken of these facilities only in exceptional cases. We consider it desirable that forest officers should be encouraged to keep abreast of the latest continental practice, and recommend that such further facilities be offered as may be necessary to achieve this object. Our recommendation applies with special force to officers who under our proposals will be recruited to the imperial branch in India, and whose practical training will have been limited to the less well-developed Indian forests.

## CHAPTER VIII.

## CONDITIONS OF PENSION.

23. *Pension rules.*—At present special rules as to pension apply to officers in the imperial branch of this department. We recommend that future entrants to this branch of the service should come under the general rules as revised by us, and that the existing officers should be given the option of accepting the revised general rules or of remaining under the special rules now applicable. Other officers in the department are now, and should continue to be, subject to the general rules. Conservators and officers of higher rank are now included in the list of officers eligible for a special additional pension. This is suitable, and we recommend no change.

## CHAPTER IX.

## SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS.

24. The changes which we have proposed in the forest department are as follows :—

- (i) Provincial service officers holding major charges should be included in the imperial service (paragraph 2).
- (ii) In view of the establishment of direct recruitment in India to the imperial service, the number of major charges thrown open to members of the provincial service should be reduced from forty-nine to twenty-four. This change should apply to new entrants (paragraph 2).
- (iii) Direct recruitment should be made to the imperial branch in India (paragraph 4).

## ANNEXURE VIII.—FOREST DEPARTMENT—(continued).

- (iv) With this object a course of training up to the highest European standard should be instituted at Dehra Dun (paragraph 4).
- (v) Candidates for this course should hold the degree of bachelor of science (paragraph 4).
- (vi) An intermediate examination should be held to test the progress of the advanced course students (paragraph 4).
- (vii) Students who satisfactorily complete the advanced course should be eligible for direct appointment to the imperial branch, and those of them who are unsuccessful in obtaining such appointments should be eligible for admission to the provincial branch (paragraph 4).
- (viii) The Government of India should announce that not less than half the recruits required for the imperial branch will be chosen from among statutory natives of India who have been through the advanced course, provided that in the opinion of an expert committee duly qualified candidates are available for appointment (paragraph 4).
- (ix) Officers so recruited to the imperial branch should be appointed subject to the condition that it will be open to the Government of India to send them for a course of practical training in European forests at any time during their career (paragraph 4).
- (x) Every effort should be made to discover and recruit competent men in India wherever they may be found, and the whole of the normal requirements of the staff should be met from India within a reasonable period of time (paragraph 5).
- (xi) Vacancies should be advertised in the Indian press (paragraph 5).
- (xii) In cases where it is necessary to resort to recruitment in Europe, the present procedure should be maintained, but the selection committee should include an officer of the Indian forest service and a non-official Indian in touch with the Indian student community (paragraph 6).
- (xiii) As the forest schools of Great Britain develop, the practice should be introduced of recruiting ready-trained foresters, who could be sent out to India without undergoing a term of probationary training in Great Britain; and, under present conditions, preference should be given to candidates who have already had some training in forestry (paragraph 6).
- (xiv) Imperial service probationers should be allotted to the various provinces on a consideration of all the circumstances, including their own wishes; but the requirements of the public service should rank before every other consideration (paragraph 7).
- (xv) Candidates for the Dehra Dun provincial service course should be nominated by local Governments with the advice of selection committees (paragraph 8).
- (xvi) Not more than thirty-three per cent. of the vacancies in the provincial services should be filled by promotion (paragraph 9).
- (xvii) It should be a condition of recognition by the Secretary of State that a forest school in Great Britain should provide for adequate courses of instruction for imperial service probationers (paragraph 10).
- (xviii) Imperial officers on joining the service in India should be trained in their own provinces (paragraph 11).
- (xix) Imperial officers should not normally be placed in charge of divisions until after four years' service (paragraph 12).
- (xx) In the provincial services the period of probation should be fixed at two years (paragraph 13).
- (xxi) The normal scale of salaries in the imperial branch should be fixed on the basis of recruitment in India, and the rates of salary for officers recruited in India and in Europe respectively should be as stated (paragraph 14).
- (xxii) The salaries fixed for provincial forest officers should be modified to the extent stated (paragraph 15).
- (xxiii) The cadre of the forest department should be increased (paragraph 16).
- (xxiv) The reserves for leave and training and the decremental rate in the imperial and provincial services should be recalculated and kept up to date (paragraphs 17 and 18).

ANNEXURE VIII.—FOREST DEPARTMENT—(*continued*).

- (xxv) The provincially recruited services should be designated the Madras, Bombay, etc., forest services (paragraph 19).
- (xxvi) In future only officers who, when they enter the department, are paid at the higher rates fixed for officers recruited in Europe, should be subject to the European service leave rules. All other officers in the department should be subject to the Indian service leave rules and should continue under them throughout their careers (paragraph 21).
- (xxvii) Such further facilities should be provided as may be necessary in order to enable forest officers to keep abreast of the latest developments of European practice (paragraph 22).
- (xxviii) Future entrants to the imperial branch should come under the revised general rules for pension and existing members of the imperial branch should be given the option of accepting these rules or of remaining under the special rules now applicable (paragraph 23).

## MINUTE BY THE EARL OF RONALDSHAY.

*Paragraph 4.*—I am in complete agreement with the principle laid down in our report that it is the duty of Government to provide in India itself such educational facilities as will enable Indians to prepare themselves in their own country for the various careers which the different public services afford. I agree, therefore, with the recommendation contained in paragraph 4 of this annexure that steps be taken to establish at Dehra Dun a course of training in forestry up to the highest European standard. At the same time I share the fears expressed by Mr. Sly in paragraph 2 of his minute of dissent, and by Sir Murray Hammick and Sir Valentine Chirol in the body of their note. I agree with Sir Murray Hammick and Sir Valentine Chirol that until it has been possible to test the efficacy of the improved school of forestry which we desire to see established at Dehra Dun, it is premature to come to any decision as to the extent to which direct recruitment to the imperial service can advantageously be made from it; and, in any case, I agree with Mr. Sly, for the reasons set forth in paragraph 2 of his minute of dissent, that until some experience of this new method of recruitment has been gained there is no sufficient justification for the recommendation that a minimum of one half of the annual vacancies should be filled from this source. I am in no way hostile to the scheme recommended in the annexure; but in view of the immense interests involved I would proceed with a greater measure of caution than the majority of my colleagues deem it necessary to display.

RONALDSHAY.

## MINUTE BY SIR MURRAY HAMMICK AND SIR VALENTINE CHIROL.

*Paragraph 4.*—We fully adhere to the recommendations contained in this paragraph that a course of training be established at Dehra Dun up to the highest European standard. The Commission has laid down the principle that facilities must be provided for Indians to acquire in their own country the education requisite to qualify them for the employment in the higher branches of every public service, and those recommendations hold forth the best promise of carrying out this principle in regard to the forest department. Moreover, we consider a great improvement in the training at present available for Indians in India to be essential to the interests of Indian forestry in general as well as to those of the provincial branch of the forests department, if its members are to discharge with assured efficiency the duties which devolve upon them when they are promoted into the upper branch of the service, and we are ready to believe that in the course of time such improvement will justify the further recommendations in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the annexure in regard to recruitment in India for the imperial service. But until the improvement in question has actually taken place and borne fruit, these further recommendations appear to us to be premature and dangerous. We cannot believe that the provision in the Dehra Dun school of forestry of a course of training “up to the highest European standards” can be effected sufficiently quickly to justify, on the mere promise it holds forth for the future, the expectations which these recommendations would raise as to the early recruitment of so large a proportion of Indians to the imperial branch of the service. We are aware that, under these recommendations, their admission would ultimately

depend upon the judgment of a committee appointed to decide in last resort as to the suitability of every individual candidate. But if Indians of a class that has hitherto shown little aptitude or inclination for the life of a forest officer are tempted to Dehra Dun by the prospect of immediate admission to the imperial service, will not such a committee as that proposed be inclined to take a dangerously lenient view of the suitability of the candidates sent up to them from Dehra Dun, or if it feels bound to reject any considerable proportion of them, will it not engender a bitter sense of disappointment which would soon lead to a strong agitation in favour of relaxing the standards originally adapted? The forest department is one in which the slightest sacrifice of efficiency must involve very serious consequences. The Indian forests represent a source of potential national wealth which has hardly yet been tapped. Yet the considerable growth of revenue which they already yield to the state shows what may be confidently expected in the future from their scientific exploitation. The results already achieved are indeed all the more noteworthy when one compares the very limited number of officers employed in the Indian forests department with that of the forestry staff in those European countries, such as Germany and France, where scientific administration has been carried to the highest pitch of development. Forestry demands the highest and most sustained standards of efficiency, and it would therefore, in our opinion, be most unwise to open an altogether new door to recruitment into the imperial branch of the Indian forests department until an improved course of training at Dehra Dun has been established and thoroughly tested. We adhere therefore generally to Mr. Sly's Minute, except as to paragraph 4, and we fully indorse the recommendations he makes for an improvement of the present methods of training; with the proviso that within a reasonable period—say five years—after the establishment at Dehra Dun of such a course of training as is recommended in paragraph 4 of the annexure, the Government of India shall appoint a committee to inquire into the measure of success which may then have been achieved in bringing up Indian forestry training to the highest European standards, and to report accordingly upon the expediency of giving effect to the further recommendations of the annexure in regard to the direct recruitment of Indians passing out from Dehra Dun into the imperial branch of the forest department. In order, however, that in the meantime young Indians may receive the necessary amount of encouragement to seek a higher course of forestry training, we would recommend that students who, having displayed conspicuous aptitude at Dehra Dun, and show special qualifications for forest work when they have passed out into the provincial service, should receive very early promotion into the imperial branch.

To sum up briefly :—

- (i) We agree with the recommendations in the annexure for the immediate establishment at Dehra Dun of a course of forestry training up to the highest European standards ;
- (ii) We dissent from the further recommendations in the annexure as to the direct recruitment, immediately upon the establishment of such a course, of Indians from Dehra Dun into the imperial service ;
- (iii) We recommend that such recruitment should, if possible, take place ultimately, but only after the superior course of training to be established at Dehra Dun has been tested and proved to be fully adequate ;
- (iv) We recommend that until such time recruitment for the imperial service should continue and training be provided on the lines set forth in Mr. Sly's Minute rather than on those laid down in the annexure ;
- (v) In order to encourage young Indians to take up the higher course of forestry training as soon as it is established at Dehra Dun, we recommend that, during the transitional period we contemplate, members of the provincial service who, after having followed the course with distinction at Dehra Dun, show conspicuous promise as forest officers, shall receive the earliest possible promotion into the imperial branch.

MURRAY HAMMICK.  
VALENTINE CHIROL.

MINUTE BY MR. M. B. CHAUBAL.

Paragraph 14. For reasons stated in my general minute of dissent on the question of increases in salaries and improvement of prospects, I do not agree with

## ANNEXURE VIII.—FOREST DEPARTMENT—(continued).

the recommendation to increase the salaries in the administrative posts. Two of the local Governments do not complain about the adequacy of the present salaries. If the additional expense involved in the higher rank is the only justification for increasing them, an increase of Rs. 200 in the case of the inspector-general and of Rs. 150 in the case of the other officers ought to suffice.

M. B. CHAUBAL.

## MINUTE BY MR. F. G. SLY.

*Paragraphs 4 and 5.*—I am unable to accept the recommendations in paragraphs 4 and 5, that, in the first instance, not less than half the recruits to the imperial branch should be appointed in India from students who have passed an advanced course of training at the Dehra Dun institute provided that, in the opinion of an expert committee, duly qualified candidates are available, and that this half should be exceeded if competent candidates can be found; and further, that the whole of the normal requirements of the service should be met from India within a reasonable period of time. At present the imperial branch is wholly recruited in England, but one-fifth of the "major" charges are allocated to selected officers of the provincial service. I agree that it is desirable to make some advance in the employment of Indians in the imperial branch, and preferably by direct recruitment in India, but I cannot support such drastic changes in the proportions as these recommended.

2. Whilst it may be true that no special considerations of policy make it necessary to recruit in England for the forest department, apart from the general proposition that a large reduction of the European element in the public services in India is a political consideration as much as is a reduction in the so-called "security" services, the efficiency of all services, and particularly of a service like the forest department which is brought into close personal relationship with the daily life of the people, has a direct bearing on this aspect of our inquiry. The evidence shows that the forest department is not a popular service with educated Indians. Two Indians only have entered the service in England, and both since the form of entry was changed from open competition to selection, although there has been no limitations on their entry; and this is ascribed to dislike of the conditions of work, which involve a life of isolation, often in unhealthy tracts, combined with hard physical exercise. The provincial service, although its prospects compare not unfavourably with other provincial services, does not attract the same class of candidate with good educational qualifications even with free instruction at Dehra Dun generally combined with scholarships adequate for maintenance during the period of training. Hitherto it has not been found possible to fill all the major charges allotted to that service owing to the lack of qualified officers. The forest department is not, therefore, likely to attract a really good class of Indian candidate, and I regard the proviso that candidates must be passed by an expert committee as an inadequate safeguard that cannot be fully enforced in practice. The suitability of a candidate for a forester's life is a very important factor in his departmental work as well as his technical proficiency. A forester's work in India is necessarily subjected in India to a minimum amount of inspection and supervision, and errors in the treatment of forests may have disastrous effects lasting over generations. So far as can reasonably be foreseen at the present time, the Indian forest service will continue to require a strong European element in order to secure proper management of its valuable property. For these reasons I consider that the advance in the employment of Indians should be much more cautious than that recommended, and that for the present, as an experiment, one-fourth of the direct recruitment should be made in India, which combined with the allocation of 24 major charges to the provincial service, will result in a proportion of one-third Indians in the imperial branch.

3. Further, I do not consider the systems of recruitment and training to be the best that can be devised in the interests of India. There is an overwhelming body of evidence that the officers come out to India at too advanced an age, with the result that they do not settle down readily to the isolated conditions of life and perform the drudgery of learning thoroughly their ordinary duties. The evil will be still greater towards the end of their careers, for full physical vigour is required for the important duties of the higher posts. Again, the present system results in too small a number

of candidates within the approved age-limits to give a good field of selection, and this will be intensified when the normal rate of recruitment is restored. Finally, the course of training requires substantial improvement. It is true that the present system has given during the past few years officers with suitable training, but this is due to the fact that almost without exception they were trained at Oxford university under Sir William Schlich, K.C.I.E., a most distinguished member of the Indian forest service who held for many years the office of inspector-general of forests in India; and this favourable condition cannot continue much longer. Apart from this fortuitous exception, there is no thoroughly equipped university school of forestry in Great Britain that gives the high technical training required for the supervision of the important state forests of India. They are designed more to provide the elementary knowledge of forestry required by British landowners than to give a complete training in scientific forestry. Even the present arrangements at most of the university schools are temporary, advance on the existing lines is hampered for lack of funds, and even if advance occurs it will be on lines suited to the needs of Great Britain and not of India. With the progressive development of the Indian state forests under more intense systems of working, the demand in the future will be for still more highly trained officers. For these reasons, I consider that a higher grade school of forestry, designed to provide a full course of scientific forestry adapted to Indian requirements, should be established at a selected university. Such complete arrangements cannot be expected at a number of universities, and the Secretary of State should select one university for the training of probationers. The schools at other universities cannot really be affected by the small number of appointments in the Indian forest service. The course of studies should include some instruction in science, a full theoretical course of forestry, teaching in special Indian forest subjects, and increased practical training on the continent. At least some members of the teaching staff should have Indian experience. The cost to the Indian revenues need not be much greater than that incurred at present by the appointment of director of Indian forest studies, whose work is much hampered by the diffusion of probationers at different universities and at different stages of instruction. The proposal that ready-trained foresters may ultimately be secured for the Indian service from the British schools of forestry without further probationary training, is, in my opinion, wholly visionary, for the university course will not give sufficient training, whilst the number of passed students is quite inadequate to provide a suitable field of selection, and is not likely to increase largely with the small demand for trained foresters in Great Britain. The scheme, therefore, that I recommend for recruitment and training in England to the Indian forest department is an open competitive examination at the school-leaving age, followed by a three years' course of training at one selected university. This will result in a reduction of at least two years in the age of arrival in India, will give a larger field of selection, will admit of a much improved course of training, and will combine the benefits of university education without the defects of the present method. The advantage in my opinion far outweighs any objection of principle against training under Government supervision and partly at Government expense, which indeed also occurs under the present system.

4. This scheme will also, in my opinion, afford a much better training for the probationers appointed to the service in India than that proposed at the Dehra Dun institute. Even if it be possible to arrange for the high theoretical course at Dehra Dun, which is doubtful, the cost of the additional staff and equipment will be considerable and quite disproportionate to the small number of students, for there is little or no demand in India for highly trained foresters outside the Government service. The practical course, which should be combined throughout with the theoretical, must be inferior at Dehra Dun for another generation at least, until the adjacent forests have been regenerated. The benefits of training in a university atmosphere will be lost. There are also many advantages in training the Indian and European probationers together at the same institution with the same standard. For these reasons I recommend that the direct recruits from India should be trained with the Europeans at a selected university in Great Britain—and not at Dehra Dun.

F. G. SLY.

## ANNEXURE IX.

## Geological Survey of India Department.

(The evidence relating to this department will be found in volume XVIII.)

## CHAPTER I.

## INTRODUCTORY.

1. The geological survey of India is conducted by a small body of twenty-one officers. Their primary object is to make a complete geological map, preferably on a scale of one inch to the mile, of the whole of the Indian empire, including so far as possible the Native States, with a view to the ultimate development of mineral resources. In the course of that work they examine and investigate any mineral deposits and do their best to bring them to the notice of the general public. In this way they are brought into touch with commercial interests, but not more than one-third of their number are allowed to be employed on investigations of this character. The rest are kept strictly to the systematic survey of the country.

## CHAPTER II.

## ORGANISATION.

2. *Constitution of the department.*—There is no division of the existing service into imperial and provincial branches or their equivalents. There is, however, some work of an inferior character, hitherto performed by members of the department, which can be done by a less highly qualified agency, and in recent years two sub-assistants have been appointed for this purpose. They appear to have given satisfaction, and suggestions were made to us for extending their numbers. We have not followed up this proposal in detail as the two officers in question filled subordinate positions outside the scope of our inquiry, but we approve of the idea in principle. If it is found possible to pursue it, and a regular service comes into existence, the department should be divided into class I. and class II. The officers in class I. should then be recruited only for the higher duties, whilst for class II. recruits should be taken who are qualified to do the less important work of the department. The suggestions which we offer in the rest of this annexure relate only to the existing department, or what under the revised scheme would be class I. of the department.

## CHAPTER III.

## METHODS OF RECRUITMENT.

3. *Place of appointment. Creation in India of facilities for technical and scientific training recommended.*—There are no grounds of policy which make it necessary that recruits for this department should be obtained from outside India. In practice it has been found necessary to go to Europe to secure candidates with the necessary qualifications. We are satisfied that in the present condition of geological instruction in India this is, and will for some time be, inevitable, but we think that immediate steps should be taken to emphasise the temporary nature of the arrangement. We accordingly recommend, as a preliminary step, that only if there is no fit statutory native of India available in India should application be made for an officer from Europe. To secure that such shall be forthcoming, and in order to develop the teaching of geology in the interests of the country generally, we recommend the early establishment in India of a school of geology which will rank with similar institutions in Great Britain and give equal opportunities for the scientific study of the subject. Considering the smallness of the existing demand for highly-trained geologists we recognise that it will probably not be suitable to provide facilities simultaneously at all the institutions at which geology is at present taught. But it is desirable that at one centre at least in India advanced study of this subject should be possible, and that that centre should be connected with one or other of the Indian universities. Such a school should also be kept in close touch with the department. Members of the geological survey staff should be seconded to it as instructors, and the students should be attached for practical training in the field to parties of the survey. Pending the development of this scheme, without which it will be difficult to achieve

any satisfactory progress in the employment of statutory natives of India on geological work, we approve the maintenance of the existing practice of giving state scholarships to likely young men to enable them to fit themselves in Europe for the work of the survey. But we feel that this remedy is uncertain in its operation, and should be applied only on the understanding that no scholar has any preferential claim to an appointment in the department.

4. *Limitations in the employment of non-Europeans.*—At present out of the 21 officers in the service, 19 were returned on the 1st April 1913 as Europeans, and two as Hindus,\* whilst from the evidence recorded in November 1913 it would appear that there were 19 Europeans, one Anglo-Indian and one Hindu.† Statutory natives of India have thus as yet scarcely achieved a footing in the department. The suggestions which we have put forward will, in due course, correct this. For the time being we have no recommendation to make under this head beyond that, if a suitable candidate is available in India, he should be selected.

5. *Qualifications of candidates. Procedure to be adopted in selecting recruits.*—At present the department is directly recruited in England on the advice of a selection committee and from candidates possessing technical qualifications. The limit of age is nominally 25 with no minimum, but in actual practice the average works out at something over 26. - A sound geological training is insisted upon in all newcomers, and an endeavour is made to take only men with academic qualifications corresponding with a first class university degree. It is also expected that recruits will have had actual practice as geologists for a year or two before they are appointed. We approve these principles but would fix 30 as the maximum age for appointment. We also think it desirable that when a vacancy occurs or is about to occur in the department it should be advertised in the first instance in the Indian press and in the colleges in India which have a geological course. The director of the geological survey should then scrutinise the applications and after interviewing the likely candidates and making such further inquiries as he may think necessary should report to the Government of India whether there are any fit applicants, and if so, which is the fittest for the appointment. If there is any suitable candidate the Government of India should select him, and only if there is not should they, as already noted, apply for an officer from Europe. The director should also include in his report a statement as to whether any of the sub-assistants of the survey are fitted for promotion, and if they are fitted their claims should also be taken into consideration. In the event of there being no candidate available in India, the present procedure of recruitment in London with the advice of a committee should be maintained. As long notice as possible of likely vacancies should be given by the Government of India, and resort should also be had to advertisement. The selection committee should also be enlarged to consist ordinarily of the director of the geological survey of Great Britain, a member of the geological survey of India who has not left the country for more than five years, another eminent geologist to be nominated by the Secretary of State, a representative of the India Office, and an Indian who is in touch with the Indian student community in the United Kingdom.

## CHAPTER IV.

### SYSTEMS OF PROBATION AND TRAINING.

6. *Probation and training.*—The rules provide for a period of probation extending to two years. This is suitable. Only such recruits are taken as have already had a thorough preliminary training. We have therefore no recommendation to make under this head.

## CHAPTER V.

### CONDITIONS OF SALARY.

7. *Rates of salary.*—An incremental system of salaries is, and should continue to be, in force. The present rates have been framed to secure suitable Europeans from

\* Volume XVIII., Appendix I. (page 235). This appendix also shows one Indian Christian in the enjoyment of a salary of from Rs. 200–300 a month making 22 officers in all. But this post has not come within the scope of our inquiry.

† Volume XVIII., 80457.

## ANNEXURE IX.—GEOLOGICAL SURVEY OF INDIA DEPARTMENT—(continued).

Europe, but have also been enjoyed by statutory natives of India. Eventually the normal requirements of this department will be met from India. This being so, we think it desirable that its standard scale of salaries should be fixed for all future entrants on the basis of recruitment in that country, and that special rates in excess of this scale should be arranged for persons, whether statutory natives of India or not, who may hereafter be recruited in Europe. For recruits from India standard scales of Rs. 300-40-500-50-1,000 a month for assistant superintendents and the chemist, and of Rs. 1,050-60-1,350 a month for superintendents will be sufficient and should be established. For officers appointed in Europe the present scales of salary have proved to be inadequate. The rapid development of the commercial side of geology has raised the market value of geologists, and the department has lost several of its officers in consequence. A suggestion was made to us that the necessary improvement of emoluments might be secured without increased cost to the state by permitting officers to take private practice. For this there are good openings and opportunities are increasing. But any such arrangement might lead to the neglect of the work of the survey. It would also conflict with the interests of government, as private firms would no longer be willing to furnish the department with confidential information, whilst it would expose officers to temptations from which they ought to be protected. This being so, we think that the rule against private practice should be upheld and some increase of pay granted. We recommend accordingly that in future officers appointed in Europe be remunerated in the first instance on a scale of Rs. 450-50-1,200 a month. Subsequently on promotion to the grade of superintendent they should draw Rs. 1,250-70-1,600 a month. For the director of the survey we propose a scale of Rs. 2,000-100-2,500 a month, which should be drawn without distinction by all officers whether recruited in Europe or in India. The existing members of the department should also enjoy the improved scale set out above if considered fit. When the department comes to be officered entirely by persons recruited in India the extra expenditure will amount approximately to Rs. 8,048 a year, as shown in the following table :—

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
		Rs.	Rs. A. P.			Rs.	Rs. A. P.
1	Director - - - -	2,000	2,000 0 0	1	Director - - - -	2,000-100-2,500.	2,333 5 4
	Exchange compensation allowance.	—	125 0 0				
3	Superintendents - - -	1,000-80-1,400.	3,800 0 0	3	Superintendents - - -	1,050-60-1,350.	3,750 0 0
16	Assistant superintendents -	350-30-500-50-1,000.	10,513 10 11	16	Assistant superintendents -	300-40-500-50-1,000.	11,131 2 0
1	Chemist - - - -	500-50-1,000.	861 11 1	1	Chemist - - - -	300-40-500-50-1,000.	756 9 0
21	Total - - - -		17,300 6 0	21	Total - - - -		17,971 0 4
					Deduct present cost - - -		17,300 6 0
					Net extra expenditure per mensem		670 10 4
					" " per annum		8,047 12 0

## CHAPTER VI.

## CONDITIONS OF SERVICE.

8. *Strength of the cadre.*—The strength of the cadre is sufficient for the actual work which is being done. We consider, however, that a case has been made out for its immediate strengthening with a view to seconding for periods, which should ordinarily be not less than five years, officers of experience for instructional work in the school of geology which we have proposed above.

9. *Leave, deputation and training reserves. Annual rate of recruitment.*—Provision has been made in the cadre for a reserve, which appears to suffice for leave and deputation purposes. No reserve is required for purposes of training as officers come fully qualified into the department. The only recommendation,

therefore, which we make is that the reserve should be re-calculated every five years in the light of actual requirements. No annual rate of recruitment is fixed. In so small a service it is not practicable to do more than recruit against actual or probable vacancies.

## CHAPTER VII.

### CONDITIONS OF LEAVE.

10. *Leave rules.*—All the present officers are now under the European service leave rules. They should continue to enjoy this privilege. In the case of future entrants to the service officers who, when they join the department, draw salaries at the higher of the two rates set out in paragraph 7 above should be under the European service rules. Other officers should be under the Indian service rules and should continue under them throughout their careers.

11. *Study leave.*—The existing rules provide that extra furlough may be granted to officers of the geological survey department for the purpose of study, but it does not appear that such leave has ordinarily been taken. We consider it desirable that officers in this department should be encouraged to keep abreast of the most recent developments of geological science. We recommend, therefore, that the present arrangements for the grant of study leave in this department be revised and that such further facilities as may be needed to popularise this form of leave be granted.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### CONDITIONS OF PENSION.

12. *Pension rules.*—At present special rules as to pension apply in this department. For the reasons given in our report all future entrants to the service should come under the revised general rules. The existing officers should be given the option in this matter. The director should be entitled, subject to the general rules on the subject, to a special additional pension. The department is also one, the members of which should be allowed, subject to the usual provisos, to reckon as service qualifying for superannuation pension the number of completed years by which their ages at the time of appointment exceeded 25.

## CHAPTER IX.

### SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS.

13. The changes which we have proposed in the geological survey of India department are as follows :—

- (i) In the event of the creation of a separate service to perform the work of a less important character, the department should be divided into class I. and class II. (paragraph 2).
- (ii) Recruitment should be made in Europe only if the Government of India are satisfied, after advertisement and upon a report from the director on the applications submitted, that no fit statutory native of India can be found in India (paragraphs 3 and 5).
- (iii) A school of geology should be developed in India which will rank with similar institutions in Great Britain. This should be staffed from the department, and its students should work in the field with the departmental survey parties (paragraph 3).
- (iv) The maximum age for appointment to the department should be fixed at 30 years (paragraph 5).
- (v) Opportunities for promotion should be given to qualified sub-assistants (paragraph 5).

ANNEXURE IX.—GEOLOGICAL SURVEY OF INDIA DEPARTMENT—(*continued*).

- (vi) In the case of recruitment from England due notice should be given and the vacancies should be advertised. The selection committee should also be enlarged to consist of five persons, one of whom should be an Indian (paragraph 5).
- (vii) There should be different rates of pay for officers who are recruited in Europe and in India respectively, and the rates fixed for the latter should be treated as the standard rates. The pay proposed for the director should be the same for all officers alike (paragraph 7).
- (viii) Salaries should be paid at the rates stated (paragraph 7).
- (ix) The cadre should be strengthened to allow for seconding officers for instructional work (paragraph 8).
- (x) The reserve of officers should be re-calculated every five years in the light of actual requirements (paragraph 9).
- (xi) In the case of future entrants, officers who when they join the department draw salaries at the higher of the two rates specified should be under European service leave rules; the others should be under Indian service leave rules and should continue under them throughout their careers (paragraph 10).
- (xii) The rules for the grant of study leave should be revised and further facilities offered (paragraph 11).
- (xiii) Future entrants should come under the revised general rules for pension (paragraph 12).
- (xiv) The director's post should carry a special additional pension (paragraph 12).
- (xv) Members of the department, subject to the usual provisos, should be permitted to reckon as service qualifying for superannuation pension the number of completed years by which their ages at the time of appointment exceeded 25 (paragraph 12).

MINUTE BY MR. M. B. CHAUBAL.

*Paragraph 7.* I dissent from the recommendation to make the improved scale for European officers applicable to the existing members of the department. This is not recommended in other similar services.

M. B. CHAUBAL.

## ANNEXURE X.

### Indian and Provincial Civil Services.

*(The evidence relating to these services will be found in volumes II. to XI.)*

#### CHAPTER I.

##### INTRODUCTORY.

1. Throughout the history of the administration of India the Indian civil service has been regarded as the senior of all the services and as the one upon which the responsibility for good government ultimately rests. Its functions are to provide officers to fill those posts of general supervision which are referred to commonly as the superior, or the Indian civil service, posts. On its executive side the service is responsible for the general administration and on its judicial is also concerned with the administration of justice. On the executive side it administers the system of land tenures and the land revenue, and deals with all matters affecting the well-being of the people. It controls the local administration of excise, income tax, stamp-duty, and certain other sources of revenue, and supervises the management of the district treasuries. In the sphere of local self-government it guides and controls the working of the district councils and of municipal bodies. It is responsible for the public peace and the suppression of crime, and exercises general control over the working of the police. It also provides officers to perform the duties of the chief or district magistrates, and to supervise the work of all the other magistrates. The superior posts on this side begin ordinarily with the headships of districts, termed collectorships or deputy commissionerships, or their equivalents, and rise through commissionerships of divisions, memberships of boards of revenue or financial commissionerships and memberships of executive councils to the chief commissionerships and lieutenant-governorships of certain provinces. On the judicial side, the officers filling the lowest superior posts are ordinarily the district and sessions judges, who exercise unlimited original jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases arising within their districts and also large appellate powers. They are further vested with administrative control over the establishments of the local courts presided over by judicial officers recruited in the province. Judicial officers also rise to be judicial commissioners or members of the various high or chief courts. There are also superior posts in the political and other departments, and in the secretariats of the local Governments and of the Government of India, which are filled by officers of the service, and some of them are also nominated to serve on the various legislative councils. The service also carries a reserve of junior officers. These occupy leave and deputation vacancies as they occur in the superior posts, and receive training by performing the duties of the minor charges or, as they are sometimes termed, the inferior posts. The provincial civil services, on the other hand, have been formed to do the bulk of the ordinary executive and judicial work of the districts and to fill the minor charges. On the executive side these include the revenue sub-divisions of the districts, the treasury officerships, and the principal magistracies other than those held by members of the Indian civil service. Numerous officers are also lent to native states or are seconded to manage private estates temporarily under the administration of the courts of ward. On the judicial side officers form courts of first instance, and dispose of the bulk of the civil judicial work of the country, and in certain provinces the senior of them are vested with the same ordinary original civil jurisdiction as are district judges, and also have power to hear appeals from certain courts of inferior jurisdiction. The functions of the two services are thus closely inter-related and should be viewed as a whole. We have, therefore, discussed them in one annexure, but to save confusion have dealt with them in separate parts.

#### PART I.—INDIAN CIVIL SERVICE.

##### CHAPTER II.

##### ORGANISATION.

2. *Classes of officers now holding Indian civil service posts and the enactments of parliament relating to the same.*—The Indian civil service occupies a unique position amongst the services in India in that its constitution is derived from various enactments of the imperial parliament. Strictly speaking, it comprises only that body of civil servants which is recruited in accordance with the provisions of the Government of India act of 1858 (21 & 22 Vict. cap. 106); hitherto by an open competitive

## ANNEXURE X.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—(continued).

examination in London.\* For these officers certain appointments were reserved, principally in the older or so-called regulation provinces, by the Indian civil service act of 1861† (24 & 25 Vict. cap. 54). Subsequently, as the need for more Indians came to be felt, powers were taken under the Government of India act of 1870 (33 Vict. cap. 3) to admit natives of India to Indian civil service posts without compelling them to pass through the door of the open competition in London.‡ This arrangement was supplementary in character, and in no way affected the right of statutory natives of India to appear in London if they chose. In accordance with these provisions rules were drawn up and first took definite shape in 1879. These provided that a proportion not exceeding one-fifth of the total number of civilians appointed by the Secretary of State to the civil service in any one year might be natives of India appointed in India by the Governor General in Council on the nomination of local Governments. By a later resolution of the Government of India it was directed that, generally speaking, these appointments should be confined to young men of good family and social position. Altogether 69 such persons were nominated under the title of statutory civilians. They had not, however, as a body, the requisite educational qualifications. The result was that the system fell into disfavour and was eventually abandoned. Then, as the result of the report of the Public Services Commission of 1886-87, it was decided to rely in the main on the promotion of officers from the provincial civil services to increase the supply of statutory natives of India obtained through the channel of the examination in London. Rules to this effect were promulgated in 1892, and lists of posts, commonly known as listed posts, to which such officers could properly be appointed, were shortly afterwards issued. The rules of 1892 remained in force until 1910, when fresh ones were issued to give effect to the recommendations of the Royal Commission upon Decentralisation, but these were concerned with points of detail and made no change of substance.§ In the areas not affected by the act of 1861, for example, the Punjab, Burma, Assam, and the Central Provinces, military and other officers were also appointed to hold Indian civil service posts, but no fresh recruitment of this nature is now made except to a

\* Section 32 of the act imposed upon the Secretary of State in Council, acting with the advice and assistance of Her Majesty's civil service commissioners in England, the duty of making regulations for "admitting all persons, being natural-born subjects of Her Majesty (and of such age and qualifications as may be prescribed in this behalf), who may be desirous of becoming candidates for appointment to the civil service of India, to be examined as candidates accordingly, and for prescribing the branches of knowledge in which such candidates shall be examined, and generally for regulating and conducting such examinations under the superintendence of the said last-mentioned commissioners. . . ." The section further laid down (1) that the candidates who might be certified by the civil service commissioners to be entitled under such regulation "shall be recommended for appointment according to the order of their proficiency as shown by such examinations"; (2) that "such persons only as shall have been so certified as aforesaid shall be appointed or admitted to the civil service of India by the Secretary of State in Council"; and (3) that all regulations made under the statute "shall be laid before parliament within fourteen days after the making thereof, if parliament be sitting, and if parliament be not sitting, then within fourteen days after the next meeting thereof."

† The so-called regulation provinces are Madras, Bombay, Bengal (which includes the present Bengal, and Bihar and Orissa), and the province of Agra (the old North-West provinces). These were the provinces which were originally governed by regulations made under the charter acts, whereas the subsequently acquired territories, the so-called non-regulation provinces, for example, the Punjab, Oudh, Central Provinces, Assam, and Burma, were administered originally by laws based on executive orders, corresponding to the orders in council made by the Crown for what are called Crown colonies. The appointments actually scheduled in the act of 1861 comprised those of the secretaries, junior secretaries, and under secretaries to the several Governments in India, both in the regulation and in the non-regulation provinces, except those in the military, marine, and public works departments, as well as those of the accountant-general, civil auditor, sub-treasurer, salt agents, controller of salt chowkies, commissioners of customs, salt and opium and opium agents. They also included, but only in the regulation provinces, the offices held by the civil, sessions, additional and assistant judges, the district, joint and assistant magistrates, the members of the boards of revenue and their secretaries, all commissioners and collectors, and such deputy or subordinate collectors as were also joint magistrates.

‡ Section 6 of the act laid down that nothing in any "act of parliament or other law now in force in India shall restrain the authorities in India by whom appointments are or may be made to offices, places, and employments in the civil service of Her Majesty in India from appointing any native of India to any such office, place, or employment, although such native shall not have been admitted to the said civil service of India in manner in section 32 of the act for the Government of India, 21 & 22 Vict. c. 106, provided, but subject to such rules as may be from time to time prescribed by the Governor-General in Council, and sanctioned by the Secretary of State in Council, with the concurrence of a majority of members present." It was further laid down that, "for the purpose of this act, the words 'natives of India' shall include any persons born and domiciled within the dominions of Her Majesty in India of parents habitually resident in India, and not established there for temporary purposes only, and that it shall be lawful for the Governor-General in Council to define and limit from time to time the qualifications of natives of India thus expressed: provided that every resolution made by him for such purpose shall be subject to the sanction of the Secretary of State in Council, and shall not have force until it has been laid for thirty days before both houses of parliament."

§ Vol. I., Appendix XI.

limited extent in Burma. Thus the higher posts in the civil administration of the country are now occupied by four distinct classes of officers. These are—

*first*, members of the Indian civil service, whether British or Indian, who are selected at an open competitive examination in London, in accordance with regulations made by the Secretary of State in Council, with the advice and assistance of His Majesty's civil service commissioners in England, under the provisions of the Government of India act, 1858 (21 & 22 Vict. cap. 106);

*secondly*, statutory civilians, who, at the time of their appointment, were young men of an age similar to that of the Indian civil servants. Such officers were appointed in India, and from amongst statutory natives of India by virtue of the rules promulgated in 1879 under the Government of India act, 1870 (33 Vict. cap. 3);

*thirdly*, listed post officers, who are men of mature years, admitted directly into certain of the superior posts, and not at the foot of the cadre. Such officers are also appointed in India, and from amongst statutory natives of India, and under the same act of 1870, but by virtue of different rules, namely, those of 1892 and 1910; and

*fourthly*, military and other officers, who hold no statutory position, but who have been specially appointed by administrative order in the non-regulation provinces, and at the bottom of their respective cadres to enjoy similar privileges to those conferred on members of the Indian civil service.

Of these four classes the statutory civilians have all but died out, whilst only in Burma are military and other officers any longer appointed.

3. *Recommendations. Legislation required.*—We are satisfied with the arrangement by which the main channel of entry into the civil service posts is by selection in London, and would make this the only channel throughout India proper for persons who are not statutory natives of India. In Burma we would continue to permit the recruitment of military officers to the extent now practised, but there should be no extension of the system, and as the province develops it should be abolished. We are also agreed that the London channel has hitherto not provided a sufficient number of statutory natives of India for the service, and that some supplementary system is required. We also note that the statutory protection afforded to the Indian civil service by the imperial parliament is regarded by the members of that service as of great value, and consider that it should be continued as a safeguard against possible abuses. To this extent we approve of the existing organisation. At the same time the schedule of appointments reserved for members of the Indian civil service under the statute of 1861 is clearly out of date in that it includes appointments which are no longer in existence under the designations given, and excludes others which have been created subsequent to the passing of the act. It is also anomalous that the statute itself should apply only to certain of the major provinces. We also feel that the powers enjoyed under the statute of 1870 to admit natives of India, as defined in the statute, only to certain offices, places and employments in the civil service, as distinguished from the civil service itself, are too restricted. We therefore recommend, first, that with due reservations in favour of existing officers and to meet the special necessities for the time being of Burma, the statute of 1861 be made applicable to the whole of India, and that its schedule be revised to include those appointments which we have recommended should be regarded as Indian civil service posts. We also propose that such further legislation be undertaken as will, without disturbing the existing powers under the statute of 1870, make it possible to admit natives of India, as defined in that statute, to the civil service itself on exactly the same terms as the officers who have hitherto been recruited in London in accordance with the provisions of the statute of 1858. Whether such legislation should take the form of an amendment of the act of 1858 or of 1870 or of a new act is a matter which can best be determined in accordance with legal opinion. Pending such legislation, which may, we recognise, take time, we would establish a mixed commission in each province on the lines which have become familiar in the present non-regulation provinces for civil and military officers; and we would appoint to it all the statutory natives of India, who will eventually be admitted to the civil service itself, under such rules under the statute of 1870 as may be required to give effect to what is wanted. Other officers appointed to fill Indian civil service posts, for example the officers who may be promoted from the provincial civil services, though not admitted to the civil service itself, or to the mixed commissions, should none the less take rank with civil service officers from the date of their appointment, and should be eligible with them for all posts in the civil service cadre on their merits,

## CHAPTER III.

## METHODS OF RECRUITMENT.

4. *Necessity for keeping the opening in London available for all alike.*—We have already indicated that we desire to see no change in the system by which recruitment for Indian civil service posts is made in the main in London. We have also considered whether this door should be left open to all alike. In the course of our inquiry we received a considerable body of European evidence, the purport of which was to show the complications which undoubtedly ensue from utilising a system based on the educational conditions of Great Britain for the purposes of young men educated in India. We also realise how greatly the problem of recruitment could be simplified if only candidates educated in Europe were allowed to compete in England and only those educated in India in that country. At the same time there is behind the present arrangement sixty years of user, and the fact that the great bulk of Indian opinion would regard any deviation from it as inconsistent with the spirit of the undertakings which have been given on this subject. This being so, we are convinced, as were the Public Services Commission of 1886–87, that it would not in present circumstances be practicable, even if it were desirable, to make any change.

5. *Criticisms of the present methods of recruitment. Possibility of a character in addition to an intellectual test.*—We now turn to a detailed examination of the complaints which have been made with regard to the existing method of selection in London through the medium of a competitive examination. These develop two main lines of criticism, sometimes stated separately and sometimes together, but always in essentials distinct. The first is directed to show that the suitability of the recruits to the Indian civil service under the competitive system has of recent years undergone deterioration, and that there has been a larger proportion of actual failures. In this category we include assertions with regard to lack of manners, decline in social status, want of consideration for Indians, and absence of the power of leadership. For this the remedy suggested was the addition of a character to the present purely literary test, either as part of the examination or by resort to some form of nomination. At first sight this idea seems attractive as providing a means for obtaining the right and excluding the wrong kind of recruit; and, from the evidence taken by us in England, it would appear that many of the best minds in the educational world are now being exercised by this problem. There is as yet, however, no unanimity of feeling. One set of witnesses contemplated some sort of preliminary nomination by a board containing a certain number of headmasters, university teachers and Indian civil servants, who would receive the names and records of all would-be candidates, and, after interviewing them, grant certificates, which would entitle those who received them to appear at the examination. The examination would then decide as between the certificate holders. Others aimed at selection after, as distinguished from nomination prior to, the examination. Under such a system the board would examine all the candidates after they had been ranged in order as the result of a competitive examination, and would reject any, within the number required, who appeared unsuitable for service in India. Others again proposed that in addition to the examination account should be taken of the school record of the candidates as is done in the award of the Scottish school-leaving certificates. On the other hand, not a few eminent authorities took the line that, however desirable, it was not practicable to interfere with the competitive system. These included, amongst others, Mr. Stanley Leathes,\* who appeared for the civil service commissioners, and the Master of Balliol,† Mr. Strachan Davidson. Our own conclusion coincides with this attitude. We should welcome any method of allowing directly for something beyond intellectual qualifications, but are satisfied that nothing suitable has as yet been devised, and that the Indian civil service is not one on which experiments should rashly be attempted. Indirectly, even now, the system is not without its guarantees, for as pointed out by one of the Cambridge representatives,‡ the severity of the examination in itself secures the presence of several of the qualities required from the successful candidates. At the same time, a general level of good conduct in all the competitors can be assured if, as we think it important it should be, full advantage is taken of the existing system, by which all have to furnish certificates of character from responsible persons before appearing for the examination. But, apart from this, we are fortified in our conclusion to leave well alone by the feeling, which is borne out by evidence given both in England and in India, that, taken as a whole, the personnel now recruited has not in any way

\* Volume XI., 53571–2.

† Volume XI., 55033.

‡ Volume XI. 55831–5.

deteriorated, and that India has been obtaining men who are keeping up the high level and the best traditions of the service. We recommend, therefore, that the present competitive system be maintained. To meet the cases of the inferior bargains, who must get in under any system, however elaborate, we prefer to rely in the first instance on better training, and in the last resort on the powers now possessed for removing inefficient, after full experience has been gained from actual work in India.

6. *Medical examination.*—Specific allegations were also made to us of a decline in physique. At present the conduct of the medical examination, in the case of the Indian civil service, is entrusted to one medical practitioner, who has had no Indian experience. This gentleman is responsible only to the civil service commissioners, and his responsibility, like that of the civil service commissioners, ceases after the recruits have been finally passed. Thereafter, as when they come to England on medical certificate, Indian civil servants are dealt with by the medical board of the India Office. In the case of all the other civil services in India the responsibility rests from the start to the finish of an officer's career with this latter body. This state of affairs has arisen out of the provisions of the statute of 1858 (21 & 22 Vict. cap. 106), which throw upon the civil service commissioners, and not on the India Office, the duty of certifying who are fit persons to be admitted to the Indian civil service.\* It also appears that there is no common standard by which the civil service commissioners and the medical board of the India Office are guided, and that the requirements of the former in the matter of eyesight are less exacting.† We are satisfied that the examination, as now conducted, is conscientiously made. At the same time we hold that two examiners are better than one, and that Indian experience is of importance and should receive representation. We also think it desirable that the standards of the medical board of the India Office and of the civil service commissioners should be co-ordinated, and that each should perform its duties in touch with the other. This could be arranged without any amendment of the provisions of the statute of 1858 if the civil service commissioners were prepared to appoint to their board one of the members of the India Office board, or such other officer with Indian experience, as was or had been in touch with that board. It also seems to us desirable that some regular procedure should be adopted by which the India Office would keep the civil service commissioners informed of any breakdown in health of Indian civil servants, due to faulty constitutions. We also consider that there should be two medical examinations, one at the commencement of the period of probation, and the other after its completion, and that any candidate, who was rejected, should have the right of appeal. We also advise that a pamphlet on personal hygiene in the tropics be compiled and placed in the hands of the probationers. For the rest, reliance should be placed rather on the rules in force for retiring, on medical certificate, those who are proved by experience of their health in India to be unfit, than on any attempt to set a standard before they go out, which might come to be based on conjecture and the personal equation of the actual examiners.

7. *Age for arrival in India.*—We turn now to the second of the main lines of criticism, which accepts the competitive principle as the only practicable guide, but finds fault with the age at which the successful candidates come to India, the way in which their period of probation is spent, and the form of examination prescribed for their admission. At present the open competitive examination is held at from 22 to 24. This relatively late age was fixed partly as being more convenient for statutory natives of India, who desired to compete in London, and partly because it was felt that being entrusted with wide powers soon after his arrival in India the Indian civil servant should possess a certain maturity of judgment. Between the years 1878 and 1891, when the age limits for the competitive examination in London were 17–19, 2·5 per cent. of the places offered were secured by Indian candidates. This figure rose to 5·6 per cent. between 1892 and 1912, when the age limits were 21–23 or 22–24,‡ though how far this increase is to be ascribed to the change in the age limits and how far to other causes it is not easy to determine. However this may be, the higher age limit is generally regarded in India as favourable to the chances of Indian candidates and is convenient to the schools and universities, as it interposes nothing to disturb the career of the sort of boy who wins scholarships and the recognised university distinctions; and the bulk of the headmasters and representatives of the universities who furnished us with their opinions desired no change in this respect. There is, however, an aspect of the problem which is not very prominent in the minds of British educationalists. This is the administrative aspect

\* Volume XI., 53605, 53608.

† Volume XI., 53163, 53609, 53610.

‡ Volume XI., Appendix IV

## ANNEXURE X.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—(continued).

in India. From this point of view the present arrangement, coupled as it now is with a period of one year's probation, is faulty in that it brings men out to India as late as 25. A man of this age must ordinarily have his tastes, aptitudes and outlook more or less fixed, and to this extent may be expected to be less easy to train in the detailed drudgery of administrative work. His early ideas have also been cast in a mould which is in no way Indian. Apart, however, from any such general considerations it is obvious that such an officer is more likely to be married, or to get married, than if he comes out, say, three years younger. The result, when this takes place, is sometimes a loss of efficiency to the administration, which is increased when the officer himself, as frequently happens, comes to be involved thereby in financial embarrassments. Again, it is important, if the Indian civil service is to be kept efficient, that an officer should attain a position of responsibility at a comparatively early age; for example, that he should be acting as a collector by the time he has reached the age of 30. Under the present system the service is recruited with a view to bringing recruits to this stage at the end of about eight years, with the result that not until 33 can an officer hope to be in any way independent, whilst any retardation in the flow of promotion, such as is now being experienced in several provinces, causes delay until even 35 or more is reached. Nor is it possible to reduce this period of waiting. On general administrative grounds at least this number of years' training is necessary, whatever be the age of arrival in India, and even if this were not the case there are technical reasons of a practical character why anything less should not be countenanced. For example, if the period were reduced to five years, the figure proposed by certain witnesses, in order to get officers, who come out at 25, into posts of real responsibility by the time they are 30, the number of junior officers in training appointments, which now stands at 656, would have to be reduced by 193 to 463, and this element in the administration would undesirably be weakened. Finally the present age is likely to produce difficulties, which are only now being foreshadowed, in the matter of retirement. The rules as to superannuation in the Indian civil service are different from those in force in the other services. An Indian civil servant is not liable to retirement at the age of 55, but is entitled to serve for 35 years, and in certain specially important appointments for even longer. It follows that with men coming out as now at 25 retirement will not ordinarily be compulsory before 60, and it will become necessary, either to disturb violently the ordinary course of promotion, or to allow the prizes of the profession to fall to men of about 57 or 58 years of age, who will not complete their terms of office until they are 62 or 63, by which time they can hardly be expected, in ordinary cases, to have retained their full vigour. We, therefore, consider that the age for arrival in India should be reduced to something as near 22 or 23 as is practically possible. This is in effect what was originally provided for in the earlier years of the controversy, before the difficulty of adapting the examination to the prevailing educational courses had come to be an important factor in the situation. This is also the age which was recommended to us by the experienced authorities whom we consulted on the subject\* as being, on medical grounds, the most suitable.

8. *Length of probationary course. Three years recommended.*—The present limits of 22–24 are also faulty in that they permit of only a single year's probation. By almost universal consent this has proved a failure. It has been too long for a holiday and not long enough to secure that officers will go out trained in the law which they will be called on to administer, in the languages which they will be called on to talk and in the history and habits of the people whom they will be called on to govern. This was recognised by the Government of India in 1907, when they brought to notice in particular the serious want of legal knowledge displayed by the Indian civil servants who had come out after only one year's probation.† The remedy

\* Volume XI., 53169–72, 53227, 53230, 53253.

† In paragraph 4 of their despatch No. 16, dated 4th July 1907, the Government of India wrote as follows :—

“The necessity for some improvement is abundantly borne out by the replies of the local Governments and has been illustrated by the course of recent events in more than one province; but before formulating our proposals it seems expedient that we should demonstrate in some detail the gravity of the present situation. We would preface our remarks by pointing out that in every branch of the duties on which an Indian civilian is employed a knowledge of law is necessary. Law is the basis of our whole system of administration. Not only as a magistrate or as a judge, but also as a revenue officer, the civilian deals with a system of codified law, he must be acquainted with the procedure of civil justice, and must be prepared to meet the questions raised by skilled legal practitioners. As an executive officer, he must be able to apply enactments to facts, must be expert in the law of contracts, must be competent to conduct executive investigations in accordance with legal methods, and not infrequently he requires sufficient legal skill to draft rules that will have the force of law. Not only his conclusions, but the methods and procedure by which he arrives at

(continued)

they proposed was the extension of the probationary period to two years. We think, however, that in view of what is required of an officer of the premier service under modern conditions nothing short of a three years' course is likely to be effective. This has the additional advantage that it would enable the probationers not only to be called to the bar but also to qualify for a university degree.

9. *Age limit of 17-19 recommended for the examination in London.*—It follows that we would put the open competitive examination at the school-leaving age. We would place this at from 17 to 19, but would date the calculation from the 1st January preceding the examination, so that the actual ages of candidates at the time of the test would run from 17½ to 19½. In this way they would be nearly 22 or 23 by the time they got to India. Failing this, as argued by the Oxford representatives,† the only alternative is the existing system. The intermediate ages of 18-20, 19-21, 20-22, or 21-23, in one form or another, either cut across the ordinary educational courses of the country or unduly limit the period of probation, or do both.

10. *Groups of options for the examination in London suggested.*—We now turn to the safeguards which we think to be necessary if the scheme which we have put forward is to be preserved from the difficulties which beset the similar arrangement in force between 1878 and 1891. These, in so far as the universities are concerned, will be provided by the extension of the probationary period, which will enable probationers to receive a liberal in place of a highly specialised education, and to be welded into the corporate life of the universities, in which their probationary period will be spent. There remain the dangers to the schools, previously incurred in connection with the so-called "cramming" establishments, or special training establishments, as we should prefer to term them. At the actual teaching, imparted or impartible at such places of education, we do not wish to cavil. It must have been good between 1878 and 1891 or it would not have been uniformly so successful, and there are obvious advantages in having recruits for the public service taught to work hard, and to concentrate their energies. At the same time, as pointed out by Mr. Stanley Leathes§ on behalf of the civil service commissioners, it is clearly undesirable to allow the Indian civil service examination to be divorced again from the ordinary educational curricula. With this in view we would make the examination for the Indian civil service in London one in which there were options classified into groups according to their affinities, and we would confine the candidate's liberty of choice to a single group. Inside the group the papers set would be based on the model of those in force for the various scholarship and bursary examinations in the universities: In this way the boys who had

† continued.

them are open to the light of criticism and must be legally valid. Most important of all, he must know the legal limitations of the extensive powers that are entrusted to him. From the very commencement of his career in India, the young civilian is in part a lawyer and in part a judge. If, however, we contrast the circumstances of the present day with those of a generation back, the considerations at once suggest themselves that the law which the modern civilian is called upon to administer is far more complicated, while the legal profession has vastly increased in numbers, and has attained to a far higher standard of training. At the same time the knowledge of law possessed by the natives of India generally, and their disposition to appeal to the courts wherever possible, has gone through a remarkable development. The question, therefore, naturally presents itself—What legal training has the civilian of the present day for the important duties which devolve upon him? The answer, we fear, is somewhat as follows: He has read in England the Indian penal code, the code of criminal procedure, and the evidence act. That may be the sum total of his legal knowledge. He need have learned nothing of the underlying principles of law. He has not even seen the inside of a court. When he arrives in India he is subjected to a desultory and unscientific form of training which consists of learning by heart more codes, and of doing a little practical work. He then takes his seat on the bench, where he has to cope with lawyers highly trained in law and endowed by nature with subtlety and ingenuity to an uncommon degree. The natural result follows. Some time or other he has to deal with a case presenting more than usual difficulty, in which a subtle lawyer is engaged. Conscious of his ignorance, he becomes flurried and makes errors of all kinds. Then he is pilloried in the press, which, in this country, is controlled by the legal profession to an extent scarcely paralleled elsewhere, and thus English justice is brought into contempt. We do not think that this picture is overdrawn. It is most frequently in criminal matters that the native newspapers attack our administration of justice, and that errors and irregularities become the subject of public criticism. It is in such cases in all countries that miscarriage of justice attracts most attention, but in civil and revenue cases affecting private rights it can scarcely be doubted that similar errors occur, and the departmental proceedings which come before us frequently disclose a surprising ignorance of elementary legal principles on the part of the officers concerned. It is unnecessary for us to elaborate the subject further. We have said enough to demonstrate the truth of our contention that there is urgent necessity for improvement and that unless some remedy can be found the influence and reputation of the service and of the Government itself are bound to suffer."

## ANNEXURE X.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—(continued).

been reading classics at school would take the classical; the mathematical and scientific boys a mathematical and scientific; and the modern language boys a modern language group of subjects; whilst all would have to appear in English, and be allowed to offer one of several voluntary subjects outside his group, for example, French, German, Italian, Spanish, Latin, Greek, mathematics, physics, or chemistry. We would also have all the candidates, who had done best, subjected to an oral examination. Such a scheme would avoid interference with the ordinary school courses and discourage special preparation, and be as little open to objection as the scholarship and bursary examinations now are. It would combine width and specialisation, would avoid the evil of an excessive number of options, and could be adjusted naturally to the existing curricula of the schools. All that would be needed would be to adjust the grouping and the marking so as to be as fair as possible to all alike. The civil service commissioners,\* whom we consulted, saw no difficulty in such an arrangement, and we would leave the amplification of the details to their skilled experience. To indicate, however, the sort of scheme which we have in mind we have included in schedule I. to this annexure draft regulations which we think will form a useful basis for subsequent discussion.

11. *Candidates to furnish certificates of attendance at a regular school course.*

—We also consider that before a candidate is admitted to the examination he should as a general rule be compelled to furnish a certificate from the headmaster of a secondary school, recognised by the civil service commissioners, that he had attended a school course for a continuous period of three years up to a time within six months of the examination itself, or if he had left school prior to this and gone to a university, that he had had the regular school course, followed by a course at a university extending over an academic year. This is, we recognise, something of an innovation, but the step is called for, and if it is sanctioned before capital has been sunk in opening or adapting special training establishments to the new needs, there will be no hardship to vested interests. In this connection we wish to make it clear that we do not contemplate that the recognition of schools will be made to depend in any way on their social status. We desire to throw the net of the Indian civil service wide, and merely to ensure that a regular school course on accepted lines has been followed. To meet the cases of candidates coming from India or the colonies or other exceptional circumstances we would leave a discretionary power in the hands of the civil service commissioners to dispense with the production of any certificate.

12. *Position of the Scottish schools.*—There remain the fears of the Scottish schools, as to which we have received much evidence. Formerly when the age limits were 17-19, "the Scotch system of secondary education was," to quote the words of Professor Irvine,† of Aberdeen university, "entirely unorganised; in fact, the universities in Scotland then did the work now done by the secondary schools. Clever boys came up to the universities in Scotland in those years when they were about 15 or 16 years of age." They then completed their training and passed well at the examination. Now the secondary schools have begun to perform their proper functions and to keep their boys more and more up to the age which is customary in England. But they are not yet, it was asserted,‡ in a position to hold their own with the English public schools, and there was believed to be a danger that Scottish boys would thereby be excluded. This is, no doubt, at the root of the general feeling in school and university circles in Scotland against the lowering of the age for the examination. We do not wish to question the sincerity of these apprehensions, and we realise the anxieties which must be in the minds of Scottish educationalists during what is obviously a period of transition in their educational history, but we are not satisfied that they are well grounded. It was admitted that certain specified schools undoubtedly could hold their own with their English rivals even now, whilst as regards others it was said by some that they feared competition only in classics, but claimed superiority in mathematics.§ If this is the case, the difficulty would be met under the system of options for the examination, explained above. On general grounds also the study of the literature of the last sixty years on this controversy of the age-limits has led us to trust more to the experience than to the anticipation of difficulties. Each change in the arrangements has been the source of numerous forebodings. Even that to the present high age limits in 1892 met with opposition from educationalists.

\* Volume XI., 53557-65.

† Volume XI., 54145.  
§ Volume XI., 53365.

‡ Volume XI., 54151.

13. *Desirability of providing special channels for the recruitment of statutory natives of India. State scholarships.*—We now turn to a consideration of the best method of supplementing the supply of statutory natives of India obtained through the open competition in London. Those who desire to obtain the supplementary material in Europe have, as a general rule, pinned their faith on some system of state scholarships which would enable Indian students to compete at the examination in London. Such a proposal is at first sight attractive, in that it appears to meet the objection taken to the present system that Indians are placed under a disadvantage as compared with Europeans owing to the expense in which they are involved in going to England to prepare and sit for the open examination in London. The system is, however, open to the general objections taken in our report that it gives rise to false hopes in the persons selected and that state money should not be spent on individuals. It is also vitiated on two special grounds, first, that it will fail to secure for certain that the state scholars will be successful, and secondly, that it will only shift the existing controversy on to the point as to how the state scholars shall themselves be selected. Moreover, the difficulties which would beset the working out of any practicable scheme to fit in with the proposal made for recruitment in London at the school-leaving age appear to be insuperable. The only scholarships which would materially assist Indian candidates in these circumstances would be such as were given to boys of thirteen or fourteen years of age to enable them to proceed to approved public schools in England. We fully realise that the character of a young Englishman is profoundly moulded by his life at a public school, and that young Indians might be found who would be benefited by similar influences, but it would be extremely difficult to select Indian boys at thirteen or fourteen with any feeling of security that they had, or would maintain, the necessary qualifications; whilst it seems doubtful if any appreciable number of Indian parents would be willing to part with their children at so early an age, and still more doubtful whether it would be well for them to do so if they would. In any case, the matter is one which should be left to their initiative. We cannot, therefore, recommend that the Government should adopt this solution.

14. *Recruitment from the bar.*—By far the greater number of witnesses have preferred to look to action in India for the necessary additional supply, and of the soundness of this we have no doubt. One of the methods suggested to us was to exclude from the Indian civil service cadre all the superior judicial appointments and to recruit for them separately from the bar. But this was an extreme position. The more moderate advocates of such a solution were satisfied with a superior judiciary, of which one-third would be manned by practising lawyers. Such an arrangement would have the merit of simplicity. It would also accord with English practice, be economical in that the lawyer would have paid for his own training, and would give satisfaction to a class which is growing in number and importance in the country. On the other hand, the course of our inquiry made it obvious that no such development, taken as the sole measure of relief, would be generally acceptable. Nor could we advise any solution to the recruitment problem which might be open to the construction that statutory natives of India were fit only for judicial work. We are satisfied indeed that more Indians can profitably be employed in the executive as well as in the judicial branch of the service. We, therefore, prefer a solution applicable to both branches and would not separate into racial channels the present method of joint recruitment. At the same time we think that, in view of the ability, attainments and influence of the legal profession in India, the administration would benefit from some bar appointments. In theory this is no new step, as the Public Services Commission of 1886-87 contemplated that one-quarter of the listed posts would be filled by statutory natives of India, who were not members of the provincial civil services, but in practice hardly any such appointments have been made. This was due partly to the permissive character of the arrangement, and partly to the way in which the posts were mixed up with the provincial civil service appointments generally. We would avoid any such danger in future by reserving certain specific judgeships. To begin with forty posts of district (divisional) and sessions judge should be set aside for this purpose, and these should be filled up from the bar, in accordance with rules to be framed under the statute of 1870, so soon as the present vested interests in them have been met. Such an arrangement would concede an important

## ANNEXURE X.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—(continued).

principle, and afford valuable experience of the possibilities of this method of recruitment.

15. *Selection from the provincial civil services.*—Another suggestion made to us was to extend the present system of selecting tried officers of the provincial civil services. Against this it was urged that the officers so selected enjoyed only an inferior status, and that they were promoted towards the end of their careers, when ordinarily they had only a short while to serve before they reached the prescribed time for their retirement. The effect of this was to allow a succession of statutory natives of India to become collectors or district and sessions judges, but to shut them out practically from any chance of rising to the higher judicial and administrative posts. It was also pointed out that it would be difficult to list more posts before the expiry of at least eight years owing to the vested interests of the junior Indian civil servants who had been recruited against them. We think that these considerations are conclusive against making promotion from the provincial civil services the sole or even the principal method of recruitment in India for statutory natives of India. At the same time the system has the undoubted advantage that it can be utilised to provide prizes towards the end of their careers for such members of the provincial civil services as may distinguish themselves. We would, therefore, maintain it to the extent needed to meet the expectations held out at the time that these services were formed, and would set aside 41 appointments with this object, to be filled in accordance with rules to be framed, as now, under the statute of 1870.

16. *Simultaneous examinations.*—It was also suggested to us, though almost exclusively by the Indian witnesses, that there should be simultaneous examinations in England and India, conducted in both cases by the civil service commissioners and with the same papers and a common list embodying the results. Few, however, pushed this suggestion to its logical conclusion. Some, for example, expressly proposed a British minimum from the outset, whilst many, who saw no necessity for imposing a minimum at the present juncture, admitted that a time might come when such would have to be established. In this uncertainty, quite apart from the practical difficulties which must surround any simultaneous system in totally different longitudes and in separate continents, will be found the main reason for rejecting this precise solution of the problem. For such an arrangement must either be accompanied by a fixed proportion between Indians and Europeans, or it must not; and in either case the results will be equally open to objection. In the former, the fundamental anomaly will be introduced, by which men, who pass lower in the examination, will be preferred on racial grounds to those who have passed higher. In the latter, the maintenance of the British character of the administration will be made to depend on the chances of an examination, for it will never be practicable to start with no restrictions against statutory natives of India, and to impose them later when the educational advance of the country has produced its inevitable result. Again it is more than doubtful whether any system of simultaneous examinations would be good for Indian education. If there was one proposition pressed upon us more than another by the educational witnesses in England, it was that an external competitive examination, if it is not to do injury, must be closely adjusted to the subjects which are actually being learned by the candidates in the normal course of their educational life. Now at the present moment there is a wide and a very natural divergence between the courses pursued at the Indian and at the British schools and universities. It is not so much that the same subjects are not studied, but their combinations are different, and the weight attached to the various educational factors are distinct. Moreover, the possible lines of separate development, particularly in the region of the vernacular languages and of applied economics, are almost limitless. All these considerations convince us that the introduction into India of an examination fashioned on English lines for the purpose of bringing clever Indians into the Indian civil service is to be deprecated.

17. *Possibility of meeting the Indian demand for simultaneous examinations by direct recruitment to the Indian civil service in India as well as in England.*—It does not follow, however, that because we reject the solution of simultaneous examinations, we do not appreciate the spirit which underlies the loud and persistent demand for its acceptance. As we read the situation the advocates of this system are looking not so much to the means as to an end. What is really wanted is not a particular form of

competition, but a method by which, first, more Indians will be secured, and secondly, their admission will be on equal terms as to conditions of service and prospects with those enjoyed by Indian civil servants. It is in the gratification of this deep-rooted sentiment that we see the possibility of harmonising the two apparently conflicting lines of thought on this much vexed question. Hitherto negotiations have failed because it has been supposed that the only way into the Indian civil service must be through a single and identical examination, whether held in one centre or in two, and that, failing this, the best that could be offered was a side entrance into specific posts and appointments as distinguished from the service itself. With this we do not concur. The solution we offer is to have two separate channels of access to the Indian civil service itself; one in London, which should be open to all alike without racial distinction, and one in India open to statutory natives of India only. In this way we would endeavour to secure the ripest products of the educational systems of the two countries, and would fuse them together during the three years' probationary period in England. Finally, in order to insure a complete sense of equality as between the two sets of officers, we recommend that seniority in the service be decided, not by the combined marks of the open and final competitions as hitherto, but by those obtained in the intermediate and final examinations of the probationary course, in which, under the scheme which we shall explain later, both will have to appear.

18. *Nine direct appointments to the Indian civil service to be recruited for annually in India.*—The next question which presents itself is the number of appointments which can safely be allotted at the present juncture to this class of recruit. At the time when the statutory civilians were first appointed in 1879, it was laid down that a proportion not exceeding one-fifth of the total number of civilians appointed by the Secretary of State to the Indian civil service in any one year might be natives of India within the meaning of the statute of 1870. This was equivalent to allowing direct recruitment in India up to a maximum of one-sixth of the total annual recruitment. In practice, however, the full number permissible was not originally selected, and the disproportion has increased in subsequent years, as the process of throwing open posts to persons who are not members of the Indian civil service has not kept pace with the growth of the cadre of that service. This discrepancy was also intensified by the action taken to give effect to the recommendations of the Public Services Commission of 1886-87. It was then decided to amalgamate the posts on the executive side subordinate to the headship of a district, to which persons who were not members of the Indian civil service might suitably be appointed, with the posts in the provincial civil service cadres. These amounted in 1892, when the step was sanctioned, to 40 out of a total of 93 for all the provinces exclusive of Burma or Assam, where no action was then taken. This left only 53 appointments whose identity could be distinguished to be filled from outside sources. This decision followed naturally from the adoption of the system, first introduced as the result of the Public Services Commission's report of 1886-87, of admitting officers directly into a fixed number of the superior posts, and thus foregoing the necessity for a reserve of junior officers against them. It has, however, somewhat obscured the calculations and has been a fruitful source of misunderstanding. Subsequent changes in the number of posts thrown open had resulted at the time of our inquiry in establishing a total of 61 superior appointments for all the provinces out of 755, which is less than one-twelfth, or including the inferior appointments, of which the identity could be traced, of 75 out of a total service of 1,411 officers, which is approximately one-nineteenth. From this calculation the number of statutory natives of India who have been successful in the open competitive examination in London has been excluded. We are satisfied that, in fixing what proportion of the service should be regarded in future as the minimum for statutory natives of India, the calculation should be made on the basis of the superior posts, to fill which the Indian civil service exists. We also feel that, though weight should be given to the fact that in 1879 it was hoped that it would be possible to work up to one-sixth, the true comparison is with what has actually been achieved in this respect. Taking this into consideration we are of opinion that, all told, provision should be made for a minimum of 25 per cent. of statutory natives of India in the superior posts. At present, as already noted, there are 755 of these counting all the appointments under the Government of India and those for deputation purposes. One-quarter of this is 189. But we have already set aside 81 appointments to be filled by promotion from

## ANNEXURE X.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—(continued).

the provincial civil services and from the bar. This leaves 108 for directly recruited officers. On the basis of the existing calculations this will allow of a recruitment of nine officers a year. We recommend that provision be made obligatory for this number over and above the number successful at the examination in London, and that the figure be revised every five years in the light of the strength of the service for the time being and of the general working of the arrangement. We exclude the Indians successful at the examination in London from this calculation in view of the probability that the lower age limits and the opening of a door for recruitment in India, which we have proposed, will tell against such candidates.

19. *Principles on which direct appointments should be allotted in India. Competitive examination recommended subject to certain safeguards and reservations.*—It remains to decide the principles on which these nine places shall be allotted. With the possibilities of superimposing a character on a purely intellectual test, either as part of an examination or by resort to some form of nomination, we have already dealt in general terms, in discussing the question of recruitment in London. The same considerations apply in India. There, however, the arguments against a purely competitive test, used by certain educationalists in England, gain added force from the communal and religious differences which prevail in the country. No system of pure competition, it was freely urged before us, could ensure a fair representation of classes and communities, whilst, without such representation, the Government would necessarily suffer in efficiency and public confidence. In particular, it was asserted, a competitive examination would tend to favour the Hindu as against the Muhammadan, the south and east of India as against the north and west, and the Brahmin as against the non-Brahmin candidate. On the other hand entrance to the Indian civil service in particular has always been by means of such an examination for Europeans and Indians alike, and this method has been recognised as suitable by statute and is hallowed by tradition. To adopt any other system for Indians, whilst retaining it for Europeans, would, therefore, run counter to a sentiment deep rooted in the minds of the Indian educated classes. In their eyes any such discrimination would result in a distinction in one and the same service between those recruited by the different methods; and to the disadvantage of Indians. This feeling would also be accentuated by the dislike which they feel for any form of unrestricted nomination for the public services, a matter which we have discussed as a general question in our report. Taking all this into consideration, and having weighed the advantages and disadvantages of the possible alternatives, we are of opinion that, subject to certain safeguards and reservations, the balance lies in admitting the principle of open competition.

20. *Safeguards and reservations.*—These safeguards and reservations are two in number. First, two candidates should be nominated each year by the Secretary of State, on the advice of the Government of India, from amongst graduates of the various universities, and of an age similar to that of the competitors at the examination. Such nominees, who should be termed "King Emperor's cadets," should rank as probationers below the other successful candidates of their year, pending the result of the final examination. Otherwise, they should be on an equal footing in all respects. This would make it possible to give representation to young men of good family, who had shown literary attainments of a high order, but who were not intellectually quite in the front rank. Members of the domiciled community and Burmans might also benefit under this provision. Secondly, in order to avoid the inconvenience of an unduly large number of candidates appearing for the examination, a committee should be appointed for the area served by each university, whose duty it should be to scrutinise the educational record of the would be candidates, and after taking into account their suitability for Government service from the point of view of physique and character, to advise the local Government as to who should be allowed to sit for the examination up to the number authorised for each area. For the present it will suffice if twenty places are allotted to each of the five existing universities so as to give an equal chance to the young men in each area, but this number should be revised from time to time in the light of experience, and should be expanded in any case to meet the claims of new universities as they are created. The committee itself should be made up so far as may be of persons in touch with educational interests, and should consist of the vice-chancellor of the university concerned, the director of public instruction of the province chiefly interested, and three other members to be nominated by the syndicate of the university whose area is in question. Should it be found that the candidates successful at the examination are coming too markedly from one particular area we

## ANNEXURE X.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—(continued).

think that the best remedy will be to hold the examination by groups of areas in rotation. But we deprecate any such arrangement unless experience shows that it is absolutely necessary. Subject to these qualifications the examination should be conducted by the civil service commissioners, who, after consultation with the educational authorities in India, should devise a scheme, having the same relation to the Indian educational courses, as the examination in England will, under our scheme, bear to the education given in the British secondary schools. To give effect to these recommendations we recognise that it will be necessary to amend the statute of 1858, and we advise that legislation be undertaken accordingly. Should there be any difficulty in arranging for this at once, we suggest, as already explained, that a mixed commission be formed as a temporary measure in each province, and that the candidates selected in India in accordance with the foregoing scheme be appointed to it by virtue of rules to be framed with this object under the statute of 1870.

21. *Age limits for the examination in India.*—We have also considered the question of age limits for the examination in India. The natural course would be to fix 17 to 19 as in England. It is, however, of the first importance that examinations should be held only after the conclusion of a definite stage in the normal course of educational life, and the Indian and English stages do not at present coincide. The Indian student at present matriculates at about 16, takes his intermediate examination at about 18, and his B.A. degree ordinarily at any time between 20 and 22. But the intermediate examination does not mark a real stage. This is reached with the B.A. degree. This has a recognised value all over India, and to insist upon it is to obtain men who have passed through a good intellectual sieve. We recommend therefore that candidates in India be required to possess the B.A. degree, or its equivalent, and to be over 20 and under 22 years of age at the time of the examination. It is true that this will make a difference of  $2\frac{1}{2}$  years on the average between the ages of the men selected in England and in India, but the advantages enjoyed by the latter in this respect, during their probationary period in England, will be counterbalanced by the fact that they will be in strange surroundings and a new intellectual atmosphere.

22. *Distribution of the posts reserved for officers promoted from the provincial civil services or appointed from the bar.*—It remains to explain in further detail our proposals with regard to the 81 Indian civil service posts which we have set aside to be filled by members of the provincial civil services and the bar. At present there is much disparity of practice in their allotment as between the various provinces. In Bombay, for example, out of 84 superior posts only six have been thrown open, whilst in the Punjab and the Central Provinces and Berar the figures are twelve out of 78 and six out of 51. This is unsatisfactory and, as soon as vested interests have been satisfied, a more even distribution should be secured in the manner shown in the following table :—

Presidency or Province.	Present number of Indian civil service posts to which persons who are not members of the Indian civil service may be appointed.	Proposed number of Indian civil service posts to which persons who are not members of the Indian civil service should be appointed.	To be held by members of the provincial civil services.			To be held by members of the bar.
			In the executive line.	In the judicial line.	Total.	
Madras - - -	8	11	2	3	5	6
Bombay - - -	6	11	2	3	5	6
Bengal - - -	9	12	2	4*	6	6
United Provinces -	10	12	2	4	6	6
Punjab - - -	12	11	2	3	5	6
Burma - - -	5	9	2	3	5	4
Bihar and Orissa -	5	8	1	3	4	4
Central Provinces and Berar.	6	6	1	3	4	2
Assam - - -	—	1	1	—	1	—
Total - -	61	81	15	26	41	40

\* Includes one appointment for Assam.

23. *Procedure to be followed in throwing open Indian civil service posts to persons who are not members of that service.*—There are also certain discrepancies of practice with regard to the issue of the notifications of the civil service appointments which may be filled by persons who are not members of the Indian civil service itself. In some provinces only those posts are notified which are included in the schedule of the statute of 1861, which, as already noted, is now out of date. In others it is customary to declare

## ANNEXURE X.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—(continued).

as well such appointments as have been classed for cadre purposes as superior. So soon as our proposal to amend the schedule of the statute of 1861 so as to make it correspond with the list of Indian civil service posts classed for cadre purposes as superior has been carried out this difficulty will disappear, as will also the need for notifying the eight inferior posts,\* contained in the present schedule of the statute, which have retained their identity and have not been merged in the provincial civil service cadres. Pending such legislation, however, we advise that all superior posts, which would otherwise be filled by Indian civil service officers, be notified, so as to leave no doubt as to the openings which have actually been created. Pending legislation also the eight inferior posts, already referred to, should continue to be notified. The practice of notifying inferior posts, which do not figure in the schedule of the statute, or which have been merged in the provincial civil service cadres should be abandoned. We also recommend that each post no longer be notified separately, except in so far as the judgeships reserved for members of the bar are concerned. For officers promoted from the provincial civil services the notification issued should cover generally so many superior appointments in the executive and so many in the judicial branch. If this is done it will be possible, whilst keeping the number of officers holding notified appointments constant, to appoint them to any Indian civil service post, however important, which they may be thought competent to fill.

## CHAPTER IV.

## SYSTEMS OF PROBATION AND TRAINING.

24. *Disadvantages of a separate institution for training probationers.*—We have already explained the difficulties which beset the present system of a one-year probationary course, and have recommended that it be extended to three years in order thoroughly to equip all officers for their life's work in India. We have also indicated that this period should be utilised for giving to the candidates appointed to the Indian civil service in India the same training as their colleagues appointed in London. We have also advised that during the course all should compete together for their seniority on a single list. This common probationary period will also be useful in welding the two sections into a composite whole. As to whether it should be spent in an isolated institution, such as a special college, or at one or more of the universities, there was some conflict of evidence. The witnesses, who favoured an isolated institution, had in mind the desirability of encouraging that spirit of comradeship, which was so special a feature of the college at Haileybury in the days of the East India Company. The whole tendency of modern education, however, is against separate instruction of this sort, and in favour of utilising the universities of the country. It has also to be remembered that the universities are in possession of the field, and that to oust them, after they have sunk money in meeting the requirements of India, would be justifiable only on the clearest proof, which is in no way forthcoming, that they had failed in their task. We are, therefore, opposed to the creation of any separate institution.

25. *Universities at which the probationary period should be spent.*—We have also considered whether the diffusion of the probationers over several or their concentration into one university is desirable. There are grounds for bringing them all together, and doubtless either Oxford, Cambridge, or London would undertake the necessary arrangements. But it is easier to point out the advantages of such a scheme than to select the privileged university; whilst, as in the case of the forest probationers, there is much to be said in favour of encouraging competition in teaching between rival institutions. There is also an obvious gain in not breeding too closely to type. The Indian civil service requires men of varied experience, and such are more likely to be secured if the training given is not precisely the same for all, and is in different surroundings. For these reasons we recommend that the period of probation be spent at any university which satisfies the civil service commissioners that it can give the instruction required, and can provide through a system of colleges or hostels adequate supervision over the probationers. We think, however, that at the outset monetary grants in aid should be given only to the universities of Oxford, Cambridge, and London, and for so long as they are prepared to co-operate in dealing with the probationers on the lines desired. It will be time

\* One secretaryship to the board of revenue, United provinces; four under-secretaryships to the Governments of Madras, Bengal, the Punjab, and Bihar and Orissa, and three assistant judgeships in Bombay.

enough to consider the claims of other universities when they can show that any considerable body of young men is anxious to attend their courses. To the probationers themselves should be paid an allowance of 150*l.* a year, subject to their being diligent and of good behaviour. This may not meet all their expenses, but we see no reason why this should be necessary. Candidates appointed in India should also receive free passages to and from England.

26. *Arrangements for the probationary course.*—In framing a syllabus of study for the three years' probationary period the objects to be kept in view are, first, to complete a liberal education, and, secondly, an education which will form a fitting foundation for the probationer's professional work. It is also desirable that all probationers should bear the hall-mark of their university in the shape of a degree. None of the existing courses at the universities, however, are precisely suitable. We therefore recommend that it should be made a condition of recognition of any university, and, *a fortiori*, of any money grant, that it should institute an honours course leading up to a degree in the appropriate subjects. From the evidence put before us we are satisfied that the university of London would be prepared to sanction such an arrangement, and that the universities of Oxford and Cambridge would give it their friendly consideration. It is impossible, however, to obtain any definite assurance from Oxford and Cambridge until the assent of their respective governing bodies has been secured to some concrete scheme. The general lines of such a scheme might conveniently be settled by the civil service commissioners in consultation with the accredited representatives of the three universities, and we recommend that this should be undertaken. When this is being done the plans for a suitable course submitted to us by the hebdomadal council of the university of Oxford and by the university of London, which will be found in schedule II. to this annexure, may be found to be of assistance. For our own part we need only express the hope that the question will be treated on broad lines. The problems, legal, philosophical, historical, and social, with which an Indian civil servant will have to deal in after life, involving as they do the whole question of the interaction of the east and the west, are amongst the most complex in the history of the world, and the universities can play a great part in their solution by providing the organisation for their sympathetic investigation and elucidation. Even now jurisprudence, economics, oriental languages, history, and political science are recognised branches of university study, and it should be possible to combine them upon the basis of their relation to India in such a way as to make an illuminating university course.

27. *Law.*—But whilst we would leave it to experts to frame the actual details of the course with due regard to the requirements and special characteristics of each university, we think it will be of assistance if we set out what appears to us to be necessary to secure a satisfactory training for the professional work of an Indian civil servant in India. From this standpoint a knowledge of law is of prime importance, and we advise that this subject be made the principal field of study throughout the whole period of probation. We also feel that the course prescribed should involve at least as full a study of general jurisprudence as that in force for probationers from 1892 to 1905, and that it should approximate, as closely as circumstances will permit, to the honours school curriculum in this subject. A detailed knowledge of the Indian codes can be acquired by officers in the course of their daily work. What they should take with them from their university is a firm grasp of the legal principles on which those codes are based, and a knowledge of comparative law which will stand them in good stead in dealing with fresh problems as they arise.

28. *Indian history.*—The second great need of a civil servant in India is a grasp of Indian history in the widest sense of that term, and this subject should be studied throughout the whole of the course. Before he leaves for India every member of the civil service should have an outline knowledge of Indian history from the earliest times, and a more special knowledge of the history of British India. His attention should also have been devoted to the administrative problems of India in their historical aspect. He should also have studied the rise and progress of the religious movements of India, and have read selected passages in English translations from the sacred books of the east. He should also have been taught the influence of geographical and climatic conditions upon Indian life and development. Opportunity should also be made for him to take up an optional subject in the domain of history. For example, it would clearly be of advantage to a civil servant in

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India to have studied, not only the general principles of ethnology, but also the social organisation of India, and more particularly of his own province: its tribes and castes, clans and families, its systems of marriage, property and inheritance, its religious beliefs and practices, and even its etiquette and social behaviour. Another subject of growing importance and complexity in India is economics. There was an opinion in certain quarters that since Indian economic conditions are very different from those which prevail in England, it would be a mistake to encourage a civil servant to study the laws of political economy in western countries. This is not our view. We recognise that the premises upon which the economics of western Europe are based are not identical with those of India, and that the conclusions cannot be identical in the two continents. But the value of the study consists not so much in the conclusions as in the processes of reasoning and in the acquisition of what may be called an economic habit of mind. Without a general alertness to economic principles and issues a civil servant will miss the significance of many of the things which he sees about him. Armed with such a preliminary training, he will be able to take in the leading features of Indian economic life, and to weigh the degree to which the laws of western science are applicable within the Indian sphere. An economic training will also be of special value to him in the region of public finance and currency. Another similar subject is comparative politics. The Indian civil service supplies India not only with her judges and magistrates, but with the statesmen who help to control her policy. In England the House of Commons is a school of statesmanship; in India the statesman is a product of the bureaucracy. For this reason it is of advantage if the civil servant proceeds to India with a wide perspective of the field of statesmanship, and if he is alive to the political problems which are agitating the progressive societies of the west, and are reproducing themselves in increasing measure in the east. The facility to treat political problems with wisdom cannot be taught in academies. What can be imparted is a certain width of mind and an interest in the political problems of the hour as illustrating large principles of public conduct.

29. *Oriental languages.*—The third requirement of a member of the Indian civil service is that he should have a knowledge of oriental languages. For his ordinary everyday work he should be thoroughly familiar with the principal vernacular language of his province. The Indian vernaculars, however, have but a small and comparatively meagre literature, and have only recently become vehicles for literary expression. It is possible, therefore, that the university authorities will not regard them in their present state of development as suitable items of a university honours course. If so, we propose that they be treated separately, and that for the honours degree only the classical languages be considered. It is in them that the best thoughts of the eastern races are enshrined, and without some knowledge of them no stranger can be in touch with the deeper springs of eastern feeling. They have also a practical value in that they are the sources from which the everyday speech of the people in India is derived. Some acquaintance with their structure and history is indeed as essential for a scholarly knowledge of the vernacular languages as is a study of Latin for a scholarly understanding of English, French, or Italian. We consider, therefore, that every probationer during his first year should be taught the elements of the classical language to which the principal vernacular language of his province is most closely allied. But this subject should not be obligatory after the first year. After that it should be optional, and only those should pursue it who have the linguistic gift. Others should take up one of the optional subjects in the domain of history described in the preceding paragraph or a special additional subject in some branch of law having special reference to Indian conditions. This optional subject, which should be taught intensively, will, we anticipate, prove a valuable means of quickening the interest of the probationers in India, and of illuminating the whole field of their studies. Its function will be to arouse an interest in Indian thought and the Indian people. It matters little whether this is first awakened by Persian poetry, Indian religions, Indian law, or the study of primitive institutions. When once aroused it will create a link of sympathy between the civil servant and the people among whom he works, and create an enthusiasm for India which the present probationary course is not suited to beget.

30. *Vernacular languages. Attendance at the law courts. Riding test. Call to the bar.*—We now turn to the question of the vernacular languages. As we have already stated, every Indian civil servant should be familiar with the principal vernacular of

his province, and with this object probationers should be allotted, as is now done, to particular language areas at the commencement of their probationary period. It is true that a colloquial knowledge of the vernacular will best be acquired in India itself, and that no one can be expected to learn to speak an eastern tongue fluently and idiomatically in Europe. But a knowledge of the script, the grammar, and a scientific analysis of the language can be pursued to advantage in England, and should be acquired in the second and third years of the course. The standard to be aimed at should be the power to read an ordinary vernacular newspaper at sight. Use should also be made of gramophone records and of Indian teachers to obtain familiarity with the spoken language. In the case of Indians, who are posted to a province, the language of which is their mother tongue, or is derived from the same stock as their mother tongue, the place of a vernacular Indian language should be taken by a modern European language, such as French or German. Arrangements for teaching the vernacular languages should be made at the universities and under university supervision, whether they are included in the degree course or not; but in the latter case the responsibility for their control should rest with the civil service commissioners, who should also conduct the riding test. The civil service commissioners should also arrange for the probationers to attend the law courts and to report cases in the manner followed before the probationary period was cut down to one year. We also think it would be a good thing if probationers were called to the bar during their three years' course. This should present no difficulties to a young man who is actually studying law at his university up to the honours standard, and the gain in after life would be great. We would not, however, make such a step obligatory, but would encourage it by the payment of half the necessary fees of those who took it of their own accord. In this connection we would note that in view of the fact that the universities would ordinarily hold their degree examinations in June, whilst the final examinations held by the civil service commissioners would take place in September, the probationers would not be obliged to take the two examinations in unduly rapid succession.

31. *Method by which the seniority of officers should be decided.*—It remains to decide in what way the relative positions of the candidates on the seniority list should be determined. The duty of conducting the examinations which are to settle this devolves under the statute of 1858 on the civil service commissioners, and we have proposed no change in this respect. On the other hand, the universities will naturally and properly insist on having the control of any examination on which they are being asked to award their degree. In these circumstances we think that the best course will be not to attempt to combine the two functions, at any rate in the earlier stages of the experiment. This being so, it will be necessary for the civil service commissioners to make their own separate arrangements. To this end they should hold two examinations, one half way through the probationary course, and the other at its close, and should include in their scope both the subjects which are being studied as part of the degree course and those which do not figure in that category. Marks should be awarded at these examinations, and their combined totals should determine the seniority of the candidates. The civil service commissioners should also have power to enforce diligence by fines, up to the amount of the allowance made by Government to the candidates, and to reject such as fail to come up to a prescribed standard. The universities should conduct their own examinations for their own degrees. Subsequently, as the arrangements settle down, we think that it may be found possible to avoid holding two separate examinations. One of the suggestions made to us for achieving this object was to have a joint board of examiners to represent both the civil service commissioners and the universities, and for all the authorities concerned to depend on its report for the action to be taken by each. Such an arrangement would obviously be an administrative convenience, but it would tend to fetter the independence of professors and readers at the different centres and to prevent any university from developing a school of its own. Such interference with the freedom of the teacher is especially to be deprecated in a new course of reading, in which scholars have yet to find their way to find the syllabus which will yield the greatest educational advantage. Another proposal was that the universities should give their degrees in three classes, and that no probationer should be admitted to the service who had not got at least a third-class degree. The civil service commissioners in their turn should accept these classes for the purpose of a preliminary classification of the probationers into three groups, and should decide the seniority within each group by an examination in the subjects already alluded to, which

ANNEXURE X.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—(*continued*).

the universities had not included in the curriculum for their degrees. Such an arrangement would have the advantage of encouraging the student throughout his period of probation to throw his energies into the course of reading for the degree and would prevent the test imposed by the civil service commissioners from distracting him from so doing. Difficulties would arise over equating the values of the classes given by the various universities, but these should not be insurmountable, and we recommend that the idea should be kept in mind and developed by the university and other authorities on such lines as commend themselves to them in the light of their experience and of their other educational necessities.

32. *Training in India*.—We now turn to the question of training in India. After a three years' probationary course in law and languages officers should have received a sufficient grounding in principles. All that will then be wanted will be practical experience. This is now arranged for under a collector, and we are satisfied that this is the best system. But more care is needed in the selection of the collector, who should not only have the special qualities required for training junior officers, but also the time to devote to this object. Much valuable assistance can often be given him in this matter by a senior assistant. We also think that for the first year too much court work should not be prescribed, and that the departmental examinations should be made more practical and not mere tests of memory. In particular a higher colloquial test than is now customary should be enforced. The subsequent stages of an officer's training will depend on whether he is to serve on the executive or the judicial side. This decision should be arrived at as soon as possible after the completion of the fourth, and at latest before the completion of the sixth year of service. For those members of the service who elect or are selected for duty in the judicial branch, the need of improved facilities for training in law has been recognised for some years past, and a scheme has been sanctioned, since our inquiry started, under which as many selected officers of not less than five years' service as can conveniently be spared will continuously be employed on civil judicial work for a period of about eighteen months. This arrangement has our approval.

33. *Study leave*.—It has also been decided to offer members of the service financial inducements to undertake, whilst on leave, the courses of study leading up to a call to the bar. Bonuses of 25*l.* will be granted for each first class obtained in any of the four examinations comprising part I., and of 50*l.* for a first class in the final examination for the bar. A further bonus of 75*l.* will also be granted in part refund of any fee actually paid by an officer for reading in chambers. This scheme appears to us to be well adapted to the present requirements of the judicial branch of the service, and should be left to its operation. It may be anticipated, however, that modifications will be needed when officers begin to come out to India with a barrister qualification under our revised scheme for the probationary period. For officers on the executive side it appears to us unnecessary to prescribe any special courses of study or to give facilities for a call to the bar. Those, however, who desire to study any specific problem of administration should be encouraged to do so during their leave. To meet such cases we have recommended in our report that the India Office should make it their business to bring officers into touch with the institutions and persons in the United Kingdom who may be willing to assist them.

## CHAPTER V.

## CONDITIONS OF SALARY.

34. *Salaries of officers holding superior posts*.—Officers of the Indian civil service are now paid on the graded system. This was a subject of widespread complaint and is on general grounds unsuitable. We recommend that incremental salaries be paid in future, and on the compartment system as elsewhere. As regards the rates themselves we are satisfied that, speaking generally, those fixed for the superior posts in the most recently reorganised cadres are adequate, in view, first, of the lower age at which officers will in future be appointed, and secondly, of the concessions which we have recommended in the matter of leave and pension. We have, therefore, kept the range of the salaries for these posts much as at present, with the addition of the existing exchange compensation allowance. But we have made such changes as were necessary to secure approximate equality of prospects as between one province and another. We think

## ANNEXURE X.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—(continued).

this reasonable in view of the practice in other services and of the fact that all officers are recruited to one and the same service, and are posted to provinces, not at their own wish, but at the discretion of the Government. In particular we have abolished, so far as possible, and to the extent that this has not been done already, the remaining distinctions, which are now out of date, in the matter of salaries between the regulation and non-regulation provinces. We have also assigned salaries of a definite amount to all superior posts. At present some carry rates of pay which fluctuate with the rates drawn by the officers next junior in the regular line to the officers holding them. When this arrangement was come to it was doubtless anticipated that such fluctuations would not result in rates of salary lower than those appropriate for superior posts. But owing to the blocks in promotion which have occurred this expectation has not always been fulfilled, with the result that officers holding important appointments, such as settlement officerships, have in certain provinces come to be remunerated on the basis of the scale fixed as suitable for assistant collectors. We have also, where possible, merged special appointments carrying special rates of pay into the appropriate general class of the cadre. This has already been done in the provinces, the cadres of which have recently come under consideration, and the arrangement should be made general. Thus we have merged in the collectorships of Madras and Bombay the commissionership of Coorg and the commissionership of settlements respectively, and in the deputy commissionerships of Burma the secretaryships to Government in that province, and so on. On the same principle several isolated appointments in the Bombay list have been collected together into one class of sub-collectors, a step which in any case would have followed naturally on the recent creation in that presidency of a new class of superior assistants. The cost of this reorganisation of the superior posts, as set out in detail in schedule III. to this annexure, will come approximately to Rs. 8,00,788 a year, as follows:—

(i) rounding-off in the process of merging exchange compensation allowance into pay - - - - -	Rs. A.
(ii) absorption of special appointments into a general class and the allotment of salaries of a definite amount to posts previously paid on a fluctuating basis - - - - -	2,742 10
(iii) equalisation of conditions of salary, including improvement of salary of particular appointments - - - - -	3,30,182 11
(iv) grant of an incremental scale of pay to collectors and district and sessions judges below the 1st grade - - - - -	1,13,082 9
(v) improvement of salary of appointments held by members of the provincial civil services - - - - -	42,444 8
(vi) readjustment of the number of appointments held by members of the provincial civil services - - - - -	1,07,650 14
(vii) grant of the equivalent of exchange compensation allowance to statutory natives of India - - - - -	1,65,973 2
	38,711 15
Total superior posts - - - - -	8,00,788 5

This excludes the superior posts under the Government of India, the salaries of which should be revised in due course in the light of our foregoing recommendations.

35. *Salaries of junior officers. Present position.*—We now turn to the question of the emoluments to be enjoyed by the junior officers of the service. Under the present scale the normal range of their salaries is through grades of Rs. 500, Rs. 700, and Rs. 900 a month, plus exchange compensation allowance. They also draw substantial allowances for officiating in the superior posts, and it has been laid down that they may expect to be so officiating without fear of being reverted after completing eight years' service. In practice, however, owing to blocks in promotion, this expectation has been falsified, and grave dissatisfaction on this score undoubtedly exists throughout the service. We are satisfied that this is reacting prejudicially on recruitment, and that young men in England are now turning their thoughts in the direction of the Home civil service in consequence. The position was recently considered in connection with the officers seconded from the Indian civil service for duty in the political department when, after much discussion, an incremental scale was sanctioned for all officers, whether holding superior or training posts. This was expressly stated to have been calculated at a rate which

## ANNEXURE X.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—(continued).

would give members of the Indian civil service approximately the emoluments which they might expect to draw in the provinces and has since been extended to the officers employed under the Government of India in the new Delhi administration. The actual scale up to the eleventh year, the figures of which include exchange compensation allowance, is as follows :—

Year of service.	Pay. Rs.	Year of service.	Pay. Rs.
1st -	Civilians will not usually be recruited till they have been three years in the provinces.	6th -	750
2nd -		7th -	850
3rd -		8th -	900
4th -	650	9th -	1,050
5th -	700	10th -	1,150
		11th -	1,250

The scale is also continued until it reaches Rs. 2,400 a month for all officers of the Indian civil service in their 21st, and for military officers in their 23rd year and over. Subject to certain provisos an officer, who has not completed nine years civil service, also draws, when posted to an appointment classed as superior, a charge allowance of Rs. 200 a month.

36. *Salaries recommended for junior officers.*—We are satisfied that nothing less than these terms will suffice to re-establish the attractiveness of this service, and we see obvious advantages in adopting the same figures. In view of the fact, however, that for reasons given in our report, we have preferred a compartment scale, which will be less favourable to the service as a whole, we advise that the allowance for holding a superior appointment be increased from Rs. 200 to Rs. 350 a month. Allowing Rs. 450, Rs. 500, and Rs. 550 a month for the first three years our scale, the figures, which include exchange compensation allowance, will be for junior officers as follows :—

Year of service.	Pay. Rs.	Year of service.	Pay. Rs.
1st -	450	7th -	850
2nd -	500	8th -	900
3rd -	550	9th -	1,050
4th -	650	10th -	1,150
5th -	700	11th and over -	1,250
6th -	750		

We would also impose the following conditions :—

- (i) no officer should draw more than Rs. 500 a month until he has passed his departmental examinations by the prescribed standards ;
- (ii) no officer should draw more than Rs. 900 a month unless he is certified by the local Government to be qualified for a charge superior to that of a sub-collector ; an officer whose pay is restricted under the operation of this rule should ordinarily lose in seniority ;
- (iii) an officer when posted to officiate in an appointment classed as superior should draw an allowance of Rs. 350 a month, subject to the condition that the combined pay and allowance received by him shall not exceed the lowest pay of the class of appointment in which he is officiating.

Under this scheme every officer who joins the service will be certain of a salary which will rise gradually to Rs. 900 a month in his eighth year, whilst he may, if promotion is good, officiate for odd months in superior appointments, which will bring him in Rs. 350 a month extra. Thereafter, in his ninth year he will, in provinces other than Madras and Bombay, normally be receiving Rs. 1,400 a month, in his tenth Rs. 1,500 a month, and in his eleventh and subsequent years Rs. 1,600 a month, until he gets his permanent step, when he will start afresh from that point. In Madras, where there will be a grade of sub-collectors on Rs. 1,500 a month, an officer, so long as he was doing only sub-collector's work, would draw Rs. 1,400 in his ninth and Rs. 1,500 in his tenth and eleventh years of service. Similarly, in Bombay, where there will be a grade of sub-collectors on Rs. 1,350 a month, an officer who was doing sub-collector's work, would not draw more than this amount whether in his ninth, tenth, or eleventh year of service. In both these presidencies an officer would receive Rs. 1,400, Rs. 1,500, or Rs. 1,600 a month when he came to act as collector, and as soon as he got his permanent step to a sub-collectorship would, if acting as a collector, receive an officiating allowance under the rules now in force. In all the provinces, if promotion were blocked, officers would rise in their eleventh year to

## ANNEXURE X.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—(continued).

Rs. 1,250 a month and remain on that salary until promoted. This would, however, be an extreme case, as if such a state of stagnation existed as to keep an officer out of superior work after eleven years' completed service, it would be necessary to apply the remedies which we shall explain in the following chapter. The cost of this reorganisation of the cadre of junior officers, as shown in schedule III. to this annexure, will amount approximately to Rs. 2,92,051 a year as follows :—

	Rs.	A.
(i) improvement of prospects - - - - -	5,43,927	10
(ii) readjustment of numbers - - - - -	—2,70,300	0
(iii) grant of the equivalent of exchange compensation allowance to statutory natives of India - - - - -	18,423	5
Total inferior posts - - - - -	2,92,050	15

This excludes the inferior posts under the Government of India, the salaries of which should be revised when those of the similar superior posts come under consideration.

37. *Relative prospects of officers in the different provinces.*—The effect of our scheme on the position of officers in the various provinces will be seen from the following table. The high average in Bihar and Orissa is due to the fact that so many of the posts in its small cadre carry specially large salaries. The low average in Assam is to be attributed to the absence of such appointments. In both, however, the collectors and district and sessions judges have been treated in the same way as in other similar provinces. Otherwise a very general level of equality has been attained. This will be the more marked when the cadres of Burma and the Central Provinces and Berar have been more fully developed.

Presidency or Province.	Average substantive pay of					
	All Indian civil service officers.	All superior posts.	Superior executive posts.	Superior judicial posts.	Collectors (deputy commiss- sioners).	District (divisional) and sessions judges, 2nd Grade.
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
Madras - - - - -	1,576	2,381	2,294	2,698	2,401	2,483
Bombay* - - - - -	1,591	2,453	2,354	2,750	2,283	2,401
Bengal - - - - -	1,656	2,548	2,469	2,703	2,107	2,401
United Provinces of Agra and Oudh	1,597	2,432	2,386	2,537	2,107	2,401
Punjab - - - - -	1,608	2,457	2,415	2,571	2,107	2,401
Burma - - - - -	1,587	2,385	2,378	2,418	2,107	2,401
Bihar and Orissa - - - - -	1,705	2,662	2,608	2,921	2,107	2,401
Central Provinces and Berar - - - - -	1,588	2,419	2,348†	—	2,107	—
Assam - - - - -	1,546	2,331	2,331	—	2,107	—

NOTE.—Appointments assigned to members of the provincial civil services and the bar, and inspector-generalships of police and directorships of agriculture have been excluded from the calculation. It has also been assumed that the lieutenant-governorships, memberships of council, and secretaryships will always be filled from the executive branch.

\* Three political appointments have been excluded from the calculation.

† Five deputy commissioners doing duty as divisional or district and sessions judges have been excluded from this calculation.

38. *Salaries to be paid to statutory natives of India.*—There remains the question of the salaries to be paid to statutory natives of India. Those who join the service through the door of the open competitive examination in London, or who are directly appointed in India, and come to Europe for the three years' probationary course should receive the same pay as their colleagues who are not statutory natives of India. The same should apply to all military or other members of the old mixed commissions, to such military officers as may be appointed in Burma in future, and to officers appointed to judgeships from the bar. We also think that all officers, however and wherever recruited, should draw the same pay if they are selected to fill posts higher in rank than that of a collector or of a district and sessions judge, second grade. Other officers, working as collectors or as district (divisional) and sessions judges, second grade, should draw incremental salaries at the rate of Rs. 1,200—75—1,800 a month, and as district judges in Burma Rs. 1,000 a month. Should they be appointed to other superior posts of an inferior standing special rates should be fixed to suit the merits of each case.

## CHAPTER VI.

## CONDITIONS OF SERVICE.

39. *Strength of the cadre. General observations.*—We received a large body of evidence to the effect that the cadre of the Indian civil service should be strengthened to cope with its duties. This was said to be necessary on the judicial side generally, and on the executive side in the larger districts. We are satisfied that the conditions of administration in India are growing daily more complex, and that increases of establishment will need to be faced in the manner experienced in other countries which are undergoing similar development throughout the world. In the case of the judiciary the remedy for this state of affairs is obvious. Additional officers should be appointed to keep pace with the increasing volume of litigation, and they should be appointed promptly. At present the tendency is to wait to give the required relief until serious congestion has arisen. On the executive side there is greater difficulty. The troubles which are now experienced are confined mainly to the larger districts, and it is they which have as a rule the most historical associations. The process of dividing them is thus complicated and open to criticism. We think, however, that serious steps should be taken to grapple with the evil. Pending division, or if division is found to be impossible, extra district officers with full powers should be appointed to work under the general control of the collector of the district, and additions should be made to the cadre of the collectors with this object. This is now being done in Bengal as an experimental measure. The same principle is being followed in some of the other provinces, but there the officer selected is a junior, and is only paid as such. Even if increases are made the cadre of the Indian civil service will not be large in comparison with its responsibilities. From the figures given in schedule V. to this annexure it will be seen that the average number of executive officers of the service on duty per district runs from 2·53 in the Punjab to 3·92 in Madras, where the districts are much larger; and these figures exceed the number of those actually serving in the districts to the extent that they include the headquarter staffs. Similarly, the average population per officer on duty on the executive side, exclusive of Burma (107,174) and Assam (203,443), runs from 211,037 in Bombay to 530,617 in Bihar and Orissa. On the judicial side the figures are as striking. Here the average number of officers per district, exclusive of Assam (·25), runs from ·62 in Burma to 1·43 in Bengal; whilst, again exclusive of Assam, the average population per officer ranges from 461,315 in Burma to 1,916,116 in Bihar and Orissa.

40. *System under which the strength of the cadre is fixed.*—The two main ideas underlying the calculations in accordance with which the strength of the cadre of the Indian civil service and its annual rate of recruitment are fixed are—

- (a) that the members of the service should have sufficient training in subordinate or inferior appointments before they are called upon to discharge the duties of higher ones; and
- (b) that they should, throughout the whole period of their service, have sufficient salaries, and sufficiently responsible duties.

To secure these objects it is ascertained exactly what number of posts of major responsibility—called technically superior posts—exists, and only sufficient officers are recruited to make it probable that each will find himself officiating with practical permanency in at least the lowest of them after the completion of eight years' service. It is further attempted so to order the cadre that officers of over two but under eight years' completed service will be appointed in the ordinary course of promotion to charges of minor responsibility, and be paid at rates above that of the lowest grade, but below that fixed as suitable for the superior posts. The lowest grade is kept, first, for officers of under two years' service, who are regarded as under training; secondly, for a reserve against leave vacancies; and thirdly to cover vacancies caused by the absence of officers in temporary posts and on deputation. Vacancies of this last-named character are constantly recurring in the ordinary course of the administration, as when a census is held or a colonisation scheme is on foot, or arrears have accumulated and have to be cleared off, or a special inquiry is in progress, or the loan of an officer is made to a ruling chief. In accordance with this scheme up-to-date lists of superior posts, corresponding with those shown in schedule III. to this annexure, are maintained for each presidency or province. A calculation is then made to show the actual total number of superior posts

## ANNEXURE X.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—(continued).

in each presidency or province, the deductions which have to be made on account of the posts reserved for persons who are not members of the Indian civil service, the additions required to meet the claims of the superior posts directly under the Government of India, for filling which the Government of India have to indent on the nine presidencies or provinces, and finally the resulting total. To this an addition of 4 per cent. is made to provide for temporary posts and deputations of a superior character, and the resulting total is the basic figure on which the rest of the cadre is built up by a series of increments calculated in percentages on the basic amount. These percentages were worked out last in 1904 in the light of past actuals and showed the need for increments of 39, 15·5 and 40 per cent. on account of the inferior posts and the training and leave reserves respectively. They also brought out an annual rate of decrement of 4·17 per cent. on the total strength of the service, based on the actual experience of the fifty years from the 1st April 1854 to the 1st April 1904. This figure is also used as the annual rate of recruitment, subject to variations not exceeding 30 per cent. either way, when the actual strength of the cadre is in excess, or falls short, of the prescribed amount. These processes are exhibited in the following statement:—

	Madras.	Bombay.	Bengal.	United Provinces of Agra and Oudh.	Punjab.	Burma.	Bihar and Orissa.	Central Provinces and Berar.	Assam.	Total.
(1) Number of superior posts in each presidency or province.	87	84	91	117	78	84	56	51	23	671
(2) Deduct for posts reserved for persons who are not members of the Indian civil service.	8	6	9	10	12	5	5	6	—	61
(3) Add for posts under the Government of India.	8	8	8	10	7	6	5	5	2	59
(4) Balance — Number of superior posts.	87	86	90	117	73	85	56	50	25	669
(5) Add 4 per cent. for temporary posts and for deputation.	3	3	3	5	3	3	2	2	1	25
(6) Total number of superior posts on which recruitment is based.	90	89	93	122	76	88	58	52	26	694
(7) Add for inferior posts at 39 per cent. of line (6).	35	35	36	48	31	34	23	20	10	272
(8) Add for leave reserve at 40 per cent. of line (6).	36	35½	37½	48	29	35½	23	21	11	276½
(9) Add for training reserve at 15·5 per cent. of line (6).	14	13½	14½	19	12	13½	9	8	4	107½
(10) Strength of service at 194·5 per cent. of line (6).	175	173	181	237	148	171	113	101	51	1,350

41. *Changes recommended in the system under which the strength of the cadre is fixed.*—This system appears to us to be satisfactory in the main. It is, however, of its essence that it shall be logically followed, and not distorted to obtain results which it will not naturally give. For example, a tendency has manifested itself in Bombay to endeavour to get out of the arrangement a larger number of junior officers than the accepted percentages will supply. A similar feeling showed itself in Bihar and Orissa. This is radically unsound. The true remedy in such cases is to recruit the provincial civil services with a view to the actual necessities of the subordinate administration in each area. We also think that the present calculations are in danger of becoming stereotyped. For instance, the allowance on account of temporary posts and deputations is the same in each province irrespective of the actual facts, and is never changed. Again, the posts under the

## ANNEXURE X.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—(continued).

Government of India are distributed arbitrarily and without any periodical check against actuals. Similarly, no machinery exists for altering the leave percentages to suit changing conditions. The annual rate of decrement, which governs the annual rate of recruitment, is also worked out on the basis of figures which savour too much of past conditions to carry conviction. We recommend, therefore, that they be recalculated on the latest actuarial data available, and that, thereafter, measures be taken every ten years to bring them up to date. The minor calculations with regard to temporary posts and deputations, leave and the like, should similarly be revised every five years in the light of the actual experience of each province. We recommend, further, that the term "inferior posts" be no longer employed in its technical sense to designate the posts supposed to be filled by officers of from two to eight years' completed service. The Indian civil service is now recruited solely on the basis of the superior appointments, and all the officers who are not holding these posts are part of the leave and training reserve for them. At the same time the completion of two years' service marks a distinct stage in an officer's career, and there are advantages in setting out clearly the number of passed assistants who should be available for duty, in order to determine the strength of the various provincial civil services. We would, therefore, alter the present cadre formula as set out in paragraph 40 above to run as follows:—

- (7) Add training reserve of passed assistants at 39 per cent. of line (6).
- (8) Add training reserve of unpassed assistants at 15·5 per cent. of line (6).
- (9) Add leave reserve at 40 per cent. of line (6).

We also think that the 30 per cent. variation allowed in the number of officers to be recruited annually is a source of danger. That some variation must be permitted is obvious. It is equally obvious that the cadres must be kept at approximately their sanctioned strength. But to make the adjustments invariably at the bottom of the list results eventually in an undue excess or deficiency of officers of a particular standing, particularly where the divergencies to be made good are great. This trouble is now being experienced in certain provinces as will be seen from the figures given in schedule IV. to this annexure. These show, for the whole of India, a deficiency of officers of 24 years' service and over, balanced by heavy excesses in officers of from 12 to 17 and 18 to 23 years' service. The number of officers of from 1 to 11 years' service is approximately correct. This suggests that, when adjustments are needed, the right remedy is to make them at the point where the shortage or excess is found to exist. We consider that this should be undertaken at once by the local Governments and that, to prevent such trouble in future, distribution lists should be compiled in each province from year to year, and be taken into consideration when the annual indent on the Secretary of State is being prepared. Failing such measures the only remedy for a congested cadre and the consequent blocks in promotion is to grant temporary allowances to the officers affected, calculated on the merits of each case.

## CHAPTER VII.

## CONDITIONS OF LEAVE.

42. *Leave rules.*—Officers of the Indian civil service are subject to the European service leave rules. These apply also to military officers holding appointments in the commissions of the various provinces. Officers promoted from the provincial civil services are subject to the Indian service leave rules. These arrangements are suitable and should continue. Should it be found necessary, pending legislation, to confine officers directly recruited in India to the commission of their province, instead of admitting them to the Indian civil service itself, they should none the less be subject to the European service leave rules. For officers appointed to judgeships from the bar special rules should be framed.

## CHAPTER VIII.

## CONDITIONS OF PENSION.

43. *Annuity system in the Indian civil service.*—Originally Indian civil servants on retirement received annuities which were paid from private funds financed by the officers themselves with the aid of a subvention from Government. This arrangement proved unsatisfactory, and in 1874, as a result of the passing of the East India annuity funds act (37 & 38 Vict., cap. 12), the annuity funds were wound

up and their assets and liabilities transferred to the Secretary of State for India in Council. It was enacted by the same statute that, for the future, an Indian civil servant, who had been 25 years or more in the service, and who had rendered 21 years' active service, should be entitled, on his resignation of the service being accepted, to an annuity of 1,000*l.* Towards this annuity he contributes four per cent. of his salary throughout the term of his employment.

44. *Alternative scheme of pension discussed.*—These conditions, which are still applicable, differ materially from those prevailing in other departments of Government service, and we have considered carefully whether it would not be possible to establish greater uniformity of procedure by applying to the Indian civil service, with suitable modifications, the general rules set out in our report. This might, we think, be arranged, without any extra cost to the state beyond that which we shall propose should be incurred in any case, if the scale of pension for this service were fixed in eightieths instead of sixtieths, if higher maxima were sanctioned, and if all officers who retired after holding the rank of commissioner or district and sessions judge, first grade, or over, were made eligible for special additional pensions. We are satisfied that a scheme of superannuation pensions, based on these principles, would be in the interests of the members of the service. They would, it is true, have to surrender the privilege of retirement on full pension after 25 years, but this would be no great hardship when the service comes to be recruited from young men aged about 22. Those who were compelled to retire for ill-health before the completion of 25 years' service, might also have to be given rates of pension slightly less favourable than those enjoyed under the present annuity system. On the other hand those who had completed a full term of 30 years' qualifying service, and had reached administrative rank, might obtain a pension in excess of 1,000*l.* a year. The Government would also reap advantages. In the first place they would have unfettered discretion to retire an officer, if they saw fit to do so, at any time after he had completed 25 years' service. They would also be less likely to lose their officers just at the time when their services were at their highest value. We, therefore, recommend that a scheme on these lines be worked out in detail and considered by the Government after taking the views of members of the service. Should it be found possible to make a workable scheme the necessary legislation to amend the statute of 1874 should be undertaken. Special pension rules should be framed for officers appointed to Indian civil service posts from the bar.

45. *Recommendations with regard to pension.*—But, whatever advantages such a scheme may appear to us to possess, we cannot lose sight of the fact that there is little indication in the evidence before us of any desire on the part of members of the service to give up their annuity system. We realise also that to force on the service a change of this sort against their wishes might prejudicially affect recruitment. In these circumstances, pending a decision with regard to the alternative scheme discussed above, we recommend that the present system be maintained subject to certain modifications of detail to meet existing complaints. The main grievances of members of the service are, first, that no exact account of officers' contributions is kept, the result being that no one knows with any accuracy how much of his annuity is paid from charges on salary; secondly, that the Indian civil service is the only service in which officers are obliged to contribute to their own pensions; thirdly, that the present system fails to recognise any distinction between officers of different rank based on the amount of their contributions; and fourthly, that there is no provision for any lump sum on retirement which could be used to defray the expenses incurred in setting up in new surroundings. As regards the first of these grievances, we were informed that calculations had recently been worked out independently in the India Office and in the finance department of the Government of India, which showed that the proportion of the annuity now contributed by officers was about one quarter of the whole. This means that roughly about 750*l.* of the total annuity of 1,000*l.* is paid by the state, a sum which is only equivalent to the pension payable to military officers who complete their service without rising beyond the rank of colonel, and which is less than the amount of pension earned by more highly placed officers of the army and the Indian medical service. On this basis of comparison we think it would be reasonable to fix the pensions of officers of the Indian civil service at 1,000*l.* a year free of contribution. We are satisfied, also, that an increase of pension to this extent will prove the cheapest and most effective means of restoring to the service the attractions which undoubtedly

## ANNEXURE X.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—(continued).

it has been losing during recent years. Subject, therefore, to the proviso that the concession shall not operate retrospectively in respect of deductions from salary already made, we recommend that the whole charge for the payment of the 1,000*l.* annuity be borne by the state, and that this concession be made without waiting for the results of any alternative scheme. Estimated on the basis of actual payments for the last three years, the average extra cost resulting from the abandonment of the contributory system will amount, approximately, to nine lakhs of rupees a year.

46. *Provision of a lump sum on retirement.*—We think it advisable also that the opportunity of the abandonment of the four per cent. contribution to pension should be taken to provide for the payment of a lump sum on retirement. We recommend accordingly that for the future the four per cent. contributions of each individual officer should be funded, and that the amount lying to an officer's credit should be payable to him on his retirement, or to his legal representatives in the event of his decease, together with interest calculated, as in the case of the general provident fund, at four per cent. As the amount of the lump sum would vary according to the length of an officer's service and the importance of the posts he had held, the adoption of this scheme would go some way towards securing the discriminating action which is missing in the present system.

47. *Special pensions.*—A claim was also put forward by a large number of service witnesses for the award of special pensions in excess of 1,000*l.* to officers who rise to high administrative rank. In this connection the precedent of the civil service high court judges, who receive a pension of 1,200*l.* after a service in the high court of 11½ years, has been freely quoted. The analogy, however, is incorrect. Members of the Indian civil service who have held the appointment of a high court judge, become eligible for a pension of 1,200*l.* not because they have done specially meritorious work as civil servants, but because they have been placed on the same footing as their barrister colleagues. Indian civil servants, as such, are subject to the equal annuity system, and, so long as this is maintained, no general case can be made out for differentiation in favour of more highly placed officers. If the service demands special rates for special officers it must make up its mind to take the loss with the profit and submit to the ordinary system of superannuation pensions. To this general principle, however, we would admit an exception in favour of officers who have held the responsible position of lieutenant-governor of a province. Such officers should be granted an additional pension of 200*l.* a year provided that they have held a lieutenant-governorship for not less than three years. Any period spent in an officiating capacity should count for this purpose as if it were a substantive tenure.

48. *Invalid pensions.*—In the statute of 1874 provision was made for the payment of special annuity rates to officers invalided before the completion of 25 years' service and of 21 years' active service. These were increased in 1904 to the following amounts :—

- (i) for less than five years' service a gratuity of 500*l.* ;
- (ii) for five years' completed service, an annuity of 150*l.* rising by 20*l.* for each additional year up to 12 ;
- (iii) for 12 years' service an annuity of 290*l.* rising by 30*l.* for each additional year up to 23 ;
- (iv) for 23 years' service, an annuity of 620*l.* ;
- (v) for 24 years' service, an annuity of 660*l.* ;
- (vi) for 25 years' service, including less than 21 years' active service, an annuity of 700*l.*

Proposals were made that these rates should be still further increased, but in our opinion they are now sufficiently liberal and we recommend no change.

49. *Indian civil service family pension fund.*—Under the Indian civil service family pension regulations it is laid down that all members of the Indian civil service must contribute, each according to his class, and whether married or unmarried, and whether with or without children, towards provision for their families, if any, in the event of their decease. At the time of our inquiry in India the rules of the fund prescribed that, in the event of a contributor's decease, the state should pay to his widow, during widowhood, an annual pension of 250*l.*, or of 300*l.* if the officer had rendered at least 12 years' service, and to his children pensions according to their ages, ranging from 25*l.* to 100*l.* for each son of less than 21 years of age and for each daughter till she married. The rules made provision also for widows who remarry

and for motherless orphans. The evidence of members of the service disclosed three cardinal grievances. It was represented, first, that contributions to the fund should cease on retirement; secondly, that the allowances payable to sons should be continued to the age of 24, and thirdly, that officers should be kept informed punctually of the financial position of the fund. On the 8th August 1913 we addressed the Secretary of State on the subject, setting forth the main points at issue and inviting suggestions as to the terms on which the demands of the service could be met, if it were considered impossible to provide the money required out of the existing surplus. We have since learned that the report of the actuary engaged by the India Office to investigate the fund as it existed on the 31st March 1911 revealed a surplus of 601,909*l.* available for disposal. This surplus it has now been decided to employ, first, in terminating all subscriptions to the fund after retirement; secondly, in reducing the monthly contributions payable from unmarried subscribers and widowers of more than 18 years' service, and, thirdly, in continuing the pensions of the sons of deceased officers until they reach the age of 24. It has also been decided that the state shall assume responsibility for all charges incidental to the management of the fund. These are estimated at 41,000*l.* a year, and this sum, added to the amount of surplus still remaining for disposal after providing for the concessions referred to above, will be sufficient to permit of a continuance of the abatement of 12½ per cent. at present allowed on the normal rates of subscription. With these improvements the fund is now on a satisfactory basis, and we need only suggest that for the future steps be taken to ensure that the accounts are rendered punctually and promulgated to the service without delay.

50. *Position of members of the Indian civil service who are statutory natives of India with respect to the family pension fund.*—Presumably on the ground of differences of social custom, the fund was originally confined to members of the Indian civil service other than statutory natives of India. The Indian witnesses who came before us were opposed to any such distinction. At the time of our enquiry the question was already under the consideration of the Government of India and the Secretary of State, and orders have now been issued that subscriptions to the fund shall be made compulsory for all officers of the service alike. Separate accounts will be kept for the two classes of subscribers, and at suitable intervals valuations of the separate sections will be made in order to determine whether any variation in the rates of subscription is necessary. The further condition has also been laid down that a wife married by an Indian subscriber to the fund during the lifetime of another wife, and the children of such marriage, shall not be eligible for any benefits from the fund. The proportion of Indians in the Indian civil service is still relatively small, but under our recommendations the number of such officers will be increased considerably in the near future. The decision of the Secretary of State to include Indian officers in the fund will thus have a wider effect than was contemplated, and the working of the new rules should be closely watched. We think it desirable also that only Indians who are members of the Indian civil service itself should be admitted to the fund. With these reservations we are content to leave the present scheme to its operation.

## PART II.—PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES.

### CHAPTER IX.

#### ORGANISATION.

51. *Constitution of the services.*—As already explained the provincial civil services have been formed to fill the minor charges, both executive and judicial, in the civil administration. In most of the provinces these two lines are distinct. In the Punjab, however, there is a joint lowest grade, through which all officers have to pass. We were told that this arrangement had been come to so as to give the Government an opportunity of deciding for which class of work an officer was best fitted.\* But stress was not laid on this point, and we are satisfied that, as elsewhere, there should be separate branches throughout. We have also considered the question as to which posts should be regarded as belonging to the provincial civil services. Ordinarily this is clear enough; but on the executive side in the presidency as distinct from the Sind portion of Bombay the

\* Volume X., 51695, 51826-33.

## ANNEXURE X.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—(continued).

provincial service has been organised with a lower division so as to take in a body of officers known as mamlatdars. It was asserted that they had a status above that of the tahsildars or other similar officers, who in other provinces belong to subordinate services. No essential difference was, however, proved to exist, and we have, therefore, included in the scope of our inquiry only the upper division officers of the Bombay presidency. Similarly on the judicial side some doubts were expressed as to the position of the munsifs in the Punjab and in the Central Provinces and Berar, and of the judicial myooks in Burma. These officers are now regarded as belonging to subordinate services. The powers possessed by munsifs of the first class in the Punjab and by all such officers in the Central Provinces and Berar are, however, similar to those exercised by officers of the provincial civil services in Bengal, the United Provinces and Assam, and apparently also in Bihar and Orissa, and we recommend that as many of them as actually have to exercise such powers be given a similar status. The exact number will need to be determined in consultation with the judicial authorities. This would leave in subordinate services the second and third class munsifs of the Punjab, the judicial myooks in Burma, and such first class munsifs in the Punjab, and munsifs in the Central Provinces and Berar as were actually doing subordinate work.

52. *Nomenclature of officers.*—We have also considered whether greater uniformity of nomenclature in the various judicial branches should not be introduced. At present in Madras, Bengal (with Assam), the United Provinces, and Bihar and Orissa, there are munsifs on salaries ranging from Rs. 200 to Rs. 400, or in Bengal (with Assam) Rs. 500 a month. Above them are the subordinate judges. In Bombay there is a similar division, but the terms subordinate judge, first and second class, are used. In the Punjab the subordinate judges draw Rs. 300 and Rs. 400 a month, and the officers above them are called extra judicial assistant commissioners. In Burma all the officers from Rs. 300 a month and upwards are called judicial extra assistant commissioners. Finally, in the Central Provinces and Berar there are sub-judges on Rs. 300 and Rs. 400 a month, and above them district judges. This sometimes leads to confusion, but to alter the terms would in several cases necessitate the amendment in the legislative councils in India of the acts which now govern the designations of certain of the existing judicial officers and we do not recommend any change.

53. *Nomenclature of the services.*—Objection was also raised to the word “provincial” in the expression provincial civil services. This is not incorrect as applied to departments which are recruited provincially, and it is impossible in practice to avoid the use of the adjective in its ordinary significance in dealing with such services generally. But this is no reason why it should be employed as the official designation of any particular local service. When this question came up in connection with the report of the Public Services Commission of 1886–87, the Secretary of State for India ordered that the terms Madras (Bombay, etc.) civil service should be adopted. This, however, overlooked the fact that in those days members of the Indian civil service used to refer to themselves as belonging to the Madras, Bombay, or Bengal civil service, and not as now to the Indian civil service. As a consequence, the orders were never carried out. Now that no bar of this sort remains we recommend that the instructions be revived and put into operation.

## CHAPTER X.

## METHODS OF RECRUITMENT.

54. *Principles underlying the present rules for recruitment.*—Subject to the general control of the Government of India, local Governments have power to make rules for recruitment to their provincial civil services in accordance with the following general principles:—

- (i) The rules must be adapted on the one hand to obtain thoroughly efficient candidates, and on the other to secure the due representation in the public service of the different classes of the community.
- (ii) Every candidate for a direct appointment must furnish satisfactory evidence—
  - (a) that he is not over 25 years of age, except in the case of barristers, advocates, or pleaders appointed to the judicial branch;
  - (b) that he has attained a prescribed preliminary standard of general education to be fixed with reference to local conditions, the object being to secure men qualified by as high a standard of general education as the conditions and requirements of the local administration permit;

- (c) that he is of sound health, good physique and active habits; and
- (d) that he is of good character.
- (iii) Every person appointed to the provincial civil service by direct recruitment must be subject to a period of probation or training during which time his appointment is probationary only, unless in special cases the local Government declares such probation or training to be unnecessary.
- (iv) The subjects of Indian princes in alliance with His Majesty must be eligible for appointment, provided they are qualified in other respects.
- (v) Admission to the provincial civil service must usually be confined to persons who are natives of the province or have definitely settled in it. In the case of candidates who are not natives of the province, recent residence of at least three years in the province must, as a general rule, be an essential condition of admission. No barrister, advocate, or pleader must be appointed as such, unless he has been at least three years actually practising his profession in India and can speak the provincial vernacular.
- (vi) Europeans who are not statutory natives of India are eligible for appointment, if qualified according to the above conditions, but with the sanction of the Government of India.
- (vii) The local Government must reserve to itself the right to make promotion to the superior grades of the provincial civil service without regard to seniority, and seniority alone should not give a claim to appointment to the grade of Rs. 500 a month and higher grades.
- (viii) The Government of India retain power in very special cases to make direct appointments to offices in the higher grades of the provincial civil services, and whenever the Government of India exercise this power in the case of judicial officers it will be confined to barristers, advocates, or pleaders of the high courts who have shown distinguished ability in the exercise of their profession for not less than ten years and have a thorough knowledge of the vernacular.
- (ix) No member of the provincial civil service must be dismissed otherwise than on the result of a judicial or formal departmental inquiry.

55. *Place of appointment. Limitations in the employment of non-Europeans.*—It will be seen from the foregoing that recruitment for the provincial civil services has to be made in India. This is suitable. We also approve of the arrangement by which admission to the services is confined ordinarily to persons who are natives of the province, or have definitely settled in it. From the statistics supplied us it appears that, on the 1st April 1913, out of a total of 2,432\* appointments only 209, or 9 per cent., were filled by Europeans or Anglo-Indians.† The services are thus manned in the main by Indians and Burmans of unmixed Asiatic descent. This is as it should be and we have no recommendation to make under this head.

56. *Relative merits of direct recruitment of untried officers and the promotion of selected officers from an inferior service.*—The present practice as to recruitment varies as between direct selection and promotion from a subordinate service, or in certain provinces from the ministerial establishments. In the executive line, for example, appointments are made almost wholly by promotion in Madras, and mainly so in the Punjab, Burma, and the Central Provinces and Berar. In the United Provinces a half and half arrangement is in force. In Bihar and Orissa direct recruits obtain 58 and in Bengal 75 per cent. of the vacancies. In the judicial line the ordinary rule is direct recruitment, but in certain provinces members of the ministerial establishments are allowed to fill a small number of the vacancies. In Burma and the Central Provinces and Berar, which have subordinate judicial services, the system of recruitment by promotion prevails. In the Punjab no question arises owing to the existence of a joint lowest grade for the executive and judicial branches. We are impressed by the advantages which are secured for services recruited in India under a system of direct recruitment. We accordingly advise that in the executive line 50 per cent. be laid down as the maximum amount to which promotion from the lower ranks should be permitted to extend. We also think that such promotion should ordinarily be from the subordinate services and not from other services or from the ministerial establishments. This will necessitate changes of procedure in several of the provinces. As regards the judicial branches we recommend that in all provinces, except

\* This figure includes the mamlatdars.

† Volume I., Appendix VIII.

## ANNEXURE X.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—(continued).

the Punjab and Burma, direct recruitment be made universal, and that ministerial officers no longer be promoted. In the Punjab and Burma, where subordinate judicial services will be continued, we would allow officers to be promoted up to a limit of 50 per cent., as in the executive branches, and we would stop appointments from other services and from the ministerial establishments. The same decision should be applied to the Central Provinces and Berar if, as the result of the inquiry which we have recommended, some of the present munsifs are left in a subordinate service.

57. *Methods by which direct recruits are selected.*—The next question which arises relates to the manner in which the appointments set aside for direct recruits shall be given. In the executive line two main systems appear to hold the field. In Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, and Assam nomination from amongst educationally qualified candidates, based for the most part on the recommendations of conferences of officials, or of the syndicate of the university, is in force, and the head of the province also keeps a few selections in his own hands. In the Punjab the lieutenant-governor appoints without reservation cadets of good family to a few posts, whilst for the rest there is a competitive examination for candidates selected from nominees of the chief court, the financial commissioners and the university. The United Province system differs somewhat from both in having no conferences and no competitive test. In the other provinces there appears to be no established practice as direct recruitment is not ordinarily in force. On the judicial side the high court enjoys statutory powers to appoint munsifs in Madras, and the local Government does not intervene until the time comes for them to be made subordinate judges. In Bombay the local Government has full powers. In Bengal (with Assam) and Bihar and Orissa all appointments are made by the local Government, but on the nomination of the high court under statutory rules framed by the local Government in consultation with the high court and sanctioned by the Governor-General in Council. In the United Provinces there is some diversity of practice. In Agra the high court nominates persons to be munsifs in the exercise of statutory powers, and the persons so nominated are appointed by the Government. In Oudh the appointments are made by the Government after consultation with the judicial commissioner. In the Punjab the procedure for filling the joint lowest grade has already been described. In Burma and the Central Provinces and Berar the local Government and local administration respectively have control.

58. *Method of selection recommended for the executive branch.*—We were informed that the system of limited competition in the Punjab had secured for the service of Government officers of a high qualification, and we are convinced that some machinery should be devised by which clever young men of suitable antecedents will be admitted freely to the provincial civil services. It appeared, however, in the Punjab that the successful candidates in the service competition had ordinarily been those who had also come out high in their university examinations. This being so, the need for any separate test does not appear to us to have been established. We are also satisfied that, whilst the main consideration in selecting recruits should be their intellectual fitness, it is also necessary to provide for the appointment of applicants of good but not of the highest educational qualifications, so as to give representation to the various communities and interests in the country. With this in view we recommend that a minimum educational qualification for all recruits be laid down, and that a committee consisting of three officials and two non-officials, and including two Indians, be instituted in each province to advise the local Government in their selections for the executive branch of the service. In making their proposals the committee should endeavour to secure in the first place suitable young men who have passed best in the university examinations, but should also submit the names of candidates, who have done less well, but who for other reasons appear fitted for the public service. Outside Burma all candidates should be required to possess the degree of a university or to have passed an examination of a corresponding standard prescribed by Government for the European schools. In Burma a similar standard should be aimed at, but pending the development of an adequate field the matriculation standard of the Calcutta university should be accepted or an equivalent test in the European schools course. We advise, further, that an age limit of 21–25 be established for all recruits.

59. *Method of selection recommended for the judicial branch.*—On the judicial side the position is rather different. Here no suggestion for any competitive

## ANNEXURE X.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—(continued).

test has been made; whilst the high and chief courts in most provinces already perform the functions which we desire to see exercised on the executive side by our proposed committees of selection. It will be sufficient, therefore, to lay down that this procedure be made general. In such case the prerogative of Government to appoint all their officers would be established, but they should in every case act with the advice of the highest judicial authority available. To bring this about legislation would be required in certain provinces, and we recommend that this be undertaken. It should also be provided that promotion into selection posts or into a different class, as for example from munsifships into subordinate judgeships, should be made on similar principles. We have also considered the question of the preliminary qualifications to be required of recruits. At present in certain provinces candidates are expected to have practised, or to have had the opportunity of practising, at the bar for a period of three years. This arrangement has the disadvantage that it delays recruitment to the detriment of an officer's pension, and prevents his reaching a position of real responsibility young enough in life. In practice also the period is not sufficient to enable young men to have acquired any real experience and is thus of little practical use. On the other hand we do not think it advisable that young men should be translated straight from the examination room to the bench. To meet this situation we are recommending in a subsequent paragraph that a grade of probationers be created. When this has been done bar experience need no longer be regarded as obligatory, though, where it has been obtained, it might rightly be taken into account by the judicial authorities in making their recommendations. We also think that the possession of the LL.B. degree, which is now expected of applicants in Madras, Bombay, Bengal (with Assam), the United Provinces and Bihar and Orissa, should be made obligatory for all direct recruits, except in Burma, where it should receive preferential consideration. We think further that in making their recommendations the judicial authorities should follow the results of the LL.B. examination for the larger share of the available vacancies, provided that the candidates who would be successful under this test are in other respects suitable, and should deal with the remaining vacancies in the manner suggested for the executive line with due regard to the claims of the various communities and interests in the country. This will make it possible to fix a maximum age-limit of 30 before which an officer should be appointed. This is on every ground desirable and we recommend accordingly.

60. *Communal representation in India.*—It remains to give the figures which we have had prepared to show the proportion of appointments, including listed posts, filled by statutory civil servants and provincial civil service officers, in the various provincial civil services, held on the 1st April 1913 by Hindus and Muhammadans respectively, and in the Punjab by Sikhs and in Burma by Buddhists as well.

Province.	Hindus.		Muhammadans.		Sikhs in the Punjab, and Buddhists in Burma.	
	Per- centage on total popula- tion.	Percentage on total number of persons employed in the execu- tive and judicial branches in the several provinces.	Per- centage on total popula- tion.	Percentage on total number of persons employed in the execu- tive and judicial branches in the several provinces.	Per- centage on total popula- tion.	Percentage on total number of persons employed in the execu- tive and judicial branches in the Punjab and Burma.
Madras	88.89	Executive 73.5 } Judicial 91.3 } 82.9	6.67	Executive 11.8 } Judicial 1.3 } 6.3	—	—
Bombay and Sind	76.02	Executive(a) 81.3 } Judicial 89.1 } 84.4	20.32	Executive(a) 4.9 } Judicial 1.7 } 3.7	—	—
Bengal	44.80	Executive 72.9 } Judicial (b) 97.5 } 84.7	52.74	Executive 18.1 } Judicial (b) 2.5 } 10.6	—	—
Bihar and Orissa	82.24	Executive 54.3 } Judicial 76.1 } 60.2	10.63	Executive 22.6 } Judicial 22.7 } 22.7	—	—
United Provinces of Agra and Oudh.	85.32	Executive 50.7 } Judicial 73.9 } 60.1	14.11	Executive 41.3 } Judicial 24.8 } 34.7	—	—
Punjab	33.46	Executive 38.2 } Judicial 37.5 } 38.0	54.85	Executive 38.2 } Judicial 39.6 } 38.6	10.48	Executive 10.3 } Judicial 6.2 } 9.2
Burma	3.22	Executive Nil } Judicial Nil } —	3.47	Executive 0.8 } Judicial Nil } 0.6	85.72	Executive 43.2 } Judicial 86.7 } 51.2
Central Provinces, including Berar.	82.62	Executive 53.0 } Judicial 88.2 } 64.9	4.06	Executive 28.0 } Judicial 3.9 } 19.9	—	—
Assam	35.55	Executive 62.7 } Judicial (c) 91.7 } 67.6	50.25	Executive 18.6 } Judicial (c) 8.3 } 16.9	—	—

(a) Includes mamlatdars.

(b) Excludes officers serving in Assam.

(c) Officers serving in Assam but borne on the Bengal cadre.

## ANNEXURE X.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—(continued).

This shows that a problem exists. But in the nature of things no exact solution of it is possible. Not only census figures, but also influence, education, race characteristics, and the number of qualified candidates available, are all points which have to be taken into consideration; whilst there is always a risk of doing more harm by stereotyping existing sectional divisions than by leaving things in a fluid state as at present. We have, therefore, preferred, as already explained, to rely on the exercise of the prerogative of Government to maintain a balance between the various interests. This will be possible under the system of recruitment already recommended.

## CHAPTER XI.

## SYSTEMS OF PROBATION AND TRAINING.

61. *Probation*.—Under the general rules all direct recruits, unless specially exempted, have to pass through a time of probation. We think that this should be made obligatory for all, and would fix the period definitely at two years. We also think that the present practice in certain provinces of paying officers whilst on probation lower rates of salary should be made general on the executive side by the creation of a definite grade of such officers through which all direct recruits should pass, and we have made provision accordingly. We have also provided for similar additions to the cadre on the judicial side to enable recruits to obtain experience before they enter upon their actual duties.

62. *Training*.—Direct recruits on the judicial side should be trained under the orders of the highest judicial authorities. On the executive side they should go through a course of practical training similar to that of an assistant collector in the Indian civil service.

## CHAPTER XII.

## CONDITIONS OF SALARY.

63. *Salaries of executive officers*.—The officers of the provincial civil services are now paid on a graded system. This was everywhere regarded as a grievance, and on general grounds we think that the incremental method should be substituted. In fixing rates for the executive side we have had regard to the fact that the class of young man required will possess no technical qualifications, and will be forthcoming in large numbers. For such the scale, which we have suggested elsewhere for services to be recruited from university graduates, will be suitable, namely, Rs. 150 a month (in Burma Rs. 200 a month) for probationers, and Rs. 250-40/3-450-50/3-500 (in Burma Rs. 300-40/3-500-50/3-550) a month for the bulk of the officers once they are confirmed. But we would recognise the special importance of these services, and the fact that the best men of their year have to be attracted to them, by providing for a number of selection posts, equal to 15 per cent. of the total strength, on a higher scale of Rs. 600-40-800 a month. Beyond this again we would have a further selection grade on Rs. 1,000 a month for two per cent. of each service. Officers would also be eligible for promotion to Indian civil service posts.

64. *Salaries of judicial officers*.—On the judicial side the position is somewhat different. Here recruits will have to possess the LL.B. qualification, and will thus have had a longer educational course. They will also be older than their executive colleagues. This is a reason for starting them on a higher initial rate of salary and for bringing them to the top of the incremental scale in a shorter period. We accordingly recommend that probationers be given a salary of Rs. 200 a month, and that on confirmation officers be remunerated on a scale of Rs. 300-40/3-500 (in Burma Rs. 300-40/3-500-50/3-550) a month. We would provide further that officers selected for subjudgeships, subordinate judgeships or similar posts be paid at the rate of Rs. 600-40-800 a month, with a further selection grade of Rs. 1,000 a month for two per cent. of the service. Beyond this again will be the Indian civil service posts, as on the executive side of the service.

65. *Estimate of cost*.—The cost of this reorganisation, as shown in schedule VI. to the annexure, and including the expenditure on account of probationers and on the formation of a leave reserve, with which we shall deal in a subsequent chapter, will be approximately Rs. 21,31,904 a year, as follows:—

## ANNEXURE X.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—(continued).

	Executive branch.			Judicial branch.			Total.		
	Rs.	A.	P.	Rs.	A.	P.	Rs.	A.	P.
(i) On account of probationers - - -	45,900	0	0	2,03,400	0	0	2,49,300	0	0
(ii) " " a leave reserve - - -	28,457	4	0	1,77,440	4	0	2,05,897	8	0
(iii) " " improved prospects - - -	6,41,546	13	0	10,35,159	13	0	16,76,706	10	0
Total - - - -	7,15,904	1	0	14,16,000	1	0	21,31,904	2	0

In making these calculations we have assumed that the line of cleavage between the main body of the appointments and the selection posts in the judicial branch will follow the existing distinctions of nomenclature in all the provinces except Burma. There only one designation is used for all judicial officers alike, and for the purposes of our estimate we have ranked as selection posts all appointments carrying a salary of Rs. 500 a month and upwards. But we are not satisfied that these distinctions represent everywhere actual distinctions of work done and of powers actually exercised, and recommend that this matter be made the subject of inquiry in consultation with the judicial authorities. The higher scale of salary should be applicable only to such officers as are specially empowered to do, and are actually doing, the higher forms of judicial work. We have omitted from our calculations the cost of transforming the first-class munsifs in the Punjab and the munsifs in the Central Provinces and Berar into subordinate judges. An estimate of this can be made only after the number to be so treated has been decided in consultation with the judicial authorities.

## CHAPTER XIII.

## CONDITIONS OF SERVICE.

66. *Strength of the cadres.*—The cadres of the provincial civil services are constantly being strengthened to meet the administrative demands of the country. In so far as the executive branches are concerned we are satisfied that the increases made are on the whole keeping pace with the work to be done. Cases, however, were brought to our notice in which new appointments had been kept on a temporary basis long after they had ceased to be temporary in anything but name. This condition of affairs was also found to exist on the judicial side, where, in addition, there were indications that the present staff was being overdriven. We recommend, therefore, that, if it is considered impossible by changes in procedure to diminish the volume of work, additions should be made to the staff to enable it to keep pace with its duties. We also think that all temporary appointments should come under review every five years so as to secure that they shall be brought on to the cadre directly they have been found by experience to be permanently necessary.

67. *Leave and deputation reserves.*—At present a leave reserve of 14 per cent. of the cadre is maintained on the executive side in all provinces except Bombay. On the judicial side no such reserve exists except in the United Provinces, where it was added at a recent reorganisation of the cadre. Now that the services will be to a large extent directly recruited, we consider that a leave reserve is necessary, and would introduce one into all the provinces and to the extent shown in schedule VI. to this annexure. In making our calculations we have assumed that 14 on the executive and 9 per cent. on the judicial side will be sufficient for present purposes, but recommend that these figures be reviewed and corrected every five years in the light of actual requirements. We also think that an allowance should be made in each province to meet temporary posts and deputations. This should be calculated in the light of actual needs and should come, like the leave reserve, under quinquennial revision. We have already in dealing with the question of probation and training recommended the creation of grades of probationers for both branches. No further training reserve will, therefore, be necessary.

68. *Annual rate of recruitment.*—The recognised annual rate of recruitment for a service recruited in India is 3·82 per cent. of the total strength. This, however, takes no account of the different conditions of the various cadres, and has ceased to be applied in practice. At present in certain provinces an annual rate has been established on the basis of experience, particularly for the executive branches, but speaking generally nothing definite has been fixed and recruits are taken on as vacancies occur or are likely

ANNEXURE X.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—(*continued*).

to occur. It is important that it should be known from year to year how many vacancies will be available. We recommend, therefore, that service tables be prepared for the two branches of the provincial civil services and formulæ drawn up for the purpose of fixing the annual rates of recruitment. Measures should also be taken every ten years to bring these tables up to date.

## CHAPTER XIV.

## CONDITIONS OF LEAVE.

69. *Leave rules.*—Members of the provincially recruited civil services in both branches are now under the Indian service leave rules. They should continue to be so, subject to the changes which we have recommended in our report. Officers promoted to hold Indian civil service posts should remain under the Indian service leave rules.

## CHAPTER XV.

## CONDITIONS OF PENSION.

70. *Pension rules.*—The ordinary pension rules apply to members of both branches of these services, and, as revised by us, should continue to do so. Officers promoted to hold Indian civil service posts should be regarded as eligible for a special additional pension under our general scheme. Members of the judicial branches should be allowed, subject to the general provisos in cases of this nature, to reckon as service qualifying for superannuation pension the number of completed years by which their age at the time of appointment exceeded 25 years.

## PART III.—MISCELLANEOUS.

## CHAPTER XVI.

## SEPARATION OF JUDICIAL AND EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS.

71. *General observations.*—Opinion in India is much exercised on the question of the separation of the executive and judicial functions of officers, and in the course of our inquiry into the methods of recruitment and the systems of probation and training for the Indian civil service a good deal of evidence was submitted on this subject. In effect we found that the phrase "separation of the executive and judicial" was employed to cover two distinct recommendations, first, the separate recruitment of the judicial service, and, secondly, the withdrawal of magisterial powers from the collector or deputy commissioner of the district. The arguments in favour of the first proposal have received our careful consideration, with the result that we have made recommendations which will have the effect of securing some recruitment from the bar and a more thorough legal training for such civil servants as may hold judicial appointments. The second proposal, relating as it does to functions rather than to training, appeared to us to fall outside the terms of our reference, and we neither took evidence from the various Governments upon it, nor did we probe the alleged evils of the existing system. The two aspects of the problem are, however, so closely related that we found it impossible in dealing with the problems of recruitment and training to exclude evidence as to functions; and we think it will be of use to the authorities to set forth in outline the main arguments which have been presented to us.

72. *Present position.*—At present the district magistrate and collector, apart from his duties as collector of revenue, chairman of the district board and district registrar, is recognised under the criminal procedure code and the police act as the officer responsible for the peace of the district, and is the superior, in all but departmental matters, of the district police force from the superintendent downwards. Under the criminal procedure code he also exercises the full powers of a magistrate of the first class, including those of taking cognisance of offences whether on a complaint before himself or another magistrate, or on information to the police or otherwise. He is also authorised to hear appeals from magistrates of the second and third classes. He can also call for the record of any case disposed of by a subordinate magistrate, and either refer it to the high court, or in certain cases order a committal to the court of sessions. Lastly he can, on due cause being assigned, transfer a case from the file of any subordinate magistrate to his own file or to that of another subordinate court.

73. *Criticisms directed against the present system.*—Against the practice of entrusting the district officer with these powers it is alleged that, as an executive officer, he naturally contracts a habit of mind which unfits him for the impartial discharge of magisterial duties. He knows, it is said, too much about the people, who are brought up for trial, and has too great an interest in securing a conviction, when he thinks that a conviction is justified on the merits, to be deterred by small imperfections in the chain of evidence. The opponents of the present system admit that the district officer rarely tries cases himself, but regard it as objectionable that an officer, who is the head of the police and responsible for the peace of the district, should also supervise the work of his subordinate magistrates, who depend for their professional advancement on his good will and are, therefore, necessarily influenced by their estimate of what his opinions regarding a suit are likely to be. A further count in the charge is that it is wrong in principle that offences under the forest and revenue acts in particular should be brought in appeal to an officer who is the direct revenue superior of the prosecutor in the suit. Criticism is also levelled against the powers, conferred on the district magistrate under section 110 of the criminal procedure code, of calling on any persons within the limits of his jurisdiction to show cause why they should not be ordered to execute bonds for their good behaviour. It is argued that such powers are particularly liable to be abused by executive officers acting on information supplied to them by a not too reliable police, and that, as a matter of fact, some miscarriage of justice has occurred under the operation of this provision. Lastly, it is contended that, owing to the demands of his other business, the district magistrate is continually under the obligation of shifting his court. Not infrequently cases are begun in one place and finished in another, with the result that considerable inconvenience is caused to vakils, pleaders and witnesses.

74. *Arguments in favour of the present system.*—Such in broad outline are the criticisms of those who object to the present system. On the other side it is argued that in the present circumstances of India the concentration of authority in the person of the district officer is a prime necessity of government. In India, it is claimed, there is no active public opinion in favour of the punishment of wrongdoing. The sense that society suffers from the impunity of hardened criminals is still imperfectly developed, and to the inhabitants of an Indian village there seems to be something harsh and inhuman in the inflexibility with which the European fits the punishment to the crime. It is therefore necessary that the official agency for the punishment of offenders should be endowed with an authority proportionate to the weakness of the support which it receives from the community at large. This is all the more necessary on account of the fact that the subordinate magistracy is too apt to take an indulgent view of crime and misdemeanour. It is further urged that a concentration of functions is especially needed for the enforcement of sanitary rules, to which the subordinate magistracy is apt to ascribe less importance than they deserve. The duty of speeding up the machinery of criminal justice cannot, it is asserted, safely be delegated to the sessions judge, who is already overburdened with judicial work, and would also be less likely to know the district well than the executive head. In practice, it is also said, the district magistrate tries comparatively few cases himself; whilst he exercises very little direct control over the police. The real advantage of the present system lies in the powers which the district magistrate holds in reserve; and he knows too much about the police and too much about the district to be misled by police evidence of a corrupt and flimsy character. It is contended also that in the circumstances of an Indian village there should be some authority capable of advising the high court in regard to administrative questions touching the working of the judicial machine. The district officer with his intimate and varied knowledge of the district is more likely to be able to do this adequately than any other official who could be substituted for him. Finally, it is urged that to deprive the collector of all magisterial power would weaken his power and influence in the district. Life is still very primitive in India and the main function of government is to put down crime. If the agency responsible for bringing criminals to justice found that its action was impeded by a weak or dilatory judiciary a fatal blow would be struck, not only at the influence of the district officer himself, but at the cause of peace and order in the country.

75. *Conclusions.*—From this conflict of opinion the following general considerations appear to emerge. In the first place, the union of executive and judicial powers in the persons of the collector and his subordinate magistracy, though strictly analogous to the

## ANNEXURE X.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—(continued).

union of powers in England in the justices of the peace from the fourteenth century to the county councils act of 1888, is an anomaly to which strong objection may be taken on theoretical grounds. The system, moreover, arouses keen dissatisfaction amongst an influential section of the educated Indian community, and particularly the lawyers, who regard it as a violation of an elementary principle of the common law that the prosecutor should not also be the judge. This feeling of dissatisfaction is more widespread in some provinces than in others, and in certain areas may be the result of shortcomings in the working of the judicial system, which are not connected with the union of powers. As to the extent of the mischief, if mischief there be arising from the system, there is a clear divergence of opinion. Some witnesses affirm, and others deny that substantial hardship has been caused. In the next place it is clear that behind a theoretical union of powers there is already a great deal of practical division, and it may be that separation will be a necessary consequence of the natural increase in the volume of legal business in the country. In the presidency towns separation is already an established fact. In Madras it already exists in the lower grades. In Burma we were told that the expansion of work was gradually solving the problem for itself. In Bengal, where there is already complete separation so far as the provincial civil service is concerned, the experiment has been made of appointing special deputy collectors to try estate lands act suits, &c. ; whilst additional district magistrates have also been established in certain areas. Administrative exigencies will doubtless carry the process of separation further, stage by stage ; and even among the upholders of the merits of the present system there is a certain body of opinion which would be prepared to admit the principle of separation in selected districts where the work of administration is especially heavy, and where the results of the experiment might carefully be watched. Finally, the evidence on both sides suggests that it would be inexpedient to sanction any scheme of separation which does not provide for the retention by the collector of the preventive powers entrusted to him by the criminal procedure code, and for some adequate supervision over the inferior magistracy. Such supervision might be secured either by adding to the number of sessions judges or by appointing special officers to discharge the magisterial functions now vested in the collector. But upon these points of administrative detail, as upon the large question of principle, we do not feel that we are entitled either by the terms of the reference or by the character of our inquiry to make positive recommendations.

## CHAPTER XVII.

## SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS.

76. *Changes recommended in the Indian civil service.*—The changes which we have proposed in the Indian civil service are as follows :—

- (i) The system of recruiting military officers to fill civil service posts in Burma should gradually be abolished (paragraph 3).
- (ii) Legislation should be undertaken with the object of making the Indian civil service act of 1861 apply, with suitable reservations, to the whole of India. The appointments scheduled in this act should be made to correspond with the existing Indian civil service posts. Provision should also be made to allow of natives of India being admitted to the Indian civil service itself, even though they have not passed the examination in London. Pending such legislation a mixed commission should be established in each province, and statutory natives of India, who will ultimately become members of the Indian civil service, should be appointed thereto as a temporary arrangement. Other officers appointed to fill civil service posts should take rank with members of the Indian civil service and be eligible for all appointments in the civil service cadre on their merits (paragraph 3).
- (iii) The medical examination of candidates for appointment in England should be made more stringent ; there should be two examinations, one at the commencement of the period of probation and one after its completion ; and touch should be established between the medical board of the India Office and the practitioners employed by the civil service commissioners. A rejected candidate should have the right of appeal (paragraph 6).
- (iv) Candidates should be selected in London at an age which will admit of their arriving in India when they are about 22 or 23 (paragraph 7).
- (v) Direct recruits to the Indian civil service should go through a three years' probationary course in England (paragraph 8).

## ANNEXURE X.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—(continued).

- (vi) The age limits for the open competitive examination in London should be 17-19 on the 1st January preceding the examination (paragraph 9).
- (vii) The papers set at the open competitive examination in London should provide for groups of options, and be based on the model of those in force for the various scholarship and bursary examinations in the universities (paragraph 10).
- (viii) Each candidate should be required to furnish a certificate that he has attended the course of a recognised secondary school for a period of three years up to a time within six months of the examination, or, if he has left school prior to this and gone to a university, that he has had the regular school course followed by a course at a university extending over an academic year. The civil service commissioners should have a discretionary power to dispense with this condition (paragraph 11).
- (ix) Forty posts of district (divisional) and sessions judge should be reserved for recruitment from the bar (paragraph 14).
- (x) Forty-one superior posts should be reserved for officers of the provincial civil services (paragraph 15).
- (xi) Nine direct appointments to the Indian civil service should be made annually in India from amongst statutory natives of India, and this figure should be subject to revision every five years (paragraphs 17 and 18).
- (xii) Such candidates should be sent to England to go through the three years' probationary course with the candidates selected at the examination in London (paragraph 17).
- (xiii) The seniority of officers directly recruited to the service, whether in England or in India, should be decided by the marks obtained in the intermediate and final examinations of the probationary course (paragraph 17).
- (xiv) Of the officers directly recruited each year in India, two should be nominated by the Secretary of State with the advice of the Government of India from amongst graduates of the various universities, and the remainder should be selected on the results of a competitive examination conducted by the civil service commissioners and open to candidates nominated with the advice of a committee in touch with educational interests in each province. To begin with up to twenty candidates should be nominated from each university area. The examination should be based on the Indian educational curriculum (paragraphs 19 and 20).
- (xv) Candidates for examination in India should be required to possess the B.A. degree or its equivalent and to be over 20 and under 22 years of age at the date of the examination (paragraph 21).
- (xvi) Of the 41 Indian civil service posts to be filled by members of the provincial civil services 15 should be in the executive and 26 in the judicial branch. Within these limits a free course should be given for promotion and officers should not be tied down to specific posts (paragraphs 22 and 23).
- (xvii) Only eight inferior posts need be notified under the statute of 1870, and that only for so long as the acts which make this process necessary are not amended (paragraph 23).
- (xviii) Direct recruits should be at liberty to go through their probationary course at any university which satisfies the civil service commissioners that it can give the instruction required and can provide by means of colleges or hostels for adequate supervision; and they should be granted an allowance of 150*l.* a year for this purpose, subject to their being diligent and of good behaviour. Probationers from India should receive free passages to and from England (paragraph 25).
- (xix) For the present, monetary grants in aid should be given only to the universities of Oxford, Cambridge, and London, and for so long as they are prepared to co-operate in dealing with the probationers on the lines desired (paragraph 25).
- (xx) It should be a condition of recognition of any university that it should institute an honours course for probationers leading up to a degree in certain prescribed subjects; in particular in law, Indian history, interpreted in its widest sense, and in oriental languages. A scheme

## ANNEXURE X.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—(continued).

- should be drawn up by the civil service commissioners in consultation with the accredited representatives of Oxford, Cambridge and London universities (paragraph 26 to 29).
- (xxi) Probationers should be required to attend the law courts and to report cases, to obtain a practical working knowledge of the vernacular of their province, and to pass in riding. They should also be encouraged to get themselves called to the bar. Indian candidates, who are posted to a province, the language of which is their mother tongue, or is derived from the same stock as their mother tongue, should offer a modern European language in place of an Indian vernacular (paragraph 30).
  - (xxii) The intermediate and final examinations in the probationary course should be conducted by the civil service commissioners. The universities should conduct their own examinations for their own degrees. As the arrangements mature it may be possible to avoid two separate examinations. This idea should be developed as occasion offers (paragraph 31).
  - (xxiii) Officers on arrival in India should be trained under the supervision of a suitable collector. Too much court work should not be given during the first year, the departmental examinations should be made more practical, and a higher colloquial test should be enforced (paragraph 32).
  - (xxiv) The decision as to whether an officer is to be employed on the executive or the judicial side should be arrived at as soon as possible after the completion of the fourth and not later than the end of the sixth year of service (paragraph 32).
  - (xxv) Officers on the judicial side should be encouraged to get themselves called to the bar. Those on the executive side should be encouraged to study specific problems of administration during their leave (paragraph 33).
  - (xxvi) Incremental scales of salary should be instituted in place of the present graded system and the salaries of officers should be fixed at the rates stated (paragraphs 34 to 37).
  - (xxvii) Statutory natives of India promoted from the provincial civil services, for so long as they are employed either as collectors or as district and session judges second grade or in other Indian civil service posts of a similar or inferior standing, should be paid at lower rates than other officers of the same rank. In all other cases officers should be paid at equal rates, wherever recruited and whether statutory natives of India or not (paragraph 38).
  - (xxviii) The cadre of the service should be increased (paragraph 39).
  - (xxix) The figures on which the strength of the cadre is based should be recalculated and brought up to date every ten years. The calculations as to temporary posts and deputations, leave, and the like should be revised every five years. The term "inferior posts" should be removed from the recruitment formula. A deficiency or surplus of officers should be corrected at the point where the shortage or excess is found to exist. With this object in view the cadres in the various provinces should be examined, and distribution lists should be prepared from year to year. If it is found to be impossible to get rid of an excess of officers of the desired standing, and a block in promotion occurs, temporary allowances should be given to the individuals affected (paragraph 41).
  - (xxx) Special leave rules should be framed for officers appointed to judgeships from the bar (paragraph 42).
  - (xxxi) A scheme of superannuation pensions on the lines indicated should be worked out in detail and considered by the Government after taking the views of members of the service (paragraph 44).
  - (xxxii) Without waiting for the results of any alternative scheme of superannuation pensions the whole charge for the payment of the 1,000*l.* annuity should be borne by the state (paragraph 45).
  - (xxxiii) The four per cent. contribution to his annuity now made by each individual officer should be funded, and the amount lying to his credit should be payable to him on his retirement, or to his legal representative in the event of his decease, together with interest at four per cent. (paragraph 46).


- (xxxiv) An additional pension of 200*l.* a year should be granted to officers who have held a lieutenant-governorship for not less than three years. Any period spent in an officiating capacity should count for this purpose as if it were a substantive tenure (paragraph 47).
- (xxxv) The accounts of the Indian civil service family pension fund should be rendered punctually and promulgated to the service without delay (paragraph 49).
- (xxxvi) The working of the arrangement by which statutory natives of India have been brought within the scope of the Indian civil service family pension fund should be closely watched; and only such officers as are members of the Indian civil service itself should be admitted to the fund (paragraph 50).

77. *Changes recommended in the provincial civil services.*—The changes which we have proposed in the provincial civil services are as follows:—

- (i) The executive and judicial branches should be separated in the Punjab to conform with the practice elsewhere. Such munsifs of the first class in the Punjab and such munsifs in the Central Provinces and Berar as are actually doing work of a superior kind should be included in the provincial civil service of their province (paragraph 51).
- (ii) The term “provincial” should not be used in the official designation of the services. They should be known as the Madras (Bombay, etc.) civil services (paragraph 53).
- (iii) In the executive branches not more than 50 per cent. of the vacancies should be filled by promotion from the subordinate services. In the judicial branches direct recruitment should be the rule, except in provinces which have subordinate judicial services, the members of which should be eligible for promotion up to a limit of 50 per cent. of the vacancies. In both branches the practice of recruiting from other services or from the ministerial establishments should be abandoned (paragraph 56).
- (iv) Direct appointments to the executive branch should be made with the advice of a committee of five persons. In selecting recruits the committee should have regard chiefly to intellectual fitness as proved by the results of the university examinations, but should also submit the names of other candidates who appear fitted for the public service. Outside Burma all candidates recommended should possess the degree of a university or have passed an examination of a corresponding standard prescribed by Government for the European schools. In Burma a lower standard should be permissible for the present. The age limits for candidates should be 21–25 (paragraph 58).
- (v) Direct appointments to the judicial branches should be made by the local Governments with the advice of the high or chief courts or other principal judicial authority. Promotion into selection posts or into a different class should similarly be given. Outside Burma all candidates for direct appointment to the judicial branches should possess the LL.B. degree of a university and no candidate should be appointed in these branches who is over 30 years of age. Bar experience need not be regarded as obligatory so soon as a probationary course has been provided. In selecting recruits the high and chief courts should have regard chiefly to intellectual fitness, as proved by the results of the LL.B. examinations, but should also submit the names of other suitable candidates in the manner proposed for the executive branches (paragraph 59).
- (vi) A grade of probationers should be provided in both the executive and the judicial branches. Direct recruits should be on probation for two years (paragraph 61).
- (vii) Direct recruits on the judicial side should be trained under the orders of the highest judicial authorities. On the executive side they should go through a course of training similar to that of an assistant collector of the Indian civil service (paragraph 62).

## ANNEXURE X.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—(continued).

- (viii) Officers should be paid salaries on the incremental system and at the rates stated. Steps should be taken to reclassify judicial officers for purposes of salary in accordance with the importance of the work done by each class of them (paragraphs 63 to 65).
- (ix) Steps should be taken to review all temporary appointments every five years so as to bring on to the cadres all posts which have come to be of a permanent character. The judicial branches should be strengthened if it is not found possible by changes of procedure to reduce the volume of their work (paragraph 66).
- (x) Leave and deputation reserves should everywhere be maintained and their adequacy should be reviewed every five years (paragraph 67).
- (xi) The number of vacancies to be filled annually should be determined and formulæ established and kept up to date for this purpose (paragraph 68).
- (xii) Members of the provincially recruited civil services should be under the Indian service leave rules and should continue under them when promoted to hold Indian civil service posts (paragraph 69).
- (xiii) Members of the provincial civil services should be under the ordinary pension rules. Officers promoted to hold Indian civil service posts should be eligible for special additional pensions. Members of the judicial branches should be allowed to reckon as service qualifying for superannuation pension the number of completed years by which their age at the time of appointment exceeded 25 years (paragraph 70).



## SCHEDULE I.

(Referred to in paragraph 10 of Annexure X.)

## DRAFT REGULATIONS FOR THE OPEN EXAMINATION FOR THE INDIAN CIVIL SERVICE.

1. Candidates must be over 17 and under 19 on the 1st January in the year in which the examination is held.

2. Unless specially excused by the civil service commissioners candidates must have attended a school recognised by the civil service commissioners continuously for at least three years before appearing at the examination. (*N.B.*—A candidate who has left school more than six months before appearing at the examination will not be held to have satisfied this regulation, save in cases where the school course has been followed immediately by residence at a university and attendance at university courses of not less than an academic year.)

3. The examinations shall be in the four following parts :—

A. English ;

B. One of the following groups of subjects :—

Group I. Classics,

„ II. Modern languages,

„ III. Mathematics and science ;

C. A supplementary subject not offered in the group which the candidate has chosen under B ;

D. An oral examination.

4. The examination in each of the parts will be conducted as follows :—

A. English. The following papers will be set :—

(1) An essay, (2) Précis writing, (3) A general paper ;

B. The following papers will be set in :—

Group I. Classics :—

- Latin - Unseen prose, Unseen verse,  
Translation into Latin prose, Roman history,  
Greek - Unseen prose, Unseen verse,  
Translation into Greek prose, Greek history ;

Group II. Modern languages :—

Candidates will be examined in—

- (a) English history and English literature ; and  
(b) Any two of the following languages :—  
French, German, Spanish, Italian.

The following papers will be set on the foreign languages :—

- (1) Unseen ;  
(2) Translation into French, German, Spanish, Italian ;  
(3) Free composition ;  
(4) An oral examination ;  
(5) History and literature of France, Germany, Spain, and Italy ;

Group III. Mathematics and science :—

Papers will be set on the following :—

Pure mathematics, Applied mathematics,  
Physics, Chemistry,

C. A supplementary subject.—A candidate may elect to be examined in any one of the following subjects provided that he has not already taken that subject as part of one of the groups in B. : Latin, Greek, French, German, Spanish, Italian, Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry. The examination in these subjects will be of a less advanced character than that required in Part B.

D. The examiners will call up for an oral examination the candidates who have most distinguished themselves in the written papers ; the examination will be partly upon one of the subjects offered in the written examination selected by the candidate and partly upon general information.

5. The different parts of the examination will carry the following marks :—

A. 3,000. B. 8,000. C. 1,500. D. 1,500.

## SCHEDULE II.

(Referred to in paragraph 26 of Annexure X.)

(a) LETTER from the ACADEMIC REGISTRAR, UNIVERSITY of LONDON, to the JOINT SECRETARY, ROYAL COMMISSION on the PUBLIC SERVICES in INDIA, dated 21st July 1914.

With further reference to paragraph (2) of your letter of June 6th, 1913\*, and to the third Resolution of Senate conveyed to you in my letter of July 16th, 1913\*, I am now directed to inform you that the Senate, after consultation with the relevant boards of studies and with the institutions concerned with the instruction in question, beg to submit to the Commission the enclosed draft scheme for an honours course of Indian studies suitable for probationers of the Indian civil service and leading up to an honours degree.

DRAFT SCHEME FOR AN HONOURS COURSE IN INDIAN STUDIES SUITABLE FOR PROBATIONERS OF THE INDIAN CIVIL SERVICE AND LEADING UP TO AN HONOURS DEGREE.

### COMPULSORY SUBJECTS.

#### First Year Course.

(1) One vernacular language to be selected according to the province to which the probationer is assigned. Three lectures a week, together with practical instruction by a native instructor.

## ANNEXURE X.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—(continued).

(2) Law : Elements of jurisprudence, together with the principles of the law of contract and tort. Two lectures a week.

(3) General Economics. Two lectures a week.

(4) Ancient History and Mediæval and Modern European History. Two lectures a week.

*Second Year Course.*

(1) and (2) Two vernacular languages. Two lectures a week for each language, together with practical instruction by a native instructor.

(3) Law : Evidence (Civil and Criminal), Principles of Equity, and Criminal Law. Two lectures a week.

(4) Economics as applied to India. Two lectures a week.

(5) History of India up to 1707 A.D. Two lectures a week.

The probationers should in the second and third years, when they have had the opportunity to acquire a knowledge of the principles of law, attend the courts of all grades and take notes of, and report, cases having some particular point or interest.

*Third Year Course.*

(1) and (2) Two vernacular languages. Two lectures a week for each language, together with practical instruction by a native instructor.

(3) Law : Evidence (Civil and Criminal), Criminal Law and Indian Procedure. The Elements of Hindu and Mohammedan Law. Three lectures a week.

(4) Indian Sociology, including the history of Indian Religions. Two lectures a week.

(5) History of India and its relation to the world after 1707 A.D. Two lectures a week.

(See also last paragraph under Second Year Course.)

## ADDITIONAL SUBJECTS.

A candidate to be required in each year to take one additional subject, and not to be allowed to take more than two additional subjects selected from the following list. He may take the same additional subjects throughout the three years if his course be approved by the appropriate board :—

- (1) a classical Oriental language ;
- (2) public administration, with special reference to India and finance, imperial and local ;
- (3) geography ;
- (4) ethnology, with special reference to India ;
- (5) philosophy, including history of philosophy, theory of knowledge and methodology ;
- (6) psychology and ethics ;
- (7) the comparative study of religions ;
- (8) constitutional law and history.

(b) LETTER from the ACADEMIC REGISTRAR, UNIVERSITY OF LONDON, to the JOINT SECRETARY, ROYAL COMMISSION on the PUBLIC SERVICES in INDIA, dated 19th November 1914.

Adverting to my letter of the 21st July 1914, enclosing a draft scheme for an Honours Course of Indian Studies suitable for probationers of the Indian Civil Service, I have now to inform you that, after report from the Board of Studies in Anthropology, the Senate at their meeting on November 18th, 1914, passed the following resolution :—

That the Royal Commission on the Public Services in India be informed, with reference to the draft scheme for an Honours Course of Indian Studies forwarded to the Commission in accordance with S.M. 4283 of 15 July 1914, that the Senate desired to amend the draft scheme by the insertion of a provision to the effect that natives of India shall be required to substitute an additional subject for one of the vernacular languages.

- (c) LETTER from the Very Rev. T. B. STRONG, D.D., VICE-CHANCELLOR of the UNIVERSITY of OXFORD, to the Rt. Hon. LORD ISLINGTON, dated 17th December 1913.

*Proposed scheme for training Indian civil service probationers at Oxford.*

The accompanying scheme is based on the expert advice of the teachers of the various subjects contained in it, and it may be taken that these teachers in their various departments would be able and willing to supply a large part, if not all, of the education and teaching required.

The Hebdomadal Council think it well to emphasise the point that while they would be prepared, if it is desired by the Government, to propose such a scheme to the university, and to introduce the legislation necessary to bring it into operation, they are not in a position to guarantee that it would be accepted.

*Scheme for an honour school of Indian studies.*

1. The general subjects of the examination in Indian studies shall be:—A. languages; B. history, sociology, and economics; C. law.

2. The honours course shall extend over three years and consist of two parts, the first leading to a preliminary examination to be held at the end of the first year, either in July or in September, and the second to a final examination to be held at the end of the third year.

3. The *preliminary examination* shall consist of the following parts:—

- (a) The elements of one classical language: Sanskrit, Persian, Arabic, Pāli, or Classical Tamil. [Two papers.]

[In the opinion of some of the teachers a general knowledge of phonetics should be required.]

- (b) History of India, including the history of Indian religions, antecedent to the commencement of British rule (with physical, historical, and political geography). [One paper.]

- (c) The principles of sociology and ethnology. [One paper.]

- (d) Outlines of jurisprudence; criminal law and procedure; law of evidence. [Two papers.]

[The reason for introducing Criminal Law and Procedure and the Law of Evidence at this stage is to prepare the probationers for the proper appreciation of the cases they will hear in the courts in the second and third years.]

4. The *final examination* shall consist of the following parts:—

- (a) One vernacular Indian language, that is, Hindustānī, Bengālī, Marathī, Tāmīl, Telugu, or Burmese. [Two papers.]

- (b) History of the British period to 1900: The rise, growth, and organisation of the British power in India (including the geography of the subject). [Two papers.]

- (c) General principles of political and economic science, with special reference to the history of political institutions in India. [One paper.]

- (d) Hindu and Muhammadan Law; the law of contracts (with special reference to the Indian law on the subject); the law of actionable wrongs; the transfer of property in British India. [Four papers.]

- (e) One of five special subjects. [Two papers.]

(1) Advanced study of one of the above classical languages.

(2) The special period of Indian history prescribed in the honour school of modern history: "British India, 1773-1805."

(3) Sociology and anthropology.

(4) A second vernacular language.

[Candidates should not be allowed to take up their mother tongue as a vernacular.]

(5) Political economy, with special reference to the economics of the Indian Empire.

## ANNEXURE X.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—(continued).

## SCHEDULE III.

[Referred to in paragraphs 34–38 of Annexure X.]

A.—DETAILED STATEMENT SHOWING THE PRESENT AND PROPOSED COST OF THE INDIAN CIVIL SERVICE AND THE NET EXTRA EXPENDITURE INVOLVED IN THE RECOMMENDATIONS. §  
Madras.

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
<i>Superior Executive Posts.</i>				<i>Superior Executive Posts.</i>			
2	Members of Council -	Rs. 5,333½	Rs. 10,666 10 8	2	Members of Council -	Rs. 5,333½	Rs. 10,666 10 8
1	Member, Board of Revenue -	3,750	3,750 0 0	1	Member, Board of Revenue -	3,890	3,890 0 0
1	Chief Secretary -	3,750	3,750 0 0	1	Chief Secretary -	3,890	3,890 0 0
1	Member, Board of Revenue -	3,500	3,500 0 0	1	Member, Board of Revenue -	3,640	3,640 0 0
1	Secretary, Revenue Department.	3,000	3,000 0 0	1	Secretary, Revenue Department.	3,140	3,140 0 0
2	Members, Board of Revenue	3,000	6,000 0 0	2	Members, Board of Revenue	3,140	6,280 0 0
1	Inspector-General of Police -	2,500-100-3,000	2,833 5 4	1	(a) Inspector-General of Police	2,640-100-3,140	2,973 5 4
1	Resident, Travancore -	2,800	2,800 0 0	1	Resident, Travancore -	2,940	2,940 0 0
9	Collectors, 1st grade -	2,500	22,500 0 0	30	(b) Collectors -	1,950-100-2,650	72,033 4 6
14	Collectors, 2nd grade -	2,250	31,500 0 0				
1	Commissioner of Coorg -	1,800-50-2,000	1,946 10 8	1	Secretary to Commissioner, Land Revenue.	1,600-70-1,950	1,833 5 4
6	Collectors, 3rd grade -	1,800	10,800 0 0	1	Secretary to Commissioner, Salt and Abkari Revenue.	1,600-70-1,950	1,833 5 4
1	Secretary to Commissioner, Land Revenue.	1,500-60-1,800	1,700 0 0	1	Private Secretary	1,600	1,600 0 0
1	Secretary to Commissioner, Salt and Abkari Revenue.	1,800	1,800 0 0	19	Sub-Collectors -	1,500	28,500 0 0
1	Private Secretary	1,500	1,500 0 0				
19	Sub-Collectors and Joint Magistrates, 1st grade.	1,200	22,800 0 0				
			1,30,746 10 8				1,43,219 15 2
<i>Deduct—Cost of appointments listed as open to members of the Provincial Civil Service:</i>				<i>Deduct—Cost of appointments as Collectors and Sub-Collectors held by members of the Provincial Civil Service:</i>			
	3 Collectors -	-	6,703 7 3		2 Collectors at Rs. 2,401 1 9 -	-	4,802 3 6
	1 Sub-Collector -	-	1,200 0 0				
			7,903 7 3				
<i>Add—Cost of listed appointments held by members of the Provincial Civil Service:</i>				<i>Add—Cost of appointments in the grade of Collectors and Sub-Collectors held by members of the Provincial Civil Service:</i>			
	3 Collectors -	-	4,282 12 3		2 Collectors -	1,200-75-1,800	3,160 0 0
	1 Secretary to Board of Revenue.	1,000	1,000 0 0				
			5,282 12 3				
<i>Add—Acting allowances for officiating promotion within the class of Collectors (approximately)</i>							
			3,250 0 0				
62	Total Superior Executive posts -		1,31,375 15 8	62	Total Superior Executive posts -		1,41,577 11 8
<i>Superior Judicial Posts.</i>				<i>Superior Judicial Posts.</i>			
2	High Court Judges -	4,000	8,000 0 0	2	High Court Judges -	4,140	8,280 0 0
2	District and Sessions Judges, 1st grade.	3,000	6,000 0 0	2	District and Sessions Judges, 1st grade.	3,140	6,280 0 0
7	District and Sessions Judges, 2nd grade.	2,500	17,500 0 0	20	District and Sessions Judges, 2nd grade.	2,150-100-2,650	49,666 10 8
7	District and Sessions Judges, 3rd grade.	2,250	15,750 0 0				
6	District and Sessions Judges, 4th grade.	2,000	12,000 0 0	1	Registrar, High Court -	1,600-70-1,950	1,833 5 4
1	Registrar, High Court -	1,500-60-1,800	1,700 0 0				66,060 0 0
			60,950 0 0				
<i>Deduct—Cost of appointments listed as open to members of the Provincial Civil Service:</i>				<i>Deduct—Cost of appointments held by members of the Provincial Civil Service:</i>			
	4 District and Sessions Judges -	-	9,318 3 0		3 District and Sessions Judges, at Rs. 2,543 0 6.	-	7,629 1 6
<i>Add—Cost of listed appointments held by members of the Provincial Civil Service:</i>				<i>Add—Cost of appointments held by members of the Provincial Civil Service:</i>			
	4 District and Sessions Judges.	†	5,981 13 0		3 District and Sessions Judges.	†	5,165 7 3
<i>Add—Acting allowances for officiating promotion between the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th grades of District and Sessions Judge (approximately).</i>							
			1,650 0 0				
25	Total Superior Judicial posts -		59,263 10 0	25	Total Superior Judicial posts -		63,596 5 9
	Carried forward -		1,90,639 9 8		Carried forward -		2,05,174 1 5

§ Throughout these calculations it has been assumed that certain specific posts have been reserved for members of the provincial civil services. This has been done to facilitate the preparation of the estimate. The officers promoted will be eligible for any superior post.

\* 1st grade, Rs. 1,600; 2nd grade, Rs. 1,500; 3rd grade, 1,200.

(a) Should be excluded for purpose of fixing strength of the cadre.

(b) Includes directorship of agriculture, which should be excluded for purpose of fixing the strength of the cadre.

† 1st grade, Rs. 2,000; 2nd grade, Rs. 1,600; 3rd grade, Rs. 1,500; 4th grade, Rs. 1,200.

‡ 1st grade, Rs. 3,140; 2nd grade, Rs. 1,200-75-1,800.

## ANNEXURE X.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—(continued).

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
	Brought forward -	Rs.	Rs. A. P.		Brought forward -	Rs.	Rs. A. P.
		- - -	1,90,639 9 8			- - -	2,05,174 1 5
	<i>Inferior Posts.</i>				<i>Inferior Posts.</i>		
3	Under Secretaries -	1,000	3,000 0 0				
16	Sub-Collectors and Joint Magistrates, 2nd grade.	900	14,400 0 0				
16	Sub-Collectors and Joint Magistrates, 3rd grade.	700	11,200 0 0	83	Assistant Collectors -	-	71,170 6 10
53	Reserve posts, i.e., Assistant Collectors.	400-500	25,800 0 0				
	Add—Acting allowances for officiating promotion between inferior posts (approximately).		4,000 0 0				
	Add—Acting allowances for officiating promotion between inferior and superior posts (approximately).		10,500 0 0		Add—Acting allowances for officiating promotion between inferior and superior posts (approximately).		8,400 0 0
88	Total Inferior posts -	-	68,900 0 0	83	Total Inferior posts -	-	79,570 6 10
	Add—Exchange Compensation allowance:						
	(i) Superior posts -	-	8,665 1 0				
	(ii) Inferior posts -	-	3,891 7 6				
			12,556 8 6				
	Grand Total -	-	2,72,096 2 2		Grand Total -	-	2,84,744 8 3
					Deduct present cost -	-	2,72,096 2 2
					Net Extra Expenditure -	-	12,648 6 1

## Bombay.

<i>Superior Executive Posts:</i>				<i>Superior Executive Posts:</i>			
2	Members of Council -	5,333½	10,666 10 8	2	Members of Council -	5,333½	10,666 10 8
1	Chief Secretary -	3,750	3,750 0 0	1	Chief Secretary -	3,890	3,890 0 0
1	Commissioner in Sind -	3,750	3,750 0 0	1	Commissioner in Sind -	3,890	3,890 0 0
3	Commissioners -	3,500	10,500 0 0	3	Commissioners -	3,640	10,920 0 0
1	Secretary -	3,125	3,125 0 0	1	Secretary -	3,265	3,265 0 0
1	Commissioner of Customs, Salt, Opium, &c.	3,000	3,000 0 0	1	Commissioner of Customs, Salt, Opium, &c.	3,140	3,140 0 0
1	Municipal Commissioner, Bombay.	3,000(a)	3,000 0 0	1	Municipal Commissioner, Bombay.	3,140(b)	3,140 0 0
1	Inspector-General of Police -	2,500-100-3,000	2,833 5 4	1	(c)Inspector-General of Police -	2,640-100-3,140	2,973 5 4
1	Secretary -	2,500	2,500 0 0	1	Secretary -	2,640	2,640 0 0
13	Senior Collectors -	2,325	30,225 0 0				
1	Commissioner of Settlements and Director of Land Records.	Salary of grade + local allowances, 250	2,293 12 0	29	(d)Collectors -	1,950-100-2,450	66,216 10 8
15	Junior Collectors -	1,800	27,000 0 0				
1	Private Secretary -	1,500	1,500 0 0	1	Private Secretary -	1,600	1,600 0 0
1	Deputy Commissioner, Upper Sind Frontier.	1,200 + local allowances, 300	1,500 0 0				
2	Under Secretaries -	1,250	2,500 0 0				
1	Talukdari Settlement Officer	1,100	1,100 0 0				
1	Assistant Commissioner in Sind.	1,100 + local allowances, 100	1,200 0 0				
1	Manager, Sind Encumbered Estates.	Salary of grade + special allowances, 200	1,047 8 0	13	Sub-Collectors -	1,350	17,550 0 0
1	Superintendent of Land Records.	Salary of grade + special allowances, 150	997 8 0				
	Carried forward -	-	1,12,488 12 0		Carried forward -	-	1,29,891 10 8

(a) Pay may range between Rs. 2,000 to Rs. 2,500 and may be raised to Rs. 3,000 after three years' service. Cost has been taken at the maximum.

(b) Pay to range between Rs. 2,125 and Rs. 2,640 and may be raised to Rs. 3,140 after three years' service.

(c) Should be excluded for purpose of fixing the strength of the cadre.

(d) Includes directorship of agriculture, which should be excluded for purpose of fixing the strength of the cadre.

## ANNEXURE X.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—(continued).

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
	<b>Brought forward -</b>	Rs.	Rs. A. P.		<b>Brought forward -</b>	Rs.	Rs. A. P.
	<i>Superior Executive Posts—cont.</i>		1,12,488 12 0		<i>Superior Executive Posts—cont.</i>		1,29,891 10 8
1	Registrar, Co-operative Credit Societies.	Salary of grade + special allowances, 150	997 8 0				
5	Assistant Collectors, 1st grade	1,200	6,000 0 0				
			1,19,486 4 0				1,29,891 10 8
	<i>Deduct—Cost of appointments listed as open to members of the Provincial Civil Service :</i>				<i>Deduct—Cost of appointments held by members of the Provincial Civil Service :</i>		
	2 Collectors -		4,087 8 0		2 Collectors -		4,566 10 8
	1 Talukdari Settlement Officer.	1,100	1,100 0 0				
			5,187 8 0				
	<i>Add—Cost of listed appointments held by members of the Provincial Civil Service :</i>				<i>Add—Cost of appointments held by members of the Provincial Civil Service :</i>		
	2 Collectors -	*	2,771 6 10		2 Collectors -	1,200-75-1,800	3,160 0 0
	1 Talukdari Settlement Officer.	800	800 0 0				
			3,571 6 10				
	<i>Add—Acting allowance for officiating promotion within the class of Collectors (approximately).</i>		3,200 0 0				
55§	Total Superior Executive posts -		1,21,070 2 10	55§	Total Superior Executive posts -		1,28,485 0 0
	<i>Superior Judicial Posts.</i>				<i>Superior Judicial Posts.</i>		
3	High Court Judges -	4,000	12,000 0 0	3	High Court Judges -	4,140	12,420 0 0
1	Judicial Commissioner in Sind.	3,000	3,000 0 0	1	Judicial Commissioner in Sind.	3,470	3,470 0 0
1	Additional Judicial Commissioner.	2,750	2,750 0 0	1	Additional Judicial Commissioner.	3,140	3,140 0 0
3	District and Sessions Judges, 1st grade.	2,500	7,500 0 0	1	District and Sessions Judge, 1st grade.	3,140	3,140 0 0
6	District and Sessions Judges, 2nd grade.	2,325	13,950 0 0	18	District and Sessions Judges, 2nd grade.	1,950-100-2,650	43,219 15 6
10	District and Sessions Judges, 3rd grade.	1,800	18,000 0 0	1	Registrar, High Court -	1,800	1,800 0 0
1	Registrar, High Court -	1,700	1,700 0 0	1	Assistant Remembrancer of Legal Affairs.	1,350-50-1,600	1,516 10 8
1	Assistant Remembrancer of Legal Affairs.	1,250-50-1,500	1,416 10 8				
			60,316 10 8				68,706 10 2
	<i>Deduct—Cost of appointments listed as open to members of the Provincial Civil Services :</i>				<i>Deduct—Cost of appointments held by members of the Provincial Civil Service :</i>		
	3 District and Sessions Judges -		6,228 15 3		3 District and Sessions Judges -		7,320 0 0
	<i>Add—Cost of listed appointments held by members of the Provincial Civil Service :</i>				<i>Add—Cost of listed appointments held by members of the Provincial Civil Service :</i>		
	3 District and Sessions Judges.	†	4,168 6 9		3 District and Sessions Judges.	‡	4,986 5 0
	<i>Add—Acting allowances for officiating promotion between the grades of District and Sessions Judges (approximately).</i>		1,600 0 0				
26	Total Superior Judicial posts -		59,856 2 2	26	Total Superior Judicial posts -		66,372 15 2
	<i>Inferior Posts.</i>				<i>Inferior Posts.</i>		
17	Assistant Collectors, 1st grade.	900	15,300 0 0	80	Assistant Collectors -		68,605 13 5
18	Assistant Collectors, 2nd grade.	700	12,600 0 0				
52	Reserve posts, i.e., Assistant Collectors.	400-500	25,300 0 0				
			53,200 0 0				
			1,80,926 5 0				1,94,857 15 2
	Carried forward -		53,200 0 0		Carried forward -		68,605 13 5

\* Senior collector, Rs. 1,600; Junior collector, Rs. 1,200.

§ Exclusive of three political appointments

† 1st grade, Rs. 1,600; 2nd grade, Rs. 1,600; 3rd grade, Rs. 1,200.

‡ 1st grade, Rs. 3,140; 2nd grade, Rs. 1,200-75-1,800.

## ANNEXURE X.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—(continued).

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
	Brought forward -	Rs.	Rs. A. P.		Brought forward -	Rs.	Rs. A. P.
	<i>Inferior Posts—cont.</i>		1,80,926 5 0		<i>Inferior Posts—cont.</i>		1,94,857 15 2
	Add—Acting allowances for officiating promotion between inferior posts (approximately).		53,200 0 0		Add—Acting allowances for officiating promotion between inferior and superior posts (approximately).		68,605 13 5
	Add—Acting allowances for officiating promotion between inferior and superior posts (approximately).		7,000 0 0				
			13,000 0 0				7,500 0 0
87	Total inferior posts -		73,200 0 0	80	Total inferior posts -		76,105 13 5
	Add—Exchange compensation allowance :						
	(i) Superior posts -		8,261 11 5				
	(ii) Inferior posts -		4,277 10 0				
			12,539 5 5				
	Grand Total -		2,66,665 10 5		Grand Total -		2,70,963 12 7
					Deduct present cost -		2,66,665 10 5
					Net extra expenditure -		4,298 2 2

## Bengal.

<i>Superior Executive Posts.</i>				<i>Superior Executive Posts.</i>			
2	Members of Council -	5,333½	10,666 10 8	2	Members of Council -	5,333½	10,666 10 8
1	Member, Board of Revenue -	3,750	3,750 0 0	1	Member, Board of Revenue -	3,890	3,890 0 0
1	Chairman, Calcutta Corporation.	3,500	3,500 0 0	1	Chairman, Calcutta Corporation.	3,640	3,640 0 0
1	Chairman, Calcutta Improvement Trust.	3,500	3,500 0 0	1	Chairman, Calcutta Improvement Trust.	3,640	3,640 0 0
1	Chief Secretary -	3,333½	3,333 5 4	1	Chief Secretary -	3,470	3,470 0 0
5	Commissioners -	2,916½	14,583 5 4	5	Commissioners -	3,000	15,000 0 0
1	Inspector-General of Police -	2,500-100-3,000	2,833 5 4	1	(a) Inspector-General of Police	2,640-100-3,140	2,973 5 4
3	Secretaries -	2,750	8,250 0 0	3	Secretaries -	2,890	8,670 0 0
12	Magistrates and Collectors, 1st grade.	2,250	27,000 0 0	38	(b) Collectors -	1,600-100-2,400	80,053 5 4
12	Magistrates and Collectors, 2nd grade.	1,800	21,600 0 0				
14	Magistrates and Collectors, 3rd grade.	1,500	21,000 0 0	1	Private Secretary	1,600	1,600 0 0
1	Private Secretary	1,500	1,500 0 0	1	Deputy-Chairman, Calcutta Corporation.	1,600	1,600 0 0
1	Deputy-Chairman, Calcutta Corporation.	1,500	1,500 0 0				
			1,23,016 10 8				1,35,203 5 4
	Add—Acting allowances for officiating promotion within the class of Collectors (approximately).		5,900 0 0		Deduct—Cost of appointments held by members of the Provincial Civil Service:		
					2 Collectors -		4,213 5 4
					Add—Cost of appointments held by members of the Provincial Civil Service:		
					2 Collectors -	1,200-75-1,800	3,160 0 0
55			1,28,916 10 8	55	Total Superior Executive posts		1,34,150 0 0
<i>Superior Judicial Posts.</i>				<i>Superior Judicial Posts.</i>			
4	High Court Judges -	4,000	16,000 0 0	4	High Court Judges -	4,140	16,560 0 0
3	District and Sessions Judges, 1st grade.	3,000	9,000 0 0	3	District and Sessions Judges, 1st grade.	3,140	9,420 0 0
13	District and Sessions Judges, 2nd grade.	2,500	32,500 0 0	28	District and Sessions Judges, 2nd grade.	1,950-100-2,650	67,231 1 0
15	District and Sessions Judges, 3rd grade.	2,000	30,000 0 0	1	Registrar, High Court -	1,800	1 800 0 0
1	Registrar, High Court -	1,700	1,700 0 0				
			89,200 0 0				95,011 1 0
	Add—Acting allowances for officiating promotion between 2nd and 3rd grade, District and Session Judges, (approximately).		1,900 0 0				
			91,100 0 0	36			1,34,150 0 0
36	Carried forward -		2,20,016 10 8		Carried forward -		95,011 1 0

(a) Should be excluded for purpose of fixing the strength of the cadre

(b) Includes directorship of agriculture, which should be excluded for the purpose of fixing the strength of the cadre.

## ANNEXURE X.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—(continued).

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
		Rs.	Rs. A. P.			Rs.	Rs. A. P.
	Brought forward - - -	- - -	2,20,016 10 8		Brought forward - - -	- - -	1,34,150 0 0
	<i>Superior Posts—cont.</i>				<i>Superior Judicial Posts—cont.</i>		95,011 1 0
	<i>Deduct—Cost of appointments listed as open to members of the Provincial Civil Service:</i>				<i>Deduct—Cost of appointments held by members of the Provincial Civil Service:</i>		
	9 Magistrates and Collectors or District and Sessions Judges.		18,404 5 6		4 District and Sessions Judges -	9,890 7 4	
	Add—Cost of listed appointments held by members of the Provincial Civil Service:				Add—Cost of appointments held by members of the Provincial Civil Service:		
	9 Magistrates and Collectors or District and Sessions Judges.	*	12,052 2 9		4 District and Sessions Judges.	†	6,923 14 0
				36	Total Superior Judicial Posts -		92,044 7 8
91	Total Superior posts - - -		2,13,664 7 11	91	Total Superior posts - - -		2,26,194 7 8
	<i>Inferior Posts.</i>				<i>Inferior Posts.</i>		
3	Under Secretaries - - -	1,000	3,000 0 0	86	Assistant Collectors - - -		73,737 4 2
17	Joint Magistrates, 1st grade -	900	15,300 0 0				
16	Joint Magistrates, 2nd grade -	700	11,200 0 0				
55	Reserve posts, i.e., Assistant Magistrates.	400-500	26,750 0 0				
			56,250 0 0				
	Add—Acting allowances for officiating promotion between Inferior posts (approximately).		5,000 0 0				
	Add—Acting allowances for officiating promotion between inferior and superior posts (approximately).		17,400 0 0		Add—Acting allowances for officiating promotion between inferior and superior posts (approximately).		9,450 0 0
91	Total Inferior posts - - -		78,650 0 0	86	Total Inferior posts - - -		83,187 4 2
	Add—Exchange Compensation Allowance:						
	(i) Superior posts - - -		9,628 0 5				
	(ii) Inferior posts - - -		4,571 8 6				
			14,199 8 11				
	Grand Total - - -		3,06,514 0 10		Grand Total - - -		3,09,381 11 10
					Deduct present cost - - -		3,06,514 0 10
					Net extra expenditure - - -		2,867 11 0

## United Provinces of Agra and Oudh.

<i>Superior Executive Posts.</i>				<i>Superior Executive Posts.</i>			
1	Lieutenant-Governor - - -	8,333½	8,333 5 4	1	Lieutenant-Governor - - -	8,333½	8,333 5 4
2	Members, Board of Revenue -	3,500	7,000 0 0	2	Members, Board of Revenue -	3,640	7,280 0 0
1	Chief Secretary - - -	3,000	3,000 0 0	1	Chief Secretary - - -	3,140	3,140 0 0
9	Commissioners - - -	2,916½	26,250 0 0	10	Commissioners - - -	3,000	30,000 0 0
1	Inspector-General of Police -	2,500-100-3,000	2,833 5 4	1	(a) Inspector-General of Police	2,640-100-3,140	2,973 5 4
1	Opium Agent - - -	2,500-100-3,000	2,833 5 4	1	Opium Agent - - -	2,640-100-3,140	2,973 5 4
1	Commissioner, Kumaon - - -	2,500	2,500 0 0		<i>Merged into Commissioners.</i>		
19	Magistrates and Collectors, 1st grade,	2,250	42,750 0 0				
17	Magistrates and Collectors, 2nd grade.	1,833½	31,166 10 8				
4	Deputy Commissioners, 1st grade,	1,833½	7,333 5 4				
10	Deputy Commissioners, 2nd grade.	1,666½	16,666 10 8				
4	Settlement officers - - -	Salary of grade + special allowance 150	3,865 2 0				
1	Deputy Director of Land Records.	Salary of grade + special allowance 150	966 4 6	60	(b) Collectors - - -	1,600-100-2,400	1,26,400 0 0
	Carried forward - - -		1,55,498 1 2		Carried forward - - -		1,81,100 0 0

\* Magistrates and collectors, 1st grade, Rs. 1,600; 2nd grade, Rs. 1,200; 3rd grade, Rs. 1,000; district and session judges, 1st grade, Rs. 2,000; 2nd grade, Rs. 1,600; 3rd grade, Rs. 1,200.

† 1st grade, Rs. 3,140; 2nd grade, Rs. 1,200-75-1,800.

(a) Should be excluded for purpose of fixing the strength of the cadre.

(b) Includes directorship of agriculture, which should be excluded for purpose of fixing the strength of the cadre.

## ANNEXURE X.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—(continued).

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
	Brought forward -	Rs.	Rs. A. P.		Brought forward -	Rs.	Rs. A. P.
		- - -	1,55,498 1 2			- - -	1,81,100 0 0
	<i>Superior Executive Posts—cont.</i>				<i>Superior Executive Posts—cont.</i>		
1	Registrar Co-operative Credit Societies.	Salary of grade + special allowance 150	966 4 6				
1	Superintendent, Dehra Dun -	1,500	1,500 0 0				
1	Deputy Commissioner, Nainital.	1,500	1,500 0 0				
2	Deputy Commissioners, Gharwal and Almora.	1,000	2,000 0 0				
			1,61,464 5 8				1,81,100 0 0
	<i>Deduct—Cost of appointments listed as open to members of the Provincial Civil Service:</i>				<i>Deduct—Cost of appointments held by members of the Provincial Civil Service:</i>		
	2 Magistrates and Collectors -		3,916 10 8		2 Collectors -		4,213 5
	<i>Add—Cost of listed appointments held by members of the Provincial Civil Service:</i>				<i>Add—Cost of appointments held by members of the Provincial Civil Service:</i>		
	2 Magistrates and Collectors.	*	2,624 0 0		2 Collectors -	1,200-75-1,800	3,160 0 0
	<i>Add—Acting allowances for officiating promotion within the class of Magistrates and Collectors (approximately).</i>		4,500 0 0				
76	Total Superior Executive posts -		1,64,671 11 0	76	Total Superior Executive posts -		1,80,046 10 8
	<i>Superior Judicial Posts.</i>				<i>Superior Judicial Posts.</i>		
3	High Court Judges -	4,000	12,000 0 0	3	High Court Judges -	4,140	12,420 0 0
1	Judicial Commissioner -	3,500	3,500 0 0	1	Judicial Commissioner -	3,640	3,640 0 0
1	Additional Judicial Commissioner.	3,333‡	3,333 5 4	1	Additional Judicial Commissioner.	3,470	3,470 0 0
2	District and Sessions Judges, 1st grade.	3,000	6,000 0 0	2	District and Sessions Judges, 1st grade.	3,140	6,280 0 0
7	District and Sessions Judges, 2nd grade.	2,500	17,500 0 0				
7	District and Sessions Judges, 3rd grade.	2,250	15,750 0 0				
10	District and Sessions Judges, 4th grade.	1,833‡	18,333 5 4	29	District and Sessions Judges, 2nd grade.	1,950-100-2,650	69,632 2 9
5	District and Sessions Judges, 5th grade.	1,666‡	8,333 5 4				
1	Registrar, High Court -	1,600	1,600 0 0	1	Registrar, High Court -	1,700	1,700 0 0
4	Sessions and Subordinate Judges.	1,200	4,800 0 0	4	Sessions and Subordinate Judges.	1,500	6,000 0 0
			91,150 0 0				1,03,142 2 9
	<i>Deduct—Cost of appointments listed as open to members of the Provincial Civil Service:</i>				<i>Deduct—Cost of appointments held by members of the Provincial Civil Service:</i>		
	8 District and Sessions Judges.	—	17,010 12 0		4 District and Sessions Judges.	—	9,795 1 8
	<i>Add—Cost of listed appointments held by members of the Provincial Civil Service:</i>				<i>Add—Cost of appointments held by members of the Provincial Civil Service:</i>		
	8 District and Sessions Judges.	†	11,019 6 0		4 District and Sessions Judges.	§	6,722 9 4
	<i>Add—Acting allowances for officiating promotion within the class of District and Sessions Judges (approximately).</i>		2,700 0 0				
41	Total Superior Judicial posts -		87,858 10 0	41	Total Superior Judicial posts -		1,00,069 10 5
	Carried forward -		2,52,530 5 0		Carried forward -		2,80,116 5 1

\* 1st grade, Rs. 1,600 ; 2nd grade, Rs. 1,200 ; 3rd grade, Rs. 1,000.

† 1st grade, Rs. 2,000 ; 2nd grade, Rs. 1,600 ; 3rd grade, Rs. 1,500 ; 4th grade, Rs. 1,200 ; 5th grade, Rs. 1,000.

§ 1st grade, Rs. 3,140 ; 2nd grade, Rs. 1,200-75-1,800.

## ANNEXURE X.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—(continued).

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
	Brought forward -	Rs. - - -	Rs. A. P. 2,52,530 5 0		Brought forward -	Rs. - - -	Rs. A. P. 2,80,116 5 1
	<i>Inferior Posts.</i>				<i>Inferior Posts.</i>		
2	Under Secretaries -	1,000	2,000 0 0				
1	" Secretary -	800	800 0 0				
1	City Magistrate, Lucknow -	1,000	1,000 0 0				
14	Joint Magistrates, 1st grade -	1,000	14,000 0 0				
8	Assistant Commissioners, 1st grade.	800	6,400 0 0				
21	Joint Magistrates, 2nd grade	700	14,700 0 0	117	Assistant Collectors -	—	1,00,837 4 4
	Registrar, Judicial Commissioner's Court.	Salary of grade + local allowance 100.	916 4 6				
72	Reserve posts, i.e., Assistant Collectors.	400-500	35,050 0 0				
			74,866 4 6				
	Add—Acting allowances for officiating promotion within the Inferior posts (approximately).		8,000 0 0				
	Add—Acting allowances for officiating promotion between inferior and superior posts (approximately).		11,300 0 0		Add—Acting allowances for officiating promotion between inferior and superior posts (approximately).		6,650 0 0
120	Total Inferior Posts -	-	94,166 4 6	117	Total Inferior Posts -	-	1,07,487 4 4
	Add—Exchange Compensation allowance :						
	(i) Superior Posts -	-	12,362 0 3				
	(ii) Inferior Posts -	-	5,643 15 7				
			18,005 15 10				
	Grand Total -	-	3,64,702 9 4		Grand Total -	-	3,87,603 9 5
					Deduct Present Cost -	-	3,64,702 9 4
					Net Extra Expenditure -	-	22,901 0 1

Punjab.

Superior Executive Posts.				Superior Executive Posts.			
1	Lieutenant Governor -	8,333½	8,333 5 4	1	Lieutenant Governor -	8,333½	8,333 5 4
2	Financial Commissioners -	3,500	7,000 0 0	2	Financial Commissioners -	3,640	7,280 0 0
1	Chief Secretary -	3,000	3,000 0 0	1	Chief Secretary -	3,140	3,140 0 0
5	Commissioners -	2,750	13,750 0 0	5	Commissioners -	3,000	15,000 0 0
14	Deputy Commissioners, 1st grade.	2,250	31,500 0 0				
14	Deputy Commissioners, 2nd grade.	1,800	25,200 0 0	42	(a) Deputy Commissioners -	1,600-100 2,400	88,480 0 0
14	Deputy Commissioners, 3rd grade.	1,500	21,000 0 0				
			1,09,783 5 4				1,22,233 5 4
	Deduct—Cost of appointments listed as open to members of the Provincial Civil Service :				Deduct—Cost of appointments held by members of the Provincial Civil Service :		
	5 Deputy Commissioners -	-	9,250 0 0		2 Deputy Commissioners -	-	4,213 5 4
	Add—Cost of listed appointments held by members of the Provincial Civil Service :				Add—Cost of appointments held by members of the Provincial Civil Service :		
	5 Deputy Commissioners.	*	6,333 5 4		2 Deputy Commissioners.	1,200-75-1,800	3,160 0 0
	Add—Acting allowances for officiating promotion within the class of Deputy Commissioners -	-	5,050 0 0				
51	Total Superior Executive Posts -	-	1,11,916 10 8	51	Total Superior Executive Posts -	-	1,21,180 0 0
	Carried forward -	-	1,11,916 10 8		Carried forward -	-	1,21,180 0 0

\* 1st grade, Rs. 1,600 ; 2nd grade, Rs. 1,200 ; 3rd grade, Rs. 1,000.

(a) Includes directorship of agriculture which should be excluded for purpose of fixing the strength of the cadre.

## ANNEXURE X.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—(continued).

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
	Brought forward -	Rs. - - -	Rs. A. P. 1,11,916 10 8		Brought forward -	Rs. - - -	Rs. A. P. 1,21,180 0 0
	<i>Superior Judicial Posts.</i>				<i>Superior Judicial Posts.</i>		
1	Chief Judge, Chief Court -	4,000	4,000 0 0	1	Chief Judge, Chief Court -	4,140	4,140 0 0
2	Judges, Chief Court -	3,500	7,000 0 0	2	Judges, Chief Court -	3,640	7,280 0 0
2	District and Sessions Judges, 1st grade.	2,750	5,500 0 0	2	District and Sessions Judges, 1st grade.	3,140	6,280 0 0
4	District and Sessions Judges, 2nd grade.	2,500	10,000 0 0	20	District and Sessions Judges, 2nd grade.	1,950-100-2,650	48,022 3 0
6	District and Sessions Judges, 3rd grade.	2,250	13,500 0 0				
10	District and Sessions Judges, 4th grade.	1,800	18,000 0 0				
1	Registrar Chief Court -	1,250	1,250 0 0	1	Registrar, Chief Court -	1,250-50-1,500.	1,416 10 8
1	Judge, Small Cause Court -	1,250	1,250 0 0	1	Judge, Small Cause Court -	1,350	1,350 0 0
			60,500 0 0				68,488 13 8
	<i>Deduct—Cost of appointments listed as open to members of the Provincial Civil Service:</i>				<i>Deduct—Cost of appointments held by members of the Provincial Civil Service:</i>		
	6 District and Sessions Judges -		12,818 3 0		3 District and Sessions Judges -		7,404 13 6
	1 Judge, Small Cause Court -		1,250 0 0				
			14,068 3 0				
	<i>Add—Cost of listed appointments held by members of the Provincial Civil Service—</i>				<i>Add—Cost of appointments held by members of the Provincial Civil Service—</i>		
	6 District and Sessions Judges.	*	8,290 14 6		3 District and Sessions Judges.	†	5,165 7 3
	1 Judge, Small Cause Court.	800—1,000	933 5 4				
			9,224 3 10				
	<i>Add—Acting allowances for officiating promotion within the class of District and Sessions Judges (approximately).</i>		1,500 0 0				
27	Total Superior Judicial Posts -		57,156 0 10	27	Total Superior Judicial Posts -		66,249 7 5
	<i>Inferior Posts.</i>				<i>Inferior Posts.</i>		
2	Under Secretaries -	1,000	2,000 0 0	75	Assistant Commissioners -		64,526 7 7
14	Assistant Commissioners, 1st grade.	900	12,600 0 0				
15	Assistant Commissioners, 2nd grade.	700	10,500 0 0				
44	Reserve posts, i.e., Assistant Commissioners.	400-500	21,400 0 0				
			46,500 0 0				
	<i>Add—Acting allowances for officiating promotion within the inferior posts (approximately).</i>		5,500 0 0		<i>Add—Acting allowances for officiating promotion between inferior and superior posts (approximately).</i>		6,300 0 0
	<i>Add—Acting allowances for officiating promotion between inferior and superior posts (approximately).</i>		9,250 0 0				
75	Total Inferior Posts -		61,250 0 0	75	Total Inferior Posts -		70,826 7 7
	<i>Add—Exchange compensation allowance:—</i>						
	(i) Superior Posts -		7,985 0 2				
	(ii) Inferior Posts -		3,713 4 6				
			11,698 4 8				
	Grand Total -		2,42,021 0 2		Grand Total -		2,58,455 15 0
					Deduct Present Cost -		2,42,021 0 2
					Net Extra Expenditure -		16,234 14 10

\* 1st grade, Rs. 1,800; 2nd grade, Rs. 1,600; 3rd grade, Rs. 1,400; 4th grade, Rs. 1,200.

† 1st grade, Rs. 3,140; 2nd grade, Rs. 1,200-75-1,800.

## ANNEXURE X.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—(continued).

## Burma.

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.						
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.			
	<i>Superior Executive Posts.</i>				<i>Superior Executive Posts.</i>					
1	Lieutenant-Governor - -	Rs. 8,333½	Rs. A. P. 8,333 5 4	1	Lieutenant-Governor - -	Rs. 8,333½	8,333 5 4			
1	Financial Commissioner - -	3,500	3,500 0 0	1	Financial Commissioner - -	3,640	3,640 0 0			
1	Chief Secretary to Government.	3,000	3,000 0 0	1	Chief Secretary to Government.	3,140	3,140 0 0			
8	Commissioners - - -	2,750	22,000 0 0	9	Commissioners - - -	3,000	27,000 0 0			
1	Commissioner of Settlements and Director of Land Records.	2,750	2,750 0 0							
1	President, Rangoon Municipality.	Salary of grade (a) + local allowance 250	2,072 8 0							
1	Director of Agriculture -	Salary of grade (b) + local allowance 150	1,972 8 0							
1	Revenue Secretary - -	Salary of grade (c) + local allowance 400	2,222 8 0							
1	Secretary - - -	Salary of grade (c) + local allowance 300	2,122 8 0	(f) Deputy Commissioners -	1,600-100-2,400	1,11,653 5 4				
12	Deputy Commissioners, 1st grade.	2,250	27,000 0 0							
13	Deputy Commissioners, 2nd grade.	1,800	23,400 0 0							
15	Deputy Commissioners, 3rd grade.	1,500	22,500 0 0							
1	Deputy Director of Land Records.	Salary of grade (d) + local allowance 200	967 10 4							
1	Secretary to Financial Commissioner.	Salary of grade (e) + local allowance 200	967 10 4							
6	Settlement Officers - -	Salary of grade + local allowance 150	5,505 14 0							
1	Registrar, Co-operative Credit Societies.	Salary of grade + local allowance 150	917 10 4							
			1,29,232 2 4							1,53,766 10 8
<i>Deduct—Cost of appointments listed as open to members of the Provincial Civil Service :</i>							<i>Deduct—Cost of appointments held by members of the Provincial Civil Service :</i>			
2 Deputy Commissioners - -			3,645 0 0				2 Deputy Commissioners - -			4,213 5 4
1 Settlement Officer - -			917 10 4							
			4,562 10 4							
<i>Add—Cost of listed appointments held by members of the Provincial Civil Service :</i>							<i>Add—Cost of appointments held by members of the Provincial Civil Service :</i>			
2 Deputy Commissioners - -			2,490 0 0				2 Deputy Commissioners - -			3,160 0 0
1 Settlement Officer - -			1,000 0 0				1,200-75-1,800			
			3,490 0 0							
<i>Add—Acting allowances for officiating promotion within the class of Deputy Commissioners (approximately) -</i>			6,000 0 0							
65	Total Superior Executive Posts -		1,34,159 8 0	65	Total Superior Executive Posts -		1,52,713 5 4			
Carried forward - - -			1,34,159 8 0	Carried forward - - -			1,52,713 5 4			

(a) Subject to a maximum of Rs. 2,500.

(b) Subject to a maximum of Rs. 2,400.

(c) Subject to a maximum of Rs. 2,250. (d) Subject to a maximum of Rs. 1,600. (e) Subject to a maximum of Rs. 1,500.

(f) Includes directorship of agriculture which should be excluded for purpose of fixing the strength of the cadre.

## ANNEXURE X.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—(continued).

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
	Brought forward -	Rs.	Rs. A. P.		Brought forward -	Rs.	Rs. A. P.
	<i>Superior Judicial Posts.</i>		1,34,159 8 0		<i>Superior Judicial Posts.</i>		1,52,713 5 4
1	Chief Judge, Chief Court -	4,000	4,000 0 0	1	Chief Judge, Chief Court -	4,140	4,140 0 0
1	Judge, Chief Court -	3,500	3,500 0 0	1	Judge, Chief Court -	3,640	3,640 0 0
1	Judicial Commissioner, Upper Burma.	3,500	3,500 0 0	1	Judicial Commissioner, Upper Burma.	3,640	3,640 0 0
2	Divisional Judges, 1st grade	2,750	5,500 0 0	1	Divisional Judges, 1st grade -	3,140	3,140 0 0
1	Divisional Judge, 2nd grade	2,500	2,500 0 0	6	Divisional Judges, 2nd grade	1,950-100-2,650	14,406 10 6
2	Divisional Judges, 3rd grade	2,250	4,500 0 0				
2	Divisional Judges, 4th grade	1,800	3,600 0 0	8	District Judges -	1,600	12,800 0 0
3	District Judges -	1,500	12,000 0 0				
1	Registrar, Chief Court -	Salary of grade (a) + local allowance 200	967 10 4	1	Registrar, Chief Court -	1,250-50-1,500	1,416 10 8
			40,067 10 4				43,183 5 2
	<i>Deduct—Cost of appointments listed as open to members of the Provincial Civil Service:</i>				<i>Deduct—Cost of appointments held by members of the Provincial Civil Service:</i>		
	2 District Judges -		3,000 0 0		3 Divisional or District Judges -		6,069 5 4
	Add—Cost of listed appointments held by members of the Provincial Civil Service:				Add—Cost of appointments held by members of the Provincial Civil Service:		
	2 District Judges -	1,000	2,000 0 0		3 Divisional or District Judges -	†	4,124 0 0
	Add—Acting allowances for officiating promotion within the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th grade of Divisional Judges (approximately)		700 0 0				
19	Total Superior Judicial Posts -		39,767 10 4	19	Total Superior Judicial Posts -		41,237 15 10
	<i>Inferior Posts.</i>				<i>Inferior Posts.</i>		
11	Assistant Commissioners, 1st grade.	1,000	11,000 0 0	81	Assistant Commissioners		69,460 11 10
13	Assistant Commissioners, 2nd grade.	700	9,100 0 0				
10	Assistant Commissioners, 3rd grade.	600	6,000 0 0				
52	Reserve posts, i.e., Assistant Commissioners.	400-500	25,300 0 0				
			51,400 0 0				
	Add—Acting allowances for officiating promotion between inferior posts (approximately).		6,200 0 0				
	Add—Acting allowances for officiating promotion between inferior and superior posts (approximately).		9,900 0 0		Add—Acting allowances for officiating promotion between inferior and superior posts (approximately).		6,650 0 0
86	Total Inferior Posts -		67,500 0 0	81	Total Inferior Posts -		76,110 11 10
	Add—Exchange Compensation allowance:						
	(i) Superior Posts -		8,902 1 7		Grand Total -		2,70,062 1 0
	(ii) Inferior Posts -		4,176 9 0		Deduct Present Cost -		2,54,505 12 11
			13,078 10 7		Net Extra Expenditure -		15,556 4 1
	Grand Total -		2,54,505 12 11				

## Bihar and Orissa.

<i>Superior Executive Posts.</i>				<i>Superior Executive Posts.</i>			
1	Lieutenant Governor -	8,333½	8,333 5 4	1	Lieutenant Governor -	8,333½	8,333 5 4
2	Members of Council -	5,000	10,000 0 0	2	Members of Council -	5,000	10,000 0 0
1	Member, Board of Revenue -	3,500	3,500 0 0	1	Member, Board of Revenue -	3,640	3,640 0 0
1	Chief Secretary -	3,000	3,000 0 0	1	Chief Secretary -	3,140	3,140 0 0
5	Commissioners -	2,916½	14,583 5 4	5	Commissioners -	3,000	15,000 0 0
1	Inspector General of Police -	2,500-100-3,000	2,833 5 4	1	(b) Inspector General of Police -	2,640-100-3,140	2,973 5 4
	Carried forward -		42,250 0 0		Carried forward -		43,086 10 8

† Divisional judge, 1st grade, Rs. 3,140; divisional judge, 2nd grade, Rs. 1,200-75-1,800; district judge, Rs. 1,000.

(a) Subject to a maximum of Rs. 1,400.

(b) Should be excluded for purpose of fixing the strength of the cadre.

## ANNEXURE X.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—(continued).

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
—	Brought forward -	Rs. - - -	R A. P. 42,250 0 0	—	Brought forward -	Rs. - - -	Rs. A. P. 43,088 10 8
	<i>Superior Executive Posts—cont.</i>				<i>Superior Executive Posts—cont.</i>		
9	Magistrates and Collectors, 1st grade.	2,250	20,250 0 0	30	(a) Collectors - - -	1,600-100-2,400	63,200 0 0
10	Magistrates and Collectors, 2nd grade.	1,800	18,000 0 0				
11	Magistrates and Collectors, 3rd grade.	1,500	16,500 0 0				
			97,000 0 0				1,06,286 10 8
	Add—Acting allowances for officiating promotion within the class of Magistrate and Collector (approximately).		3,200 0 0		Deduct—Cost of Appointments held by members of the Provincial Civil Service: 1 Collector - - -		2,106 10 8
					Add—Cost of appointments held by members of the Provincial Civil Service: 1 Collector - - -	1,200-75-1,800	1,580 0 0
41			1,00,200 0 0	41	Total Superior Executive Posts		1,05,760 0 0
	<i>Superior Judicial Posts.</i>				<i>Superior Judicial Posts.</i>		
2	High Court Judges - -	4,000	8,000 0 0	2	High Court Judges - -	4,140	8,280 0 0
2	District and Sessions Judges, 1st grade.	3,000	6,030 0 0	2	District and Sessions Judges, 1st grade.	3,140	6,280 0 0
5	District and Sessions Judges, 2nd grade.	2,500	12,500 0 0	11	District and Sessions Judges, 2nd grade.	1,950-100-2,650	26,412 3 3
6	District and Sessions Judges, 3rd grade.	2,000	12,000 0 0				40,972 3 3
			38,500 0 0				
	Add—Acting allowances for officiating promotion between 3rd and 2nd grades of District and Sessions Judges (approximately).		700 0 0		Deduct—Cost of appointments held by members of the Provincial Civil Service: 3 District and Sessions Judges.		7,544 5 9
15			39,200 0 0	15	Total Superior Judicial Posts		38,837 13 6
	Deduct—Cost of appointments listed as open to members of the Provincial Service: 5 Magistrates and Collectors or District and Sessions Judges.	—	9,912 12 7				
	Add—Cost of listed appointments held by members of the Provincial Civil Service: 5 Magistrates and Collectors or District and Sessions Judges.	*	6,581 6 6				
56	Total Superior posts -		1,36,068 9 11	56	Total Superior Posts -		1,44,647 13 6
	<i>Inferior Posts.</i>				<i>Inferior Posts.</i>		
2	Under Secretaries - -	1,000	2,000 0 0	52	Assistant Collector - - -		44,662 15 4
11	Joint Magistrates 1st grade -	900	9,900 0 0				
10	" " 2nd " -	700	7,000 0 0				
34	Reserve posts, i.e., Assistant Magistrates.	400-500	16,550 0 0				
			35,450 0 0				
	Add—Acting allowances for officiating promotion within the inferior posts (approximately).		4,250 0 0				
	Add—Acting allowances for officiating promotion between inferior and superior posts (approximately).		8,450 0 0		Add—Acting allowances for officiating promotion between inferior and superior posts (approximately).		5,250 0 0
57	Total Inferior Posts - - -		48,150 0 0	52	Total Inferior Posts -		49,912 15 4
	Carried forward - - -		1,84,218 9 11		Carried forward -		1,94,560 12 10

\* Magistrates and collectors, 1st grade, Rs. 1,600; 2nd grade, Rs. 1,200; 3rd grade, Rs. 1,000; district and sessions judges 1st grade, Rs. 2,000; 2nd grade, Rs. 1,600; 3rd grade, Rs. 1,200.

† 1st grade, Rs. 3,140; 2nd grade, Rs. 1,200-75-1,800.

(a) Includes directorship of agriculture which should be excluded for purpose of fixing the strength of the cadre.

## ANNEXURE X.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—(continued).

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensum.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensum.
		Rs.	Rs. A. P.			Rs.	Rs. A. P.
	Brought forward - - -	- - -	1,84,218 9 11		Brought forward - - -	- - -	1,94,560 12 10
	Add—Exchange Compensation Allowance :—						
	(i) Superior Posts - - -	- - -	5,901 9 2				
	(ii) Inferior Posts - - -	- - -	2,904 0 9				
			8,805 9 11				
	Grand Total - - -	- - -	1,93,024 3 10		Grand Total - - -	- - -	1,94,560 12 10
					Deduct present cost - - -	- - -	1,93,024 3 10
					Net extra expenditure - - -	- - -	1,536 9 0

## Central Provinces and Berar.

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensum.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensum.
	<i>Superior Executive Posts.</i>				<i>Superior Executive Posts.</i>		
1	Chief Commissioner - -	5,166½	5,166 10 8	1	Chief Commissioner - -	5,500	5,500 0 0
1	Financial Commissioner - -	3,500	3,500 0 0	1	Financial Commissioner - -	3,640	3,640 0 0
5	Commissioners - - -	2,750	13,750 0 0	5	Commissioners - - -	3,000	15,000 0 0
1	Inspector General of Police -	2,250-100-2,750	2,583 5 4	1	(a) Inspector General of Police	2,400-100-2,900	2,733 5 4
10	Deputy Commissioners, 1st Class.	2,250	22,500 0 0				
11	Deputy Commissioners, 2nd Class.	1,800	19,800 0 0				
12	Deputy Commissioners, 3rd Class.	1,500	18,000 0 0	39	(b) Deputy Commissioners -	1,600-100-2,400	82,160 0 0
4	Settlement Officers - -	Salary of grade + special allowance 150	3,800 0 0				
1	Director of Agriculture -	"	950 0 0				
1	Registrar, Co-operative Credit Societies.	"	950 0 0				
			91,000 0 0				
	Add—Acting allowances for officiating promotion within the class of Deputy Commissioners — (approximately).		3,550 0 0				
47			94,550 0 0	47			1,09,033. 5 4
	<i>Superior Judicial Posts.</i>				<i>Superior Judicial Posts.</i>		
1	Judicial Commissioner - -	3,500	3,500 0 0	1	Judicial Commissioner - -	3,640	3,640 0 0
1	Additional Judicial Commissioner.	3,000	3,000 0 0				
1	Second Additional Judicial Commissioner.	2,750	2,750 0 0	2	Additional Judicial Commissioners.	3,140	6,280 0 0
1	Senior Divisional Judge -	2,500	2,500 0 0	1	Senior Divisional Judge -	2,640	2,640 0 0
4			11,750 0 0	4			12,560 0 0
	Deduct—Cost of appointments listed as open to members of the Provincial Civil Service : 6 Deputy Commissioners or Divisional Judges		11,082 5 6		Deduct—Cost of appointments held by members of the Provincial Civil Service : 4 Deputy Commissioners or Divisional Judges.		8,480 0 0
	Add—Cost of listed appointments held by members of the Provincial Civil Service : 6 Deputy Commissioners or Divisional Judges.		7,570 9 6		Add—Cost of appointments held by members of the Provincial Civil Service : 4 Deputy Commissioners or Divisional Judges.		6,426 0 0
51	Total Superior Posts - - -	- - -	1,02,788 4 0	51	Total Superior Posts- - -	- - -	1,19,539 5 4
	Carried forward - - -	- - -	1,02,788 4 0		Carried forward - - -	- - -	1,19,539 5 4

\* Senior divisional judge, Rs. 1,700; deputy commissioner, 1st grade, Rs. 1,600; 2nd grade, Rs. 1,200; 3rd grade, Rs. 1,000.

† Senior divisional judge, Rs. 2,640; deputy commissioner, Rs. 1,200-75-1,800.

(a) Should be excluded for purpose of fixing the strength of the cadre.

(b) Includes directorship of agriculture which should be excluded for purpose of fixing the strength of the cadre.

## ANNEXURE X.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—(continued).

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
	Brought forward - -	Rs. - - -	Rs. A. P. 1,02,788 4 0		Brought forward - -	Rs. - - -	Rs. A. P. 1,19,539 5 4
	<i>Inferior Posts.</i>				<i>Inferior Posts.</i>		
10	Assistant Commissioners, 1st grade.	900	9,000 0 0	49	Assistant Commissioners -	—	42,097 5 11
10	Assistant Commissioners, 2nd grade.	700	7,000 0 0				
31	Reserve posts, i.e., Assistant Commissioners.	400-500	15,100 0 0				
			31,100 0 0				
	Add—Acting allowances for officiating promotion within the inferior posts (approximately).		4,600 0 0				
	Add—Acting allowances for officiating promotion between inferior and superior posts (approximately).		5,650 0 0		Add—Acting allowances for officiating promotion between inferior and superior posts (approximately).		3,850 0 0
51	Total Inferior Posts - - -		41,350 0 0	49	Total Inferior Posts - - -		45,947 5 11
	Add—Exchange Compensation allowance:—						
	(i) Superior posts - - -		5,010 2 0				
	(ii) Inferior posts - - -		2,481 0 0				
			7,491 2 0				
	Grand Total - - -		1,51,629 6 0		Grand Total - - -		1,65,486 11 3
					Deduct present cost - - -		1,51,629 6 0
					Net extra expenditure - -		13,857 5 3

## Assam.

	<i>Superior Posts.</i>				<i>Superior Posts.</i>		
1	Chief Commissioner - -	4,666½	4,666 10 8	1	Chief Commissioner - -	4,805	4,805 0 0
2	Commissioners - - -	2,750	5,500 0 0	2	Commissioners - - -	3,000	6,000 0 0
6	Deputy Commissioners, 1st grade.	2,250	13,500 0 0	20(a)	Deputy Commissioners -	1,600-100-2,400.	42,133 5 4
7	Deputy Commissioners, 2nd grade.	1,800	12,600 0 0				
7	Deputy Commissioners, 3rd grade.	1,500	10,500 0 0				
			46,766 10 8				52,938 5 4
					Deduct—Cost of appointments held by members of the Provincial Civil Service:—		
					1 Deputy Commissioner.	—	2,106 10 8
	Add—Acting allowances for officiating promotion within the class of Deputy Commissioners (approximately).		1,700 0 0		Add—Cost of appointments held by members of the Provincial Civil Service:—		
					1 Deputy Commissioner.	1,200-75-1,800.	1,580 0 0
23	Total Superior Posts - - -		48,466 10 8	23	Total Superior Posts - - -		52,411 10 8
	<i>Inferior Posts.</i>				<i>Inferior Posts.</i>		
2	Under Secretaries - - -	1,000	2,000 0 0	23	Assistant Commissioners -	—	19,865 0 2
4	Joint Magistrates, 1st grade -	900	3,600 0 0				
4	" " 2nd " - - -	700	2,800 0 0				
16	Reserve posts, i.e., Assistant Magistrates.	400-500	7,800 0 0				
			16,200 0 0				
	Add—Acting allowances for officiating promotion between Inferior Posts (approximately).		1,800 0 0				
	Add—Acting allowances for officiating promotion between inferior and superior posts (approximately).		2,000 0 0		Add—Acting allowances for officiating promotion between inferior and superior posts (approximately).		1,400 0 0
26	Total Inferior Posts - - -		20,000 0 0	23	Total Inferior Posts - - -		21,265 0 2
	Add—Exchange compensation allowance:—						
	(i) Superior Posts - - -		2,790 5 8				
	(ii) Inferior Posts - - -		1,250 0 0				
			4,040 5 8				
	Grand Total - - -		72,507 0 4		Grand Total - - -		73,676 10 10
					Deduct present cost - - -		72,507 0 4
					Net extra expenditure - -		1,169 10 6

(a) Includes inspector-generalship of police and directorship of agriculture which should be excluded for purpose of fixing the strength of the cadre.

ANNEXURE X.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—(continued).

B.—ABSTRACT STATEMENT SHOWING THE PRESENT AND PROPOSED COST OF THE INDIAN CIVIL SERVICE AND THE NET EXTRA EXPENDITURE INVOLVED IN THE RECOMMENDATIONS.

Presidency or Province.	Present cost per mensem.	Proposed cost per mensem.	Net extra expenditure per mensem.
	Rs.    A. P.	Rs.    A. P.	Rs.    A. P.
Madras - - - - -	2,72,096 2 2	2,84,744 8 3	12,648 6 1
Bombay - - - - -	2,66,665 10 5	2,70,963 12 7	4,298 2 2
Bengal - - - - -	3,06,514 0 10	3,09,381 11 10	2,867 11 0
United Provinces of Agra and Oudh -	3,64,702 9 4	3,87,603 9 5	22,901 0 1
Punjab - - - - -	2,42,021 0 2	2,58,255 15 0	16,234 14 10
Burma - - - - -	2,54,505 12 11	2,70,062 1 0	15,556 4 1
Bihar and Orissa - - - - -	1,93,024 3 10	1,94,560 12 10	1,536 9 0
Central Provinces and Berar - - -	1,51,629 6 0	1,65,486 11 3	13,857 5 3
Assam - - - - -	72,507 0 4	73,676 10 10	1,169 10 6
Total - - - - -	21,23,665 14 0	22,14,735 13 0	91,069 15 0
Total extra expenditure per annum -	—	—	10,92,839 4 0





## ANNEXURE X.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—(continued).

## D.—DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE EXTRA EXPENDITURE BY PROVINCES.

*Madras.*

Superior executive posts :	Rs.	A.	P.
Rounding off in the process of merging exchange compensation allowance into pay	69	4	8
Inclusion of commissioner of Coorg in the grade of collectors	332	12	5
Incremental scale of pay for collectors	— 2,383	11	10
Increased pay for officers promoted from the provincial civil service	176	13	2
Raising pay of sub-collectors	4,275	0	
Decrease in the number of appointments to be held by members of the provincial civil service	1,272	12	11
Grant of the equivalent of exchange compensation allowance to statutory natives of India	452	1	11
Total superior executive posts	4,195	1	3

## Superior judicial posts :

Rounding off in the process of merging exchange compensation allowance into pay	31	3	6
Incremental scale of pay for district and sessions judges below 1st grade	— 18	10	1
Increased pay for officers promoted from the provincial civil service	480	1	6
Decrease in the number of appointments to be held by members of the provincial civil service	981	9	1
Grant of the equivalent of exchange compensation allowance to statutory natives of India	200	1	6
Total superior judicial posts	1,674	5	6
Total superior posts	5,869	6	9

## Inferior posts :

Improvement of prospects	9,726	10	10
Savings on account of decrease in number of appointments	— 3,240	10	0
Grant of the equivalent of exchange compensation allowance to statutory natives of India	292	14	6
Total inferior posts	6,778	15	4
Grand total	12,648	6	1

*Bombay.*

Superior executive posts :	Rs.	A.	P.
Rounding off in the process of merging exchange compensation allowance into pay	17	5	6
Inclusion of commissioner of settlements in the grade of collectors	— 149	4	11
Incremental scale of pay for collectors	— 229	15	1
Increased pay for officers promoted from the provincial civil service	228	9	2
Inclusion of several* appointments in the grade of sub-collectors	929	13	6
Raising pay of assistant collectors, 1st grade (sub-collectors)	375	0	0
Decrease in the number of appointments to be held by members of the provincial civil service	368	12	0
Grant of the equivalent of exchange compensation allowance to statutory natives of India	381	13	6
Total superior executive posts	1,922	1	8

## Superior judicial posts :

Rounding off in the process of merging exchange compensation allowance into pay	8	8	7
Raising pay of judicial commissioner and additional judicial commissioner	582	3	6
„ „ one district and sessions judge, 1st grade	421	15	9
Incremental scale of pay for district and sessions judges below 1st grade	1,889	11	1
Increased pay for officers promoted from the provincial civil service	652	14	3
Grant of the equivalent of exchange compensation allowance to statutory natives of India	192	7	11
Total superior judicial posts	3,747	13	1
Total superior posts	5,669	14	9

## Inferior posts :

Improvement of prospects	2,846	7	5
Savings on account of decrease in number of appointments	— 4,515	10	0
Grant of the equivalent of exchange compensation allowance to statutory natives of India	297	6	0
Total inferior posts	— 1,371	12	7
Grand total	4,298	2	2

\* Deputy commissioner, Upper Sind frontier; under-secretaries; assistant commissioner in Sind; manager, Sind encumbered estates; superintendent of land records; registrar co-operative credit societies; talukdari settlement officer.

## ANNEXURE X.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—(continued).

		<i>Bengal.</i>		
Superior posts :		Rs.	A.	P.
Rounding off in the process of merging exchange compensation allowance into pay -		19	2	0
Reducing the pay of commissioners -		— 277	12	7
Incremental scale of pay for collectors and district and sessions judges below 1st grade -		— 1,253	10	2
Increased pay for officers promoted from the provincial civil service -		1,408	15	5
Decrease in the number of appointments to be held by members of the provincial civil service -		2,616	4	6
Distribution of appointments held by members of the provincial civil service between executive and judicial branches -		— 335	10	10
Grant of the equivalent of exchange compensation allowance to statutory natives of India -		724	11	0
Total superior posts -		2,901	15	4
Inferior posts :		Rs.	A.	P.
Improvement of prospects -		2,862	4	2
Savings on account of decrease in number of appointments -		— 3,240	10	0
Grant of the equivalent of exchange compensation allowance to statutory natives of India -		344	1	6
Total inferior posts -		— 34	4	4
Grand total -		2,867	11	0
		<i>United Provinces of Agra and Oudh.</i>		
Superior executive posts :		Rs.	A.	P.
Rounding off in the process of merging exchange compensation allowance into pay -		5	8	9
Reducing the pay of commissioners -		— 500	0	3
Inclusion of commissioner Kumaon in the grade of commissioners -		361	1	9
Inclusion of several* appointments in the grade of collectors -		9,650	6	2
Incremental scale of pay for collectors -		— 3,320	0	9
Increased pay for officers promoted from the provincial civil service -		376	0	0
Grant of the equivalent of exchange compensation allowance to statutory natives of India -		352	1	3
Total superior executive posts -		6,925	0	11
Superior judicial posts :		Rs.	A.	P.
Rounding off in the process of merging exchange compensation allowance into pay -		4	2	5
Incremental scale of pay for district and sessions judges below 1st grade -		2,634	13	1
Increased pay for officers promoted from the provincial civil service -		942	14	4
Decrease of appointments held by members of the provincial civil service -		3,654	1	0
Raising pay of sessions and subordinate judges -		900	0	0
Grant of the equivalent of exchange compensation allowance to statutory natives of India -		163	0	1
Total superior judicial posts -		8,298	14	11
Total superior posts -		15,223	15	10
Inferior posts :		Rs.	A.	P.
Improvement of prospects -		9,301	3	7
Savings on account of decrease in number of appointments -		— 1,859	6	0
Grant of the equivalent of exchange compensation allowance to statutory natives of India -		235	2	8
Total inferior posts -		7,677	0	3
Grand Total -		22,901	0	1
		<i>Punjab.</i>		
Superior executive posts :		Rs.	A.	P.
Rounding off in the process of merging exchange compensation allowance into pay -		3	5	3
Increase of pay to commissioners -		555	8	9
Incremental scale of pay for deputy commissioners -		360	8	10
Increased pay for officers promoted from the provincial civil service -		456	10	8
Decrease of appointments held by members of the provincial civil service -		2,237	15	4
Grant of the equivalent of exchange compensation allowance to statutory natives of India -		169	7	8
Total superior executive posts -		3,783	8	6
Superior judicial posts :		Rs.	A.	P.
Rounding off in the process of merging exchange compensation allowance into pay -		3	5	3
Increase of pay to district and sessions judges, 1st grade -		433	11	9
Incremental scale of pay for district and sessions judges, below the 1st grade -		1,903	5	3
Increased pay for officers promoted from the provincial civil service -		897	8	0
Decrease of appointments held by members of the provincial civil service -		3,162	6	8
Raising pay of registrar, chief court, and judge, small cause court -		110	6	8
Grant of the equivalent of exchange compensation allowance to statutory natives of India -		77	7	8
Total superior judicial posts -		6,588	3	3
Total superior posts -		10,371	11	9

\* Settlement officers ; deputy director of land records ; registrar co-operative credit societies ; superintendent, Dehra Dun deputy commissioners, Naini Tal, Gharwal, and Almora.

## ANNEXURE X.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—(continued).

		Rs.	A.	P.
Inferior posts :		5,748	5	7
Improvement of prospects				
Grant of the equivalent of exchange compensation allowance to statutory natives of India		114	13	6
Total inferior posts		5,863	3	1
Grand total		16,234	14	10
<i>Burma.</i>				
Superior executive posts :		Rs.	A.	P.
Rounding off in the process of merging exchange compensation allowance into pay		2	3	6
Increase of pay to commissioners		999	15	9
Inclusion of several* appointments in the grade of deputy commissioners		9,750	6	8
Incremental scale of pay for deputy commissioners		346	9	1
Increased pay for officers promoted from the provincial civil service		470	0	0
Decrease in the number of appointments to be held by members of the provincial civil service		— 34	6	0
Grant of the equivalent of exchange compensation allowance to statutory natives of India		70	3	0
Total superior executive posts		11,605	0	0
Superior judicial posts :				
Rounding off in the process of merging exchange compensation allowance into pay		43	5	3
Raising pay of one divisional judge		200	14	3
Incremental scale of pay for divisional judges below the 1st grade		— 360	3	9
Readjustment of existing appointments held by members of the provincial civil service		— 371	15	1
Increase of appointments held by members of the provincial civil service		— 779	11	9
Increased pay for officers promoted from the provincial civil service		364	0	0
Raising pay of registrar, chief court		401	0	8
Grant of the equivalent of exchange compensation allowance to statutory natives of India		19	11	8
Total superior judicial posts		— 482	14	9
Total superior posts		11,122	1	3
Inferior posts :				
Improvement of prospects		7,738	13	10
Savings on account of decrease in number of appointments		— 3,346	14	0
Grant of the equivalent of exchange compensation allowance to statutory natives of India		42	3	0
Total inferior posts		4,434	2	10
Grand total		15,556	4	1
<i>Bihar and Orissa.</i>				
Superior posts :		Rs.	A.	P.
Rounding off in the process of merging exchange compensation allowance into pay		7	4	1
Reducing pay of commissioners		— 277	12	7
Incremental scale of pay for collectors and district and sessions judges below 1st grade		1,256	11	5
Decrease in the number of appointments to be held by members of the provincial civil service		835	10	11
Increased pay for officers promoted from the provincial civil service		1,172	9	0
Distribution of appointments to be held by members of the provincial civil service between executive and judicial branches		— 530	13	2
Grant of the equivalent of exchange compensation allowance to statutory natives of India		214	0	9
Total superior posts		2,677	10	5
Inferior posts :				
Improvement of prospects		1,994	3	4
Savings on account of decrease in number of appointments		— 3,240	10	0
Grant of the equivalent of exchange compensation allowance to statutory natives of India		105	5	3
Total inferior posts		— 1,141	1	5
Grand total		1,536	9	0
<i>Central Provinces and Berar.</i>				
Superior posts :		Rs.	A.	P.
Rounding off in the process of merging exchange compensation allowance into pay		14	7	0
Raising pay of chief commissioner		194	7	1
" " commissioners		555	8	9
" " 2nd additional judicial commissioner		251	1	9
Inclusion of several* appointments in the grade of deputy commissioners		6,640	0	0
Incremental scale of pay for deputy commissioners		1,319	14	11
Increased pay for officers promoted from the provincial civil service		1,073	15	0
Decrease of appointments held by members of the provincial civil service		1,482	12	10
Grant of the equivalent of exchange compensation allowance to statutory natives of India		208	12	0
Total superior posts		11,740	15	4

\* President, Rangoon municipality; director of agriculture; revenue secretary; secretary; deputy director of land records; secretary to financial commissioner; settlement officers; registrar, co-operative credit societies.



## ANNEXURE X.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—(continued).

## SCHEDULE VI.

[Referred to in paragraph 65 of Annexure X.]

STATEMENT SHOWING THE PRESENT AND PROPOSED COST OF THE PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES AND THE EXTRA EXPENDITURE INVOLVED IN THE RECOMMENDATIONS.

## Madras.

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
<i>Executive Branch.</i>				<i>Executive Branch.</i>			
		Rs.	Rs. A. P.			Rs.	Rs. A. P.
3	Deputy Collectors - -	800	2,400 0 0	3	Deputy Collectors - -	1,000	3,000 0 0
6	" " - -	700	4,200 0 0	20	" " - -	600-40-800.	14,666 10 8
8	" " - -	600	4,800 0 0		" " - -	250-40/3-450-50/3-500.	39,749 13 10
29	" " - -	500	14,500 0 0	114	" " - -		
32	" " - -	400	12,800 0 0		Probationers - -	150	1,050 0 0
29	" " - -	300	8,700 0 0				
30	" " - -	250	7,500 0 0				
3	Probationers - -	150-200	525 0 0				
140	Total - -	-	55,425 0 0	144	Total - -	-	58,466 8 6
					Deduct present cost - -	-	55,425 0 0
					Net extra expenditure - -	-	3,041 8 6
<i>Judicial Branch.</i>				<i>Judicial Branch.</i>			
4	Sub-Judges - -	800	3,200 0 0	3	Sub-Judges - -	1,000	3,000 0 0
5	" " - -	650	3,250 0 0	15	" " - -	600-40-800.	11,000 0 0
9	" " - -	500	4,500 0 0		" " - -	300-40/3-500.	57,864 6 0
33	District Munsifs - -	400	13,200 0 0	143	District Munsifs - -		
33	" " - -	300	9,900 0 0		Probationers - -	200	3,200 0 0
33	" " - -	250	8,250 0 0				
31	" " - -	200	6,200 0 0				
13	Officiating Munsifs* - -	200	2,600 0 0				
161	Total - -	-	51,100 0 0	177	Total - -	-	75,064 6 0
					Deduct present cost - -	-	51,100 0 0
					Net extra expenditure - -	-	23,964 6 0
					Total extra expenditure—Executive and Judicial Branches.	-	27,005 14 6

## Bombay.

<i>Executive Branch.</i>				<i>Executive Branch.</i>			
2	Deputy Collectors and Magistrates.	800	1,600 0 0	2	Deputy Collectors and Magistrates.	1,000	2,000 0 0
3	" " "	700	2,100 0 0	14	" " "	600-40-800.	10,266 10 8
7	" " "	600	4,200 0 0		" " "	250-40/3-450-50/3-500.	27,461 15 8
23	" " "	500	11,500 0 0	79	" " "		
24	" " "	400	9,600 0 0		Probationers - -	150	750 0 0
24	" " "	300	7,200 0 0				
4	Probationers - -	150-200	675 0 0	5	Probationers - -		
12†	Officiating Deputy Collectors and Magistrates.	150	1,800 0 0				
99	Total - -	-	38,675 0 0	100	Total - -	-	40,478 10 4
					Deduct present cost - -	-	38,675 0 0
					Net extra expenditure - -	-	1,803 10 4
<i>Judicial Branch.</i>				<i>Judicial Branch.</i>			
3	Judges, Small Cause Court -	800	2,400 0 0	3	Judges, Small Cause Court -	1,000	3,000 0 0
4	Subordinate Judges, 1st class	800	3,200 0 0	24	Subordinate Judges, 1st class and Assistant Judges and Sessions Judges.	600-40-800.	17,600 0 0
5	" " "	650	3,250 0 0		Subordinate Judges, 2nd class	300-40/3-500.	45,081 11 4
12	" " "	500	6,000 0 0		Probationers - -	200	2,800 0 0
3	Assistant Judges and Sessions Judges.	500 or 600†	1,650 0 0				
25	Subordinate Judges, 2nd class	400	10,000 0 0				
24	" " "	300	7,200 0 0				
15	" " "	250	3,750 0 0				
	Carried forward - -	-	37,450 0 0		Carried forward - -	-	68,431 11 4

\* 13 officiating munsifs, corresponding to the number now brought on to the permanent strength on account of the leave reserve, have been shown here.

† 12 officiating deputy collectors, corresponding to the number now brought on to the permanent strength on account of the leave reserve, have been shown here.

‡ 1st grade, Rs. 600; 2nd grade, Rs. 500.

## ANNEXURE X.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—(continued).

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
	Brought forward	Rs.	Rs. A. P.		Brought forward	Rs.	Rs. A. P.
	<i>Judicial Branch—cont.</i>		37,450 0 0		<i>Judicial Branch—cont.</i>		68,431 11 4
24	Subordinate Judges, 2nd Class	200	4,800 0 0				
14	" " "	150	2,100 0 0				
12*	Officiating " Subordinate Judges, 2nd class.	150	1,800 0 0				
141	Total - - -	- - -	46,150 0 0	155	Total - - -	- - -	68,431 11 4
					Deduct present cost -	- - -	46,150 0 0
					Net extra expenditure	- - -	22,281 11 4
					Total extra expenditure, Executive and Judicial Branches.	- - -	24,085 5 8

*Bengal.*

<i>Executive Branch.</i>				<i>Executive Branch.</i>			
5	Deputy Magistrates and Deputy Collectors.	800	4,000 0 0	6	Deputy Magistrates and Deputy Collectors.	1,000	6,000 0 0
7	" " "	700	4,900 0 0	45	" " "	600-40-800	33,000 0 0
16	" " "	600	9,600 0 0	252	" " "	250-40/3-	91,541 0 3
49	" " "	500	24,500 0 0		" " "	450-50/3-500.	
72	" " "	400	28,800 0 0				
74	" " "	300	22,200 0 0				
80	" " "	250	20,000 0 0				
21	Probationers - - -	100	2,100 0 0	21	Probationers - - -	150	3,150 0 0
324	Total - - -	- - -	1,16,100 0 0	324	Total - - -	- - -	1,33,691 0 3
					Deduct present cost -	- - -	1,16,100 0 0
					Net extra expenditure	- - -	17,591 0 3
<i>Judicial Branch.</i>				<i>Judicial Branch.</i>			
7	Subordinate Judges - -	1,000	7,000 0 0	7	Subordinate Judges - -	1,000	7,000 0 0
14	" " - -	800	11,200 0 0	41	" " - -	600-40-800	30,066 10 8
27	" " - -	600	16,200 0 0	282	Munsifs - - -	300-40/3-500.	1,13,241 0 9
29	Munsifs - - -	500	14,500 0 0				
72	" - - -	400	28,800 0 0	33	Probationers - - -	200	6,600 0 0
74	" - - -	300	22,200 0 0				
80	" - - -	250	20,000 0 0				
27§	Officiating Munsifs - -	200	5,400 0 0				
330	Total - - -	- - -	1,25,300 0 0	363	Total - - -	- - -	1,56,907 11 5
					Deduct present cost -	- - -	1,25,300 0 0
					Net extra expenditure	- - -	31,607 11 5
					Total extra expenditure, Executive and Judicial Branches.	- - -	49,198 11 8

*United Provinces of Agra and Oudh.*

<i>Executive Branch.</i>				<i>Executive Branch.</i>			
8	Deputy Collectors - -	800	6,400 0 0	6	Deputy Collectors - -	1,000	6,000 0 0
11	" " - -	700	7,700 0 0	44	" " - -	600-40-800	32,266 10 8
22	" " - -	600	13,200 0 0	242	" " - -	250-40/3-	84,513 6 8
47	" " - -	500	23,500 0 0		" " - -	450-50/3-500.	
76	" " - -	400	30,400 0 0				
69	" " - -	300	20,700 0 0				
44	" " - -	250	11,000 0 0				
30	Probationers - - -	100-150	3,750 0 0	15	Probationers - - -	150	2,250 0 0
307	Total - - -	- - -	1,16,650 0 0	307	Total - - -	- - -	1,25,030 1 4
					Deduct present cost -	- - -	1,16,650 0 0
					Net extra expenditure	- - -	8,380 1 4

\* 12 officiating subordinate judges, corresponding to the number now brought on to the permanent strength on account of the leave reserve, have been shown here.

§ Twenty-seven officiating munsifs, corresponding to the number now brought on to the permanent strength on account of the leave reserve, have been shown here.

ANNEXURE X.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—(continued).

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
		Rs.	Rs. A. P.			Rs.	Rs. A. P.
<i>Judicial Branch.</i>				<i>Judicial Branch.</i>			
4	Subordinate Judges - -	800-40-1,000.	3,733 5 4	3	Subordinate Judges - -	1,000	3,000 0 0
10	" " - -	800	8,000 0 0	46	" " - -	600-40-800	33,733 5 4
13	" " - -	650	8,450 0 0	100	Munsifs - " - -	300-40/3-500.	37,377 3 2
22	" " - -	500	11,000 0 0	15	Probationers - - -	200	13,000 0 0
32	Munsifs - - -	400	12,800 0 0				
34	" - - -	300	10,200 0 0				
34	" - - -	200	6,800 0 0				
14	Probationers - - -	175	2,450 0 0				
163	Total - - -	- -	63,433 5 4	164	Total - - -	- -	77,110 8 6
					Deduct present cost - -	- -	63,433 5 4
					Net extra expenditure - -	- -	13,677 3 2
					Total extra expenditure, Executive and Judicial Branches.	- -	22,057 4 5

Punjab.

<i>Executive Branch.</i>				<i>Executive Branch.</i>			
3	Extra Assistant Commissioners.	800	2,400 0 0	2	Extra Assistant Commissioners.	1,000	2,000 0 0
4	" " "	700	2,800 0 0	16	" " "	600-40-800	11,733 5 4
5	" " "	600	3,000 0 0	86	" " "	250-40/3-450-50/3-500	29,845 4 3
12	" " "	500	6,000 0 0				
24	" " "	400	9,600 0 0				
25	" " "	300	7,500 0 0				
31*	" " "	250	7,750 0 0				
6	Probationers - - -	75, 150, and 200.	850 0 0	6	Probationers - - -	150	900 0 0
110	Total - - -	- -	39,900 0 0	110	Total - - -	- -	44,478 9 7
					Deduct present cost - -	- -	39,900 0 0
					Net extra expenditure - -	- -	4,578 9 7
<i>Judicial Branch.</i>				<i>Judicial Branch.</i>			
3	Extra Judicial Assistant Commissioners.	800	2,400 0 0	1	Extra Judicial Assistant Commissioner.	1,000	1,000 0 0
4	" " "	700	2,800 0 0	23	" " "	600-40-800.	16,866 10 8
5	" " "	600	3,000 0 0	45	Subordinate Judges - -	300-40/3-500.	16,028 5 2
12	" " "	500	6,000 0 0	4	Probationers - - -	200	800 0 0
12	Subordinate Judges. - -	400	4,800 0 0				
12	" " "	300	3,600 0 0				
21*	Extra Assistant Commissioners.	250	5,250 0 0				
69	Total - - -	- -	27,850 0 0	73	Total - - -	- -	34,694 15 10
					Deduct present cost - -	- -	27,850 0 0
					Net extra expenditure - -	- -	6,844 15 10
					Total extra expenditure, Executive and Judicial Branches.	- -	11,423 9 5

Burma.

<i>Executive Branch.</i>				<i>Executive Branch.</i>			
3	Extra Assistant Commissioners.	800	2,400 0 0	2	Extra Assistant Commissioners.	1,000	2,000 0 0
5	" " "	700	3,500 0 0	20	" " "	600-40-800	14,666 10 8
	Carried forward - -	- -	5,900 0 0		Carried forward - -	- -	16,666 10 8

\* There is a combined grade of 52 officers for both the executive and the judicial branches. This has been divided proportionately.

## ANNEXURE X.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—(continued).

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
	Brought forward -	Rs.	Rs. A. P.		Brought forward -	Rs.	Rs. A. P.
	<i>Executive Branch—cont.</i>		5,900 0 0		<i>Executive Branch—cont.</i>		16,666 10 8
11	Extra Assistant Commissioners.	600	6,600 0 0	108	Extra Assistant Commissioners.	300-40/3-500-50/3-550.	43,018 7 3
37	" " "	500	18,500 0 0	7	Probationers	200	1,400 0 0
37	" " "	400	14,800 0 0				
37	" " "	300	11,100 0 0				
3	Probationers	250	750 0 0				
133	Total - - -	- -	57,650 0 0	137.	Total - - -	- -	61,085 1 11
					Deduct present cost	- -	57,650 0 0
					Net extra expenditure	- -	3,435 1 11
	<i>Judicial Branch.</i>				<i>Judicial Branch.</i>		
1	Judicial Extra Assistant Commissioner.	800	800 0 0	1	Judicial Extra Assistant Commissioner.	1,000	1,000 0 0
1	" " "	700	700 0 0	11	" " "	600-40-800	8,066 10 8
2	" " "	600	1,200 0 0	20	" " "	300-40/3-500-50/3-550.	7,004 1 0
8	" " "	500	4,000 0 0				
8	" " "	400	3,200 0 0	2	Probationers	200	400 0 0
9	" " "	300	2,700 0 0				
3*	Officiating Judicial Myooks	150	450 0 0				
32	Total - - -	- -	13,050 0 0	34	Total - - -	- -	16,470 11 8
					Deduct present cost	- -	13,050 0 0
					Net extra expenditure	- -	3,420 11 8
					Total extra expenditure—Executive and Judicial Branches.	- -	6,855 13 7

## Bihar and Orissa.

	<i>Executive Branch.</i>				<i>Executive Branch.</i>		
4	Deputy Magistrates and Deputy Collectors.	800	3,200 0 0	5	Deputy Magistrates and Deputy Collectors.	1,000*	5,000 0 0
5	" " "	700	3,500 0 0	35	" " "	600-40-800	25,666 10 8
13	" " "	600	7,800 0 0	195	" " "	250-40/3-450-50/3-500.	69,342 9 4
37	" " "	500	18,500 0 0				
55	" " "	400	22,000 0 0				
57	" " "	300	17,100 0 0				
60	" " "	250	15,000 0 0				
18	Probationers	100	1,800 0 0	14	Probationers	150	2,100 0 0
249	Total - - -	- -	88,900 0 0	249	Total - - -	- -	1,02,109 4 0
					Deduct present cost	- -	88,900 0 0
					Net extra Expenditure	- -	13,209 4 0
	<i>Judicial Branch.</i>				<i>Judicial Branch.</i>		
2	Subordinate Judges	1,000	2,000 0 0	2	Subordinate Judges	1,000	2,000 0 0
6	" " "	800	4,800 0 0	17	" " "	600-40-800	12,466 10 8
11	" " "	600	6,600 0 0	76	Munsifs	300-40/3-500.	29,854 14 10
14	Munsifs	400	5,600 0 0				
20	" " "	300	6,000 0 0	10	Probationers	200	2,000 0 0
22	" " "	250	5,500 0 0				
12	" " "	200	2,400 0 0				
8†	Officiating Munsifs	200	1,600 0 0				
95	Total - - -	- -	34,500 0 0	105	Total - - -	- -	46,321 9 6
					Deduct present Cost	- -	34,500 0 0
					Net extra expenditure	- -	11,821 9 6
					Total extra expenditure—Executive and Judicial Branches.	- -	25,030 13 6

\* Three officiating judicial myooks, corresponding to the number of judicial extra assistant commissioners now brought on to the permanent strength on account of the leave reserve, have been shown here.

† Eight officiating munsifs, corresponding to the number now brought on to the permanent strength on account of the leave reserve, have been shown here.

## ANNEXURE X.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—(continued).

## Central Provinces and Berar.

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
	<i>Executive Branch.</i>	<i>Ra.</i>	<i>Rs. A. P.</i>		<i>Executive Branch.</i>	<i>Ra.</i>	<i>Rs. A. P.</i>
2	Extra Assistant Commissioners.	800	1,600 0 0	2	Extra Assistant Commissioners.	1,000	2,000 0 0
3	" " "	700	2,100 0 0	15	" " "	600-40-800	11,000 0 0
6	" " "	600	3,600 0 0	32	" " "	250-40/3-	28,589 10 0
14	" " "	500	7,000 0 0		" " "	450-50/3-	
24	" " "	400	9,600 0 0			500.	
24	" " "	300	7,200 0 0				
14	" " "	250	3,500 0 0				
12	" " "	200	2,400 0 0				
4	Probationers - - -	100-150-200.	600 0 0	5	Probationers - - -	150	750 0 0
103	Total - - -		37,600 0 0	104	Total - - -		42,339 10 0
					Deduct present cost - - -		37,600 0 0
					Net extra expenditure - - -		4,739 10 0
	<i>Judicial Branch.</i>				<i>Judicial Branch.</i>		
2	District Judges - - -	800	1,600 0 0	1	District Judge - - -	1,000	1,000 0 0
3	" " " - - -	700	2,100 0 0	14	" " " - - -	600-40-800	10,266 10 8
5	" " " - - -	600	3,600 0 0	39	Subordinate Judges - - -	300-40/3-	14,240 0 6
5	" " " - - -	500	2,500 0 0			500.	
17	Subordinate Judges - - -	400	6,800 0 0	3	Probationers - - -	200	600 0 0
17	" " " - - -	300	5,100 0 0				
5*	Officiating Munsifs - - -	125	625 0 0		Total - - -		26,106 11 2
54	Total - - -		21,725 0 0	57	Deduct present cost - - -		21,725 0 0
					Net extra expenditure - - -		4,881 11 2
					Total extra expenditure, Executive and Judicial Branches.		9,121 5 2

## Assam.

	<i>Executive Branch.</i>				<i>Executive Branch.</i>		
1	Extra Assistant Commissioner	800	800 0 0	1	Extra Assistant Commissioner	1,000	1,000 0 0
1	" " "	700	700 0 0	9	" " "	600-40-800	6,600 0 0
3	" " "	600	1,800 0 0	50	" " "	250-40/3-	17,429 12 10
10	" " "	500	5,000 0 0		" " "	450-50/3-	
14	" " "	400	5,600 0 0			500.	
15	" " "	300	4,500 0 0				
16	" " "	250	4,000 0 0				
2	Probationers	100	200 0 0	3	Probationers - - -	150	450 0 0
62	Total - - -		22,600 0 0	63	Total - - -		25,479 12 10
					Deduct present cost - - -		22,600 0 0
					Net extra expenditure - - -		2,879 12 10

Total net extra expenditure.	Per mensem.	Per annum.
All provinces:	Rs. A. P.	Rs. A. P.
Executive Branch - - -	59,658 10 9	7,15,904 1 0
Judicial Branch - - -	1,18,000 0 1	14,16,000 1 0
Total - - -	1,77,658 10 10	21,31,904 2 0

Analysis of extra expenditure per year.	Executive Branch.	Judicial Branch.	Total.
(i) On account of probationers - - -	Rs. A. P.	Rs. A. P.	Rs. A. P.
(ii) " " leave reserve - - -	45,900 0 0	2,03,400 0 0	2,49,300 0 0
(iii) " " improved prospects - - -	28,457 4 0	1,77,440 4 0	2,05,897 8 0
	6,41,546 13 0	10,35,159 13 0	16,76,706 10 0
Total - - -	7,15,904 1 0	14,16,000 1 0	21,31,904 2 0

\* Five officiating munsifs, corresponding to the number of subordinate judges, now brought on to the permanent strength on account of the leave reserve, have been shown here.

## ANNEXURE X.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—(continued).

MINUTE BY SIR MURRAY HAMMICK AND MR. F. G. SLY.

*Paragraph 18.*—We can only support the recommendation in this paragraph that provision should be made for a minimum of 25 per cent. of statutory natives of India in the superior posts, if it is made subject to two important exceptions. In the first place, the province of Burma should be excluded from the scope of the scheme. The evidence leaves no doubt in our minds that Burma requires separate treatment from the rest of India in regard to the employment of non-Europeans in the Indian civil service. The proposed scheme of admission by competitive examination is wholly unsuited to Burma in its present stage of educational progress, and will seriously prejudice the admission of Burmans to that portion of the service employed in their own country. In the present conditions of Burma, we recommend that a start should be made in the recruitment of Burmans to the Indian civil service by giving to the lieutenant-governor power to nominate from time to time for direct recruitment a suitable Burman candidate of similar educational qualifications to those prescribed for King-Emperor's cadets. In the second place, we consider that the superior posts of the foreign department should be excluded from the scope of our recommendation regarding proportions. That department was not included in the scope of our inquiry, and should similarly not be included in the proposed scheme. We do not wish to imply that no Indian should be admitted to the foreign department, but in the absence of any inquiry into it, we are not prepared to recommend a definite proportion of Indians. The Government of India should be left free to deal with that department on its merits.

MURRAY HAMMICK.  
F. G. SLY.

MINUTE BY SIR THEODORE MORISON.

*Paragraph 20.*

I cannot agree with my colleagues in recommending that the direct appointments which are to be made annually in India should be filled by means of one competitive examination open to the inhabitants of all the provinces. I believe that education is very much more advanced in the presidencies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay than it is in Bihar and Orissa, the United Provinces, the Punjab, and the smaller Administrations. I anticipate that the result of one competitive examination for all India would be to give an excessive representation to the southern provinces of India, and virtually to exclude from the Indian civil service the inhabitants of the north. I think that this would be a misfortune to the service, because Punjabis and Hindustanis have, in my opinion, great natural aptitude for some of the duties of administration. I fear that it would also create ill will between Hindus and Muhammadans because, if my anticipations turn out to be correct, Muhammadans would be virtually excluded from the service. Though it is true that in mere numbers the Muhammadans are fairly equally distributed between the east and the north of India, yet Muhammadans of the class from whom good public servants are likely to be drawn are chiefly found in the north. The solution which I prefer is that, for the purpose of direct recruitment to the Indian civil service, India should be divided into two areas; the first to contain Bengal, Madras, and Bombay (population 106 millions); and the second Bihar and Orissa, the United Provinces, the Punjab and the North-West Frontier Provinces (population 103 millions); the Central Provinces, Assam, and the minor Administrations would be assigned partly to one area and partly to the other, according to the standard of education prevailing in different districts in those provinces. The examination would be held in each area in alternate years, and competition would thus be confined to persons who are, approximately, upon the same educational plane. The interests of the Muhammadans would, I believe, be adequately safeguarded by this measure. I do not think that the Muhammadans of northern India have anything to fear from competition with other communities inhabiting the same area; what, I believe, they cannot do, and cannot be expected to do, is to compete with the best brains of provinces which have had at least a generation's start of them in education.

2. There is, I recognise, one disadvantage in the scheme I propose. To any individual Indian the opportunity of appearing in the Indian civil service examination in India will be offered only every other year, instead of every year. Instead of

having the two chances which fall to the lot of the candidates in London, the candidate in India will have only one. But all Indian candidates will be on an equal footing with each other, and the number of probationers taken respectively from India and England will not be affected by the number of chances given to the individual. Considered absolutely, I cannot see any particular merit in the custom of giving every candidate two chances. I should certainly have preferred a solution by which the candidate in India had the same number of opportunities of competing as the candidate in England, but as that can only be secured by having one examination for the whole of India, I prefer the solution I have indicated as involving the lesser evil.

3. In making this great experiment I think it would certainly be prudent to begin with the two-area system ; if, after the experience of ten years or so, the civil service commissioners are satisfied that the examination papers do not disclose an important difference of educational standard in the two areas, it would be easy to discard this precaution, and to hold one examination for the whole of India. To revert to a system of examination by areas in rotation, after a single examination had once been instituted, would, I fear, be impossible.

*Paragraphs 14, 15, and 18.*

4. I agree with Mr. Chaubal\* that recruitment in India should be for 25 per cent. of the whole cadre, and not for 25 per cent. of the superior posts only.

THEODORE MORISON.

MINUTE BY SIR V. CHIROL.

*Paragraph 15.*—I have only agreed very reluctantly to the recommendation that the number of "listed posts" reserved for members of the provincial civil services should be reduced from 61 to 41. The provincial civil service constitutes the backbone of the civil administration. It is drawn, for the most part, from the same classes of Indian society from which the bulk of the Indian members of the Indian civil service are themselves drawn. In proportion, as the work of administration increases—and it is bound to go on increasing steadily—an increasingly large proportion of the more responsible duties hitherto discharged by the Indian civil service must necessarily devolve upon the provincial civil services. The importance of raising the general standard of efficiency in the provincial civil service and of bringing it nearer to the level of the Indian civil service is, therefore, beyond dispute. A great advance in this direction would have been made if it had been possible to devise a scheme of direct promotion into the Indian civil service for some of the most promising members of the provincial civil services at an early stage in their career ; but the difficulties in the way of combining any such scheme with the scheme for recruitment of Indians in India recommended by the Commission are, to my regret, regarded as insuperable, and it seems to me all the more unfortunate that, in order to give larger opportunities for the employment of Indians recruited from other sources to the Indian civil service, it should have been found necessary to reduce the number of prizes hitherto within the reach of the provincial civil services. The Commission has, however, made in regard to the provincial civil services various recommendations which should undoubtedly improve its material prospects and to that extent give general satisfaction. In view of those recommendations, I cannot formally dissent from the proposed reduction of the listed posts, but I feel bound to place on record my great regret that it should have been found necessary to reduce the number of prizes which have hitherto proved valuable incentives to good work in the provincial civil services and have come to be widely regarded as the legitimate rewards of a distinguished career in its ranks.

VALENTINE CHIROL.

MINUTE BY MR. M. B. CHAUBAL.

*Paragraph 3: Legislation.*

While I agree with the proposal that further legislation be undertaken to make it possible to admit natives of India who will be recruited in accordance with our recommendations to the Indian civil service itself, and temporarily the establishment

\* See page 234.

## ANNEXURE X.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—(continued).

of a mixed commission until such legislation, I do not approve of the recommendation so to revise the schedule to the act of 1861 as to include all the present Indian civil service posts. There are at present several posts in some of the miscellaneous departments which have been held by Indian civil service men, but these posts are not in the schedule, and it is therefore discretionary at present to appoint either an Indian civil service man or an outsider to any of these; and if an outsider is appointed it cannot be said, as the law now stands, that there has been any encroachment on the field of the Indian civil service. I do not object to the revision that may be necessary in the designation of the officers or to bring the non-regulation provinces under the act. My objection is rather to a statutory reservation of more posts.

*Paragraph 6: Medical examination.*

2. I do not approve of the introduction in the medical examination of a person of Indian experience, and I would leave untouched the statutory powers of the civil service commissioners. The suspicion may be ill-founded, but there is undoubtedly a suspicion in certain quarters that a retired Indian official does not look with much sympathy on Indians trying to get into this the premier service in India. And if it is admitted that at present medical examinations are conscientiously made, and unless there is evidence that faulty constitutions have been allowed to get through, I see no reason for any change. Subsequent breakdown may be and often is an officer's self-acquisition. The climatic variations between province and province make it difficult perhaps for a medical gentleman with an experience of one province only to say how a physical constitution is likely to stand in India in another province. So long as a person is generally recommended to be of a strong and healthy constitution, it is quite enough, and it is necessary to see that the admission itself to the examination is not hampered by difficult restrictions. Besides I do not think it right to lay down that persons who intend going into the police service or a military service like the Indian medical service, and those who are thinking of a career in the judicial or executive departments must be judged by the same invariable standard. Two examinations, before and after the period of probation, may be unobjectionable if they are conducted ordinarily by the same person. On the whole I prefer to leave the present system untouched except that the medical practitioner who has examined a candidate before probation should also examine him at the end of the probationary period before going out to India.

संयमन नयति

*Paragraphs 7 to 9: Question of age-limits.*

3. This is one of the most important questions for consideration in connection with this service, and I am sorry that, after the most anxious consideration that I have been able to give to the subject, I cannot bring myself to share the view which my European colleagues have taken. Since a separate source for recruitment to the Indian civil service in India has been recommended, I am not attaching much importance to the fact that the reduction of the age-limits for the examination in England to 17 to 19 is calculated to narrow the chances of any Indians attempting to seek entrance to the service through the English door; though this consideration must not be altogether ignored, as that door is not expressly shut against Indians. But even considering the question from the point of view which regards the interests of British students only, but with the main object of securing the good government of India, I must confess that the grounds given for the reduction of the age are weak and unconvincing, while the reasons against such a material reduction of the age-limits are far more cogent, and the conclusion arrived at is against the whole mass of Indian evidence received, and also against the evidence of a highly respectable body of European witnesses. When I say "Indian evidence" I must not be understood as referring to evidence given under any apprehension of the reduction of age being unfavourable for Indian candidates to compete for the examination in London, but to that large body of evidence which considers that the British official in India must have arrived at some maturity of judgment before being invested with the large civil and magisterial powers which even as a young officer he is called upon to exercise soon after his arrival in India. This aspect of the age-limits question is, to my mind, far more important than the administrative point of view to which my European colleagues attach so much importance.

4. The reasons stated for a reduction of the age-limits appear to me to be more or less hypothetical and imaginary and without anything in actual experience in the past to support them. The proposed reduced age-limits, 17-19, were in force from 1878 to 1891, a period of about 14 years. The higher age-limits, 21-23 or 22-24, have now been in force for over 22 years. The conclusion that the lower age-limits are better is not based on any appreciable evidence that the British officers who were recruited to the service between 1878 and 1891 have shown any markedly superior traits of character generally that are not to be found in the young men who have been coming to India during the last 22 years; on the contrary, there is no doubt that in point of general liberal education the latter are superior to the average of those who came to India at the younger age.

5. It is said that at 25 or thereabouts a man comes too late to India, as at this age ordinarily he would have his tastes, aptitude and outlook more or less fixed, and in consequence is less easy to train in the detailed drudgery of administrative work. His early ideas are said to have been cast in a mould which is in no way Indian. Looking to the present political conditions and progress of India, I think it is a distinct advantage that the young officer who comes to India should be capable of forming his own opinion about the Indian people, their ways of living and thinking, rather than be of that tender and susceptible age at which he can easily inherit the traditions of the older Indian official. As it is, the environment of a young officer on his arrival in India is generally that of his own people; he becomes a member probably of some exclusively European club, where he hears the conversation of senior officers, and accepts the views and shibboleths current among them with unquestioning respect and faith. A university man with a completed British education is more likely to think for himself. According to the generally accepted Indian belief, all European official opinion about the people of India is formed in one mould without much appreciable variation; so that a couple of years' difference in the age of arrival in India would not affect the question. But the most important point which seems to be ignored is that the Indian public do not desire that the large civil and criminal powers with which the civil servant is invested within a short time of his arrival in India should be exercised by a raw and inexperienced youth. Even as a junior officer, he has control over provincial service officers older in age and experience, who are mostly well educated men, and it is necessary that these men should think well and highly about the young recruit to power. The wishes of the people of India in this respect are entitled to far more weight than all the considerations mentioned in the report taken together.

6. Then it is said that if the Indian civil service is to be kept efficient, it is important that an officer should attain a position of responsibility at a comparatively early age, *i.e.*, at about 30; that at present, or even if the age limits were reduced by a year, he would be 33 or 32 by the time he attains that position, and this is too late. It seems to be assumed that as a junior officer his position is not one of trust and responsibility. I think, on the contrary, that the position of an assistant collector or an assistant judge is one of considerable responsibility, though not the same responsibility as that of a collector or district and sessions judge. Looking at the very large civil, criminal and revenue powers exercised by collectors, district magistrates and district and sessions judges, I should say that no one ought to be entrusted with them before he is 35, and surely there ought to be no complaint if, out of a total service of 35 years, a person passes only 8 to 10 years in a junior position of responsibility. The argument that officers in selection posts as members of council, &c., may be in some cases a little over 60 is not one to which much weight need be attached.

7. Then it is said that if the age limits stand as at present, a young officer is more likely to be married or to get married than if he came out three years younger, and likely to get into financial embarrassments. Assuming this to be so (for we have had no figures or evidence about this) I do not think that the efficiency of the service or the interests of good administration should be prejudiced owing to the connubial or matrimonial desires of the British youth; nor ought any weight to be attached to financial embarrassments which are probably of the officer's own creation. If any importance does really attach to this point, a rule can easily be made, as has been done in another service, that a candidate must be single and unmarried at the commencement of his service in India.

8. We must not assume that these considerations were not present to the minds of Lord Macaulay's committee or those of the last Public Services Commission which

## ANNEXURE X.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—(continued).

recommended the later age even for the British candidates for the competitive examination in London. They are considerations which are likely to occur to any one considering the question. The decision of the Commission is certainly opposed to the weight of the evidence. Take, for example, all the evidence given on the point in one province, say Bombay. Thirty witnesses were in all orally examined before the Commission on this service. Nine of these—five Europeans and four Indians—express no opinion on the point. Out of the remaining 21, only two witnesses (Messrs. Barrow and Curtis) gave any decided preference to a younger age; of these it is only Mr. Curtis who definitely says that the men who come out at present are too old, that the age-limits should be 17–19, and that on arrival in India the officer should be 21 or 22 years old. Mr. Barrow favours the view that the officers should be 20 or 21 on arrival in India, but says he found no difference between the men who came out at the earlier age and those who have been coming under the later age-limits, and that those who are coming in now are intellectually superior. There is an unconscious prepossession in the human mind in favour of any system under which it has itself been trained and brought up, and both these officers passed during the time that the 17–19 limits held the field. The remaining 19 (five Europeans, all themselves Indian civil service officers, and 14 Indians) all distinctly favour either the present age or 21–23.

9. Again, if one looks into the written statements received by the Commission in Bombay from the 87 non-oral witnesses there is the same overwhelming majority in favour of the later age. Out of these 87 written statements 40 are from Government servants (18 members of the Indian civil service and 22 officials not members of the Indian civil service); 9 are from associations and public bodies; and 38 are from non-official individuals—members of the public. Out of the 18 Indian civil service officers, 2 do not state any opinion, 6 advocate 17–19, 1 advocates 20–22, 3 advocate 21–23, and 6 approve the present age, 22–24. Out of the 22 officials not members of the Indian civil service only 5 advocate 17–19, 2 advocate 18–20, and the rest, *i.e.*, 15, are for 21–23, or the present age-limits or wish to further increase the age. Out of the 47 individuals non-official and members of the public or representatives of associations and public bodies 11 do not state any opinion, the rest being either for retaining the present age or still further increasing the age-limits.

10. A disadvantage of the reduction of the age-limits to 17–19 would be that a lad just coming out of a public school would hardly be able to make up his mind as to his future career. The examination for the Indian civil service, if held at 17–19 would have to be separated from the examination for the home and colonial services. This itself would probably prejudicially affect recruitment. All the evidence that was taken here from the universities and schools deprecated the suggestion to lower the age. Again it is proposed that a special curriculum for a diploma may be arranged for the probationers who pass the competitive examination, thus completing their liberal education. It may be noted that it has always been considered objectionable that the revenues of India should be spent for completing the general education of the successful men at the competitive examination.

11. I therefore think that it is not desirable to cut down the age-limits to 17–19. Even from the administrative point of view the wishes of those whom British officers are sent out to govern ought to be by far the predominating factor in the consideration; and the wish was universally given expression to in India that the young civil servant ought not to be less than 25 years old on his arrival in India. That is the age prescribed for Government service in all the provincial services in India. But I think a fair compromise on this point is not impossible, and would be highly desirable. The age-limits of 21–23 would be most suitable from every point of view, and the period of probation should be reduced from the three proposed to two years. It would make it possible for the candidates to complete their university course by 21 or 22, and a probation of two years to persons who have finished their liberal education is quite ample for a study of subjects peculiar to India. It was said that the Oxford course was one of four years, and that therefore 21 to 23 would not suit Oxford. I do not see that there is much force in this argument. It suits the other British universities, and in any event under the proposed probation of three years it will not be possible to take the present full Oxford course. It must be taken into consideration that 21–23 were actually the age-limits in the past from 1892 to 1905, a period of nearly 14 years; I am not sure that Oxford did not send in any men for the examination during that

period. When the age-limits are 21–23, surely some men will pass at 21, and with two years' probation these men will be only 23 on arrival in India, so that you will always have a fair representation of the desirable younger blood in the service. Some will be able to go at that age, some at 24, and 25 will be the maximum. This will also be a far more suitable age for the Indian examination than the one now proposed, viz., 20–22, because the minimum of 20 is not likely to be of much practical use, as the Indian student can take his degree in Arts at the earliest when he is 20. And above all the great recommendation of this age is that it secures the same age-limits for the examination here and in India. Uniformity in this respect is highly desirable. I think more than 20, and less than 22, will give most of the Indian candidates only one chance to compete.

*Paragraph 10 (and schedule I.): Subjects for the open examination for the Indian civil service.*

12. I think it desirable that, owing to recent developments, in group II.—modern languages, the Russian language should either be added as the language of our great ally, or at least be substituted for either Spanish or German. German “kultur” is now at a discount and need not now be encouraged.

13. In group I.—the classics, I propose that instead of making both Latin and Greek necessary, an option should be given for any two of the following:—Latin, Greek, Sanscrit, or Arabic. In support of this, I may be permitted to quote from the report of the last Public Services Commission. They say “the case of Sanscrit and Arabic is somewhat different. These classical languages possess a philological and educational value of their own, while at the same time exceptional importance attaches to them in connection with the vernacular languages of India.” It may be seen that this proposal is not made from any desire to put facilities in the way of the Indian candidate, from which point of view it was urged; but purely in the interests of general culture. As there is option, it will be only such students as feel attracted towards a study of these eastern languages that will take them up; but for an examination meant for the *Indian* civil service, I do not see any reason why a person, if he feels so disposed, should be unable to take it up. If the examination for the Indian civil service is going to be separated from that for the home or the colonial services, there is only an additional reason for adopting the improvement suggested. It will also give facilities for the study of these eastern languages in connection with part C.—i.e., a supplementary subject not offered in group B.

*Paragraphs 14, 15 and 18: Recruitment in India.*

14. I am not satisfied with the proportion in this service proposed to be set apart for recruitment in India. It is based on a calculation of 25 per cent. of the superior posts in the service, which are stated to be 755 out of a total strength of 1,411. According to this scheme there will be in all 189 superior posts eventually held by Indians throughout India and Burma, and 102 junior posts out of 621. Out of the 189 posts, 40 are allotted for recruitment from the bar, 41 for recruitment by promotion from the provincial civil services, and 108 for recruitment partly by a competitive examination in India, and partly by nomination of “King Emperor’s cadets.” It is admitted that when this source for recruitment in India is opened, the number of Indians coming through the examination in London will be negligible. Therefore, under the proposal made, the figures stand as under:—

	Superior posts.	Junior posts.
Recruited in India (25 per cent.)	189	—
from the bar	40	
from the provincial service	41	
by examination and King’s cadetships	108	
Recruited in India	—	102
Recruited in England	566	519
Total number	755	621

That is, total recruitment in England 1,085, in India 291. This works out to a percentage of only 21·1 per cent. on the actual strength of the whole cadre of 1,376.

## ANNEXURE X.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—(continued).

15. In the evidence recorded by us, though some of the Indian witnesses went as far as claiming a half, a very substantial number stated that a third, or 33 per cent., was what they thought could be reasonably claimed and fairly granted. The percentage that they claimed, however, was based not on the superior posts, but on the whole cadre, *i.e.*, instead of the 291 worked out above, they desired to have 470. My proposal is for a compromise between these two, so that the recruitment in India from all sources should come to one-fourth, or 25 per cent. of the *whole cadre*, and not the superior posts only. I agree that the calculation may be made on the superior posts, but contend that the proportion of these to be left open for Indians should be such as will give 25 per cent. of the actual strength of the whole service. In order to get at this percentage, 30 per cent. of the superior posts have to be granted. The corresponding figures under my proposal would stand as under :—

	Superior posts.	Junior posts.
Recruited in India (30 per cent.) - - - -	226	—
from the bar - - - - 40		
from the provincial civil service - - - 41		
by examination and King's cadetships - 145		
Recruited in India - - - - -	—	137
Recruited in England - - - - -	529	484
Total number - - - - -	755	621

That is total recruitment in England 1,013, in India 363. This, it will be seen, works out at a percentage of 26·6 on the whole cadre for recruitment in India.

16. Though it may be convenient to base calculation on the number of superior posts, I think that the responsibility and importance of the junior posts ought not to be lost sight of. The responsibility and position of the headships of districts is, no doubt, comparatively higher; at the same time, the posts of assistant judges and assistant collectors are posts of position and influence, carrying considerable powers and substantial salaries with a large subordinate service under their control and supervision. In a sense they are subordinate to the sessions judge and the collector, but hardly more so than they themselves are to the high court and the commissioners of divisions. The proportion accepted by my European colleagues gives only 15 per cent. of these posts to Indians, while under the proportion I claim they would get at least 20 per cent. The importance of these officers in the administration of Government should not be ignored or belittled because in one sense they are called training posts. Thus the statement that the Indian civil service exists for filling the superior posts in the administration is only partially true.

17. Then as regards the number itself. It is no doubt true that the number proposed to be given to Indians is much higher than it is at present; but the Indian claim is not purely on the number of Indian civil service posts actually held by them at the present day. They naturally expect that the number of posts opened to them will be much in excess of that which they would have had if the rules of 1879 had been in force till now. It has been pointed out in a previous part of this minute that if the full number of appointments to the civil service posts had been made as contemplated by the rules of 1870, by the end of 1914 there would have been not less than 200 Indians in all appointed to the posts in this service. The scheme proposed by the Commission increases this number only by 30, which, in the circumstances, I consider to be inadequate.

18. Again, it is not as if this increased number is going to come into existence immediately. It will take something like a generation more to work out the full proportion granted; and, therefore the latter must be based on a reasonable calculation of the general progress and advance in education that may be expected in India during the next 30 years. For these reasons I consider that 362 out of a total of 1,411 is by no means an excessive demand. It appears to be the minimum that could be reasonably claimed and fairly granted to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of educated India.

19. It should be further noted that the acceptance of a proportion at all, which means the introduction of a system of allotting a certain number of appointments to

be competed for by Indians and Europeans respectively, is a departure from the principles of the statute of 1833 and the Queen's proclamation, as it involves an artificial exclusion of candidates on grounds of race for appointments for which they may be in other respects the best qualified persons. And though this is technically safeguarded by leaving the competition in England open as before to Indians, they feel that on grounds of expediency and practical politics they will be giving up a very valued privilege which they would be reluctant to abandon but for a substantial proportion.

20. Once a reasonable and substantial proportion is fixed for recruitment in India, the sources from which that proportion is made up is a matter of subsidiary importance. It is then a question of selecting the best available material in India. The proportion must not be frittered away by drawing upon too many sources, or inadequately from any one source. While, therefore, on the one hand I consider that 40 judicial posts throughout India are inadequate for the bar, looking to the large supply of qualified candidates, on the other hand I consider 41 posts throughout India as hardly any appreciable prizes for the provincial service consisting of 2,572 officers.

- (i) In the first place, I maintain that the recruitment to the provincial service will not be prejudicially affected in the slightest degree by removing these few posts from that service. I do not think that the existence of the present "listed posts" has improved the material drawn into that service. It is the general prospect of rising, towards the end of his career, to posts of about Rs. 800 a month that is, and has been, the main attraction to this service.
- (ii) Secondly, the few men getting these posts will be necessarily men of advanced age, getting these billets almost towards the end of their service. And their work has to be compared with that of men much younger and fresher than themselves. This disadvantage is likely to be more marked in the executive branch of the service. And though in theory it may be laid down that they can rise to the highest posts, in practice they will very rarely go beyond the headships of districts.
- (iii) Thirdly, they will necessarily be men who have served for years in a subordinate position, with the natural result that they will find it difficult to adapt their outlook to their new positions of responsibility.
- (iv) Fourthly, it introduces into the service a small number who, although they may get higher salaries as compared with the topmost places in their own service, are likely to be discontented as men doing exactly the work which the ordinary members and the bar-recruited portion of the service do, but getting lesser salaries.
- (v) Fifthly, the "listed posts," as they are now called, and as in substance they will continue to be under the new arrangement, were not constituted as prize appointments for the service. They were improvised for the purpose of giving the Indians a *quid pro quo* for the statutory service which was abolished. Both the statutory service and its substitute, the "listed posts," were shifts intended to provide additional facilities for the employment of Indians in Indian civil service posts, and it was felt that the only existing way for admission into them, viz., the competition in London, was not a facility in any sense of the word. If, therefore, a wider and a better source of recruitment in India is now proposed, it is only natural and reasonable that it should take the place of those substitutes.
- (vi) Sixthly, the selection for these few posts is calculated to be a source of discontent in the whole service, as this selection is very likely to degenerate into a mischievous form of nomination. Sometimes the most senior men, though quite capable for the rest of the period of their service, will be objectionable on the ground of their physical unfitness, and the selection of younger men over their heads is almost certain to be attended with bitterness.
- (vii) In the last place, it must be observed that the prospects of the present men will as usual be sufficiently safeguarded, as any recommendation made will and ought to affect future entrants only.

## ANNEXURE X.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—(continued).

21. For these reasons I would reserve a higher number for recruitment from legal practitioners, and increase the recruitment by examination. The nine a year includes King's cadets, so that the number actually allotted to the competitive examination is hardly adequate. In these circumstances, there are two courses that are, to my mind, reasonably feasible. One would be to grant 30 per cent. of the superior posts, and raise the recruitment from the bar to 81 instead of 40. If 81 is considered to be a high number for this new source of recruitment in India to the judicial service, the other course would be to raise the recruitment from the bar to 60 instead of 40, and throw the remaining 21 for recruitment by the competitive examination in India. If the second alternative is accepted I would be content even with 28 per cent. of the superior posts.

*Paragraph 20: King Emperor's cadets.*

22. While I recognise the expediency of leaving a facility for communities at present slightly backward in education by way of the nomination of the best men among them, I cannot agree to include the Anglo-Indian and domiciled European community among those to whom the privilege should extend. I do not consider that community to be an educationally backward one.

*Paragraph 21: Age limits for examination in India.*

23. I have already stated in a previous portion of this minute that it is extremely desirable to have no differentiation, if possible, between the age limits for the two examinations. If this cannot be done, then I propose that the age limits for the examination in India should be 21-23. Under the proposed limits, 20-22, seeing that the Indian can graduate only after he is 20, and that he must be under 22, it would be practically giving him only one chance. I have also stated that the probationary course, for candidates of the general education which they will have completed, can conveniently be reduced from three years to two, in consideration of the fact that the general educational qualifications of candidates will be higher.

*Paragraphs 71-75: Separation of judicial and executive functions.*

24. I agree that chapter XVI. of the annexure as far as it goes states fairly the contentions of the two sides which maintain differing views on this question. But I am afraid it does not cover the entire ground of the criticism to which those who are opposed to it subject the present system. It seems to me that the report takes cognisance of this criticism only as regards the superior executive officers, the collector and the deputy commissioner. It ignores the fact that a large body of provincial revenue or executive officers exercise considerable magisterial and criminal powers. The officers designated deputy collectors, and mamlatdars in some provinces, and their equivalents in the others, are all magistrates either of the first, second, or third class, and exercise the powers respectively given to them by the criminal procedure code. So far as this question enters legitimately into the scope of our reference, the question of the proper recruitment for these posts, and that of the judicial training both in civil law and criminal jurisprudence necessary in persons exercising the powers they do, have not, I am afraid, been alluded to in the report. Those who advocate a complete separation of the two functions rest no small portion of their criticism on the judicial work done by these officers. The majority, or practically all of them, have no grounding whatever in the principles of law, and get no training whatever in criminal jurisprudence, which enters largely into the performance of their duties, or in the principles of civil law, with which also they have to do, though not to the same extent as in the former. No doubt there are some questions in the so-called departmental examinations on some of the Indian acts, but these they have to get up by themselves, and no one affirms that this gives them the necessary legal equipment. While it is said that recommendations have been made which it is hoped will have the effect of securing some recruitment from the bar and a more thorough training for such civil servants as may hold judicial appointments (though I do not see that this training is in any way different from that which other civil servants not holding judicial appointments will go through), there are no recommendations as regards these officers. The opponents of the present system contend that with such meagre qualification in law as these officers have, the wonder is that the work is not worse done than it is at

present. They further contend that side by side with these officers there is a trained body of provincial judicial officers who, notwithstanding their study of and training in criminal law, are purely confined to disposing of the civil litigation in the province except when, as in famine time, the volume of crime becomes too much for the ordinary magistrates to cope with, when these civil judges are invested temporarily with magisterial powers. They contend that the administration of justice would be improved if these magisterial powers were severed from the executive officers and permanently transferred to the judicial branch; and they contend that the cost of effecting this severance ought not to be extravagant, as though a larger number of judicial officers may be required, there will be a corresponding reduction in the number of the executive officers, who will have purely revenue duties to perform. It was obviously beyond the scope of our inquiry to see how far this was feasible, and the solution of this must be left to the Government of India, who may, if necessary, direct such further inquiry as they may think proper. I can only indicate here that having to deal with the question of the recruitment for the judicial service, a large volume of Indian evidence incidentally came before us which put forth the existing combination of functions in the same officer as a grievance that should be remedied if possible by a complete or partial separation of the two powers as may be found practicable.

M. B. CHAUBAL.

MINUTE BY MR. W. C. MADGE.

*Paragraph 32.*—I dissent from the recommendation contained in paragraph 32 to the effect that officers of the Indian civil service should be posted finally to the judiciary as soon as possible after the completion of the fourth, and at latest before the completion of the sixth, year of their service. The barrister chief justices of Madras and Bombay admitted in their evidence that the experience gained by civil servants in the earlier years of their career, when exercising both executive and magisterial functions, had proved a valuable asset on the bench. It becomes a matter of importance not to shut off any civil servant by any hard and fast rule, too early either from a judicial or from an executive career, before he has had time to assimilate the necessary mixed experience. An argument for delaying the period of bifurcation is that a young civilian's choice of the judicial line too early in his career may prove a mere speculative preference, of which he may be disillusioned by actual experience of its duties and trials, which are neither few nor trivial. It is therefore only the officer who has made trial of the office for some years, whose final choice contains any promise of success, and British analogy drawn from entirely different conditions should not be allowed to darken the true nature of the Indian administration, in which British rule has taken over from a long past a system of Government in which, though the interpretation of law takes a great part, it has never obscured the fact that the seeing of justice done amongst the rural masses, and especially among backward populations, has not infrequently stopped disturbances at their growth-centres by other means than judicial decisions, and thus prevented mischievous litigation with its train of evils. If executive experience is most useful to a judge, as familiarising him with much he can never learn on the bench, some judicial experience is also of great use to executive officers, not only in district and divisional charges, but also in the highest offices open to them in later official life. I am therefore of opinion that the separation of the judicial from the executive should not take place before an officer has had some years of experience of judicial work and is confirmed in a sessions judgeship.

*2. Paragraphs 27 and 30.*—I also dissent from the proposals contained in paragraphs 27 and 30 to make law the foundation of the probationer's course and to encourage probationers to get themselves called to the bar, though I do not object to some civil servants getting called to the bar of their own choice as some do under existing conditions. If there is any truth in the views expressed in the first paragraph of this minute it follows that, while a sound acquaintance with the principles of law may be helpful in any kind of Indian career, the overshadowing of other branches of education of at least equal promise by more than the necessary share of a technical legal education may prove unfortunate. British experience, not always applicable to the needs of the Indian people, has lent an impetus to the demand for the selection of some Indian judges from the bar. The subordination of the district officer, resulting

## ANNEXURE X.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—(continued).

from the appointment of an outsider to a district judgeship, ought to be appraised in the light of the conviction left on record by Sir J. Fitzjames Stephen, an experienced Indian councillor, a barrister judge and jurist of high authority, and also a statesman, who said : “ It seems to me the first principle which must be borne in mind is that *“ the maintenance of the position of the district officers is absolutely essential to the maintenance of British rule in India,* and that any diminution of their influence and authority over the natives would be dearly bought even by an improvement in the administration of justice.” This elementary truth may not be evident to any one after a short excursion in India, but to men who have spent their lives in the country its appeal is overwhelming, and is greatly strengthened by the reflection that the danger indicated in the words quoted is not lessened by any experiment in “ the administration of justice ” which may not prove “ an improvement.” My conclusion is that legal training should not take too large a place in the education of candidates for the Indian civil service, to the displacement of equally important and not less necessary elements.

3. *Paragraph 14.*—In this connection, though I support the recommendation contained in paragraph 14 in favour of some recruitment from the bar purely as an experimental measure, it cannot be overlooked that this is an experiment for the success of which everybody hopes, but of the possible or partial failure of which some experienced men are reluctantly expectant on grounds already explained in previous allusions to the necessary mixed training of civil servants. No wrong can, therefore, be done in any quarter by frankly labelling the step recommended as “ an experiment,” which may easily be expanded, should it prove successful, as it may do if the right type of barrister, British or Indian, is always selected, but which, if it should end in only partial success, or, worse still, in failure, as is at least possible, will not only bring about serious complications, but also create discontent if any attempt should be made to withdraw from it. Objections to the candid recognition of the true nature of an experiment can surely only arise from suspicions of its soundness. Undue weight ought not to be given to political considerations in so serious a matter. I feel also that, in making bar appointments, no rigid proportions ought to be fixed, because that works against wise selections.

W. C. MADGE.

MINUTE BY MR. H. A. L. FISHER AND MR. J. RAMSAY MACDONALD.

*Paragraphs 45–46.*—Though the concession would be greatly welcomed by the officers affected, and is not in itself exorbitant, the proposal to free the members of the Indian civil service from contribution to pension does not appear to us to be a necessary condition of continued efficiency. The existing arrangements with regard to pension in this service are generally regarded as satisfactory by young men when they are considering an Indian career, and it must be remembered that if effect is given to the recommendations of this report, Indian civil servants will in future enter the service earlier, retire from the service earlier and draw their pensions for a longer period. We are not therefore in favour of a general remission of the 4 per cent. contribution. At the same time the requirement of a contribution from officers who have already earned their full pension seems to us to be open to objection on grounds of equity, and we would accordingly recommend that contributions to pension should determine after the conclusion of the twenty-fifth year of service.

H. A. L. FISHER.

J. RAMSAY MACDONALD.

## ANNEXURE XI.

### Land Records (Burma) Department.

(The evidence relating to this department will be found in volume XV.)

#### CHAPTER I.

##### INTRODUCTORY.

1. The duty of the Burma land records department is to keep up to date the large scale maps and the record of rights prepared by the survey and settlement departments in that province. It also frames the land revenue assessment rolls of the cadastrally surveyed area for each assessment season, and thereby determines the assessment of each individual cultivator. It also makes crop forecasts, and collects much statistical matter regarding rents, produce prices, &c., for use from year to year, and for the information of the settlement officer when the time comes for the revision of the current rates of assessment.

#### CHAPTER II.

##### ORGANISATION.

2. *Existing organisation approved.*—The work of the department, which is a small one, is all of one kind, which requires only one class of officer, and there is no division of the service into imperial and provincial branches. This is as it should be. We also approve of the arrangement by which both a commissioner, who is also commissioner of settlements, and a deputy director are selected from amongst members of the Burma commission to serve in the department.

#### CHAPTER III.

##### METHODS OF RECRUITMENT.

3. *Place of appointment.*—The department is not one for which considerations of policy suggest that officers should be obtained from outside Burma, nor are any technical qualifications required in its recruits which cannot be found in the ordinary well-educated young man of the province. The class to be recruited from is that which provides the personnel for the local civil, police, and salt and excise services. We accordingly recommend that the place of recruitment should continue to be in Burma as at present.

4. *Limitations in the employment of non-Europeans.*—There have been several reorganisations of the department in recent years. The latest, which now holds the field, took place in 1908. Under this, exclusive of the appointments of deputy director and commissioner, which belong to the Burma commission, the cadre consists of one assistant director, 41 superintendents, and six assistant superintendents, making 48 officers in all. Of these on the 30th June 1913, only eight were persons of unmixed Asiatic descent. The rest were either Europeans or Anglo-Indians.\* This proportion compares unfavourably with that reached in similar services in other provinces. In the present conditions of Burma we do not feel justified in making a recommendation in favour of the employment of any definite number of officers of unmixed Asiatic descent, but think that the matter should receive the special consideration of the local Government each time that an appointment is made, and that so far as is practicable, at least every second selection should be of a Burman or of an Indian domiciled in Burma.

5. *Procedure to be followed in selecting recruits.*—Originally recruitment to the department was made almost entirely by borrowing from the survey of India staff, but since 1893 the service has been put on a self-supporting basis, and direct recruitment has been the rule. Young men are selected by the local Government from a list of nominees submitted by the commissioner of settlements and land records, and proficiency in mathematics in a candidate carries special weight. No candidate is ordinarily registered unless he has passed the

\* The number shown in volume XV. appendix III. (page 438) is 45, but this excludes the three assistant superintendents in receipt of salaries of Rs. 150-200 a month.

## ANNEXURE XI.—LAND RECORDS (BURMA) DEPARTMENT—(continued).

intermediate examination in arts or science of an Indian university, with mathematics as one of the subjects, or the European high school pass examination, or such other examination as may be declared to be of an equivalent standard. Besides possessing these educational qualifications candidates are required to be statutory natives of India, to be above the age of 18 and not more than 25, to be vouched for physically and morally, to be unmarried, and to undertake not to marry before the expiry of the period of probation. We approve this system, but recommend that in making selections in future the local Government should act with the advice of a committee of five persons, consisting of three officials and two non-officials, and including two Burmans or Indians domiciled in Burma. The committee should take the necessary steps to make known the occurrence of vacancies, and should examine and report on the qualifications of such applicants as may come forward. In the present state of education in Burma we do not press for any immediate raising of the educational qualification, but we note that it is a low one and suggest that it be raised gradually as a larger supply of better qualified candidates becomes available.

6. *Promotion of officers from the subordinate staff should be permitted.*—We also note that at present there is no provision for promoting into the department officers of the subordinate staff. On general grounds such an opening should exist, and we advise that the possibility be recognised. We do not recommend that any fixed number of places be set apart for this purpose. We would leave it to the local Government to take action in cases of special merit as they arise.

## CHAPTER IV.

## SYSTEMS OF PROBATION AND TRAINING.

7. *Probation and training.*—Recruits to the department are under probation for a period of two years. This is suitable. During this time they are also under training. Until recently they received their instruction from survey of India officers, partly at Dehra Dun and partly in the field in Burma itself. On the completion of the two years they were posted to duty in Burma under a superintendent of land records for a further six months. This procedure proved unsatisfactory and has been abandoned. Officers will now be trained in the department itself. We consider this to be the best arrangement and recommend that it be continued.

## CHAPTER V.

## CONDITIONS OF SALARY.

8. *Rates of salary.*—The department is now paid under a graded system. The assistant director receives Rs. 1,000 a month; the superintendents from Rs. 300 to Rs. 800 a month according to their grades, and the assistant superintendents Rs. 150–200 or Rs. 250 a month. The officers generally asked for an incremental scale of salaries, and we advise that this be conceded. The local Government suggested a rate of Rs. 300–25–800 as suitable for superintendents,\* but we prefer, as for the other departments recruited in India, to provide selection grades at the top, and not to allow any officer to draw more than Rs. 500 a month on a purely time basis. For the rest we think it will be convenient to adopt the rates proposed for the Burma salt and excise officers (*vide* annexure XXII.), who will be drawn from the same class of recruit. These will give Rs. 250 a month for assistant superintendents (Rs. 200 whilst under training); Rs. 300–20–500 a month for the bulk of the superintendents, with eight selection appointments, three each on Rs. 600 and Rs. 700, and two on Rs. 800 a month; and Rs. 1,000–50–1,250 a month for the assistant director. In framing this scale account has been taken of the special expensiveness of living in Burma. No Burma allowance therefore should be sanctioned. The cost of this reorganisation, as shown in the following table, will come approximately to Rs. 30,159 a year.

\* Volume XV., Appendix II. (page 437).

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
		Rs.	Rs. A. P.			Rs.	Rs. A. P.
1	Assistant director - -	1,000	1,000 0 0	1	Assistant director - - -	1,000-50 -1,250.	1,166 10 8
1	Superintendent, 1st grade -	800	800 0 0	2	Superintendents - - -	800	1,600 0 0
2	Superintendents, 2nd grade -	700	1,400 0 0	3	" - - -	700	2,100 0 0
3	" 3rd " -	600	1,800 0 0	3	" - - -	600	1,800 0 0
10	" 4th " -	500	5,000 0 0	33	" - - -	300-20- 500.	14,561 1 11
12	" 5th " -	400	4,800 0 0				
13	" 6th " -	300	3,900 0 0				
3	Assistant superintendents, 1st grade.	250	750 0 0	6	Assistant superintendents -	250 (200 during pro- bation).	1,315 7 5
3	Assistant superintendents, 2nd grade.	150-200	530 0 0				
48	Total - - -	-	20,030 0 0	48	Total - - -	-	22,543 4 0
					Deduct present cost - - -	-	20,030 0 0
					Net extra expenditure per mensem -	-	2,513 4 0
					" " per annum -	-	30,159 0 0

## CHAPTER VI.

### CONDITIONS OF SERVICE.

9. *Leave, deputation, and training reserves.* Annual rate of recruitment.—Provision exists in the grade of superintendent for a reserve of five officers. We approve of this arrangement, but recommend that the actual number of such places be fixed every five years in the light of actual requirements. The reserve is needed only for purposes of leave and deputation. The training reserve is supplied by the existing six posts of assistant superintendent. No annual rate of recruitment has as yet been fixed. This should be done and calculations should be made accordingly.

10. *Creation of openings into the settlement department.*—A request was put forward for the creation of openings into the settlement department for qualified officers of the land records department. This was supported to a certain extent by the local Government, who advised that the listed post of settlement officer on Rs. 1,000 a month should be given alternately to a superintendent of land records and to a member of the provincial civil service.\* Provided that this can be arranged without prejudice to the claims of members of the provincial civil service to listed appointments generally, we support this proposal.

## CHAPTER VII.

### CONDITIONS OF LEAVE.

11. *Leave rules.*—The department is recruited in Burma for purely local purposes, and we consider that all its members ought to be under the Indian service leave rules. They are now under these rules, so our recommendation involves no change in this respect.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### CONDITIONS OF PENSION.

12. *Pension rules.*—The general rules as to pension should be applied in this department. There is no appointment in it to which we recommend that a special additional pension should be attached.

\* Volume XV., Appendix II. (page 437).

ANNEXURE XI.—LAND RECORDS (BURMA) DEPARTMENT—(*continued*).

## CHAPTER X.

## SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS.

13. The changes we have recommended in the land records (Burma) department are as follows:—

- (i) So far as practicable, a Burman or Indian domiciled in Burma should be appointed to at least every second vacancy in the department (paragraph 4).
- (ii) A committee of five persons should be constituted to advise on the selection of direct recruits (paragraph 5).
- (iii) The educational standard for recruits should be raised gradually as opportunity offers (paragraph 5).
- (iv) The possibility of promotion from the subordinate staff into the department should be recognised (paragraph 6).
- (v) An incremental system of salaries should be introduced and the rates equalised with those proposed for other similar departments in the manner and to the extent stated (paragraph 8).
- (vi) The figure for the leave and deputation reserve should be revised every five years in the light of actual requirements. An annual recruitment rate should also be calculated (paragraph 9).
- (vii) Openings should be created into the settlement department if this can be arranged without prejudice to the rights of members of the provincial civil service (paragraph 10).



ANNEXURE XII.

Medical Services.

(The evidence relating to these services will be found in volume XII.)

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY.

1. *Scope of the present inquiry.*—We have included in the scope of our inquiry into the medical services in India all those appointments which, though not necessarily medical in character, are now filled as a matter of practice by officers who possess a medical qualification ; for example, the professorships and chemical examinerships and their connected posts, and the posts in the alienist, bacteriological, sanitary, and jail departments. The more important of these appointments are now filled almost exclusively by the officers who form the war reserves either of the Indian medical service or of the Indian subordinate medical department. These are both military services and their organisation is based on military considerations. Officers are recruited to them by the military authorities for service with the troops in the east, and after they have learnt their military duties those of them who are in excess of the peace requirements of the army are lent to the civil authorities for employment on civil duties until such time as they are needed on the outbreak of a war. If no war breaks out officers who have been transferred to civil employ ordinarily continue to do civil work until the end of their service, when they are reverted to military duty as a matter of form, so as to enable them to draw a military pension. But a few of the senior officers of the Indian medical service are also reverted from civil to military duty towards the end of their careers and are given high military commands. Transfer to civil employment is sought after by most of the officers and forms one of the principal attractions of the two services. The civil element in the various medical cadres is restricted for the most part to the posts of minor importance. Civilians have but a small share of the superior appointments. Thus at the time of our investigation in India the Indian medical service had a sanctioned strength of 748 and an actual strength of 772 officers, of whom 475 or 62 per cent. were engaged on civil duties. All of these officers were holding superior posts. At the same period the Indian subordinate medical department had a total cadre of 713 officers, of whom 289 or 41 per cent. were employed by the civil authorities.\* Only a few of these held superior appointments. The bulk of them filled posts of minor importance. We are not, however, concerned with all of the officers of these two services who are in civil employ. Some of them are engaged on civil duties which lie outside the scope of our inquiry, as under the foreign department of the Government of India. With others we have dealt specially in another annexure as in the case of the assay department. There have also been certain changes of detail since our inquiry in India was completed. Allowing for the necessary adjustments on these accounts we find that, out of a total of 566 officers in superior civil medical employment within the sphere of our investigations, 493 or 87 per cent. were military and 73 or 13 per cent. civil officers. The exact distribution of each class over the various departments is shown in the following table :—

	Officers of the Indian medical service.	Officers of the Indian sub- ordinate medical department (military assistant surgeons).	Civil officers.	Total.
Administrative - - - - -	10	—	—	10
Staff - - - - -	7	—	—	7
Civil and presidency surgeoncies and certain miscellaneous appointments of a kindred character	192	46	47	285
Professorships, chemical examinerships, and alienist appointments	45	—	5	50
Bacteriological department - - - - -	27	—	—	27
Sanitary department (including plague appointments)	53	—	14	67
Jail department - - - - -	38	1	7	46
Leave reserve - - - - -	74	—	—	74
	446	47	73	566

\* Volume XII., 56429.

## ANNEXURE XII.—MEDICAL SERVICES—(continued).

The position is reversed in the case of the posts of minor importance. Here, out of 821 appointments, 723 or 88 per cent. are filled by civil officers, who are known as civil assistant surgeons. Military officers of the Indian subordinate medical department, who are also called military assistant surgeons, occupy 98 or 12 per cent. We have not found it possible to show the distribution over the various departments of the officers who are filling the posts of minor importance, as they are not shown separately in the various official publications. The civil assistant surgeons are all borne together on one list, and the military assistant surgeons on another, and every officer is liable to transfer from one department to another as need arises. A tendency towards specialisation has, however, made itself felt as in the case of the superior appointments.

2. *Employment of the war reserve of officers on civil duties.*—It will have been seen from the foregoing summary that the civil medical administration of India is dependent in the main on the military requirements of the country. This was made the subject of complaint by most of the non-official witnesses who came before us. Some of them alleged that the prevailing system produced an unsatisfactory personnel. Others, whilst admitting that the staff was efficient and that the machinery worked satisfactorily in peace time, urged that it would not stand the strain of war conditions. It was also claimed that it was wrong in principle that the size of the civil cadres should be dependent on military considerations or *vice versâ*. Other witnesses, again, raised objection not so much to the employment of military officers on civil duties as to the size of the war reserve itself. Thus we were told in Bombay by the spokesman of the Bombay medical union that a war reserve of 87 Indian medical service officers would be sufficient for military purposes. "He could not conceive," this witness said, "of any mobilisation of greater dimensions than that in China in 1900, unless a big European war broke out, but the chances of that were too remote."\* From the inquiries which we made we are satisfied that, under the existing arrangements, the civil medical work of the country has hitherto been economically and satisfactorily performed, and that no case has been made out, either on the ground of expense or of efficiency, for ceasing to employ the medical war reserve of the army in India on civil duty. If, however, it should hereafter be discovered that the medical cadre of the army in India as determined solely by military requirements, is insufficient to meet the civil medical needs of the administration, we consider that the Government should obtain such additional assistance as may be necessary by some form of civil recruitment to its civil medical service. In a later part of our report we propose to indicate the manner in which such recruitment should be carried out, together with such changes in points of detail as seem to us to be conducive to the more effective working of the existing system, both on its practical and on its professorial side. Meanwhile we are satisfied that the machinery of the present system has stood the test of previous wars. Since, however, our inquiry in India was concluded, it has been exposed to the more serious strain of the present war, to meet the needs of which 286 officers of the Indian medical service and 113 of the Indian subordinate medical department had been recalled from civil to military duty down to the 8th April 1915.† This has obviously produced a new situation, calling for fresh investigation, and we recommend that this be undertaken at the conclusion of the war and in the light of the experience gained during its duration. For the purposes of this annexure we shall assume that the existing system will be maintained in its essentials. We shall, therefore recommend only such measures as are consistent with its retention. From this standpoint we lay stress on the necessity for calculating separately on their merits the needs of the army and of the civil administration, and for abandoning the idea that the civil medical administration should be dependent on the requirements of a military reserve. At the conclusion of the present war it should be possible to estimate more closely than has hitherto been the case what are the military requirements, and to what extent these can be met from private practitioners in England or in India.‡ Calculations should also be

\* Volume XII., 58270.

† *Vide* Schedule VII. to this annexure.

‡ From information supplied by the India Office it appears that 64 temporary commissions had been given in the Indian medical service during the war down to 30th April 1915; 35 in England and 29 in India.

## ANNEXURE XII.—MEDICAL SERVICES—(continued).

made and reviewed from time to time of the civil needs of the country, and a purely civil machinery should be created to meet all civil requirements. The officers forming the medical reserve of the army should be admitted to the civil cadres so formed. But if, after an estimate has been made of the military requirements in time of war, it is found that the number of Indian medical service officers available for civil employment, as determined solely by military requirements, is insufficient for the needs of the civil administration, then every civil medical post for which no war reserve officer is available should be filled by civil recruitment, the method of which we shall proceed to indicate in the chapter of this annexure which deals with recruitment. We recommend further that, if the experience of the present war leads to such an increase in the military reserve as would seriously endanger the maintenance of a civil element in the civil medical administration, it should be considered whether a minimum number of civil officers in civil medical service should not be fixed. We also think it important that military officers who are admitted to the civil cadres should take their places with the civilian officers in the department in the same way that officers of the army hold Indian civil service posts in the non-regulation provinces, or are employed in the public works or railway departments. It should no longer be the case that the civil departments should be the adjuncts of the military services. We also think that steps should be taken to secure that, even under the gravest war conditions, the civil cadres shall not be unduly depleted, and in particular that no dislocation of the educational and scientific work of the country shall take place. With this object we shall explain in dealing with the various departments the extent to which, in the interests of the civil administration, the personnel should be freed from liability for recall to military duty. We recommend further that each of the various departments included in this annexure be regarded as a separate unit. We shall discuss them in the light of the foregoing observations in the following parts. We note also that by the terms of our reference we are limited to the consideration of their civil aspects :—

PART I.—Civil medical services, including the administrative and staff posts, the civil and presidency surgeoncies and the assistant surgeoncies, and certain miscellaneous appointments of a kindred character (chapters II. to VIII.);

PART II.—Other services or departments, viz. :—

Professorships and chemical examinerships, with their connected posts, and the alienist department (chapter IX.);

The bacteriological department (chapter X.);

The sanitary department, including the plague appointments (chapter XI.);

The jail department (chapter XII.);

PART III.—Summary of recommendations.

## PART I.—CIVIL MEDICAL SERVICES.

## CHAPTER II.

## ORGANISATION.

3. *Need of a regular service of officers for the performance of civil medical duties.*—The purely medical duties for which arrangements have to be made in India include :—

- (i) attendance on the police and on all Government servants entitled to free medical attendance ;
- (ii) the administration and inspection of all Government hospitals and dispensaries ;
- (iii) the charge of the headquarters hospital of each district and the performance there of the more important surgical operations ;
- (iv) the medico-legal work connected with the administration of justice ;
- (v) the examination of recruits for the army, police and state employment generally ; and
- (vi) the issue of health certificates to all Government servants.

There are also other duties of a quasi-medical character, particularly in connection with the jails and the care of the public health, which, as a matter of economy and convenience, are entrusted to medical officers in addition to their other duties. These will be explained in subsequent parts of this annexure. To perform them a regular

## ANNEXURE XII.—MEDICAL SERVICES—(continued).

service of officers is now maintained in each province. At the head of the organisation is the surgeon-general in Madras and Bombay and the inspector-general of civil hospitals in the other provinces. Below them at the headquarters of each civil district throughout India there is a medical officer, known ordinarily as the civil surgeon, but in Madras as the district medical officer. He in his turn has under his orders a staff of assistant and sub-assistant surgeons. To advise the Government of India there is the director-general of the Indian medical service, who has also military duties to perform. The director-general and the surgeons-general have also certain officers under their orders. To this arrangement objection was taken in certain quarters. It was urged that there was no need of a Government service at all, and that local bodies should be left to make their own arrangements for medical relief by appointing private practitioners after advertisement for fixed terms of years. On the other hand the bulk of the non-official and all the official witnesses, who dealt with the matter, pointed out the impossibility of staffing and keeping staffed the unpopular districts under any system of individual contracts. We are satisfied that, in the present conditions of India, if there were no state service there would be large tracts of country which would be left without any regular provision of medical relief. We are also convinced that state control is necessary in order to secure the continued and extended diffusion in India of western medical knowledge. We have no hesitation, therefore, in finding that some form of state service is needed, and to this extent approve of the existing arrangement.

4. *Constitution of the higher branch of the civil medical services. Indian medical service. Uncovenanted officers. Promoted civil and military assistant surgeons.*—The superior civil medical posts are now divided between two services or groups of services. The higher, as already explained, is now manned to the extent of 209 posts by officers of the Indian medical service. The other superior civil medical posts are held either by uncovenanted officers or promoted assistant surgeons. The former are now only 15 in number, and the practice of appointing them has died out. The latter total 78. Of these, 32 are taken from the civil and 46 from the military assistant surgeons. The promoted civil assistant surgeons are wholly at the disposal of the civil authorities. The promoted military assistant surgeons form part of the war reserve, and can be recalled to military duty in case of necessity. There are thus 302 superior civil medical appointments, exclusive of the leave reserve. Of the officers filling these posts 69 per cent. belong to the Indian medical service, whilst 15 per cent. are promoted military assistant surgeons, thus making 84 per cent. liable to recall to military duty in all. The remaining 16 per cent. is of a purely civil character. It remains to note that the promoted civil and military assistant surgeons, though they do the same work and have the same responsibilities as the civil surgeons belonging to the Indian medical service, have a lower status. They are nowhere allowed promotion into the administrative posts, and in most provinces are appointed as a matter of practice only to the smaller and less popular districts.

5. *Constitution of the lower branches of the civil medical services. Civil and military assistant surgeons.*—The less important civil medical duties are performed by civil and military assistant surgeons. There are 723 of the former and 98 of the latter. These numbers include the officers who are filling the posts of minor importance in the other departments referred to in this annexure. The civil assistant surgeons are appointed from amongst the ordinary graduates of the Indian medical colleges, and are purely civil officers. The military assistant surgeons are the war reserve of the Indian subordinate medical department, the officers of which are Europeans and Anglo-Indians who have been trained in special classes in India for service with the British troops in the east. These officers are liable to recall to military duty. Both classes of officers occupy a position similar to that of members of the provincial services in the police and similar departments, but are not recognised as belonging expressly to provincial medical services. Indeed, in certain provinces the civil assistant surgeons are regarded as members of a subordinate service, whilst, as already noted, the official designation of the service to which the military assistant surgeons belong is the Indian "subordinate" medical department. In reality, the subordinate ranks are manned by the civil and military sub-assistant surgeons, into whose cases we have not entered.

6. *Division of the civil medical services into imperial and provincial.*—Practically all the witnesses who came before us approved of the performance of the superior civil medical duties of the country by two classes of officers recruited on separate qualifications; one for the work mainly of supervision, and the other for the less important functions; and we have no hesitation in advising the adoption of this familiar organisation. We therefore recommend that regular civil medical services be constituted. One should be entrusted with the higher duties and should be for the whole of India. This should be known as the Indian civil medical service. The others should be formed separately in each province to carry out the duties of minor importance, and should be called the Madras (Bombay, etc.) civil medical services respectively. In the Indian civil medical service should be placed all the civil surgeoncies and posts of similar or superior position, and all the officers holding them, whether civil or military, should be on one list with seniority as amongst themselves counting from the date of their entry on to the list; and all should be equally eligible for all appointments of a purely civil character. Officers of the Indian medical service, who have been admitted permanently to the Indian civil medical service, should be at the disposal of the military authorities only if they are not of administrative rank, and only in the event of war. The present practice by which senior officers on the civil side are promoted to hold medical commands on the military side towards the end of their careers produces an unnecessary disturbance, and should be discontinued in the case of all future entrants. Officers already in the service should maintain their existing privileges. In the local services should be included such assistant surgeoncies and similar posts as do not belong to the other departments referred to in this annexure. These should be separated off and included in those departments. We also think that military assistant surgeons employed on civil duties should be admitted to the local services and should take rank with their civilian colleagues from the date of their admission to the service, but their names should be borne on a separate list. We see no reason to fix any limit to the extent to which military assistant surgeons should be recalled, if needed, to military duty.

7. *Nomenclature of officers in the civil medical services.*—We have also considered the nomenclature of officers. In so far as officers of the Indian medical service are concerned no question arises, but a grievance exists amongst the civil assistant surgeons on this point. They hold a degree in medicine from their universities, which is the equivalent of the degree of any British university, and possess a medical qualification which is registrable in the United Kingdom. They object, therefore, to having the title “civil assistant surgeon” prefixed to their names. We think this objection reasonable, and recommend that the usage customary in the United Kingdom be observed. We record no finding as to the use of the word “subordinate” in the designation of the service to which the military assistant surgeons belong as this is a military matter. We note, however, that the evidence given before us showed that the officers concerned resented the implication that they belonged to a “subordinate” service. On the civil side this term has a definite technical meaning, and we think it would remove an undoubted grievance if the military authorities could employ some more honorific title.

8. *Position of military assistant surgeons in railway appointments.*—We have also considered a suggestion that military assistant surgeons holding railway appointments should be admitted to the local service of the province in which their work is chiefly cast. Their employment, it was urged, is of a purely civil character, but no prize posts, like the civil surgeoncies, are open to them. It appears, however, that there are other similar appointments of a non-military character in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere, which could not be included in any service under a local Government, but for which the director-general has to find men; and if the railway appointments were removed from his control, administrative difficulties, particularly in the matter of transfers, would arise. We recommend, therefore, that the railway posts be left to be filled by the director-general as at present, and that the officers appointed be not admitted to any civil medical service. This being so, we shall not make any further recommendations about them beyond that they should share generally in any improvements which may be made in the conditions of service of their department as a whole.

## CHAPTER III.

## METHODS OF RECRUITMENT.

9. *Open competitive examination for the Indian medical service in England.*—At present the Indian medical service is recruited for by an open competitive examination in England. This, as already explained, is primarily a military matter, and only concerns us in so far as it is the indirect means by which officers for the Indian civil medical service will be secured. On the evidence we received we see no reason to find fault with the present system of competition. Strong opinions were, however, expressed that the present form of examination was not sufficiently practical. This was the view, not only of members of the service in India, but of recognised authorities in England like Sir Clifford Allbutt, the Regius professor of physic at Cambridge university,\* and Sir Charles Ball, who appeared as the representative of the general medical council.† In view of this we recommend that the syllabus and marking of the examination be revised, and that a *viva voce* test be introduced. The opportunity should also be taken to secure that all candidates have had a hospital training, have been through a practical course of midwifery, and have had experience of treating the diseases of women and children. The facilities for acquiring this knowledge are now wanting in many parts of India owing to the customs of the country,‡ and though the lack of it may not be prejudicial for a regimental officer, it is a serious drawback in any civil practitioner. If it is found necessary to give Indians this training in the United Kingdom sufficient facilities should be provided there for them.

10. *System under which officers of the Indian medical service should be admitted to the proposed Indian civil medical service.*—At present officers of the Indian medical service are allowed after the completion of two years' service to apply for civil employment. Their names are then registered, and as vacancies occur in the provinces of their choice they are posted to them in the order of their application. No selection of any kind takes place. The director-general was anxious to maintain this arrangement. On the other hand, experience has shown that hitherto transfer from military to civil duty has been much delayed in the popular provinces. In the United Provinces, for example, the period at the time of our inquiry was from seven and a half to eight years; in the Punjab and Bengal about seven years; and in Madras and Bombay six to six and a half years. The evils arising out of this are obvious. These early years in a young officer's professional career should be so planned as to afford a wide and thorough basis of medical and surgical experience. Special courses of medicine and surgery should be attended, and openings should be afforded for an extended range of pathological observation, seeing that it is upon the skill and experience acquired during these years that the efficiency of the future civil surgeon will largely depend. The duties connected with the medical charge of a regiment are of too monotonous and restricted a character to give the experience which is essential, and we consider that seven or eight years spent in the limited atmosphere of a regiment must have an injurious effect on the energy and ambition of a young officer. Whilst therefore we recognise the continued necessity for a period of training with a regiment, we are of opinion that in no case ought the preliminary period in military employ to exceed five years. We were told by the director-general§ that forces were at work which would bring this about without any alteration in the existing arrangements. If this proves to be the case—and the effect of the war will also need to be considered in this connection—no further action will be necessary, and admission to the Indian civil medical service can be regulated accordingly. If not, we are of opinion that a five-year limit should be fixed, and that no officer of more than this service should ordinarily be eligible for transfer. Officers with less than this seniority should then be appointed as now in order of application. During the five years in military employ officers should be required to attend certain courses which we shall specify in the chapter dealing with probation and training.

11. *System under which officers who are not members of the Indian medical service should be admitted to the proposed Indian civil medical service.*—There are 93 civil medical posts of the standing of the civil or presidency surgeoncies which

\* Volume XII., 58581.

† Volume XII., 58479–80.

‡ Volume XII., 56375–77.

§ Volume XII., Appendix I.

are not reserved for members of the Indian medical service. Fifteen are now held by a class of uncovenanted officers which is dying out, and with which we need not deal. Of the rest 32 are reserved for civil and 46 for military assistant surgeons. There are thus only 47 superior appointments, which, on the present assumptions, are not already bespoken to meet military requirements. This number will not admit of the introduction of any system of direct recruitment. We, therefore, recommend that the present practice of promoting assistant surgeons be maintained. We would, however, lay down that, after satisfying existing vested interests, not more than one-third of the appointments not reserved for officers of the Indian medical service should be allotted to promoted military assistant surgeons. Efforts should also be made to promote younger men, whether civil or military officers, who are more in touch with the latest developments of medical science. If older men have to be appointed, who have not an up-to-date experience, they should first be given study leave or be put through a suitable course. We also recommend that after the lapse of five years preference should be given in promoting military assistant surgeons to such officers as have obtained a qualification registrable in the United Kingdom. It is an unsatisfactory feature of the present arrangement that there are still districts in the charge of officers who would not be allowed to practise in Great Britain, and we trust that this will become increasingly infrequent. Should it be decided at any time to abandon the practice of employing military officers on civil medical duties, or should the civil medical cadre require to be increased to an extent which the military reserve, as determined solely by military requirements, fails to provide, a system of direct civil recruitment should be adopted for at least a part of the civil medical service. We are not in a position to put forward a detailed scheme for such recruitment, but think that, when the time comes to frame one, regard should be had to the special needs of European officers entitled to free medical attendance and of their families. Efforts should also be made to utilise the products of the Indian medical schools. It should also be provided that no officer should be appointed unless and until he had proved his fitness in actual hospital practice. If it is found necessary to give Indians this training in the United Kingdom sufficient facilities should be provided there for them.

12. *System under which appointments should be made to the provincially recruited civil medical services. Civil officers.*—Civil assistant surgeons are now recruited in different ways in the different provinces, but in every case direct recruitment from amongst the graduates of the Indian medical colleges is the rule. We approve of this generally for the proposed local services, but would also open the door to meritorious sub-assistant surgeons, who had obtained a qualification registrable in the United Kingdom. We recognise that such cases will be rare, but provision should be made to meet them. For the rest, we think that all appointments, whether of direct recruits or of promoted sub-assistant surgeons, should be made by the local Government of the province concerned. This will emphasise the improvement of status, which we desire to see conferred on this class of officer. We also recommend that, before making appointments of direct recruits, each local Government should take the advice of a locally constituted committee of five members. These should include the surgeon-general or inspector-general of civil hospitals of the province and the principal of the Government medical college from which recruitment is ordinarily made. The other members should be nominated differently in the different provinces. Where the only considerable body of candidates comes from a Government medical college, the committee can suitably be wholly official in character, but should contain an Indian, if there is any suitable Indian officer available. Where candidates from private medical institutions are forthcoming in any numbers at least one of the members of the committee should be an independent Indian medical practitioner.

13. *System under which appointments should be made to the provincially recruited civil medical services. Military officers.*—As already noted military assistant surgeons are required to be Europeans or Anglo-Indians. The reason for this restriction is that their primary function is to attend on British troops in the east. In order to obtain an adequate supply of young men a low preliminary educational standard has hitherto been accepted; the state meets the whole cost of the candidates' instruction; and this instruction lasts only for four years as against the five ordinarily prescribed for civil officers. The result is that the qualification obtained is lower than that of the present civil assistant surgeons, and is not registrable in the United Kingdom. To the injurious effect of this, when officers are transferred to the civil side, we

## ANNEXURE XII.—MEDICAL SERVICES—(continued).

have already alluded. Since our inquiry in India was completed this has been recognised, and a scheme has been sanctioned\* under which this inferiority will be removed. This is satisfactory. As regards the future we recommend that the number of military assistant surgeons in civil employ be kept within its present limit. We also think that in making transfers to civil employ, the director-general should, so far as possible, select men of a fixed number of years standing, so that an even flow of retirement from the civil cadre may be secured. Senior men should ordinarily not be transferred, as this leads to grievances and inequalities in the civil branch. Seniority in the civil cadre should date ordinarily from the date of transfer.

14. *Limitations in the employment of non-Europeans in the civil medical services.*—It remains to consider the question of such limitations as still exist in the employment of non-Europeans in the higher and lower branches of the civil medical services.† By the terms of their recruitment all military assistant surgeons are required to be Europeans or Anglo-Indians. We have already explained the reasons which have necessitated this, and no further remarks are called for. The present civil assistant surgeons are almost exclusively Indians. No recommendation for their extended employment is therefore necessary. In the Indian medical service, so long as the system of automatic transfer to civil employ in the order of application is in force, the number of Indian members of this service in the new Indian civil medical service will depend partly on the number successful at the open competitive examination in London, and partly on the desire shown by Indian members of the service to be transferred from military employ. In this connection it is worthy of note that the percentage of Indian members who prefer to remain in military employ is at present greater than the corresponding percentage of European members.‡ At the time of our inquiry out of 772 officers 54 or 7 per cent. were Indians.§ In recent years, however, Indians have been more successful, as will be seen from the following table.||

Year.	Number of appointments.	Number of candidates who appeared at the examinations.	Number of Indians successful.	Percentage of Indians successful to number of appointments.
1910 - - -	28	56	5	18
1911 - - -	26	46	3	12
1912 - - -	24	53	4	17
1913 - - -	24	44	8	33
1914 - - -	35	39	14	40

It will also be remembered that in addition to Indian officers of the Indian medical service in the new Indian civil medical service there will continue to be a further Indian element in the civilian officers promoted from the provincially recruited services.

## CHAPTER IV.

## SYSTEMS OF PROBATION AND TRAINING.

15. *Probation. Civil medical services.*—An officer of the Indian medical service on first appointment to civil employ in any province is on probation for a period of two years, and it is open to the local Government at any time during this period and before he has been confirmed, to move the Governor-General in Council to revert him to military duty on the ground that he is unsuited for civil work.¶ In the case of officers seconded from the Indian medical service for employment in the Indian civil medical service, we consider that this arrangement should be modified so as to give to local Governments full power to revert any officer during his probationary period in their sole discretion. We think also that this period of probation should be treated as a real test of the suitability of an officer for the requirements of the civil department, and lay stress on the importance of not confirming officers as a matter of course. Officers promoted into the Indian civil medical service from the provincially recruited

\* Volume XII., Appendix IV. (ii) (page 281).

† The figures given in appendix XLI. to volume XII. comprise in one total the cases of officers of the Indian medical service, uncovenanted officers, civil assistant surgeons, and military assistant surgeons in civil employ.

‡ Volume XII., 56360.

§ Volume XII., 56358.

|| Volume XII., Appendix XLVII.

¶ Volume XII., Appendix II.

civil medical services should be tested in officiating vacancies. In the provincially recruited services all direct recruits should be on probation for two years. This period should also suffice for such military assistant surgeons as are given civil employment. These latter officers are now kept under trial on the civil side for five years. This seems to us unnecessarily long. We also attach importance to putting them on the same footing, whenever possible, as their civilian colleagues.

16. *Training. Indian medical service officers.*—In dealing with the question of recruitment we have already referred to the disadvantages which exist under the present system by which officers of the Indian medical service, who are destined for civil work, spend their early years on regimental duties; and we have suggested an extreme limit of five years for this period. We also think it important that the time of waiting for transfer should be regarded as one of preparation, and that an officer who has failed to utilise it as such should be refused civil work. Many fields are open for useful training, apart from the experience which can be gained in administrative work and practical hygiene. Officers can learn the language and study the customs of the country. They should also be required during this period to undergo courses of post-graduate training, for example, in X-ray work, bacteriology, malaria technique, serology, and tropical medicine. Much good will also be done if the scheme now under discussion for the institution of station staff hospitals in the larger cantonments comes to fruition. Failing this, it should be arranged, so far as this is compatible with his military duties, that every candidate for civil employ should have systematic access to the civil hospital of the place in which he is stationed, and should work there in his leisure hours under the guidance of the civil surgeon in charge, or in a central hospital. Where this cannot be arranged, a six months' course of training under an experienced civil surgeon should be made obligatory before any officer is allowed to take up independent work in the Indian civil medical service. Further training should be secured through the medium of study leave, as will be explained later in dealing with leave questions.

17. *Training. Other officers in the civil medical services.*—At present civil assistant surgeons are subjected to two septennial examinations with a view to keeping their training up to date. This arrangement is resented by the officers concerned, who regard it, not unnaturally, as a slur on the character of their initial qualification. It is also inelastic in its operation. Under it an officer, who has specialised in medical jurisprudence and has done nothing but medico-legal work for years, may be called upon to undergo an examination in midwifery, and if he fails his promotion is stopped.\* We think that this should be changed, and that the civil officers of local civil medical services should merely be required to keep themselves up to date by undergoing a post-graduate course after seven years' service, and by passing a practical, as opposed to a written, examination in the course on its completion. The courses should also be framed to suit the special bents of the various types of officers, and success in them should be taken into consideration in making promotions. Further training should be given through the medium of study leave as in the case of the Indian medical service officers. Every facility should also be given to assistant surgeons in the hospitals themselves to perform the duties for which they are qualified. Similar arrangements should be made both for post-graduate courses and for study leave and in the hospitals for military members of the provincially recruited services.

## CHAPTER V.

### CONDITIONS OF SALARY.

18. *Fees for private practice by officers of the civil medical services.*—Before considering the adequacy of the salaries attached to the various medical appointments it is necessary to come to some finding with regard to the liberty enjoyed by certain officers to take fees for private practice. On this point a good deal of misunderstanding appears in the evidence. On the one hand some officers of the Indian medical service endeavoured to exalt the permission accorded to them to take fees

## ANNEXURE XII.—MEDICAL SERVICES—(continued).

into a right conferred by statute, which is clearly not the case. On the other hand private practitioners, not in Government employment, and non-official witnesses generally, were under a wrong impression as to the extent to which members of the Indian medical service actually did practice, and as to the value of the fees earned when they did. This misconception is due in a considerable degree to the great change which has taken place in the medical conditions of India. Some years ago, when Indian medical service officers were the only practitioners in the field, and when their official duties were light, most of them undoubtedly did add very largely to their official incomes. Nowadays the evidence is clear that it is only special officers with special gifts and special opportunities who earn anything unusual. The actual figures as regards the posts classed as practising appointments also show that the competition with the private practitioner is almost negligible when the vast population of India is taken into consideration, and that in any case it has not been extended. In 1885 the total civil strength of the Indian medical service was 299 exclusive of the leave reserve. The recognised practising appointments then numbered 190. In 1913, out of a similar strength of 396, the recognised practising appointments were 194.\* Most of these posts are held by the civil surgeons or officers of equivalent standing dealt with in this part of this annexure. We have considered carefully whether these officers should continue to enjoy their existing privileges, and have come to the conclusion that in the interests of efficient medical treatment they should. In most of the districts of India no independent practitioners have as yet attempted to set up a practice, and if the civil surgeons were to be debarred from giving their services much unnecessary hardship would be caused. And it does not seem practicable to allow a civil surgeon the permission in one district and to refuse it in another according as capable independent practitioners become available or not. At the same time we think that steps should be taken to make clear to all officers at the outset of their careers that the permission is given at the pleasure of Government and to meet the needs of the country and not as a matter of right. But should it be found desirable to withdraw the permission in individual cases a suitable monthly allowance should be granted in compensation. We would treat the officers promoted to hold civil surgeoncies in the Indian civil medical service from the locally recruited services and the officers of the locally recruited services employed under Indian civil medical service officers on the same lines. The other officers, who are shown in schedule I. to this annexure as holding administrative, staff, or miscellaneous appointments, in which we include the resident and other college appointments, should be debarred from private practice with the exception of the surgeons to the Governors of Madras, Bombay and Bengal. It should be decided in their case before each appointment is made whether the incumbent should or should not have the privilege, and if permission is not given a suitable monthly allowance should be granted. The privileges of the existing incumbents of all these posts should also be safeguarded. This reservation is necessary as, though these appointments are not recognised practising appointments, some of their incumbents none the less appear to enjoy permission to take fees for private work. The present rules governing the amount of the fees which may be taken were fixed in 1911 after long discussion, and with the approval of the British medical association, and should be left to their operation.† In subsequent parts of this annexure we shall record our recommendation as to the way in which officers in the other departments should be treated in this matter.

19. *Rates of salary. Indian medical service officers.*—Indian medical service officers when employed as civil surgeons or in posts of a similar character draw salary in accordance with their rank, but as this depends on the length of their service, they, in fact, enjoy an incremental scale of pay. This is suitable. Their salaries also bear a fixed relation with those enjoyed by their brother officers in charge of regiments of the Indian army. They also vary in accordance with whether they are holding second or first class civil surgeoncies. The first class civil surgeoncies are now 42 in number and comprise the districts of special importance. The remaining charges are ranked in the second class and

\* Volume XII., 56385 and Appendix V. (Statements II. and III).

† Volume XII., 58538 and Appendix XL.

total 124. From the actual figures quoted to us\* it will be gathered that a second class civil surgeon draws Rs. 50 a month less, and a first class civil surgeon Rs. 50 a month more, than he would in the army, but both first and second class officers have the privilege of private practice. These rates were regarded as quite inadequate by all the officers who came before us, and support is given to their view by the actual figures of the competition in London in recent years. These show a serious decline in the number of applicants who have actually appeared at the examinations. In January and July 1914 matters had reached such a pitch that only 1·10 and 1·13 candidates were forthcoming to each appointment, inclusive of Indians.† The evidence of the experienced authorities in the United Kingdom whom we consulted pointed in the same direction. “Twenty years ago,” said Sir Charles Ball, “the Indian medical service was the most popular service amongst the graduates of Dublin University. . . . Now things had altered.”‡ In the same strain Sir Clifford Allbutt told us that during recent years the popularity of the service “had been continually decreasing with graduates of the medical schools.”§ We are satisfied that the incomes of medical practitioners in England have risen considerably in recent years, and that some enhancement of prospects is necessary to secure a suitable field of candidates in England for the Indian service. We find it impossible, however, to calculate the exact amount of the enhancement required or the form in which it should be given, without going outside the terms of our reference and taking into consideration the military aspect of the question. We are also conscious that after the conclusion of the present war there may be a wholly new set of values for medical knowledge. We think, however, that we shall be on safe ground in proposing definite increases of emoluments for the higher administrative officers. At present the director-general gets Rs. 3,000 a month, the two surgeons-general and the inspector-general of civil hospitals, Bengal, Rs. 2,500 a month, the inspector-general of civil hospitals, Central Provinces and Berar, Rs. 2,000 a month, and the remaining inspectors-general Rs. 2,250 a month. They also draw exchange compensation allowance. In future they should all forego this. The director-general should then receive Rs. 3,500 a month, the surgeons-general and the inspector-general, Bengal, Rs. 3,000 a month, the inspectors-general, United Provinces, Punjab, Burma and Bihar and Orissa, Rs. 2,750 a month, the inspector-general, Central Provinces and Berar, Rs. 2,500 a month, and the inspector-general, Assam, Rs. 2,250 a month. The other officers should be given temporary allowances, to be apportioned by Government, but not exceeding in the aggregate 12½ per cent. of their present emoluments. They should continue to draw exchange compensation allowance. At the conclusion of the war the whole question should be reconsidered in the light of experience and of the needs of the military side of the service. No hesitation should then be shown in advancing on the 12½ per cent. enhancement now proposed, if this is found to be necessary. The opportunity should also be taken to abolish the distinction between second and first class civil surgeoncies, to get rid of exchange compensation allowance, and to secure that officers shall not lose pay on transfer to the civil side. Nowadays a young officer in the early days of his civil employment has no private practice worth consideration.

20. *Rates of salary. Other officers of the Indian civil medical service.*—At present civil assistant surgeons, when promoted to be civil surgeons, are paid salaries which differ in the different provinces, as shown in schedule I. to this annexure, but range from Rs. 350 to Rs.,700 a month. These rates are wholly inadequate, and suitable assistant surgeons, who are making a steady income from private practice in districts in which they have established a name, are sometimes unwilling to take promotion. In future a rate of Rs. 500–50/2–800 (in Burma Rs. 550–50/2–850) a month for permanent, and Rs. 450 (in Burma Rs. 500) a month for officiating, officers should be sanctioned. The same rates should be drawn by promoted military assistant surgeons.

21. *Rates of salary. Officers of the provincially recruited civil medical services.*—Civil assistant surgeons are paid differently in the different provinces, but ordinarily begin on Rs. 100 and rise to Rs. 300 or, in a few cases, to Rs. 350 a month. Military

\* Volume XII., Appendix VI.  
‡ Volume XII., 58474.

† Volume XII., Appendix XLVII.  
§ Volume XII., 58578.

## ANNEXURE XII.—MEDICAL SERVICES—(continued).

assistant surgeons in civil employ receive pay in accordance with their army rank. When of less than seven years' service they get Rs. 100, and after 17 years' service Rs. 250 a month. They can also rise, if promoted to commissioned rank, to Rs. 350 and Rs. 450 a month. We consider that both classes of officers should be paid alike, whilst employed side by side on civil duties in the new local civil medical services. We also think that a substantial increase of emoluments is required so as to appeal to the same class of candidate as will go in for the other provincially recruited civil services of a similar standing. Taking into account the income to be made from private practice, and the various openings for special allowances, we recommend the adoption of a scale of Rs. 150-40/3-350-50/3-400 (in Burma Rs. 200-40/3-400-50/3-450) a month for all officers on confirmation, and Rs. 100 (in Burma Rs. 150) a month whilst on probation. Military assistant surgeons transferred to civil employ should be paid at the same rates. Should any such officer rise to be a captain without becoming a civil surgeon, which is unlikely, he should be allowed to draw a captain's pay, namely, Rs. 450 a month, as a special case.

22. *Estimate of cost of reorganisation of the civil medical services.*—In estimating the cost of the concessions proposed in the foregoing paragraphs we have assumed that the number of posts of the rank of civil surgeon and over reserved for officers of the Indian medical service will be as at present, and that the posts not so reserved will be divided between civil and military assistant surgeons in the proportion of two to one. We have also calculated that military assistant surgeons will join the local civil medical services on the completion on an average of seven years' service. We have also included in the calculations for the local civil medical services in schedule II. to this annexure the posts of minor importance which belong properly to the various special departments. On this basis, as set out in detail in schedules I. and II. to this annexure, the total increased cost a year will be approximately Rs. 11,29,935 as follows :—

<i>Indian civil medical service :—</i>						Rs.	Rs.
(i)	Administrative appointments	-	-	-	-	37,500	
(ii)	Officers belonging to the Indian medical service at 12½ per cent.	-	-	-	-	2,71,704	
(iii)	Officers not belonging to the Indian medical service	-	-	-	-	1,63,464	
							4,72,668
<i>Local civil medical services :—</i>							
(i)	Civil branch	-	-	-	-	5,89,640	
(ii)	Military branch	-	-	-	-	67,627	
							6,57,267
Total							11,29,935

## CHAPTER VI.

## • CONDITIONS OF SERVICE.

23. *Strength of the cadres of the civil medical services.*—Representations were made to us by certain of the civil surgeons that they were unable to cope with their work. We are satisfied that this has not as yet become a general question, but there are signs of pressure in the larger districts, and the matter requires consideration. Where action is found to be necessary, the first step should be to relieve civil surgeons of their jail duties. These take up much of their time, and are only partially medical in character. If this is not found to be enough the next step should be to relieve them of their sanitary functions. Corresponding increases would, of course, have to be made in the jail and sanitary staffs. Relief can also be given to civil surgeons by delegating to selected assistant surgeons the powers required for the management of the subdivisions of the various districts. At present the control of the rural dispensaries in many places appears to be unduly centralised. Only when these remedies have proved insufficient should the civil surgeon establishment be increased.

24. *Leave, deputation, and training reserves. Annual rate of recruitment. Civil medical services.*—At present a leave reserve of 20 per cent. is allowed in the Indian medical service. This needs to be recalculated in the light of recent experience, particularly in view of the changed conditions which have resulted from the grant of

increased facilities for study leave. The requirements for deputation and training should also be reconsidered. The annual rate of recruitment is settled by the military authorities for the whole service and does not concern us. No reserve is needed in the superior service for that portion of the cadre of the Indian civil medical service which will be recruited by promotion from the local civil medical services. The present service of civil assistant surgeons carries a reserve for purposes of leave, but the percentage varies in different provinces, being 15 per cent. in Madras, Bombay, the United Provinces, the Punjab and Burma, 20 per cent. in Assam, and 25 per cent. in Bengal. In the Central Provinces and Berar no addition has yet been made on this account, although it has been recognised that a 15 per cent. reserve should be provided. In some provinces, in the Punjab, for example, the number of civil surgeoncies held by promoted assistant surgeons is not taken into account in calculating the reserve, while in others it is so taken. We recommend that a uniform practice be followed in all provinces and that all appointments held by assistant surgeons be included in the calculation. We also think that steps should be taken to recalculate the present percentage for the reserve in each province in accordance with the actual requirements of the last five years. Vacancies caused by deputation or temporary appointments should be taken into account. No provision is necessary for a training reserve as the service is recruited from amongst fully-qualified men. There is no annual rate of recruitment in the services. The cadres in most of the provinces are large enough to admit of this, and a rate should be fixed and kept up-to-date every ten years. For the military assistant surgeons in civil employ no separate leave reserve is maintained. The officers are lent to the civil departments by the military authorities, and a general leave reserve of 15 per cent. is maintained by them and is under the control of the director-general. No difficulty has been experienced in the civil department in obtaining officers from the military department to fill leave vacancies and from the civil standpoint no further action is needed.

25. *The director-generalship of the Indian medical service.*—Complaint was made to us that the director-general of the Indian medical service had to be appointed from what is known as the Bengal establishment, that is to say from some province other than Madras and Bombay. We do not know if there is any good military reason for this rule. If not, it should be abolished, and the most capable officer, wherever employed, taken. This would go far to remove the present distrust felt by Madras and Bombay officers for schemes for improving the efficiency of the service based on an all-India organization. We shall have occasion to refer to these later in dealing with the professorships and the special departments. The reform would also be in harmony with the movement which has been going on for some years to get rid of the old distinction between the Madras, Bombay and Bengal armies and civil services. As it is, with effect from 1897, all officers of the Indian medical service have been placed on one list for promotion.\* We have also considered whether the director-general should be a secretary to the Government of India, and agree with the present holder of the post that this officer, as an expert adviser, having to deal with a large number of departments, is in a better position as he now is than he would be as secretary in one department.† We, therefore, advise no change in this respect.

26. *The surgeon-generalships and inspector-generalships of civil hospitals.*—We have considered a similar proposal that surgeons-general and inspectors-general of civil hospitals should be secretaries to their respective local Governments, but are not in favour of this step. We think, however, that these officers should have regular and direct access at fixed intervals to the head of their province or to the member of council in charge of the medical department, where there is a council form of Government.

27. *Advisability of taking bonds from students in the Government medical colleges.*—At present the students in some of the Government medical colleges are required to execute bonds that they will serve Government for a period of years after obtaining their qualification. Such a system was required in the early days of medical education when Government met the cost of the student's education, and when the out-turn of young men from the colleges was wholly insufficient. These conditions have now changed, and we think that the time has come for Government to go into the open market for their civil medical officers as in the case of the other services. But the

\* Volume XII., 56362.

† Volume XII., 56448.

## ANNEXURE XII.—MEDICAL SERVICES—(continued).

system should be maintained for the military assistant surgeons for so long as the present practice of granting them stipends and a free education continues.

28. *Promotion of the growth of an unofficial medical profession.*—Several of the non-official witnesses who came before us drew our attention to the importance of developing in India an unofficial medical profession. Some of them were of opinion that this could best be secured by replacing the Indian medical service officers in the civil medical services by officers recruited in India. There can be no doubt of the need for an increased number of private practitioners to provide medical treatment on western lines for the many millions of the people of India, and we have every sympathy with the movement which we observed in this direction. But to substitute one set of officials to do certain Government work of a restricted character for another would not help matters. We are, therefore, of opinion that this question should be treated as distinct from the question of limiting or reducing the number of Indian medical service officers in civil employ. To encourage independent practitioners we would let them have the advantages of state institutions and of state help wherever this can be secured without dislocation of the ordinary machinery. For example, Government hospitals should be made available as training grounds for young men who are about to take up private practice, and who are prepared to work in them as assistants to the house surgeons and physicians for suitable periods at the outset of their careers ; and such men should be encouraged to come back in after years, to the extent of the clinical material available, and subject to the general rules of discipline of the hospital, to keep themselves up-to-date. We anticipate that in this way it would be possible to attach to the larger hospitals by ties of sentiment bodies of practitioners, who would look to them as their centres and to the civil surgeons in charge of them as their friends and professional heads. Arrangements should also be made by which practitioners of distinction should be allowed to join the visiting staffs of the non-teaching hospitals in an honorary capacity. Measures should also be taken to prevent Government medical institutions from competing with private practitioners by giving gratuitous relief to persons who can afford to pay for attendance. Suggestions were also made to us for assisting private practitioners by subsidising from Government revenues private medical colleges and hospitals under suitable conditions to insure efficiency and for enforcing registration. It was also claimed that money grants should be made or increased to institutions and societies for the training and treatment of women. These proposals are not directly relevant to our inquiry, but they appear to us to have been well conceived and to be worthy of favourable consideration.

## CHAPTER VII.

## CONDITIONS OF LEAVE.

29. *Leave rules. Civil medical services.*—Indian medical service officers in civil employ are subject to the European service leave rules. Officers of this service transferred to the Indian civil medical service should be subject to the European service rules as revised by us, whether they are statutory natives of India or not. It was pointed out to us that in certain cases the civil leave rules gave rather lower allowances than the military ones, and the suggestion was made that officers in civil employ should draw whichever allowances were the highest. We do not think that any case for this was made out. Officers who elect for civil employ do so for the advantages which this offers, and should take the rough with the smooth. They are, however, placed in a difficulty during the time that they are officiating in civil posts, inasmuch as they are not admitted to the benefits of the civil leave rules, or to the civil minimum furlough allowance of 500*l.* per annum, unless they have put in three years' continuous officiating service in the civil department. If within these three years they have to go on leave, they are reverted to military service and lose their lien on their civil appointment. On return from leave they then have to put in a further three years' service in the civil department to entitle them to the privileges of the civil leave rules. To mitigate this hardship we recommend that for purposes of leave officers should be regarded as permanently in civil employ after two years. Civil assistant surgeons are and should remain subject to the Indian service leave rules, and should continue to be bound by them when promoted to hold posts in the Indian civil medical service. Military assistant surgeons are peculiar in not coming under civil leave rules when in civil employ. This is unsuitable. Like the civilian members of the local civil medical services, they should be under the Indian service leave rules, and should remain

## ANNEXURE XII.—MEDICAL SERVICES—(continued).

under them when promoted to the Indian civil medical service. The officers now in civil employ should be allowed to exercise an option in this matter. For the purposes of leave military assistant surgeons should be regarded as permanently in civil employ after the completion of their two years' probation.

30. *Study leave. Civil medical services.*—Officers of the Indian medical service are now encouraged to take study leave with beneficial results. We attach great importance to the grant of this privilege, and recommend, as already noted, that the leave reserve of the Indian medical service should be increased to meet the new conditions. We also think that the regulations should apply to all officers of the Indian civil medical service, and that they should be revised from time to time in the light of experience. It should also be possible to take study leave in any part of the world. We are satisfied that similar encouragement should be given to the members of the locally recruited services, whether civil or military officers, and recommend that steps be taken accordingly. For such officers, leave for study in India would ordinarily be appropriate, but machinery should be created whereby in special cases leave to Europe should also be granted.

## CHAPTER VIII.

## CONDITIONS OF PENSION.

31. *Pension rules. Civil medical services.*—The services of officers of the Indian medical service in civil employ are replaced at the disposal of the military authorities as a matter of form prior to retirement, and on retirement they draw pension at military rates. A similar arrangement is in force for military assistant surgeons. We are, therefore, not concerned with their cases. Civil assistant surgeons are subject to the ordinary pension rules. This should hold good for all civilian officers of the locally-recruited medical services, and for such officers when promoted into the Indian civil medical service.

## PART II.—OTHER SERVICES or DEPARTMENTS.

## CHAPTER IX.

PROFESSORSHIPS AND CHEMICAL EXAMINERSHIPS, WITH THEIR CONNECTED POSTS,  
AND THE ALIENIST DEPARTMENT.

32. *Organisation. Liability of military officers to be recalled for military duty.*—In our introductory remarks we have proposed that the various special departments referred to in this annexure should be formed into separate units. Thus we would treat separately the staff of professors, with their connected posts of minor importance, attached to each of the Government medical colleges. This will be in accordance with what we have suggested in annexure IV. for the Government arts colleges. In this way there would be five separate teaching staffs for the five Government medical colleges at Madras, Bombay, Calcutta, Lucknow, and Lahore. With the same object we would place all the chemical examiners and their assistants in a separate chemical department, and the alienists and their assistants in a separate alienist department. Subject to this reservation we propose to deal with all these officers together in this chapter so as to avoid unnecessary repetition in our recommendations. We now turn to the question of the liability of military officers in these appointments to be recalled to military duty. At present there are 37 whole time professorships at the Government medical colleges, including the four appointments in Madras which are held by officers who are also presidency surgeons. Of these, 33 are ordinarily reserved for Indian medical service officers, whilst four are open to all comers. Of the latter, three are at present filled by officers of the locally recruited services. There are also seven chemical examiners who in most cases teach chemistry to the students at the medical colleges in addition to performing their ordinary duties as Government analysts. Six of them are officers of the Indian medical service. Finally, there are six whole-time charges of lunatic asylums, all held by Indian medical service officers. The information at our disposal has not enabled us to decide on the number of posts of minor importance which should be attached permanently to these staffs or departments, and we leave the determination of this question to the Government. All the Indian medical service officers and the military assistant surgeons form part of the war reserve, and are liable to recall to military duty in case of necessity. There is a clear objection to an arrangement under which the medical education of a country is liable to be disorganised during the course of a serious war,\* and for this reason we have

\* *Vide* Schedule VII. to this annexure.

ANNEXURE XII.—MEDICAL SERVICES—(*continued*).

no hesitation in recommending that military officers holding the professorships, chemical examinerships, and the whole-time charges of the asylums should be excluded altogether from liability to recall to military duty. This will not prevent local Governments in times of grave national peril from allowing some of their officers in these appointments to volunteer for military duty if they can be spared, but will secure that this is done only after due deliberation, and with due regard for civil necessities. To the recall of military assistant surgeons, if such officers happen to be holding any of the posts of minor importance, there is less objection, and the present practice should be continued.

33. *Methods of recruitment. Extent to which the professorships and the connected appointments should be thrown open to outside competition.*—At present, as has already been noted, the professorships are reserved almost entirely for officers of the Indian medical service. Strong objection was taken to this system by certain private practitioners on the ground that such officers had not the necessary qualifications for the task of instructing the young men of the country. But this position, though advanced strongly by certain witnesses in their written statements, was not maintained by them in its entirety in their oral examinations.\* We are satisfied that, viewing the question broadly, the qualifications of the present officers are fairly good, whilst there is no question but that several of them are distinguished specialists in their subjects and thoroughly efficient teachers. At the same time there are indications that the number of applicants is limited, and that the supply of those with suitable qualifications is unduly restricted.† This is especially marked in the case of the scientific as opposed to the clinical chairs. It was also shown that transfers of officers from clinical to scientific chairs and *vice versa* were not infrequent, and that this was detrimental to efficiency. All this points to the desirability of extending the present field of selection. At the same time it is obvious that the great experience accumulated in their ordinary course of practice is in a special degree calculated to fit officers of the civil medical services for the highest forms of clinical teaching; and, since the clinical chairs can always be well filled by members of the Government services, the cause of medical education has little, if anything, to gain from opening them to the general public. On the other hand there would be a distinct loss to medical progress were such a course adopted, since the assurance that these chairs are reserved to the services is one of the most powerful attractions for men of scientific tastes and aptitudes. We accordingly recommend that the clinical chairs of medicine, surgery, clinical surgery, ophthalmology and midwifery, and their connected posts, be reserved, for so long as a fit person is available, for officers of the civil medical services, however recruited. The scientific chairs of physiology, pathology, anatomy, *materia medica* (or pharmacology) and biology on the other hand, and their connected posts, should be thrown open to all comers, and officers of the civil medical services should compete for them on the same terms as the general public. Similar action should be taken with the chemical examinerships and the alienist appointments, as also with the appointments to posts of minor importance attached to these departments. We trust, however, that the time will soon come when the teaching in biology, chemistry and physics will, wherever possible, be arranged for through the various universities. We also advise that once an officer has specialised in a clinical or scientific subject, or in chemistry, or in the duties of an alienist, he should be kept to this class of work. For example, a teacher in one of the clinical subjects should be eligible for any appointment in the clinical group for which he may be fitted. He should only in the rarest instances be allowed to teach in the scientific subjects, and *vice versa*.

34. *Methods of recruitment. Desirability of an all-India field of selection for the professorships, chemical examinerships and the alienist appointments.*—At present appointments to the higher teaching posts are made by the local Governments concerned, subject to the approval, in all cases except those of Madras and Bombay, of the Government of India. The Madras and Bombay civil medical cadres are small compared with those of the remaining provinces taken together, and present a very restricted field of selection. The service witnesses from Madras and Bombay were, however, averse from merging their appointments in a general list. They represented that they were far away from headquarters, that the director-general was never taken from the Madras or Bombay establishment, and that in consequence their interests would tend to be overlooked. This, they urged, would lead to the deterioration of their respective staffs, as the capable men would gravitate to the other provinces, where they would be more under the eye of the Government of India. We sympathise

\* Volume XII., 57184–92.

† Volume XII., 58485 and 58582.

to the full with the desire for local autonomy, and have kept this in view throughout our proposals. We think, however, that it can be pushed too far, and that for specialist appointments the widest possible field of recruitment is essential. We would, therefore, whilst leaving the actual appointments to the local Governments as before, require that they should be made everywhere after reference to, and with the approval of, the Government of India. We would safeguard the interests of the outlying provinces, first, by providing, as we have already recommended, that the director-generalship should be open to all officers, wherever employed, and, secondly, by giving them representation on the committee of selection with which we shall deal in the following paragraph. We would follow a similar procedure in the case of the chemical examinerships and the alienist appointments. The posts of minor importance in these departments should be filled locally as at present.

35. *Methods of recruitment. Procedure to be adopted in making appointments to the professorships, chemical examinerships, and alienist posts.*—In making their higher teaching appointments local Governments now depend for expert advice on the surgeon-general or inspector-general of civil hospitals, and the Government of India on the director-general. For appointments not of professorial standing this is suitable. For professorial appointments we advise as for other services that the machinery of a committee should be utilised, though we recognise that in certain cases these bodies may find it necessary to conduct their deliberations in part by correspondence. In the case of the appointments not reserved for members of the civil medical services the committee should consist of five persons, not more than two of whom should be members of the Indian medical service, and at least two of whom should be from the province to which the appointment to be made is attached. The university of the province concerned should be represented on the committee, and at least one member should be an Indian. The director-general, when present, should be chairman of the committee *ex officio*. A similar procedure should be followed in the case of the chemical examinerships and the superior alienist posts. For the appointments reserved for members of the civil medical services a smaller committee of a more official character will be suitable, and for this purpose the director-general, the surgeon-general or inspector-general of the province concerned, and the principal of the medical college to which the professorship is attached will suffice. All appointments not reserved for members of the civil medical services should be advertised in the first instance in India, and only if no fit person, whether an officer of Government or a private individual, is found there, should application be made to the Secretary of State in England. In the event of its being necessary to make a selection in England the Secretary of State should make his choice after advertising the vacancy and taking the advice of a selection committee constituted for the purpose. In the case of the reserved appointments selection should be made from a list of applicants to be maintained by the director-general.

36. *Systems of probation and training.*—All officers of Government appointed to fill professorships or to be chemical examiners or alienists will have been through a period of probation and general training. All that is required in this connection is that the Government should not confirm them in their specialist appointments before they have shown their fitness for specialist work, and as teachers, where they are required to teach, over a period of two years. A similar procedure should be followed in the case of the direct appointment of outside candidates. Once an officer has been confirmed he should not ordinarily be allowed to revert to the regular line. The same procedure should hold good in the case of officers holding the connected posts of minor importance.

37. *Conditions of salary. Private practice of professors, chemical examiners, and alienists.*—At present no clear principle appears to be laid down as to which professors should be allowed permission to take fees for private practice. The privileges of the existing incumbents in this respect should be maintained. In the case of all future incumbents we recommend that the holders of what we have termed the scientific posts should be debarred from private practice; but, if they are medical practitioners they should be given a monthly allowance instead, to be determined by Government in accordance with local conditions. The officers holding the clinical posts, on the other hand, should be allowed private practice, but this should be

## ANNEXURE XII.—MEDICAL SERVICES—(continued).

restricted to consulting practice in their own subject, the term consulting practice being interpreted in the sense understood by London practitioners. Chemical examiners and alienists who may be appointed in future should not be allowed to take any private practice of a medical nature at all. It should, however, be open to the Government of India or to any local Government, where no qualified private chemist or alienist is available, to call upon officers serving in these departments to give to the public their services in their own special line and under such conditions as may seem suitable in each case. In such circumstances the fees should be credited to Government and a suitable monthly allowance made to the officer concerned. A similar procedure should be followed in the case of officers holding posts of minor importance.

38. *Conditions of salary. Rates of salary of professors, chemical examiners and alienists.*—At present officers of the Indian medical service draw salary as professors in accordance with their army rank, but at rates which are Rs. 200 a month in excess of those attached to first class civil surgeoncies. The salaries of similar officers holding alienist appointments also depend on their army standing. Chemical examiners, on the other hand, of less than 25 years' service, draw Rs. 800-70-1,500 a month without reference to their military status. Only when a chemical examiner has completed 25 years' service and is a lieutenant-colonel is any notice taken of his army rank. Now that none of these officers will be liable to be recalled to military duty we think that their salaries should be determined without reference to military conditions, and in such a form that civilian officers can be brought on to the same scale, either from the outset, or at some definite stage. But we do not feel in a position to record any finding as to the appropriate rates pending the decision as to the salaries to be paid to Indian medical service officers generally at the conclusion of the war. For the present, therefore, we recommend that all Indian medical service officers receive temporary allowances not exceeding in the aggregate  $12\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. on their existing emoluments. This, as shown in schedule III. to this annexure, will involve an increased expenditure of Rs. 83,770 a year. At the conclusion of the war the position should be reviewed and suitable rates fixed, both for military and civilian officers. The opportunity should then be taken to raise the allowance given to principals of medical colleges from Rs. 150 to Rs. 250 a month. Lower rates should be paid to officers promoted from the locally recruited services. Suitable salaries should also be attached to the posts of minor importance.

39. *Conditions of service, leave, and pension. Professors, chemical examiners, and alienists.*—In Part I. of this annexure we have explained the steps which we think should be taken with regard to the conditions of service, leave, and pension of officers who will belong to the Indian and the local civil medical services. The same principles should be followed, so far as they are applicable, in the case of the professorships and chemical examinerships, and their connected posts, and of the alienist appointments. The only special point to be made under this head is the need which was proved to exist for providing specialist assistants for the more important professors. At present, when these officers go on leave, temporary arrangements have to be made, which are sometimes of an unsuitable character, and cases were brought to our notice in which the duties of an absent officer were being performed in addition to his legitimate duties by a brother professor in another and an alien subject. This is detrimental to efficiency and calls for attention. In deciding the field from which assistants should be selected, regard should be paid to whether the chair in question is or is not reserved for members of the civil medical services. It is, however, unnecessary that every important professor should have an assistant. Once appointments are made under the general control of the Government of India, it will be possible to maintain a central reserve of specialist officers who can be employed in the various provinces as occasion arises. We also recommend that, subject to the usual provisos, civilian officers who are directly appointed to professorships, chemical examinerships, or alienist posts, and who have belonged to no service, should be allowed to reckon as service qualifying for superannuation pension the number of completed years by which their ages at the time of appointment exceeded 25 years. Such officers, when appointed as professors, should also be eligible for a special additional pension.

## CHAPTER X.

## BACTERIOLOGICAL DEPARTMENT.

40. *Organisation. Methods of recruitment. Systems of probation and training.*—The bacteriological department at present contains 27 permanent officers, all of whom are ordinarily members of the Indian medical service. Officers of this service form part of the war reserve and are liable to recall, when needed, to military duty. We are satisfied that the bacteriological department should not form part of any military organisation, and recommend that its posts, whether of major or minor importance, be included in a separate department, and treated on the lines already proposed for the professorships of a scientific character. In this way, if bacteriologists are needed in time of war, their services will be obtained by arrangement with the civil authorities; all the appointments will be thrown open to general competition; applications will be called for by advertisement; and selections will be made by the Government of India with the advice of a specially constituted committee. Members of the civil medical services will also be eligible like anyone else, and so long as there is a fit candidate in India appointment will be made in that country. Officers should also pass through a period of two years' probation in the department, and once they have been confirmed should ordinarily remain in it for the rest of their careers. We have also considered a suggestion that the officers of this department should be placed on the same list as the members of the sanitary department in a combined department of public health, and that there should be interchangeability of functions between the two groups of officers. The duties of a deputy sanitary commissioner appear to us to correspond closely with those of a sanitary commissioner under the local government board in England, and are different from those of a scientific bacteriologist. Whilst, therefore, the closest contact between the two departments is necessary we do not approve of amalgamation. The difficulties incidental to the administration of a small cadre of officers, which the scheme for amalgamation appears to have been designed to meet, are temporary in character, and will gradually pass away as the department of bacteriology is developed.

41. *Conditions of salary, service, leave, and pension.*—In the matter of private practice bacteriologists should be placed in the same position as chemical examiners. If medical officers they should be debarred from medical practice. In their own special line they should give their services to the public, if required by Government to do so, and in this case should receive a suitable monthly allowance. Any fees they may earn should be credited to the state. Their salaries should also be treated on the lines laid down for chemical examiners. The cost of giving a temporary enhancement not exceeding in the aggregate  $12\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. on their existing emoluments to all Indian medical service officers will amount, as shown in schedule IV. to this annexure, to Rs. 48,587 a year. The conditions of service, leave, and pension of bacteriologists should be framed on the same lines as those of the chemical examiners.

## CHAPTER XI.

## SANITARY DEPARTMENT.

42. *Organisation. Extent to which the sanitary department should be imperialised.*—The ordinary duties relating to the public health in the various districts in India are performed by the civil surgeons or district medical and sanitary officers, as they are termed in Madras. It is only the work of general supervision and co-ordination, and the advisory work, which is done by the officers of what is now known as the sanitary department, but which we think should be called in future the department of public health. This again is not an imperial department for the whole of India, like the bacteriological department, but consists of a number of small watertight departments under the different local Governments and Administrations of from one to six officers each. It also contains four health officers for special areas and a sanitary commissioner and an assistant director-general (sanitary) under the Government of India. The sanitary commissioner with the Government of India is subordinate to the director-general of the Indian medical service. Attached to the department in certain provinces, but not of it, are a certain number of plague appointments. These have long since ceased to be of a temporary character and should be brought on to the permanent strength, and will be so treated throughout this annexure. The first question we have had to consider has been the extent to which the provincial character of the existing

## ANNEXURE XII.—MEDICAL SERVICES—(continued).

organisation should be maintained. As in other small departments the difficulties now experienced centre in the headship of the department and in the provision of an adequate leave reserve. Where only four or five officers are employed it often happens that one or two unexpected casualties will bring quite a junior officer to the head of his provincial list. Then, if such an officer is made the head of the department in his province, a grievance is created in the neighbouring areas, where quite senior men may happen to be blocked for promotion. Again, it is impossible to maintain a proper leave reserve for a small cadre without undue extravagance. This leads to the neglect of any regular provision and to consequent makeshift arrangements when officers go on leave. We recognise the force of these objections, but as in similar cases do not think that they should outweigh the more solid advantages of decentralised control. We also see advantages in having at the head of a department an officer who knows the local languages. We think, further, that the difficulties now experienced will grow less as the sanitary establishments are developed. We recommend, therefore, that the present system be maintained in essentials. We would, however, lay it down that local Governments should have uncontrolled powers of appointment to the office of sanitary commissioner only if they have a suitable officer of at least the rank of lieutenant-colonel, if an Indian medical service officer, or of the equivalent standing, if a civilian, available. Where this is not the case the name of the officer thought suitable should be submitted to the Government of India for confirmation. Where there is only a small difference between the seniority of the officer proposed and of a suitable officer awaiting promotion in another province, preference should be given to the local candidate; but where a marked difference exists seniority should prevail. The Government of India should also keep a leave and training reserve for the whole department.

43. *Methods of recruitment to the sanitary department. Conditions under which officers of the Indian medical service should be appointed.*—Up till recently all appointments in the sanitary department were reserved for officers of the Indian medical service. Such officers form part of the war reserve and are liable to be recalled to military duty in case of need. In 1912 a scheme was sanctioned by which persons, who were not members of the Indian medical service, were made eligible for the deputy sanitary commissionerships. At present, out of 47 officers in the department, 33 belong to the Indian medical service. This arrangement had so lately been come to when it was submitted for our consideration that there had not been time to obtain any useful experience of its working. We therefore decided not to inquire into it in detail, and did not summon before us any member of the department not belonging to the Indian medical service. We recommend, however, as elsewhere, that the civil character of the department be emphasised by the adoption of a civil organisation, and that all appointments in it be thrown open to all members of the department. We see no reason why such military officers as are transferred to this department should not be recalled to military duty in time of need, but as in the case of the civil surgeons would limit the liability to officers who have not attained to administrative rank.

44. *Methods of recruitment to the sanitary department. Procedure to be followed in making appointments.*—At present officers of the Indian medical service who desire to enter the sanitary department register their names with the director-general and as vacancies occur in the provinces are posted to them. This arrangement has worked satisfactorily and should be continued. Candidates not belonging to the Indian medical service are selected by the local Governments. This is suitable, but local Governments should act with the advice of committees. These should be formed separately for each province, and should consist of three officials and two non-officials, and should include two Indians. All candidates are now required to hold a British diploma in public health and to possess a medical qualification registrable in the United Kingdom. In the present circumstances, we approve of this regulation, but recommend that steps be taken to improve the facilities for instruction in hygiene in India, so as to make it possible for statutory natives of India to obtain a diploma in public health and instruction in tropical hygiene without going to Europe. This is especially necessary in view of the fact that the sanitary problems of India and England are developing on such different lines. The course for the diploma of public health in England no longer covers the whole ground.

45. *Systems of probation and training for officers in the sanitary department.*—At present there are no rules regarding any training prior to entering into the sanitary department, except such as is implied by the possession of a diploma of public health. Indian medical service officers, however, have had some practical experience of modern hygienic methods when in charge of their regiments. Officers who are not members of the Indian medical service are ordinarily kept on probation for a period of not less than two years, but this condition may be dispensed with at the discretion of local Governments in the case of men who have rendered approved service as municipal officers of health. We think that, in future, all officers should be on probation for two years, and that for part of that time such as are not members of the Indian medical service should be given practical experience of urban and rural problems under the supervision of selected municipal and district health officers.

46. *Conditions of salary in the sanitary department.*—Officers of the sanitary department are not allowed private practice. This prohibition should be maintained in future. Officers belonging to the Indian medical service, when working as deputy sanitary commissioners, are remunerated according to their army rank, and at rates which are Rs. 250 a month in excess of those fixed for civil surgeons of the second class. As sanitary commissioners they receive specially determined salaries. Other officers are paid partly in this way and partly on the system followed for deputy sanitary commissioners. For officers who are not members of the Indian medical service lower all-round rates have been fixed. We think that a case has been made out for increasing the salary of the sanitary commissioner with the Government of India from Rs. 2,000–100–2,500 to Rs. 2,500–100–3,000 a month, and of the eight sanitary commissioners in the provinces from Rs. 1,250–50–1,750 in the Central Provinces and Berar, and Rs. 1,500–60–1,800 elsewhere to Rs. 1,750–50–2,000 and Rs. 1,750–100–2,250 a month respectively. The increased expenditure on this account will amount, as shown in schedule V. to this annexure, to Rs. 30,692 a year. These salaries should be payable to all officers whether they are members of the Indian medical service or not. As regards the remaining officers, we think that such as are members of the Indian medical service, including those who are holding plague appointments, should receive temporary allowances, not exceeding in the aggregate  $12\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. on their present emoluments, as has been proposed by us for civil surgeons. Subsequently, when the salaries of the civil surgeons come to be fixed at the conclusion of the war, the salaries of Indian medical service officers in the sanitary department, including those holding plague appointments, should also be determined. Suitable salaries should also be attached to the posts of minor importance. The opportunity should also be taken to reconsider the salaries of the officers who do not belong to the Indian medical service. The cost of giving to Indian medical service officers the temporary allowances proposed will be approximately Rs. 70,547 a year, as shown in detail in schedule V. to this annexure.

47. *Conditions of service, leave, and pension in the sanitary department.*—Indian medical service officers in the sanitary department should be treated as regards their conditions of service, leave, and pension on the lines already laid down by us for the other officers of their service who are in civil employ. Other officers as regards leave should be under the Indian service rules, as at present, and should continue under them throughout their careers. These officers are not entitled under the terms of their contracts to any pension. We do not think it probable that good recruits will be secured on such terms, and recommend that all future appointments should be pensionable. Generally we attach importance to the development of the sanitary department, and advise, as has been already stated, that as civil surgeons become overworked in the larger districts the opportunity should be taken to relieve them of their sanitary duties by adding to the sanitary staffs.

## CHAPTER XII.

### JAIL DEPARTMENT.

48. *Organisation and method of recruitment.*—In the jails at the headquarters of the districts only short-term prisoners are confined. Such jails are managed

ANNEXURE XII.—MEDICAL SERVICES—(*continued*).

ordinarily by the district civil surgeons, who receive special allowances for this work. Such officers do not belong to the jail department. Jail department officers are concerned only with the few large central jails in each province into which the long term prisoners are collected. These officers are 43 in number, of whom 38 belong to the Indian medical service. All the 38 form part of the war reserve of the Indian army and are liable to be recalled to military duty in case of need. There are also in the jail department certain appointments of minor importance. From the evidence we received we are satisfied that there is no settled opinion in India with regard to the present methods of jail management. In particular, views differ as to the suitability, under modern conditions, of maintaining numerous small jails, scattered about over various districts, and of placing them in the charge of part-time officers. We were also told that an expert committee was about to be appointed to inquire into the jail administration generally. Such a body would be in a favourable position to advise also on all questions relating to the jail services. We therefore suggest that they be submitted for its consideration. Meanwhile we recommend the following changes of detail in the department. Of the Indian medical service officers, who are appointed to it, only those who are not of administrative rank should be liable to recall to military duty, and the method of reconciling the control of the local Government and of the Government of India, put forward for the sanitary department, should be introduced. The Government of India should similarly maintain an imperial leave reserve.

49. *Systems of probation and training in the jail department.*—We also think that immediate steps should be taken to secure that officers receive a proper training in jail work. No officer should be permitted to hold independent charge of a central jail until he has had one year's practical training in a jail, and has passed a departmental examination in jail subjects. The reserve of officers maintained by the Government of India should be calculated so as to secure this. On being appointed finally to a province every officer should be required to pass a colloquial test in its principal vernacular. The period of probation should be two years for all officers, and an Indian medical service officer, who has once been confirmed, should ordinarily be kept to jail work for the rest of his career.

50. *Conditions of salary in the jail department.*—Officers of the jail department should ordinarily be debarred from private practice. The inspectors-general of jails who now draw Rs. 1,500 a month in the Central Provinces and Berar, Rs. 1,800 in a month in the Punjab and Bihar and Orissa, and Rs. 1,800–50–2,000 a month elsewhere, should be paid Rs. 2,000–50–2,250 a month everywhere except in the Central Provinces and Berar, where Rs. 1,750–50–2,000 a month will suffice. This will involve an increased expenditure of Rs. 15,875 a year, as shown in schedule VI. to this annexure. These salaries should be drawn by all officers, whether members of the Indian medical service or not. Other Indian medical service officers should receive temporary allowances not exceeding in the aggregate  $12\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. on their present emoluments. The cost of this will be approximately Rs. 46,295 a year, as shown in detail in schedule VI. to this annexure. We also think that the jail allowances at present paid to civil surgeons are quite inadequate; and if these officers are kept in charge of jails, their emoluments should be increased. We recommend, further, that provided they are fit, officers who have been promoted from being civil or military assistant surgeons, should be entitled to hold charge of jails like other civil surgeons.

51. *Conditions of service, leave and pension in the jail department.*—Officers of the Indian medical service and of the Indian subordinate medical department in the jail department should be treated as regards their conditions of service, leave, and pension on the lines already laid down by us for the other officers of their services who are in civil employ. Other officers, as regards leave, should be under the Indian service rules, and should continue under them throughout their careers. Such officers should draw pension under the general rules. At present inspectors-general who are not members of the Indian medical service are entitled to a special additional pension except in the Central Provinces and Berar. We recommend that there also this privilege should be enjoyed.

## PART III.

## CHAPTER XIII.

## SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS.

52. We have recommended generally that, at the conclusion of the present war, it should be considered whether the existing civil medical machinery has stood satisfactorily the strain imposed upon it by war conditions. Assuming that the existing system is maintained in essentials, we have proposed the following changes in the medical services:—

*General recommendations.*

- (i) The various departments included in this annexure should be treated as separate units (paragraph 2).
- (ii) The medical needs of the army and of the civil administration should be calculated separately on their merits, and a purely civil medical machinery should be created to meet the requirements of each civil medical department. The officers forming the medical reserve of the army should be admitted to the cadres of the various civil medical departments in the same way that military officers are admitted to posts in other civil departments. Any excess of civil posts should be filled by civil recruitment. If the experience of the present war leads to such an increase in the military reserve as would seriously endanger the maintenance of a civil element in the civil medical administration, it should be considered whether a minimum number of civil officers in civil medical service should not be fixed (paragraph 2).

*Civil medical services.*

- (iii) Regular civil medical services should be constituted. One should be entrusted with the higher duties, and should be for the whole of India. This should be called the Indian civil medical service. The others should be formed separately in each province to carry out the duties of minor importance, and should be called the Madras (Bombay, etc.) civil medical services (paragraph 6).
- (iv) In the Indian civil medical service should be placed the civil surgeoncies and posts of a similar or superior position, and all officers holding them should be on one list and enjoy the same status. In the local services should be included the assistant surgeoncies and similar posts which do not belong to the various special departments (paragraph 6).
- (v) Military assistant surgeons in civil employ should be admitted to the local services, and should take rank with their civilian colleagues from the date of their entry into the service, but their names should be borne on a separate list (paragraph 6).
- (vi) Officers of the Indian medical service in civil employ should be recalled to military duty only if they are not of administrative rank, and only in the event of war. All military assistant surgeons in civil employ should be liable to recall to military duty (paragraph 6).
- (vii) The title "civil assistant surgeon" should not be prefixed to the names of the civilian members of the local services. The usage customary in the United Kingdom should be observed. It would remove a grievance if the military authorities could get rid of the term "subordinate" from the designation of the Indian subordinate medical department (paragraph 7).
- (viii) The open competitive examination for the Indian medical service should be made more practical, and a *viva voce* test should be introduced. All candidates should have had a hospital training, have been through a practical course of midwifery, and have had experience of treating the diseases of women and children. If it is found necessary to give Indians this training in the United Kingdom sufficient facilities should be provided there for them (paragraph 9).
- (ix) No officer of the Indian medical service of more than five years' standing should ordinarily be admitted to the Indian civil medical service (paragraph 10).

## ANNEXURE XII.—MEDICAL SERVICES—(continued).

- (x) After satisfying existing vested interests not more than one-third of the superior appointments, not reserved for officers of the Indian medical service, should be allotted to promoted military assistant surgeons. In promoting assistant surgeons preference should be given to men who are in touch with the latest developments of medical science. After five years preference as amongst military assistant surgeons should be given to officers possessing a qualification registrable in the United Kingdom (paragraph 11).
- (xi) Should the number of superior posts available for civilian officers be increased, a system of direct civil recruitment should be adopted for at least a part of the civil medical service. In such circumstances regard should be had, amongst other points, to the special needs of European officers entitled to free medical attendance and of their families (paragraph 11).
- (xii) Sub-assistant surgeons, who possess a medical qualification registrable in the United Kingdom, should be eligible for appointment to the various local services (paragraph 12).
- (xiii) Appointments to the various local services should be made by the local Governments concerned, and with the advice of a committee (paragraph 12).
- (xiv) The number of military assistant surgeons in civil employ should not be increased. When transferred for civil work these officers should ordinarily be of a fixed number of years' standing. Their seniority in the civil cadre should date ordinarily from the date of their transfer (paragraph 13).
- (xv) Local Governments should have full power to revert officers of the Indian medical service to military duty at any time during their probationary period. Directly recruited civil assistant surgeons and all military assistant surgeons should be on probation for two years (paragraph 15).
- (xvi) The period during which officers of the Indian medical service are awaiting transfer to civil duties should be utilised for specialist training on the lines stated (paragraph 16).
- (xvii) The septennial examinations for civil assistant surgeons should be abolished. Assistant surgeons should instead be required to undergo post-graduate courses. They should be encouraged themselves to perform in the hospitals the duties for which they are qualified (paragraph 17).
- (xviii) Civil surgeons, and officers holding similar posts, whether belonging to the Indian medical service or not, and the assistant surgeons working under them, should enjoy the privilege of private practice at the pleasure of Government. Should it be found necessary to withdraw this privilege in individual cases a suitable monthly allowance should be granted. Subject to the exceptions stated, officers shown in schedule I. to this annexure as holding administrative, staff, or miscellaneous appointments should not be allowed private practice (paragraph 18).
- (xix) The higher administrative officers should receive salaries at the rates stated. Other officers, who are members of the Indian medical service, should receive temporary allowances in addition to their salaries. These should be apportioned by Government, but should not exceed in the aggregate  $12\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. of the present emoluments. At the conclusion of the war the whole question should be reconsidered (paragraph 19).
- (xx) Civil and military officers of the provincially recruited services should be paid alike, both when they are working as assistant surgeons, and after promotion into the Indian civil medical service; and at the rates stated (paragraphs 20 and 21).
- (xxi) In the larger districts, when it is found that the civil surgeon is overworked, he should be relieved, first of his jail, and then of his sanitary duties. Powers should also be delegated to assistant surgeons to enable them to manage the subdivisions of the districts (paragraph 23).
- (xxii) The reserves for leave, deputation, and training in the various civil medical services should be recalculated. In the local services more uniformity should be observed in making the calculations, and, where possible, an annual rate of recruitment should be fixed (paragraph 24).

## ANNEXURE XII.—MEDICAL SERVICES—(continued).

- (xxiii) The director-generalship of the Indian medical service should be thrown open to all officers of that service, wherever employed (paragraph 25).
- (xxiv) The surgeons-general and the inspectors-general of civil hospitals should have regular and direct access to the head of their province, or to the member of council in charge of the medical department, where there is a council form of Government (paragraph 26).
- (xxv) The practice of taking bonds from students in the Government medical colleges should be abandoned. It should be maintained for the military assistant surgeons under the conditions stated (paragraph 27).
- (xxvi) Steps should be taken to encourage the growth of an unofficial medical profession, and on the lines indicated (paragraph 28).
- (xxvii) For purposes of leave officers of the Indian medical service and of the Indian subordinate medical department should be regarded as permanently in civil employ after two years. All officers of the Indian subordinate medical department, who may in future be transferred to civil employ, should come under the Indian service leave rules. Such officers as are now in civil employ should be allowed to exercise an option in this matter (paragraph 29).
- (xxviii) Facilities for study leave should be given to all officers of the civil medical services (paragraph 30).

*Professorships and chemical examinations, with their connected posts, and the alienist department.*

- (xxix) The teaching staff of each Government medical college should be treated as a separate unit, and separate chemical and alienist departments should be established. Military officers holding any of the superior posts on the teaching staffs or in the chemical and alienist departments should not be liable to recall to military duty in case of war. Military assistant surgeons, holding posts of minor importance should be liable to such recall (paragraph 32).
- (xxx) The clinical chairs of medicine, surgery, clinical surgery, ophthalmology, and midwifery and their connected posts, should be reserved, for so long as a fit person is available, for officers of the civil medical services, however recruited. The scientific chairs of physiology, pathology, anatomy, materia medica (or pharmacology) and biology, and their connected posts, should be thrown open to all candidates. Similar action should be taken with the chemical examinations and their connected posts and the alienist appointments (paragraph 33).
- (xxxi) Efforts should be made to have the teaching in biology, chemistry, and physics given through the various universities, wherever possible (paragraph 33).
- (xxxii) An officer who has once specialised in any line should be kept to that line of work (paragraph 33).
- (xxxiii) For specialist appointments an all-India field of recruitment is necessary. The interests of officers in distant provinces should be safeguarded in the manner indicated (paragraph 34).
- (xxxiv) Appointments to professorships and chemical examinations and to superior posts in the alienist department should be made with the advice of a committee. Only if no fit candidate is available in India should an officer be appointed from England. Vacancies in posts not reserved for members of the civil medical services should be advertised (paragraph 35).
- (xxxv) Specialist officers should be kept on probation for two years, and where they are required to teach should prove their capacity to do so during this period (paragraph 36).
- (xxxvi) Medical officers holding scientific posts should be debarred from private practice, but should receive a monthly allowance instead. Similar officers holding clinical posts should be allowed consulting practice in their own subject. Chemical examiners and alienists and their assistants should be allowed private practice, but only in their own subject and under the conditions stated (paragraph 37).
- (xxxvii) As a temporary measure officers of the Indian medical service holding specialist posts should receive temporary allowances not exceeding in

## ANNEXURE XII.—MEDICAL SERVICES—(continued).

the aggregate  $12\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. of their existing emoluments. At the conclusion of the war the position should be reviewed and rates fixed for them and for civilian officers and for officers holding posts of minor importance on the lines indicated. Lower rates should be paid to officers promoted from the locally recruited services (paragraph 38).

- (xxxviii) Arrangements should be made by which specialists will be available to officiate for specialists when they go on leave. Where a case is made out for such action, specialist assistants to professors should be appointed (paragraph 39).
- (xxxix) Subject to the usual provisos civilian officers directly appointed to professorships, chemical examinerships, or alienist posts should be allowed to reckon as service qualifying for superannuation pension the number of completed years by which their ages at the time of appointment exceeded 25 years. Such officers when appointed as professors should be eligible for a special additional pension (paragraph 39).

*Bacteriological department.*

- (xl) The posts in the bacteriological department, whether of major or minor importance, should be included in a separate department, and members of the Indian medical service employed in this department should not ordinarily be liable to recall to military duty (paragraph 40).
- (xli) All appointments should be thrown open to general competition, and be made, after advertisement, by the Government of India with the help of a selection committee (paragraph 40).
- (xlii) Officers should pass through a period of two years' probation in the department, and once confirmed should ordinarily remain in it for the rest of their careers (paragraph 40).
- (xlili) Medical officers in the bacteriological department should be debarred from private practice; if so required by Government, officers of the bacteriological department should give their services in their own special line to the public, and in return should receive a suitable monthly allowance. All fees realised from the public should be credited to Government (paragraph 41).
- (xliv) As a temporary measure officers of the Indian medical service should receive allowances not exceeding in the aggregate  $12\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. of their existing emoluments. At the conclusion of the war definite rates of salary should be prescribed (paragraph 41).
- (xlv) The conditions of service, leave, and pension of bacteriologists should be framed on the same lines as those of the chemical examiners (paragraph 41).

*Sanitary department.*

- (xlvi) The plague appointments should be brought on to the permanent strength of the department (paragraph 42).
- (xlvii) The present provincial organisation should be maintained, but the local Governments should have uncontrolled powers of appointment to the office of sanitary commissioner only if they have a suitable officer of at least the rank of lieutenant-colonel, if an Indian medical service officer, or of the equivalent standing, if a civilian, available; in other cases the name of the officer thought suitable should be submitted to the Government of India for confirmation; where there is only a small difference between the seniority of the officer proposed and of a suitable officer awaiting promotion in another province, preference should be given to the local candidate (paragraph 42).
- (xlviii) The Government of India should keep a leave and training reserve for the whole department (paragraph 42).
- (xlix) All appointments should be thrown open to all members of the department (paragraph 43).
  - (i) Only such officers of the Indian medical service as have not attained administrative rank should be liable to recall to military duty (paragraph 43).
  - (i) In selecting candidates not belonging to the Indian medical service, local Governments should act with the advice of committees. These should

## ANNEXURE XII.—MEDICAL SERVICES—(continued).

- be formed separately for each province, and should consist of three officials and two non-officials, and should include two Indians (paragraph 44).
- (lii) Statutory natives of India should be able to obtain a diploma in public health and instruction in tropical hygiene without going to Europe (paragraph 44).
  - (liii) In future all officers should be on probation for two years, and for part of that time such as are not members of the Indian medical service should be given practical experience of urban and rural problems under the supervision of selected municipal and district health officers (paragraph 45).
  - (liv) The sanitary commissioners should receive salaries at the rates stated. Other officers who are members of the Indian medical service should receive temporary allowances not exceeding in the aggregate  $12\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. of their present emoluments. At the conclusion of the war, and when the rates of salary for civil surgeoncies are fixed, the salaries of Indian medical service officers in the sanitary department, including officers on plague duty, should be determined. Suitable salaries should also be attached to the posts of minor importance and the salaries of other officers not belonging to the Indian medical service should be reconsidered (paragraph 46).
  - (lv) Indian medical service officers in the sanitary department should be treated as regards conditions of service, leave, and pension on the lines laid down for other similar officers in civil employ (paragraph 47).
  - (lvi) In future civilian officers of the sanitary department should be given pensions (paragraph 47).

*Jail department.*

- (lvii) All questions relating to the jail services should be referred to the expert committee which is to inquire into the jail administration. Meanwhile only such Indian medical service officers as are not of administrative rank should be liable to recall to military duty, and the control of the local Governments and the Government of India should be reconciled in the manner proposed for the sanitary department (paragraph 48).
- (lviii) The Government of India should maintain a reserve for leave and training (paragraph 48).
- (lix) Steps should be taken to secure that officers receive a proper training in jail work, and no officer should hold independent charge of a central jail unless he has had one year's practical training and has passed a departmental examination. The reserve should be calculated to permit of this arrangement (paragraph 49).
- (lx) On being appointed to any province, officers should be required to pass a colloquial test in its principal vernacular. The period of probation should be two years, and an Indian medical service officer, once confirmed, should ordinarily remain in the department for the rest of his career (paragraph 49).
- (lxi) Inspectors-general of jails should receive salaries at the rates stated. Other officers belonging to the Indian medical service should receive temporary allowances not exceeding in the aggregate  $12\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. of their present emoluments (paragraph 50).
- (lxii) All civil surgeons, whether belonging to the Indian medical service or promoted from the provincially recruited services, should be entitled, if fit, to hold charge of district jails and to draw the allowances; such allowances should be increased (paragraph 50).
- (lxiii) Officers of the Indian medical service and the Indian subordinate medical department in the jail department should be treated as regards their conditions of service, leave, and pension on the lines laid down for other similar officers in civil employ. Other officers should be under the Indian service leave rules and the ordinary pension rules should apply to them (paragraph 51).
- (lxiv) The inspector-general of jails, Central Provinces and Berar, when not a military officer, should be admitted to a special additional pension (paragraph 51).

## ANNEXURE XII.—MEDICAL SERVICES—(continued).

SCHEDULE I.  
Indian civil medical service.

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
	OFFICERS BELONGING TO THE INDIAN MEDICAL SERVICE.				OFFICERS BELONGING TO THE INDIAN MEDICAL SERVICE.		
	(i) <i>Administrative appointments.</i>	Rs.	Rs. A. P.		(i) <i>Administrative appointments.</i>	Rs.	Rs. A. P.
1	Director-general, Indian medical service.	3,000	3,000 0 0	1	Director-general, Indian medical service.	3,500†	3,500 0 0
2	Surgeons-general (Madras and Bombay).	2,500	5,000 0 0	2	Surgeons-general (Madras and Bombay).	3,000†	6,000 0 0
1	Inspector-general of civil hospitals (Bengal).	2,500	2,500 0 0	1	Inspector-general of civil hospitals (Bengal).	3,000†	3,000 0 0
5	Inspectors-general of civil hospitals (United Provinces, Punjab, Burma, Bihar and Orissa, and Assam).	2,250	11,250 0 0	4	Inspectors-general of civil hospitals (United Provinces, Punjab, Burma, and Bihar and Orissa).	2,750†	11,000 0 0
1	Inspector-general of civil hospitals (Central Provinces).	2,000	2,000 0 0	1	Inspector-general of civil hospitals (Central Provinces).	2,500†	2,500 0 0
	Exchange compensation allowance.	—	1,375 0 3	1	Inspector-general of civil hospitals (Assam).	2,250†	2,250 0 0
10	Total—administrative appointments - - -		25,125 0 3	10	Total—administrative appointments - - -		28,250 0 0
	(ii) <i>Other appointments.</i>	*			(ii) <i>Other appointments.</i>		
1	Deputy director-general, Indian medical service.	350-1,000 + staff pay, 600.	1,405 4 5				
1	Assistant director-general, Indian medical service (stores).	350-1,000 + staff pay; captain, 400; higher rank, 500.	1,050 11 0				
2	Personal assistants to surgeon-general (Madras and Bombay).	500-800, + staff allowance, 100.	1,580 7 8				
42	Presidency and civil surgeons, 1st class.	550-1,450	49,360 4 6				
124	Civil surgeons, 2nd class.	450-1,350	87,022 13 0				
3	Third and fourth physicians and third surgeon, Madras general hospital.	450-1,350	2,103 6 3				
1	Resident medical officer, Madras general hospital.	500-700	648 4 4				
1	Assistant superintendent, maternity hospital, Madras.	"	648 4 4				
1	Director, King institute of preventive medicine, Madras.	350-1,000 + staff pay, 300-600.	1,129 1 11				
1	Assistant director, King institute of preventive medicine, Madras.	"	1,129 1 11				
1	Surgeon to H.E. the Governor, Madras.	1,000	1,600 0 0				
1	Surgeon superintendent, St. George's hospital, Bombay.	1,800	1,800 0 0				
	Carried forward - - -		25,125 0 3		Carried forward - - -		28,250 0 0
			1,48,879 11 4				

\* The pay of officers of the Indian medical service in the various appointments depends on their military rank. For details see volume XII, appendix VI.

† Not entitled to exchange compensation allowance.

## ANNEXURE XII.—MEDICAL SERVICES—(continued).

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
	Brought forward	Rs. - -	Rs. A. P. 25,125 0 3		Brought forward	Rs. - -	Rs. A. P. 28,250 0 0
			1,48,879 11 4				
	OFFICERS BELONGING TO THE INDIAN MEDICAL SERVICE— <i>continued.</i>				OFFICERS BELONGING TO THE INDIAN MEDICAL SERVICE— <i>continued.</i>		
	(ii) <i>Other appointments</i> — <i>continued.</i>	*			(ii) <i>Other appointments</i> — <i>continued.</i>		
1	Resident surgeon, St. George's hospital, Bombay.	800	800 0 0	199	To officers in this group it has been proposed in paragraph 19 of the annexure to grant temporary allowances, which will not exceed in the aggregate 12½ per cent. of their present emoluments. The cost involved will be as follows:— Present emoluments. 1,81,136 5 9 Temporary allowance at 12½ per cent. in the aggregate. 22,642 0 9 2,03,778 6 6		2,03,778 6 6
1	Surgeon, Gokuldas Tejpal hospital, Bombay.	750-1,650	1,375 3 11				
1	Surgeon to H.E. the Governor, Bombay.	1,000	1,000 0 0				
1	Police surgeon, Bombay.	500-100-1,000	833 5 4				
1	Surgeon superintendent, presidency general hospital, Calcutta.	1,800	1,800 0 0				
1	Resident surgeon, presidency general hospital, Calcutta.	1,000	1,000 0 0				
1	Resident surgeon, presidency general hospital, Calcutta.	800	800 0 0				
3	Resident physician and resident surgeons, medical college hospital, Calcutta.	500-700	1,944 13 0				
1	Superintendent, Campbell medical school, Calcutta.	Major, 1,500; Lt.-Col., 1,800.	1,670 3 9				
1	Surgeon to H.E. the Governor, Bengal.	1,000	1,000 0 0				
1	Superintendent, general hospital, Rangoon.	1,700†	1,700 0 0				
1	Resident surgeon, general hospital, Rangoon.	1,100†	1,100 0 0				
1	Police surgeon, Rangoon.	1,100†	1,100 0 0				
1	Ophthalmic surgeon, Rangoon.	450-1,350	701 12 9				
1	Superintendent, X-ray institute.	350-1,000 + staff pay; captain, 400; higher rank, 500.	1,155 1 2				
2	Civil surgeons, Simla east and west.	550-1,450	2,350 7 10				
1	Medical officer, Port Blair.	1,500	1,500 0 0				
	Exchange compensation allowance.	—	10,425 10 8				
199	Total—other appointments	-	1,81,136 5 9	199	Total—other appointments	-	2,03,778 6 6
209	Total—officers belonging to the Indian medical service - }		2,06,261 6 -	209	Total—officers belonging to the Indian medical service - }		2,32,028 6 6
	Carried forward	- - -	2,06,261 6 0		Carried forward	- - -	2,32,028 6 6

\* The pay of officers of the Indian medical service in the various appointments depends on their military rank. For details, see volume XII., appendix VI.

† Not entitled to exchange compensation allowance.

ANNEXURE XII.—MEDICAL SERVICES—(continued).

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
	Brought forward	Rs. - -	Rs. A. P. 2,06,261 6 0		Brought forward	Rs. - -	Rs. A. P. 2,32,028 6 6
	OFFICERS NOT BELONGING TO THE INDIAN MEDICAL SERVICE.				OFFICERS NOT BELONGING TO THE INDIAN MEDICAL SERVICE.		
2	Civil surgeons . (un-covenanted officers) (1 Madras and 1 Punjab).	700	1,400 0 0	48	Civil surgeons (promoted officers—civil branch) (5 Madras, 4 Bombay, 6 Bengal, 12 United Provinces, 9 Punjab, 4 Bihar and Orissa, 6 Central Provinces, and 2 Assam).	500-50/2-800	29,823 4 3
13	Civil surgeons (un-covenanted officers) (3 Bengal, 1 United Provinces, 7 Burma, 1 Bihar and Orissa, and 1 Central Provinces).	350-100/5-550-150/5-700.	6,887 9 0				
19	Civil surgeons (promoted civil assistant surgeons) (4 Madras, 3 Bombay, 5 Bengal, 6 Punjab, and 1 Bihar and Orissa).	350-30-500	8,550 0 0	14	Civil surgeons (promoted officers—civil branch) (Burma).	550-50/2-850	9,398 7 3
8	Civil surgeons (promoted civil assistant surgeons) (United Provinces).	400-40-600	4,266 10 8	23	Civil surgeons (promoted officers—military branch) (2 Madras, 2 Bombay, 4 Bengal, 7 United Provinces, 4 Punjab, 1 Bihar and Orissa, 2 Central Provinces, and 1 Assam).	500-50/2-800	15,251 9 2
4	Civil surgeons (promoted civil assistant surgeons) (Burma).	500-40-700	2,533 5 4				
1	Civil surgeon (promoted civil assistant surgeon) (Central Provinces).	400-20-500	466 10 8	8	Civil surgeons (promoted officers—military branch) (Burma).	550-50/2-850	5,704 14 4
46	Civil surgeons (promoted military assistant surgeons) (2 Madras, 3 Bombay, 2 Bengal, 10 United Provinces, 6 Punjab, 11 Burma, 3 Bihar and Orissa, 6 Central Provinces, and 3 Assam).	350-100/5-550-150/5-700.	21,551 15 4				
18	local allowances, Burma.	50	900 0 0				
93	Total—officers not belonging to the Indian medical service - {		46,556 3 0	93	Total—officers not belonging to the Indian medical service - {		60,178 3 0
302*	Grand total—Indian civil medical service - - - {		2,52,817 9 0	302	Grand total—Indian civil medical service - - - {		2,92,206 9 6
					Deduct present cost - - - {		2,52,817 9 0
					Net extra expenditure per mensem -		39,389 0 6
					" " per annum -		4,72,668 6 0

\* Exclusive of the leave reserve.

ANNEXURE XII.—MEDICAL SERVICES—(continued).

SCHEDULE II.

Local civil medical services (including jail, sanitary, bacteriological, and other miscellaneous appointments).

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
	<b>CIVIL ASSISTANT SURGEONS.</b>				<b>LOCAL CIVIL MEDICAL SERVICES—</b>		
	<i>Madras.</i>				<i>Madras.</i>		
141	Officers, 1st grade -	Rs. 200	Rs. A. P. 21,704 15 7	141	Officers - - -	Rs. 150-40/3-350-50/3-400 (100 during probation).	Rs. A. P. 36,313 9 0
	" 2nd grade -	150					
	" 3rd grade -	100					
	<i>Bombay.</i>				<i>Bombay.</i>		
55	Officers, senior grade -	300	8,945 10 9	55	Officers - - -	"	13,882 15 0
	" 1st grade -	200					
	" 2nd grade -	150					
	" 3rd grade -	100					
	<i>Bengal.</i>				<i>Bengal.</i>		
160	Officers, senior grade -	350	32,758 6 8	160	Officers - - -	"	41,162 6 5
	" " " -	325					
	" junior grade -	100-10/2-110-10-300.					
	<i>United Provinces of Agra and Oudh.</i>				<i>United Provinces of Agra and Oudh.</i>		
104	Officers, senior grade -	300	18,360 13 6	104	Officers - - -	"	25,640 14 2
	" 1st grade -	200					
	" 2nd grade -	165					
	" 3rd grade -	135					
	<i>Punjab.</i>				<i>Punjab.</i>		
99	Officers, senior grade -	300	16,047 3 7	99	Officers - - -	"	24,741 14 1
	" 1st grade -	200					
	" 2nd grade -	150					
	" 3rd grade -	100					
	<i>Burma.</i>				<i>Burma.</i>		
40	Officers - - -	200-10-450	12,187 12 10	40	Officers - - -	200-40/3-400-50/3-450 (150 during probation).	10,725 7 0
	<i>Bihar and Orissa.</i>				<i>Bihar and Orissa.</i>		
62	Officers, senior grade -	350	12,724 13 10	62	Officers - - -	150-40/3-350-50/3-400 (100 during probation).	15,719 15 7
	" " " -	325					
	" junior grade -	100-10/2-110-10-300.					
	<i>Central Provinces and Berar.</i>				<i>Central Provinces and Berar.</i>		
31	Officers, senior grade -	300	5,066 9 1	31	Officers - - -	"	7,309 9 10
	" 1st grade -	200					
	" 2nd grade -	150					
	" 3rd grade -	100					
	<i>Assam.</i>				<i>Assam.</i>		
31	Officers, senior grade -	350	6,423 10 6	31	Officers - - -	"	7,859 15 10
	" " " -	325					
	" junior grade -	100-10/2-110-10-300.					
723	Total - - -		1,34,220 0 4	723	Total - - -		1,83,356 10 11

ANNEXURE XII.—MEDICAL SERVICES—(continued).

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
	<b>MILITARY ASSISTANT SURGEONS.</b>				<b>LOCAL CIVIL MEDICAL SERVICES—</b>		
	<i>Madras.</i>				<b>MILITARY BRANCHES.</b>		
21	Officers - - -	Rs. Senior grade with honorary rank of captain, 450.	Rs. A. P. 4,716 7 7	21	Officers - - -	Rs. 150-40/3-350-50/3-400.	Rs. A. P. 6,518 15 2
22	<i>Bombay.</i>			22	<i>Bombay.</i>		
22	Officers - - -	Senior grade with honorary rank of lieutenant, 350.	4,810 9 0	22	Officers - - -	"	6,841 7 10
13	<i>Bengal.</i>			13	<i>Bengal.</i>		
13	Officers - - -	Senior grade with honorary rank of lieutenant, 350.	2,816 5 1	13	Officers - - -	"	3,146 9 9
13	<i>United Provinces of Agra and Oudh.</i>			13	<i>United Provinces of Agra and Oudh.</i>		
13	Officers - - -	1st class after 17 years' service, 250.	2,442 2 6	13	Officers - - -	"	2,911 15 5
7	<i>Punjab.</i>			7	<i>Punjab.</i>		
7	Officers - - -	2nd class after 12 years' service, 200.	1,293 6 6	7	Officers - - -	"	1,555 1 10
9	<i>Burma.</i>			9	<i>Burma.</i>		
9	Officers - - -	3rd class after 7 years' service, 150.	1,560 6 3 780 3 2	9	Officers - - -	200-40/3-400-50/3-450.	2,301 7 1
8	<i>Central Provinces and Berar.</i>			8	<i>Central Provinces and Berar.</i>		
8	Officers - - -	4th class under 7 years' service, 100.	1,508 4 3	8	Officers - - -	150-40/3-350-50/3-400.	1,985 8 4
5	<i>Assam.</i>			5	<i>Assam.</i>		
5	Officers - - -		969 0 2	5	Officers - - -	"	1,271 4 7
98	Total - - -		20,896 12 6	98	Total - - -		26,532 6 0
821	Grand total - - -		1,55,116 12 10	821	Grand total - - -		2,09,889 0 11
					Deduct present cost - - -		1,55,116 12 10
					Net increased expenditure per mensem		54,722 4 1
					" " per annum		6,57,267 1 0

## ANNEXURE XII.—MEDICAL SERVICES—(continued).

## SCHEDULE III.

*Professorships, chemical examinerships, and alienist appointments.*

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
	OFFICERS BELONGING TO THE INDIAN MEDICAL SERVICE.	Rs.	Rs. A. P.		OFFICERS BELONGING TO THE INDIAN MEDICAL SERVICE.	Rs.	Rs. A. P.
33	Professors of medical colleges (including principals).	750-1,650*	38,059 13 3	45	To officers in this group it has been proposed in paragraph 38 of the annexure to grant temporary allowances, which will not exceed in the aggregate 12½ per cent. of their present emoluments. The cost involved will be as follows :— Present emoluments - 55,846 7 1 Temporary allowances at 12½ per cent. in the aggregate. 6,980 12 11 62,827 4 0	62,827 4 0	62,827 4 0
6	Chemical examiners -	800-1,650*	7,859 1 0				
6	Superintendents of lunatic asylums.	350-1,000* + staff pay 300-550.	6,642 7 6				
	Exchange compensation allowance.	—	3,285 1 4				
	5 allowances to principals of medical colleges.	150	750 0 0				
45	Total—officers belonging to the Indian medical service - }		56,596 7 1	45	Total—officers belonging to the Indian medical service }		63,577 4 -
	OFFICERS NOT BELONGING TO THE INDIAN MEDICAL SERVICE.				OFFICERS NOT BELONGING TO THE INDIAN MEDICAL SERVICE.		
2	Professors of anatomy (Bombay and Calcutta).	700-100/3-1,200.	1,832 15 10	5	No change has been proposed in the scales of pay of these officers. Their salaries will be reconsidered when the salaries of Indian medical service officers are fixed at the conclusion of the war.	—	4,28 5 3
1	Professor of anatomy (Lucknow).	350-30-500	450 0 0				
1	Professor of physiology (Lahore).	700	700 0 0				
1	Chemical examiner -	800-70-1,500	1,302 5 5				
5	Total—officers not belonging to the Indian medical service - }		4,285 5 3	5	Total—officers not belonging to the Indian medical service - }		4,285 5 3
50†	Grand total - - -		60,881 12 4	50	Grand total - - -		67,862 9 3
					Deduct present cost - - -		60,881 12 4
					Net extra expenditure per mensem		6,980 12 11
					" " " annum		83,769 11 0

\* The pay of officers of the Indian medical service in the various appointments depends on their military rank. For details see volume XII., appendix VI.

† Exclusive of the leave reserve.

ANNEXURE XII.—MEDICAL SERVICES—(continued).

SCHEDULE IV.  
Bacteriological department.

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
		Rs.	Rs. A. P.			Rs.	Rs. A. P.
27	Officers - - -	350-1,000* + staff pay 300-600.	30,486 3 9	27	To officers of this department who belong to the Indian medical service it has been proposed in paragraph 41 of the annexure to grant temporary allowances, which will not exceed in the aggregate 12½ per cent. of their present emoluments. The cost involved will be as follows :— Present emoluments - Temporary allowances at 12½ per cent. in the aggregate.  The salaries of officers who do not belong to the Indian medical service will be fixed at the conclusion of the war.		
	Exchange compensation allowance.	—	1,905 6 3			32,391 10 0 4,048 15 3 36,440 9 3	36,440 9 3
27†	Total - - -		32,391 10 0				
					Total - - -		36,440 9 3
					Deduct present cost - - -		32,391 10 0
					Net extra expenditure per mensem		4,048 15 3
					" " " annum		48,587 7 0

\* The pay of officers of the Indian medical service depends on their military rank. For details see volume XII., appendix VI.  
† Inclusive of the leave reserve.

## ANNEXURE XII.—MEDICAL SERVICES—(continued).

SCHEDULE V.  
Sanitary department (including plague appointments).

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
	<b>ADMINISTRATIVE APPOINTMENTS.</b>				<b>ADMINISTRATIVE APPOINTMENTS.</b>		
1	Sanitary commissioner with the Government of India.	Rs. 2,000-100-2,500.	Rs. 2,333 5 4	1	Sanitary commissioner with the Government of India.	Rs. 2,500-100-3,000.†	Rs. 2,833 5 4
7	Sanitary commissioners (Madras, Bombay, Bengal, United Provinces, Punjab, Burma, and Bihar and Orissa).	1,500-60-1,800.	11,900 0 0	7	Sanitary commissioners (Madras, Bombay, Bengal, United Provinces, Punjab, Burma, and Bihar and Orissa).	1,750-100-2,250.†	14,533 5 4
1	Sanitary commissioner (Central Provinces). Exchange compensation allowance.	1,250-50-1,750.	1,555 8 11 986 12 11	1	Sanitary commissioner (Central Provinces).	1,750-50-2,000.†	1,916 10 8
9	Total—administrative appointments - - -		16,775 11 2	9	Total—administrative appointments - - -		19,333 5 4
	<b>OTHER OFFICERS BELONGING TO THE INDIAN MEDICAL SERVICE.*</b>				<b>OTHER OFFICERS BELONGING TO THE INDIAN MEDICAL SERVICE.</b>		
20	Deputy sanitary commissioners.	500-1,400 + staff pay, 200.	20,869 12 8	<p>(To officers in this group it has been proposed in paragraph 46 of the annexure to grant temporary allowances, which will not exceed in the aggregate 12½ per cent. of their present emoluments. The cost involved will be as follows:—</p> <p>Present emoluments. 47,031 10 0</p> <p>Temporary allowances at 12½ per cent. in the aggregate. 5,878 15 3</p> <p>52,910 9 3</p>			52,910 9 3
2	Port Health officers (Bombay and Aden).	850-1,450	2,205 0 4				
1	Health officer (Simla) -	500-1,400	1,052 8 2				
20	Officers on plague duty	700-1,450	19,035 15 0				
1	Assistant director, Indian medical service (sanitary). Exchange compensation allowance.	850-1,000 + staff pay, 500.	1,101 12 9 2,766 9 1				
44	Total—other officers belonging to the Indian medical service }		47,031 10 0	44	Total—other officers belonging to the Indian medical service }		52,910 9 3
	<b>OTHER OFFICERS NOT BELONGING TO THE INDIAN MEDICAL SERVICE.</b>				<b>OTHER OFFICERS NOT BELONGING TO THE INDIAN MEDICAL SERVICE.</b>		
12	Deputy sanitary commissioners.	500-100/2-600-100/3-700-100/4, 1,000.	9,497 1 0	<p>(No change has been proposed in the scales of pay of these officers. Their salaries will be reconsidered when the salaries of Indian medical service officers are fixed at the conclusion of the war.)</p>			11,866 6 5
1	Port health officer (Calcutta).	1,200	1,200 0 0				
1	Director, vaccine institute (Belgaum).	750-50-1,100-125-1,350.	1,169 5 5				
14	Total—other officers not belonging to the Indian medical service - - -		11,866 6 5	14	Total—other officers not belonging to the Indian medical service - - -		11,866 6 5
67†	Grand total - - -		75,673 11 7	67	Grand total - - -		84,110 5 0
					Deduct present cost - - -		75,673 11 7
					Net extra expenditure per mensem -		8,436 9 5
					" " per annum -		1,01,239 1 0

\* The pay of officers of the Indian medical service in the various appointments depends on their military rank. For details, see volume XII, appendix VI.

† Not entitled to exchange compensation allowance.

‡ Exclusive of the leave reserve.

## ANNEXURE XII.—MEDICAL SERVICES—(continued).

SCHEDULE VI.  
Jail department.

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
	<b>ADMINISTRATIVE APPOINTMENTS.</b>	Rs.	Rs. A. P.		<b>ADMINISTRATIVE APPOINTMENTS.</b>	Rs.	Rs. A. P.
5	Inspectors-general of prisons (Madras, Bombay, Bengal, United Provinces, and Burma).	1,800-50-2,000.	9,733 5 4	7	Inspectors-general of prisons (Madras, Bombay, Bengal, United Provinces, Punjab, Burma, and Bihar and Orissa).	2,000-50-2,250†	15,166 10 8
2	Inspectors-general of prisons (Punjab and Bihar and Orissa).	1,800	3,600 0 0				
1	Inspector-general of prisons (Central Provinces).	1,500	1,500 0 0	1	Inspector-general of prisons (Central Provinces).	1,750-50-2,000†	1,916 10 8
	Exchange compensation allowance.	—	927 1 4				
8	Total—administrative appointments—	ap- }	15,760 6 8	8	Total—administrative appointments—	ap- }	17,083 5 4
	<b>OTHER OFFICERS BELONGING TO THE INDIAN MEDICAL SERVICE.</b>				<b>OTHER OFFICERS BELONGING TO THE INDIAN MEDICAL SERVICE.</b>		
27	Superintendents of 1st class central jails.	*650-1,550	26,824 3 6	<p>To officers in this group it has been proposed in paragraph 50 of the annexure to grant temporary allowances, which will not exceed in the aggregate 12½ per cent. of their present emoluments. The cost involved will be as follows :—</p> <p>Present emoluments - 30,863 6 11</p> <p>Temporary allowances at 12½ per cent. in the aggregate. 3,857 14 10</p> <p>34,721 5 9.</p>			
3	Superintendents of 2nd class central jails.	*550-1,450	2,223 11 6				
	Exchange compensation allowance.	—	1,815 7 11				
30	Total—other officers belonging to the Indian medical service		30,863 6 11				
	<b>OTHER OFFICERS NOT BELONGING TO THE INDIAN MEDICAL SERVICE.</b>				<b>OTHER OFFICERS NOT BELONGING TO THE INDIAN MEDICAL SERVICE.</b>		
3	Superintendents of 1st class central jails.	600-50-1,000	2,560 0 0	<p>No change has been proposed in the scales of pay of these officers. Their salaries will be reconsidered when the salaries of Indian medical service officers are fixed at the conclusion of the war.</p>			
1	Superintendent of 2nd class central jail.	550-50-700	670 0 0				
1	" " "	450-30-600	550 0 0				
2	Superintendents of district jails.	350-20-450	1,250 0 0				
8	Total—other officers not belonging to the Indian medical service		5,030 0 0	8	Total—other officers not belonging to the Indian medical service		5,030 0 0
46†	Grand total -	-	51,653 13 7	46	Grand total -	-	56,834 11 1
					Deduct present cost -	-	51,653 13 7
					Net extra expenditure per mensem		5,180 13 6
					" " " annum		62,170 2 0

\* The pay of officers of the Indian medical service depends on their military rank. For details, see volume XII., appendix VI.

† Not entitled to exchange compensation allowance.

‡ Exclusive of the leave reserve.

## ANNEXURE XII.—MEDICAL SERVICES—(continued).

## SCHEDULE VII.

EXTRACT FROM A MEMORANDUM DATED THE 8TH APRIL 1915, PREPARED BY THE  
DIRECTOR-GENERAL, INDIAN MEDICAL SERVICE.

1. Under present arrangements the number of officers in civil employ, whom we are bound to surrender on mobilisation, is 337. Up to date 286 officers have been surrendered and 15 are awaiting orders to proceed at a moment's notice should their services be required. When the services of the last-mentioned have been utilised, we shall still be able to give another 36 officers if called upon to do so.

2. Immediately on receipt of orders from England to take the preparatory steps under the Defence Scheme, general instructions were issued to all officers liable to recall, and the 286 officers mentioned above have been surrendered as follows :—

1st call 8th of August 1914	-	-	-	-	-	-	32 officers.
2nd „ 10th of August 1914	-	-	-	-	-	-	37 „
3rd „ 8th of September 1914	-	-	-	-	-	-	17 „
4th „ 14th of September 1914	-	-	-	-	-	-	46 „
5th „ 21st of September 1914	-	-	-	-	-	-	9 „
6th „ 29th of September 1914	-	-	-	-	-	-	8 „
7th „ 8th of October 1914	-	-	-	-	-	-	6 „
8th „ 14th of October 1914	-	-	-	-	-	-	16 „
9th „ 19th of October 1914	-	-	-	-	-	-	44 „
10th „ 24th of October 1914	-	-	-	-	-	-	4 „
11th „ 13th of November 1914	-	-	-	-	-	-	46 „
12th „ 30th of November 1914	-	-	-	-	-	-	10 „
13th „ 3rd of March 1915	-	-	-	-	-	-	11 „
Total	-	-	-	-	-	-	286 „

Of these 286 officers reverted to military duty, 14 were Indians.

The positions held by these 286 officers were as follows :—

Civil surgeons	-	-	-	-	-	-	188
Officers serving under the foreign department	-	-	-	-	-	-	28
Officers on plague duty	-	-	-	-	-	-	15
Superintendents of central jails	-	-	-	-	-	-	17
Officers in charge of lunatic asylums	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
Professorial appointments	-	-	-	-	-	-	8
Bacteriological department (research work)	-	-	-	-	-	-	13
Miscellaneous appointments	-	-	-	-	-	-	15
Total	-	-	-	-	-	-	286

3. The surrender of Indian medical service officers in the various presidencies and provinces has been effected smoothly, and has not led to any serious dislocation of work. The appointments rendered vacant have been filled as follows :—

(1) By recall of officers from leave	-	-	-	-	-	-	73
(2) By recall to duty of officers retired under the age of 55	-	-	-	-	-	-	5
(3) By employment of retired officers volunteering for service	-	-	-	-	-	-	12
(4) By promotion of civil assistant surgeons	-	-	-	-	-	-	76
(5) By promotion of military assistant surgeons	-	-	-	-	-	-	13
(6) By re-employment of retired provincial medical officers	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
(7) By employment of retired military assistant surgeons	-	-	-	-	-	-	5
(8) By employment of medical missionaries	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
(9) By employment of private medical practitioners or uncovenanted medical officers	-	-	-	-	-	-	15
(10) By employment of non-medical officers	-	-	-	-	-	-	13
(11) By appointing civil surgeons to be in visiting charge of neighbouring districts	-	-	-	-	-	-	31
(12) By placing civil surgeoncies in collateral charge of officers in military employ	-	-	-	-	-	-	11
Total	-	-	-	-	-	-	261

This leaves 25 appointments still to be accounted for. After deducting 9 appointments filled by supernumerary officers who had been given to the civil department to fill appointments rendered vacant by the grant of leave in excess of the authorised 20 per cent., the balance of 16 appointments refers to officers of the bacteriological department employed on deputation in research work and to officers filling various miscellaneous appointments, such as mint masters, &c. These appointments, of course, have not been filled up.

As regards the superintendentships of central jails, the administrative charge of these has been made over either to members of the Indian civil service or police officers, or to retired military assistant surgeons and uncovenanted medical officers who, whilst on the active list, had been in charge of district jails. In every case in which a non-medical man has been placed in administrative charge of a central jail, the civil surgeon of the station has taken over the medical duties as a collateral charge.

Great care has been taken to prevent any interference with the teaching in the various medical colleges, and on that account only eight officers holding professorial appointments have been recalled to military duty, as follows, and in every instance temporary arrangements have been made for filling the vacant chair.

## ANNEXURE XII.—MEDICAL SERVICES—(continued).

*Lahore medical college.*

- (i) Lieutenant-Colonel Hugo, professor of surgery, replaced by Captain Bott, who had previously officiated for him.
- (ii) Lieutenant-Colonel Heard, professor of midwifery, replaced by Lieutenant-Colonel Davidson, civil surgeon, holding professorship as collateral charge.

*Madras medical college.*

- (i) Lieutenant-Colonel Giffard, professor of midwifery, relieved by Major Hingston, who had acted as his assistant professor.
- (ii) Major Symons, professor of anatomy, relieved by Major Chalmers.
- (iii) Captain Bradfield, professor of biology, relieved by Major Niblock, professor of surgery as collateral charge.

*Calcutta medical college.*

- (i) Lieutenant-Colonel Stevens, professor of operative surgery, relieved by Major Wilson, principal Campbell medical school, as collateral charge.

*Bombay medical college.*

- (i) Major Carter, professor of pathology.
- (ii) Major Novis, professor of operative surgery.

These two officers have only recently been surrendered, and the arrangements for their relief have not yet been communicated to the Government of India.

*Lucknow medical college.*

No professor has been taken from the Lucknow medical college.

4. In addition to the surrender of Indian medical service officers, we have reverted to military duty 113 military assistant surgeons, and 122 are still available, should their services be required.

## MINUTE BY MR. M. B. CHAUBAL.

The civil medical services stand in volume and importance next to the Indian and provincial civil services, and second in the five principal services out of the twenty-four inquired into (*vide* paragraph 2 of the report). The Indian medical service portion of these medical services stands to the rest of it as in some of the other departments the imperial service stands to the provincial. But while in the other services it is possible to suggest and carry out proposals for a larger employment of the indigenous agency, the peculiar constitution of this service and the existing arrangement for the employment of its members in civil employ during peace time, make it virtually impossible to suggest ways and means for increasing the proportion of Indians in the higher civil medical service, or indeed of putting the civil medical administration of the country on any permanent basis by divorcing it from the military requirements of the country.

2. The annexure more or less assumes that the recruitment for the Indian medical service is solely dependent on military requirements, and it is said that “the annual rate of recruitment is settled by the military authorities for the whole service, and does not concern us.” I doubt how far this will stand investigation, but it appears to me obvious that the volume of this service has grown more owing to the posts held by members of the service in civil medical employ than on account of the requirements of the army. The actual strength of the Indian medical service at the present day is 772, of whom 475, or 62 per cent., are engaged on civil duties, and 297 only, or 38 per cent., are working with the army. The rate of annual recruitment must be calculated upon the decremental rate of the total 772, and not upon the 297. At the same time by its present organisation the whole 772 is a war reserve, and liable to be called away from civil duties in time of war. The recommendation in the annexure proposes practically to shelve the question to a subsequent investigation after the close of the present war, at which an estimate is to be made of the war reserve on the military requirements in time of war; and this war reserve is to be drawn upon first for all appointments in civil employ, and it is only when no Indian medical service officer is available for a civil medical post that direct civil recruitment is to be resorted to.

3. I am reluctantly obliged to differ from this recommendation. There is no doubt that the argument of economy is in favour of the present arrangement; at the same time I cannot contemplate with equanimity this arrangement, under which the civil medical administration is perpetually to be dependent on military requirements. I am almost sure that in any investigation of the kind proposed, the dimensions of a war reserve in time of war will be fixed on the proportions of a huge war, and based upon the scene of the war being nearer India. Even now it is said that if the whole of the Indian army were in action, then every Indian medical service officer in civil employ would be requisitioned, and I do not see any chance of the investigation fixing the war reserve at anything substantially less than its present strength. I feel almost certain that it will not be possible to carry out the recommendation that posts in the kindred departments which are purely of a scientific and educational character should in future be open to civil recruitment, for if these posts are excluded it will be impossible to accommodate the war reserve in time of peace.

4. The experience of the present war so far is enough to satisfy anyone that even without the whole of the Indian army being engaged in war, there is enough serious dislocation of the entire civil medical administration, and if the war continues much longer still further dislocation may be expected, for, up to the end of March 1915, not less than 286 men in civil employ had been surrendered. It will be seen from the director-general's report that practically all civil surgeons who are the chief district medical officers have been recalled (188); officers on plague duty, 15 out of 20; central jail officers, 17 out of 30; lunatic asylum officers, 2 out of 6; professors, 8 out of 33; research work officers, 13 out of 27; and others holding miscellaneous appointments and appointments under the foreign department have had to be surrendered so far.

5. It is, I think, idle to contend that, with so many trained officers suddenly called away and their places filled in from a promiscuous and motley group of all descriptions, there should be no serious dislocation of work. It is, therefore, in my opinion, necessary that the organisation of this higher medical service should be put on some permanent and reasonable basis. Of course, the cost of both the military and the civil administration is borne by the revenues of the country, and economy must be practised in the interests of the latter, so far as it can be, consistently with other interests.

6. I would recommend that one-third, or roughly, 200 out of the whole war reserve, should be utilised in peace time by the civil administration in the present superior posts; and the remaining two-thirds should be open to civil recruitment. These higher posts in the civil administration should be filled by medical men of the highest qualifications, European and Indian. Certain high degrees conferred in the United Kingdom, like M.D. and F.R.C.S., should be recognised as a proper qualification for the service, or there may be instituted an examination like that for the Indian medical service, but for recruitment only to the Indian civil medical service. A certain proportion (one-fourth of the whole service) should be filled by promotion from the provincial branch of the assistant civil surgeons.

7. I must not be taken as necessarily claiming any fixity for the number 200 that I have proposed above. The principle is, that it should be a number fixed once for all with a reasonable regard to all the interests involved. I consider one-third to be reasonable, but the principle involved would be equally recognised if you made the proportions half and half.

8. *Paragraph 11.*—If there is no change adopted on the lines proposed by me, and the present arrangement of giving only a one-twelfth to recruitment from indigenous medical men is to continue, I am distinctly of opinion that the proportion should be increased. The disproportion at present is very unfair and inadequate. The total of the subordinate medical service posts is 821, out of which 723 are civil assistant surgeons, and 98 military assistant surgeons. At present there are 93 civil surgeoncies open to both these classes and the uncovenanted officers. 32 civil surgeoncies are open to the 713 civil assistant surgeons, 46 to the 98 military assistant surgeons, and 15 are at present held by uncovenanted officers. The last are stated to be in a moribund condition, and on their retirement it is proposed in the annexure that there should be 62 civil surgeoncies open to the civil assistant surgeons, and 31 to the

## ANNEXURE XII.—MEDICAL SERVICES—(continued).

military. I think the least fair proportion would be a one-fourth for the latter, and I would increase the number of civil surgeoncies open to the two classes to 100 (i.e., 7 more), and give 75 out of these to the civil assistants and 25 to the military assistants.

9. *Paragraph 19.*—I do not agree to the recommendation proposing definite increase of emoluments for the higher administrative posts. Surely the recruitment for this service is not suffering because the salaries attached to these higher posts are insufficient or inadequate. I also disagree with the recommendation for temporary allowances of  $12\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. for every officer in the service. In my opinion the original character of this service should not be lost sight of, nor the reason why they have to be employed on the civil side. They are mainly a military service, and it may be conceded that their remuneration should have some relation to the scale of salaries prevalent in the army. The civil medical administration ought not to cost more to the state than if the state recruited these posts from the open market. They ought to get their staff pay and perhaps something more. If a subsequent investigation is recommended, then I think it is not necessary for this Commission to make any recommendation whatever. The committee engaged on that investigation will be able to consider the new set of values that are expected to prevail for medical knowledge after the war, and a state of things which has continued so many years may well continue for a year or so more without appreciable hardship. It may be noticed that the net additional cost for the Indian medical service officers in civil employ is under the recommendations calculated to be at least about Rs. 600,000 to Rs. 700,000.

10. *Paragraph 33.*—I do not agree with the recommendation to reserve the clinical chairs to any service. Though the annexure reserves these chairs to officers of the civil medical services generally, I feel sure that in practice they will continue, as hitherto, the monopoly of the Indian medical service, and I do not desire that the interests of medical education in India should in any way be suspected to be sacrificed to the interests of any service. If a civil medical officer is the fittest man for a chair, he will be naturally selected, but I am against reserving it for any special body of officers whatever.



M. B. CHAUBAL.

## ANNEXURE XIII.

### Indian Mines Department.

(The evidence relating to this department will be found in volume XVIII.)

#### CHAPTER I.

##### INTRODUCTORY.

1. The present mines department, which now contains five officers, first came into prominence with the passing of the mines act of 1901. The duties of the staff are generally to administer the mines act, and also to advise, first, as to the restrictions which should be imposed on the working of mines, and, secondly, on mining education. The chief inspector is also chairman of the mining educational advisory board and is on the board of governors of the Sibpur college.

#### CHAPTER II.

##### ORGANISATION.

2. *Existing organisation approved.*—The department is under the direct control of the Government of India in the commerce and industry department. The duties are all such as should be performed by officers of one class and there is no division of the service into imperial and provincial branches. This arrangement is suitable and should be continued.

#### CHAPTER III.

##### METHODS OF RECRUITMENT.

3. *Place of appointment. Creation in India of facilities for instruction in mining recommended.*—Hitherto there have been nine officers, all Europeans, who have been connected with the department, of whom one, the first chief inspector, was recruited from the geological survey of India, in which department he was a mining expert. The second and third chief inspectors were H.M. inspector and H.M. assistant inspector of mines in England respectively, and have since returned to England. The present and fourth holder of the office of chief inspector of mines in India was previously an inspector of mines in India, and before that was one of H.M. assistant inspectors of mines in England. One inspector, who was originally one of H.M. assistant inspectors of mines in England, has retired. Of the present three inspectors one was recruited from the geological survey of India, in which department he was a mining expert, and the two others were in the employ of railway companies in India as mining engineers. The present junior inspector was selected in England after advertisement from amongst suitably qualified candidates. All the officers up to date have thus been taken either directly or indirectly from Europe. For the work of inspecting mines technical qualifications are needed, and facilities for obtaining these do not as yet exist in India to the extent that prevails in Europe. At the same time we feel that there are no grounds of policy for regarding this as a permanent feature of the department. We recommend accordingly that recruitment should continue to be allowed in Europe or from amongst Europeans in India who are not statutory natives of India, but only if the Government of India are satisfied that no statutory native of India with the prescribed qualifications can be found in India. We also urge the importance of improving the instructional facilities in India. It was stated before us that many of the Indian mine managers were not certificated and had had no training except that which they had gained by growing up with the industry. We were also told that a committee was about to assemble to consider the whole question of mining education, and that the idea was to found a new school of mines in the coal fields. The value of this from the point of view of producing in India a supply from which the inspecting staff could be recruited would be great, and we recommend that this consideration be taken into account in deciding the larger educational question. When such a school has been developed and brought up to the standard of those in Europe we contemplate that the qualifications prescribed for recruits to the service will be such as can be obtained by young men in India without going to Europe.

## ANNEXURE XIII.—INDIAN MINES DEPARTMENT—(continued).

4. *Limitations in the employment of non-Europeans.*—As already stated all the officers of the department are Europeans from Europe. No statutory native of India, whether an Indian or an Anglo-Indian, is employed on the staff. We have attempted to remedy this by the recommendation made in the preceding paragraph that preference shall be given in future to candidates from India who are statutory natives of India and have the prescribed qualifications. In a technical department containing only five officers it is not practicable to go further, particularly in view of the fact that 25 per cent. of the mine managers are Europeans and that the mines under their charge produce about 75 per cent. of the total output. The fact, however, remains that there is a considerable Indian element amongst the mine managers, and, as mining spreads, it may be anticipated that more and more such talent will be employed in its development. Indian inspectors, if properly qualified, should not, therefore, be regarded as unsuitable for employment in the department, and every effort should be made to utilise their services.

5. *Procedure to be adopted in selecting recruits.*—Hitherto all the recruits have been directly appointed. This is suitable as there is no qualified subordinate service from which promotions can be made. The men taken have also until recently been fully experienced officers of some age at the time of their appointment. This system of selection is not inappropriate when a department is being newly started, but it produces difficulties with regard to conditions of service, salary, and pension if it becomes the regular rule. This has now been recognised, and, whilst our inquiry was in progress, sanction was accorded to a scheme under which recruits would be got who were between the ages of 25 and 30, and who possessed qualifications similar to those required in the United Kingdom. There every candidate must hold a first class certificate under the coal mines regulation act, and must within five years previous to his application have been employed for two years as manager or under-manager of a coal mine, or in some other responsible capacity necessitating regular attendance underground in a coal mine. We endorse this alteration of practice. We also suggest that all vacancies should be advertised. Finally we recommend that appointments in England should be made with the advice of a committee of five persons, who should include two representatives of the India Office, a representative of the institute of mining engineers, a member of the Indian mines department whose connection with India has not been severed for more than five years, and an Indian in touch with the Indian students in the United Kingdom. In the case of appointments in India the advice of the chief inspector of mines should for the present be taken, but as soon as a school of mining has been instituted one of the instructors should act with the chief inspector. This opportunity should also be taken to associate Indian experience in the task of selection.

## CHAPTER IV.

## SYSTEMS OF PROBATION AND TRAINING.

6. *Probation.*—Officers recruited from England have all to pass through a period of probation in India before being confirmed in their appointments. This period has varied in length, but in the most recent case was two years. This appears to us to be suitable. A similar period of probation should be passed by officers recruited in India.

7. *Training.*—The question of training presents no difficulties. All the officers now in the department are qualified mining engineers, and hold first class certificates as colliery managers under the English coal mines regulation act of 1887, and are therefore experts. The recruits under the new system will also have all the necessary initial qualifications and will acquire their practical experience of Indian conditions whilst working as junior inspectors or officiating in leave or other vacancies as inspectors. We approve this arrangement.

## CHAPTER V.

## CONDITIONS OF SALARY.

8. *Rates of salary.*—Several of the officers now in the department draw personal rates of pay, but the standard scale, which we have adopted as the present scale for purposes of formal comparison, is Rs. 500-40-700 a month for junior inspectors, Rs. 800-100-1,000 a month for inspectors, and Rs. 1,750-50-2,000 a month for the chief

## ANNEXURE XIII.—INDIAN MINES DEPARTMENT—(continued).

inspector. An incremental system is thus in force and should be maintained. The present rates have been framed to secure the services of officers from Europe. In view of the fact that the service is one which will eventually come to be recruited normally in India, we think that the standard scale should be assessed on the basis of recruitment in that country, and that officers who are obtained from Europe, whether statutory natives of India or not, should be paid such rates in excess of the normal scale as may be necessary. We think that when junior inspectors are forthcoming in India they will suitably be remunerated at rates of Rs. 300–40–500 a month, and that when they rise to be inspectors they should receive Rs. 550–50–1,050 a month. For officers, on the other hand, who are recruited in Europe the scales should be Rs. 500–40–700 and Rs. 750–50–1,250 a month respectively. No change is needed in the scale now authorised for the chief inspector, and it should apply equally to all officers whether recruited in Europe or in India, and whether statutory natives of India or not. The claims of the present inspectors and chief inspector, who were recruited on terms appropriate to each case, and none of whom came in as junior inspectors in the manner now intended, should be treated on their merits. It may be that all or some of them deserve consideration, but this is a matter on which we are not in a position to advise, as we have not attempted to appraise the justice of individual demands. Assuming that the department is recruited entirely in India, the saving on the present standard scale will be approximately Rs. 6,277 a year, as set out in the following table :—

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
1	Chief inspector of mines -	Rs. 1,750-50-2,000.	Rs. 1,916 10 8	1	Chief inspector of mines -	Rs. 1,750-50-2,000.	Rs. 1,916 10 8
3	Inspectors of mines - -	800-100-1,000.	2,920 0 0	3	Inspectors of mines - -	550-50-1,050.	2,596 15 4
1	Junior inspector of mines -	500-40-700.	633 5 4	1	Junior inspector of mines -	300-40-500.	433 5 4
5	Total - - -	- - -	5,470 0 0	5	Total - - -	- - -	4,946 15 4
					Present cost - - -	- - -	5,470 0 0
					Net savings per mensem - -	- -	523 0 8
					" " per annum - -	- -	6,276 8 0

## CHAPTER VI.

## CONDITIONS OF SERVICE.

9. *Strength of the cadre.*—The post of junior inspector has only recently been added to the cadre, and there has not yet been time to show whether this will give the necessary relief to the existing officers. This should be watched, and, as mining develops, no hesitation should be felt in adding to the inspecting staff. It would be false economy to allow abuses to take root for want of inspectors to insist from the outset on the maintenance of a high standard.

10. *Leave and deputation reserves. Annual rate of recruitment.*—The department is too small to carry a percentage of reserve officers for leave and deputation and none need be provided. The new junior inspector will be available for these purposes. He will also be acquiring practical experience of Indian conditions and will to this extent be under training. If this provision is not found in practice to be adequate more such posts should be created. No annual rate of recruitment can be calculated. Officers should be selected as vacancies occur.

## CHAPTER VII.

## CONDITIONS OF LEAVE.

11. *Leave rules.*—All existing officers are under the European service leave rules. This is suitable. For the future all the officers who, when they enter the service, draw

## ANNEXURE XIII.—INDIAN MINES DEPARTMENT—(continued).

salary at the higher rates proposed in paragraph 8 above, should come under the European service leave rules. Other officers should come under the Indian service leave rules and should continue under them throughout their careers.

## CHAPTER VIII.

## CONDITIONS OF PENSION.

12. *Pension rules.*—The general rules as to pension should apply to this department. The post of chief inspector should be ranked as one entitling its holder to a special additional pension. Members of the department should be permitted, subject to the general provisos in cases of this nature, to reckon as service qualifying for superannuation pension the number of completed years by which their age at the time of appointment exceeded 25 years.

## CHAPTER IX.

## SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS.

13. The changes which we have recommended in the Indian mines department are as follows:—

- (i) Recruitment should be made in Europe, or from amongst Europeans in India, who are not statutory natives of India, only if the Government of India are satisfied that no statutory native of India with the prescribed qualifications can be found in India (paragraph 3).
- (ii) Facilities for instruction in mining should be developed in India, and every effort should be made to utilise the services of Indian inspectors (paragraphs 3 and 4).
- (iii) All vacancies should be advertised (paragraph 5).
- (iv) Appointments should be made with the advice of a committee in Europe, and the same procedure should be followed in India so soon as circumstances permit (paragraph 5).
- (v) Officers should be on probation for two years (paragraph 6).
- (vi) Different rates of salary should be paid to junior inspectors and inspectors who are and who are not recruited in India respectively, and at the rates stated. The pay fixed for the chief inspector should be drawn in full by all officers wherever recruited (paragraph 8).
- (vii) The officers who when they enter the service draw salary at the higher rates should be under the European service leave rules. The others should be under Indian service leave rules and should continue under them throughout their careers (paragraph 11).
- (viii) The chief inspector's post should carry a special additional pension (paragraph 12).
- (ix) Members of the department, subject to the general provisos, should be permitted to reckon as service qualifying for superannuation pension the number of completed years by which their age at the time of appointment exceeded 25 (paragraph 12).

## ANNEXURE XIV.

### Mint and Assay Departments.

(The evidence relating to these departments will be found in volume XIV.)

#### CHAPTER I.

##### INTRODUCTORY.

1. There are two mints in India, one in Calcutta and the other in Bombay. The Calcutta mint undertakes the minting of silver and bronze for the Government of India and occasionally of silver and copper for other Governments. It is also engaged on a great variety of miscellaneous work in connection with the striking of medals and orders, and the preparation of stamps, weights and measures, both for Government departments and for the general public. The Bombay mint, in addition to the minting of silver and nickel for the Government of India and for other Governments, is responsible for the minting of a large amount of silver into British dollars for various banks. It has other duties of a miscellaneous character to perform, but these are of less importance than the work of the same kind carried out in the Calcutta mint. When in full working order the Calcutta mint employs about 1500 men in all, and the Bombay mint about 1000.\*

#### CHAPTER II.

##### ORGANISATION.

2. *Existing organisation approved.*—Each mint consists of two departments, the mechanical department or mint proper and the assay department. In the mint department there are three gazetted officers, namely, two mint masters and a deputy mint master who is available for duty either in Calcutta or in Bombay. In the assay department there are four gazetted officers, namely, two assay masters and two deputy assay masters. In neither department is there any division into imperial and provincial services. We recommend no change of organisation.

#### CHAPTER III.

##### METHODS OF RECRUITMENT.

3. *Procedure to be adopted in selecting officers for the mint department.*—Mint officers are selected from the corps of Royal engineers. The posts are not definitely reserved for officers of the corps, but it is considered by the Government of India that a Royal engineer's training makes him especially suitable for the work and responsibilities of a mint officer.† We accept this view, but at the same time point out that the qualifications required for the posts are not necessarily peculiar to Royal engineer officers. The field of selection should be definitely extended so as to include not only Royal engineers but all such candidates, European and Indian alike, as possess the necessary engineering experience and are otherwise eligible for appointment.

4. *Procedure to be adopted in selecting officers for the assay department.*—Assay officers have in the past been recruited from European members of the Indian medical service, but the Secretary of State has recently decided that it will not be possible to continue this method of recruitment, and that future vacancies shall be filled by the direct appointment either in India or in England of qualified metallurgical chemists.‡ Under the new system appointments made in England will either be offered to assistant assayers in the Royal mint or be filled by selection from among candidates who have obtained the associateship in metallurgy of the imperial school of science and technology, South Kensington, or a corresponding university qualification. In all cases the Government of India will first ascertain whether suitably qualified persons are available in India, and recourse will only be had to recruitment in England if no such persons can be found. The normal age limits will be twenty-three and twenty-seven.§ We approve these arrangements, but suggest that in making appointments in England the Secretary of State should consider the claims of metallurgical chemists who have been properly trained as such and have obtained the associateship of the Royal school of mines or the associateship of the institute of chemistry. All vacancies should be duly advertised.

\* Volume XIV., 65844.

† Volume XIV., 65871, 65880.

‡ Volume XIV., 65861.

§ Volume XIV., Appendix III. (page 137).

CHAPTER IV.

SYSTEMS OF PROBATION AND TRAINING.

5. *Probation.*—In the mint department there appear to be no rules as to probation.\* In the assay department the intention is that officers should be on probation for three years.† We recommend that the probationary period should be fixed at two years for both departments.

6. *Training.*—No definite regulations have been framed for the training of mint officers, but it is apparently the usual practice for newly appointed officers to spend six months in acquiring the details of the business transacted in the various branches of the department.\* This should be sufficient for the purpose. In the assay department it is contemplated that under the new system selected candidates may be sent to the Royal mint for a few months' preliminary training.† Actual experience will determine whether an officer can more suitably be trained in England or in India. Both plans should be tried. In any case it should be laid down that until an officer has completed six months training, whether in England or in India, he will not be placed in responsible charge.

CHAPTER V.

CONDITIONS OF SALARY.

7. *Rates of salary. Mint department.*—The two mint masters draw salaries of Rs. 3,000 and Rs. 2,000 a month respectively. The deputy mint master receives a salary of Rs. 1,250–50–1,500 a month. All three officers receive exchange compensation allowance. Due account being taken of the magnitude of the operations of the department these salaries are not excessive. We recommend that they should be maintained, but that, in pursuance of the practice adopted elsewhere, exchange compensation allowances should be absorbed. On this basis the salaries of the two mint masters should be fixed at Rs. 3,140 and Rs. 2,125 a month respectively. For the deputy mint master we propose a scale of Rs. 1,300–60–1,600 a month. This works out, as may be seen from the following table, at an average salary of Rs. 1,500 a month, which approximates as nearly as possible to the average emoluments payable under the present scale.

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
1	Mint master - - - -	Rs. 3,000	Rs. A. P. 3,000 0 0	1	Mint master - - - -	Rs. 3,140	Rs. A. P. 3,140 0 0
	Exchange compensation allowance.	—	138 14 3				
1	Mint master - - - -	2,000	2,000 0 0	1	Mint master - - - -	2,125	2,125 0 0
	Exchange compensation allowance.	—	125 0 0				
1	Deputy mint master - -	1,250–50–1,500.	1,416 10 8	1	Deputy mint master - -	1,300–60–1,600.	1,500 0 0
	Exchange compensation allowance.	—	88 8 8				
					Total - - - -	- - -	6,765 0 0
3	Total - - - -	- - -	6,769 1 7	3	Present cost - - - -	- - -	6,769 1 7
					Net savings per mensem - - -	- - -	4 1 7
					„ per annum - - -	- - -	49 3 0

The salaries proposed for the two mint masters should be payable alike to all officers wherever recruited. The post of deputy mint master, when held by an officer recruited in India, should carry a salary of Rs. 1,000–60–1,300 a month.

8. *Rates of salary. Assay department.*—At the time of our enquiry the details of the new scheme for appointment to the assay department were already in process of being settled by the Secretary of State in correspondence with the Government of

\* Volume XIV., 65846. † Volume XIV., Appendix III. (page 137).

India.\* In these circumstances we deemed it unnecessary to take evidence with regard to the conditions of salary under which assay officers should in future be employed, and we make no recommendation on the subject, except that in the grade of deputy assay master a lower scale of salary should be fixed for officers recruited in India. In the administrative grade of assay master all officers should be paid alike.

## CHAPTER VI.

### CONDITIONS OF SERVICE.

9. *Leave and training reserve. Annual rate of recruitment.*—The mint and assay departments are too small to admit of the provision of a regular reserve for leave and training. For the same reason it would be impossible to fix an annual rate of recruitment.

10. *Liability of military officers in the mint department to pass examinations for promotion.*—Complaint was made to us regarding the rule which prescribes that the continuance on the active list of Royal engineer officers employed in the mint department is dependent on their passing the examinations for military promotion. The Royal engineer officer who came before us agreed, however, that so long as mint officers were counted as part of the war reserve a regulation of this kind was not unreasonable.† We do not consider that any change in the rule is necessary.

## CHAPTER VII.

### CONDITIONS OF LEAVE.

11. *Leave rules.*—Royal engineer officers transferred to the mint department become subject to the ordinary leave rules for military officers in civil employ. This practice should continue. Civilian officers who may in future be appointed in India either to this department or to the assay department should come under the Indian service leave rules, and should continue under these rules throughout their careers. The European service leave rules should apply to civilian officers appointed in England.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### CONDITIONS OF PENSION.

12. *Pension rules.*—Royal engineer officers in the mint department draw pension under military rules. Other officers in the mint department, and all civil officers in the assay department, should be subject to the pension rules in force throughout the various Government departments. The posts of mint master, when not held by a Royal engineer officer, and of assay master, when not held by a military officer, should be included in the list of appointments entitling these holders to a special additional pension. We also recommend that civilian officers in the mint and assay departments should be permitted, subject to the general provisos in cases of this nature, to reckon as service qualifying for superannuation pension the number of completed years by which their age at the time of appointment exceeded twenty-five.

## CHAPTER IX.

### SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS.

13. The changes which we have recommended in the mint and assay departments are as follows :—

- (i) The field of selection for the mint department should include all officers possessing the necessary engineering and other qualifications (paragraph 3).
- (ii) Trained metallurgical chemists who are associate members of the Royal school of mines and of the institute of chemistry should be eligible for appointment to the assay department (paragraph 4).
- (iii) Vacancies in the assay department should be duly advertised (paragraph 4).

\* Volume XIV., Appendix III. (page 133).

† Volume XIV., 65847, 65864.

ANNEXURE XIV.—MINT AND ASSAY DEPARTMENTS—(*continued*).

- (iv) Officers appointed to the mint and assay departments should be under training for six months and on probation for two years (paragraphs 5 and 6).
- (v) The salaries in the mint department should be kept at their present level, but exchange compensation allowance should be absorbed (paragraph 7).
- (vi) Officers appointed in India to the mint and assay departments should receive lower rates of salary whilst holding the appointments of deputy mint master and deputy assay master (paragraphs 7 and 8).
- (vii) Officers appointed in India to the mint and assay departments should be subject to the Indian service leave rules (paragraph 11).
- (viii) Mint and assay masters, who are not military officers, should be entitled to special additional pension (paragraph 12).
- (ix) Civilian officers in the mint and assay departments should be permitted, subject to the general provisos, to reckon as service qualifying for superannuation pension the number of completed years by which their age at the time of appointment exceeded twenty-five (paragraph 12).



## ANNEXURE XV.

### Bengal Pilot Service.

*(The evidence relating to this service will be found in volume XVIII.)*

#### CHAPTER I.

##### INTRODUCTORY.

1. Originally the Hughli pilots were ordinary servants of Government receiving fixed rates of salary and subject to the usual rules in regard to leave allowances and pension. In 1856 a licensed service was established, the members of which were remunerated by a percentage of the regulated pilotage fees but beyond this had no claim on Government. Two members of this service still remain. In 1876 the licensed service was abolished for future entrants and was replaced by the present covenanted service, the members of which are entitled, in addition to a percentage of the pilotage fees, to leave allowances and pension.

#### CHAPTER II.

##### ORGANISATION.

2. *Existing organisation approved.*—Unlike other pilot services in India, the Bengal pilot service is under Government control, and its affairs are directly administered by the port officer of Calcutta, who is a Government official.\* This arrangement was adversely criticised by the witnesses who came before us as representatives of the service, but having regard to all the circumstances we are not prepared to recommend any change.

#### CHAPTER III.

##### METHODS OF RECRUITMENT.

3. *Place of appointment. Limitations in the employment of non-Europeans.*—Out of 55 officers in the service drawing Rs. 200 a month and over on the 1st April 1913, 39 were Europeans and 16 Anglo-Indians.† We recognise that under present conditions the number of persons in India possessing the requisite qualifications for appointment is extremely limited, and that in such circumstances the importation of a certain number of officers from Europe is inevitable. At the same time local resources should be utilised wherever it is possible to do so without lowering the standard of admission to the service, and it should be laid down that before applying to the Secretary of State for the appointment of a candidate in England, the local Government shall first satisfy itself that no candidate with the requisite qualifications is forthcoming in India. With this object vacancies should be widely advertised. We also advise that the present rules which prescribe that candidates must be Europeans or the descendants of European or Anglo-Indian parents domiciled in India, should be amended so as to provide that any statutory native of India will be eligible for appointment provided he is duly qualified. There is no justification for excluding non-Europeans from this service on racial grounds.

4. *Qualifications of candidates.*—Under the present rules for recruitment candidates must be not less than eighteen or, more than twenty-two years of age; they must produce a Board of Trade certificate of competency as second mate, which requires either four years' service at sea or in the case of those who have spent two years in a mercantile training ship three years' service at sea; and they must have served at sea for not less than two years in a square rigged sailing vessel of over 300 tons. Candidates appointed in England are for the most part ex-cadets of the "Conway" and "Worcester" training ships, and the almost invariable practice of the India Office is to ask the "Conway" and "Worcester" in turn to nominate a candidate for appointment. Candidates selected in India are subjected to the test of a competitive examination.‡ This procedure appears to us to be generally suitable. We have carefully considered a proposal of the pilots' representatives that the service

\* Volume XVIII., 79752.

† Volume XVIII., Appendix IV. (page 156).

‡ Volume XVIII., Appendix III. (page 155) and 79,786.

ANNEXURE XV.—BENGAL PILOT SERVICE—(continued).

should be recruited direct from the “Conway” and “Worcester,” as used formerly to be the practice, and a proposal of the acting port officer of Calcutta that candidates should be required to hold a Board of Trade certificate of competency as master ;\* but in view of the opinion expressed by the Bengal Government and by the port commissioners that the present system is working satisfactorily,† we are not prepared to advise that either proposal be adopted. The only change we recommend is in regard to the rule prescribing that candidates for appointment must have served for two years in a square rigged sailing vessel. Sailing ships no longer come to Calcutta, and experience in the handling of such vessels need no longer be regarded as an essential item in the training of a Hughli pilot. Moreover, the average number of mates’ (square rigged) certificates issued annually by the Board of Trade dropped from 1,032 in the period from 1890–1894 to 299 in the period of the last five years, and should the number continue to decrease in the same ratio, the field of selection for the service would very soon become too small. The present regulation is also open to the objection that it operates unfairly against local candidates, who for the most part are denied the opportunity of obtaining employment on sailing ships. Having regard to all these considerations we recommend that the rule should be abolished.

CHAPTER IV.

SYSTEMS OF PROBATION AND TRAINING.

5. *Existing rules as to probation and training approved.*—Under present regulations, all candidates must serve an apprenticeship of five years in the leadsman apprentice grade, which period may, in exceptional circumstances, be reduced to 4½ years with the sanction of the local Government. Whilst in this grade officers are required to undergo a course of training in the duties of a pilot and to pass periodical examinations.‡ The rules appear to be generally suitable and we do not recommend any change.

CHAPTER V.

CONDITIONS OF SALARY.

6. *Revision of the present system of remunerating pilots recommended.*—As we have already stated pilots are remunerated by a share of the fees paid by the ships piloted by them. The share is fixed by the Government of Bengal, and at present amounts to fifty per cent. of the fees. The amount of remuneration earned by each grade of pilots is determined by the regulations laid down as to the tonnage of the vessels which officers in the several grades are authorised to pilot up and down the river. The tonnage limits are adjusted from time to time on the basis of past experience of earnings from pilotage fees, and they have recently been modified in consequence of the considerable drop which has taken place in the average earnings by junior master pilots and mate pilots since the year 1900.§ According to a statement prepared by the Government of Bengal, the average earnings per mensem by pilots during the years 1890, 1900, and 1912 have been as follows :—

	1890.	1900.	1912.
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
Branch pilots - - - - -	1,225	1,986	2,364
Senior master pilots - - - - -	818	1,535	1,165
Junior master pilots - - - - -	536	938	580
Mate pilots - - - - -	301	731	601

No demand was made by officers in the service for an increase in the percentage of the pilotage fees set apart for the remuneration of pilots. It was, however, brought out in the evidence that, as the average tonnage of ships is constantly on the increase, there is a persistent tendency in the direction of an

\* Volume XVIII., 79744. † Volume XVIII., Appendix III. (page 155) and 79855.  
‡ Volume XVIII., Appendix V. (page 157). § Volume XVIII., Appendix III. (page 155).

inequitable distribution of earnings among the several grades. One of the two representative witnesses suggested as a remedy for this that the number of pilots in the lower grades should be reduced. If this were done—and he thought it could be done without loss of efficiency—the pilots in the lower grades would individually get more pay.\* The acting port officer, on the other hand, took the view that it was becoming every year more and more necessary to abandon the present system and to introduce in its place a system by which the whole of the payments would be pooled and distributed among the various grades of pilots according to a fixed scale.† A reduction in the number of junior master pilots and mate pilots would no doubt get rid of the undue disparity which now exists between the payments made to the lower and higher grades of the service, but the evidence before us is insufficient to justify the conclusion that such a reduction would be compatible with the requirements of the public, and we cannot therefore put forward this scheme as a solution of the present problem. On the other hand there are difficulties in the way of introducing a satisfactory pooling system. The acting port officer stated that a pooling system had been tried on several occasions by the pilots themselves and had invariably given rise to trouble; and the representatives of the pilots explained that if any such system were established it would be necessary to increase the service very considerably, because a pilot was not likely to work as hard for a fixed salary as he now did under the system of payment for work done.‡ In these circumstances we suggest that the best plan will be to retain the present system with such modifications of procedure as may best be adapted to the removal of existing anomalies. As a first step, it will be desirable that the local Government should frame a revised normal scale for the earnings of each grade. The present normal scale, which serves for the calculation of leave allowances, has long ceased to bear any relation to actual earnings, and the revised scale should be determined with reference to past experience and to the proportion of the total earnings which Government consider it equitable to allot to each grade. The next step will be to assess tonnage limits for each grade in accordance with the normal scale, and the limits should thereafter be reassessed at regular intervals of, say, four years on the basis of the last four years' results.

7. *Remuneration of officers commanding pilot vessels.*—At present the two pilot vessels are commanded by licensed pilots who entered the service before the reorganisation of 1877, but on the retirement of these officers it will be necessary to detail branch pilots for the duty. The salary of the officers in command has been fixed at Rs. 1,000 a month and if this salary is retained, branch pilots selected for the command will have to face a very serious reduction of emoluments during the tenure of their appointments.§ We accordingly recommend that the salary should be raised to Rs. 1,500 a month. The increase, however, should not take effect until the retirement from the service of the two officers now holding the command of the vessels, one of whom (according to evidence given before us)|| has no inclination for pilotage and the other is not allowed by Government to serve as a pilot. We recommend also that when the present officers retire, the rule should be laid down that the command of the pilot vessels should be held by branch pilots for short periods in regular rotation.

## CHAPTER VI.

### CONDITIONS OF SERVICE.

8. *Strength of the cadre.*—The establishment has been fixed at a strength sufficient to make it possible for nine pilots to be absent on long leave at one and the same time. This limit is sometimes exceeded when the condition of trade allows. The leadsmen apprentices—of whom the sanctioned number is 16—constitute the training reserve.¶ These arrangements are satisfactory, and no change is needed.

9. *Expenses of pilots carried out to sea.*—Formerly a pilot carried out to sea through stress of weather was allowed, at the expense of the shipowner concerned, Rs. 10 a day with free board and actual payments for his return journey, but since 1903 the shipowners have been relieved of this charge. The pilots complained to us

\* Volume XVIII., 79827.

† Volume XVIII., 79767.

‡ Volume XVIII., 79827, 79838.

§ Volume XVIII., 79747, 79806.

|| Volume XVIII., 79828.

¶ Volume XVIII., Appendix III. (page 155).

## ANNEXURE XI.—BENGAL PILOT SERVICE—(continued).

that the concession has been abused, with the result that nowadays there is frequently a lack of officers available for the pilotage of inward-bound vessels. It was stated that recently as many as thirteen pilots had been carried out to sea in one week.\* We suggest that this matter should be investigated by the local Government, and that, if the complaint is substantiated, the rules should again be modified so as to make the shipowner liable in whole or in part for the expenses incurred.

10. *Abolition of punishment by fine recommended.*—We are agreed that the system of punishing pilots by means of reduction of earnings is unjust and should be discontinued.† Aggravated misconduct should be punishable by discharge or suspension, and pilots convicted of mistakes due to lack of experience should be reduced temporarily to a lower grade. We recommend that the schedule of offences and punishments prepared in accordance with section 17 of act XII. of 1859, should be amended accordingly.

11. *Age of retirement.*—Pilots reaching the age of fifty-five may be required to retire at the discretion of the local Government, but unlike other officers in Government employ they are not at liberty to retire of their own option at this age and to take their pension. We recommend that the regulation on this point should be amended so as to bring the pilot service into line with other departments.

## CHAPTER VII.

## CONDITIONS OF LEAVE.

12. *Leave rules.*—Officers of the Bengal pilot service are under special rules as regards leave. These are sufficiently liberal, and we advise no change except that the normal scale of earnings used for the calculation of leave allowances should be revised in the manner suggested in paragraph 6.

## CHAPTER VIII.

## CONDITIONS OF PENSION.

13. *Pension rules.*—Special rules are also laid down for the grant of pensions. Branch pilots retired after thirty years' service in India or on medical certificate are entitled to a pension of Rs. 200 a month. Other pilots retired after thirty years' service in India and master pilots retired on medical certificate receive a pension of Rs. 100 a month. Mate pilots retired on medical certificate receive a pension of Rs. 60 a month. The service also has its own family pension fund to which the following monthly contributions, which are estimated to amount to half the liabilities, are made by officers, namely, branch pilots, Rs. 40, master pilots, Rs. 20, mate pilots, Rs. 10.† The chief demand from members of the service was that their pensions should be brought up to the level of the scale in force in other departments. They represented that retired members of the service cannot support themselves on their pensions alone, and that a pilot is specially liable to the risk of being invalided before he attains to a position in the service in which he can begin to save money from his earnings. From the memorandum furnished by the Bengal Government it appears that inquiries have recently been set on foot with the object of ascertaining the actual expenditure incurred under all heads on the work of pilotage and the proportion it bears to the share of fees received by Government. In the opinion of the Bengal Government the high average earnings of branch pilots, as compared with the salaries payable to officers in other branches of Government service, suggest that a scheme for contributory pensions would be suitable, and an attempt is being made to devise a scheme which, without imposing an undue burden on the resources of Government, will meet the reasonable requirements of the case.† Whilst we accept the view that the same scale of pensions should apply to the pilot service as to other departments, we are agreed that, taking pay and pensions as a whole, the pilot service is already adequately remunerated. We therefore recommend that the whole cost of improving the scale of pensions should be borne by the pilots themselves.

\* Volume XVIII., 79794, 79839.

† Volume XVIII., 79802, 79841.

## ANNEXURE XV.—BENGAL PILOT SERVICE—(continued).

According to official calculations made in 1907\* the extra expenditure involved would be equivalent to an addition of Rs. 281 a year to the earnings of each pilot during the whole period of service, and could fairly be met by contributions at the following rates, namely :—

Branch pilots	-	-	-	-	-	-	Rs. 50 a month.
Senior master pilots	-	-	-	-	-	-	Rs. 40 „
Junior master pilots	-	-	-	-	-	-	Rs. 25 „
Mate pilots	-	-	-	-	-	-	Rs. 20 „

These calculations would need to be revised in consequence of the improvements which we have recommended in the conditions of pension applicable in other departments, but the increase in the amount of contributions would be slight. For new entrants to the service contributions towards pension should be compulsory, but pilots now in the service should be given the option of remaining subject to the present rules.

## CHAPTER IX.

## SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS.

14. The changes which we have recommended in the Bengal pilot service are as follows :—

- (i) Application should be made for the appointment of officers in England only after the Bengal Government has satisfied itself that no suitable candidates are available locally, and all statutory natives of India who possess the requisite qualifications should be eligible for appointment (paragraph 3).
- (ii) Experience in a sailing vessel should not be regarded as an essential qualification for admission to the service (paragraph 4).
- (iii) A revised normal scale of earnings should be framed, and the scale should be reassessed at regular intervals (paragraph 6).
- (iv) The salary attached to the command of the two pilot vessels should be increased, and the command of these vessels should be held by branch pilots for short periods in regular rotation (paragraph 7).
- (v) The working of the rule which relieves shipowners of all liability for carrying pilots out to sea should be investigated, and the rule should, if necessary, be modified (paragraph 9).
- (vi) The system of punishment by fines should be abolished (paragraph 10).
- (vii) Pilots should be at liberty to retire on pension when they reach the age of 55 (paragraph 11).
- (viii) Pensions should be brought up to the scale in force in other Government departments, but the increased cost should be met by contributions from earnings (paragraph 13).

\* Volume XVIII., Appendix III. (page 155).

## ANNEXURE XVI.

## Police Department.

(The evidence relating to this department will be found in volume XIII.)

## CHAPTER I.

## INTRODUCTORY.

1. The police force in India has only recently emerged from the searching inquiry of the Indian police commission. As the result of their report sweeping changes in every direction were introduced. The orders for these were actually passed in 1905,\* so that only seven years had elapsed when the department was again placed under our investigation. It has not been suggested that the reforms have broken down. Indeed the evidence shows that they have been on the whole successful, but that hardly sufficient time has elapsed thoroughly to test their efficacy. We are impressed with this consideration, and have devoted our attention rather to co-ordinating, so far as possible, the conditions of service of the officers with those in force in departments of similar standing than to any elaborate schemes of reconstruction. It will be time enough to consider these when the full effect of the reorganisation of 1905 has become apparent.

## CHAPTER II.

## ORGANISATION.

2. *Division of the services into imperial and provincial. Present position.*—The police force is organised on the lines of the civil services. It has an imperial branch, known as the Indian police service, recruited in Europe, and separate provincial branches for each province recruited in India. The Indian police service is intended for the work of supervision and contains only so many officers as are required to fill the superintendentships of the districts and the posts of equivalent or higher standing and to supply a leave and training reserve of assistant superintendents. The provincial services of deputy superintendents are recruited to carry on the less important duties of police administration. They are thus, like the provincial civil services, inferior services, and promotion from them to superintendentships in the Indian police service is given only in a few instances, and as the reward of special merit in selected individuals. These provincial services, it should be added, were formed only in 1905 as a result of the orders passed on the report of the Indian police commission.

3. *Recommendations with regard to the division of the services into imperial and provincial.*—The organisation into a superior and inferior service was accepted by most of the witnesses and by the local Governments as suitable, and was said to be working satisfactorily in practice. Some of the provincial officers, however, claimed that the present arrangement by which assistant and deputy superintendents are included in different cadres should be abandoned. They based this for the most part on a phrase in the orders passed on the police commission's report, where it was stated that the functions and departmental status of the deputy superintendents would be similar to those of assistant superintendents.† But it was clear from their examination that they had not thought out the difficulties which would arise if the two cadres of assistant and deputy superintendents were merged, whilst the number of superintendentships remained the same; and that in essentials they did not differ from those of their colleagues, who asked only for better treatment as deputy superintendents and for increased prospects of rising into the higher ranks. We are satisfied that the position of the officers in the provincial services towards members of the Indian police service should be the same as that of members of the provincial civil services towards members of the Indian civil service, and recommend in consequence that the existing organisation be maintained. We think, however, that once an officer of a provincial service has been promoted permanently to hold a post in the Indian police service, he should become a full member of that service and not be left in a doubtful position half way between both services. He should also be able to rise on his merits through all the grades of the Indian police service like any other member. In the rest of this annexure we shall deal with the Indian and provincial police services

\* Volume XIII., Appendix XVI. (pages 160–177).

† Volume XIII., Appendix XVI. (paragraph 33, page 167).

separately. We have also devoted a third section to the cases of the various special forces which are parallel with, but lie outside the main organisation of, the police department.

## PART I.—INDIAN POLICE SERVICE.

### CHAPTER III.

#### METHODS OF RECRUITMENT.

4. *Maintenance of the present system of competitive examination for admission to the Indian police service in London recommended.*—The ordinary method of recruitment to the Indian police service is by a competitive examination in London. The regulations lay down that all candidates must be above 19 and under 21 years of age, and must be unmarried at the time of the examination. Selected candidates are also required to remain unmarried at least until they reach India. The obligatory subjects of examination are English, elementary mathematics, French or German, and English history and geography. The optional subjects, any two of which may be offered, comprise intermediate and higher mathematics, German or French, Latin, Greek and science (physics and chemistry). Candidates may also appear in freehand drawing. Successful candidates have further to pass medical and riding tests, and on doing so leave for India at once, and pass their period of probation in that country. A few of the witnesses threw out a suggestion for the modification of the competitive test by some system of prior nomination, but the majority asked for no change in the prevailing procedure. We are satisfied that there are grounds of policy for importing the bulk of the officers for this service from Europe. We also think that the existing system of examination is giving a good personnel. We, therefore, recommend no change of principle in this respect.

5. *Conditions under which Indians and Anglo-Indians should be allowed to appear at the competitive examination in London.*—The rules for the competition in London provide that "every candidate must be a British subject of European descent," and that "at the time of his birth his father must have been a British subject, either "natural born or naturalised in the United Kingdom." It is also laid down that in cases of doubt as to eligibility to compete application should be made to the Secretary of State for India in Council for a decision. To the extent that it is necessary to secure that the police force shall in present circumstances be officered by men who have had a European training and upbringing the existing rule is not unsuitable, but it works hardly in the case of young men of mixed descent who have been educated in Great Britain and who have made their homes there; whilst the form in which it is expressed is naturally unpopular with Indians, who also urge that the restriction is in contravention of the letter and the spirit of the Government of India Act, 1833 (3 & 4 Will. IV. cap. 85). Whether the last-named objection is good in law or not we recommend that the present rule be modified to allow both Europeans of mixed descent and Indians of unmixed Asiatic descent, who have been educated in the United Kingdom for a period of five years prior to the examination, to appear at the competitive test. We recognise, however, that this will not provide for any substantial advance in the employment of statutory natives of India. For this we think it will be better to devise means in that country.

6. *Conditions under which statutory natives of India should be admitted directly in India to the Indian police service.*—At present there are two roads open in India. In the first place the Governor-General in Council has power, in exceptional cases, to make direct appointments. But these must be from amongst domiciled Europeans, including those of mixed descent, and on the special recommendation of a local Government in favour of an individual. The candidate put forward must also have attained an adequate standard of educational qualifications. This power has hitherto seldom been exercised. The bulk of the evidence which we recorded was against the development of any method of direct recruitment as the means for obtaining in India the best class of recruit. In principle we are not convinced that this attitude is entirely justified, and had the question been an open one we should have been inclined to have recommended that a definite share of the service be recruited in this manner. As it is we recognise that the members of the provincial service have a prior claim in view of the expectations held out to them on the formation of their service so recently as 1905.\* We therefore content ourselves with recommending that the power of direct appointment be

\* Volume XIII., Appendix XVI. (paragraph 33, page 167).

developed to cover the cases of all statutory natives of India and not only those who belong to the domiciled community, and that it should be more freely exercised than it is at present.

7. *Extension of facilities for the promotion of deputy superintendents to the Indian police service recommended.*—The second method of recruitment in India is by promotion. The existing rule on this subject is that up to the extent of five per cent. of its superintendships the Indian police cadre may be recruited by the selection of officers of proved capacity from the provincial services. In the Punjab, Assam and Bombay full effect has not as yet been given to this provision. Elsewhere it is in operation, and there are indications that in certain provinces the time is ripe for a considerable extension of the system. Thus the Government of the United Provinces was prepared to increase the present number of such posts from three to eight,\* whilst the inspector-general of police in Madras saw no objection to raising the existing figure in that presidency from two to five.† In the same way the Chief Commissioner of the Central Provinces expressed the view that “the number of promotions, at present fixed at five per cent., can gradually be increased as the provincial service develops.”‡ We therefore recommend that immediate steps be taken in this direction. With this object the various local Governments should be required to review their superior posts and to decide in the light of actual local conditions how many superintendships can suitably be filled by officers promoted from the provincial service. The number of these will, no doubt, vary from province to province, but should nowhere be less than ten per cent. of the total number of superintendships, and should gradually be increased to twenty per cent. as occasion offers. Of these posts a number equal to five per cent. of the superintendships should be filled permanently by officers from the provincial service at once, and recruitment for them should be stopped in England. For the remainder recruitment in England should also be stopped at once, but they should not be filled permanently by promoted deputy superintendents until provision has been made for all the assistant superintendents recruited against them, who are fitted to hold them. We also advise that in making promotions to all posts in excess of the original five per cent. only such deputy superintendents shall be taken as have been directly recruited into the provincial service, and this should be without prejudice to their claims to the original five per cent. alongside of the deputy superintendents who have been promoted to that position after serving as inspectors. We also desire to see opportunities given to the best of the younger officers to enter the higher ranks at approximately the same age as the assistant superintendents. This will mitigate the difficulties under which statutory natives of India will labour in rising to administrative positions owing to the restricted chances which they will possess of direct recruitment.

#### CHAPTER IV.

##### SYSTEMS OF PROBATION AND TRAINING.

8. *Maintenance of police schools in India approved.*—Successful candidates leave for India directly after the competitive examination, and pass a period of two years' probation in that country. In the course of this they have to appear at their departmental examinations, and are also trained in their duties in the police school of their province. This arrangement was come to after full discussion only a few years ago, and against the advice of the police commission, which recommended recruitment between the ages of 18 and 20, and a course of probation for two years thereafter at an English residential university. The evidence given before us showed that, though there were advocates of a probationary period in England, the general feeling of the service accepted as suitable the system now in force. What criticisms were made were directed rather against the details and qualities of the courses in the various schools than against the general principle involved in the maintenance of these institutions. It was also made clear that the curriculum had not yet taken a final form. In particular, the exact amount of time to be devoted to the study of law on the one hand and languages on the other was in debate; whilst the rival claims of theoretical study and practical experience had still to be adjusted. We consider that these points of detail should be settled in accordance with the needs of the various provinces, and are satisfied that the authorities have the matter well in hand. All that we need specially recommend is that opportunities be given to the heads of the various institutions and the inspectors-general to see for themselves what is going on in provinces other than their own. We also think that provision should be made for periodical conferences of police officers to discuss these questions.

\* Volume XIII., Appendix IV. (page 129).

† Volume XIII., 62258.

‡ Volume XIII., Appendix XIV. (page 155).

## CHAPTER V.

## CONDITIONS OF SALARY.

9. *Rates of salary.*—Salaries are now drawn under the graded system. This was a subject of complaint amongst the officers and is on general grounds unsuitable. We recommend, as elsewhere, that the incremental method of payment be substituted. As regards the rates, the evidence was clear that considerable enhancements were given only a few years ago as the result of the report of the police commission, and that a satisfactory class of recruit is now coming forward. We cannot, therefore, accede to the requests which were made to us for a further all-round increase. At the same time we think that a case was made out for giving the deputy inspectors-general the equivalent of the three grades of Rs. 1,500, Rs. 1,750, and Rs. 2,000 a month, recommended by the police commission, but in the form of an incremental scale of Rs. 1,500–100–2,000 a month. We also consider it desirable to allow assistant superintendents to rise to a maximum salary of Rs. 600 a month so as to mitigate the hardships of such blocks in promotion to superintendentships as may occur. With this object we recommend the adoption for them of a scale of Rs. 300–50–400–50/2–600 a month. For the superintendents we would keep a selection grade of Rs. 1,200 as at present, and for the rest would cover the existing range from Rs. 700 to Rs. 1,000 a month by a scale of Rs. 700–60/2–1,000 a month. And we would remove the present efficiency bar at Rs. 900 a month. We would also allow these rates to be drawn equally by persons wherever recruited and whether statutory natives of India or not. We base this exception to our ordinary rule of differentiation on the grounds, elaborated in the body of our report, namely, that for this service suitable Europeans can be got for rates as low in relation to the general run of European salaries, as the salaries required to get a suitable statutory native of India are high in relation to the general run of Indian salaries. The financial effect of this reorganisation, assuming that ten per cent. of the superintendentships will be filled by promoted officers, will be a saving of approximately Rs. 17,214 a year, as shown in schedule I. to this annexure.

## CHAPTER VI.

## CONDITIONS OF SERVICE.

10. *Strength of the cadre. General observations.*—The strength of the existing cadre appears to be inadequate in certain of the larger districts where there is more work than can be performed by a single superintendent. For this one of two remedies appears suitable. Either the district should be divided, or if this is for any reason inexpedient an additional superintendent to work under the superintendent of the district should be appointed. In either case the cadre should be increased to the extent indicated. We have not endeavoured to work out in detail the exact areas in which such a development is required, but advise that the local Governments be called upon to do so. We regard it as bad policy to go on with inadequate supervision of this important branch of the public service, particularly in face of the growing complexities of police administration. We would also point out that, where overwork is substantiated, it is not necessary to wait to give relief until the difficult question of sub-dividing the district has been settled. In such a case an additional superintendent can and should be appointed at once without prejudice to the larger issue. This arrangement, we were told, had been tried in Bengal and had met with success.\*

11. *Changes recommended in the system under which the strength of the cadre is fixed.*—To fix the strength of the cadre of the Indian police service the superior posts of superintendent and upwards are counted, and to these are added the number of deputation posts shown by experience to be necessary. To this combined total a further addition of 77·3 per cent. is made in order to secure a sufficient number of assistant superintendents to fill the leave vacancies in the service (31·2 per cent.) and to learn their work in positions of minor responsibility over a period of eight years (46·1 per cent.). After this time the intention is that all officers shall at least be officiating with practical permanency in one of the superior appointments. This system is in essentials the same as that in force in the Indian civil service, but there are differences in detail. For example, in the Indian civil service an all-round increase of four per cent. is allowed for deputation posts, whereas in the police service an arbitrary number has been taken, based originally on experience, but not kept up to date. Again, in the Indian civil service a deduction is made for posts listed as open

## ANNEXURE XVI.—POLICE DEPARTMENT—(continued).

to members of the provincial civil services, but this has been overlooked in the police service. Again, whilst in the Indian civil service the total percentage for assistants was fixed on the basis of actual experience in that service at 94·5 per cent., in the police this figure has been reduced arbitrarily to 77·3 per cent. on account of the greater length of time for which a police officer must serve for pension, and to meet the probability that he will take less leave owing to his lower rate of remuneration. The result is that the calculations fail to carry conviction. This is not satisfactory, and we recommend that steps be taken to put matters on a more secure footing by the preparation of an up-to-date formula which should be based on recent police experience and should allow for the necessary deductions on account of the posts to be filled by promotion from the provincial services. This formula should then be kept up to date by a quinquennial check of the figures adopted for deputation and leave reserves in the light of actual requirements, and by giving effect as they occur to the changes in the number of promoted deputy superintendents. This in its turn will give a trustworthy annual rate of recruitment. The present figure of 4·17 per cent. on the total strength of the cadre has been taken without any adjustment from the Indian civil service tables and is open to the suspicion of being in excess of actual requirements.

12. *Steps to be taken to relieve blocks of promotion.*—This raises the question of blocks of promotion. This difficulty is already serious in the United Provinces and there are indications that it will spread elsewhere before many years. To a certain extent this is due to the recruitment which has hitherto been made in England against posts reserved for promoted deputy superintendents or filled by direct recruitment in India. The proposals we have already made will prevent this factor operating in future. The hardships will also be mitigated for individuals when assistant superintendents draw up to Rs. 600 instead of Rs. 500 a month. This, however, will not be enough, and further steps will be needed. At present the only machinery for meeting the situation is the provision which allows for the diminution of the annual recruitment rate up to a limit of 30 per cent. in cases in which the actual is in excess of the sanctioned strength of the cadre. But this remedy is often in the long run worse than the disease, as it has to be applied at the foot of the cadre and not at the point where the excess or deficiency occurs. For instance, if there is an excess of officers of say fifteen or twenty years' standing it does no permanent good merely to diminish the supply of first year recruits. What is wanted to restore the even flow of promotion is to draw off in some way the overflow of the congested years. This, therefore, should be attempted in the first instance. In a department like the police this should not be impossible of accomplishment if the local Governments concerned are called upon to examine the problem in detail. In the first place the increases of staff, which we have advised on administrative grounds, should help to give relief. Again, it should be feasible to transfer some officers from provinces where there is an excess to neighbouring provinces where there is a deficiency of staff. Failing this, encouragement should be given to officers of suitable standing to retire voluntarily on suitable pensions. In the last resort personal allowances should be given, appropriate to the circumstances of each case. It follows that similar steps should be taken where there is a deficiency of staff. In such case additions should only be made at the foot of the cadre if it is found impossible to fill up the gaps at the proper points. This procedure has recently been followed in Bihar and Orissa and Assam and has our approval.

13. *The inspector-generalships of police.*—Except in the Punjab and Burma the post of inspector-general of police is recruited for in the Indian civil service, and is ordinarily held by a senior district magistrate. The police witnesses naturally asserted their prior claims. Some went so far as to say that a police officer, from whatever province, should be preferred. Others thought that an Indian civil servant should be appointed if no member of the local force was suitable. The civil service witnesses were inclined to leave discretion to the local Government, but admitted that the claims of police officers were growing with the improvement in the personnel of the force. They laid stress, however, on local knowledge, and were generally averse from the importation of an outsider if no local police officer were available. We are of opinion that practice in this matter has tended to settle down too much into a groove, and that the time has come for local Governments to consider more carefully the claims of senior police officers when making appointments. At the same time absolutely to earmark the post for the police or to give countenance to the idea that a police officer, say, from Burma, could suitably be appointed in, say, the United Provinces, would be unwise. All that seems necessary is definitely to stop

recruitment for the inspector-generalships in the Indian civil service cadre, and to leave them to be filled by the local Government from the best material available. Once the vested interests of the Indian civil service have ceased, there is little likelihood that a good police officer, if available, will not be taken. Even now the inspectors-general of the United Provinces and Bombay are police officers, despite the claims of members of the Indian civil service to the posts. At the same time the post should not be recruited for in the police cadre lest vested interests be created there instead.

14. *Designation of superintendents.*—Objection was taken by several witnesses to the title of superintendent, but no good alternative was suggested. That of district superintendent, which on the whole was preferred, appears unsuitable, owing to the confusion which would be caused with deputy superintendents when the initials "D.S.P." were used in ordinary correspondence. No change, therefore, is required.

15. *Provision of chargers.*—A further complaint was made as to the burden imposed on officers in the matter of chargers. This appears to be reasonable and we recommend that increased facilities be provided by Government.

## CHAPTER VII.

### CONDITIONS OF LEAVE.

16. *Leave rules.*—Members of the Indian police service are now under the European service leave rules. This is suitable for all officers who are recruited in England through the door of the open competitive examination. Officers appointed directly in India and officers promoted from the provincial services should be placed under the Indian service leave rules, as revised by us, to whatever community they may belong, and should continue under them throughout their careers.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### CONDITIONS OF PENSION.

17. *Pension rules.*—All officers are now under the ordinary pension rules. These require a service of thirty years for a retiring pension. Efforts were made to prove that this period was excessive in view of the hardships of life in the department. We were not convinced by the arguments adduced, and consider that thirty years is not an unreasonable time for an officer to serve who is recruited at the age of 21 at latest. At the same time we feel that the department has a legitimate grievance in that it is placed in a worse position than the public works, forest, and certain other departments, the duties of which are no more onerous. This will be met by our new pension scheme which should apply to this department. Under this all officers not belonging to the Indian civil service will be placed on the same footing. All will have to serve thirty years for a full retiring pension, and all will have the option of retiring after twenty-five years on a reduced pension. We also recommend that the posts of deputy inspector-general and inspector-general carry a special additional pension under our general scheme.

## PART II.—PROVINCIAL POLICE SERVICES.

### CHAPTER IX.

#### METHODS OF RECRUITMENT.

18. *Constitution of the provincial police services. Present rules for recruitment.*—The provincial police services are recruited on uniform lines throughout India, though there are local variations of detail. A typical set of rules is that furnished by the Government of the United Provinces.\* These lay down that deputy superintendents of police shall be statutory natives of India, and shall be appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor (a) by direct recruitment, (b) by the selection of deputy collectors and tahsildars, or (c) by the promotion of inspectors of police, but that not more than one-half of the total number shall have come in by the first-named method. As between (b) and (c) the preference is given to (c), if suitable inspectors of police are available. In the case of promoted inspectors the

\* Volume XIII., Appendices V. and VI. (pages 130-132).

## ANNEXURE XVI.—POLICE DEPARTMENT—(continued).

Lieutenant-Governor acts on the advice of the inspector-general of police. No age limit is fixed for such candidates, but they are required to have a fair knowledge of English. In the same way, when deputy collectors and tahsildars are taken, the joint advice of the inspector-general of police and of the board of revenue is sought, and an age limit of 35 is ordinarily imposed. The inspector-general of police also puts forward to the Lieutenant-Governor the names of likely direct recruits, but his selection must be from amongst residents of the province, graduates of the Allahabad or an English university, or barristers-at-law. He has also to satisfy himself as to the physical and moral qualifications of his nominees, and as to their capacity to ride. An age limit of 25 is ordinarily imposed. Power is also taken to place candidates selected under methods (b) and (c) in a grade higher than the lowest in the case of necessity. The other provinces show slight variants. Thus in Bengal no reference is made to the possible selection of revenue officials, whilst for direct recruits the local Government depends in the first instance on the advice of commissioners and district officers, but also consults the inspector-general of police.\* The same holds good with regard to Bihar and Orissa, though here it is implied by one of the subsidiary rules that an officer already in Government service, but not necessarily in the revenue department, can be recruited directly into the ranks of the deputy superintendents.† In the Punjab the educational qualification is lower, and the candidates for direct recruitment need only have passed the matriculation examination. Here also it is a common practice to enrol likely young men as inspectors with the promise of a direct appointment as deputy superintendent in a few years if they do well.‡ In Burma no direct appointments have hitherto been made.§ In Madras the Government nominates the direct recruits with the advice of a board consisting of the chief secretary as chairman, the inspector-general of police, and one other member to be appointed from time to time.||

19. *Modifications suggested in the present rules for recruitment.*—These rules were regarded as generally suitable, and in view of the fact that they have hardly yet had time to settle down we shall recommend only such changes as are needed to bring the services into line with those of a similar character with which we have dealt. In the first place we are satisfied that the system of appointing officers from other departments has never taken root and should cease to be recognised. Such a provision is naturally resented by men in the department, and the rare cases in which it is necessary to make such selections could be met under the general power, which already exists, to make exceptional appointments in exceptional circumstances. Secondly, we suggest that at least half the vacancies should be reserved for direct recruits, except in Burma, where the supply of suitably educated young men is still deficient. In Burma a start should be made by the local Government which should set aside a definite share of all future vacancies to be filled by this method. Thirdly, we think it desirable that the Madras system of a committee to advise on the selection of direct recruits should be developed and introduced into the other provinces. Each such committee should consist of three officials and two non-officials and should include two Indians. Fourthly and finally, we would insist that, where possible, all direct recruits should have taken the degree of a university or have passed an examination of a corresponding standard prescribed by Government for the European schools. Where this is not possible owing to the backwardness of education the local Governments should be called upon to fix at least a minimum number who shall possess such a qualification and to recruit accordingly.

20. *Limitations in the employment of non-Europeans.*—There remains the question of the employment of non-Europeans. At present the members of the provincial police services have all, ordinarily, to be statutory natives of India, but European inspectors who do not fall under this category, but who are shown to have adopted an Indian domicile, can be promoted to deputy superintendships in numbers proportionate to the sanctioned European strength of the inspectors' cadre. How far the services are made up of such officers or of members of the domiciled community, who are statutory natives of India, on the one hand, and of Indians or Burmans of unmixed Asiatic descent on the other, cannot be ascertained precisely from the general returns supplied us, which have been made up for the Indian and provincial police services together, and also include a considerable number

\* Volume XIII., Appendix VII. (page 133).

† Volume XIII., Appendix IX. (page 144).

‡ Volume XIII., 61695, 61723-4.

§ Volume XIII., Appendix VIII. (page 138), 62184, 62218.

|| Volume XIII., Appendix XII. (page 148).

## ANNEXURE XVI.—POLICE DEPARTMENT—(continued).

of inspectors on Rs. 200 and Rs. 250 a month.\* From the civil lists of the 1st January, 1914, however, the distribution in the various provinces would seem to be as follows :—

	Europeans and Anglo-Indians.	Indians or Burmans of unmixed Asiatic descent.	Vacant.	Total.
Madras - - - - -	4	36	—	40
Bombay - - - - -	10	25	—	35
Bengal - - - - -	3	20	—	23
United Provinces - - - - -	4	36	—	40
Punjab - - - - -	8	25	1	34
Burma - - - - -	19	20	—	39
Bihar and Orissa - - - - -	3	12	—	15
Central Provinces and Berar - - - - -	4	14	—	18
Assam - - - - -	1	5	5	11
Total - - - - -	56	193	6	255

This gives 22 per cent. of Europeans or Anglo-Indians as against 78 per cent. of Indians or Burmans of unmixed Asiatic descent, or 18 and 82 per cent., if the figures for Burma are excluded. The services outside Burma are thus predominantly non-European, and no special steps are needed for the increase of this element. It is doubtful whether any advance can be made in Burma, but the local Government should specially consider the position there in view of the striking difference between the practice in Burma and that in force in other provinces.

## CHAPTER X.

## SYSTEMS OF PROBATION AND TRAINING.

21. *Probation.*—All direct recruits are under probation in the first instance. This is satisfactory, but the position should be emphasised by the institution of a regular grade of probationers for such officers. To secure this we recommend the creation of thirteen such posts, three for the United Provinces, two each for Madras, Bombay, Bengal, and the Punjab, and one each for the remaining provinces except Burma and Assam, where the cadre of direct recruits will be too small to admit of this step. This will ensure that on an average about two years will be passed by each direct recruit before he is confirmed in the service.

22. *Training.*—Deputy superintendents are trained on the same lines as assistant superintendents in the police schools of their respective provinces. We have already dealt with this subject and have no further recommendations to offer.

## CHAPTER XI.

## CONDITIONS OF SALARY.

23. *Rates of salary.*—There are now four grades of deputy superintendents on Rs. 250, 300, 400, and Rs. 500 a month. The evidence disclosed in their case three of the several defects inherent in any graded system. First, difficulties arose on the formation of the new service. In some provinces the grades were filled up at once or very quickly, thus causing unnecessary expenditure, and setting a wrong standard of prospects, whilst at the same time tending to create a block. In others the local Governments kept vacancies in the higher grades to the dissatisfaction of the staff. Secondly, it has not been found easy to regulate without discontent the flow of promotion as between promoted subordinates and direct recruits. This has led in Bengal to the formation of two cadres, one for each class of deputy superintendent. This in its turn has been resented, and the inspector-general, who devised the scheme, himself said that it should be regarded as a temporary expedient, and that a time scale was the only real remedy.† Thirdly, with the lowest grade of deputy superintendent drawing the same salary as the highest grade of inspector, it has been found impossible to give a promoted officer an increase of salary without interfering with the seniority of

\* Volume XIII., Appendix XV. (page 156).

† Volume XIII., Annexure II. to Mr. Hughes Buller's written statement. *Vide* paragraph 61914 (pages 40 and 41), also 61933.

## ANNEXURE XVI.—POLICE DEPARTMENT—(continued).

officers already in the service. We, therefore, propose as elsewhere the adoption of the incremental system. In fixing the actual rates we would follow the precedent set for the services in which it is desired to attract young graduates or similarly qualified members of the domiciled community. This means a scale of Rs. 250-40/3-450-50/3-500 a month (Rs. 300-40/3-500-50/3-550 a month in Burma) for the bulk of the officers, with two selection grades of Rs. 600 and Rs. 700 a month for 8 and 7 per cent. of the total cadre. Probationers should also get Rs. 150 a month (Rs. 200 in Burma) in place of Rs. 100 a month as at present. The cost of these readjustments will be approximately Rs. 1,33,691 a year, as shown in schedule II. to this annexure.

## CHAPTER XII.

## CONDITIONS OF SERVICE.

24. *Strength of the cadres.*—We have already suggested additions to the various cadres, amounting to thirteen posts in all, to provide grades of probationers. We were also impressed by the evidence which we received as to the importance of increasing the numbers of the deputy superintendents for administrative purposes. The local Governments of Bombay, Bengal, Burma, and Bihar and Orissa definitely committed themselves to this view, whilst the director of criminal intelligence pointed to the unsatisfactory nature of the arrangement by which large cities, like Delhi, were left in the charge of officers of only inspector standing.\* The fact seems to be that the provincial services were manned at the outset on experimental lines, and that with the success of the scheme the idea of increasing their numbers has taken root. We do not feel that we can come to any detailed finding on this subject, but on general grounds approve of the development of these services and consider that there should be no hesitation in adding to their cadres to meet the needs of the administration.

25. *Leave, deputation, and training reserves. Annual rate of recruitment.*—Provision is made for a leave and deputation reserve for deputy superintendents in the subordinate service. In view of the smallness of the existing cadres and the fact that to the extent of about one-half they will be recruited by the promotion of subordinates, we see no need at present for any change in the existing practice. It will be time enough to consider this when the number of directly recruited officers in each province becomes considerable. We have provided for a grade of probationers and no further training reserve is necessary. No annual rate of recruitment is fixed for direct recruits, and on account of the paucity of their numbers and the newness of the services nothing in this direction is yet possible.

26. *Designation of the provincially recruited services. Uniform. Privileges of deputy superintendents.*—The question of the future designation of the provincial police services was raised by certain witnesses. The word "provincial," owing to its misuse for certain services, has come to be misunderstood. We therefore recommend that the terms Madras, Bombay, etc., police service, should be employed in future. Certain complaints were also made about the uniform prescribed. In so far as these were part and parcel of the demand of the provincial staff to be regarded as imperial officers, they deserve no consideration. It was, however, shown that distinctions were drawn as between deputy superintendents on the ground of race only. This is open to objection. Whilst there must be differences to suit the habits and customs of the two races, particularly in the matter of headgear, it should be open to any Indian deputy superintendent, who has adopted European methods of life, to opt for the European uniform, provided he does so in every respect. It was also asserted that deputy superintendents were under certain disadvantages in not being allowed to attend at levees, and in not being exempted from the operation of the arms act. We did not pursue these points in detail, but speaking generally are of opinion that members of the provincial police services should enjoy the same privileges in these and kindred matters as members of the provincial civil services.

27. *Duties of deputy superintendents.*—The main grievance of the deputy superintendents was as regards their duties. It was alleged in several, though not in all, of the provinces that they had been turned into "glorified head clerks," and that this did not provide an adequate career for the class of man it was desired to attract. The position has obviously arisen out of a remark in the orders on the police

\* Volume XIII., Appendices VII. (page 133), VIII. (page 141), IX. (page 143), and XIII. (page 153); also 61687, 61690.

commission's report, where it was stated that the members of the provincial service would relieve the superintendent "of office routine, so that he may be more free to tour about his district."<sup>\*</sup> It was recognised, however, by many of the imperial officers that this was not enough, whilst it was shown that in certain provinces steps had been or were being taken to put matters on a proper footing. The precise duties to be performed by the officers of any service must obviously be left to the authorities to decide from time to time in the light of local necessities, and we desire to make no detailed recommendation under this head. But we think generally that the deputy superintendent should be treated as an executive officer, and that, where this has not been done already, the regulations should be revised with a view to dissipating the idea that he should have any more or less connection with office work than the assistant superintendent. If the deputy superintendents are to provide good material to fill the superintendentships they must be allowed to find their feet in subdivisions, or in the executive charge, under the superintendents, of portions of districts.

### CHAPTER XIII.

#### CONDITIONS OF LEAVE.

28. *Leave rules.*—The officers of the various provincial police services are and should continue to be under the Indian service leave rules, to whatever community they may belong.

### CHAPTER XIV.

#### CONDITIONS OF PENSION.

29. *Pension rules.*—The ordinary pension rules apply to these departments and, as revised by us, should continue to do so. There is no appointment which should carry a special additional pension.

## PART III.—SPECIAL POLICE FORCES.

### CHAPTER XV.

30. *General recommendations with regard to the special police forces.*—Special police forces exist in the three presidency towns and in Rangoon. There are also special railway and river forces, and officers are attached to the various provincial and imperial criminal investigation departments. We made no detailed inquiry into these, but observed two matters of a general character which seemed to require attention. First, the adequacy of the salaries in the expensive cities needs to be reviewed in the light of present local conditions. Secondly, the arrangements for the recruitment by promotion of deserving Indians requires reconsideration in view of the success which has been achieved by the deputy superintendent class. We therefore suggest that, when a decision has been come to on our recommendations with regard to the main police services, the local Governments be called upon to consider the extension of the reforms sanctioned into the various special forces.

## PART IV.

### CHAPTER XVI.

#### SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS.

31. *Changes recommended in the Indian police service.*—The changes which we have recommended in the Indian police service are as follows :—

- (i) Once an officer of a provincial police service has been promoted permanently to the Indian police service, he should become a full member of that service and should be able to rise through all its grades (paragraph 3).
- (ii) Europeans of mixed descent and Indians of unmixed Asiatic descent, who have been educated in the United Kingdom for a period of five years, should be allowed to appear for the open competitive examination in London (paragraph 5).
- (iii) The power at present possessed by the Governor General in Council to make appointments in India in exceptional cases should be developed to cover the cases of all statutory natives of India, and should be more freely exercised than has hitherto been the case (paragraph 6).
- (iv) Not less than ten per cent. of the superintendentships should be filled by promotion from the provincial service, and efforts should be made gradually to extend this amount to twenty per cent. Recruitment in England for all the appointments thus allocated should be stopped at once. Immediate steps should be taken to give five per cent. of the

\* Volume XIII., Appendix XVI. (paragraph 33, page 167).

## ANNEXURE XVI.—POLICE DEPARTMENT—(continued).

- superintendships to members of the provincial services, and the remainder when provision has been made for all assistant superintendents already recruited against them. Promotions in excess of five per cent. should be given only to directly recruited deputy superintendents. Opportunities should be made for the best of the younger officers to enter the higher ranks at approximately the same age as the assistant superintendents (paragraph 7).
- (v) Opportunities should be given to the heads of the various police schools and to inspectors-general to see for themselves what is going on in provinces other than their own. Provision should be made for periodical conferences of police officers (paragraph 8).
  - (vi) The pay of deputy inspectors-general should be fixed at Rs. 1,500-100-2,000 a month. For the superintendents there should be one selection grade on Rs. 1,200 a month as at present. The others should be given an incremental salary of Rs. 700-60/2-1,000 a month. The efficiency bar at Rs. 900 a month should be removed. Assistant superintendents should be paid at the rate of Rs. 300-50-400-50/2-600 a month. Statutory natives of India, whether directly recruited or promoted from the provincial services, should be paid the above rates of salary in full (paragraph 9).
  - (vii) In certain large districts, where there is more work than can be performed by a single superintendent, additional superintendents should be appointed to work under the superintendent of the district unless and until it is found possible to divide the district (paragraph 10).
  - (viii) The formula for fixing the strength of the police cadre should be revised and based on up-to-date police experience. Deduction should be made on account of posts to be filled by promotion from the provincially recruited services. The formula should be kept up to date by a quinquennial check. The annual rate of recruitment should be revised along with the formula (paragraph 11).
  - (ix) To relieve blocks of promotion transfers should be made of officers from provinces where there is an excess to neighbouring provinces where there is a deficiency of staff, with a view to drawing off the overflow of congested years. Failing this remedy officers should be encouraged to retire, and, as a last resort, personal allowances should be given to mitigate hardships. Similar steps should be taken where there is a deficiency of staff. Additions and subtractions should only be made at the foot of the cadre if it is found impossible to apply the remedy required at the proper points (paragraph 12).
  - (x) Recruitment against the appointments of inspector-general, whether in the Indian civil service or police cadre, should be stopped. Local Governments should fill the appointments from the best material available with due regard to the claims of senior police officers and to the advantages of local experience (paragraph 13).
  - (xi) Increased facilities should be provided by Government in the matter of chargers (paragraph 15).
  - (xii) Officers appointed directly in India and officers promoted from the provincial services should be placed under the Indian service leave rules as revised by us, and should continue under them throughout their careers (paragraph 16).
  - (xiii) The proposed general pension rules should apply to all officers. The posts of inspector-general and deputy inspector-general should carry a special additional pension under the general scheme (paragraph 17).

32. *Changes recommended in the provincial and special police services.*—The changes which we have proposed in the provincial and special police services are as follows :—

- (i) Officers should no longer be appointed from other departments (paragraph 19).
- (ii) In all provinces except Burma at least half the vacancies should be reserved for direct recruits. In Burma the local Government should set aside a definite share of all future vacancies to be filled by direct recruits (paragraph 19).
- (iii) A committee to advise on the selection of direct recruits should be formed in each province (paragraph 19).
- (iv) Where possible all direct recruits should have taken the degree of a university or have passed an examination of a corresponding standard prescribed by Government for the European schools. Where this is not possible

## ANNEXURE XVI.—POLICE DEPARTMENT—(continued).

- the local Governments should fix a minimum number who should possess this qualification (paragraph 19).
- (v) The Burma Government should consider the question of a larger employment of persons of unmixed Asiatic descent (paragraph 20).
- (vi) A grade of probationers should be created in Madras, Bombay, Bengal, the United Provinces, the Punjab, Bihar and Orissa, and the Central Provinces, large enough to ensure that on an average two years will be passed by each direct recruit before confirmation (paragraph 21).
- (vii) There should be two selection grades on Rs. 700 and Rs. 600 a month for deputy superintendents. The rest of these officers should be placed on an incremental scale of Rs. 250-40/3-450-50/3-500 (in Burma Rs. 300-40/3-500-50/3-550) a month. Probationers should get Rs. 150 (in Burma Rs. 200) a month (paragraph 23).
- (viii) The services should be developed, and there should be no hesitation in adding to the cadre to meet administrative requirements (paragraph 24).
- (ix) The services should be styled the Madras, Bombay, etc., police service (paragraph 26).
- (x) Indian deputy superintendents should be allowed to wear European uniform provided they do so in every respect (paragraph 26).
- (xi) In matters of attendance at levees, operation of the arms act, and other kindred matters, deputy superintendents should enjoy the same privileges as members of the provincial civil services (paragraph 26).
- (xii) The duties of deputy superintendents should be so arranged that they will get a fair share of executive work in the same manner as assistant superintendents (paragraph 27).
- (xiii) The changes made in the Indian and provincial police services as the result of the foregoing recommendations should be carried out also in the special police services in so far as they are applicable to the conditions of those forces (paragraph 30).

## SCHEDULE I.

INDIAN POLICE SERVICE.  
MADRAS.

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
2	Deputy inspectors general, 1st grade.	Rs. 1,800	Rs. 3,600 0 0	5	Deputy inspectors general -	Rs. 1,500-100 2,000.	Rs. 9,166 10 8
3	Deputy inspectors general, 2nd grade.	1,500	4,500 0 0				
			8,100 0 0				9,166 10 8
2	Superintendents, 1st grade -	1,200	2,400 0 0	2	Superintendents, 1st grade -	1,200	2,400 0 0
5	" 2nd " -	1,000*	5,000 0 0	32	" 2nd " -	700-60/2-1,000.	27,199 15 6
9	" 3rd " -	900*	8,100 0 0				
8	" 4th " -	800*	6,400 0 0				
10	" 5th " -	700*	7,000 0 0				
			28,900 0 0				29,599 15 6
14	Assistant superintendents, 1st grade.	500	7,000 0 0	33	Assistant superintendents -	300-50-400-50/2-600.	15,523 9 6
14	Assistant superintendents, 2nd grade.	400	5,600 0 0				
8	Assistant superintendents, 3rd grade.	300	2,400 0 0				
			15,000 0 0				15,523 9 6
	Add—Probable acting allowances for officiating promotion between grades of the same class.	- - -	3,500 0 0		Add—Cost of three additional deputy superintendents.	- - -	1,050 0 0
			3,500 0 0				1,050 0 0
			55,500 0 0				
	Deduct—Difference between pay of two European and Indian officers.	- - -	200 0 0				
	Total - - -	- - -	55,300 0 0		Total - - -	- - -	55,340 3 8
					Deduct present cost - - -	- - -	55,300 0 0
75				72	Net extra expenditure - - -	- - -	40 3 8

\* Promoted deputy superintendents draw Rs. 600, 700, 800, and 900.

## ANNEXURE XVI.—POLICE DEPARTMENT—(continued).

## BOMBAY.

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
2	Deputy inspectors general, 1st grade.	Rs. 1,800	Rs. 3,600 0 0	4	Deputy inspectors general	Rs. 1,500-100-2,000.	Rs. 7,333 5 4
2	Deputy inspectors general, 2nd grade.	1,500	3,000 0 0				
			6,600 0 0				7,333 5 4
2	Superintendents, 1st grade	1,200	2,400 0 0	2	Superintendents, 1st grade	1,200	2,400 0 0
5	" 2nd "	1,000*	5,000 0 0	33	" 2nd "	700-60/2-1,000.	28,240 2 10
9	" 3rd "	900*	8,100 0 0				
9	" 4th "	800*	7,200 0 0				
10	" 5th "	700*	7,000 0 0				
			29,700 0 0				30,640 2 10
13	Assistant superintendents, 1st grade.	500	6,500 0 0	30	Assistant superintendents	300-50-400-50/2-600	13,971 5 3
14	Assistant superintendents, 2nd grade.	400	5,600 0 0				
6	Assistant superintendents, 3rd grade.	300	1,800 0 0				
			13,900 0 0				13,971 5 3
	Add—Probable acting allowances for officiating promotion between grades of the same class.	- - -	3,250 0 0		Add—Cost of three additional deputy superintendents.	- - -	1,050 0 0
			3,250 0 0				1,050 0 0
			53,450 0 0				
	Deduct—Difference between pay of one European and Indian officer.	- - -	100 0 0				
	Total	- - -	53,350 0 0		Total	- - -	52,994 13 5
					Present cost	- - -	53,350 0 0
72				69	Net savings	- - -	355 2 7

## BENGAL.

2	Deputy inspectors general, 1st grade.	Rs. 1,800	Rs. 3,600 0 0	4	Deputy inspectors general	Rs. 1,500-100-2,000.	Rs. 7,333 5 4
2	Deputy inspectors general, 2nd grade.	1,500	3,000 0 0				
			6,600 0 0				7,333 5 4
2	Superintendents, 1st grade	1,200	2,400 0 0	2	Superintendents, 1st grade	1,200	2,400 0 0
7	" 2nd "	1,000*	7,000 0 0	43	" 2nd "	700-60/2-1,000	37,068 8 2
11	" 3rd "	900*	9,900 0 0				
11	" 4th "	800*	8,800 0 0				
14	" 5th "	700*	9,800 0 0				
			37,900 0 0				39,468 8 2
17	Assistant superintendents, 1st grade.	500	8,500 0 0	41	Assistant superintendents	300-50-500-50/2-600	19,331 15 3
18	Assistant superintendents, 2nd grade.	400	7,200 0 0				
11	Assistant superintendents, 3rd grade.	300	3,300 0 0				
			19,000 0 0				19,331 15 3
	Add—Probable acting allowances for officiating promotion between grades of the same class.	- - -	4,500 0 0		Add—Cost of five additional deputy superintendents.	- - -	1,750 0 0
			4,500 0 0				1,750 0 0
			68,000 0 0				
	Deduct—Difference between pay of two European and Indian officers.	- - -	200 0 0				
	Total	- - -	67,800 0 0		Total	- - -	67,883 12 9
					Deduct present cost	- - -	67,800 0 0
95				90	Net extra expenditure	- - -	83 12 9

\* Promoted deputy superintendents draw Rs. 600, 700, 800, and 900.

## ANNEXURE XVI.—POLICE DEPARTMENT—(continued).

## UNITED PROVINCES.

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
2	Deputy inspectors general, 1st grade.	Rs. 1,800	Rs. 3,600 0 0	5	Deputy inspectors general	Rs. 1,500-100 2,000	Rs. 9,166 10 8
3	Deputy inspectors general, 2nd grade.	1,500	4,500 0 0				
			8,100 0 0				9,166 10 8
3	Superintendents, 1st grade -	1,200	3,600 0 0	3	Superintendents, 1st grade -	1,200	3,600 0 0
8	" 2nd " -	1,000*	8,000 0 0	52	" 2nd " -	700-60/2-1,000	44,844 3 10
14	" 3rd " -	900*	12,600 0 0				
14	" 4th " -	800*	11,200 0 0				
16	" 5th " -	700*	11,200 0 0				
			46,600 0 0				48,444 3 10
20	Assistant superintendents, 1st grade.	500	10,000 0 0	45	Assistant superintendents	300-50-400 -50/2-600	20,864 4 9
20	Assistant superintendents, 2nd grade.	400	8,000 0 0				
10	Assistant superintendents, 3rd grade.	300	3,000 0 0				
			21,000 0 0				20,864 4 9
	Add—Probable acting allowances for officiating promotion between grades of the same class.	- - -	5,250 0 0		Add—Cost of five additional deputy superintendents.	- - -	1,750 0 0
			5,250 0 0				1,750 0 0
	Total - - -	- - -	80,950 0 0		Total - - -	- - -	80,225 3 3
					Present cost - - -	- - -	80,950 0 0
110				105	Net savings - - -	- - -	724 12 9

## PUNJAB.

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
1	Inspector general—Punjab	Rs. 2,500-100-3,000	Rs. 2,833 5 4	1	Inspector general—Punjab	Rs. 2,500-100-3,000	Rs. 2,833 5 4
1	Inspector general—N.W.F. Province.	2,000	2,000 0 0	1	Inspector generals—N.W.F. Province.	2,000	2,000 0 0
			4,833 5 4				4,833 5 4
2	Deputy inspectors general, 1st grade.	1,800	3,600 0 0	4	Deputy inspectors general	1,500-100-2,000	7,333 5 4
2	Deputy inspectors general, 2nd grade.	1,500	3,000 0 0				
			6,600 0 0				7,333 5 4
2	Superintendents, 1st grade -	1,200	2,400 0 0	2	Superintendents, 1st grade -	1,200	2,400 0 0
7	" 2nd " -	1,000*	7,000 0 0	45	" 2nd " -	700-60/2-1,000	38,732 0 8
12	" 3rd " -	900*	10,800 0 0				
12	" 4th " -	800*	9,600 0 0				
14	" 5th " -	700*	9,800 0 0				
			39,600 0 0				41,132 0 8
17	Assistant superintendents, 1st grade.	500	8,500 0 0	43	Assistant superintendents	300-50-400 -50/2-600	20,284 0 9
18	Assistant superintendents, 2nd grade.	400	7,200 0 0				
11	Assistant superintendents, 3rd grade.	300	3,300 0 0				
			19,000 0 0				20,284 0 9
	Add—Probable acting allowances for officiating promotion between grades of the same class.	- - -	4,750 0 0		Add—Cost of three additional deputy superintendents.	- - -	1,050 0 0
			4,750 0 0				1,050 0 0
	Deduct—Difference between pay of one European and Indian officer.	- - -	74,783 5 4				
			100 0 0				
	Total - - -	- - -	74,683 5 4		Total - - -	- - -	74,632 12 1
					Present cost - - -	- - -	74,683 5 4
99				96	Net savings - - -	- - -	50 9 8

\* Promoted deputy superintendents draw Rs. 600 700, 800, and 900.

## ANNEXURE XVI.—POLICE DEPARTMENT—(continued).

## BURMA.

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
1	Inspector general - - -	Rs. 2,500-100-3,000	Rs. 2,333 5 4	1	Inspector general - - -	Rs. 2,500-100-3,000	Rs. 2,333 5 4
			2,333 5 4				2,333 5 4
2	Deputy inspectors general, 1st grade.	1,800	3,600 0 0	4	Deputy inspectors general -	1,500-100-2,000	7,333 5 4
2	Deputy inspectors general, 2nd grade.	1,500	3,000 0 0				7,333 5 4
			6,600 0 0				7,333 5 4
2	Superintendents, 1st grade -	1,200	2,400 0 0	2	Superintendents, 1st grade -	1,200	2,400 0 0
7	" 2nd " -	1,000*	7,000 0 0	42	" 2nd " -	700-60/2-1,000.	35,989 7 8
11	" 3rd " -	900*	9,900 0 0				
11	" 4th " -	800*	8,800 0 0				
13	" 5th " -	700*	9,100 0 0				
			37,200 0 0				38,389 7 8
16	Assistant superintendents, 1st grade.	500	8,000 0 0	39	Assistant superintendents -	300-50-400-50/2-600	18,255 12 6
17	Assistant superintendents, 2nd grade.	400	6,800 0 0				
9	Assistant superintendents, 3rd grade.	300	2,700 0 0				
			17,500 0 0				18,255 12 6
	Add—Probable acting allowances for officiating promotion between grades of the same class.	- - -	4,250 0 0		Add—Cost of three additional deputy superintendents.	- - -	1,050 0 0
			4,250 0 0				1,050 0 0
			68,383 5 4				
	Deduct—Difference between pay of two European and Indian officers.	- - -	200 0 0				
	Total - - -	- - -	68,183 5 4		Total - - -	- - -	67,861 14 10
					Present cost - - -	- - -	68,183 5 4
91				88	Net savings - - -	- - -	321 6 6

\* Promoted deputy superintendents draw Rs. 600, 700 800, and 900.

## ANNEXURE XVI.—POLICE DEPARTMENT—(continued).

## BIHAR AND ORISSA.

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
1	Deputy inspector general, 1st grade.	Rs. 1,800	Rs. 1,800 0 0	3	Deputy inspectors general -	Rs. 1,500-100-2,000	Rs. 5,500 0 0
2	Deputy inspectors general, 2nd grade.	1,500	3,000 0 0				
			4,800 0 0				5,500 0 0
1	Superintendent, 1st grade -	1,200	1,200 0 0	1	Superintendent, 1st grade -	1,200	1,200 0 0
4	Superintendents, 2nd " -	1,000*	4,000 0 0	24	Superintendents, 2nd " -	700-60/2-1,000	20,609 1 11
6	" 3rd " -	900*	5,400 0 0				
6	" 4th " -	800*	4,800 0 0				
8	" 5th " -	700*	5,600 0 0				
			21,000 0 0				21,809 1 11
9	Assistant superintendents, 1st grade.	500	4,500 0 0	23	Assistant superintendents -	300-50-400-50/2-600	10,825 3 3
10	Assistant superintendents, 2nd grade.	400	4,000 0 0				
6	Assistant superintendents, 3rd grade.	300	1,800 0 0				
			10,300 0 0				10,825 3 3
	Add—Probable acting allowances for officiating promotion between grades of the same class.	- - -	2,500 0 0		Add—Cost of two additional deputy superintendents.	- - -	700 0 0
			2,500 0 0				700 0 0
			38,600 0 0				
	Deduct—Difference between pay of one European and Indian officer.	- - -	100 0 0				
	Total - - -	- - -	38,500 0 0		Total - - -	- - -	38,334 5 2
					Present cost - - -	- - -	38,500 0 0
53				51	Net extra expenditure - - -	- - -	334 5 2

## CENTRAL PROVINCES.

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
1	Deputy inspector general, 1st grade.	Rs. 1,800	Rs. 1,800 0 0	2	Deputy inspectors general -	Rs. 1,500-100-2,000	Rs. 3,666 10 8
1	Deputy inspector general, 2nd grade.	1,500	1,500 0 0				
			3,300 0 0				3,666 10 8
1	Superintendent, 1st grade -	1,200	1,200 0 0	1	Superintendent, 1st grade -	1,200	1,200 0 0
5	Superintendents, 2nd " -	1,000*	5,000 0 0	26	Superintendents, 2nd " -	700-60/2-1,000	22,540 11 2
7	" 3rd " -	900*	6,300 0 0				
7	" 4th " -	800*	5,600 0 0				
7	" 5th " -	700*	4,900 0 0				
			23,000 0 0				23,740 11 2
10	Assistant superintendents, 1st grade.	500	5,000 0 0	22	Assistant superintendents -	300-50-400-50/2-600	10,225 2 11
10	Assistant superintendents, 2nd grade.	400	4,000 0 0				
4	Assistant superintendents, 3rd grade.	300	1,200 0 0				
			10,200 0 0				10,225 2 11
	Add—Probable acting allowances for officiating promotion between grades of the same class.	- - -	2,500 0 0		Add—Cost of two additional deputy superintendents.	- - -	700 0 0
			2,500 0 0				700 0 0
			39,000 0 0				
	Deduct—Difference between pay of one European and Indian officer.	- - -	100 0 0				
	Total - - -	- - -	38,900 0 0		Total - - -	- - -	38,332 8 9
					Present cost - - -	- - -	38,900 0 0
53				51	Net savings - - -	- - -	567 7 3

\* Promoted deputy superintendents draw Rs. 600, 700, 800, and 900.

ANNEXURE XVI.—POLICE DEPARTMENT—(continued).

ASSAM.

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
		Rs.	Rs. A. P.			Rs.	Rs. A. P.
1	Superintendent, 1st grade -	1,200	1,200 0 0	1	Superintendent, 1st grade -	1,200	1,200 0 0
1	" 2nd " -	1,000*	1,000 0 0	11	Superintendents, 2nd " -	700-60/2-1,000	9,528 2 2
3	Superintendents, 3rd " -	900*	2,700 0 0				
3	" 4th " -	800*	2,400 0 0				
4	" 5th " -	700*	2,800 0 0				
			10,100 0 0				10,728 2 2
4	Assistant superintendents, 1st grade.	500	2,000 0 0	10	Assistant superintendents -	300-50-400-50/2-600.	4,698 7 0
4	Assistant superintendents, 2nd grade.	400	1,600 0 0				
3	Assistant superintendents, 3rd grade.	300	900 0 0				
			4,500 0 0				4,698 7 0
	Add—Probable acting allowances for officiating promotion between grades of the same class.	- - -	1,000 0 0		Add—Cost of an additional deputy superintendent.	- - -	300 0 0
			1,000 0 0				300 0 0
23	Total - - - -	- - -	15,600 0 0	22	Total - - - -	- - -	15,726 9 2
					Deduct present cost - - -	- - -	15,600 0 0
					Net extra expenditure - - -	- - -	126 9 2
671				644	Total net savings per mensem - -	- -	1,434 7 7
					" " per annum - -	- -	17,213 11 0

\* Promoted deputy superintendents draw Rs. 600, 700, 800, and 900

ANNEXURE XVI.—POLICE DEPARTMENT—(continued).

SCHEDULE II.

PROVINCIAL POLICE SERVICES.

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
	<i>Madras :</i>	<i>Rs.</i>	<i>Rs. A. P.</i>		<i>Madras :</i>	<i>Rs.</i>	<i>Rs. A. P.</i>
8	Deputy superintendents, 1st grade.	500	4,000 0 0	3	Deputy superintendents, 1st grade.	700	2,100 0 0
12	Deputy superintendents, 2nd grade.	400	4,800 0 0	3	Deputy superintendents, 2nd grade.	600	1,800 0 0
10	Deputy superintendents, 3rd grade.	300	3,000 0 0	37	Deputy superintendents, 3rd Grade.	250-40/3-450-50/3-500.	12,741 15 2
10	Deputy superintendents, 4th grade.	250*	2,500 0 0	2	Probationers - - -	150	300 0 0
			14,300 0 0				16,941 15 2
	Deduct difference between grade pay and probationary allowance.	- - -	312 2 5		Deduct—Amount included under Indian Police for three additional deputy superintendents.	- - -	1,050 0 0
	Total - - -	- - -	13,987 13 7		Total - - -	- - -	15,891 15 2
					Deduct present cost - - -	- - -	13,987 13 7
40				45	Net extra expenditure - - -	- - -	1,904 1 7
	<i>Bombay :</i>				<i>Bombay :</i>		
7	Deputy superintendents, 1st grade.	500	3,500 0 0	2	Deputy superintendents, 1st grade.	700	1,400 0 0
10	Deputy superintendents, 2nd grade.	400	4,000 0 0	3	Deputy superintendents, 2nd grade.	600	1,800 0 0
9	Deputy superintendents, 3rd grade.	300	2,700 0 0	33	Deputy superintendents, 3rd grade.	250-40/3-450-50/3-500.	11,242 10 9
9	Deputy superintendents, 4th grade.	250*	2,250 0 0	2	Probationers - - -	150	300 0 0
			12,450 0 0				14,742 10 9
	Deduct—Difference between grade pay and probationary allowance.	- - -	267 9 7		Deduct—Amount included under Indian Police for three additional deputy superintendents.	- - -	1,050 0 0
35	Total - - -	- - -	12,182 6 5	40	Total - - -	- - -	13,692 10 9
					Deduct present cost - - -	- - -	12,182 6 5
					Net extra expenditure - - -	- - -	1,510 4 4
	<i>Bengal :</i>				<i>Bengal :</i>		
5	Deputy superintendents, 1st grade.	500	2,500 0 0	2	Deputy superintendents, 1st grade.	700	1,400 0 0
7	Deputy superintendents, 2nd grade.	400	2,800 0 0	2	Deputy superintendents, 2nd grade.	600	1,200 0 0
6	Deputy superintendents, 3rd grade.	300	1,800 0 0	24	Deputy superintendents, 3rd grade.	250-40/3-450-50/3-500.	7,962 10 0
5	Deputy superintendents, 4th grade.	250*	1,250 0 0	2	Probationers - - -	150	300 0 0
			8,350 0 0				10,862 10 0
	Deduct—Difference between grade pay and probationary allowance.	- - -	185 13 7		Deduct—Amount included under Indian Police for five additional deputy superintendents.	- - -	1,750 0 0
23	Total - - -	- - -	8,164 2 5	30	Total - - -	- - -	9,112 10 0
					Deduct present cost - - -	- - -	8,164 2 5
					Net extra expenditure - - -	- - -	948 7 7
	<i>United Provinces of Agra and Oudh :</i>				<i>United Provinces of Agra and Oudh :</i>		
8	Deputy superintendents, 1st grade.	500	4,000 0 0	3	Deputy superintendents, 1st grade.	700	2,100 0 0
12	Deputy superintendents, 2nd grade.	400	4,800 0 0	3	Deputy superintendents, 2nd grade.	600	1,800 0 0
10	Deputy superintendents, 3rd grade.	300	3,900 0 0	39	Deputy superintendents, 3rd grade.	250-40/3-450-50/3-500.	13,164 15 4
10	Deputy superintendents, 4th grade.	250*	2,500 0 0	3	Probationers - - -	150	450 0 0
			14,300 0 0				17,514 15 4
	Deduct—Difference between grade pay and probationary allowance.	- - -	297 4 10		Deduct—Amount included under Indian Police for five additional deputy superintendents.	- - -	1,750 0 0
40	Total - - -	- - -	14,002 11 2	48	Total - - -	- - -	15,764 15 4
					Deduct present cost - - -	- - -	14,002 11 2
					Net extra expenditure - - -	- - -	1,762 4 2

\* Allowance of Rs. 100 during probation.

## ANNEXURE XVI.—POLICE DEPARTMENT—(continued).

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
	<i>Punjab :</i>	Rs.	Rs. A. P.		<i>Punjab :</i>	Rs.	Rs. A. P.
7	Deputy superintendents, 1st grade.	500	3,500 0 0	2	Deputy superintendents, 1st grade.	700	1,400 0 0
10	Deputy superintendents, 2nd grade.	400	4,000 0 0	3	Deputy superintendents, 2nd grade.	600	1,800 0 0
9	Deputy superintendents, 3rd grade.	300	2,700 0 0	32	Deputy superintendents, 3rd grade.	250-40/3-450-50/3-500.	10,788 12 10
8	Deputy superintendents, 4th grade.	250*	2,000 0 0	2	Probationers - - -	150	300 0 0
			12,200 0 0				14,288 12 10
	Deduct—Difference between grade pay and probationary allowance.	- - -	260 1 7		Deduct—Amount included under Indian Police for three additional deputy superintendents.	- - -	1,050 0 0
34	Total - - -	- - -	11,939 14 5	39	Total - - -	- - -	13,238 12 10
					Deduct present cost - - -	- - -	11,939 14 5
					Net extra expenditure - - -	- - -	1,298 14 5
	<i>Burma :</i>				<i>Burma :</i>		
8	Deputy superintendents, 1st grade.	500	4,000 0 0	3	Deputy superintendents, 1st grade.	700	2,100 0 0
11	Deputy superintendents, 2nd grade.	400	4,400 0 0	3	Deputy superintendents, 2nd grade.	600	1,800 0 0
10	Deputy superintendents, 3rd grade.	300	3,000 0 0	36	Deputy superintendents, 3rd grade.	300-40/3-500-50/3-550.	12,976 15 10
10	Deputy superintendents, 4th grade.	250	2,500 0 0				16,876 15 10
					Deduct—Amount included under Indian Police for three additional deputy superintendents.	- - -	1,050 0 0
39	Total - - -	- - -	13,900 0 0	42	Total - - -	- - -	15,826 15 10
					Deduct present cost - - -	- - -	13,900 0 0
					Net extra expenditure - - -	- - -	1,926 15 10
	<i>Bihar and Orissa :</i>				<i>Bihar and Orissa :</i>		
3	Deputy superintendents, 1st grade.	500	1,500 0 0	1	Deputy superintendent, 1st grade.	700	700 0 0
4	Deputy superintendents, 2nd grade.	400	1,600 0 0	1	Deputy superintendent, 2nd grade.	600	600 0 0
4	Deputy superintendents, 3rd grade.	300	1,200 0 0	15	Deputy superintendents, 3rd grade.	250-40/3-450-50/3-500.	5,030 6 2
4	Deputy superintendents, 4th grade.	250*	1,000 0 0	1	Probationer - - -	150	150 0 0
			5,300 0 0				6,480 6 2
	Deduct—Difference between grade pay and probationary allowance.	- - -	118 15 2		Deduct—Amount included under Indian Police for two additional deputy superintendents.	- - -	700 0 0
15	Total - - -	- - -	5,181 0 10	18	Total - - -	- - -	5,780 6 2
					Deduct present cost - - -	- - -	5,181 0 10
					Net extra expenditure - - -	- - -	599 5 4
	<i>Central Provinces and Berar :</i>				<i>Central Provinces and Berar :</i>		
4	Deputy superintendents, 1st grade.	500	2,000 0 0	1	Deputy superintendent, 1st grade.	700	700 0 0
5	Deputy superintendents, 2nd grade.	400	2,000 0 0	2	Deputy superintendents, 2nd grade.	600	1,200 0 0
4	Deputy superintendents, 3rd grade.	300	1,200 0 0	17	Deputy superintendents, 3rd grade.	250-40/3-450-50/3-500.	5,672 6 6
5	Deputy superintendents, 4th grade.	250*	1,250 0 0	1	Probationer - - -	150	150 0 0
			6,450 0 0				7,722 6 6
	Deduct—Difference between grade pay and probationary allowance.	- - -	141 4 10		Deduct—Amount included under Indian Police for two additional deputy superintendents.	- - -	700 0 0
18	Total - - -	- - -	6,308 11 2	21	Total - - -	- - -	7,022 6 6
					Deduct present cost - - -	- - -	6,308 11 2
					Net extra expenditure - - -	- - -	713 11 4

\* Allowance of Rs. 100 during probation.

ANNEXURE XVI.—POLICE DEPARTMENT—(continued).

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
2	Assam : Deputy superintendents, 1st grade.	Rs. 500	Rs. A. P. 1,000 0 0	1	Assam : Deputy superintendent, 1st grade.	Rs. 700	Rs. A. P. 700 0 0
3	Deputy superintendents, 2nd grade.	400	1,200 0 0	1	Deputy superintendent, 2nd grade.	600	600 0 0
3	Deputy superintendents, 3rd grade.	300	900 0 0	10	Deputy superintendents, 3rd grade.	250-40/3-450-50/3-500 (150 while on probation).	3,245 2 7
3	Deputy snperintendents, 4th grade	250*	750 0 0				
			3,850 0 0				4,545 2 7
	Deduct—Difference between grade pay and probationary allowance.	- - -	81 12 0		Deduct—Amount included under Indian Police for one additional deputy superintendent.	- - -	300 0 0
11	Total - - - -	- - -	3,768 4 0	12	Total - - - -	- - -	4,245 2 7
255				295	Deduct present cost	- - -	3,768 4 0
					Net extra expenditure	- - -	476 14 7
					Total net extra expenditure per mensem.		11,140 15 2
					Total net extra expenditure per annum.		1,33,691 6 0

Allowance of Rs. 100 during probation.

MINUTE BY MR. M. B. CHAUBAL.

The Indian public will hail the recommendation to do away with what they have been complaining about as an infringement of the letter and spirit of the Government of India act of 1833. But under the proposed recommendation they are also likely to think that it is calculated to observe the letter and ignore the spirit of the enactment. At the same time I believe this is and has always been a service in which it is considered necessary that the officers should have a European training and upbringing. I am not therefore prepared to differ from the recommendation that insists upon education in the United Kingdom for five years previous to the examination. But this examination is at the age of 19, and in order to compete for it an Asiatic Indian student will have to be in the United Kingdom before he is 14. The inconvenience and difficulty of sending young boys at this age was felt by us when considering a similar proposal made to us in the evidence about the Indian civil service. It is not therefore likely that this facility for employment in the police department is likely to be of much practical use to Indians. I think the age of the candidates for this examination should range between 21 and 23. It is just possible that more young men will be able to come and stay in the United Kingdom at the age of 16 than at 14. This would be particularly desirable if the recruitment in India is only going to be ten per cent. for a long time to come.

M. B. CHAUBAL.

MINUTE BY Mr. W. C. MADGE.

Paragraph 5.—For the reasons given in the minute which I have attached to the main report\* with regard to the position of the domiciled community in India, I dissent from the recommendations which impose on Anglo-Indians of mixed descent qualifications for recruitment which are not imposed on Europeans of unmixed descent, and are according to my legal advice, an executive infringement of a legal right which can only be judicially limited.

W. C. MADGE.

\* See page 386.

## ANNEXURE XVII.

### Post Office of India and Telegraph Department.

*(The evidence relating to the post office of India and the telegraph department will be found in volume XVII.)*

#### CHAPTER I.

##### INTRODUCTORY.

1. At the time of our inquiry in India the post office and the telegraph department were separate entities, but a process of fusion had been commenced, and proposals were under discussion for a complete amalgamation. This has since been carried out in virtue of the orders passed on the subject on the 6th March 1914.\* Under the new scheme the traffic and engineering branches of the old telegraph department have been separated. The former has been assimilated with the post office, whilst the conditions of the latter have been left to correspond closely with those prevailing in the public works department and in the engineering branch of the railway department. Both have been placed with the post office under one director-general of posts and telegraphs. Certain alterations in the rates of pay drawn by officers have also been sanctioned. In view of the action taken, we have accepted this reconstruction as a settled fact, and shall propose only such changes as are compatible with this decision. For the most part these will be put forward in order to bring the new scheme into line with what we are recommending in the cases of similarly circumstanced departments.

#### CHAPTER II.

##### ORGANISATION.

2. *Post office.*—The superior staff of the post office consists of gazetted or first-class postmasters and superintendents with the necessary administrative officers above them. The first-class postmasters are in charge of the major offices, to which a salary of Rs. 300 a month and over is attached. There are also second-class postmasters in charge of the minor offices, but they belong to what is in effect a subordinate service and lie outside the scope of our inquiry. The department is not divided into imperial and provincial branches. We accept this as suitable. We also approve of the arrangement by which members of the Indian civil service are introduced into the department as postmasters-general but have no special privileges in the matter of salary or status to differentiate them in any way from their colleagues of the same rank. We think, however, that the desire expressed by the departmental officers to have the numbers allotted to each service revised is reasonable. At present there are ten postmaster-generalships, to fill which ten permanent and two officiating officers are always likely to be required. Of these one permanent and one officiating post are needed for telegraph officers under the amalgamation scheme. Of the rest we recommend that the postal department be guaranteed four permanent and one officiating appointment, subject to fit men being available, and that five permanent appointments be kept for the Indian civil service. Should new postmaster-generalships be created, they should be disposed of by the authorities as seems best at the time, with due regard to the desirability of eventually making the department self-supporting, but subject always to the claims of efficiency.

3. *Traffic branch of the telegraph department.*—The superior staff of the traffic branch of the telegraph department is made up of 40 officers, of whom 27 belong to a lower and 13 to an upper division. There is also an upper subordinate service of deputy superintendents, into whose case, after hearing one witness, we decided not to inquire further. The duties of the superior traffic staff are not such as to require the recruitment of officers with different qualifications, and there is no division of the service into imperial and provincial branches. As in the case of the post office, we approve this arrangement.

4. *Engineering branch of the telegraph department.*—On the engineering side of the telegraph department there is also an upper subordinate service of deputy superintendents, but, as on the traffic side, after hearing one witness, we decided to inquire no

\* Vol. XVII., Appendix I. (ii) (page 90).

further into its conditions. The new scheme also provides for a superior service of 46 officers, of whom four are to have administrative and 24 executive rank. The remaining 18 are to be assistants, who will be qualifying themselves to fill the executive charges. These officers are all on one list for promotion and take seniority amongst themselves from the dates of their appointments, but those recruited in Europe are allotted to an imperial and those in India to a provincial branch. This arrangement is in every way similar to that which we have condemned in the case of the public works department and the engineering branch of the railway department. It should be abolished here also, and all officers be made members of one service.

### CHAPTER III.

#### METHODS OF RECRUITMENT.

5. *Place of appointment. Post office and traffic branch of the telegraph department.*—The post office is, and the traffic branch of the telegraph department in future will be, recruited ordinarily in India and from amongst statutory natives of India. There are no grounds of policy for doing otherwise, nor are any technical qualifications required in recruits which cannot be procured in India. We therefore approve this arrangement. The director-general, however, has power to enlist in India non-domiciled Europeans to the extent of ten per cent. of the superintendents' cadre for employment on field service in time of war, and in places like cantonments, where the presence of such officers is found in practice to be necessary. It was also stated that occasionally it might be expedient to maintain touch with the British post office by bringing out an officer from that institution for service in the superior traffic staff of the telegraph department. We recognise that such exceptions to the general rule of employing only statutory natives of India may need to be made, but think that they should be justified in each case. We therefore recommend that in future the sanction of the Government of India be sought to such appointments, and that the unrestricted powers now possessed by the head of the department be to this extent curtailed. We also think that all officers appointed under these powers should come in as probationers at the foot of the cadre and not be admitted to any higher grade, as is sometimes allowed at present.

6. *Place of appointment. Engineering branch of the telegraph department.*—Different considerations arise in the case of the engineering branch of the telegraph department. Here there are grounds of policy for maintaining an element which has been recruited in Europe and which will be mainly European. This is reflected in the new scheme, which provides for half recruitment there and half in India. We think this a suitable distribution.

7. *Limitations in the employment of non-Europeans. Post Office.*—In our inquiry we have covered the cases of 246 officers of the post office establishment, exclusive of those belonging to the Indian civil service. The statement furnished for the appointments in this department on Rs. 200 a month and over, held on the 1st April 1913 by members of the various communities, gives a total of 277, or 31 more.\* This difference is due to the fact that we have omitted from our inquiry the posts on Rs. 200–300 a month held by the second-class postmasters. For present purposes, however, the details for the larger total can be regarded as sufficiently accurate. These show that in the higher ranks, for example in the posts carrying salaries of Rs. 500 a month and over, Indians or Burmans of unmixed Asiatic descent were in a marked inferiority. Out of 46 such appointments they held only 5, or 11 per cent. Taking the service, however, as a whole, out of 277 appointments they held 132, or 48 per cent. Roughly speaking, therefore, a half-and-half distribution has already been achieved. In these circumstances we do not think it expedient to fix any minimum for the members of this community. We prefer to express our approval of the progress already made, and to leave it to the authorities to continue to increase the proportion with due regard to the merits of the candidates and the efficient discharge of the business of the department.

8. *Limitations in the employment of non-Europeans. Telegraph department.*—The facts with regard to the telegraph department are obscure owing to the re-organisation which has been effected subsequent to the completion of our inquiry. According to the new scheme only 40 officers on the traffic and 46 on the engineering side, making 86 in all, will come within our scope. On the other hand, the return

\* Vol. XVII., Appendix IV. (page 98).

## ANNEXURE XVII.—POST OFFICE OF INDIA AND TELEGRAPH DEPARTMENT—(continued).

furnished to show the position prevailing on the 1st April 1913 gives a total of 664 appointments.\* This was drawn up on the basis of the old cadre and includes the members of the upper subordinate services and portions of the signalling establishment. It is thus of no use for present purposes. The question, however, is not a crucial one, as the places in both branches are all earmarked for officers already in the department, for whom provision has to be made. We, therefore, make no recommendation under this head beyond that the authorities should have due regard to the claims of Indians of unmixed Asiatic descent to employment in this department.

9. *Extent to which direct appointments should be made to gazetted postmasterships.*—The practice as to direct recruitment and promotion from below varies in the different branches. In the post office the gazetted or first-class postmasters are ordinarily all officers who have served previously as second-class postmasters or in some other subordinate capacity. This was justified on the ground that work in a post office depends for its successful conduct on a knowledge of detailed regulations, which can be acquired only by long practice. At the same time it was admitted that this method of selection had not invariably produced a sufficiency of officers suited for the charge of the biggest offices or for administrative rank, and that it was occasionally necessary to utilise superintendents for the former purpose and more often than not for the latter. To remedy this the experiment was being made of appointing a few direct recruits as probationary postmasters, but sufficient time had not elapsed to judge of the results. We recognise the difficulties of the position and that experience must in the long run decide what is best for the efficient conduct of postal business. At the same time we are convinced that some direct recruitment is desirable, and we recommend that at least one vacancy in four be filled by this method and that the necessary addition be made to the cadre in the shape of one probationer. If this arrangement proves a success it will obviate the necessity of diverting superintendents from their proper work, and will also remove the existing grievance that postmasters in practice are shut out from higher employment.

10. *Extent to which direct appointments should be made to the traffic branch of the telegraph department.*—Such a solution will also be in accordance with the decision come to under the amalgamation scheme with regard to the traffic side of the telegraph department. Here similarly the staff will ordinarily be employed in the bigger telegraph offices and familiarity with detailed rules will be essential. At the same time a personnel is needed which in due course will be capable of filling the administrative ranks. It has accordingly been decided, once the existing officers of the old telegraph department have been disposed of, to reserve only three-quarters of the vacancies for promotion from below and to allow the director-general to dispose of the remaining quarter to direct recruits. We approve this system, but would make the one quarter an obligatory quantity.

11. *Extent to which direct appointments should be made to superintendentships in the post office.*—The position of the superintendents of the post office is quite different from that of the postmasters or of the superior traffic staff of the telegraph department. Their function is to inspect and control groups of post offices extending ordinarily over two revenue districts, and generally to watch over the development of postal business throughout the country. For such work, which requires greater activity of mind and body, a leaven of younger men is necessary, and to secure this, roughly half the vacancies are now filled, as a matter of practice, by the selection of qualified persons, not already in the service of the department, leaving half for officials promoted from the subordinate ranks. A question was raised by certain witnesses whether an even higher rate of direct recruitment should not be adopted. Although we are not prepared to recommend an obligatory increase in the existing proportion, we consider that a further advance in this direction should be made, if experience of the working of the existing arrangement continues to prove satisfactory.

12. *Extent to which direct appointments should be made to the engineering branch of the telegraph department.*—On the engineering side of the telegraph department the new scheme gives half the vacancies to direct recruits in Europe, and one quarter to similar recruits in India, leaving one quarter for officers promoted in India from the upper subordinate ranks. This balance has been struck so recently that we do not desire to disturb it.

13. *Procedure to be adopted in selecting direct recruits for the post office and for the traffic branch of the telegraph department.*—Direct appointments to superintendentships are now made by the director-general, acting on the advice of a postmaster-general and with the help of the deputy director-general. These officers practically form a board of selection, and one or more of them interviews each candidate and considers his claims with reference to local needs, and the desirability of giving representation to the various communities. This procedure is also followed in selecting probationary postmasters, and will presumably also hold good when the time comes to choose direct recruits for the traffic branch of the telegraph department. On account both of the desirability of securing representation for the more important communities in India, and of the difficulties which would beset any system of examination, owing to the differences in the educational curricula of the Indian and the Anglo-Indian competitors, we consider that appointments should continue to be made by a process of nomination as at present. But we are impressed with the necessity for bringing the nominating authority into closer touch with educational experience and with Indian knowledge and sentiment. We accordingly recommend that whenever a vacancy occurs the director-general shall decide from which province it shall be filled, and that thereupon a selection committee shall be convened to advise on how to secure the best candidates and to report on their merits. These committees, which should be formed separately for each province, should consist of three officials and two non-officials, and should include two Indians. We also advise the application of a more rigorous educational qualification. Candidates should possess the degree of a university or have passed an examination of a corresponding standard prescribed by Government for the European schools.

14. *Procedure to be adopted in selecting direct recruits for the engineering branch of the telegraph department.*—For the engineering branch of the telegraph department no new recruits are now being selected.\* Nor will any step in this direction be taken until the existing members of the old telegraph department have been absorbed. When recruitment opens it is also contemplated that the first three vacancies will be given to members of the upper subordinate service as some compensation for the stoppage which has occurred in their promotion whilst the amalgamation scheme has been under discussion.† The question, therefore, is not in any way acute. We accordingly make no recommendation under this head beyond that, when direct recruits come to be taken, the procedure which we have laid down in the case of the public works department and the engineering branch of the railway department should be followed as far as possible. With the development of technical education in electrical engineering in India the importance of encouraging direct recruitment should be recognised.

## CHAPTER IV.

### SYSTEMS OF PROBATION AND TRAINING.

15. *Probation and training.*—Promoted officers in the various branches are tested in officiating vacancies, and no period of probation for them is required. A probationary grade has also been provided in the post office and on the traffic side of the telegraph department, through which all direct recruits will have to pass. We think that this will suffice and that the only caution needed is that the authorities should watch carefully the rate at which probationers are confirmed, and should appoint only so many of them as they find by experience can be absorbed within two years of their entertainment. During the probationary period officers of the post office are given a practical training in their duties, and we have no suggestions to offer on this point. We think, however, that the training of Indian civil service officers is neglected, and that they should receive at least six months' instruction before taking over charge of an appointment. During this time they should be regarded as on deputation. The newly sanctioned scheme of reorganisation for the telegraph department provides for the officers of both branches a carefully designed course of training, and we are content to leave this to its operation.

\* Vol. XVII., Appendix VI. (page 99).

† Vol. XVII., Appendix I., para. 38 (pages 79–80).

## CHAPTER V.

## CONDITIONS OF SALARY.

16. *Rates of salary. Administrative officers in the post office.*—The salaries of the director-general and the postmasters-general have been fixed by the orders recently passed on the amalgamation scheme. All that seems necessary, therefore, is, in the case of the latter, to introduce, with as little additional expenditure as possible, the incremental system which on general grounds we have considered to be desirable. This in the case of the postmasters-general can be secured by leaving two selection posts on Rs. 2,500 and having a scale of Rs. 1,750-50-2,250 for the rest. In ordinary circumstances we should have proposed a similar course for the assistant directors-general and the deputy postmasters-general, but their present salaries, which have also been under revision in recent years, are the same as those which are to be given to the administrative officers of the traffic branch of the telegraph department. We have thought it impolitic to disturb these, and, this being so, it seems wiser to make no change in the post office either.

17. *Rates of salary. Superintendents in the post office.*—The emoluments of the superintendents have also been under recent consideration, but no finality has been reached about their position, and neither the present nor the last director-general has been satisfied with the orders passed about them. To a large extent this appears to be due to the special inapplicability of a graded system to a rapidly growing cadre like that of the post office. There are also complaints about the blocks caused in the two lowest grades and the refusal of a senior grade on Rs. 700 a month. It was also urged that Rs. 100 a month was too low a starting point for probationary superintendents. These grievances appear to us to have been substantiated. We therefore suggest that, in future, probationers be paid Rs. 150 a month, and that superintendents be put on an incremental scale of Rs. 250-40/3-450-50/3-500 a month, with a selection grade of 15 per cent. of their number on Rs. 500-40-700 a month. This will give the main body of them equal prospects with those of the members of other similarly recruited services.

18. *Rates of salary. Postmasters.*—Different considerations affect the gazetted postmasters. These officers claimed increases of salary proportionate to those given to superintendents. The director-general, however, professed himself satisfied with the considerable improvements effected in their prospects in recent years, and asked for no change. None appears necessary, and the present rates should be maintained. It is impossible to apply the incremental system to these officers owing to the fact that the salaries in this branch are not personal but follow the office.

19. *Rates of salary. Traffic branch of the telegraph department.*—The salaries of the officers on the traffic side of the telegraph department have also been newly fixed, and with a view to the absorption of officers who would otherwise have come under reduction. We therefore recommend no change. Under the conditions thus established this service in its lower division will not be exactly parallel in the matter of salaries with the post office, but there is no harm in this, as the methods of recruitment will differ considerably.

20. *Rates of salary. Engineering branch of the telegraph department.*—For similar reasons we do not suggest any changes in the salaries now sanctioned for officers of the imperial branch on the engineering side of the telegraph department. These rates should be drawn by all officers appointed in England, whether statutory natives of India or not. Officers appointed in India should draw salaries at the rates now prescribed for members of the provincial branch. To this general rule we make the exception that all chief engineers (telegraphs) and directors (telegraph engineering) should be paid at uniform rates, wherever recruited, and whether they are statutory natives of India or not. It will be time enough, when the new organisation has settled down, to decide whether to introduce into this small cadre the changes of detail which we have proposed in the cases of the public works department and the engineering branch of the railway department.

21. *Estimate of cost.*—Assuming that half the superintendents and assistant superintendents in the telegraph (engineering) department will be recruited in Europe and half in India the annual cost of these readjustments will be approximately Rs. 1,09,503 in the post office, Rs. nil in the telegraph (traffic), and Rs. 3,385 in the telegraph (engineering) department, or Rs. 1,12,893 in all, as set out in detail in the following tables :—

## ANNEXURE XVII.—POST OFFICE OF INDIA AND TELEGRAPH DEPARTMENT—(continued).

## Post Office.

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
1	Director-general of post office and telegraphs.	Rs. 3,500-100-4,000.	Rs. 3,833 5 4	1	Director-general of post office and telegraphs.	Rs. 3,500-100-4,000.	Rs. 3,833 5 4
2	Postmasters-general -	2,500	5,000 0 0	2	Postmasters-general -	2,500	5,000 0 0
2	" " -	2,250	4,500 0 0	8	" " -	1,750-50-2,250.	16,444 7 4
3	" " -	2,000	6,000 0 0				
3	" " -	1,750	5,250 0 0				21,444 7 4
	Add probable acting allowances for inter-grade officiating promotion except to the first grade.	-	687 8 0				
			21,437 8 0				
3	Assistant directors-general and deputy-postmasters-general.	1,200-40-1,400.	4,000 0 0	3	Assistant directors-general and deputy-postmasters-general.	1,200-40-1,400.	4,000 0 0
6	" " -	1,000	6,000 0 0	6	" " -	1,000	6,000 0 0
4	" " -	800	3,200 0 0	4	" " -	800	3,200 0 0
			13,200 0 0				13,200 0 0
1	Superintendent postal workshops and press.	600-20-700	666 10 8	1	Superintendent postal workshops and press.	600-20-700	666 10 8
			666 10 8				666 10 8
11	Superintendents, post office.	500-20-600	6,233 5 4	26	Superintendents, post office.	500-40-700	16,466 10 8
33	" " -	400-20-500	15,400 0 0	145	" " -	250-40/3-450-50/3-500.	49,085 6 4
48	" " -	300-20-400	17,600 0 0				
47	" " -	250	11,750 0 0				
32	" " -	200	6,400 0 0	16	Probationary superintendents.	150	2,400 0 0
16	Probationary superintendents.	100	1,600 0 0				67,952 1 0
212			58,933 5 4	212			
2	Presidency postmasters -	1,000-40-1,200	2,266 10 8	2	Presidency postmasters	1,000-40-1,200	2,266 10 8
1	Presidency postmaster -	800-40-1000	933 5 4	1	Presidency postmaster -	800-40-1,000	933 5 4
2	Postmasters -	600-40-800	1,466 10 8	2	Postmasters -	600-40-800	1,466 10 8
5	Postmasters and deputy-postmasters.	500-20-600	2,833 5 4	5	Postmasters and deputy-postmasters.	500-20-600	2,833 5 4
11	" " -	400-20-500	5,133 5 4	11	" " -	400-20-500	5,133 5 4
19	Postmasters, deputy and assistant postmasters.	300-20-400	6,966 10 8	19	Postmasters, deputy and assistant postmasters.	300-20-400	6,966 10 8
				1	Probationary postmaster	150	150 0 0
40			19,600 0 0	41			19,750 0 0
					Total	-	1,26,846 8 4
					Deduct present cost	-	1,17,720 13 4
					Net extra expenditure per mensem	-	9,125 11 0
252	Total	-	1,17,720 13 4	253	" " per annum	-	1,09,508 4 0

## Telegraph (Traffic).

No.	Name of appointment.	Rs.	Rs. A. P.	No.	Name of appointment.	Rs.	Rs. A. P.
1	Deputy director-general, Traffic.	1,750-50-2,000.	1,916 10 8	1	Deputy director-general, Traffic.	1,750-50-2,000.	1,916 10 8
2	Deputy postmasters-general, Superintendents, Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras offices, and Assistant director-general, Traffic.	1,200-40-1,400.	2,666 10 8	2	Deputy postmasters-general, Superintendents, Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras offices, and Assistant director-general (traffic).	1,200-40-1,400.	2,666 10 8
4		1,000	4,000 0 0	4		1,000	4,000 0 0
6		800	4,800 0 0	6		800	4,800 0 0
27	Assistant to deputy director-general (traffic), Superintendents, Agra, Karachi, Rangoon, Lahore, and Delhi offices and Superintendents (traffic) in offices of Postmasters-general.	250-15-400-20-600.	9,385 10 6	27	Assistant to deputy director-general (traffic), Superintendents, Agra, Karachi, Rangoon, Lahore, and Delhi offices and Superintendents (traffic) in offices of Postmasters-general.	250-15-400-20-600.	9,385 10 6
1	Probationer -	200	100 0 0	1	Probationer -	200	100 0 0
40½	Total	-	22,868 15 10	40½	Total	-	22,868 15 10
					Present cost	-	22,868 15 10

## ANNEXURE XVII.—POST OFFICE OF INDIA AND TELEGRAPH DEPARTMENT—(continued).

*Telegraph (Engineering).*

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
		Rs.	Rs. A. P.			Rs.	Rs. A. P.
1	Chief engineer, Telegraphs.	2,750	2,750 0 0	1	Chief engineer, Telegraphs.	2,750	2,750 0 0
1	Director, Telegraph engineering—			1	Director, Telegraph engineering.	2,000	2,000 0 0
	Imperial - - -	2,000	1,887 2 6				
	Provincial - - -	1,600					
2	Directors, Telegraph engineering—			2	Directors, Telegraph engineering.	1,500	3,000 0 0
	Imperial - - -	1,500	2,830 11 10				
	Provincial - - -	1,200					
21	Superintendents and Assistant superintendents—			21	Superintendents and Assistant superintendents recruited in Europe.	380-40-700-50-1,250.	17,697 2 3
	Imperial - - -	380-40-700-50-1,250.	17,697 2 3				
21	Superintendents and Assistant superintendents—			21	Superintendents and Assistant superintendents recruited in India.	250-25-450-50-500-35-850-50/5-900.	10,946 11 5
	Provincial - - -	250-25-450-50-500-35-850-50/5-900.	10,946 11 5				
46	Total - - -	- - -	36,111 12 0	46	Total - - -	- - -	36,393 13 8
					Deduct present cost - - -	- - -	36,111 12 0
					Net extra expenditure per mensem		282 1 8
					" " " annum -		3,385 4 0

## CHAPTER VI.

## CONDITIONS OF SERVICE.

22. *Strength of the cadre.*—We have provided for the addition of such probationary posts as are required to test direct recruits in the post office and telegraph (traffic) department. Otherwise the cadres appear to be adequate. They are constantly being expanded to meet the growth of postal and telegraphic business, and there should be no hesitation in developing them with this object.

23. *Leave, deputation, and training reserves.*—No reserve for leave or deputation is provided in the gazetted or first-class postmasters' cadre, nor yet on the traffic side of the telegraph department. This is suitable, as in both cases recruitment is ordinarily made by promoting subordinates. There is also no reserve on the engineering side of the telegraph department, and temporary vacancies will have to be filled by members of the upper subordinate service. In the present position of this department we do not propose any change, but when its conditions have become normal we think that a reserve should be added, as is done in the public works department and for the engineering branch of the railway department. In the cadre of superintendents of post offices a reserve exists, but it is mixed up with the training reserve of probationers, and needs to be recalculated in the light of actual requirements. We recommend that this should be undertaken. In all these branches there is a training reserve in the form of probationers or assistants and no further provision is required.

24. *Annual rate of recruitment.*—An annual rate of recruitment has been fixed for the telegraph (engineering) department, and this is satisfactory. Vacancies in the other branches are filled up as they occur. This is inevitable in the case of the postmasters and the telegraph (traffic) officers as there are so few direct recruits. The same holds good with the post office superintendents, who ordinarily are recruited by postal circles so as to avoid as far as possible the transfer of officers to parts of India distant from their own homes.

25. *The director-generalship.*—It was claimed by officers of the telegraph department that the director-generalship of the combined post office and telegraph department should be declared open to telegraph officers as some return for the abolition of the old director-generalship of telegraphs, and that it should not be reserved for members of the Indian civil service. The appointment is not now reserved, nor is there any reason why it should be. It should be open to the best officer available, to whatever service he may belong.

## CHAPTER VII.

## CONDITIONS OF LEAVE.

26. *Leave rules.*—At present officers of the post office of higher rank than superintendents, and the members of the imperial service of the old telegraph department are under the European service leave rules. All other officers are under the operation of the Indian service leave rules. This position is anomalous and needs to be cleared up. The existing officers must of course continue to enjoy their present privileges, but in the case of future entrants we recommend that, exclusive of members of the Indian civil service, all officers of the post office, whether statutory natives of India or not, should come under the Indian service leave rules as amended by us, and should continue under them throughout their careers. This decision should also apply to the officers of the telegraph (traffic) department, except in the rare cases when anyone is specially imported from the British post office, when, if the Government of India think fit, European leave conditions might be conceded. In the telegraph (engineering) department all officers who, when they enter the service, draw salary at the higher rates set out in the table contained in paragraph 21 above should come under the European service rules; other officers should come under the Indian service rules and remain under them throughout their careers.

## CHAPTER VIII.

## CONDITIONS OF PENSION.

27. *Pension rules.*—At present all officers of the post office and the telegraph department, except the members of the Indian civil service employed in the post office and the officers of the imperial telegraph service, are under the operation of the ordinary pension rules. The Indian civil service officers come under the special rules for that service. The imperial telegraph officers, along with the officers of the imperial public works and certain other departments, enjoy special privileges as to early retirement, and a special scale of pensions is laid down for them. As explained generally in our report, these special rules should disappear, and all officers of the post office and the telegraph department, except the members of the Indian civil service, should in future come under the general rules of pension as recommended by us. The director-general, deputy directors-general (post office), postmasters-general, chief engineer (telegraphs), and directors (telegraph engineering) are at present entitled to a special additional pension. They should continue to enjoy this privilege, which should also be allowed to the deputy director-general (traffic).

## CHAPTER IX.

## SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS.

28. The changes which we have recommended in the post office and the telegraph department are as follows :—

- (i) The officers of the post office, who are not members of the Indian civil service, should be guaranteed four permanent and one officiating postmaster-generalships, subject to fit men being available; and five permanent postmaster-generalships should be reserved for members of the Indian civil service (paragraph 2).
- (ii) The imperial and provincial branches of the telegraph (engineering) department should be amalgamated into one service (paragraph 4).
- (iii) The power now possessed by the director-general to appoint non-domiciled Europeans in the post office and in the telegraph (traffic) department should be curtailed, and the sanction of the Government of India obtained to every such appointment. All officers appointed in this way should come in as probationers at the foot of the cadre (paragraph 5).
- (iv) The authorities should have due regard to the claims of Indians of unmixed Asiatic descent to appointments in the telegraph department (paragraph 8).
- (v) One vacancy in every four amongst gazetted postmasters should be filled by a direct recruit. One appointment of probationer should be added to the cadre on this account (paragraph 9).
- (vi) As soon as the existing officers of the old telegraph department have been provided for, it should be obligatory on the director-general to fill one-fourth of the vacancies in the telegraph (traffic) branch by direct recruits (paragraph 10).

## ANNEXURE XVII.—POST OFFICE OF INDIA AND TELEGRAPH DEPARTMENT—(continued).

- (vii) When a vacancy for a direct recruit occurs in the post office or telegraph (traffic) department, the director-general should decide from which province it should be filled, and thereupon a selection committee of five members from that province should be convened to advise on how to secure the best candidates and to report on their merits. A more rigorous educational qualification should also be applied (paragraph 13).
- (viii) When direct recruits for the telegraph (engineering) department come to be taken, the procedure laid down in the case of the public works department and engineering branch of the railway department should be followed as far as possible (paragraph 14).
- (ix) The authorities should watch the rate at which probationers are confirmed, and should appoint only so many of them as they find by experience can be absorbed within two years of their entertainment (paragraph 15).
- (x) Officers of the Indian civil service should receive at least six months' instruction before taking over charge of an appointment in the post office (paragraph 15).
- (xi) There should be one selection grade of two appointments of postmaster-general on Rs. 2,500 a month. The other postmasters-general should draw Rs. 1,750–50–2,250 a month. For the superintendents of the post office there should be a selection grade of 15 per cent. of the total strength on Rs. 500–40–700 a month. The remaining officers should be on an incremental scale of Rs. 250–40/3–450–50/3–500 a month. Probationers should get Rs. 150 a month (paragraphs 16 and 17).
- (xii) All chief engineers (telegraphs) or directors (telegraph engineering) should get the same pay, wherever recruited, and whether they are statutory natives of India or not (paragraph 20).
- (xiii) When the conditions in the telegraph (engineering) department have become normal, a leave reserve should be added to the cadre. The leave reserve for the superintendents (post office) should be recalculated in the light of actual requirements (paragraph 23).
- (xiv) The appointment of director-general should be open to the best officer available, to whatever service he may belong (paragraph 25).
- (xv) All officers of the post office, exclusive of members of the Indian civil service, should come under the Indian service leave rules as amended by us and should continue under them throughout their careers. This decision should apply to the telegraph (traffic) department, except in the case of officers imported from the British post office, to whom the Government of India should be able to concede European leave conditions where necessary. In the telegraph (engineering) branch all officers who, when they enter the service, draw salary at the higher rates should come under the European service leave rules as revised by us. Other officers should come under the Indian service leave rules and remain under them throughout their careers (paragraph 26).
- (xvi) All officers, except members of the Indian civil service, should come under the ordinary pension rules as revised by us. The officers who at present enjoy the privilege of a special additional pension should continue to do so under the scheme which we have recommended, and this privilege should also be conceded to the deputy director-general, traffic (paragraph 27).

## ANNEXURE XVIII.

### Public Works Department and Railway Department (Engineering Establishment).

(The evidence relating to these departments will be found in volumes XVI. and XIX.)

#### CHAPTER I.

##### INTRODUCTORY.

1. The railway branch of the public works department of the Government of India was abolished in 1905 when the railway system in India was placed under the control of a specially constituted railway board. The arrangement by which administrative officers in the two branches were borne on a common list for purposes of promotion had been terminated some years previously. This process of separation, however, has not resulted in destroying the close resemblance between the public works and the railway engineer. Both are still recruited through the same agencies and on similar qualifications. Their classification and conditions of salary, leave, and pension are at all points similar. The cadres to which they respectively belong are built up on the same lines. In such circumstances we have thought it desirable to deal with the two establishments at the same time. Our recommendations, except where the context clearly shows that one or other establishment is specifically referred to, will apply equally to both.

#### CHAPTER II.

##### ORGANISATION.

2. *Functions and classification of officers of the public works department and of the engineering branch of the railway department.*—In the public works department there are two main sections, one concerned with schemes of irrigation and the other with the construction, repair, and maintenance of roads, buildings and bridges. For purposes of organisation each province is divided into circles, divisions and subdivisions; in some provinces these are called divisions, districts and subdivisions. At the head of the department in each province there are one or more chief engineers. Immediately below these come the superintending engineers, who are in charge of circles consisting usually of three or more divisions. The latter, which as a rule contain at least three subdivisions, are in charge of executive engineers and occasionally of temporary engineers. The subdivisions are in charge of assistant engineers, temporary engineers and upper subordinates. On the state railways the engineering staff is required to maintain and execute works on existing open lines, to carry out surveys and constructional work on new lines, and to undertake inspecting duties. The administrative classification of officers is broadly similar to what it is in the public works department.\*

3. *Division of the services into imperial and provincial, and temporary engineers.*—The superior engineering establishment of both departments is composed of (a) an imperial service, which includes civil engineers appointed by the Secretary of State in England and a limited number of Royal engineer officers; (b) a provincial service, which includes civil engineers appointed from the Indian engineering colleges and promoted upper subordinates; and (c) a body of temporary engineers recruited for the most part in India. In each department the strength of the permanent cadre is determined by the number of constituted superior posts, i.e., appointments to be filled by chief, superintending and executive engineers. The total number of officers required is calculated on the basis of allowing margins of twenty-five and ten per cent. for leave vacancies in the imperial and provincial branches respectively, and of providing for the promotion of assistant engineers to executive rank after ten years' service. Recent sanction has been given to a staff of 728 officers for the public works department, and of 200 officers for the engineering establishment of the railway department. These numbers have been fixed so as to provide for filling 344 and 96 superior posts in the public works department and railway department respectively.†

\* Volume XVI., 71266; Volume XIX., 80845.

† Volume XVI., 71266.

## ANNEXURE XVIII.—PUBLIC WORKS AND RAILWAY (ENGINEERING) DEPARTMENTS—(continued).

4. *Extent to which engineering work should be performed by officers of Government.*—The principle has been laid down by the Secretary of State that the permanent establishments of the imperial and provincial services should be limited to the numbers required for the normal annual output of work, and that such staff as is needed on account of any large new undertaking should be obtained by means of the appointment of officers for specified items of work or for strictly limited periods. We think it should also be laid down that the public works department in particular should confine itself to work which cannot be discharged either by private enterprise or through the agency of district boards and municipalities with the necessary financial support from Government. Work done for Government by private firms must be carried out under Government supervision; but in cases where the contract provides for the skilled direction of the work the cost of Government supervision is necessarily lower than it is in cases where the contract is for labour and materials alone. We were informed that there are at present few firms in India competent to undertake large engineering contracts. But some such firms are already established in the larger cities; and we anticipate that once it becomes the rule to put out as much work as possible to open competition among engineering firms, instead of contracting, as is now the practice, for labour and materials alone, the number of these firms will be increased. Subject to these qualifications, we agree with the suggestion made to us by the secretary to the Government of India in the public works department that in cases where it can be foreseen that, on completion of a large scheme of new construction, a permanent addition to the staff of the department will be required for purposes of maintenance, the necessary recruitment should be made in advance, so that the extra staff will be available by the time it is required.\*

5. *Length of period for which officers should serve as assistant engineers.*—The arrangement by which the number of officers in the superior cadre of the public works and railway engineering establishments is fixed so as to provide for promotion to executive rank after ten years' service, appears to us to be open to the objections, first, that it involves the undue retention of officers with high technical qualifications on routine work which does not call for the exercise of such qualifications, to the ultimate detriment of their capacity for the discharge of the higher work of the department; and, secondly, that it necessitates the maintenance of large and unnecessarily expensive cadres. By this we do not mean to imply that the duties performed by assistant engineers are unimportant. On the contrary it is to these officers that the department looks for the immediate direction of the work done by subordinates. They arrange the terms of petty contracts, settle rates, measure up work done, prepare bills for payment, and in many cases have also to pay the bills presented. In these ways they are primarily responsible for the expenditure of a large amount of public money. But in those subdivisions especially where the bulk of the work is maintenance the duties of an assistant engineer make little demand on engineering skill, and men who bring with them into the department the complete equipment of an advanced engineering training cannot fail to lose both in keenness and in capacity if they are kept on such duties too long. The present system is also unsatisfactory from the point of view of expense. The longer promotion to charge of a division is deferred, the greater is the number of officers required to man a given number of superior posts, and the greater the cost of the engineering establishment as a whole. At present, it is true, the supply of upper subordinates qualified for appointment to subdivisional charges is inadequate. In such circumstances it is clear that a relatively large number of subdivisional charges must continue to be allotted to assistant engineers, and that for the time being the present arrangement for promoting assistant engineers after ten years' service must be maintained. We recommend, however, that steps be taken to raise the qualifications of the upper subordinate service. For this purpose it may be necessary to improve the present scale of pay of that service. We think also that when, as we propose in a later paragraph, the present imperial and provincial branches of the two departments have been amalgamated, it will be desirable to consider the further question of transforming the upper subordinate branch into a service organised on the model of the existing provincial civil services and of the similarly organised services which we

have proposed for the education and forest departments. As suitable members of such a service or of the upper subordinate service become available in larger numbers for appointment as subdivisional officers, it will be possible to make a corresponding reduction in the cadre of assistant engineers. In our opinion, an assistant engineer after eight years' employment should be fully competent to hold an executive charge; and we recommend that the process of reducing the cadre be allowed to continue until the number of assistant engineers is just sufficient to provide for their promotion in an officiating capacity after this period of service.

6. *Temporary engineers.*—In certain provinces, and in the railway department, considerable bodies of temporary engineers are at present employed, not only with the object of giving the permanent staff the assistance needed for the carrying out of large programmes of constructional work, but also in order to make up the number of officers permanently required to fill subdivisional charges.\* The necessity for doing this has been attributed to the shortage in the supply of qualified upper subordinates. Evidence was adduced to show that the practice has led to serious administrative difficulties. We recommend that in future temporary engineers should be appointed only when it is imperative to engage additional assistance in order to cope with temporary emergencies, and it should be made clear that their engagements will be either for a specified item of work or for a limited term, in no case exceeding five years.

7. *Amalgamation of the present imperial and provincial services into one service recommended.*—The provincial services of the public works and railway engineering establishments had their origin in the recommendations of the last Public Services Commission. It was the Commission's intention that the imperial services in these departments should include only such officers as were required for purposes of control and direction, and for the execution and repair of works calling for high engineering skill; and that the provincial services should be responsible for the construction and maintenance in the several provinces of works for which a lower standard of engineering skill was adequate. A difference of status and duties, as well as of emoluments, was thus clearly contemplated. In practice, however, no such difference has been established. We found on inquiry that both in the public works and in the railway departments officers recruited in India are engaged on work of the same importance and responsibility as officers of the same official standing recruited in England. In these circumstances we are of opinion that the present system of division into imperial and provincial services should be abolished. There should for the future be only one superior engineering service.

### CHAPTER III.

#### METHODS OF RECRUITMENT.

8. *Place of appointment.*—Under present arrangements the staff of the imperial branches of the two departments is recruited mainly from England. The provincial branches are recruited entirely in India. The latter have together an authorised cadre of 280 officers, which is approximately thirty per cent. of the combined establishments of the imperial and provincial branches. It is also laid down that ten per cent. of the vacancies in the imperial branch shall ordinarily be reserved for Indians. It follows therefore that the number of appointments in the superior service for which officers are obtained from India amounts approximately to thirty-seven and a half per cent. of the total strength.† We are satisfied that there are grounds of policy for continuing to recruit from Europe as well as from India, and propose no change of principle in this respect.

9. *Conditions under which statutory natives of India should be appointed in England.*—A considerable volume of evidence was, however, recorded against the present system of recruiting Indians in England on the same terms as Europeans under what is known as the ten-per-cent. rule. Officers of the provincial services in particular are opposed to the arrangement because of the invidious distinctions it

\* Volume XVI., 71266 (9), Volume XIX., 80845.

† Volume XVI., 71273.

## ANNEXURE XVIII.—PUBLIC WORKS AND RAILWAY (ENGINEERING) DEPARTMENTS—(continued).

creates between statutory natives of India recruited in England on the one hand and in India on the other. The system is also open to the objection that it tends to arrest the development of the engineering colleges which have been established and are maintained by Government in India at large expense. Moreover, many young Indians are now being sent to England with no other purpose than to secure the prize of an appointment in the imperial service. Those who fail for the prize are thrown on their own resources. They cannot find suitable employment in England; they are debarred from serving the Government in India in any permanent capacity; and their opportunities of finding private employment in India are few and far between. Having regard to all the circumstances, and especially to the increase of recruitment in India proposed in the following paragraph, we recommend that, whilst statutory natives of India should be eligible for appointment by the Secretary of State, the ten-per-cent. rule should be abolished, due notice of the change being given so as to prevent any hardship to prospective candidates now under training in Europe. Many of us would also, in view of the considerations referred to above, have preferred to lay down the principle that statutory natives of India appointed by the Secretary of State in England should be employed on the same terms as to salary and leave as officers recruited to the superior service in India. Out of deference, however, to our Indian colleagues, who attach great importance to securing equality between Europeans and Indians who have been through the same course of training, we refrain from recommending a departure from existing practice in this respect.

10 *Extent to which appointments should be made in India, whether directly or by the promotion of members of the upper subordinate service.*—Under present arrangements nine and ten vacancies in the superior service are filled in alternate years from the Indian colleges and five and four vacancies by promotion from the upper subordinate service.\* The proportion of direct recruitment in India is no higher now than it was thirty years ago, and we are of opinion that, whilst the cadre remains at its present strength, the number of vacancies allotted to the Indian colleges might be raised to thirteen annually at once, and to sixteen annually so soon as recruitment in England under the ten-per-cent. rule has come to an end. We further recommend, in view of the importance of raising the standard of the upper subordinate service, that six and seven vacancies in the superior cadre should be assigned to upper subordinates in alternate years, provided that suitably qualified officers are available for promotion. As a result of these changes the proportion of appointments in the superior service open to statutory natives of India will be raised from thirty-seven and a half to fifty per cent. The adoption of our proposal to reduce the period of service in the grade of assistant engineer will also have the effect of reducing recruitment to the superior service by about thirteen and a half per cent. Such reduction should take place in the same measure in India as in England, and so as not to diminish the proportion of vacancies assigned annually to statutory natives of India. The upshot will be a considerable increase in the employment of statutory natives of India in the department. This will take effect partly in the superior service and partly in the subdivisional charges now held by imported European officers. The distribution over the several provinces of the appointments to be filled in India is a matter which may more suitably be dealt with by the Government of India in correspondence with the local Governments after a final decision has been taken on our main recommendations.

11. *Procedure to be adopted in selecting recruits in England. Re-establishment by Government of a residential engineering college deprecated.*—From 1872 to 1906 appointments in England were made from the Royal Indian engineering college, Coopers Hill. Coopers Hill officers still form the greater part of the imperial service, and of the witnesses who came before us to represent the European members of this service not one had been recruited since the present system of selection came into force. We were therefore not surprised to find amongst them a general disposition to advocate the revival of the Coopers Hill system. They claimed for it that it made for *esprit de corps*, and laid stress on the importance of keeping candidates for the service under close observation during the period of their professional training. Such

considerations appear to us to weigh little against the arguments on the other side. The re-establishment by Government of a residential engineering college would involve an expenditure of public money which only the most pressing necessity could justify. Certainly it cannot be urged that the present method of recruitment has so far given unsatisfactory results; and those who plead for its abandonment can hardly have taken sufficient account of the great advance which has been made of recent years in the provision of facilities for higher engineering training throughout the country. We are convinced that by drawing on the resources of a large number of well-equipped engineering institutions the Government will obtain better material for the service than could be secured through the medium of a single agency, and, subject to the modifications of detail referred to in the following paragraphs, we recommend that the present arrangements should continue.

12. *Constitution of the committee for the selection of recruits in England.*—Appointments to the superior engineering establishments of the public works and railway departments are now made in England on the nomination of the Secretary of State, with the advice of a specially constituted selection committee. Candidates for appointment must be between the ages of twenty-one and twenty-four. They must produce evidence that they have (i) obtained one of certain specified university degrees; or (ii) passed the examination for the associate-membership of the institution of civil engineers; or (iii) obtained such other diploma or distinction in engineering as may, in the opinion of the selection committee, be accepted as approximately equivalent to one or other of the recognised degrees. Hitherto the selection committee has been composed of a member of the India Council and two engineers, of whom one has been nominated from year to year by the council of the institution of civil engineers.\* We recommend that for the future the committee should consist of the following six members:—

- (a) a representative of the India Office;
- (b) two eminent engineers, of whom one should have experience of railway engineering, to be nominated by the president of the institution of civil engineers;
- (c) a member of the public works department and Indian state railway department respectively, being either an officer on the active list or an officer who has not been on the retired list for more than five years; and
- (d) an Indian in touch with the Indian student community in the United Kingdom.

13. *Qualifications of officers appointed in England.*—We further recommend that candidates for appointment should have obtained one of the university degrees specified in the regulations or an equivalent diploma or distinction in engineering. We attach much importance to a collegiate training, and we do not consider that a candidate should be eligible for appointment merely on the strength of having passed the examination for the associate-membership of the institution of civil engineers. In the current regulations it is stated that candidates should preferably have had at least one year's practical experience of civil engineering under a qualified civil engineer at the time of their appearance before the selection committee, and that candidates whose qualifying diploma has been obtained without a college course should have had a full three years of such practical experience.† From a statement placed before us by the secretary in the public works department at the India Office, it appears that out of 256 candidates selected in England during the last ten years, 162 had more than one year's practical experience, 89 had one year's practical experience or less, and only five were without professional experience of any kind. This is satisfactory. We would, however, make it a definite condition of appointment that candidates should have had at least twelve months' practical experience of engineering work, and in the case of candidates for appointment to the railway department, special weight should be given to practical experience on a British railway.

\* Volume XVI., 72625.

† Volume XVI., Appendix XIX.

## ANNEXURE XVIII.—PUBLIC WORKS AND RAILWAY (ENGINEERING) DEPARTMENTS—(continued).

14. *Procedure to be adopted in selecting recruits in India. Establishment of a central engineering college deprecated.*—We turn now to the method of appointment in India. There, as we have already stated, the practice is to fill vacancies in the superior service partly by direct recruitment and partly by promotion. It is also laid down that each of the four Indian engineering colleges shall have the patronage of a certain proportion of the total number of appointments available for direct recruits. Under present arrangements six and seven students are taken in alternate years from the Thomason engineering college, Rurki, and one each year from the Sibpur, Madras, and Bombay engineering colleges respectively.\* One of the first questions brought to our notice concerned the rival merits of this arrangement and of an alternative scheme for the establishment of a central engineering college for the whole of India. The advocates of a central college affirmed the advantages to be gained by concentrating the whole of the higher engineering teaching in a single institution; but the objections to any such scheme seem to us far stronger than any arguments in its favour. It has to be remembered, first, that the four engineering colleges constitute the sources of supply from which engineers are obtained not only for employment under the Government of India and the local Governments, but for the service of native states, of local and districts boards and municipalities, and of outside engineering firms. The number of highly trained engineers required for all these purposes, already considerable, is continually increasing, and we doubt whether a single college would be able to cope with so large a number of advanced students as would, even under present conditions, be annually under instruction. Apart from this consideration, we believe that a central college, wherever established, would tend to obtain students mainly from the neighbouring provinces, and that the advancement of engineering science in the more distant provinces would be bound to suffer. We, therefore, deprecate the adoption of this scheme. The balance of advantage lies on the side of encouraging the development of the local colleges so that each may be capable of teaching up to the highest standard.

15. *Conditions under which students should be admitted to the engineering colleges and selected for Government service.*—We are satisfied that the training now given in each of the four colleges is adequate to the needs of the higher branches of the public service. The regulations prescribed for the entry of students and the details of the curriculum adopted by the four colleges show many points of difference, but these are matters lying beyond the scope of our reference. We confine ourselves to laying down the principle that the selection of students for appointment to the superior engineering service should in all cases be based partly on their record during the college course, partly on their position on the final examination list, and partly on the degree of their proficiency in practical work. We consider further that the maximum age for admission to the service should be fixed at twenty-seven. Our attention has also been drawn to the fact that students in engineering who desire to enter the provincial service from Bihar and Orissa, Assam and Burma, are obliged to attend the course of the Sibpur engineering college, notwithstanding the fact that practically all the guaranteed appointments in these provinces are filled by students who have qualified at Rurki.† We are not aware of the reasons which have led to the adoption of this rule. But it seems only fair that students should be allowed admission to the college which has the patronage of the guaranteed appointments in the provinces to which they belong, and we recommend that the existing regulations should be amended accordingly.

16. *Conditions under which Royal engineer officers should be appointed.*—Officers belonging to the corps of Royal engineers are appointed in India to the imperial service of the public works and railway engineering departments on the nomination of the Government of India. No criticism was brought against the method of their selection, and beyond suggesting that Royal engineers should not be eligible for transfer to the public works department after they have completed five years in military employ, we have no recommendation to make. In the railway department a rule prohibiting the appointment of officers with more than five years' military service appears already to be in force.‡

\* Volume XVI., 71267, 71963.

† Volume XVI., 71963.

‡ Volume XIX., 81364.

## CHAPTER IV.

## SYSTEMS OF PROBATION AND TRAINING.

17. *Probation.*—Under the present rules officers selected for the imperial service in England are ordinarily not appointed on probation, but it is laid down that in the event of any candidate being selected who has not, in the opinion of the selection committee, had sufficient practical experience, he may be required to undergo, after arrival in India, a year's probation in charge of works, and his final appointment will be made dependent on such probation. Recruits from the Indian colleges, on the other hand, are invariably appointed in the first instance as apprentices and remain on probation until they have proved their fitness to be confirmed. The probationary period is normally of twelve months' duration. At Rurki the practice is to appoint two qualified students in each vacancy subject to the condition that one of the two will be discharged at the end of twelve months' probation.\* We recommend that all officers, whether appointed to the superior service in India or in England, should alike be on probation for a period of two years. We recommend also that the arrangement by which two qualified Rurki students are appointed on probation in one vacancy should be discontinued. This system is wrong in principle, and can hardly fail to work unfairly in practice.

18. *Training.*—For the first year of the probationary period it is desirable that officers should be regarded as under training and that they should not be employed in charge of subdivisions. We do not consider that the training, or any part of it, should be given in England. Officers recruited in England will be employed to better purpose during their first year of service in acquiring a knowledge of the vernacular and some experience of local conditions; and for officers appointed locally at the end of their college course a spell of practical work in India will be of greater value than a course of training in a country where the problems which confront an engineer and the methods by which he gets his results are widely different from the problems and methods of engineering in India.

## CHAPTER V.

## CONDITIONS OF SALARY.

19. *Rates of salary for officers recruited in Europe.*—The rates of salary now payable to members of the imperial service were last fixed for administrative officers in 1905 and for assistant and executive engineers in 1908, and are generally adequate. We suggest, however, that incremental scales of Rs. 1,500-100-2,000 a month for superintending engineers and of Rs. 2,500-50-2,750 a month for chief engineers should be introduced in substitution for the present graded system. We think it desirable also that, in place of the present continuous time scale for assistant and executive engineers, there should be two separate scales of Rs. 380-40-700-50-750 a month and Rs. 800-50-1,250 a month for assistant and executive engineers, respectively. Under this scheme officers promoted to the substantive rank of executive engineer would in all cases start on a salary of Rs. 800 a month; officers employed in subdivisional charges would not be eligible to draw a salary of more than Rs. 750 a month; whilst officers holding executive charges in an officiating capacity would be entitled to draw the ordinary rate of acting allowance subject to the condition that their substantive salary and acting allowance should not be in excess of the minimum salary of an executive engineer. These scales have been framed by us on the assumption that effect will be given to our proposal for shortening from ten to eight years the term of service prior to appointment to an executive charge.

20. *Rates of salary for officers recruited in India.*—For officers recruited in India to the superior service, we recommend the following scales, namely, Rs. 300-50/2-500-50-550 a month for assistant engineers with a probationary rate of Rs. 200 a month for the first year of service and Rs. 600-50-1050 a month for executive

\* Volume XVI, 71617; Volume XIX, 80846.

## ANNEXURE XVIII.—PUBLIC WORKS AND RAILWAY (ENGINEERING) DEPARTMENTS—(continued).

engineers. In fixing these scales, as in fixing the corresponding scales for officers recruited in Europe we have assumed that an officer will get officiating promotion after eight years' service. In the administrative grades, the present rule is that provincial service officers who are promoted to be chief engineers receive the same rates of salary as those authorised for imperial service officers of the same rank. We approve this, and recommend that a similar principle be applied in the case of officers holding the rank of superintending engineer.

21. *Estimate of cost.*—The financial effect of the changes recommended by us in the foregoing paragraphs is shown in the following table:—

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
10	Chief engineers, 1st Class -	Rs. 2,750	Rs. 27,500 0 0	22	Chief engineers - - -	Rs. 2,500-50-2,750	Rs. 58,666 10 8
12	" " 2nd Class -	2,500	30,000 0 0				
			57,500 0 0				
15	Superintending engineers, 1st class (imperial).	2,000	30,000 0 0				
21	Superintending engineers, 2nd class (imperial).	1,750	36,750 0 0				
21	Superintending engineers, 3rd class (imperial).	1,500	31,500 0 0				
5	Superintending engineers, 1st class (provincial).	1,600	8,000 0 0	72	Superintending engineers -	1,500-100-2,000	1,32,000 0 0
5	Superintending engineers, 2nd class (provincial).	1,400	7,000 0 0				
5	Superintending engineers, 3rd class (provincial).	1,200	6,000 0 0				
			1,19,250 0 0				1,90,666 10 8
569	Executive and assistant engineers (imperial).	380-40-700-50-1,250	4,80,553 6 5	346	Executive engineers recruited in Europe.	800-50-1,250.	1,83,585 5 10
265	Executive and assistant engineers (provincial).	250-25-475-60-535-35-850-50/5-900.	1,45,060 11 9		Executive engineers recruited in India.	600-50-1,050.	1,47,842 10 5
			6,25,614 2 2	354	Assistant engineers recruited in Europe.	380-40-700-50-750.	93,656 8 3
					Assistant engineers recruited in India.	300-50/2-500-50-550.	76,570 1 3
	Add—Probable acting allowances for inter-class officiating promotion in the ranks of chief and superintending engineers.		7,000 0 0		Add—Probable acting allowances to assistant engineers officiating as executive engineers.		5,300 0 0
928*			7,000 0 0	794†			5,11,954 9 9
	Total - - - -		8,09,364 2 2		Total - - - -		7,02,621 4 5
							8,09,364 2 2
					Net saving per mensem -	1,06,742 13 9	
					" " per annum -	12,80,914 5 0	

\* Royal engineers - - - 70  
Imperial engineers - - - 578  
Provincial engineers - - - 280

928

† Royal engineers - - - 70  
Engineers recruited in Europe - - - 327  
Engineers recruited in India - - - 397

794

*Note.*—Under the scheme proposed an additional staff of about 100 upper subordinates at an approximate cost of Rs. 2,00,000 a year will be required for the manning of subdivisional charges. This will reduce the total saving to approximately Rs. 10,80,900 a year.

In drawing up this statement it has been assumed that the period of service prior to promotion to executive rank has been shortened from ten to eight years, and that the proportion of appointments held by officers recruited in India is increased from thirty-seven and a half to fifty per cent. It will be seen that the estimated saving on this basis amounts approximately to Rs. 12,80,914 a year, or to Rs. 10,80,900 a year if allowance is made for the cost of increasing the number of upper subordinates to the extent required for the manning of subdivisional charges.

22. *Rates of salary for Royal engineers.*—Royal engineer officers, who joined the public works and railway departments before 1906, were allowed the option of drawing either their regimental pay supplemented by rates of staff pay varying according to their position in the department, or consolidated rates of pay depending on their departmental rank together with their net military pay. Most of these officers appear to have elected for regimental pay plus staff pay, and in 1906 the alternative system was abolished for all new entrants. Four years later, with effect from 1908, an incremental scale was established for Royal engineer officers in the grades of assistant and executive engineer. This was the same as the scale adopted in 1908 for civil engineers, with the exception that the Royal engineer scale started at the amount of salary prescribed for a civil engineer in his third year of service. It has more recently been decided by Government that there is no justification for offering Royal engineers higher rates of pay than those sanctioned in 1908 for civil engineers, and apart from the privilege of calculating his initial rate of salary as though he had entered departmental employ two and a half years from the date of his first commission, the Royal engineer officer is no longer entitled to any special concession in the matter of pay. The two officers who came before us as representatives of the Royal engineers employed respectively in the public works and the railway departments put forward three specific complaints. Their first grievance was that officers who on joining these departments had opted for the staff pay scale of salary were not allowed to exercise a fresh option in 1907, when the higher rates of salary sanctioned for civilian officers in the administrative grades were made applicable to those Royal engineers who had elected for a consolidated salary in addition to their net military pay. In the second place, they asserted that, when an incremental scale for assistant and executive engineers was introduced in 1908, Royal engineer officers who had elected for the consolidated pay scale should, as a matter of course, have been allowed to draw this incremental scale in addition to their net military pay, and that the Government should not have placed before them the alternative of retaining their existing emoluments or of accepting an enhanced incremental scale without any addition of military pay. Thirdly, and this was their most urgent demand, they contended that, in consideration of his special expenses and of his liability for war service, a Royal engineer employed in either the public works department or the railway department should be entitled to draw his net military pay in addition to the civil scale of salary authorised for each class of officers.\* It appears to us unreasonable that a Royal engineer officer should expect to be allowed a second choice when he finds that the system of remuneration for which he elected at the outset, mainly on the ground of the superior advantages it offered during the earlier years of service, is not likely to be so profitable to him during his service in the administrative grades as the alternative system of remuneration which he rejected. The second grievance is founded on a footnote in the public works department code, 1907, to the effect that the consolidated scale of pay for Royal engineer officers is the civil scale for the time being, but this is merely a statement of existing fact and not in any way the expression of a binding rule. On the third point the witness who came before us from the railway department admitted that the new rules as to pay had not adversely affected recruitment. We can find in the evidence before us no arguments which would justify us in recommending that steps should be taken to redress these alleged grievances.

23. *Rates of salary for temporary engineers.*—We do not recommend the establishment of any fixed scale of salaries for temporary engineers who may, in future, be recruited to the department. The salaries of these officers should be assessed at whatever rates may be necessary in order to obtain qualified engineers on short term appointments from the open market.

## CHAPTER VI.

### CONDITIONS OF SERVICE.

24. *Leave reserve. Annual rate of recruitment.*—We have already referred to the arrangement by which margins of twenty-five and ten per cent. respectively are allowed


\* Volume XVI., 71628 ; Volume XIX., 81360.

## ANNEXURE XVIII.—PUBLIC WORKS AND RAILWAY (ENGINEERING) DEPARTMENTS—(continued).

in the imperial and provincial branches of the public works and railway departments to provide for leave. We recommend that these percentages be revised every five years. Opportunity should also be taken to examine the correctness of the rate of annual recruitment for that part of the superior service which is appointed in England.

25. *Date from which Royal engineer officers should reckon seniority for promotion to the administrative grades.*—We have already alluded to the arrangement by which Royal engineer officers, when appointed to the public works or railway department, enter the incremental scale at the salary which they would have reached if they had been appointed two-and-a-half years after the date of their first commission. The object of this rule is to provide that a Royal engineer officer shall receive approximately the same salary as his civilian colleagues of the same age. Whether the rule implies also that he shall be allowed to count military service for seniority on the same basis is not clear. However this may be, we think it should be laid down that for purposes of promotion to the administrative grades a Royal engineer officer will reckon his seniority only from the date on which he was taken into civil employ.

26. *Temporary engineers.*—Of the temporary engineers now in the service many have been continuously employed for a great number of years, and their position has become practically permanent. On behalf of these officers it was urged, first, that they should either be transferred to the pensionable establishment or placed on a permanent non-pensionable list with improved conditions of salary and assured prospects of promotion, and secondly, that on retirement they should be granted the benefits either of pension under ordinary rules or else of a provident fund constituted on the same lines as the state-aided provident funds of the Government railways. We cannot accept these proposals. In our opinion no case has been made out for the grant of so large a concession to the whole body of temporary engineers. There may be a few cases calling for exceptional treatment, but these we would leave to the Government of India and the local Governments to deal with on their merits.


 CHAPTER VII.

## CONDITIONS OF LEAVE.

27. *Leave rules.*—Under present conditions officers appointed to the imperial branch are subject to the European service leave rules and provincial officers are subject to the Indian service leave rules. No change should be made as regards officers now employed, but for the future it should be laid down that officers who, when they enter the department, are paid salaries at the higher rates specified for officers recruited in Europe, should be subject to the European service leave rules. All other officers should be subject to the Indian service leave rules and should continue under them throughout their careers.

## CHAPTER VIII.

## CONDITIONS OF PENSION.

28. *Pension rules.*—At present special rules as to pension apply to officers in the imperial branches of the two departments. We recommend that future entrants to these departments should come under the general rules as revised by us, and that the existing officers of the imperial branches should be given the option of accepting the revised general rules or of remaining under the special rules now applicable. Superintending engineers, first class, and officers of higher rank are now included in the list of officers eligible for a special additional pension. We recommend that for the future this concession be extended to all superintending engineers.

## CHAPTER IX.

## SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS.

29. The changes which we have proposed in the public works and railway (engineering) departments are as follows :—

- (i) The public works department should confine itself strictly to work which cannot be discharged either by private enterprise or through the agency of district boards and municipalities with the necessary financial support from Government (paragraph 4).
- (ii) Where it can be foreseen that, on completion of a large scheme of new construction, a permanent addition to the staff of the department will be required for purposes of maintenance, the necessary recruitment should be made in good time (paragraph 4).
- (iii) Assistant engineers should be appointed to executive charges after eight years' instead of after ten years' service, and the cadres should be reduced accordingly (paragraph 5).
- (iv) The decrease in the number of assistant engineers should be made good by the appointment of an increased number of upper subordinates to subdivisional charges. To this end the standard of qualification in the upper subordinate service should be raised, and if necessary, the scale of pay of that service should be improved. The question should also be considered of transforming the upper subordinate branch into a service organised on the model of the provincial civil services (paragraph 5).
- (v) In future temporary engineers should be appointed only when it is necessary to engage additional assistance in order to cope with temporary emergencies; and their engagements should be for a fixed item of work or for a limited term in no case exceeding five years (paragraph 6).
- (vi) The present imperial and provincial services should be amalgamated into one service (paragraph 7).
- (vii) Statutory natives of India should be eligible for selection in England, but the arrangement by which ten per cent. of the vacancies filled in England are reserved for Indians should be abolished. Due notice of the change should be given (paragraph 9).
- (viii) So long as the cadre remains at its present strength the number of vacancies allotted to the Indian colleges should be increased to thirteen annually, and to sixteen annually when recruitment under the ten-per-cent. rule in England comes to an end; and the number of vacancies in the superior cadre assigned to the upper subordinate service should be increased to six and seven in alternate years (paragraph 10).
- (ix) As the cadre is reduced to the numbers necessary to provide for promotion after eight years' service, recruitment in England and in India should be so adjusted as not to cause any decrease in the proportion of vacancies to be filled in India (paragraph 10).
- (x) The selection committee at the India office should be enlarged (paragraph 12).
- (xi) Evidence of having passed the examination for the associate-membership of the institution of civil engineers should not be accepted as a sufficient qualification for appointment (paragraph 13).
- (xii) It should be made a condition of appointment in England that candidates should have had at least twelve months' practical experience of engineering work. In the case of candidates for appointment to the railway department, special weight should be given to practical experience on a British railway (paragraph 13).
- (xiii) The selection of students from Indian colleges for appointment to the superior engineering service should in all cases be based partly on their record during the college course, partly on the final examination list and partly on the degree of their proficiency in practical work. The maximum limit of age for admission should be fixed at twenty-seven (paragraph 15).

ANNEXURE XVIII.—PUBLIC WORKS AND RAILWAY (ENGINEERING) DEPARTMENTS—(*continued*).

- (xiv) Students in India should be allowed admission to the college having the patronage of the guaranteed appointments in the provinces to which they belong (paragraph 15).
- (xv) Royal engineer officers with more than five years' military service should not be eligible for appointment (paragraph 16).
- (xvi) All officers appointed to the superior cadre should be on probation for two years (paragraph 17).
- (xvii) The arrangement by which, in the case of Rurki students, two candidates are appointed on probation in one vacancy should be discontinued (paragraph 17).
- (xviii) For the first year of service officers should be under training (paragraph 18).
- (xix) Incremental scales for chief and superintending engineers, and separate incremental scales for assistant and executive engineers should be established (paragraph 19).
- (xx) Officers recruited in India should receive lower scales of salary in the grades of executive and assistant engineers than those authorised for officers recruited in Europe; but in the administrative grades the scales of salary should be the same for all officers (paragraph 20).
- (xxi) The reserves for leave and the annual rate of recruitment should be subjected to periodic checks (paragraph 24).
- (xxii) Royal engineer officers should reckon seniority for promotion to the administrative grades from the date of transfer to civil employ (paragraph 25).
- (xxiii) It should be left to the Government of India and the local Governments to deal on their merits with any temporary engineers whose cases appear to call for special treatment (paragraph 26).
- (xxiv) Officers who, when they enter the department, are paid salaries at the rates fixed for persons recruited in Europe, should be subject to the European service leave rules. Other officers should be subject to the Indian service leave rules and should continue under them throughout their careers (paragraph 27).
- (xxv) Future entrants to the public works and railway (engineering) departments should come under the general rules as to pension. Existing officers of the imperial branches should be allowed to exercise an option in the matter (paragraph 28).
- (xxvi) All officers holding the rank of superintending engineer should be eligible for a special additional pension (paragraph 28).

## ANNEXURE XIX.

### Railway Department (Revenue Establishments).

(The evidence relating to this department will be found in volume XIX.)

#### CHAPTER I.

##### INTRODUCTORY.

1. The railway system of India is under the control of a railway board consisting of a chairman and two members. It is laid down that the chairman should be a senior officer of tried capacity with wide experience of railways in India, and that of the two members one should have had experience of railway management in England and the other should be selected from the staff of the Indian railways and should have special knowledge of traffic business. Of the twelve main lines of railway in India and Burma only three, the North Western, the Eastern Bengal, and the Oudh and Rohilkhand, are worked by the state. The remainder, although subject to the controlling authority of Government, are administered by their own boards of directors and do not come within the scope of our inquiry. Each of the state-worked railways is in charge of a general manager, who is responsible to the railway board for the efficiency of the various departments into which the railway is divided. Of these the most important are the management, engineering, traffic, locomotive, carriage and wagon, and stores departments. Our recommendations in regard to the engineering establishment will be found in annexure XVIII. In this annexure we deal with the remaining departments, which are known collectively as the railway revenue establishments.

#### CHAPTER II.

##### ORGANISATION.

2. *Existing organisation approved.*—The work done in each of these departments is homogeneous in character, and none of them is divided into imperial and provincial branches. This arrangement is suitable and should continue.

#### CHAPTER III.

##### METHODS OF RECRUITMENT.

3. *Place of appointment. Management establishment.*—The management establishment of the state railways consists of the three managers, four deputy managers, and an undetermined number of assistant managers. Appointments of manager and deputy manager are filled by selection from among officers of the engineering and revenue establishments, who for the time being are seconded from their own list. Assistant managers are drawn as necessary from the traffic and engineering staffs.\* These arrangements appear to be working satisfactorily and there is no need for any change in the prevailing system.

4. *Place of appointment. Traffic establishment.*—Recruitment to the traffic establishment was formerly made entirely in India, but under the present system, which came into force in 1907, the normal practice is to recruit for about three-fifths of the vacancies in England, and for about two-fifths in India.† This arrangement was sanctioned on the ground that the supply of eligible candidates in India was insufficient to meet the requirements of the department, and should be regarded as a temporary expedient. We recognise that owing to considerations of policy it is necessary to maintain a nucleus of officers imported from Europe, but this can be supplied by the appointment in India of Royal engineer officers. Some such officers are already found in the ranks of the department and their numbers should, if necessary, be increased. The rest of the staff should gradually be recruited in India from among statutory natives of India. We advise that this object be kept constantly in view, and that in no case should application be made for the appointment of an officer in England if a suitably qualified candidate is available in India.

5. *Place of appointment. Locomotive and carriage and wagon departments.*—As regards the locomotive and carriage and wagon departments, we were informed that appointments in India to the superior establishment would rarely be possible, because under existing conditions the requisite training for direct appointment is obtainable only in England, and members of the subordinate staff are ordinarily specialists in a particular branch of work without the educational and technical qualifications which

\* Volume XIX., 80869.

† Volume XIX., 80858, 80930-1, 80984.

## ANNEXURE XIX.—RAILWAY DEPARTMENT (REVENUE ESTABLISHMENTS)—(continued).

would enable them to undertake the higher duties of the department.\* These conditions should not be allowed indefinitely to continue. The best of the subordinate officers should be given as comprehensive an experience as possible of the various operations of the department, with a view to their promotion in due course to the superior staff. Arrangements should also be provided by which statutory natives of India with suitable educational qualifications would be able to serve as apprentice pupils in the shops and running sheds of the state railways, and so to reach the standard of professional training prescribed for direct recruitment. The rule should also be laid down, as for the traffic department, that application should not be made to the Secretary of State for the appointment of an officer in England until it has been ascertained that no qualified candidate is forthcoming in India.

6. *Place of appointment. Stores department.*—The stores department is recruited entirely in India.† This arrangement is suitable and we do not recommend any change.)

7. *Extent to which non-Europeans should be employed in the traffic and stores departments.*—Statistics supplied to us as to appointments on Rs. 200 a month and over show that, out of a total of 447 posts in the department on the 1st April 1913, 402 were held by Europeans or Anglo-Indians and 45 by Indians. These figures include officers of the engineering branch of the department, with whom we are not dealing in this annexure. From other sources, however, we learned that in the traffic department there were two Indian officers in 1907 and ten in 1913. These figures suggest that steps are being taken in this department to extend the employment of Indians. In the stores department, on the other hand, there are no signs of any tendency to increase the proportion of Indian officers, only one Indian being employed at the present time out of a total authorised cadre of 18 officers. This is not satisfactory. We think that Indians should be appointed in at least fifty per cent. of the vacancies in the superior revenue establishments for which recruitment is made in India.

8. *Procedure to be followed in selecting recruits for the traffic department.*—Appointments in India to the traffic establishment may now be made in four different ways, namely, (a) by direct appointment of outside candidates, (b) by appointment of Royal engineer officers, (c) by promotion, and (d) by transfer from other Indian railways.‡ We recommend that, for the future, vacancies should normally be filled by direct recruitment. Promotions from the subordinate staff should only be made exceptionally, and officers should not be transferred from other Indian railways except to fill higher appointments for which no suitably qualified departmental officer is available. For direct recruits a minimum educational qualification should be prescribed. Candidates should either possess the degree of an Indian university or have passed an examination of a corresponding standard prescribed by Government for the European schools. Passed students from the provincial service class of the Rurki engineering college should also be eligible for appointment. In England the practice is to select candidates on the advice of a selection committee, and the rules enjoin that candidates should either have had at least two years' experience of traffic work on a British or colonial railway or possess a university degree or diploma, or a recognised technical diploma or certificate. In so far as it may still be necessary to make appointments in Europe, the present method of recruitment should continue, and the only recommendations we make are, first, that an officer of the state railways, being either an officer on the active list or an officer on the retired list within five years of his retirement, should be elected to serve on the committee of selection, and, secondly, that in choosing candidates for appointment preference should be given to men with experience of railway traffic work.

9. *Procedure to be followed in selecting recruits for the locomotive and carriage and wagon departments.*—Appointments to the locomotive and carriage and wagon establishments are now made by the Secretary of State on the advice of the consulting engineer to the India Office. Candidates for the locomotive department must have had a good general and technical education, followed by at least three years' training in the shops of a railway company and six months' training in the running sheds and firing. Candidates for the carriage and wagon department must have served as pupils or apprentices in the carriage and wagon or locomotive shops of a railway company or in the carriage works of a large rolling stock builder, and in either case must have had in addition at least a year's experience as outside assistant on a British railway. Under these regulations an efficient body of officers has been secured to the service, and the only changes

\* Volume XIX., 81254, 81272.

† Volume XIX., 80877.

‡ Volume XIX., Appendices I. and II., 80853, 80930-1, 81299.

we recommend are, first, that preference should be given to candidates who have passed the examination for the associate membership of the institute of civil engineers or an equivalent test, and, secondly, that appointments should be made on the advice of a selection committee consisting of a representative of the India office, the Government director of Indian railways, and the consulting engineer to the India office.

10. *Procedure to be followed in selecting recruits for the stores department.*—Recruitment to the stores establishment is made by selection from among candidates “of good education and suitable social position.” We are agreed that this method of recruitment should continue, but it should be laid down, as for the traffic department, that candidates must possess the degree of an Indian university or have passed an examination of a corresponding standard prescribed by Government for the European schools. Passed students from the provincial service class of the Rurki engineering college should also be eligible for appointment. A proposal was also submitted to us that the higher posts in the stores department should be filled by selection from among officers in the engineering and locomotive and carriage and wagon departments. It was claimed that this plan would have the advantage of securing for the stores department officers of a better class than are likely to be attracted under the present system, and that the employment in charge of stores of officers having a practical knowledge of the uses to which stores are put would undoubtedly make for economy. We are not convinced of the soundness of these arguments. What a storekeeping officer requires is not so much an advanced training in engineering as experience of the most suitable methods for the purchase and maintenance of stores and for bringing store transactions to account. Such experience, as well as a knowledge of the uses to which stores are put, can best be acquired in the department itself, and can readily be assimilated by anyone possessing a good general education. The system of recruitment now in force is essentially the same as that employed for the recruitment of storekeeping officers to Government departments in England. We see no reason why it should not work satisfactorily provided that only such candidates are selected for appointment as come up to the prescribed educational standard. At the same time we recognise that, other things being equal, it would be of advantage to an officer to have from the outset some knowledge of mechanics, and we would suggest that, as between candidates of equal educational qualifications, preference should be given to those who had received a training in this subject.

11. *Constitution of a committee recommended to advise on the selection in India of direct recruits.*—We recommend, finally, that appointments by direct recruitment in India should be made by the railway board with the advice of a selection committee to be nominated by the Government of India. This committee should consist of three officials and two non-officials, and should include two Indians. The constitution of the committee should be changed from time to time in order to deal with the claims of the various areas served by the railways. We also regard it as important that all vacancies in the revenue establishments which require to be filled either in India or in England should be widely advertised.

## CHAPTER IV.

### SYSTEMS OF PROBATION AND TRAINING.

12. *Present systems of probation and training approved.*—The present regulations governing the probation and training of officers appointed to the railway revenue establishments are shown in detail in volume XIX. of the evidence which relates to the railway department.\* They are generally suitable, and we have no modification to suggest.

## CHAPTER V.

### CONDITIONS OF SALARY.

13. *Rates of salary.*—Officers are paid under a graded system, but as the number in each grade is not fixed and officers get regular promotion from grade to grade every two years, the grading is practically equivalent to an incremental scale.† The

\* Volume XIX., Appendices I., II. and III., and 80877.

† Volume XIX., 80937.

ANNEXURE XIX.—RAILWAY DEPARTMENT (REVENUE ESTABLISHMENTS)—(continued).

salaries in the various departments have recently been increased, and on the evidence before us we are not prepared to recommend any further improvement except in the traffic department. There a case has been made out for increasing the pay of traffic superintendents, and we propose accordingly that the pay of these officers be raised from Rs. 2,000 to Rs. 2,250 a month. In the stores department the rates of salary in the administrative ranks are somewhat lower than in the traffic department, but the average emoluments are appreciably higher. This is owing to the fact that the proportion of administrative to executive posts is less in the traffic department than in the stores department. We do not think that there is any need for paying so high an average salary in the stores department, where the duties to be carried out are certainly not of greater importance or responsibility than those devolving on the traffic staff, and we recommend accordingly that for new entrants to the stores department the present arrangement by which officers in that department are entitled to exchange compensation allowance should be abolished. This will have the result of making the average emoluments in the two departments approximately equal. In the traffic department officers recruited in India are appointed in a lower grade than officers imported from Europe, and the difference of pay thus established continues throughout their service. This arrangement is suitable. A similar rule should apply in the case of officers recruited in future to the superior cadre of the locomotive and carriage and wagon departments. Assuming that three-fifths of the officers of the traffic and all the officers of the locomotive and carriage and wagon departments are appointed in Europe, there will be a saving on the changes proposed of Rs. 900 a year, as shown in the following table.

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
<i>Management establishment.</i>				<i>Management establishment.</i>			
2	Managers - - -	Rs. 3,000	Rs. 6,000 0 0	}	No change proposed.	Rs.	Rs. A. P.
1	Manager - - -	2,500	2,500 0 0				
2	Deputy managers - -	1,750	3,500 0 0				
1	" " - -	1,500	3,000 0 0				
1	Assistant managers - -	Grade pay in the Engineering or Traffic establishment.	* * * *				15,000 0 0
7	Total - - -	- - -	15,000 0 0	7	Total - - -	- - -	15,000 0 0
<i>Traffic establishment.</i>				<i>Traffic establishment.</i>			
3	Traffic superintendents -	2,000	6,000 0 0	3	Traffic superintendents -	2,250	6,750 0 0
8	Deputy traffic superintendents.	1,500	12,000 0 0	8	Deputy traffic superintendents.	1,500	12,000 0 0
35	District traffic superintendents, 1st grade.	1,100	31,567 1 6	35	District traffic superintendents, 1st grade.	1,100	31,567 1 6
	District traffic superintendents, 2nd grade.	1,000			District traffic superintendents, 2nd grade.	1,000	
	District traffic superintendents, 3rd grade.	900			District traffic superintendents, 3rd grade.	900	
	District traffic superintendents, 4th grade.	800			District traffic superintendents, 4th grade.	800	
	District traffic superintendents, 5th grade.	700			District traffic superintendents, 5th grade.	700	
66	Assistant traffic superintendents, 1st grade.	550	30,305 4 6	66	Assistant traffic superintendents, 1st grade.	550	30,305 4 6
	Assistant traffic superintendents, 2nd grade.	450			Assistant traffic superintendents, 2nd grade.	450	
	Assistant traffic superintendents, 3rd grade.	400			Assistant traffic superintendents, 3rd grade.	400	
	Assistant traffic superintendents, 4th grade.	300			Assistant traffic superintendents, 4th grade.	300	
	Assistant traffic superintendents, 5th grade.	200-250			Assistant traffic superintendents, 5th grade.	200-250	
112	Total - - -	- - -	79,872 6 0	112	Total - - -	- - -	80,622 6 0
119	Carried forward - - -	- - -	94,872 6 0	119	Carried forward - - -	- - -	95,622 6 0

## ANNEXURE XIX.—RAILWAY DEPARTMENT (REVENUE ESTABLISHMENTS)—(continued).

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
119	Brought forward	-	Rs. A. P. 91,872 6 0	119	Brought forward	-	Rs. A. P. 95,622 6 0
	<i>Locomotive establishment.</i>				<i>Locomotive establishment.</i>		
3	Locomotive superintendents	Rs. 2,000	6,000 0 0			Rs.	
4	Deputy locomotive superintendents.	1,500	6,000 0 0				
	District locomotive superintendents, 1st grade.	1,100	22,129 8 7		No change proposed.		48,630 9 9
	District locomotive superintendents, 2nd grade.	1,000					
24	District locomotive superintendents, 3rd grade.	900					
	District locomotive superintendents, 4th grade.	800					
	District locomotive superintendents, 5th grade.	700					
	Assistant locomotive superintendents, 1st grade.	550	14 501 1 2				
	Assistant locomotive superintendents, 2nd grade.	450					
29	Assistant locomotive superintendents, 3rd grade.	400					
	Assistant locomotive superintendents, 4th grade.	300*					
60	Total	-	48,630 9 9	60	Total	-	48,630 9 9
	<i>Carriage and wagon establishment.</i>				<i>Carriage and wagon establishment.</i>		
1	Carriage and wagon superintendent.	1,750	1,750 0 0				
1	Carriage and wagon superintendent.	1,500	1,500 0 0				
1	Deputy carriage and wagon superintendent.	1,250	1,250 0 0				
	District carriage and wagon superintendent, 1st grade.	1,100	6,432 14 6		No change proposed.		14,372 6 8
	District carriage and wagon superintendent, 2nd grade.	1,000					
7	District carriage and wagon superintendent, 3rd grade.	900					
	District carriage and wagon superintendent, 4th grade.	800					
	District carriage and wagon superintendent, 5th grade.	700					
	Assistant carriage and wagon superintendent, 1st grade.	550	3,439 8 2				
	Assistant carriage and wagon superintendent, 2nd grade.	450					
7	Assistant carriage and wagon superintendent, 3rd grade.	400					
	Assistant carriage and wagon superintendent, 4th grade.	300*					
17	Total	-	14,372 6 8	17	Total	-	14,372 6 8
	<i>Stores establishment.</i>				<i>Stores establishment.</i>		
1	Chief storekeeper	1,500	1,500 0 0	1	Chief storekeeper	1,500	1,500 0 0
1	" "	1,400	1,400 0 0	1	" "	1,400	1,400 0 0
1	" "	1,250	1,250 0 0	1	" "	1,250	1,250 0 0
	Storekeepers, 1st grade	950	5,762 2 7		Storekeepers, 1st grade	950	5,762 2 7
7	" 2nd "	800		7	" 2nd "	800	
	" 3rd "	700			" 3rd "	700	
	" 4th "	600			" 4th "	600	
	Assistant storekeepers, 1st grade.	500			Assistant storekeepers, 1st grade.	500	
	Assistant storekeepers, 2nd grade.	400	3,287 4 9		Assistant storekeepers, 2nd grade.	400	3,287 4 9
8	Assistant storekeepers, 3rd grade.	350		8	Assistant storekeepers, 3rd grade.	350	
	Assistant storekeepers, 4th grade.	200-250			Assistant storekeepers, 4th grade.	200-250	
	Exchange compensation allowance.	-	13,199 7 4 824 15 6	18			
18	Total	-	14,024 6 10		Total	-	13,199 7 4
214	Grand Total	-	1,71,899 13 3	214	Grand Total	-	1,71,824 13 9
					Present cost	-	1,71,899 13 3
					Net savings per mensem	-	74 15 6
					" " per annum	-	899 10 0

\* Ordinarily recruits start on Rs. 400.

ANNEXURE XIX.—RAILWAY DEPARTMENT (REVENUE ESTABLISHMENTS)—(*continued*).

## CHAPTER VI.

## CONDITIONS OF SERVICE.

¶ 14. *Leave and training reserves. Annual rate of recruitment.*—With the exception of the traffic department, the railway revenue establishments are too small to carry a reserve of officers for leave and training. Nor would it be practicable in any of these establishments to fix an annual rate of recruitment.

## CHAPTER VII.

## CONDITIONS OF LEAVE.

15. *Leave rules.*—Officers appointed in India to these establishments should be subject to the Indian service leave rules; other officers should be subject to the European service rules.

## CHAPTER VIII.

## CONDITIONS OF PENSION.

16. *State railway provident fund.*—With the exception of officers transferred from the engineering staff, the members of the railway revenue establishments are employed on a non-pensionable basis. Instead of receiving pensions they are entitled to the benefits of the provident fund of the particular railway on which they are serving. These funds, known collectively as the state railway provident fund, are subject to the following regulations:—

- (a) Officers subscribe to the fund at the uniform rate of one-twelfth of salary, to which is added half-yearly a first sum out of the gross revenue of the railway equal to one half of such subscriptions, and a second sum not exceeding one half of such subscriptions and also not exceeding one per cent. of the net earnings of the railway calculated before any contributions to the fund have been added to the working expenses. The bonus so added by the railway is limited by rule to a maximum of 100 per cent. and to a minimum of 75 per cent. of the officer's contributions.
- (b) Interest at the rate of 3 per cent. per annum in the case of accounts kept in sterling and at  $3\frac{3}{4}$  per cent. in the case of accounts kept on a rupee basis is at present allowed on compulsory deposits and bonuses, and at rates applicable to deposits in the Government post office on voluntary deposits. European and Anglo-Indian subscribers have the option, to be exercised within six months of joining the fund, of having their accounts kept in sterling or rupees. The Government reserve the right to vary the interest payable on compulsory deposits and bonuses.
- (c) The sum which thus accumulates to the credit of an officer is paid to him on his retirement from the service; or, in the event of his death before retirement, to his legal representatives.\*

A provident fund system is well adapted to the requirements of a railway service, and we do not recommend any important change in the present arrangements. In effect the fund provides a substitute for a pension to an officer on his retirement, and also operates both as a life assurance during his service and as a means of securing to him a gratuity on voluntary retirement after a length of service which would not entitle a pensionary officer to any benefit. Such being the case it would be unreasonable to expect that the contribution of the state towards the lump sum payable to an officer on retirement should be equivalent to the pension payable by the state in other departments. At the same time we are of opinion that the benefits offered by the fund are inadequate. We were informed that the whole question has recently become the subject of correspondence between the Secretary of State and the Government of India, and in such circumstances it is unnecessary for us to come to a definite finding on all the proposals which have been made to us for the improvement of the fund. We would, however, recommend, without prejudice to any further concessions which the Secretary of State may see fit to grant, that the rate of interest payable on deposits and bonuses should be 4 per cent., as in the case of the general provident fund; and, secondly, that the Government bonus should be fixed at 100 per cent. on officers' contributions, irrespective of fluctuations in the earnings of the railways.†

\* Volume XIX., 80921, 80941-2.

† Volume XIX., 81262, 81267-8, 81301.

## CHAPTER IX.

## SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS.

17. The changes which we have proposed in the railway department (revenue establishments) are as follows :—

- (i) The European element in the traffic department, to the extent needed, should be provided by Royal engineer officers, and all other officers should be recruited in India. Officers should be appointed in England only if no suitable candidate is forthcoming in India (paragraph 4).
- (ii) Selected subordinates in the locomotive and carriage and wagon departments should be given as comprehensive a training as possible, with a view to their promotion to the superior staff (paragraph 5).
- (iii) Statutory natives of India should be admitted as apprentice pupils to the shops and running sheds of the state railways (paragraph 5).
- (iv) Officers should be appointed in England to the locomotive and carriage and wagon departments only if no suitable candidate is forthcoming in India (paragraph 5).
- (v) Indians should be appointed in at least fifty per cent. of the vacancies in the superior revenue establishments for which recruitment is made in India (paragraph 7).
- (vi) Appointments to the traffic department in India should normally be made by direct recruitment from among candidates with a prescribed educational qualification (paragraph 8).
- (vii) An officer of the state railways should be appointed to serve on the India office selection committee for the traffic department (paragraph 8).
- (viii) In making appointments in England to the traffic department preference should be given to candidates with experience of railway traffic work (paragraph 8).
- (ix) In making appointments in England to the locomotive and carriage and wagon departments preference should be given to candidates who have passed the A.M.Inst.C.E. examination or an equivalent test. Appointments should be made with the advice of a selection committee (paragraph 9).
- (x) A minimum educational qualification should be prescribed for admission to the stores department, preference being given to candidates with a knowledge of mechanics (paragraph 10).
- (xi) Appointments in India should be made with the advice of a selection committee (paragraph 11).
- (xii) The pay of traffic superintendents should be increased (paragraph 13).
- (xiii) New entrants to the stores department should not be entitled to exchange compensation allowance (paragraph 13).
- (xiv) Officers appointed in India to the locomotive and carriage and wagon departments should enter in a lower grade than officers appointed in England (paragraph 13).
- (xv) Officers appointed in India should be subject to the Indian service leave rules (paragraph 15).
- (xvi) The rate of interest payable on deposits and bonuses in the railway provident fund should be increased to 4 per cent., and the Government bonus should be fixed at 100 per cent. on officers' contributions (paragraph 16).

**ANNEXURE XX.****Registration Department.**

*(The evidence relating to this department will be found in volume XIII.)*

**CHAPTER I.****INTRODUCTORY.**

1. A separate registration department exists in each province to deal with the registration of deeds. The organisation of each has been more or less developed according as the work to be done is complicated or simple. At one end of the scale come, first, Burma, where no separate establishment, even of a subordinate kind, is provided, and, secondly, the Punjab, where a subordinate staff of local notables, who are not officials, is ordinarily employed. At the other will be found Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, and Madras, where whole-time salaried officers perform the duties in a position of more or less complete independence. Outside Madras, however, we found only twelve isolated appointments, the initial salaries of which were Rs. 200 a month or over, and of these four were special to the presidency towns of Calcutta and Bombay. We accordingly decided, after taking evidence on the subject, to restrict our findings to the district registrars of the Madras department, who alone constitute anything in the nature of a superior service. As the work in the other provinces develops, the Madras organisation will doubtless become more general, when our recommendations with regard to it should be applied so far as circumstances in each case permit.

**CHAPTER II.****ORGANISATION.**

2. *Existing organisation approved.*—The Madras department is not divided into imperial and provincial branches. All the registrars perform the same class of duties. They are twenty-one in number, of whom nineteen work in Madras city or the districts, whilst two are attached to the office of the inspector-general, one as his personal assistant and one to help him in his inspections, under the title of inspector of registration offices. The district registrars are independent of the district collectors, and have as their inspector-general a provincial civil service officer. This arrangement works well in practice, and has our approval.

**CHAPTER III.****METHODS OF RECRUITMENT.**

3. *Present methods of recruitment approved.*—The department is one which is, and should be, recruited for entirely in India, and from amongst statutory natives of India. Out of the 21 district registrars on the 1st April 1913,\* 20 were persons of unmixed Asiatic descent. It is therefore unnecessary to make suggestions for the extended employment of officers of this community. Ordinarily district registrars are recruited by selection from among sub-registrars of approved service and competence, but in recent years certain clerks from the inspector-general's office have been promoted either without passing through the sub-registrar grades at all or only through those at the top. Such officers are usually younger than the promoted sub-registrars, and supply an element which appears to us to be valuable; but the matter is one to be decided by the local Government in the light of the personnel available in the department. We consider that the present method of recruitment is satisfactory and that it should be maintained.

**CHAPTER IV.****SYSTEMS OF PROBATION AND TRAINING.**

4. *Existing systems of probation and training approved.*—District registrars under a system of recruitment by promotion from a subordinate service will always be experienced men and no question of training arises. They should be tested as now in officiating vacancies.

**CHAPTER V.****CONDITIONS OF SALARY.**

5. *Rates of salary.*—At present there are six grades of district registrars on salaries ranging from Rs. 200 to Rs. 500 a month. The officers asked for an incremental scale

\* Volume XIII., Appendix XIII. (page 242).

## ANNEXURE XX.—REGISTRATION DEPARTMENT—(continued).

and on general grounds this should be given them. Assuming that recruitment will ordinarily take place at an average age which will not exceed 44, a scale of Rs. 200–25–500 will be suitable. Beyond this it is unnecessary to go as the class of officer required is not as high as that needed for the provincially recruited services, for the members of which scales rising from Rs. 250 to Rs. 500 a month, with selection grades above Rs. 500 a month, have been recommended. We also propose that the inspector of registration offices, like the personal assistant to the inspector-general, be granted Rs. 50 a month as a local allowance. The cost of this reorganisation, as set out in the following table, will be approximately Rs. 246 a year.

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
1	District registrar, 1st grade -	Rs. 500	Rs. 500 0 0	21	District registrars - - -	Rs. 200–25–500.	Rs. 6,120 7 6
2	District registrars, 2nd " -	400	800 0 0				
4	" " 3rd " -	350	1,400 0 0				
4	" " 4th " -	300	1,200 0 0				
5	" " 5th " -	250	1,250 0 0				
5	" " 6th " -	200	1,000 0 0				
	Two local allowances to (1) personal assistant to the inspector-general, and (2) district registrar, Madras -	50	100 0 0		Three local allowances to (1) personal assistant to the inspector-general; (2) district registrar, Madras; and (3) inspector of registration offices	50	150 0 0
21	Total - - -	-	6,250 0 0	21	Total - - -	-	6,270 7 6
					Deduct present cost - - -	-	6,250 0
					Net extra expenditure per mensem -	-	20 7 6
					" " per annum -	-	245 10 0

## CHAPTER VI.

## CONDITIONS OF SERVICE.

6. *Leave, deputation and training reserves.* Annual rate of recruitment.—No provision is made in the cadre of the district registrars for a leave, deputation, or training reserve. This is not needed as all the vacancies in their ranks are filled by promotion from a subordinate service. For the same reason there is no need to fix any annual rate of recruitment.

7. *Districts in which district registrars should be employed.*—We were asked that the rule, which prohibits the employment of district registrars in districts in which they hold landed property, should be cancelled. The matter appears to us to be one for local determination, and we suggest that the local Government be invited to consider it.

## CHAPTER VII.

## CONDITIONS OF LEAVE.

8. *Leave rules.*—All the district registrars are now, and should continue to be, under the Indian service leave rules.

## CHAPTER VIII.

## CONDITIONS OF PENSION.

9. *Pension rules.*—The general rules as to pension should be applied to the district registrars. None of them should enjoy a special additional pension.

## CHAPTER IX.

## SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS.

10. The changes which we have recommended in the service of district registrars in Madras are :—

- (i) The introduction of an incremental system of salaries (paragraph 5); and
- (ii) The grant of a local allowance of Rs. 50 a month to the inspector of registration offices (paragraph 5).

## ANNEXURE XXI.

### Northern India Salt Revenue Department.

*(The evidence relating to this department will be found in volume XVIII.)*

#### CHAPTER I.

##### INTRODUCTORY.

1. The Northern India salt revenue department is under the direct control of the Government of India. At the time that we were taking evidence its operations extended over the North-West Frontier Province, the Punjab, the United Provinces, Bihar, the Central Provinces, Rajputana, and Central India ; but arrangements have since been made to transfer the charge of Bihar, where no salt is manufactured, to the local Government of Bihar and Orissa. The officers of the department are concerned, first, with the manufacture, mining, and quarrying of salt, and its issue to the public, and, secondly, with the protection of the salt revenue. They patrol the areas in which there are exposures of rock salt, and the saline tracts generally, in order to guard against the removal or illicit manufacture of salt. They also exercise supervision over the manufacture of saltpetre. All are liable to serve in either branch as circumstances may require, and interchangeability of functions and duties is the common rule. Indeed, some officers have to perform both classes of duties at one and the same time. The main centres of production are the Sambhar lake in Rajputana, and the mines of the salt range in the Punjab.

#### CHAPTER II.

##### ORGANISATION.

2. *Extent to which members of the Indian civil service should be employed in the department.*—The department has at its head a commissioner who is a member of the Indian civil service. Otherwise it is homogeneous in character and is not divided into imperial and provincial branches. This is as it should be. The only suggestion we make is that for officiating vacancies in the commissionership which are not likely to exceed six months in duration, the claims of members of the department should be considered.

3. *Restriction of the operations of the department recommended.*—We have also gone into the question whether it would not be advisable to provincialise the work of the department, as has already been done in Madras, Bombay, Bengal, Burma, and Bihar and Orissa. In Assam there is no salt work at all. In favour of such a course is the general advantage which accrues ordinarily from decentralisation, and the fact that the trend of administrative development in all the provinces is setting unmistakably in the direction of strong specialised excise staffs, and the combination in their hands, in the provinces where separate salt departments have hitherto existed, of excise and salt duties. Against it is the weakness of the existing excise establishments in the three provinces concerned, and the fact that some provision is necessary for the control of the big Sambhar works in Rajputana, and for preventive duties in Rajputana and Central India generally. These considerations do not, however, apply with any particular force in the United and Central Provinces. In the latter area there is now no salt manufacture, and very little preventive work ; and the main function of salt officers is to visit a particular factory, which uses salt, and to calculate the rebates due on the same. Similarly, the duties to be performed in the United Provinces are purely of a preventive character. We, therefore, recommend that steps be taken to hand over to the local Governments of the United and Central Provinces the charge of the salt arrangements within their respective boundaries, and to confine to the Punjab, North West Frontier Province, Rajputana, and Central India the operations of the Northern India salt revenue department. In course of time it will doubtless be possible still further to provincialise control, but the time is not yet ripe for the completion of this measure of decentralisation.

## CHAPTER III.

## METHODS OF RECRUITMENT.

4. *Place of appointment.*—The department is now recruited for in India. There are no grounds of policy for interfering with this system, nor are any technical qualifications required in the recruits for which it is necessary to go to Europe. We accordingly approve the present arrangement and recommend its continuance. All recruits should be statutory natives of India.

5. *Imitations in the employment of non-Europeans.*—The return of the officers in receipt on the 1st April 1913 of salaries of Rs. 200 a month and over shows a total of 36, of whom 31 were Europeans or Anglo-Indians and five Indians of unmixed Asiatic descent.\* Our inquiry has embraced the cases of 45 officers, or nine more, of whom seven were assistant superintendents and two probationers in receipt of salaries of less than Rs. 200 a month. We were told that the department with these included contained 36 Europeans or Anglo-Indians and nine Indians of unmixed Asiatic descent.† The proportion of the latter appears to us to be inadequate and to bear no relation to the number of suitable candidates of this class who, under a revised system of salaries, should be available. We accordingly recommend that in future at least one in every three of the candidates nominated to sit for the examination for entry into the department should be an Indian of unmixed Asiatic descent. We also lay stress on the fact that this should be regarded as a minimum. If more qualified candidates are forthcoming their claims to nomination should be treated on their merits with those of members of other communities.

6. *Extent to which direct appointments should be made to the department.*—Under the present system one vacancy in every two years goes to a promoted subordinate, provided that a suitable officer is available, whilst in each year one recruit is taken in direct. The present feeling in the department appears to be in favour of a larger proportion of direct recruitment, and the commissioner asked for an unfettered discretion in the matter. On the other hand it is necessary in the interests of the subordinate service to keep an avenue of promotion open, and to this end some guiding principle is needed. We recommend therefore that the existing practice be formally recognised and that one vacancy in every three be given to a promoted subordinate, provided that a suitable officer is available. The remaining two should be filled directly from outside applicants.

7. *Procedure to be adopted in selecting direct recruits.*—Hitherto direct recruits have been appointed on the results of a competitive examination open to candidates who have been nominated by the commissioner. In recent years this method has not been securing a satisfactory class of recruit, and the evidence we received favoured the substitution of a system of pure nomination. We are not, however, satisfied that the defects observed are due to the existing competitive arrangement. The pooriness of the present prospects in the department has also had a bad effect on recruitment. Before, therefore, examinations are abandoned they should be tested by experience obtained under our revised scales of salary. We think, however, that the present power of nominating candidates possessed by the commissioner should be subjected to the checks proposed for other similar departments. To secure this we recommend that nominations be given in future by the Government of India on the advice of a selection committee, consisting of three officials and two non-officials, and including two Indians. The committee should take the necessary steps to make known the occurrence of vacancies and should examine and report on the qualifications of such applicants as may come forward. Its constitution should also be changed from time to time so as to keep it in touch with the various areas over which the department works.

8. *Educational qualifications of candidates.*—We are also satisfied that a more stringent educational qualification should be required of candidates than is now the case, and that this test should be applied impartially to all alike. We therefore recommend that, unless for special reasons in each case the Government of

## ANNEXURE XXI.—NORTHERN INDIA SALT REVENUE DEPARTMENT—(continued).

India otherwise determine, the recommendations of the selection committee should be restricted to candidates who possess the degree of a university or have passed an examination of a corresponding standard prescribed by Government for the European schools. Passed students from the Rurki engineering college should also be eligible for appointment. The age limits for candidates should be adjusted to fall in with this arrangement.

## CHAPTER IV.

## SYSTEMS OF PROBATION AND TRAINING.

9. *Existing systems of probation and training approved.*—Provision is made in the cadre for probationers, and all directly recruited officers pass through this grade. Promoted officers are tested in officiating vacancies. There is no special system of training, but direct recruits are ordinarily posted to the more important centres of salt production to learn their work under the supervision of senior officers, and are not confirmed as assistant superintendents until they have given satisfaction for a year, and have passed in full a departmental examination. Promoted subordinates similarly have to pass a departmental examination. After confirmation officers are also deputed, as occasion arises, to the Thomason engineering college at Rurki for a six months' course in levelling and surveying. This system has worked well and we do not recommend any change.

## CHAPTER V.

## CONDITIONS OF SALARY.

10. *Rates of salary.*—At present, except in the case of the deputy commissioner and four of the assistant commissioners the officers are paid under a graded system. For general reasons this should be abandoned, and the incremental method introduced. We are also satisfied that the present rates of salary are too low to attract the right sort of officer. The type of young man required is the same as that which is needed for the post office or the various salt and excise services under the local Governments. A suitable scale for such officers has recently been sanctioned for the combined salt and excise departments of the Bengal presidency. This allows salaries of Rs. 150 a month for probationers, of Rs. 250–15–400–25–500 a month for the main body of superintendents, with two small selection grades of superintendents on Rs. 600 and 700 a month, and Rs. 850–50–1,000 a month for deputy commissioners. The organisation of the Northern India salt revenue department is somewhat different in detail, as it contains assistant superintendents and assistant commissioners. Allowing for this, we consider that the following rates will be suitable, namely, Rs. 150 a month for probationers; Rs. 250 a month for assistant superintendents; Rs. 300–50/3–500 a month for the main body of the superintendents, with a selection grade of three superintendents on Rs. 600 a month; and Rs. 700–800, Rs. 900, and Rs. 1,000 a month for assistant commissioners. The deputy commissioner should continue to draw his present salary. For the commissioner the present rate of pay appears to be excessive in view of the decrease in the importance of the department in recent years, and the further decrease which will follow on the provincialisation of the work in the United and Central Provinces in accordance with our recommendation. The kind of officer needed is a young and active collector or deputy commissioner, who will stay in the department for about five years, and then be reabsorbed naturally in his own province. We recommend accordingly that future incumbents receive the salary they would be getting as collectors or deputy commissioners, plus an allowance of Rs. 250 a month, but subject to a maximum of Rs. 2,400 a month. The cost of this reorganisation, as shown in the following table will be approximately Rs. 49,283 a year.

ANNEXURE XXI.—NORTHERN INDIA SALT REVENUE DEPARTMENT—(continued).

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
1	Commissioner - - - Exchange compensation allowance.	Rs. 2,500 -	Rs. A. P. 2,500 0 0 138 14 3 2,638 14 3	1	Commissioner - - - Grade pay as collector plus allowance of Rs. 250 subject to maximum salary of Rs 2,400.	Rs. 2,400 -	Rs. A. P. 2,400 0 0 2,400 0 0
1	Deputy commissioner - -	1,200-40-1,400	1,333 5 4 1,333 5 4	1	Deputy commissioner - -	1,200-40-1,400	1,333 5 4 1,333 5 4
1	Assistant commissioner -	1,000	1,000 0 0	1	Assistant commissioner -	1,000	1,000 0 0
1	" - - -	900	900 0 0	1	" - - -	900	900 0 0
4	Assistant Commissioners -	500-30-800	2,210 2 11 4,110 2 11	4	Assistant Commissioners -	700-25-800	3,093 5 4 4,993 5 4
7	Superintendents, 1st grade -	400	2,800 0 0	3	Superintendents - - -	600	1,800 0 0
7	" 2nd " -	350	2,450 0 0	26	" - - -	300-50/3-500	10,312 9 10
7	" 3rd " -	300	2,100 0 0				12,112 9 10
8	" 4th " -	250	2,000 0 0 9,350 0 0				
4	Assistant superintendents, 1st grade.	175	700 0 0	7	Assistant superintendents -	250	1,750 0 0
3	Assistant superintendents, 2nd grade.	150	450 0 0 1,150 0 0				1,750 0 0
2	Probationers - - -	100	200 0 0 200 0 0	2	Probationers - - -	150	300 0 0 300 0 0
46	Total - - -		18,782 6 6	46	Total - - -		22,889 4 6
					Deduct present cost -		18,782 6 6
					Net extra expenditure per mensem -		4,106 14 0
					" " per annum -		49,282 8 0

CHAPTER VI.

CONDITIONS OF SERVICE.

11. *Leave, deputation, and training reserves.*—No provision at present exists in the cadre for any leave or deputation reserve. Leave vacancies are filled by promotion from the subordinate ranks. This was objected to by the commissioner, and we think with reason. The department is large enough to carry its own complement of leave and deputation officers, and should be strengthened accordingly on the basis of the actual requirements of the last five years. Sufficient provision for a training reserve exists already in the shape of probationers.

12. *Annual rate of recruitment.*—An annual rate of recruitment of 3·8 per cent. on the sanctioned strength of the cadre has been fixed. This figure, however, is applicable only to a service, all the entrants to which join at the age of about 21. It is not suitable without modification for a department, in which promotion from the ranks at varying ages takes place. We recommend that a fresh calculation be made which will take into account the actual facts of the situation, and be based on the latest available data.

CHAPTER VII.

CONDITIONS OF LEAVE.

13. *Leave rules.*—At present officers of the rank of assistant commissioner and over are under the European service, and the others under the Indian service leave rules. The department is to be recruited wholly in India, and from amongst statutory natives of India. In these circumstances we see no justification for any differentiation.

## ANNEXURE XXI.—NORTHERN INDIA SALT REVENUE DEPARTMENT—(continued).

We recommend that all future entrants be brought under the Indian service leave rules and kept under them throughout their careers. These remarks will not, of course, apply to the commissioner for so long as he is a member of the Indian civil service.

## CHAPTER VIII.

## CONDITIONS OF PENSION.

14. *Pension rules.*—The commissioner, as a member of the Indian civil service, is under the special rules for annuities for that service. The other officers are under the ordinary pension rules. This arrangement should continue. No special additional pension is at present admissible to any member of this service, and there are no circumstances attached to any appointment which would justify such a concession.

## CHAPTER IX.

## SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS.

15. The changes which we have recommended in the Northern India salt revenue department are as follows:—

- (i) The claims of members of the department to fill officiating vacancies in the commissionership for periods not exceeding six months should be considered (paragraph 2).
- (ii) Steps should be taken to hand over to the local governments of the United and Central Provinces the charge of the salt arrangements within their respective boundaries (paragraph 3).
- (iii) Recruitment should be confined to statutory natives of India (paragraph 4).
- (iv) At least one nomination in every three should be given to an Indian of unmixed Asiatic descent (paragraph 5).
- (v) One vacancy in every three should be given to a promoted subordinate, provided that a suitable officer is available, and the remaining two filled directly from outside applicants (paragraph 6).
- (vi) The system of recruitment by competitive examination from amongst nominated candidates should be maintained, but the power of nomination should be exercised by the Government of India with the advice of a selection committee (paragraph 7).
- (vii) A more stringent educational qualification should be required of candidates, and their age limits should be fixed so as to suit their respective curricula (paragraph 8).
- (viii) The salary of the commissioner should be reduced for future incumbents to the grade pay of a collector or a deputy commissioner plus a local allowance of Rs. 250 a month, subject to a maximum of Rs. 2,400 a month. The pay of the other officers should be fixed on an incremental basis, and should be increased to the extent stated (paragraph 10).
- (ix) Provision should be made in the cadre for a leave and deputation reserve. This should be based on the actual requirements of the previous five years (paragraph 11).
- (x) The figure for the rate of annual recruitment should be re-calculated (paragraph 12).
- (xi) All future entrants to the service except the commissioner should come under the Indian service leave rules and should continue under them throughout their careers (paragraph 13).

## ANNEXURE XXII.

### Salt and Excise Departments.

*(The evidence relating to these departments will be found in volume XVIII.)*

#### CHAPTER I.

##### INTRODUCTORY.

1. We shall deal in this annexure with the local salt and excise departments of Madras, Bombay, Bengal, Burma, and Bihar and Orissa. In the case of the United Provinces, where the salt work has hitherto been done by the officers of the Northern India salt revenue department, and of Assam, where there are no salt duties to be performed, we shall be concerned only with the local excise departments. With the Punjab and the Central Provinces we shall not treat at all, as, like the United Provinces, they are relieved of their salt work by the Northern India salt revenue department, whilst their excise staffs are as yet of a subordinate character and lie outside the scope of our inquiry. In this way our range lies only over seven out of the nine provinces. Each of these has its own separate service or services, organised to deal with its own problems, and no interchange of personnel takes place between them. The points of similarity, however, are numerous, whilst the differences are mainly those of development, and with the growth of administrative specialisation all are tending to conform to a common type. We have, therefore, thought it convenient to view them all as a whole and to treat them together in a single annexure. Our task has been simplified by the fact that several of the departments have only recently been remodelled and brought up to date. Indeed, the orders with regard to the Bengal and Bihar and Orissa schemes were issued\* at a time subsequent to the record of our evidence and whilst we were considering the terms of our report. Similar proposals are also pending with regard to Assam.† We have assumed that they also will be carried into effect.

#### CHAPTER II.

##### ORGANISATION.

2. *Amalgamation of the salt and excise departments.*—In the provinces which have both a salt and an excise department the accepted principle now is that they should be amalgamated. This has long been the practice in Madras, was subsequently enforced in Burma under the pressure of local opium difficulties, and has recently been extended to Bengal and Bihar and Orissa. It also prevails in the Sind portion of the Bombay presidency. The process is also at work in Bombay proper, where the details of the combination were being worked out at the time of our investigation.‡ This development is due partly to the growing importance of the excise administration and partly to the recognition of the fact that small cadres are difficult to manage. We are impressed with these considerations and approve the steps which have been or are being taken. We also suggest that the movement be developed in Bombay by the amalgamation of the Sind staff with that of the presidency proper. We also think that combined departments should be formed in the United and Central Provinces, so soon as effect has been given to the recommendation contained in annexure XXI. that the Northern India salt revenue department shall cease to have any connection with those areas, and when in the case of the Central Provinces a superior excise service has come to be formed.

3. *Constitution of the departments.*—In the amalgamated salt and excise departments and in those under amalgamation, as also in the separate excise departments, the work is such as can be performed by officers recruited on the same qualification, and there is no division into imperial and provincial branches or their equivalents. We suggest no change under this head. We also approve of the arrangement by which members of the Indian civil service are seconded for duty at the top, or in

\* Volume XVIII., Appendices XI. and XII. (pages 74 *et seq.*).

† Volume XVIII., Appendix XIII. (page 86).

‡ Volume XVIII., Appendix X. (page 66—*vide* resolution No. 7,211 dated 4th August 1913).

## ANNEXURE XXII.—SALT AND EXCISE DEPARTMENTS—(continued).

the higher ranks, of the various departments. We think, however, that the time has come to make them self-supporting in other respects. At present in several provinces the practice of borrowing officers from other cadres to do the ordinary work prevails. We recommend that this be discontinued as a practice and be resorted to only in exceptional cases.

4. *Nomenclature of officers.*—We also suggest certain changes of nomenclature. At present the same class of officer is called in one place an inspector, in another a superintendent, and in a third an assistant commissioner. In the same way the class of officer who is known as an assistant commissioner in one province appears as a deputy commissioner in another, and so on. This leads to misunderstanding as to the status and the legitimate expectations of officers, and should so far as possible be avoided. We therefore recommend that in the United Provinces and Assam the officers now employed in the ordinary line be called superintendents. In Bengal and Bihar and Orissa the terms superintendent and assistant commissioner should be used, and in Madras superintendent, assistant commissioner, and deputy commissioner. In Burma the title superintendent is already employed. We would keep this, as also that of chief superintendent for the senior officer of the department. In Bombay, which now has a large staff of inspectors on salaries ranging from Rs. 100 to Rs. 400 a month, we would divide up the staff, though without interfering with their present duties, into superintendents and inspectors and include in the former category all those in receipt of Rs. 250 a month and over. Above them we would have assistant commissioners as elsewhere. This arrangement will fit in with that in force in the Northern India salt revenue department, and emphasise the fact that all these services should be recruited from the same sort of material.

## CHAPTER III.

## METHODS OF RECRUITMENT.

5. *Distillery experts.*—Five distillery experts are now imported from Europe to do the technical work of the various excise departments. They are borne on the cadres of Madras, Bombay, Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, and the United Provinces, but their services are also utilised in the neighbouring provinces, where the work is not sufficient for a whole-time officer. The recruitment of these officers from Europe is not justified on any ground of policy. It is rendered necessary solely because it has been impossible hitherto to find a suitably qualified person in India. The field for employment in India is at present so small that we do not wish to lay down any hard and fast rule. But we think that suitable steps should be taken to train up statutory natives of India for this work, so as to fit them for appointment in vacancies of this character which may occur in future.

6. *Place of appointment.*—In other respects the departments are recruited for solely in India. This was generally accepted as suitable by the witnesses who came before us, but there were indications that in Madras and Burma the idea of supplementing local talent by officers imported from Europe existed. The drawbacks of such a procedure are obvious. It would involve not only considerable additional expenditure in the two provinces themselves, but would set an inconvenient precedent for other provinces, to whom it would be difficult to refuse the same liberty. Nor would the precedent be confined to the salt and excise establishments. If recruitment in Europe were allowed for these, a movement would at once arise for similar action for other similar departments, in which no considerations of policy in favour of importation existed, and for which no technical qualifications not procurable in India were required in the recruits. We, therefore, advise that no change in this direction be made, and that the rule be made absolute that the salt and excise departments, excluding the distillery experts and officers borrowed from other services, be recruited for solely in India and from amongst statutory natives of India.

7. *Limitations in the employment of non-Europeans.*—According to the statistics supplied\* to us there were, on the 1st April 1913, 338 officers in the various salt and excise departments under the local Governments in receipt of salaries of Rs. 200 a month and over. Of these, only 130, or 38 per cent., were Indians of unmixed Asiatic descent. These figures differ considerably from those for the posts included in our

\* Volume XVIII., Appendix XV. (page 89).

inquiry, which come to only 266, or 72 less. This is due in the main to the fact that we have made a salary line of Rs. 250 a month our starting point in Bombay and Burma, which has cut off 112 appointments, against which have to be set additions on account of the reorganisations made or being made since the statistics were compiled in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, and Assam. Smaller differences also appear in the other provinces. There is nothing, however, to show that these discrepancies affect the main position that in these departments, despite the fact that they are recruited for in India, Indians of unmixed Asiatic descent are numerically in an inferiority. This is especially noticeable in the higher ranks. Only ten per cent. of the posts carrying salaries of Rs. 500 a month and upwards are held by officers of this community. It was suggested by certain witnesses that the reason for this state of affairs was to be sought in the special fitness of Europeans and Anglo-Indians for the outdoor work of the large salt departments in Madras and Bombay, and figures were quoted as to the lack of stamina displayed by the Indians who had been recruited in the former presidency between 1886 and 1912.\* It was admitted, however, that the Indians who had fallen out had been men who had worked their way up from below, whilst the Europeans and Anglo-Indians had joined the superior ranks at an earlier age, and had thus had less exposure. So far as these statistics go, therefore, their results are not to be depended upon, though they point to the need for caution in introducing changes. On general grounds we are convinced that, if the terms of employment are improved, there will be no difficulty in obtaining as good Indians as are now got for kindred departments like the post office or the provincial police service. We, therefore, recommend that in Madras and Bombay at least every alternate vacancy be given to an Indian of unmixed Asiatic descent, provided that a suitable candidate is available. Beyond this, the claims of members of this community should be considered on their merits with those of other applicants. In Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, and Assam, and in the United Provinces, where the cadres are all new, and Indians are now being recruited, we anticipate that a larger percentage will be given without question, and so see no need to fetter the discretion of the authorities. In Burma, where religious sensibilities tell against the employment of Burmans, and where education is backward, we recognise that a European and Anglo-Indian preponderance must continue, and would leave it to the local Government to adjust the balance with due regard to the importance of not allowing a monopoly to be developed.

8. *Extent to which direct appointments should be made.*—The various provinces differ considerably in the extent to which they recruit their services directly or by promotion from the subordinate or ministerial ranks. The latter method is especially conspicuous in Madras. The result, as stated in evidence by the commissioner, is that it is uncommon for a man to become an assistant commissioner before he is 40, when his long training in subordinate positions has tended to unfit him for the exercise of authority.† Similar testimony was given by the officer who appeared to represent the European and Anglo-Indian members of the department, whilst the evidence of the Indian witness was in the same direction. The evil is also being aggravated as time goes on. At present, as noted by the commissioner, the higher ranks are filled by men who entered the service in the eighties and nineties, shortly after the department was formed, and without having to pass through all the grades.‡ This is no longer the case, and the future seniors, unless some drastic change is made, will be men who started life on a very small salary. The same holds good with regard to the Bombay salt department, and this system, it was admitted, was likely to spread into the excise branch of the combined department, unless some new method were adopted for bringing in fresh blood. In Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, and Assam the new organisations, though sanctioned, have not yet come into operation, and no practice can be said to exist. Much the same is the case with Burma; whilst in the United Provinces the question has not arisen as it is still the rule to work with a staff borrowed from other services. If the salt and excise departments are to be put on a sound footing we are convinced that it will be necessary to recruit them on the lines which have proved so successful in the provincial civil and police services and for superintendents of the post office, and from the same material. To this end it is important to secure

\* Volume XVIII., 78081.

† Volume XVIII., 78067.

‡ Volume XVIII., 78068.

## ANNEXURE XXII.—SALT AND EXCISE DEPARTMENTS—(continued).

that a constant stream of vigorous and well educated young men shall be admitted to the superior appointments without having to go through the subordinate ranks. We recommend accordingly that two out of every three vacancies amongst the superintendents be so recruited in Bengal, the United Provinces, Burma, Bihar and Orissa, and Assam. In Madras and Bombay, where the system of promotion from below has become ingrained, we would make the change more slowly, and give only every alternate vacancy in these ranks to direct recruits.

9. *Procedure to be followed in appointing direct recruits.*—The selection of direct recruits, where this takes place, is now made everywhere by a process of nomination. We approve this system in principle on account of the difficulties which would beset the framing of any form of competitive examination which would be equally suitable for candidates educated at the universities and in the European schools respectively. But, as in the case of the other kindred departments, we advise the creation of selection committees to advise the local authorities. These should be appointed separately in each province and should consist of three officials and two non-officials, and should include two Indians. The committees should take the necessary steps to make known the occurrence of vacancies, and should examine and report on the qualifications of such applicants as may come forward. We also advise that a stricter educational qualification be imposed on all alike without any distinction of communities. Candidates should be required either to have taken a university degree or to have passed an examination of a corresponding standard prescribed by Government for the European schools. Finally, we recommend that all new appointments of direct recruits be made at the same place in the cadre. The practice of appointing Europeans and Anglo-Indians at a higher point in the cadre than Indians gives rise to ill-feeling and should be stopped. Under our revised scheme of salaries it will be unnecessary.

## CHAPTER IV.

## SYSTEMS OF PROBATION AND TRAINING.

10. *Probation.*—In several of the provinces provision has already been made at the foot of the cadre for a grade of probationers, through which all direct recruits have to pass before they are confirmed. So long as a service is large enough to absorb such officers after not more than two years this arrangement is suitable and should be made general. This will, on the present figures, require the creation of five such posts in Madras, three in Bombay, two in Bengal and one in Bihar and Orissa. In Burma, which has a grade of assistant superintendents, these posts are not needed, but all direct recruits there should be regarded as under trial for two years. The cadres of the United Provinces and Assam are too small to carry this addition. In their case newly appointed superintendents will need to be on probation for their first two years.

11. *Training.*—The duties of salt and excise officers are not of a complicated character, and ordinarily no special training is needed for their performance. We are also satisfied that local Governments and their officers are alive to the desirability of instruction in such special duties as fall outside the usual routine. Thus in the United Provinces junior officers are given an excise course in distilleries and bonded warehouses, whilst a proposal is under consideration to let them study the law of evidence and procedure in the police training school at Moradabad. In Bengal the details with regard to training have not been as yet fully worked out, pending sanction to the reorganisation scheme as a whole, but it has been proposed that one probationer shall receive a training in distillery work from the distillery expert, and something in the nature of a special training school is also being discussed. In Burma, where the new staff has only just been sanctioned, it is contemplated that assistant superintendents will receive instruction for a year or so in Rangoon, not only in technical work but also in law and the Burmese language, and will then be posted for a few months to Mandalay to study distillery work and Upper Burma conditions. It is also not improbable that a course at the police training school will be given. In Madras where direct recruits have hitherto been few, and the question has therefore not assumed prominence, a probationary period for directly nominated inspectors (superintendents) is fixed, and during this time they are required to pass a

departmental examination and to show by their work that they are fitted for employment. In Bombay a rather similar state of affairs has hitherto prevailed. It is not clear what the arrangements will be under the pending scheme for reorganisation, but when direct recruitment is enforced at the Rs. 250 point, as suggested, the matter will become of importance and should receive attention. Speaking generally, the evidence shows that the necessity for training is fully realised, and so long as this is the case the decision of the details should be left to local experience.

CHAPTER V.

CONDITIONS OF SALARY.

12. *Rates of salary.*—Hitherto payment by grades has been the rule in most of the services, but under the recently sanctioned scheme for Bengal and Bihar and Orissa the incremental system has been introduced. We would make this general everywhere. A rate of salary suited to present conditions has also recently been worked out for Bengal and Bihar and Orissa. This gives Rs. 250-15-400-25-500 a month to the bulk of the superintendents with selection grades for the same class of Rs. 600 and 700 a month, and more in proportion to the higher officers. This conforms very closely to the scale of Rs. 250-40/3-450-50/3-500 a month, with selection grades beyond, which we have framed independently to secure young Indian graduates or members of the domiciled community with a corresponding educational equipment for other similar departments. It is, however, slightly more favourable in that it spreads the increments of the main scale over fifteen instead of the eighteen years contemplated under our proposals. We see no reason why the salt and excise officers should be specially favoured, and recommend that our standard scale be applied generally, except in Burma where we would allow the assistant superintendents Rs. 250 (Rs. 200 whilst under probation), and the main body of the superintendents Rs. 300-20-500 a month. Beyond this we would have selection grades for superintendents in certain provinces as shown in the following table, which also shows the rates which we think suitable for the probationers and also for the assistant and deputy commissioners and other superior officers. Salaries should be drawn equally at these rates by all alike, except the distillery experts. Should statutory natives of India come to be recruited in India for these appointments lower rates should be framed appropriate to each case. The net cost of this reorganisation will be approximately Rs. 86,015 a year on the assumption that the distillery experts will be persons who are not statutory natives of India recruited in India, and including the charges on account of six additional probationers. In applying the rates we recognise that it will be necessary to allow for temporary modifications to meet the cases of certain of the borrowed officers, for example, in the United Provinces, but such concessions should be strictly personal in character and the earliest possible opportunity should be taken to bring the whole staff on to our standard rates.

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
MADRAS.				MADRAS.			
<i>Salt and excise department.</i>				<i>Salt and excise department.</i>			
2	Deputy commissioners - -	Rs. 1,200-40-1,400	Rs. 2,666 10 8	2	Deputy commissioners - -	Rs. 1,200-40-1,400	Rs. 2,666 10 8
1	Distillery expert - - -	800-25-1,000-50-1,300	1,111 7 7	1	Distillery expert - - -	800-25-1,000-50-1,300	1,111 7 7
2	Assistant commissioners - -	1,000	2,000 0 0	2	Assistant commissioners - -	1,000	2,000 0 0
2	" " - - -	900	1,800 0 0	2	" " - - -	900	1,800 0 0
10	" " - - -	500-30-800	5,673 15 6	10	" " - - -	600-25-800	6,561 10 3
19	Inspectors, 1st grade - -	400	7,600 0 0	85	Superintendents - - -	250-40/3-450-50/3-500	29,357 8 5
21	" 2nd " - - -	350	7,350 0 0				
23	" 3rd " - - -	300	6,900 0 0				
22	" 4th " - - -	250	5,500 0 0	5	Probationers - - -	150	750 0 0
4	Probationary inspectors - -	150-200	666 10 8				
106	Total - - -	- - -	41,268 12 5	107	Total - - -	- - -	44,747 4 11
					Deduct present cost - - -	- - -	41,268 12 5
					Net extra expenditure - - -	- - -	3,478 8 6

## ANNEXURE XXII.—SALT AND EXCISE DEPARTMENTS—(continued).

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
<b>BOMBAY.</b>				<b>BOMBAY.</b>			
<i>Salt and excise department.</i>				<i>Salt and excise department.</i>			
		Rs.	Rs. A. P.			Rs. Rs. A. P.	
1	Distillery expert - - -	650-50-1,300	1,099 3 1	1	Distillery expert - - -	650-50-1,300	1,099 3 1
3	Assistant collectors - - -	1,000	3,000 0 0	3	Assistant commissioners - - -	1,000	3,000 0 0
4	" " - - -	800	3,200 0 0	3	" " - - -	900	2,700 0 0
6	" " - - -	600	3,600 0 0	12	" " - - -	600-25-800	8,168 2 6
2	" " - - -	450	900 0 0				
3	" " - - -	400	1,200 0 0				
1	Assistant commissioner, Sind -	500-30-800	662 2 6	1	Assistant commissioner, Sind -	500-30-800	662 2 6
	Exchange compensation allowance to assistant collectors, salt department.	—	456 4 0				
2	Inspectors and supervisors -	400	800 0 0	36	Superintendents - - -	250-40/3-450-50/3-500	11,542 6 3
3	" - - -	300-20-400	1,100 0 0				
11	" - - -	300	3,300 0 0	3	Probationers - - -	150	450 0 0
20	" - - -	250	5,000 0 0				
56	Total - - -	- - -	24,317 9 7	59	Total - - -	- - -	27,621 14 4
					Deduct present cost - - -	- - -	24,317 9 7
					Net extra expenditure - - -	- - -	3,304 4 9
<b>BENGAL.</b>				<b>BENGAL.</b>			
<i>Salt and excise department.</i>				<i>Salt and excise department.</i>			
		Rs.	Rs. A. P.			Rs. Rs. A. P.	
2	Deputy commissioners - - -	850-50-1,000	1,940 0 0	2	Assistant commissioners - - -	850-50-1,000	1,940 0 0
1	Distillery expert - - -	650-50-1,300	1,099 3 1	1	Distillery expert - - -	650-50-1,300	1,099 3 1
2	Superintendents - - -	700	1,400 0 0	2	Superintendents - - -	700	1,400 0 0
3	" - - -	600	1,800 0 0	3	" - - -	600	1,800 0 0
21	" - - -	250-15-400-25-500	7,907 1 9	21	" - - -	250-40/3-450-50/3-500	7,229 2 0
1	Probationer - - -	150	150 0 0	2	Probationers - - -	150	300 0 0
30	Total - - -	- - -	14,296 4 10	31	Total - - -	- - -	13,768 5 1
					Present cost - - -	- - -	14,296 4 10
					Net savings - - -	- - -	527 15 9
<b>BIHAR AND ORISSA.</b>				<b>BIHAR AND ORISSA.</b>			
<i>Salt and excise department.</i>				<i>Salt and excise department.</i>			
		Rs.	Rs. A. P.			Rs. Rs. A. P.	
1	Deputy commissioner - - -	850-50-1,000	970 0 0	1	Assistant commissioner - - -	850-50-1,000	970 0 0
1	Distillery expert - - -	750-50-1,000	916 10 8	1	Distillery expert - - -	750-50-1,000	916 10 8
2	Superintendents - - -	700	1,400 0 0	2	Superintendents - - -	700	1,400 0 0
2	" - - -	600	1,200 0 0	2	" - - -	600	1,200 0 0
19	" - - -	250-15-400-25-500	7,277 8 6	19	" - - -	250-40/3-450-50/3-500	6,696 6 4
				1	Probationer - - -	150	150 0 0
25	Total - - -	- - -	11,764 3 2	26	Total - - -	- - -	11,333 1 0
					Present cost - - -	- - -	11,764 3 2
					Net savings - - -	- - -	431 2 2
<b>ASSAM.</b>				<b>ASSAM.</b>			
<i>Excise department.</i>				<i>Excise department.</i>			
		Rs.	Rs. A. P.			Rs. Rs. A. P.	
2	Superintendents - - -	450-25-600	1,096 10 8	1	Superintendent - - -	700	700 0 0
2	" - - -	325-15-400	750 0 0	1	" - - -	600	600 0 0
5	" - - -	200-10-300	1,284 5 3	7	Superintendents - - -	250-40/3-450-50/3-500. (150 during probation.)	2,321 13 2
9	Total - - -	- - -	3,130 15 11	9	Total - - -	- - -	3,621 13 2
					Deduct present cost - - -	- - -	3,130 15 11
					Net extra expenditure - - -	- - -	490 13 3

ANNEXURE XXII.—SALT AND EXCISE DEPARTMENTS—(continued).

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
UNITED PROVINCES OF AGRA AND OUDH.				UNITED PROVINCES OF AGRA AND OUDH.			
<i>Excise Department.</i>				<i>Excise Department.</i>			
		Rs.	Rs. A. P.			Rs.	Rs. A. P.
1	Distillery expert - - -	800-50-1,300	1,175 11 0	1	Distillery expert - - -	800-50-1,300	1,175 11 0
1	Assistant commissioner - -	350-50-500	470 0 0	1	Superintendent - - -	600-25-700	673 5 4
4	Assistant commissioners - -	300-50-500	1,786 10 8	4	Superintendents - - -	250-40/3-450-50/3-500 (150 during probation).	1,345 7 2
6	Total - - -	- - -	3,432 5 8	6	Total - - -	- - -	3,194 7 6
					Present cost - - -	- - -	3,432 5 8
					Net savings - - -	- - -	237 14 2
BURMA.				BURMA.			
<i>Salt and excise department.</i>				<i>Salt and excise department.</i>			
1	Chief superintendent - - -	1,000-50-1,250	1,166 10 8	1	Chief superintendent - - -	1,000-50-1,250	1,166 10 8
1	Superintendent, 1st grade -	800	800 0 0	1	Superintendent - - -	800	800 0 0
2	Superintendents, 2nd " -	700	1,400 0 0	2	Superintendents - - -	700	1,400 0 0
3	" 3rd " -	600	1,800 0 0	3	" - - -	600	1,800 0 0
5	" 4th " -	500	2,500 0 0	23	" - - -	300-20-500	9,891 4 3
9	" 5th " -	400	3,600 0 0				
9	" 6th " -	300	2,700 0 0	5	Assistant superintendents -	250 (200 during probation).	1,145 4 0
5	Assistant superintendents -	250 (200 during probation).	1,145 4 0				
35	Total - - -	- - -	15,111 14 8	35	Total - - -	- - -	16,203 2 11
					Deduct present cost - - -	- - -	15,111 14 8
					Net extra expenditure - - -	- - -	1,091 4 3
267				273	Total net expenditure per mensem -	-	7,167 14 8
					" " per annum -	-	86,015 0 0

CHAPTER VI.

CONDITIONS OF SERVICE.

13. *Strength of the cadre.*—We have already suggested that certain of the cadres be increased to provide for probationers. Otherwise there is no indication that there is any deficiency in the staffs. On the other hand it was suggested that the Madras cadre had too many administrative posts, and that only one inspecting agency was required between the board of revenue and the officers whom we have called the superintendents. It is clear that the supervision now exercised is very close but we are not prepared to say that it is excessive in view of the class of officer now being recruited. It will be time enough to consider this matter when the system of direct recruitment which we have recommended has begun to lighten the service with a younger and better educated type of officer.

14. *Leave, deputation and training reserves. Annual rate of recruitment.*—No reserve for leave or deputation appears to have been provided in any province. The Madras, Bombay, Bengal, Burma, and Bihar and Orissa cadres are large enough to be self-contained, and we recommend that such additions be made as will suffice, on the basis of the last five years' actual requirements, to meet these needs. The United Provinces and Assam cadres are too small as yet for this step to be taken. Provision has been made for training posts, so no reserve on this account is necessary. No annual rate of recruitment has anywhere been fixed. This should be calculated for the Madras cadre. The other cadres are hardly as yet old enough or large enough to have adequate data and for the present should be filled as vacancies occur.

## ANNEXURE XXII.—SALT AND EXCISE DEPARTMENTS—(continued).

15. *Personal assistant to the excise commissioner in the United Provinces.*—It was claimed in the United Provinces that the post of personal assistant to the excise commissioner should be added to the cadre of the excise department. We agree with the view expressed by the local Government that this should be done so soon as it is vacated by the present incumbent.

16. *Chief superintendent, Burma.*—In Burma a request was made that the chief superintendentship should be reserved exclusively for officers of the department. In view of the doubts expressed by the local Government as to the possibility of conducting efficiently the work of the department without a stiffening of officers trained in Europe, it seems inexpedient to lay down any hard and fast rule. But, with the excise commissioner a member of the Indian civil service or of the Burma commission, it ought not to be necessary permanently to exclude members of the department from the one prize open to them, and we recommend that the opportunity of leave vacancies be taken to test them in the appointment.

## CHAPTER VII.

## CONDITIONS OF LEAVE.

17. *Leave rules.*—Members of the Indian civil service, the distillery experts and officers of the rank of assistant commissioner or assistant collector in the salt departments are under the European service leave rules. All other officers are under the Indian service leave rules. The whole service, with the exception of the few members of the Indian civil service and the present distillery experts, is recruited for entirely in India, and we see no reason why any differentiation in the matter of leave privileges should be made in favour of certain senior officers. We therefore recommend that the members of the Indian civil service employed in this department and distillery experts, if not statutory natives of India, should continue to enjoy the privileges of the European service leave rules, and that in the case of future entrants the Indian service leave rules should be applied to all others throughout their careers. If a statutory native of India is hereafter appointed a distillery expert he should come under the Indian service leave rules.

## CHAPTER VIII.

## CONDITIONS OF PENSION.

18. *Pension rules.*—The ordinary pension rules apply and should apply to the officers of these departments. There is no post which should carry a special additional pension. Distillery experts should be permitted, subject to the general provisos in cases of this nature, to reckon as service qualifying for superannuation pension the number of completed years by which their age at the time of appointment exceeded 25.

## CHAPTER IX.

## SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS.

19. The changes we have recommended in the salt and excise departments are as follows :—

- (i) The salt and excise staff in Sind should be amalgamated with that of the Bombay presidency proper (paragraph 2).
- (ii) Combined salt and excise departments should in due course be formed in the United and Central Provinces (paragraph 2).
- (iii) The practice of borrowing officers from departments other than the Indian civil service should be discontinued (paragraph 3).
- (iv) The nomenclature of the different ranks in the several provinces should be made more uniform (paragraph 4).
- (v) Steps should be taken to train up statutory natives of India as distillery experts (paragraph 5).

- (vi) In Bombay and Madras at least every alternate vacancy should be given to an Indian of unmixed Asiatic descent. Beyond this the claims of members of this community should be considered on their merits with those of other applicants (paragraph 7).
- (vii) Two out of every three vacancies in the rank of superintendent should be filled by direct appointment in Bengal, the United Provinces, Burma, Bihar and Orissa, and Assam. In Madras and Bombay every alternate vacancy should be so filled (paragraph 8).
- (viii) Selection committees should be created to advise the local authorities in the selection of candidates for direct appointment (paragraph 9).
- (ix) A stricter educational qualification should be imposed on all alike without distinction of communities. Candidates should be required either to have taken a university degree or to have passed an examination of a corresponding standard prescribed by the Government for the European schools (paragraph 9).
- (x) All new appointments of direct recruits should be made at the same place in the cadre (paragraph 9).
- (xi) Three appointments of probationer should be provided in Bombay and one in Bihar and Orissa; the number of probationers in Madras should be raised to five and that in Bengal to two (paragraph 10).
- (xii) Salaries should be paid on the incremental system and at the rates stated (paragraph 12).
- (xiii) A lower scale of pay should be fixed for any statutory native of India hereafter appointed in India as a distillery expert (paragraph 12).
- (xiv) Additions should be made to the cadre of Madras, Bombay, Bengal, Burma, and Bihar and Orissa to provide for leave and deputation reserves on the basis of the last five years' actual requirements (paragraph 14).
- (xv) An annual rate of recruitment for Madras should be fixed (paragraph 14).
- (xvi) The post of personal assistant to the excise commissioner in the United Provinces should be added to the excise cadre so soon as it is vacated by the present incumbent (paragraph 15).
- (xvii) The capacity of members of the salt and excise department in Burma to fill the chief superintendentship should be tested in leave vacancies (paragraph 16).
- (xviii) Except the members of the Indian civil service employed in the department and distillery experts, who are not statutory natives of India, all future entrants to the department should be under the Indian service leave rules throughout their careers (paragraph 17).
- (xix) Distillery experts should be permitted, subject to the general provisos, to reckon as service qualifying for superannuation pension the number of completed years by which their age at the time of appointment exceeded 25 (paragraph 18).

## ANNEXURE XXIII.

### Survey of India Department.

(The evidence relating to this department will be found in volume XV.)

#### CHAPTER I.

##### INTRODUCTORY.

1. The main function of the survey of India department is to prepare a topographical map for India and Burma. For this purpose the country is divided into three circles, each under a superintendent, with headquarters at Mussoorie, Bangalore, and Shillong respectively. Each circle superintendent is in general charge of the work of four topographical field parties. In addition to the staff employed on topographical work there is a trigonometrical branch with headquarters at Dehra Dun. This is in charge of a superintendent, who has six trigonometrical survey parties working under him. Another superintendent is stationed at Calcutta in charge of the reproducing offices. Calcutta is also the headquarters of the surveyor-general, who is in administrative control of the whole department.

#### CHAPTER II.

##### ORGANISATION.

2. *Division of the department into class I. and class II. recommended. Military nature of the department described.*—The department is divided into imperial and provincial branches, consisting respectively of officers drawn from the corps of Royal engineers and from the Indian army, and of statutory natives of India recruited in India. This arrangement, in so far as it is based on the principle that the higher work of the department is of two kinds, requiring two different classes of officers, has our approval, but the term “provincial” is a misnomer as applied to a service which works over the whole of India. We recommend, therefore, that all officers be regarded as belonging to one service, but that this be divided up into a class I. and a class II. For the rest, we endorse the policy, which has hitherto been followed, of maintaining a military element in the upper ranks of the department. The object of a topographical survey is primarily military; and the employment of military officers is also necessary on account of the requirements of the war reserve.\*

3. *Extent to which, and conditions under which, officers of class II. should be promoted into class I. of the department.*—At present, out of thirty-four posts in the department which are classed as superior, twenty-seven are filled by military officers and seven have been assigned to members of the provincial service. Opportunity is thus given to provincial service officers of rising to the upper ranks. The existing position is, however, unsatisfactory in that provincial service officers holding major charges, in which they have to carry out work of the same importance and responsibility as imperial officers, are yet denied equality of status with their imperial colleagues. In all such cases the class II. officer should be transferred to class I., taking seniority in that class as from the date of his first appointment to a major charge, and should be regarded as eligible, equally with officers directly recruited to class I., for further promotion to the administrative grades. We note also that the proportion of civilians to military officers in the upper ranks of the department is smaller now than it was before the establishment of a provincial service in 1895. In 1886, at the time of the last inquiry into the Indian public services, twelve civilian officers were included in the staff of forty-nine officers belonging to what was then known as the senior division. The effect of instituting the provincial service was practically to close the door to the employment of civilians in the higher posts, and for many years only three executive charges were thrown open to provincial service officers. The decision of the Government, in 1912, to increase this number to seven has gone some way towards redressing the balance.† In view, however, of the extent to which the services of civilians were formerly utilised, and of the higher standard which may now be set for recruitment in India, we are of opinion that the prospects offered to statutory natives of India in this department should be still further improved. We recommend accordingly

\* Volume XV., 70158-9.

† Volume XV., 70161.

that, so soon as the vested interests of junior military officers now serving have been satisfied and suitably qualified class II. officers become available for promotion, the number of class I. posts allotted to class II. officers should be increased from seven to ten. In 1931, according to the current estimate, the present topographical survey will be completed, and thereafter a reconstruction of the department may become necessary. It should be laid down that in such event the proportion of superior posts assigned to statutory natives of India will not be reduced.

4. *Rate at which reductions of establishment in class II. of the department should be made.*—By a recent order, recruitment to the provincial branch has been stopped on the ground that its present strength is far in excess of the number of supervisory posts in which officers on the provincial scale of salary can economically be employed.\* We agree that a reduction of staff is necessary. At the same time, whilst no final decision regarding the ultimate constitution of the staff will be possible until it is known what sort of work the department will be called on to undertake after the topographical survey is finished, we consider it desirable that steps should be taken in advance to ensure that there will always be an adequate field from which civilian officers can be obtained with suitable qualifications and of the right seniority for promotion to superior posts. We recommend accordingly that every alternate vacancy arising in class II. should be filled. The effect of this will be to retard the process of reducing the present inflated establishment, and temporarily to add to the expenditure on staff. But the department has already suffered much from too violent changes of organisation, and the administrative advantages which are likely to accrue from the adoption of a more cautious policy appear to us to be well worth the extra cost involved.

### CHAPTER III.

#### METHODS OF RECRUITMENT.

5. *Procedure to be followed in selecting military officers for class I. of the department.*—Appointments to the imperial service are made from among officers of the Royal engineers on the Indian establishment and officers of the Indian army with not more than six years' military service.† The normal proportion of appointments from the two services is three Royal engineers to one Indian army officer. We were informed by the surveyor-general that it was of advantage to have the Indian army as well as the corps of the Royal engineers represented on the directing staff of the department.‡ The Indian army officer is perhaps at the outset a less highly trained surveyor than the Royal engineer officer, but his Indian experience serves him in good stead when he comes to deal with large bodies of Indian surveyors. The present regulations appear to be working satisfactorily and we recommend that they be maintained for direct recruits for class I. of the new service.

6. *Procedure to be followed in selecting direct recruits for class II. of the department.*—Recruitment to the provincial service may, under present rules, be made, (a) by competition among nominated candidates who possess the qualifications required for admission to the entrance examination at the Rurki engineering college, or equivalent qualifications in provinces other than the United Provinces and the Punjab; (b) by nomination of candidates who have graduated, taking mathematics as a subject for their degree, or who have passed as a bachelor of engineering or possess the Rurki college certificate or other equivalent qualification; or (c) by promotion from the upper subordinate service.§ Hitherto the first of these methods has been the one commonly adopted, and it is said to have given on the whole satisfactory results. We recommend that it be maintained in future for class II. of the new service, but candidates should be nominated to appear for examination with the advice of a selection committee consisting of three officials and two non-officials and including two Indians, and so far as may be practicable, the standard of examination should be raised. We were informed by the surveyor-general that under the conditions which have hitherto been in force, vacancies have not been filled solely on the results of the examinations but on the basis also of providing for the appointment of Anglo-Indians in three out of every four posts. This practice should be discontinued. For adjudging the rival claims of the nominated candidates the examination results should be the sole test.

\* Volume XV., 70044.

† Volume XV., Appendix IV. (page 397).

‡ Volume XV., 70178.

§ Volume XV., Appendix V. (page 397).

## ANNEXURE XXIII.—SURVEY OF INDIA DEPARTMENT—(continued).

7. *Extent to which members of the upper subordinate service should be promoted into class II. of the department.*—No rules have been laid down as to the proportion of vacancies in the present provincial service which should be filled by direct recruitment and promotion respectively. We would leave the decision in this matter in the case of class II. of the new service to the Government of India, stipulating only that at least three vacancies out of four should be filled by direct recruits.

8. *Extent to which non-Europeans should be employed in class II. of the department.*—The question of admitting non-Europeans to the higher branches of the department was first raised in 1884, when it was decided that they should be recruited in one fourth of the total number of vacancies arising in what was then known as the junior division. In the present provincial service the rule has been that at least one quarter of the appointments should be allotted to such officers. The present position is that out of 181 posts on Rs. 200 and over in the department on the 1st April 1913, 153 were held by Europeans or Anglo-Indians and 28 by Indians.\* We think that the time has arrived when a further advance in the direction of the extended employment of non-Europeans in class II. of the department might properly be made, and with this object we recommend that not less than half the total number of candidates nominated for the class II. examination should be Indians of unmixed Asiatic descent.

## CHAPTER IV.

## SYSTEMS OF PROBATION AND TRAINING.

9. *Class I. of the department.*—Imperial officers are appointed on probation, and may be confirmed or reverted to military duty at any time within two years of their appointment. Since 1899 all military officers have also undergone a year's course of instruction at the Dehra Dun training school before being drafted to field parties. The present rules appear to be satisfactory, and should be maintained for class I. of the department.†

10. *Class II. of the department.*—In the rules for the provincial service it is laid down that the probationary period shall be two years for candidates recruited on a degree qualification or its equivalent, and three years for other candidates.‡ During his first year of service the probationer attends a survey training class, and is taught the theory and practice of surveying and map drawing, and the use of surveying and drawing instruments. He is subsequently attached to a survey party for a term of practical training in surveying and map drawing. The term of probation for officers in class II. of the new service should be fixed at two years in all cases. The present provision for training is sufficient, and no further facilities need be offered.

## CHAPTER V.

## CONDITIONS OF SALARY.

11. *Rates of salary for military officers in class I. of the department.*—The rates of salary of the imperial service were last fixed in 1910, when it was decided to place the military officers in the department on a time scale rising by Rs. 50 annually to Rs. 1,500 a month. Under this scale service for increment counts from the date of first commission in the Army, the assumed initial rates being Rs. 370 a month for Royal engineer officers, and Rs. 300 a month for Indian army officers. In addition to their pay, as regulated by the time scale, substantive superintendents were to draw charge allowances ranging from Rs. 500 to Rs. 750 a month, and officers in permanent or temporary charge of field parties were to draw a charge allowance of Rs. 200 a month. No change was made in the emoluments of the surveyor-general. This officer receives Rs. 3,000 a month and exchange compensation allowance. In fixing these rates the Government of India had in mind the desirability of attracting to the survey of India department military officers of the same class as those employed in the public works and railway departments. It was represented to the Secretary of State that the prize appointments were more numerous and more valuable in these departments than in the survey of India department, and that for a great part of

\* Volume XV., Appendix II., (page 396).

† Volume XV., 70160.

‡ Volume XV., Appendix V. (page 397).



## CHAPTER VI.

## CONDITIONS OF SERVICE.

13. *Leave and training reserves. System to be followed in fixing the strength of the cadre of class I. of the department.*—At present the cadre of the imperial service includes a margin of twenty-five per cent. as a reserve for leave and training. This is based on the total number of imperial service appointments, including those held by assistant superintendents under training for the higher duties. We think it desirable that the present opportunity should be taken to recalculate the strength of the cadre in accordance with the principles adopted in other departments. Under this system the establishment should be fixed on the basis of the total number of superior charges, and so as to provide, first, for an adequate margin for leave, and, secondly, for the promotion of assistant superintendents to major charges after an adequate term of service. The class I. posts assigned to promoted class II. officers should be left out of the calculation. Leave vacancies in these posts should, as far as possible, be filled by class II. officers, whose fitness for promotion to class I. could thus be tested. In view of the fact that the number of officers in class II. is largely in excess of the authorised establishment, we make no recommendation regarding the sufficiency of the leave and training reserve in that branch of the service.

## CHAPTER VII.

## CONDITIONS OF LEAVE.

14. *Leave rules.*—Under present conditions members of the imperial service are under the European service and other officers under the Indian service leave rules. We recommend that in future direct recruits to class I. be entitled to the European service rules and that class II. officers come under the Indian service rules and remain under those rules throughout their careers, even when promoted to class I.

## CHAPTER VIII.

## CONDITIONS OF PENSION.

15. *Pension rules.*—Military officers are pensioned under army rules, and other officers under the rules ordinarily applicable to civil departments. The posts of surveyor-general and superintendent are included in the schedule of appointments entitling their holders, when not military officers, to a special additional pension. The present arrangements are suitable, and we advise no change.

## CHAPTER IX.

## SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS.

16. The changes which we have recommended in the survey of India department are as follows :—

- (i) The service should be divided into class I. and class II. (paragraph 2).
- (ii) Class II. officers holding major charges should be included in the cadre of class I. (paragraph 3).
- (iii) The number of class I. posts allotted to class II. officers should be increased from seven to ten (paragraph 3).
- (iv) Every second vacancy in class II. should be filled up (paragraph 4).
- (v) Nominations to appear at the examination for admission to class II. should be made with the advice of a selection committee; the standard of examination should be raised; and appointments should be given strictly in accordance with the examination results (paragraph 6).
- (vi) At least three out of four vacancies in class II. should be filled by direct recruits (paragraph 7).

- (vii) Not less than half the candidates nominated for the class II. examination should be Indians of unmixed Asiatic descent (paragraph 8).
- (viii) The term of probation in class II. should be fixed at two years (paragraph 10).
- (ix) The rates of salary in classes I. and II. should be modified to the extent stated (paragraphs 11 and 12).
- (x) The reserves for leave and training in class I. should be recalculated (paragraph 13).
- (xi) Direct recruits to Class I. should be subject to the European service leave rules. Class II. officers should come under the Indian service leave rules and remain under them throughout their careers (paragraph 14).

MINUTE BY MR. W. C. MADGE.

*Paragraph 3.*—The community from which the department is recruited in India will appreciate Colonel Burrard's committee's concessions to the better class of India-recruited members of the department, and be grateful for the extension of those concessions contained in this annexure; and no word of mine need be read as an objection to the scheme now propounded, which I support. My note under this head is directed against the spirit of the policy which has prevailed for some years past, and may possibly have been temporarily suppressed, but the revival of which is quite conceivable and may lead to future delays in personal promotions on allegations of inefficiency which may not operate under the present head of the department, but may be revived in the future as they have been active in the past. The delay in fulfilling the promises of the last Commission justifies and demands some foresight to-day. To my mind it is a mistake which may cause more harm to the country than to its victims to represent India-recruited officers as mainly engaged on a lower class of work, while the imported branch attends to higher duty. Up to the time of the last surveyor-general, during whose incumbency it was ruled that no provincial officer should ever again hold charge of a camp party, officers recruited in India had not only held such charges and done excellent work, acknowledged in successive reports, but had risen to such high offices as deputy superintendent and assistant surveyor-general. Colonel Burrard's committee has undone some of this injustice, and in this annexure the extension of charges tenable by India-recruited officers has been recommended from the "seven" of Colonel Burrard's committee to "ten" such charges. The total number of such charges being 34, it follows that India-recruited officers will fill nearly one-third of the superior cadre. They cannot, therefore, be described as doing a lower class of work. Many India-recruited officers do the best kind of work done by the department, and in this respect stand in the same category with the imported officers.

2. Then, again, the result of appointing two imported officers to each of the 24 charges has meant a costly extravagance, and in time of war like the present, when military officers are recalled to regiments, must either compel suspension of survey work, to the permanent injury of the country, or force resort to the former successful practice of putting provincial officers in temporary charge, a practical refutation of their theoretical incompetence. A grave wrong will further be done to the country if—whether to prevent men recruited in India from rising to eminence as they did in the past to their own credit, and for the good of the service and the country, as testified in official records, or for any worse reason—the educational standard for entrance into any section of the department in India should be lowered. In the interests of the country at large everything ought to be done to raise the standard of professional education in this as in other departments to the highest practicable standard, and, whereas men recruited in India have rendered acknowledged good service in the past, nothing should be allowed to stand in the way of their promotion. I cannot agree in the dictum now, so far as I am aware, for the first time pronounced, that a scientific department directly engaged in other than trigonometrical surveys, such as the geodetic for instance, and is also indirectly of value in the development of railways and industrial resources, is to be regarded as of an essentially military character, though I highly approve of the fine tone maintained in it by the military element, which ought never to be abolished.

W. C. MADGE.

## ANNEXURE XXIV.

### Madras Survey Department.

*(The evidence relating to this department will be found in volume XV.).*

#### CHAPTER I.

##### INTRODUCTORY.

1. The primary function of the Madras survey department is to produce village or field maps for the purposes of the revenue administration. The first revenue survey of the presidency was completed in 1896, but some of the work had been inaccurately done, and, owing to this fact and to the continuous changes of holdings in the villages, it became necessary either to revise or re-make a large portion of the maps. The work of the department came under review in 1903, and two years later a new scheme of organisation was started.\* Under this scheme it was contemplated that the re-survey and revision programme would be completed by 1910-11, and that thereafter a staff of three survey officers in two field parties would be required for the mapping of some 25,000 square miles of zamindari tracts as yet unsurveyed. At the same time it was decided that in areas for which efficient maps had been prepared the maintenance and correction of the maps should be entrusted to a land records agency. For this purpose the presidency was split up into five divisions, to each of which an officer of the Madras survey was to be appointed as a technical expert with the title of superintendent of land records. The scheme provided further for the employment of a number of land record tahsildars and land revenue inspectors, but it was intended that ultimately the maintenance of the records should be regarded as an essential part of the duties of the ordinary revenue staff and that the special appointments of land records tahsildar and land records inspector should gradually be absorbed. The policy of the new system was adversely criticised by witnesses who came before us, but the issue thus raised is purely administrative and lies outside the scope of our reference. In any event it is clear that some time must elapse before the transitional stage has been passed, and for some years at any rate the existing establishment will need to be maintained. Indeed, proposals have recently been put forward by the Government of Madras for temporarily increasing the cadre by six appointments. In these circumstances we have decided to accept the facts as they are, and our recommendations in the following paragraphs have been framed accordingly.

#### CHAPTER II.

##### ORGANISATION.

2. *Existing organisation approved.*—The department is not divided into imperial and provincial branches. Its officers are engaged partly on survey work and partly on the maintenance of land records, and for these duties only one class of officers is required. The direction of the land records system is vested in an officer of the Indian civil service to whom the survey officers employed as superintendents of land records are responsible.\* Other survey officers are under the control of the director of the Madras survey. This arrangement is suitable, and we advise no change.

#### CHAPTER III.

##### METHODS OF RECRUITMENT.

3. *Place of appointment.*—The department is recruited entirely in India. A proposal was made to us that a portion of the staff should for the future be obtained from Europe, but this we are unable to support. No technical qualifications are required of candidates and there are no grounds of policy which would justify recourse to recruitment in England. This would, moreover, entail a substantial increase of expenditure, and would constitute the single instance of a provincial Government recruiting its staff from England. We advise that the present system be maintained, and that if on any occasion no suitably qualified person is available for appointment in the Madras presidency, application be made for the

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\* Volume XV., Appendix I. (page 420).

transfer of an officer of the survey of India. The present provincial branch of that department is at present largely in excess of its authorised cadre and there would probably be no difficulty in obtaining the services of a fully trained officer.

4. *Limitations in the employment of non-Europeans.*—The first appointment of an Indian officer to the gazetted staff was made in 1892, and at present out of sixteen appointments in the department ten are held by Europeans or Anglo-Indians, and six by Indians.\* From 1892 to 1908 it was the established rule to appoint Europeans and Indians in alternate vacancies. In the latter year the Madras Government decided that a limitation of this kind was undesirable, but the abolition of the rule has not hitherto resulted in any change of practice, two of the four appointments filled since 1908 having gone to Indian candidates.† We recommend that the present practice be continued.

5. *Procedure to be followed in making appointments.*—Except for a brief period in the early history of the department, during which admission to the service was regulated by open competition, appointments to the gazetted staff have invariably been made on the nomination of the Governor in Council. Selected candidates are now required to pass a qualifying examination in mathematics.‡ We are of opinion that this system should continue, but that in making appointments the Governor in Council should be assisted by a selection committee consisting of a member of the board of revenue, an officer of the education department, and a non-official Indian. The committee should take the necessary steps to make known the occurrence of vacancies and should examine and report on the qualifications of candidates. We further recommend that for direct recruits to the department a minimum educational qualification should be prescribed. Candidates should either possess the degree of a university, or have passed an examination of a corresponding standard prescribed by Government for the European schools. Preference should be given to candidates showing proficiency in mathematics. If such a test is applied, a qualifying examination in that subject will no longer be needed. We are in favour also of continuing the practice hitherto followed of filling vacancies partly by the promotion of subordinates and partly by direct recruitment. In so small a department it would be undesirable to lay down any hard and fast rule as to the proportion of vacancies to be filled by each of these two methods.

#### CHAPTER IV.

##### SYSTEMS OF PROBATION AND TRAINING.

6. *Probation and training.*—Newly-recruited officers are attached to a survey party for one month, to a settlement party for twelve months, to a survey party again for six months and to the central survey office for three months; and their confirmation is subject to their passing examinations in survey and settlement work and in the vernacular.‡ Officers in the department consider that more time should be allowed for training in survey and that six months should ordinarily suffice for the training of probationers in settlement work. The amount of time spent on survey training compares unfavourably with the two or three years' course prescribed for the provincial branch of the survey of India department, and in view of the fact that the training of officers in the Madras survey is intended to serve as an adequate preparation both for survey and for land records work, we are of opinion that an extension of the probationary course rather than a readjustment of the periods allowed in the present curriculum for survey and settlement work is needed. In other respects the present arrangements appear to be satisfactory.

#### CHAPTER V.

##### CONDITIONS OF SALARY.

7. *Rates of salary.*—The department is now paid under a graded system. Certain of the present staff are in receipt of personal salaries, but according to the authorised

\* Volume XV., Appendices I., II. (pages 420 *et seq.*), and 70775.

† Volume XV., Appendix I. (page 420), and 70770.

‡ Volume XV., Appendix I. (page 240), and 70770.

## ANNEXURE XXIV.—MADRAS SURVEY DEPARTMENT—(continued).

scale the director of survey is allowed a salary of Rs. 1,200-40-1,400 a month, the assistant directors' salaries ranging from Rs. 300 to Rs. 900 a month. Probationers are paid Rs. 200 a month.\* In our opinion the present standard of salaries is sufficiently high. The graded system, however, has not proved satisfactory, and we recommend the establishment of an incremental scale of Rs. 250-50/3-550 a month in place of the three lowest grades of Rs. 300, 425, and 550. This, on the numbers proposed by the Madras Government for the next few years, will work out at a slightly higher average than the present graded system. For probationers a salary of Rs. 150 a month should be adequate. It will be seen from the following statement that if these changes are made the increased cost, taken on the basis of the number of officers proposed by the Madras Government for the immediate future, will be approximately Rs. 7,273 a year. There will, however, be a slight saving on present cost when the number of officers is ultimately reduced to 16 (including probationers), as contemplated by the Madras Government.

PRESENT SCALE.				PROPOSED SCALE.			
No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.	No.	Name of appointment.	Pay of each.	Cost per mensem.
1	Director of survey - - -	Rs. 1,200-40-1,400	Ra. 1,333 5 4	1	Director of survey - - -	Rs. 1,200-40-1,400	Ra. 1,333 5 4
2	Assistant directors of survey, 1st class.	900	1,800 0 0	2	Assistant directors of survey, 1st class.	900	1,800 0 0
2	Assistant directors of survey, 2nd class.	700	1,400 0 0	2	Assistant directors of survey, 2nd class.	700	1,400 0 0
2	Assistant directors of survey, 3rd class.	550	1,100 0 0	16†	Assistant directors of survey, 3rd class.	250-50/3-550	6,256 0 9
2	Assistant directors of survey, 4th class.	425	850 0 0				
12*	Assistant directors of survey, 5th class.	300	3,600 0 0				
2	Probationers - - - -	200	400 0 0	2	Probationers - - - -	150	300 0 0
23	Total - - - -	- - -	10,483 5 4	23	Total - - - -	- - -	11,089 6 1
					Deduct present cost - - -	- - -	10,483 5 4
					Net extra expenditure per mensem -	-	606 0 9
					" " per annum -	-	7,272 9 0

\* The Madras Government propose that this number should ultimately be reduced to 5.

† This number, if the proposals of the Madras Government are sanctioned, will ultimately be reduced to 9.

## CHAPTER VI.

## CONDITIONS OF SERVICE.

8. *Leave and training reserves. Annual rate of recruitment.*—The present cadre includes one officer as a reserve for leave, but the Madras Government have recently proposed that this post should be abolished, the intention apparently being that leave vacancies shall in future be filled by subordinates.† This arrangement will make it possible to test the fitness of subordinate officers for permanent promotion and appears to be suitable. The Madras Government have also in their recent proposals for an increase of staff made provision for a training reserve of two probationers.\* This should be sufficient. No annual rate of recruitment is at present fixed, nor is any needed in so small a department.

## CHAPTER VII.

## CONDITIONS OF LEAVE.

9. *Leave rules.*—At present European officers in the department down to and including assistant directors of survey second class are subject to the European service leave rules, and the remaining officers to the Indian service leave rules.‡ We are of opinion that the Indian service leave rules should apply to all officers in this department irrespective of their salaries, and the regulations should be modified accordingly with due regard for existing rights.

\* Volume XV., Appendix I. (page 420).

† Volume XV., Appendix I. (page 423).

‡ Volume XV., 70748.

## CHAPTER VIII.

## CONDITIONS OF PENSION.


10. *Pension rules.*—Officers of the department are now subject, and should continue to be subject to the ordinary pension rules. There is no post in the department the holder of which should, in our opinion, be entitled to a special additional pension.

## CHAPTER IX.

## SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS.

11. The changes we have recommended in the Madras survey department are as follows :—

- (i) Application should be made for the transfer of an officer from the survey of India department if on any occasion no suitably qualified candidate is available for appointment in the Madras presidency (paragraph 3).
- (ii) Appointments should be made with the advice of a selection committee (paragraph 5).
- (iii) A minimum educational qualification should be prescribed for direct recruits and preference should be shown to candidates proficient in mathematics (paragraph 5).
- (iv) The period of training should be lengthened (paragraph 6).
- (v) An incremental scale of salary should be established at the rates stated (paragraph 7).
- (vi) All future entrants to the service should be subject to the Indian service leave rules (paragraph 9).



## MINUTES RELATING TO THE REPORT BY MEMBERS SIGNING THE REPORT.

MINUTE BY THE EARL OF RONALDSHAY, SIR MURRAY HAMMICK, SIR VALENTINE CHIROL  
AND MR. F. G. SLY.

*Paragraph 57 (end of paragraph.)*—We regret that we are unable to agree with our colleagues in this recommendation. The arguments against granting to Indians recruited in England, emoluments superior to those granted to Indians recruited in India, appear to us to be overwhelming and unanswerable. One objection only—though that a powerful one—is mentioned in the text, namely, the effect such a recommendation will have upon public estimation of the educational institutions of India. One of the most insistent demands with which the Commission were confronted during the course of their inquiry was for the improvement and development of facilities for technical and higher education in India. By the recommendations which they are making in this connection, they admit unreservedly the force and the justice of this demand. The Commission are profoundly desirous of seeing established in India institutions capable of satisfying the highest educational aspirations of her people, and they recommend measures designed to achieve this object. It is surely then not only illogical but the height of folly to issue to the youth of India, whom it is desired to attract to the educational institutions of his own country, an official manifesto offering him better terms of service on condition that he acquires his education abroad. We say better terms of service advisedly, because under the recommendations made, European rates of pay carry with them European conditions of leave. It is difficult to comprehend on what grounds of logic or justice or even of expediency it can be held that an Indian who has spent a few years as a student abroad should, for the whole period of his service, draw pay which is admittedly higher, and enjoy leave which is admittedly more extensive than is necessary in the case of a man serving in his own country. Nor can we be persuaded to believe that this invidious distinction between one Indian and another will be popular except with the limited number who will benefit by it. In this connection it is not inappropriate to recall the fact that an objection frequently urged by Indian witnesses to the present practice necessitating appearance at an examination in England for entrance to the Indian civil service, was that the rich boy was given an advantage over the poor boy, the suggestion being that it was the rich boy of moderate ability who was able to repair to England, while the poor boy, however great his talents, was compelled to remain at home. If this contention be well founded, the folly of according a higher rate of pay to Indians recruited in England becomes yet more glaringly manifest, since one of the chief factors enabling them to make Great Britain their place of recruitment is their possession of more ample means. Finally, it is generally accepted that the main reason for according a higher rate of pay and more generous leave rules to the European officer, is because he is serving away from his own country and amid surroundings, climatic and other, which impose upon him a strain to which he would not be subjected if serving at home. To extend the same treatment to a limited number of Indians, simply because they are appointed in England instead of in India, is to cut to the root of this the legitimate ground for differentiation, and must result in diffusing the false and most undesirable idea that the Indian educated in his own country is inferior in status and ability to his fellow countryman who has been partly educated abroad. In our opinion nothing could be more inimical to the best interests of the Indian personnel of the public services than thus to create within their ranks a small, exclusive and officially recognised class, whose existence can only have the effect of placing a perpetual and an irritating discount, in the eyes of the youth of India, upon the institutions of their own land. Our dissent on this point should be understood as applying generally throughout the relevant annexures.

RONALDSHAY.  
MURRAY HAMMICK.  
VALENTINE CHIROL.  
F. G. SLY.

MINUTE BY SIR THEODORE MORISON.

I do not agree with the arguments advanced by the majority (in paragraphs 55–57 of the report) in favour of differential rates of pay nor with the conclusions they draw from them.

2. That there is something to be said in defence of paying Indians less than Englishmen when serving in India, I admit; most men will be ready to accept a lower salary for serving in their own country than for serving abroad. The attractiveness of the service depends upon two factors, viz.:—(i) the salary, and (ii) the conditions of life which that service involves. Where the conditions of life are pleasant the salary may be proportionately low, and where the conditions of life are comparatively unpleasant the salary must be correspondingly high. It is obvious that to the great majority of men service in their own country offers much pleasanter conditions of life than service abroad does; it follows that service in India offers much pleasanter conditions of life to Indians than to Englishmen. In order, therefore, to make the service equally attractive to both classes of officers the salary should be high for those who, when serving in India, are serving abroad, and low for those who are serving at home. If this is not done the real remuneration of the two classes of officers will be different.

3. That is, I believe, a fair statement of the case for differential rates of pay between Englishmen and Indians. I do not, however, think it is convincing. The state does not attempt to buy its officers individually in the cheapest market; it prescribes a rate of salary which is on the average likely to attract the right sort of recruit and applies it to all alike. That is the essence of a service as contrasted with individual appointments. As long as the service-system of recruitment is maintained that principle should be upheld. It is very dangerous doctrine that the state should inquire into the private circumstances of its officers and make these circumstances a ground for a differentiation of salaries. We should all agree that it is not desirable that the state should pay the bachelor less than the married man or reduce the salary of the officer who has private means, though these retrenchments might be defended on the ground of economy. The only thing which differentiates these cases from those under discussion is that these are individual and Indians and Englishmen form a large and easily distinguishable class; but there is no real dividing line between individuals, groups of individuals, small classes and large classes. If the state once begins to look into the private circumstances of its officers there is no logical ground for stopping short of the individual. Divisions other than those between Indians and Englishmen could be found on which as good a claim for differential pay could be based. At present the Government of India does not pay the Indian who is serving in his own province any less than the Indian who is serving far from his home, and yet the Madrasi who has to serve in the Punjab has perhaps a better title to a foreign service allowance than an Englishman serving in the same province whose parents have made their home in the Himalayas. The state wisely declines to investigate the personal and domestic circumstances of its officers and to make them a ground for a differentiation of salary, because it knows that it would be impossible to assess them justly in terms of money.

4. I venture to think that my colleagues themselves have not been altogether successful in making their scheme of differentiation fit the circumstances of Indian service. They have made the difference between English and Indian salaries most marked in the early years of service and conceded equality of pay towards the end of the officers' career. But as a matter of fact it is in the early years of his service that the Englishman feels the drawbacks of an Indian career least. It is when he is married and wishes to be with his children and look after their education that he realises its disadvantages most acutely. A differential scheme of pay which corresponded with the difference in the domestic circumstances of Indian and English officers should, I venture to submit, be the exact opposite of that which the majority propose.

5. Even if it be held that the economic arguments for differentiating between Englishmen and Indians are stronger than I conceive them to be, the political reasons against such a course are, to my mind, overwhelming. Indians feel that they are slighted by being assigned, as a class, less pay than Englishmen when they are doing the same work. In India the rate of salary is so commonly taken as a criterion of merit that this is not altogether unreasonable. But whether reasonable or unreasonable the feeling is there, and we have to take account of human nature as it is, not as it might be. The political unwisdom of appearing to put a slight upon Indian officers as a class needs no demonstration. The misconstruction to which this policy is open in the minds of malevolent people is also obvious. "The Government of India" they argue "is composed of Englishmen, and they take good care to look

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“ after their own countrymen ; so they have found an excuse for giving them bigger “ salaries than Indians.” Even a Government as clean handed as that of India cannot afford to give such a handle to its enemies ; it must not only be fair, it must be seen and acknowledged to be fair. When the arguments are so evenly balanced as they are in this case, it should choose the course which is not open to any misconstruction.

6. I am not indifferent to the argument of economy, and I certainly have no wish to impose on India *for all time* a burden which she ought not to bear ; but happily there is no danger of that. As soon as the condition of the country makes it possible that recruitment for a particular service should take place wholly in India, the salaries of that service should be revised and put upon an Indian scale. This is what this Commission has recommended with regard to the finance department. We do not believe that it is any longer necessary to import men from England for this department, and therefore we do not think it necessary to retain for it an English scale of pay. The same course will I hope be taken in future with regard to some other departments. In those important services like the Indian civil service in which reasons of state make it desirable that Englishmen, for as long a time as we can foresee, should be in a substantial majority, my colleagues agree with me that Indians should receive the same salaries as Englishmen. There remain for consideration those smaller but very important services, like the education and the public works departments in which I am not prepared to contemplate the disappearance of the English element. In these departments I would ask the Government of India to divide the superior service into classes I. and II. according to the nature of the work to be done ; this classification into two categories is a highly technical task which our Commission was not competent to undertake, but I have no doubt that with expert goodwill it could be done. My recommendation to the Government of India would be to keep class I. as small as possible ; Indians and Englishmen would of course be equally eligible for both classes, and would draw the same salaries. In this way, it would, I believe, be possible to reduce the expense caused by paying Englishmen and Indians the same salaries to a figure which would be a small price to pay for getting rid of a fruitful source of discontent.

THEODORE MORISON.

MINUTE BY MR. M. B. CHAUBAL.

## CHAPTER I.—INTRODUCTORY.

I have signed the report as I am in agreement with its large principles, and as I support its main recommendations for the sympathetic spirit in which so far as they go they are conceived. I rather append this dissenting minute so as to indicate the direction in which, in my opinion, they might well go further to meet adequately the hopes and expectations of the reasonable portion of the Indian public without materially affecting the efficiency of the administration. The Indian view of some of the questions dealt with, or touched, in the report is also different, and I have attempted to set that forth in this minute. The recommendations in the report, if accepted in their entirety, will eventually mean a fair advance over the present state of things, but the points made in this minute contain the minimum Indian demand which I think can and ought to be conceded if the reasonable aspirations of the Indian people are to be satisfied.

## CHAPTER II.—PUBLIC SERVICES COMMISSION OF 1886–1887.

2. Chapter II. of the report deals with the Public Services Commission of 1886–1887. The Indian view of the main recommendation of that Commission, and of the decision taken on it by the Secretary of State is, however, not very complimentary to it. We had clear evidence before us that Indian public opinion considers it to be not only inappropriate for the time but positively of a retrograde character and that instead of doing full justice to the claims of natives of India to the higher and more extensive employment in the public service, it was calculated to put back considerably the employment of Indians in the higher service. Seven years before the appointment of that Commission, the Secretary of State, with the full concurrence of the Governor-General in Council, had framed rules under which a proportion not exceeding one-fifth of the *total number* of civilians appointed by the

Secretary of State to the Indian civil service in any one year was to consist of natives of India selected by the local Governments; and it was further provided that the nominations in the first three years (1879-1881) might exceed the said proportion by two. As pointed out in the report of the last Commission, the practical effect of the limit imposed by the rules, when calculated upon the regular annual recruitment of covenanted civilians fixed as proportionate for each province, was to give 7·56 as the total yearly number of statutory appointments for the whole of British India. It must be noted that during all the discussion which followed the re-opening of the question in 1884, no complaint was made that the proportion laid down by the rules of 1879 was an excessive proportion. The discussion was confined to the point that the plan of nomination adopted under the rules failed to secure sufficient guarantees of ability and education. Now, if the rules had continued in force and the proportion fixed under them had been worked out, there would by the end of 1914 have been about 260 appointments to the higher service made in India in a period of 35 years: and we might have expected to see that number (subject to the rate of decrement) always in the service. Instead, the Aitchison Commission fixed 108 posts for all time to come.

3. The way in which this number 108 was arrived at is also worth noticing, because the Commission claimed that the number fixed by them was in excess of the proportion referred to in the rules of 1879. From the total cadre certain posts were excluded, and roughly one-sixth of the reserved posts only were taken into calculation. In the rules of 1879 there is no reference to reserved posts, and the recruitment fixed under them was a certain proportion of the *total annual* recruitment.

4. The effect of these recommendations, retrograde as they were, was further limited by the Secretary of State. The 108 were reduced to 93: and the posts were not cut down from the schedule of reserved posts, and transferred to the local service thenceforward designated the provincial service. The junior posts out of these 93 have now been mostly incorporated with the provincial service, the result being that there are at present only about 61 specific superior posts to which it is open to make appointments from the members of the provincial service, but they do not form part of an organised service.

5. It is, I believe, the expectation of the Indian public that this Commission should recommend a proportion of the higher service for recruitment in India which will not only redress this setback, but will take into account the progress that India has made since 1886 and such further progress as she may reasonably be expected to make during the next 30 years, for it will take fully that time to work up the proportion recommended, taking into consideration the fact that vested interests must be safeguarded.

#### CHAPTER III.—CHANGED CONDITIONS OF INDIA.

6. The relevance of the figures of material prosperity to the three great questions in connection with the services, which we have been commissioned to inquire into is not very obvious. The really important figures that have a distinct bearing on the problems before us are those relating to the intellectual progress of the country during the last 30 years. The want of careers for young men is more or less a problem of anxiety to parents in most countries, but perhaps in no country in the world is it so acute and accentuated as in India. The one career most popular and most sought after there is Government service: and a considerable part of the discontent in the "young educated" in India is due to the inadequacy of employment in the higher service. Recently, no doubt, young men from different communities have begun to look to trade, commerce and industries; but the great bulk of young men turned out from the universities look upon Government service as the only available occupation. It is necessary that this should always be present to our minds when dealing with the question of the larger employment of Indians in the higher public service.

*Paragraph 18.—Extent to which the western educated classes represent the masses of the people.*

7. The two views on this question are fairly stated in this paragraph. But in view of the wide belief in high circles in the first of these views a closer examination

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of the question so far as it is material to the services concerned, and to the employment of Indians in them, is necessary. In the first place, it may be pointed out that in relation to the public services under Government there is no such class as *eastern educated classes*, as distinguished or distinguishable from "the western educated classes." For such eastern education as exists now there is absolutely no scope for employment in any of the departments we have considered. If any Indians have to be employed in the higher service at all, they must be from the western educated classes, whether they *represent* the masses of the people or not. Assuming that they do not, the next step implied in the argument is that the ability or capacity to *represent* the masses must be present in anyone who claims to be entitled to enter the higher service under Government. Therefore, it is not desirable to employ a larger number of these western educated classes in the higher service, and, consequently it is impossible with safety and in the interests of these masses to narrow the field of employment for Europeans and Anglo-Indians in the higher posts under Government. To employ the educated Indian in larger numbers is, in the words of the late Sir Charles Crosthwaite, "to give a disproportionate degree of authority in the government of the masses and the aristocracy into the hands of a few thousand men whose heads have been turned by an education they have not assimilated."

8. If this argument is analysed one cannot help being struck with the assumption that this capacity to *represent* the masses is taken for granted in the European and the Anglo-Indian. It is difficult to understand exactly what is intended to be conveyed by the word "represent." If it implies a knowledge of the conditions of life of these masses, their habits, their ways of living and thinking, their wants and grievances, the ability to enter into their thoughts, and appreciate what is necessary to educate them, to give them higher ideas of life, and make them realise their duties towards all about them, there ought to be no doubt that the educated Indian has all these in a far higher degree than any European or Anglo-Indian can claim to have. The charge really is that the educated Indian has a class bias, a sort of clannishness, a tendency to favour his own caste or community in the discharge of his official duties which detract from his usefulness in the higher service, and, therefore, the presence of the European in large numbers is necessary to hold the scales evenly between these few educated thousands and the dumb and ignorant millions, who would otherwise be oppressed by them.

9. This is rather a shallow pretence—this attempt to take shelter behind the masses; and I think it only fair to state that the class of educated Indians from which only the higher posts can be filled is singularly free from this narrow-mindedness and class or caste bias; e.g., no instances of complaint on this score as against any of the Indian members of the Indian civil service would be available, and I have no hesitation in endorsing the opinion of Sir Narayan Chandavarkar, in his recent contribution on village life in his tour through southern India, that the interests of the masses are likely to be far better understood and taken care of by the educated Indian than by the foreigner. As a matter of fact all the measures proposed for the regeneration of the lower and depressed classes have emanated from the educated Indians of the higher castes. The scheme for the free and compulsory education of these masses was proposed by an educated Indian of a high caste and supported mainly by the western educated classes. High-souled and self-sacrificing men are every day coming forward from this class to work whole-heartedly in improving the condition of the masses.

10. Perhaps the truth, however unpalatable, is that there are still a number of the average English officials in India who have a distrust and suspicion about the educated Indian. The explanation of this is probably that given by Sir P. M. Mehta in his evidence—that the English official does not like the independence, the self-assertion and the self-respect which come naturally in the wake of education. As Dr. Wordsworth stated in his evidence before the last Commission, "deferential ignorance, conciliatory manners, and a plentiful absence of originality and independence are now, and will always be, at a premium." It is high time that this shibboleth was exploded. It is indeed hardly consistent that while on the one hand Government should foster and encourage the growth of opportunities for educated Indians for participation in public life, in the municipalities and district boards, and in the provincial and imperial legislative councils, they should, on the

other, so jealously guard the entrance of educated indigenous agency into the higher and better remunerated posts in the state.

#### CHAPTER IV.—GENERAL STATEMENT OF THE EXISTING PROBLEM.

11. The questions relating to the salary, leave, pension, and prospects in the services, are, comparatively only of subsidiary importance. By far the most important part of the existing problem relates to the employment of Indians in the higher branches of the service. The lower branches of the service, and the subordinate services, have ever been and must continue to be mainly recruited from the natives of the country, partly because Europeans cannot afford to serve on the salaries generally attached to the posts in them. The question relating to their larger employment in the higher service requires, under the present political conditions of India, to be approached and looked at from a broad, far-reaching and statesmanlike point of view, and there are certain factors which must, under the present circumstances, be steadily kept in mind.

12. The too limited employment of Indians in the higher service is one of the main causes of the discontent and unrest which have recently become so marked among the educated classes, and about which so much has been heard and written. To understand the genesis of this unrest one must consider what young educated India is at the present day and how it has come to be what it is. Young men of the present generation do not and cannot appreciate the benefits of the British rule to the same degree as did the men of a past generation. The latter contrasted the peace and security of life and property with the troublous times before the British rule, and felt happy and contented. The young man of the present day takes these great blessings as his birthright. When western education was started and schools, colleges and universities were established, the young Indian began to study eagerly the history and literature of free and advanced western countries and the biographies of great men, studied their careers and how they struggled for freedom and liberty; he studied the birth and growth of liberal institutions in western countries, and he began to contrast their state with his own helpless dependence. A vague discontent took possession of his mind, and a wild enthusiasm to break through his environment seized him. He fancied that his progress in every direction was hampered. Nearer home he saw how a small nation, comparatively recently quite as low as his own country in civilisation, rose to splendour and worked out its own salvation. These forces, which had been working silently, found expression in the annual national congress came to a head at the noted Surat congress, and the school of anarchy of which we now find exhibitions had its origin in this discontent. The phenomenon of practically all the higher offices in the state being monopolised by the foreigner and the European loomed large in the view of those young men, who formed originally the extremist school. A few wise and farseeing men like the late Mr. Gokhale saw the trend of events, and were afraid of the pit into which young India was being led. To counterbalance this school they wisely placed before their educated countrymen the goal of a "colonial self-government" and the privilege of the citizenship of the largest empire in the world; and they declared that as they made themselves fit for it, they would draw nearer to this goal, until India took its proper place in the empire as a self-governing colony. In the speeches in the viceroy's legislative council, the restricted employment of Indians in the higher service was the frequent theme of attack on the lines on which the administration of the country was run. By their incessant efforts, they have now been able to persuade a very large body of young educated Indians to adopt this ideal, and those who believe that that ideal is attainable by self-improvement and constitutional agitation form what is recognised as the *moderate* school in Indian politics. A wider and more liberal employment of highly educated and capable Indians in the higher posts under Government will, it is believed, in no small degree strengthen this party and correspondingly break through the strength of the other school.

13. Since last August, however, this earnest demand for a larger employment of qualified Indian agency in the higher service has received an added force. This unfortunate war into which the whole empire has been launched, the response that India has made to the call of the empire in its need, and the generous and appreciative terms in which responsible British administrators have spoken and are

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speaking of the loyal support from all classes and communities in India, have raised hopes and aspirations which if not substantially satisfied will result in disappointment and cause alarming discontent. Whatever may come after a successful termination of the war, the country is now in a ferment and is anxiously awaiting the final pronouncements of this Commission for some substantial indication of the "altered angle of vision" towards Indian problems.

14. The question, therefore, of the proportions in which indigenous agency is to be utilised in the near future in the higher service of the state is of vital importance. These proportions must be such as will cumulatively throughout the services help to create the feeling that we Indians are in a substantial degree carrying on the government of the country. At present the Indians are far and few; and every Indian officer, whether high or low, feels that he is not serving himself or his country, but is an individual hired to labour for somebody else. He can rarely put his whole heart into the work, because he is always conscious of the presence of his taskmaster and never works but with his eyes upon his superior officer and always thinking of what he will say of the work turned out by him. To dispel this feeling there must, in the higher service in all departments of the administration, be present a large number of Indians, so that they may collectively feel that the responsibility for a strong and wise government of the people rests mainly on them. This consideration, indeed, appears to have been present to the mind of the last Commission, but I think it did not realise the extremely limited employment of the Indians in the services. They observe in their report, "As the progress of education excites in constantly increasing numbers of the natives of India an interest in their political condition, the knowledge that men of their own race and creed are freely associated with Englishmen in the government of the country will minimise any sense of subjection and enhance the sentiment of a common citizenship—a sentiment which is at once the interest of the empire and the desire of her most eminent politicians to inspire and confirm." The evidence received by us in India during the last two years has left on my mind a painful impression that a much more sympathetic treatment by, and a far more liberal association with, Englishmen is required before that sense of subjection is appreciably reduced, and before the desired sentiment of a common citizenship is *created*, for at present it is indeed non-existent except perhaps in platform speeches. When, therefore, in this minute I am dissenting from the proportions allotted, in the report and annexures, to the Indians in the different services, I am doing so because I look at the question from this point of view, and I feel that the proportions recommended by the majority are insufficient and inadequate. I believe that what I claim for them in my minute would be the minimum likely to secure this end and would go far to satisfy the expectation and hope which have been raised. The whole country is even now grumbling at the fate of an innocent bill like the United Provinces councils bill and is afraid that this is but an indication of what it may expect. At the same time I believe that the minimum claimed for each service in this minute is that which can at the present time be conceded to India, without any loss to the British spirit of administration and perhaps with some advantage in the efficiency of the different departments.

## CHAPTER V.—ORGANISATION.

*Paragraph 29: Employment of members of the Indian civil service in other departments.*

15. The Indian civil service was in the main organised for the supply of the higher officers in the executive and judicial departments of the state, and the classes of posts reserved for the Indian civil service in the schedule to the statute of 1861 indicate roughly the offices which the members of the service were originally intended to fill. Under its present organisation every superior post is practically required to have a junior officer in training. Thus for every new superior post reserved for members of this service the state has to engage two men. Now I do not believe that the members of this service carry a monopoly of the high talent and organising power necessary for the highest offices in any department whatsoever under Government. But as things have been managed, many superior posts in the miscellaneous departments as they are created are filled by members of this service—often to the prejudice of the most senior and experienced men in the department

itself. The result is that the cadre of the Indian civil service is continually increasing, and a number of posts are thus added in effect to the schedule. The report of the majority recommends practically a continuance of this practice. They have partially broken through it as regards one office, viz., the inspector-generalship of police. In the case of this office, they recommend that it should no longer be borne on the Indian civil service cadre, so that it may be easier to appoint a police officer, if one of suitable standing and experience is available. Now I fail to see how any distinction can be made between the highest office in the police department and those in any of the miscellaneous departments which have been reserved for the Indian civil service. Just as there may be a fit and capable police officer, so there may be officers of suitable standing and experience in each of these departments who may be fit for the highest place. I do not propose to exclude Indian civil service officers. If there is no fit and capable officer in the department itself, then the best men available, whether from the Indian civil service or any other service, may be appointed by Government in their discretion. But there is no reason whatever for this practical enlargement of the schedule of reserved posts. It unnecessarily increases the cadre of the service by adding so many under charges.

16. Similarly it was seen that the Indian civil service does not connote any special training in agriculture, but the directorships of agriculture have hitherto been reserved for the service. The report very rightly recommends that these posts should no longer be included in the Indian civil service cadre. But the effect of this recommendation, which would have reduced the strength of the cadre by a few posts, is nullified by the recommendation to create the new posts of rural commissioners, and definitely reserving them for the Indian civil service. This is tantamount to saying that as a civil servant has no special training, or the necessary technical knowledge in agriculture, or veterinary medicine or arts and crafts, he ought not to occupy the highest post in any of these departments, but he is the fittest man for an office for which technical knowledge to some extent in all the three departments is necessary, and the fittest man for effectively organising and co-ordinating the various agencies concerned with the rural development of the country. I am emphatically against the creation of these posts. The departments dealing with these agencies would ordinarily be in the portfolio of one member of council who will generally be an Indian civil service officer, and I consider the introduction of another Indian civil service officer between the head of a technical department and the member of council superfluous, as involving unnecessary cost and as making the machinery of administration more complex without any corresponding advantage. If, however, it is decided to create these new posts, then on the principle I have maintained above I protest against the posts being reserved for the Indian civil service.

#### CHAPTER VI.—METHODS OF RECRUITMENT.

##### *Paragraph 32 : Classification of services and recommendation.*

17. I agree with the classification of services, as given in paragraph 32 of the report, into three main groups, and the principle upon which it seems to be based. The principle seems to be the varying degree of necessity for resorting to Europe for recruitment. In my opinion, however, this classification is unmeaning, unless there is some definite idea as to the proportions in which Indians should be admitted to the higher posts in the services comprised in each group, and unless this idea is sought to be carried out in the recommendations made as regards each service generally in the report and in detail in the various annexures. I am aware that there are some well-meaning persons who think that it is not in the interests of the Indians themselves that *any* proportions whatsoever should be fixed, as the tendency is for the minimum to become the maximum ; but this is a belief held by persons who do not seem to be aware of the strength and influence of the forces that work in India for encouraging recruitment from abroad ; and for some years to come a fixing of the proportions is perhaps the only way to counteract these forces.

18. If substantially different proportions are recommended for services comprised in the same group or the same proportion for services falling in the different groups, then the classification is futile and there can hardly be said to be any principle on which the division is based. It may be inexpedient, and perhaps not possible, to state

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with definite exactness the proportion for each service to start with ; but there ought to be a clear indication of the goal that should be reached within a reasonable time as regards the different groups. Thus, in the first group in which only two services, the Indian civil service and the police department, are included, there ought not to be much substantial difference between the proportion allotted to each. The Indian civil service is admitted on all hands to be the premier and governing service ; but in this service the recommendation is for a recruitment of 25 per cent. of the superior posts in India ; while in the police it is recommended that only 10 per cent. of the superior posts should be recruited in India, and a pious hope is expressed that as occasion offers, and gradually, the proportion may increase to 20 per cent. I think the proportions in both should be about the same, and there appears to me to be no reason why the higher police service requires to be more guarded against the admission of Indians than the Indian civil service. On the contrary, there are safeguards in the police service against any possible apprehensions that may be entertained, because the admission to the higher posts in the police will mainly be by selection from men who have shown their merit in actual service. It must not be lost sight of that, owing to the necessity of safeguarding vested interests, any recommendations that the Commission make will require about a generation to take full effect ; and therefore our recommendations must not be simply based on the present progress and advance of India, but must take into account such further progress as may reasonably be expected to take place within a period of about the next thirty years.

19. In the second group, in the services comprised in which there are not the same grounds necessitating a preponderatingly large proportion of British officers, and where a harmonious admixture of the western and eastern elements is contemplated with a view to the better efficiency of the machinery of Government, the proportions should, I think, be roughly half-and-half. But here, again, the recommendation for education is the same as that for the Indian civil service in the first group ; it is only in the public works that a 50 per cent. has been recommended, and there is hardly any advance over the present likely to be secured in practice under the recommendations for the civil medical department. In the third group it is conceded that the services are scientific and technical and may be purely Indian recruited services, as soon as efficient men are turned out from the technical and scientific institutions in India which it is recommended should be fully equipped with this object in view. This recommendation has my full concurrence, and I only wish that the recommendations made as regards these services be given effect in practice with the same sympathetic spirit in which they have been conceived. The fear entertained as regards these services in the third group is that perhaps an indefinite length of time may be taken in "Indianising" them, and that as they become India recruited, Asiatic Indians would not be selected for them in due proportion, and they may become like the present recruited-in-India services, in which, as pointed out later, the proportion of Asiatic Indians to Europeans and Anglo-Indians is only 23, 8·2, and 6·3 per cent. in posts with salaries of Rs. 200 and above, Rs. 500 and above, and Rs. 800 and above, respectively.

*Paragraphs 33-36 : The employment of Europeans and Anglo-Indians in the services as compared with that of pure Asiatic Indians.*

20. According to the last census, out of a total population of over 302,000,000 in the country, there are only 199,787 Europeans and allied races (of whom 91,000 form the army, with their wives and dependents), and a little over 100,000 Anglo-Indians. So, roughly, for the purposes of recruitment for the public services in India, the total population between these two communities is about 209,000 or 210,000. The tendency in the latter to return themselves as pure Europeans, and in some of the Indian Christians to return themselves as Anglo-Indians, has been noticed both at the last census and in the earlier ones. Thus, strictly, the number of real Anglo-Indians would appear to be even a smaller figure than that given above. To the whole population they stand in the proportion of 1 to 1,400. Assuming all of them to be literate in English, these two communities stand to the Indian literate population as 1 to 6. It should be noted that the European population given in the census includes all those that are in India purely temporarily for purposes of Government service or trade. The permanent European population must be very small indeed, and this,

together with the Anglo-Indian population, would probably stand as 1 to 10 in literacy. The Anglo-Indian community by itself stands to the general Indian population as 1 in 3,000, and in literacy in English they stand as 1 in 13. With these figures one will be able to appreciate the surprisingly large number of posts held by Europeans and Anglo-Indians in the public services as against the natives of the country. Out of 11,064—the total number of posts—6,491, or 58 per cent., are held by the members of this small community. As regards posts of Rs. 500 and above, out of a total of 4,984 they hold 4,042, *i.e.*, 81 per cent., and as regards posts of Rs. 800 and above, out of a total of 2,501 they hold 2,259, or 90 per cent.

21. It is a matter of common knowledge that only a few out of this community possess or can acquire the educational qualification and the acquaintance with the vernaculars necessary for entry into the executive and judicial departments of the provincial service; and, therefore, there are now only a few from this community employed in those departments, and naturally the great bulk of this provincial service is recruited from the Asiatic Indian communities. Let us, therefore, exclude this service from consideration, and see how they stand as regards the other 23 services inquired into. If we exclude the Indian and the provincial civil services, the total number of posts of Rs. 200 and above, Rs. 500 and above, and Rs. 800 and above, is respectively 7,261, 3,073, and 1,601. Out of these, 4,974, 2,756, and 1,499 respectively are at the present day held by the members of the two communities, *i.e.*, the percentages of higher posts held by them are 69, 90, and 94, as against 31, 10, and 6 held by Asiatic Indians. And more or less, with trifling differences, the necessary qualifications for employment in these services are and can be acquired by both Europeans and Anglo-Indians as well as Asiatic Indians. In paragraph 34 of the report an improvement of the percentage of Indians and Burmese in 1913 is shown as compared with the state of things in 1887, and it is observed that in view of the progress made by the country in the interval this increase is inadequate. Perhaps the degree of inadequacy would be higher and the increase only nominal if in 1887 the posts in the new province of Burma were not included in the calculation.

22. These figures speak for themselves and indicate roughly how wide the field for the larger employment of the real natives of the country is at the present day. If the three communities are taken separately, the percentage of Europeans, Anglo-Indians, and Asiatic Indians (excluding the Indian and provincial civil services) stand at 48·7, 19·8, 31·5 in the Rs. 200 and above posts; 80·0, 9·7, 10·3 in the Rs. 500 and above posts; and 87·7, 5·9, 6·4 in the Rs. 800 and above posts. The very meagre percentage of the Asiatic Indians in the higher service ought not to be hidden from view by lumping the Anglo-Indians and the Asiatic Indians together, under the plausible excuse of the definition of “statutory natives of India” in the Act. In the third question for inquiry in our terms of reference, the term “non-Europeans” is rightly construed to mean and refer to pure Asiatic Indians only, and I am of the opinion that this construction should be upheld throughout. It is a mistake in the present circumstances to class the Anglo-Indian with the Asiatic native of India. Whatever the schisms and sects and divisions among the latter, they all consider each other to belong to a common land, and they do not consider the Anglo-Indian to be in any sense a native of the country, and the Anglo-Indian will not consider the interests he has in common with the rest of the inhabitants of the country and try to get over or reduce that feeling. On the contrary, he takes a pride in being considered to be a non-Indian. He evidently thinks it would reduce his chance of being classed with the European, and it would seem to be his ambition to be so classed. He thinks he has no permanent interest in common with the masses of the population; and with the masses the Anglo-Indian poses to be as great a “sahib” as the pure European. In these circumstances I think he ought not, for the convenient purpose of getting into Government employ, be allowed to take advantage of the statutory definition; besides, it rests purely with himself to describe himself as being born of parents habitually resident in India and not established there for temporary purposes only. His position is anomalous, as he can be an Indian for getting into Government service at the same time that he can claim, along with the European, certain exemptions under the arms act and the other privileges of European British subjects. For these reasons the Asiatic Indian would rather that his ambition is gratified, and that he should be classed with Europeans in India *for all purposes*, except his remuneration, in respect of which the special

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considerations referred to in the report for a higher salary to persons recruited in Europe would have no application.

23. A number of difficulties and complications would disappear with an amendment of the definition in this direction. Anglo-Indians have separate schools started for them with an European schools course. They can, if they choose, take advantage of the educational institutions started by Government for the other Indian communities, but the latter cannot take advantage of the schools started for them. And, owing to his colour and his European education, the Anglo-Indian finds it easier to get a disproportionate representation in the public services of the country. One has only to glance at the figures in the higher service in such departments as the salt and excise, Bengal pilots, Burma land records, customs, factory and boilers, forests, Indian finance, medical (and Government of India medical), sanitary, military finance, Northern India salt revenue, state railways, survey of India, and telegraph, to see how, as against the pure Asiatic Indian, the Anglo-Indians have practically monopolised these departments. Indeed, the fear is that the recommendation in the report to alter the present educational qualification for entry into the executive branch of the provincial services by the recognition of "an examination of a corresponding standard in the European schools course" is likely to bring in a large number of Anglo-Indians or domiciled Europeans into this department in which at present they find admission difficult.

24. When, therefore, it is proposed that in certain departments where there has to be recruitment partially in Europe and partially in India, the proportion should be half-and-half, it only definitely safeguards the interests of the Europeans, and for the other half competition is introduced between the Anglo-Indians and the Asiatic Indians, in which, for reasons not necessary to mention, the former are bound to score. There is no definite recommendation, so far as I can see, calculated to remedy this. Reliance is placed on nomination, but it has to be borne in mind that the present unfair and unequal distribution has come into existence under and because of a system of nomination. In paragraph 31, for instance, it is observed that for eight services (*with the exception of a few specialist appointments*), viz., (i) post office, (ii) telegraph (traffic), (iii) land records (Burma), (iv) railway (stores), (v) registration, (vi) northern India salt revenue, (vii) salt and excise, and (viii) survey (Madras), recruitment is made in India. *Primâ facie*, this would convey the impression that a large number of Asiatic Indians would be found in these departments, in the higher posts, but what are the facts?

Service.	Total number of posts of Rs. 200 and above.	Europeans.	Anglo-Indians.	Pure Asiatics.
i. Post office - - - - -	277	106	39	132
ii. Telegraph - - - - -	664	162	441	61
iii. Land records (Burma) - - - - -	45	1	38	6
iv. Railway - - - - -	447	330	72	45
v. Registration - - - - -	64	—	1	63
vi. Northern India salt revenue - - - - -	36	16	15	5
vii. Salt and excise - - - - -	338	110	98	130
viii. Survey (Madras) - - - - -	16	9	1	6
	1,887	734	705	448

The percentage of Asiatic Indians to Europeans and Anglo-Indians together is 23 to 77, being almost equal as between themselves. Out of 536 posts of Rs. 500 and above, 492 are held by Europeans and Anglo-Indians, *i.e.*, 91·8 per cent.; and of 298 posts of Rs. 800 and above, 279 are held by them, *i.e.*, 93·6. Thus the Indian percentage in the three classes is only 23, 8·2, and 6·4. And yet they are all services recruited in India. This illustrates how large still is the field for the wider employment of Asiatic Indians in services in which recruitment is ordinarily stated to be within the country. In view of the present figures, it would be more appropriate to call them Europe recruited services than Indian recruited.

25. The remedy I propose is that the Anglo-Indians should be classed with Europeans, and the minimum of 50 per cent. should be reserved for Asiatic Indians. But if there be insuperable difficulties in changing the statutory definition, and if the

Anglo-Indian, because of his theoretic adoption of India as his country, is to be classed as a community in India, along with the other Asiatic communities, I strongly maintain that the qualifying examination for admission into Government service should be the same examination for all communities. The only substantial point of difference between the European schools course and an Indian university course is the second language, which has to be a European classic for the former. But common examinations with different second languages are not a novelty in India. The European schools must teach up to the B.A. standard, and if any Anglo-Indians care to seek admission into the Government service, they must, like any other of the Asiatic Indians, submit themselves for the degree examination of an Indian university. Otherwise I see no escape from the charge that a lower educational standard is permitted by Government to get into its service a favoured community at a comparatively lower age. And their representative on the Commission emphatically asserted that his community wanted no favour—and only cared for an equality of terms along with others.

*Paragraph 46: Representation of castes and communities in the public services.*

26. I am prepared to concede that, other things being equal, the caste or community to which a candidate belongs may be taken into consideration; but of late there is an unfortunate tendency to attach undue importance to this consideration, and educational and other qualifications are often subordinated to it. In some provinces, the prejudice against certain castes has gone so far that the members of these castes have begun to think that Government service is practically tabooed to them, and the accident of belonging to such a caste is regarded as a positive disqualification. I am, therefore, inclined to support this vague recommendation about the due representation of castes and communities if it is put negatively, *i.e.*, that the authorities concerned with the nomination or appointment of candidates should only take care to see that posts in any service are not substantially and unduly monopolised by any one caste or community; and the existence or otherwise of certain traits of "*character*" be not assumed necessarily to exist in an individual because he belongs to a certain caste or community. The other limitation that I would introduce in the consideration of this question is that as regards the highest posts, what may be roughly called selection posts, to which the appointments must generally be by selection from among those who have already been in service, the question of the representation of a caste or a community should be regarded as absolutely irrelevant, and that the best man available be selected.

*Paragraphs 39-43: Competitive examinations and nomination.*

27. I agree entirely with what has been said about the experience in England about recruitment to the services on a system of competitive examinations. But if this system is a success for the Indian civil, the Indian medical, and the Indian police services, and for the commissions in the army, and if the form of nomination stands condemned by experience, it is difficult to understand the grounds on which nomination is permitted to hold the field so far as recruitment to the public works department is concerned. There are so many engineering institutions in the United Kingdom that there ought to be no apprehension on the ground of want of candidates for a competitive test. The system of nomination is always liable to suspicion, and I see no reason why, with the proper safeguards of a medical examination, etc., a competitive test should not be established for the public works department also.

28. About experience in India, too, I do not agree with those who think that the competitive system has been a failure wherever it has been tried. It could not fairly be said anywhere that the officers who have been recruited under a competitive test had failed to come up to the mark. The Indian public's belief that admission to any service depends upon a candidate's being backed up by strong recommendations from influential quarters is notorious. The old statutory service is a standing instance of the failure of nomination and selection. I therefore think that not only should the system of competition be retained where it obtains at present, but that it should be further introduced wherever possible. The only plausible argument against it is that based on the unequal diffusion of education in the different communities, and the consequent probability of a community like the Brahmans, which has had from early days a hereditary association with learning, getting a disproportionate share of employment in the services. I think a study of the results of university examinations

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for some years past ought to satisfy anyone that the Brahman's intellect is being fast beaten by other communities, and though perhaps a larger number of men might be passing from such a community, owing to the numerical strength of the student class in it, they no longer head the lists and carry away the prizes as they used to do in the early days. This is so, at least in Bombay, and was conclusively shown in a book published by Mr. Gole, a late principal of the Fergusson college, styled "The Brahmans and their education," and I believe the tendency ought to be the same in other provinces also. Under the system of competitive test it will always be the best men who will come to the top. At any rate, in these services in which the annual recruitment is for a fairly good number, there is no reason why a system like the one proposed for the Indian civil service in India should not be followed. A one-fifth or one-sixth of the recruitment should be reserved for nomination, and that proportion should be filled up by nomination after the result of the competitive examination. It is desirable that the healthy emulation to excel in literacy as between class and class should not be checked, and it is not fair to the best men of the communities considered backward in education that they should always be under the imputation of being selected from class bias rather than for merit. Most communities, e.g., the Muhammedans, are classed as backward, because only a small percentage of them go in for education; but it is not at all true that the best Muhammadan, or the best Parsi or Sikh, is in any way inferior to the best Brahman. Generally for direct recruitment in most of the services a fairly high standard of preliminary educational qualification is prescribed, and I think there is no reason why by far the greater portion of recruitment for the service should not be by competition. I would not even exclude the Anglo-Indian, because I do not see any difficulty in his competing at the same examination with the other communities, and, as I have observed in a previous portion of this minute, so far as this community is concerned the result of the recommendations is that while competition is practically recognised as between the members of the Asiatic Indian communities, for this community a competition at a lower age and on a lower standard of general education is favoured. In one case nomination is resorted to for the purpose of securing due representation of communities but from candidates of the same standard of general education—in the other a lower standard of general education is substituted.

29. To safeguard the admitted drawbacks of a system of nomination, the Commission recommend the constitution of boards or committees, and though it may be conceded that this is an improvement over the present system, I have not so much faith in their satisfactory working as to believe that it will secure the same absolute freedom from suspicion of any unfairness as is predicated under a system of competition. There would, of course, be no objection to competition being confined to certain definite conditions of physical or moral fitness.

## CHAPTER VIII.—CONDITIONS OF SALARY.

*Recommendations for increase in salaries; improvements of prospects, etc., and cost involved therein.*

30. The estimate of the net increase in cost involved in the recommendations of the Commission is given as Rs. 42,25,760. This, as stated, is an estimate of the ultimate increase which will occur when all our proposals have taken effect. How long it may take to give all of them practical effect is not stated, nor is there any attempt at calculating this time. But during this indefinite transitional stage increased salaries and better prospects have in the immediate future been recommended for all European officers in those departments which are to be eventually services wholly recruited in India, such as agriculture, civil veterinary, forest, etc., and these increased salaries are proposed, as the present ones are considered to be insufficient to *secure* and *retain* the services of men of the required calibre. Substantial increases over the present rates are proposed, because it is considered desirable that officers who may be appointed to any of these departments from Europe should be of the highest quality, and their conditions of employment should be such as to make it reasonably certain that they will remain in India *for a full term of service*. This implies that for many years to come there will be not only no decrease in, but an appreciable increase over, the present cost, roughly for about 30 years more in some departments at least, and

at least for the next 10 to 15 years in some others. Though it may be difficult to calculate this immediate increased cost precisely it will, on a rough calculation, come to about Rs. 20,00,000. Then the increased cost for the super-posts in the educational department is not included in the estimate. Assuming an average of Rs. 2,000 a month for these posts, it will cost about Rs. 5,00,000 more.

31. The cost involved in the proposal to abolish the 4 per cent. contribution towards the pension of Indian civil servants is about Rs. 9,00,000. The increased maximum pension proposed means an additional cost of Rs. 9,00,000. The additional pensions proposed to certain high officers mean an added cost of Rs. 3,00,000. Thus the immediate additional cost involved in the various proposals comes to :—

Rs. 20,00,000 for the officers who will be recruited in Europe in certain services (this figure takes into account the immediate non-realisation of savings in certain departments like the public works, the Indian finance and the survey of India);

Rs. 9,00,000 for the abolition of the 4 per cent. contribution;

Rs. 9,00,000 increased maximum pension;

Rs. 3,00,000 additional pension to certain officers; and

Rs. 5,00,000 super-posts in the educational department.

Rs. 46,00,000 or £306,667.

For practical purposes, therefore, if all our recommendations are to be given effect to, the Secretary of State must be prepared to sanction an additional cost of Rs. 88,25,760 or £588,384.

32. I find it difficult to believe that the Secretary of State or the Government of India can, particularly after the strain of the present war, which must affect India both directly and indirectly, be prepared to sanction this huge additional cost over and above the present cost, and this is practically indicated in paragraph 97 of the report. It must not be lost sight of that the recommendation fully to equip the technical and scientific institutions, and bring them up to the standard of similar institutions in the United Kingdom will be a considerable item of non-recurring expenditure and some recurring expenditure which will have to be incurred over and above the £588,384 (Rs. 88,25,760) estimated above. Though the increases proposed and the improvement of prospects in the different services may be generally desirable, we must not, as practical administrators, ignore the consideration that the authorities concerned might find it financially impossible or inexpedient to throw this additional burden on the revenues of India. Nor can one say that the degree of urgency for the increase of salaries and the improvement of prospects in all branches of the services inquired into is the same. Though generally the representatives of all the services inquired into put forth grievances about their hard and strenuous work (as one witness put it, "burning the midnight oil the whole day long") and clamoured for better prospects, and though we have generally confined our recommendations to the extent of increase and improvement that appeared fair and reasonable, I must say that the evidence as regards grievances on this point struck me with different degrees of force, that the grievance is more acute in some cases than in others, and therefore if there be any limitations on the financial capacity of the authorities to meet the whole demand, there ought to be some indication to them as to the directions in which we consider improvement in prospects immediately necessary, and of pressing urgency.

33. If this indication of priority in incurring added cost is necessary (as I think it is), the first item of importance in my opinion is the recommendation to improve the permanent source of recruitment to the services in India by way of providing facilities in India for complete instruction in technical and scientific subjects, by equipping fully the existing institutions, and starting such as do not exist and making them capable of imparting the same high standard of instruction as similar institutions in the United Kingdom do. It is this recommendation which requires to be acted upon not only to make the proposed entire recruitment in India for some of the services feasible, but in view of the contribution it must make to the industrial development of the country, and the impetus it will give to scientific and technical research by Indians in their country.

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34. Next in importance comes, in my opinion, the improvement in the prospects of the provincial services, such as the provincial civil services, the educational service, the provincial medical service, and the introduction of the incremental scale proposed in all of them. The blocks in promotion for most of these have been a crying evil for a long time and need to be forthwith attended to. Take, for instance, the subordinate judicial service in the Bombay Presidency. The high court of that province, as stated in the evidence before us, has been pressing the claims of these provincial officers for favourable consideration for many years past, but without fruit, with the result that though this body of efficient officers exercises larger powers and jurisdiction than similar officers in other provinces they have been paid much less. The incremental scale proposed for these provincial services is admittedly a modest one, and although the figure of the net additional cost would appear a large one, it will be found that it is necessarily so owing to the large number of officers affected.

35. As regards the salaries of officers recruited in Europe, I think a fair case has been made out for an increase and improvement in the earlier years of the service. This claim I prefer to rest more on the general rise in prices than on any grounds of the present rates being inadequate. I am not prepared to endorse the implication in paragraph 58, that on the present rates of salary officers of the right stamp are not either obtained or obtainable. It may be true that an ordinary well-educated individual in search of a career has a wide choice of alternative employments the remuneration of which can safely be taken as a standard *above* which salaries for service in India should be fixed. But we have had no evidence before us as to what ordinarily is the remuneration of a young educated man in the different alternative careers said to be open to him, and, so far as I can judge, the present rates are above the proposed standard, in some cases rather much above it. On the other hand, with the rapid advance in education of every kind in the United Kingdom, the supply of well-educated men would also be expected to be greater. While, therefore, I agree that the salaries and prospects of the officers in the earlier years need some increase on the ground of a general rise in prices, and in order that they should be able to make some provision while in junior service for the higher cost of living when they enter into the married state and have a family to look after, I do not think that the necessity for an increase of salary is at all so acute in the higher and superior posts.

36. Generally I should consider that wherever at present the salaries of any posts range at Rs. 2,000 and over a month, they should be taken as being fairly adequate, and the recommended increase in them should only be sanctioned if funds are available. This is specially the case with the Indian civil service. The present salaries in this service are, in my opinion, pitched fairly high. One has only to compare them with the rates for the home and the colonial services for all of which there is at present one common examination for entrance. Again, if one glances at the table given in paragraph 60 of the report, it will be seen that the average for each officer in this service under the present scale is Rs. 1,587 per month for all appointments and Rs. 2,400 for the superior appointments. The incremental scale for this service is taken from the rates sanctioned for the political department, a service which it was decided to exclude from our inquiry. I believe that before the introduction of the revised scale in that department its officers complained that their remuneration compared unfavourably with and was less than that of the Indian civil, and they claimed, I believe, that it should be brought up to that standard. As a matter of fact, however, the revised scale granted more, raising the average in that department to Rs. 1,671, *i.e.*, Rs. 84 higher than the present scale in the Indian civil service. And now the civil service in their turn complain that their salaries are inadequate, that the rates were fixed many years back and that there has been no revision of the salaries during all this long period. It is proposed to grant increases in salaries calculated to raise the average in it from Rs. 1,587 to Rs. 1,653; and this in addition to the other favourable recommendations in leave, pension and other conditions of service. A glance again at the same table on page 42 will show how the average in this service compares with that in the other services for some of which at any rate men of almost similar educational qualifications are recruited in Europe. In these circumstances the argument that the increase of salary proposed in this service comes only to 4·1 per cent. is not entitled to any great weight. Any increase, however slight, should be given only where the present salary is obviously inadequate.

37. Then we must consider what net additional cost is incurred in the recommendations for this service. Out of the total net additional cost of Rs. 42,00,000 between all the services that came under inquiry, nearly Rs. 11,00,000, or more than a quarter of the whole additional cost, are for increase in the Indian civil service salaries alone. Besides this there will be Rs. 9,00,000 involved in the proposal to abolish the 4 per cent. contribution towards the fixed pension. It is difficult for me to say if the proposal to guarantee 4 per cent. interest on their contribution to the family provident fund means any added cost to the state. It must mean some added cost as Government can borrow from the market only at about  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. But even without it, if all the recommendations are sanctioned, this one service will cost a year :—

Rs. 252,00,000 present cost,

Rs. 15,00,000 the present cost of the superior posts under the Government of India,

Rs. 11,00,000 proposed increase in salaries, and

Rs. 9,00,000 pensions without the 4 per cent. contribution ;

*i.e.*, roughly nearly Rs. 290,00,000. In these circumstances I am decidedly against the abolition of the 4 per cent. contribution. I have reasons to believe that the fixed pension of 1,000*l.* a year with the contribution is the main attractive feature of the service, and that it is therefore unnecessary to incur the additional cost of Rs. 9,00,000 on this item.

38. I do, however, think that the salaries in the earlier years require to be somewhat improved, not on the ground that they were inadequate, but on the ground that the rise of prices generally hits hard in the lower ranks, and on the ground that in these early years the officer should be able to lay by something to meet the higher cost of living when he will marry and have a family to care for. At any rate I would arrange the incremental scale of the salaries so as not to raise the average for each officer in the service by more than Rs. 30, *i.e.*, I would raise the present average of Rs. 1,587 to Rs. 1,617. This itself will mean a saving of more than Rs. 5,00,000 in the figure of the additional cost mentioned above. I would also suggest that the necessity of the increased cost owing to the absorption of special appointments into a general class, the allotment of salaries of a definite amount to posts hitherto paid on a fluctuating basis, and the equalisation of the conditions of salary which is estimated at nearly Rs. 4,50,000, be closely looked into. *Prima facie* it seems to me that every special appointment ought to stand on its special merits, and the salary for it should be fixed when the special post is created, and in consideration of the duties attached to the post ; and I would not readily accept a proposal which necessitates every new special post to be in a certain general class, and therefore carrying the salary or the scale fixed for that class. Uniformity of remuneration is no doubt desirable but not necessarily so when it means no inconsiderable burden on the revenues.

M. B. CHAUBAL.

#### MINUTE BY MR. W. C. MADGE.

I agree with most of the recommendations made in the main report, but desire to amplify the reasons given in paragraphs 38-42 against the virtual adoption of the competitive system as a means for recruiting officers for the public services. I also wish to lay more stress than is done in paragraph 46 of the report on the imperative need for communal representation in India and further to emphasise the claims of members of the domiciled community in India to public office. I am unable to agree to paragraph 47 on probation. I shall develop these three points separately in the above order.

#### *Paragraphs 38-42: The competitive system.*

2. The standpoint from which I view the duty laid on the Royal Commission is the paramount claim of the unrepresented masses of India to the best class of available officers for whom the country can afford to pay, and the kind of administration best suited to their condition as that is effected by recruitment. Though this claim need not antagonise any real claim of the educated class, yet, wherever the two claims are thought to be distinct, there ought to be no doubt which interest demands precedence.

## MINUTES RELATING TO THE REPORT BY MEMBERS SIGNING THE REPORT—(continued).

3. There is no question that education in India has not only not attained to the standard secured in Britain, but, as has been substantiated by expert testimony, has seriously miscarried in the direction of memorising for examinations instead of preparing for life work. As a minimum qualification, ordinarily a university degree which is virtually the result of one variety of competition, has been recommended for all candidates, the mere fact that the reform of Indian education does not fall within the scope of the reference to the Commission cannot close our eyes to the insecurity, and it may be the danger, of the admittedly unstable foundation on which it is proposed in part to build recruitment. I submit that the defects of Indian university education, as ancillary to recruitment, should be more boldly dealt with in any serious treatment of recruitment. Resort to some more promising method likely to give better results seems necessary; and, though nomination is not free from risks, insistence on some true test of real mental and moral culture would neutralise some of these risks, while other methods of eliminating the residuary risks are not beyond reach. I fear that the suggested methods of nominating from amongst candidates in possession of a minimum educational qualification, which does not stand for much, are not searching enough; and, until education in India is recognised as real, I should depend somewhat more on carefully guarded nomination or any other method fortified with assurances of character from trustworthy sources, with, of course, some real educational attainment attested by oral examination and impromptu essays on "unseen" subjects written under suitable custody, or otherwise.

4. Leaving aside the three kinds of fraud, unknown in Britain, which have actually been detected in India, namely, leakage in examination papers, false horoscopes, fabricated to suit required age limits, and passing by personation, all of which present dangers that cannot be ignored, the competitive system was originally designed for British candidates, of whom, while it tested chiefly their literary attainments, it was fairly assumed that most would possess the average qualities and character of their race. Experience has justified this assumption. I had it from more than one Indian witness before the Commission that, if the Indian civil service were thrown open to European continental races generally, as good a class of officer could not be expected as had been secured from Britain. The differentiation here admitted need not involve offensive comparison, since it need only establish a distinction; the British race having succeeded better than others in administrative and colonising capacity in a field of enterprise in which Indians have enjoyed no opportunity. Competition, whether in crude form or when disguised under a university degree, which, being settled by mere marks at an examination based on virtual cramming, is only a veiled form of competition, seems therefore to be discredited in India until education has secured better results there. Nearly all responsible evidence condemns simultaneous examinations in India for the Indian civil service; and my note under probation explains my distrust of any method of probation in India which is to be matured in British universities.

*Paragraph 46 : Communal representation in India.*

5. In recognising the claims of different communities in India to a place in the administration of their respective provinces, notwithstanding great differences in "education," our recommendations have peeped into a haunted house and hesitated on its threshold, where imperial considerations called for a bolder entrance, a careful tread, and more sympathetic treatment. No one who has travelled much in India and conversed in their own tongue with its gentry and its rural masses—both of whom have characteristics distinguishable from the inhabitants of larger cities, from which the educated class of politicians generally mainly come—can doubt the nature of the feeling against the ascendancy gained all over India by the products of the competitive system, who owe their advantage to the accident of an earlier introduction of universities. If what is right in this feeling demands contraction in the evil it challenges, it not only points to the need of modified methods of recruitment, but also suggests some arrest of the highly technical system of administration whose advantages ought to be discounted by its ascertained drawbacks, such as the sad growth of false and vexatious litigation and the enormous increase in the crime of perjury. This consideration affects recruitment as much as administration, and is, indeed, implicitly admitted in the recommendations of community representation. If there is danger in treating all India as an equally civilised and developed country—and this is proved

by the special regulations by which the Government of India itself has withdrawn some large sections of the country from the incidence of general laws, in order to protect simpler races from legal chicanery—and if communal representation in the administration is advised by the Commission as one of the necessities forced on the attention of the State, any compromise in this region ought to be effective, and not merely aim at superficial concession which does not strike down to the roots of an admitted evil affecting the happiness of the ignorant masses, and also to some extent of their natural leaders, who have more influence among them for good or evil than successful candidates at examinations.

6. The exclusion in recent years of the domiciled community (from which the public services in many departments were once freely recruited) from appointments to which they ought to be eligible, because they have rendered excellent service in them, as testified by official records, is to be lamented, not alone because of its injustice and the political danger it is brewing, as foreseen by Lords Canning and Lytton, but because it deprives the country of a class of officers whose efficiency has of late years been measured by a wrong standard, and one in no way truer than that of the more experienced officials of earlier periods who lived longer in the country and gained sounder knowledge of all classes found in it. The ostracism of the domiciled community has resulted from a superstition that no member of this community can, in any circumstances, be superior or even equal in education and character to any European sent out from Great Britain; and this superstition can only be owing to a want of acquaintance with the best class of the community, an unhappily increasing state of things probably arising from the shorter periods lived in India by most Europeans, and their more cramped lives under pressure of office work and less enlightening duties.

7. For example, section 87 of the Government of India Act of 1833, confirmed by later Royal Proclamation, declared that “no native of the said territory nor any “natural-born subject of His Majesty resident there shall by reason of his religion, “place of birth, descent, colour, or any of these be disabled from holding any place, “office, or employment under the company.” A note attached to Rule III. of the regulations for admission by a competitive examination to the Indian police force states that “parents and guardians of candidates are warned that European descent will be regarded as essential.” It does not say “pure European descent,” but this is the construction departmentally put on the published rule, in defiance of the universal law that a child takes its nationality from its father. My legal advice is that, in the case of any qualified candidate, as proved by educational attainment and responsible certification of character, this construction is a “fraud upon the statute,” which may, if persisted in, be challenged in the courts, into which it is most undesirable to force it. The line in our report which admits of a doubt of the legality of this rule, but proposes to subject it to a modification that does not extract its poison, strikes me as an unconvincing method of procedure.

8. The late police commission “did not believe that a good type of European “is generally obtained by any system of recruitment in India. They regarded “English education and home association of supreme importance in the formation “of character.” But in his decision on this point, the Secretary of State “was “unable to admit that for police purposes he (the domiciled) was inferior to the “imported Englishman,” and held that “*arguments in favour of continuing to utilise him greatly preponderated.*” In the departmental orders finally issued, the large concession freely made in this decision, or rather its frank recognition of an indefeasible right, was whittled down to a permissive instruction to accept an occasional candidate recommend by a local government and approved by the Government of India. Careful inquiry will show that, as a matter of fact, a colour-bar has been drawn across the legal right recognised in the passage quoted, on the strange assumption that Anglo-Indians of other than white complexion cannot be respected by Indians. This unwritten law is on a par with a standing rule of the East Indian railway, which, of two brothers, admits a fair one to European, and condemns the darker one to Indian, conditions of privileges. In the deliberate opinion submitted to the Royal Commission by the deputy superintendents of police of the Bombay presidency (volume xiii, paragraph 62437), I found this statement—following another bearing testimony to the excellent services of men “bearing the colour stain” in the past. “In the police, bygone history exemplifies this, for in times of stress

## MINUTES RELATING TO THE REPORT BY MEMBERS SIGNING THE REPORT—(continued).

“ or strain or emergency, in times of dire need, *the policeman who has come to the front, invariably and persistently has been a member of the domiciled community*, thus in the troublesome times of 1857, Forjet ; in the political crisis of 1897, Brown ; and in the Nasik conspiracy of 1909, Guider.” The obvious deductions from such data, which have never been challenged, would be that drawn by the authority, who furnishes them, in these words:—“For ordinary purposes the European from England is useful, even valuable ; but *it is the domiciled European element that has been essential in all those cases where the pressing need has been for men possessing more than the ordinary administrative capacity.*” It would be surprising were it otherwise if, with their superior knowledge of the country, of its peoples, of their language, and of their ways, those of the domiciled who revert to the British type of character, as many unquestionable do, were not at least quite equal, where they were not superior, to, at any rate, some of the inexperienced young persons sent out from home, against whom nothing whatever is advanced here, beyond their taking some years to gain the standing from which the domiciled start. With the evidence before us and the further testimony that was within reach, if the Commission had spent more time in gathering evidence amongst rural communities removed from large cities, and more Anglo-Indians had been called on to give their testimony, I fear a great opportunity has been lost of pricking a bubble and in undoing a great injustice resting on no better support in the evidence before us than the natural preference expressed by imported officers for others like themselves, who advanced no facts in support of this prejudice.

9. I am quite alive to all the great interests embodied in the so-called “ security services ” of India, and, being myself a member of the Anglo-Indian community who has been educated in Scotland and lived many years in India, I realise both sides of a troublesome question, in which justifiable fears are entertained of the efficiency, for many purposes, of certain sections of the domiciled community sprung from nearly all races under heaven. I am most reluctant to draw any line of cleavage between any of these and between Anglo-Indians and Indians among whom I number many respected friends ; but to refuse free access to the Indian police of members of a community, many of whom are “ European British subjects ” and, as such, entitled to special legal privileges, and the great bulk of whom are freely welcomed into the volunteer forces corresponding in some respects with the territorial forces in Britain, and who may also be regarded as a kind of honorary security service, in which they have risen to the highest regimental commissioned ranks, is in my humble judgment to create and perpetuate a grave evil, for which a reasoned defence is impossible, and which, when it is swept away, as it must one day sooner or later be, if it cannot be so defended, will be regarded as one of the strangest inconsistencies of the past, and must reflect on its authors.

10. Even if the Royal Commission had not advocated community representation, it would have been my duty on this opportunity to clear the claim of the domiciled community from the obscurity in which accidents have enveloped it ; inasmuch as, while Indians, to whom no one grudges any improvement in their prospects, have been increasingly employed in the public services, Anglo-Indians have been excluded from appointments which they had held for many years with credit to themselves and benefit to the country. The recognition by the Royal Commission of the Indian claim fortifies that of the Anglo-Indian. The allegation of educational deficiency, even if that could be tested in cramming for examinations which furnish no test of character, is sufficiently answered by the facts furnished by the Catholic society of Calcutta who show that their college at North Point, Darjeeling, successfully educated pupils for examinations which they creditably passed ; so that it was not, because they failed, but after they had succeeded in appointed tests, that Anglo-Indians were shut out from prize appointments. Though nobody doubts the desire of the Government to be absolutely fair, could any department which has brought about the above results complain if its victims asked “ Post hoc or propter hoc ? ”.

11. The increasing poverty of a community thus deprived of its former place in the sun may have led to the cessation of fruitless sacrifices for children, from whom their former good prospects have been taken away ; but so long as the great bulk of the expenditure on Anglo-Indian education has come from private sources and not from state grants, which have been lavishly given for Indian education, it is difficult to see how any just reproach can be levelled against a struggling community, all of

whom cherish and preserve Christian traditions, and most of whom strive to maintain British standards of living, while those of them who enjoy the legal rights, as many of them do, of "European British subjects," have been separated, not by themselves, but by the legislature, from fellow subjects of different religions and different standards of life.

*Paragraph 47: Probation.*

12. If we could have seen our way to set out alternative suggestions for the recruitment of Indian civil servants, at an earlier and at a later age respectively, I should have been relieved from any further dissent. But as this was not possible, the plumping for earlier recruitment leaves me no option but to dissociate myself from the opinions expressed on this point, first because the implication of its proposed changes is that the Indian civil service of the last 12 years or more has not proved successful. The service has attracted somewhat less desirable recruits, perhaps, than before because of the superior attractions of the home and colonial services, but the actual "inefficiency" proved has been rare, and can be dealt with under existing powers; *and none of the proposed changes will touch the rival attraction.* The whole purpose of this section hangs on the change from the present to an earlier period of entrance, on the double ground that an entirely new course must be imposed on the education of candidates, and that it is an advantage for the character of young men to be moulded in the atmosphere of the country of their life-service.

13. As regards early recruitment—quite apart from the bad effect on candidature, which must result from the uncertainty of final acceptance at the close of probation—*the great bulk of the expert evidence before the Commission was decidedly against it.* Nearly all the heads of famous public schools opposed it, and though I do not know why the heads of some of the best public schools, who submitted written opinions against it, were not summoned to give oral evidence, and be examined on their written views, I do not understand why, since the omission to summon them was not their fault, their recorded opinions, which ought to be published with our report, should not be accepted at their face value. Even some summoned expert witnesses, who seemed inclined to favour early recruitment, under some vague impression that it was favoured by Government who only wanted some suitable scheme to dovetail into their plans, when told by myself that no such Government opinion had been conveyed to the Commission, and that substantial expert testimony was against that view, acknowledged their personal preference for the later period of recruitment. I was greatly impressed by the thoughtful observation of one head of a school that *frequent change in the period of recruitment was very unsettling, and that the present later age, one deliberately adopted, had not been tested long enough to yield a true estimate of its value.*

14. All Indian opinion is also against early recruitment because of its certain result of shutting out most Indian candidates for reasons placed before the Commission; and it would be deplorable if Indians came to think, what cannot of course be true, that the early age was chosen with the design of restricting Indian recruitment.

15. As regards the proposed methods of educating candidates, I have two observations to make. In the best sense, a man's education does not in my humble opinion end, but begins, when he has done with instructors, in school or college, and faces the world on his own legs, having achieved the habit of mastering knowledge gained under tuition, almost as much from the personal influence of his instructors as from the subjects of their lessons, which are sometimes forgotten. Some bias towards subjects underlying all true education is of course necessary, but rather as an ingredient in mental discipline, and as a stepping-stone to later self-culture in special directions, than as an introduction to theoretical expertness or pertness; and there is no teaching to compare with that gained in the practical experience of fulfilling duty. *Solvitur ambulando.* If, as has been said, education is a leading out of the individual mind into its true relation with its surroundings, practical and responsible contact with these surroundings is a better education than theoretical and irresponsible speculations about them under tuition uninspired by experience. This is why I had hoped that the listed posts would have been increased, and more tried officers promoted from the provincial civil service.

16. Even in industrial life, formation of character in the best available atmosphere is surely a necessity, and I submit that the atmosphere of British

## MINUTES RELATING TO THE REPORT BY MEMBERS SIGNING THE REPORT—(continued).

institutions, impregnated with the collateral home associations of Britain, is preferable to that found in India, where the unavoidable personal ascendancy of individuals of the British race, sometimes mistaken for "arrogance," is apt to influence impressible young men more injuriously than older men with characters formed at home. British descent, Christian ideals, British standards of living with their legacy of *noblesse oblige*, have been known to bring about a reversion to the British type of character among sections of the domiciled European and Anglo-Indian community; but these advantages are not available to our Indian fellow subjects; and a certain isolation in India of men of British birth and upbringing, which secures a valuable detachment from the subtle local influences that handicap and hamper Indians, also results in an apparent want of sympathy that is far more likely to be aggravated by sending out impressible young officers than somewhat older men with character matured at home and impressed with the growing democratic sentiment.

17. Finally, on this point, I consider the concentration of the education of candidates in the London university or at Oxford and Cambridge, to the exclusion of the Scottish universities, which have sent out as good officers as any other, wrong in theory and mischievous in practice. Whatever course of education may be determined on for candidates, and by whatever methods secured, all British universities should be left free to adopt it or not as they think desirable in the general interests of education, without subsidies from the Government, which I regard as a subtle reaction towards the Coopers Hill policy, which many true friends of the public services hope was finally abandoned by the wiser policy of resort to the open market. If a highly specialised department did not need a state nursery for its recruits, still less can a general administrative service requiring a general educated capacity and high character require any stricture in the funnel of recruitment.

W. C. MADGE.

## MINUTE BY MR. J. RAMSAY MACDONALD.

1. I have signed the report subject to certain reservations which are as follows:—

2. *Report, paragraph 32: Place of appointment, classification of services, and recommendation.* For the time being it is convenient for purposes of recruitment to divide the public services into three classes: the first, those that from their nature must contain a substantial porportion of British members, of which the Indian civil service and police are the best examples, but which also include the Indian medical service; the second, those that either are now, or ought without delay to be, staffed wholly by Indians; and the third, those which are in a transition stage but regarding which there is no reason why they should not be all-Indian services except that, for the time being, Indians cannot be found to fill them adequately. The type of this last group is the education service, and it includes the purely technical and scientific services, the survey departments, the forest service, factory and boiler inspectorships. Regarding the first group the methods of recruitment should be such as to maintain at least the requisite British minimum; regarding the second, recruitment should be in India, and examination tests applied so as to secure the best Indian talent available; regarding the third, the Government should endeavour to fill vacancies in India and trust to British appointments only when properly qualified Indians are not available. This will mean that in some of these services there may be as yet a considerable number of British members, but the fact that the whole services are open to Indians so soon as they are able to take advantage of their privileges will supply the necessary incentive to Indians to qualify for the posts. It might also mean that temporarily or for some special reason (as for instance the teaching of English literature) the Government may deem it advisable to recruit from home, but in that event the Secretary of State ought to be satisfied that the need for this exceptional recruitment does exist, and no doubt should remain in the minds of either the Government or the public of India that the goal to be reached is that the services should become Indian services. At present the services that ought ultimately to be all-Indian cannot be staffed with the same proportion of Indians, and I accept the proportions recommended in the annexures as the starting point for progressive increases, except where I specifically dissent.

3. *Report, paragraphs 36, 43, and 44 : Measures recommended for extending the employment of non-Europeans, &c.*—Throughout the report references are made to nomination of candidates for the various services, and in the annexures schemes are proposed for securing some measure of impartiality for carrying out this plan. The aim is to try to impose some tests of personality and character upon candidates, to secure a representation of communities, and, where competition may afterwards be resorted to, to limit the number of candidates. The allurements of nomination in one or other of its many forms, either with or without a following competition, is very great. It was pressed upon us by several official witnesses. It has many special dangers in India where the system of asking for *chits* and of canvassing for influence has been widely practised, and has been degrading. It is also dangerous because it offers much inducement, especially in view of present political conditions, to make or refuse appointments on political grounds. Moreover, it is absolutely necessary that the Indian public should have no reason for suspecting the impartiality with which public offices are filled, and no committee of selection, however it is constituted, can be protected wholly against suspicions and charges of favouritism or bias, and no rule penalising attempts to secure influence can be equitably enforced in practice. Appointment by nomination cannot be avoided in certain services, as, for instance, where the appointee has to be taken from men of a certain status in their profession ; for example, judges appointed from the bar, or professors. In India the existence of important communities on different educational levels presents special difficulties in the manning of services where it is advisable to have the communities represented, and is supposed to force upon the Government some form of nomination. This expedient for recruiting for any service which would ordinarily be filled by competition should, however, be regarded as an unfortunate and temporary method, and the Government should watch for the time when, owing to the levelling up of education, competition can be safely adopted. In services like the provincial executive service, where a certain standard of education with university degrees can be insisted upon even now, at least half the direct appointments should be made by a competition amongst candidates of the prescribed education attainments who obtain from their colleges certificates of good general character. The Punjab experiment has been so successful that it can be taken as having established both the practicability and desirability of extending it to the rest of India, though the evidence we have had of the undesirability of encouraging canvassing for appointments in India<sup>\*</sup> might well lead the Government to reconsider the value of nomination before examination, and substitute for it a certificate of good character from college authorities. In every service where it is recommended that vacancies should be filled by nomination from candidates who have attained a certain standard of education, a competition amongst qualified candidates should be held and where communal representation is necessary and cannot be obtained by open competition the selection should still be made by competition amongst those candidates who come up to the educational standards prescribed for the various communities. At the same time whilst it may be necessary at the moment for Government to make special provision for communal representation in the public services, it is a bad system and ought not to be assumed as inevitable in India. With improvement in education and the growth of a common civic spirit which recent political changes in India are encouraging, the Government will soon have opportunity to abandon the practice. Nor is there anything inherent in Indian circumstances which makes competition less suited to India than to Great Britain. The educated material available increases every year and becomes more and more representative of classes and communities. The gravest objection is that the Indian memorises with such facility that competitive tests do not indicate intellectual ability. But that is only a problem in how to devise the examination papers and how to supplement them by *viva voce* examinations. If adapted to Indian circumstances the open competition as the door into the public services will yield in India the same good it has yielded in Great Britain. I wish to emphasise my dissent to the various suggestions and implications made in these paragraphs and in others in the annexures (*i.e.*, annexure X.—Indian and provincial civil services, paragraph 20) that a test of character can be imposed. Obviously a candidate whose conduct has violated any of the ordinary laws of good conduct should be disqualified, but existing practice amply provides for that. Any attempt to value “character” beyond that will only lead to endless difficulties and will not

\* Objections to simultaneous examinations, Punjab evidence, volume X, page 199, question 51,562.

## MINUTES RELATING TO THE REPORT BY MEMBERS SIGNING THE REPORT—(continued).

improve the general quality of the service. In India such an attempt is surrounded by special difficulties as political considerations could not be kept out of account.

4. *Report, paragraph 35 (and various Annexures): Fixed proportions of Indians in the various services.*—In the various annexures there are proposals that Indians should be recruited to the extent of at least certain proportions. I agree to this way of securing Indian representation very reluctantly. A minimum always tends to become a maximum in practice, and also it may sometimes mean that obviously inferior candidates receive appointments. That has already happened in services where this rule regarding minimum number has now to be observed. It would be far better both for India and Indians in the long run if examinations and standards were devised so that Indians got a fair chance of success, and if it could be said of everyone in the services that he was admitted solely on his merits. Preserved appointments are bad for any service; but I yield to the emphatically expressed opinions of Indian witnesses that they must have guarantees other than the declared sympathy of Government. It is, however, far more important for an increasing employment of Indians in the services that their recruits should be good than that they should, for the moment, be numerous, and the only real guarantee of their adequate employment is the improvement of their educational institutions, and the influence they gain in their legislative councils.

5. *Annexure IV., Education Department, paragraph 11: Place of appointment—class I.*—I indicate in my notes of dissent to paragraph 32 of the report the scheme for recruitment to the education department which I favour. I would adapt the fifth paragraph of the forest department annexure to the education department. The evidence which the Commission received from both official and unofficial witnesses shows that the staffing of the education service, especially in its higher branches, is inefficient, and though it may have been the best that could have been done on the whole up to now, its inefficiency will become more and more marked as the standards of Indian education are raised. I agree that salaries in the education service should be raised, but I do not believe that higher pay will improve materially the kind of British candidate available for the service. The problem of how to recruit for the staff of colleges is different in kind from that of recruiting for similar institutions at home. The special appeal which missions can address to men may secure the spirit which the successful teacher in India requires; purely Indian educational institutions the beginnings of which are seen at Hardwar and at Bolpur may also be made successful centres of Indian culture and mental discipline, but if the present policy of recruitment for Government service is continued the result will never be satisfactory and will continue to contribute to the defects which Indian higher education undoubtedly shows to-day. In no department of the public service is it truer than in that of education, that systems of recruitment ought to be accepted or rejected with a view not only to immediate efficiency but to a more remote advantage. A discussion on whether education in India should be a shoot transplanted from Great Britain, or a graft of the west on an eastern root, or the opposite, does not come within the scope of our terms of reference, and yet the considerations which would be the substance of such a discussion must be in our minds when deciding the best scheme for recruitment. One can hardly help being struck with the impression given by so many Indian educational institutions that they are foreign to the spirit of the youth of India and therefore fail in their moral and intellectual effects, and so far as Government institutions are concerned, that is partly due to fundamental conceptions of what should be the aims of education in India. India must use the knowledge and experience of the west, but in its own way and not as something imposed upon it. It, therefore, becomes imperative that the Indian Governments should watch with a vigilant eye for Indians qualified to fill every important appointment in the education cadre.

6. *Annexure IV., Education Department, paragraph 22.*—I see no reason for the further ten per cent. on Rs. 1,500–50–1, 750, or for the allowance of Rs. 250 a month for one principal in each province to be selected by the local Government.

7. *Annexure X., Indian and Provincial Civil Services, paragraphs 14, 15 and 18.*—I agree with Mr. Chaubal\* that recruitment in India should be for 25 per cent. of the whole cadre and not for 25 per cent. of the superior posts only.

J. RAMSAY MACDONALD.

\* See page 234.

## Minute by Mr. ABDUR RAHIM.

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I regret that I have not been able to agree in the tenour of the report presented by the rest of the Commissioners or to accept the more important of their conclusions on the matters referred to us for inquiry. I therefore submit separately my own views and recommendations.

2. The terms of reference were as follows:—“To examine and report upon the following matters in connection with the Indian civil service, and other civil services, imperial and provincial:—

- “(i) the methods of recruitment and the systems of training and probation ;
  - “(ii) the conditions of service, salary, leave and pension ; and
  - “(iii) such limitations as still exist in the employment of non-Europeans and the working of the existing system of division of services into imperial and provincial ;
- “and generally to consider the requirements of the public service, and to recommend such changes as may seem expedient.”

3. I feel that by the death of our colleague, Mr. G. K. Gokhale, which took place on the 19th February 1915, the cause of India has suffered irreparable loss. He had studied the questions relating to the public services of the country with his usual care and earnestness ; and I must acknowledge that I have derived much confidence from the fact that the main proposals which I have ventured to put forward had his entire approval, and were virtually formulated in consultation with him.

### PART I.—REPORT.

#### CHAPTER I.—INTRODUCTORY.

4. *What led to the appointment of the Commission.*—In March 1911 Mr. Subbarao, an Indian representative of the presidency of Madras on the Viceroy's legislative council, moved for the appointment of a commission “to consider the claims of Indians to higher and more extensive employment in the public services connected with the civil administration of the country,” and in support of the motion he and other Indian members of that council alleged that, although from time to time during the greater part of a century repeated declarations had been made of the intention of the imperial Government to admit Indians freely to higher offices in the public administration for which they might qualify themselves, their progress in this connection was still hampered by considerable disabilities, mainly imposed by artificial arrangements. They further alleged that in many important respects the position of Indians in the higher administrative appointments had actually received a set-back and that, while the division of the services into imperial and provincial, based on the recommendations of the Aitchison Commission of 1886–87, has been so worked as to depress the status of the Indian officials full effect was not given to such of their recommendations as would have extended the employment of Indians in a number of public departments. They conveyed in no ambiguous words that in consequence a sense of unjustified repression of their legitimate ambitions and energies was oppressing the minds of the most active, talented, and enterprising sections of the Indian community. Our late colleague, Mr. G. K. Gokhale, in the course of his speech, said: “Sir, one of the fundamental conditions of the peculiar position of the British Government in this country is that it should be a continuously progressive government. I think all thinking men, to whatever community they belong, must accept that. Now, I suggest four tests to judge whether the government is progressive, and, further, whether it is continuously progressive. The first test that I would apply is what measures it adopts for the moral and material improvement of the mass of the people, and under these measures I do not include those appliances of modern government which the British Government has evolved in this country, because they were appliances necessary for its very existence, though they have benefited the people, such as the construction of railways, the introduction of posts and telegraphs, and things of that kind. By measures for the moral and material improvement of the people, I mean what the Government does for education, what the Government does for agricultural development, what the Government does for industrial



## MINUTE BY MR. ABDUR RAHIM—(continued)—REPORT.

Department.	Number of Officers in service recruited		Total Number of Officers in the Department.
	In England.	In India.	
7. Indian finance <sup>(1)</sup> - - - - -	82	81	163
8. Military finance - - - - -	57	—	57
9. Forest—Imperial service - - - - -	213	—	213
"    Provincial services - - - - -	—	208	208
10. Geological survey - - - - -	21	—	21
11. Land records (Burma) - - - - -	—	48	48
12. Medical (including jails and sanitary) :—			
Superior appointments - - - - -	446	120	566
Appointments of minor importance - - - - -	—	821	821
13. Mines - - - - -	5	—	5
14. Mint and assay - - - - -	7	—	7
15. Pilots (Bengal) - - - - -	74 <sup>(2)</sup>	—	74
16. Police—Imperial service - - - - -	661	10 <sup>(3)</sup>	671
"    Provincial services - - - - -	—	255	255
17. Post office and telegraph—Post office - - - - -	—	247	247
"    "    "    Telegraph (traffic) - - - - -	—	40	40
"    "    "    Telegraph (engineering) - - - - -	23 <sup>(3)</sup>	23 <sup>(3)</sup>	46
18. Public works, including railway (engineering) - - - - -	648 <sup>(4)</sup>	280 <sup>(5)</sup>	928
19. Railway (revenue)—Management - - - - -	7	—	7
"    "    Traffic <sup>(6)</sup> - - - - -	67	45	112
"    "    Locomotive - - - - -	60	—	60
"    "    Carriage and wagon - - - - -	17	—	17
"    "    Stores - - - - -	—	18	18
20. Registration - - - - -	—	21	21
21. Northern India salt revenue - - - - -	—	45	45
22. Salt and excise - - - - -	5 <sup>(7)</sup>	262	267
23. Survey of India—Imperial service - - - - -	51	—	51
"    "    Provincial service - - - - -	—	96	96
24. Survey (Madras) - - - - -	—	23	23
TOTAL - - - - -	4,140	5,809	9,949

(1) Recruited half in England and half in India.

(2) Mainly recruited in England

(3) The service is equally divided between imperial and provincial branches.

(4) Imperial service.

(5) Provincial service.

(6) Three-fifths recruited in England and two-fifths in India.

(7) Distillery experts.

(8) Officers promoted from the provincial services.

I have tried for the sake of convenience to follow the arrangements adopted by the majority of commissioners as closely as possible. The general considerations and principles underlying the recommendations which I have made are arranged (in Part I.) under the following heads :—

Changed conditions of India (chapter II.).

Organisation (chapter III.).

The disabilities of Indians (chapter IV.).

Methods of recruitment (chapter V.).

Probation and training (chapter VI.).

Conditions of salary (chapter VII.).

Conditions of service (chapter VIII.).

Conditions of leave (chapter IX.).

Pensions (chapter X.).

I have arranged the annexures (Part II.) in the same order as in the majority report but having regard to the paramount importance of the civil services to which we devoted the entire first year of our inquiry, I have placed the annexure relating to those services first in order. In Part III. will be found a summary of the important changes which I have recommended and the main points on which I have dissented from the majority of Commissioners, and at the end will be found a table showing the cost of my proposals side by side with that of the majority proposals.

## CHAPTER II.—CHANGED CONDITIONS OF INDIA.

7. In chapter III. of the majority report, under this heading a large amount of matter is introduced whose relevance to the questions under inquiry is but of a remote character. The only paragraph which has a distinct bearing on one of the subjects referred to us, namely, the employment of Indians, is the one dealing with their intellectual progress. Some of the paragraphs bearing on the economic condition of India raise questions of a highly controversial kind which the Commission was never asked to consider and did not in fact investigate. They cannot be said to be lifted out of the plane of controversy because certain figures have been quoted in support of a particular inference. That inference is expressed in the words of Mr. K. L. Datta, a member of the Indian finance department, who was deputed to inquire into the rise of prices in India. His conclusion is that an enormous rise in the prices of foodstuffs and other necessities of life in India has been accompanied with a proportionate rise in wages, so that the agricultural and labouring classes at least, who form the great majority of the population, have both been improved in their material condition. This conclusion has been keenly controverted by the Indian press, which does not recognise his authority to speak on economic questions. Without attempting to discuss the matter in its various bearings, I shall only mention a few broad facts which go to show that in more than one direction the picture sought to be presented of the material progress of India's general population is inaccurate and misleading.

8. From the report of Mr. Datta himself it appears that in 1896-97, 62 millions, in 1907-8, 50 millions of the population were affected by famines within certain areas mentioned, and from 1888 to 1908 more than 160 millions were affected by famine conditions. In paragraph 71 of his report he prefaces his narrative of the factors affecting the growth of population in these words—"the most important factor affecting the growth of population between 1891 and 1911 was famine. The familiar furies in the train of famine are cholera, dysentery, and fever, which play havoc with an already enfeebled population." Since 1896, when plague made its first appearance in India, it seems to have secured a permanent foothold in the country. Mr. Datta says, "Since the black death of the fourteenth century" (I believe he means that which raged in Europe) "there has never been such mortality from plague as in India between 1896 and 1912. The mortality was even from 70 to 85 per mille, though at times it was considerably higher. The Punjab" (the home, I may parenthetically point out, of India's brave soldiers) "had lost by 1912 about 2,250,000 persons from plague out of a total population of under 20,000,000. . . . It is interesting to note that the million limit in the plague mortality was not reached till 1904, when 1,143,933 deaths were recorded." The lowest death rates during the period from 1901 to 1912 seem to have been in those two years, the figures standing at 29·4 and 29·7 per 1,000 respectively; during the intervening years they varied between 30·9 and 38·2 per 1,000. The seriousness of these facts cannot be discounted, because, in spite of them, India has shown considerable recuperative powers, as indicated by the increase in the total population between 1891 and 1911 from 287 to 315 millions. Nor in the face of them is it possible to accept the conclusion that "judging from the quantity of food, clothing, and housing accommodation, and the comforts of life, there has been a remarkable increase in material welfare of the country as a whole, and that there has been an equitable distribution of the means of enjoyment." So far as this is a matter for personal observation, one should have thought that the standard of living which obtains among the great mass of Indian population could hardly have been any lower. The increase in the quantity of precious metals imported into India and the expansion of the import trade referred to, might only indicate an increase of wealth in a limited class residing or carrying on business there.

9. The spread of education among the masses of the population is an important index to their material no less than their moral condition. The census report of 1911 shows that of the total population of India only 59 persons per mille are literate. In paragraph 18 of the majority report allusion is made to the opinion of those who allege that the western educated classes do not represent the interests of the many scores of millions of India. The fact, however, is that for some time they have been making most earnest endeavours in this direction. If Mr. Gokhale's

bill for popular education, supported as it was by the entire educated opinion of the country, has not been placed on the Indian statute book the blame cannot be laid at their door. If we look for light on the material and moral condition of the general population of British India from the facts revealed in the statistics of crime there appears to have been no diminution in the proportion of criminal cases returned as true to the total population. In 1901 the population had increased by 4·7 per cent. and the number of true criminal cases had increased by 3·5 per cent. over the figures of 1891, but in 1911, while the population had increased by 10·4 per cent., the criminal cases returned as true had increased by 12·6 per cent. over the figures of 1891. On the question of industrial development, the Indian opinion has been persistently expressed to the effect that the industries of the country stand in need of special attention, and that the existing facilities for technical education and training are of the most meagre and primitive description. Then it is said that some of the services have been concerned with commercial and quasi-commercial undertakings, the success of which has been a source of considerable profit to the country. The state railways are specially cited. In this connection the fact should be borne in mind that in the beginning of this enterprise, for many years, it was a source of considerable loss to the state. And after all, what is the inference, even if it be assumed that India has somewhat improved in material prosperity? This is quite consistent with the existence of considerable defects in the organisation of its public services.

*The national movement.*

10. The main significance of the changed conditions in India is to be found in the growth of a national sense within the last few years. Like all great ideas, it is showing a remarkable rapidity of development, whose full meaning is not easily grasped by outsiders. The factors that have contributed to it are manifold, and cannot be discussed here in detail. It will be useful, however, for a broad comprehension of the situation to refer to some of the more prominent movements in this connection. In the region of social reforms which have been instituted in the Hindu community by a notable galaxy of reformers in all parts of India, the Brahma Samaj of Bengal, the Arya Samaj of the Punjab, the depressed classes mission of Madras, and the servants of India society of Bombay, the last founded by Mr. Gokhale, are but a few of the more visible manifestations. No one who lives in India and knows the people can fail to perceive that a vast welding force has come into existence. It may be safe to assert that whatever undesirable significance the caste system may have had in the past, the educated classes of Hindus would at the present day regard it as an undeserved and cruel aspersion of their character to have it suggested that they do not sympathise with the uneducated masses or would not deal fairly by them in the discharge of their official duties. No doubt there are erratic and narrow-minded men among the Hindus, but so there are in all nations and communities. The Hindus above all have been the organisers of the Indian national congress, whose proud boast to-day is that its title "national" has been amply justified. It is pointed out that almost all the important items in its original programme have received warm support of the leaders of all Indian communities, whether they speak from the congress platform or from that of the Moslem league or from the Sikh Khalsa. The unifying and democratic spirit of Islam is well known, and among the Muhammadans there have been no such relics of an old system as the castes to mislead those whose knowledge of the Indian people is mostly historical and theoretical. Further, it must be remembered that care for the poor, so definitely enjoined by all religions of the east, has developed in the Indian character generally almost an overflow of charity and generosity, while the new movements have helped largely to divert much of that fund of philanthropy into more regulated channels.

11. The inquiry has disclosed a remarkable change in the attitude of the Muhammadan community towards the questions debated before us from what it was in 1886-87. At that date the Muhammadan views were dominated by a revived hope that considerable encouragement would be afforded by the Government to their desire to regain a fair and fitting place in the public service of the country. Their representatives therefore pleaded for some special measures of protection not, perhaps, entirely compatible with a high standard of educational qualification. In the meantime, however, mainly under the guidance of Sir Syed Ahmad and his fellow-workers,

the community has shown an earnestness in keeping abreast of the times not unworthy of their past traditions. It now holds its own in primary education along with other communities and Muhammadan graduates have increased within the last nine years by 80 per cent. There is much more way to be made up yet, but the unflagging determination with which the Muhammadan leaders are now seeking to adjust the ideals of the people to modern conditions indicates that the community is inspired with a new confidence. This, again, is but a proof that the Indian Muhammadans have not remained unaffected by the recent national movement. Their sense of the duty to live in amity, and friendship with one's neighbours so strictly enforced by their religion has now insensibly glided into the channels of nationalism. The younger followers of Sir Syed Ahmad cite with cordial approval the simile in which he likened the Hindus and the Muhammadans to the two apples of India's eyes. They repudiate with equal warmth the dissent which he had at one time expressed from some of the more advanced political measures advocated by the Indian national congress as being inconsistent with his own ideal. This change in the political outlook of the community was reflected in the views expressed before us by its representatives as to the principles which should regulate recruitment for the public service. The keynote of their attitude is the same as that of the others, a demand for a more intimate and more extensive association of the people with the administration and a complete removal of disabilities.

12. The Sikhs, another influential though smaller community, have also fast risen in political importance. In traditions and religion more allied to the Hindus, they seem to possess the freer outlook of the Muhammadans. They have advanced rapidly in education and industrial enterprises while fully preserving their innate military genius. They now count as a powerful factor in the new national forces.

13. The Parsis, the well-known community of Bombay, have produced some of the greatest leaders of national thought and have set an example of enlightened citizenship and business capacity which has been of great significance.

14. Among the other classes of India's population the Anglo-Indians, formerly called Eurasians, or persons of mixed descent, have decided to throw in their lot with the Europeans so far as the national aspirations of India are concerned. They do not even call themselves Indians though they would reckon themselves as "statutory natives of India." As statutory natives they insist on a full share in the public services of the country and by virtue of their kinship with the Europeans they claim a part of "the British responsibility for the good government of India," which gives them much more than their full share. Such a position has naturally given rise to more than one practical difficulty in dealing with the questions raised before us. A number of Indian Christians bearing European names are making determined efforts to share the privileges enjoyed by this community, and it has been found a difficult task with certain departments to trace a European in their genealogical tree on the one side or the other.<sup>(1)</sup> Then the most successful men of the community are perpetually migrating to England, so that it is suffering on the one hand from a depletion of its best men and an accession on the other hand of very dubious material. Anyhow their number is insignificant (being only 102,000 out of the total population of 315,000,000), but they must be reckoned as standing outside the general national movement.

15. There are also persons of pure European descent domiciled in India, who are eligible for appointments made in India as "statutory natives of India." Their number is small but difficult to determine, as many of them return to Europe when they find themselves in a position to do so, either on retirement from Government service or otherwise.

16. The political attitude of the Indian Christians, so far as they have developed it, seems to harmonise with that of the other Indian communities.

#### *Indians' fitness for higher appointments.*

17. In paragraph 18 of the majority report, allusion is made to the allegation that the western-educated Indians do not reflect the views or represent the interests of the

(1) Volume XII., Appendix IV., page 277.

many scores of millions in India. So far as the views of the latter on any of the matters in dispute, or of an allied character, are concerned, it is impossible to imagine what opinions they are in a position to form so long as they are allowed to remain, as at present, in their illiterate and appallingly ignorant condition. As for the representation of their interests, if the claim be that they are better represented by European officials than by educated Indian officials or non-officials, it is difficult to conceive how such a reckless claim has come to be urged. The inability of English officials to master the spoken languages of India and their different religions, habits of life and modes of thought so completely divide them from the general Indian population that only an extremely limited few possessed with extraordinary powers of intuitional insight have ever been able to surmount the barriers. As for the sacred books and classics of the Indian peoples, Hindu and Muhammadan, whose study is indispensable to a foreigner wishing to understand the people's national genius, it would be difficult to name more than two or three Englishmen among the thousands that during a period of more than 100 years of British connection with India have been employed in the service of Government, whose attainments could be mentioned with a show of respect. Such knowledge of the people and of the classical literatures as passes current among the European officials is compiled almost entirely from the data furnished to them by the western-educated Indians; and the idea of the European officials having to deal with the people of India without the medium of the western-educated Indian is too wild for serious contemplation. It would be no exaggeration to say that without their co-operation the administration could not be carried on for a single day.

18. With the educated Indians, on the other hand, this knowledge is instinctive, and the ties of religion and custom, so strong in the east, inevitably make their knowledge and sympathy far more intimate than is to be seen in countries dominated by materialistic conceptions. It is from a wrong and deceptive perspective that we are asked to look at the system of castes among the Hindus more as a dividing force than as a powerful binding factor; and the unifying spirit of Islam, so far as it affects the Muhammadans, does not stand in need of being explained; while in all communities the new national movement has received considerable accession of impulse from the lessons of such arguments as are hinted at in the majority report. The evidence is remarkably significant in this connection. His Highness the Agha Khan joined his weighty voice with that of the leaders of the congress in demanding simultaneous examinations for the Indian civil service, and the representatives of the Sikh Khalsa and the Pathans of the Punjab, the Moslem league along with the spokesmen of the communities more advanced in western education, were unanimous in entering their emphatic protest against the suggestion that the presence of Indians in the higher official ranks would be distasteful to the people themselves, and specially in a province or a community other than that of the Indian official.

19. As for the allegation that the Indians are wanting in initiative, driving power, resource, and the faculty of control, so far as it depends upon a priori assumptions, it could not affect our deliberations. The facts relating to the services inquired into, however, show that so far the Indians have been mostly employed in the lower ranks, of the administrative services. If they have not found their way to the higher appointments in the administration above those included in the cadres of the provincial services, it is because these appointments have been reserved for officers recruited in Europe into the imperial services. In the imperial services the number of Indians has been so few that they cannot be said to have been given anything like opportunity for competing in this respect with Europeans. This is clearly made out by the interesting facts elicited by Mr. Gokhale from an English Indian civil service witness in Bengal.<sup>(1)</sup> There are, however, other facts from which a clear inference can be drawn, the reverse of this allegation.

20. Looking back to past history, India until the disruption of the Mogul empire, always produced men of high administrative talents, and at the present day in the more advanced native states, wherever opportunity exists, Indians are successfully bearing the burden of the entire administration; some of them achieved notable

(<sup>1</sup>) Volume III., 11053 to 11116.

distinction, such as Sir Salar Jung and Sir T. Madhorao. It should also be noted that a fair proportion of these men were originally in the British Indian service but only found an adequate opportunity for a full play of administrative capacity when they were appointed either as ministers or heads of departments in these states. Then where there are large Indian commercial communities, such as in the Bombay presidency, Indians successfully conduct the affairs of industrial concerns of considerable magnitude.

21. In professions where success is dominated by free competition and the value of work accomplished is judged under conditions different from what prevails in an Indian official department the merits of the Indian's work cannot be gainsaid. In the profession of law which it must be observed was wholly unknown to the Hindu and Muhammadan systems and is, of all institutions, peculiarly occidental, Indians have acquired such remarkable proficiency that it is now conceded to them as being particularly suited to their aptitudes. In western medicine, in the practice of which they suffer from many disadvantages as I shall have to point out, their success has been equally remarkable. Not only is the general level of efficiency of Indian qualified practitioners highly satisfactory, but some of them in the more advanced presidencies have achieved eminent distinction as surgeons, doctors, and gynæcologists, and a few men have also done research work of value with such facilities as were within their reach. Of those who devoted themselves to politics it would not be difficult to mention the names of a number of men of commanding gifts of political judgment and foresight and of platform oratory, debate and organisation. In the region of scientific research of the higher order, at least two names may be mentioned, those of J. C. Bose and P. C. Roy who have won more than an Indian reputation, while the Nobel prize of literature was awarded the year before last to Rabindra Nath Tagore, whose poems have become familiar to most cultured men and women of Europe and America. Then to everyone who knows India will occur the names of those men who organised momentous movements of social, religious, educational and political reforms that have so largely changed the outlook of India. Under Lord Morley's scheme of reforms, Indians have been found fit for appointment in the executive councils of the Viceroy and of the council of the Secretary of State for India. While on the benches of the high courts Indians have long established their reputation. An Indian sits on the judicial committee of the privy council. In the face of these facts it is hard to believe that India is deficient in wealth of intellect or character.

*The necessity for recruitment in India.*

22. Then the question of employment in the public service of India has to be considered in its important aspect of affording an adequate career to the educated Indians wishing to serve their country. In this connection it will not be inappropriate to take a bird's-eye view of the field of recruitment in England for Indian public services. The evidence shows what was naturally to be expected that under normal conditions an Indian career does not rank at all high in the estimation of English youths of more than average capacity and ambition. Such men prefer one of the many careers open to them in England, the army, the navy, the diplomatic service, the church and the law, journalism, literature, education, business and the home civil service. It has also been brought to our notice that the increasing activities of social life in manifold directions have, in England, so augmented the demand for educated men that only a very limited number of young men of superior calibre are available for foreign employment, and to this small number, service in self-governing colonies seems to appeal more strongly than service in India. There can be no doubt that the offers which Indian services ordinarily get proceed mostly from candidates of average attainments and rather limited outlook, more or less obliged by circumstances to seek for a living in a land which otherwise does not evoke much enthusiasm in their breasts. I am not inclined to depreciate the many good qualities of such men, and have no doubt that they prove quite equal to the daily duties of official business. But we cannot look with confidence to recruits of this type as a body to supply the higher order of administrative talent which alone can enable a foreigner to understand the real forces at work in the very complex conditions of modern India and to guide

them with sympathy. I have no hesitation in recording my opinion that the country in its present circumstances cannot safely or fairly be called upon to accommodate more than a very limited number of English officials of this class.

23. On the other hand, as was to be expected, the Indian field of recruitment has been steadily expanding. The response of India to the demands of modern ideals of civic life has for some time been growing rapidly emphatic, not only among the Hindus and Parsis, but among the Muhammadans, the Sikhs and in other communities. Western education is spreading in all parts of India and amongst all classes, in castes and families whose hereditary occupations have been of a purely intellectual or literary character, amongst those whose ancestors carried on the military, civil and revenue administration of the country under the Mogul emperors and also among growing sections of the commercial and industrial communities. The educational institutions of India, from the most primitive primary schools known as muktabs and pathshalas to the universities and colleges, are literally full to overflowing. If they were multiplied five-fold they would soon be filled. Indian students are also flocking to foreign countries; they are crowding, not only at the doors of British universities, but are spreading to America and Japan, and some also come to France, Germany and Switzerland. Leaving aside a fair proportion of inefficients, the number of those well qualified for a useful civic career has been growing larger day by day.

24. But on the other hand the careers open to an educated Indian are grievously limited. To him, whether he be a Sikh, a Pathan, a descendant of the Moguls or a Rajput, the commissioned ranks of the army and the navy still remain closed. Literature, owing to the absence of a large reading public, affords very limited attractions as a career except to the specially gifted, journalism presents more difficulties than prizes, while the larger commercial and industrial enterprises mostly belong to foreigners whose reluctance to employ educated Indians except in purely clerical work has been specially brought home to us. Law possibly has had more than its fair share of recruits, and medicine the only other large independent profession, though crowded in big cities like Calcutta and Bombay can still accommodate a certain number, and so also teaching so far as it is a private enterprise. Indians cannot look for a career in any capacity in the colonies, nor for all practical purposes anywhere else outside their own country. The pressure therefore on the public service of India from the Indian side is so great that the question, as is well known, has assumed considerable political proportions. No doubt the number of men that can be absorbed in such service must necessarily be small compared to the total educated force of the country; all that can reasonably be expected, and is asked for, is that the disabilities should be removed and the conditions of entry be such as to make the service freely accessible to honest effort and merit. For the rest other forces must be relied upon to open other avenues of employment.

25. In this connection I may notice that it has been urged before us that the first and foremost duty of the British Government in India is towards the vast masses of the people, and so long as the interests of peace and security are safeguarded and there is no demand from the general population for larger employment of Indian officials, the Government need not pay much heed to the cry of educated Indians. The sphere of duties here suggested for the Indian Government is so obviously primitive and reactionary that it hardly calls for an elaborate refutation. It was never anticipated that the duty of the Indian Government as a civilised Government would be fully discharged by merely keeping peace and order which is as much necessary for its own existence as for the well-being of the people. On the other hand it has from the very commencement undertaken to uplift the general level of the people in their material intellectual and moral conditions, to spread modern science and culture and to develop the instincts of enlightened citizenship affording at the same time ample and growing opportunities to qualified Indians to manage the affairs of their own country. The time seems to be ripe when a much freer and larger admission of Indians into the higher regions of administration has become necessary, if there is to be harmony between the Government and the reawakened life of India. An English official in so far as he represents a high level of western knowledge and training, has a sincere and earnest desire to help the cause of progress combined with an aptitude for adapting

western methods to the changing conditions of an ancient oriental country, and above all a determination to deal justly not merely between one Indian and another, but what is much more politically important and far more difficult between conflicting Indian and English claims which constantly crop up in various forms, has a very useful career in India, and will always be welcomed by competent Indian public opinion. A few such men would considerably strengthen the bonds between the Government and the people; on the other hand an English official of a lower type or with lower ideals would at the present day be felt as an anachronism and prove a fruitful source of political friction. I would also point out the obvious fact that an English official is at best a bird of passage in India, his ties and cherished associations lie outside the country, he stands in need of frequent and prolonged absences from his work leading to constant shiftings of official arrangements, his knowledge of the people, their wants and aspirations must always be more or less limited, and when he retires at the age varying between 40 and 55 all his training and ripe experience are entirely lost to the country. He is expensive to train, expensive to employ—two men, roughly speaking, being required to do one man's work—and is a dead loss to the country when he retires. Even supposing that he initially brings to his work some superior qualifications, still the balance of advantage must in the nature of things be heavily on the side of the Indian official. Further an efficient Indian administrator has a value to the country far greater than is to be measured by the actual output of his daily routine work. He becomes a centre of further growth.

### CHAPTER III.—ORGANISATION.

#### *The division of services into imperial and provincial.*

26. The present organisation of the public service in most of its important departments in so far as their general classification into imperial and provincial is concerned, was the outcome of the recommendations of the Aitchison Commission which inquired into the Public Service of India in 1886–87. In those days, as now, the great bulk of the civil posts of higher responsibility and emoluments were filled by recruits from Europe, and that Commission was expressly asked to suggest measures which would “do full justice to the claims of natives of India to higher and more extensive employment in the public service.” The central point of their recommendations, which were generally accepted in principle by the Government, was that the recruitment of officials in England should be substantially reduced—the exact language used with reference to the Indian civil service being that it should be reduced to “a corps d’élite”—and the higher appointments so set free transferred to a service to be locally recruited in India and called the provincial service in contrast to the imperial service which was to comprise officers recruited in England. The conditions of appointment in regard to pay, leave and pension of officers belonging to the two services were to be fixed on independent grounds and were not necessarily to have any relation to each other. There was to be a third service comprising the lower administrative appointments above the ministerial grades and this was to be called the “subordinate service.” With respect to the imperial and provincial services they further recommended that the members of these services should be put on a footing of social equality as far as possible and when they occupied similar offices they should be graded together in the official precedence list. These proposals which were mainly developed with reference to the civil service were to be applied also to services connected with the special departments. It is abundantly clear that the design underlying the scheme was that officers of both the services—one recruited for in England and the other in India—were to be employed in the performance of higher administrative duties. The object in view was, to quote their own words, “that all his Majesty’s subjects should receive equal treatment” and “all invidious distinctions of class or race should be removed.” The services to be recruited for in England were to remain open to Indians along with the other subjects of the Crown and the Commission was for encouraging them as far as possible to qualify for the appointments to be made here.

27. At the present day the division into imperial and provincial obtains in the civil services and in the police, the education, the medical, agricultural, civil veterinary, forests, telegraph (engineering), public works and the survey of India

departments. These are all departments in which the cadre is mixed consisting of officers recruited partly in England and partly in India. The division is not found in the departments in which the official personnel is homogenous and composed, with a few exceptions, of men recruited either wholly in England or in India, viz., the geological survey, mines, mint and assay, factory and boiler inspection, military finance, Bengal pilots, post office, northern India salt revenue, salt and excise, survey (Madras), Burma land records, and registration. The Indian finance department is the only one in which the officers are appointed partly in England and partly in India, but in which there is no division into imperial and provincial services, all officers being placed on an absolutely equal footing. Wherever the division exists it is based on the place of recruitment, and not as might be inferred from the description, in order to distinguish officers placed under the Government of India and liable to serve all over India from officers placed under the orders of local Governments and liable to serve only in specified provinces. For instance the officers belonging to the provincial services in the telegraph (engineering) and the survey of India are directly under the Government of India and not confined to any particular province, while officers in the imperial service in the education and the police departments are allotted to different provinces.

28. I have had no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the recommendations of the Aitchison Commission have failed in their desired object. So far as appointments made in England are concerned experience has shown that the chances of Indians are inconsiderable, and the Aitchison Commission itself rightly regarded the London door of admission as a supplementary source. Their most important recommendation that recruitment in England for the Indian public service should be substantially reduced as a necessary step towards steadily increasing the scope for Indians has not been carried out. In fact, the reverse has taken place in the more important services. There has been an increase altogether of 678 (*i.e.*, from 2,338 to 3,016) in the number of officers recruited in England, excluding the number of civil servants required for Burma, which had not been annexed in 1886-87, and the military finance and forest departments for which figures at the date of the Aitchison Commission are not available.

29. The inevitable result has been a repression of the expansion of the Indian element in the higher administration. On the other hand, that part of the scheme of the Aitchison Commission which recommended payment to officers appointed in India on a lower scale of salaries, pensions, &c. than to those appointed in England, even when both were engaged on the same plane of duties has been carried out perhaps beyond the intentions of the Commission. The differentiation in this respect has undoubtedly become much more marked now than it was before 1886-87. Then the officers appointed in India, for instance, to the Indian civil service, called "statutory" civil servants, received from the commencement of service two-thirds of the pay allowed to officers appointed in England, and the same with regard to the education department. In the public works department, and presumably also in the survey of India department, equal pay was allowed. Now no officers are appointed to the posts of assistants in the India civil service; and the provincial service officers holding identical appointments receive about one-half the pay of a civilian assistant. In the education department the officers appointed in India receive on the average less than half of what is received by a similar officer appointed in England; in the public works the average pay of an officer recruited in India is less than two-thirds of the average pay of an officer appointed in England, and in the survey of India the average pay of an officer appointed in India is about 38 per cent. of the average pay of the imperial officer.

30. The departure in the policy as regards the conditions of pay, etc. was recommended with a view to achieving a larger and gradually increasing substitution of recruitment in India for recruitment in England; that object failing, it has only tended to deteriorate the Indian officers' position in the higher ranks of the public service. I may mention that three of the Indian members of the Aitchison Commission in giving their adherence to the recommendations of that body had it distinctly noted that their approval was given on the assumption that the scheme would be acted on as a whole and that no alterations would be made on any essential point.

31. Reserving the question of differential treatment in the matter of pay for another part of the report, I shall now point out the inequality of treatment accorded to officers recruited in England and in India respectively in the matter of opportunity for attaining the higher appointments. The great bulk of these appointments are reserved for officers appointed in England; the disparity in this respect is especially significant in services in which there is a division of appointments into "superior" and "inferior" properly so-called. In the civil service, out of 730 superior posts 669 are held by officers appointed in England and 61 by officers appointed in India; in the police, out of 358 superior posts 348 are held by officers appointed in England and 10 by officers appointed in India; in the survey of India department, out of 34 superior appointments 27 are reserved for officers recruited in England and 7 are open to locally recruited officers; and in the public works, out of 440 superior appointments 307 are held by officers appointed in Europe and 133 by officers appointed in India. In the telegraph department alone, in which the superior staff is composed of 28 officers, the appointments are equally divided between officers appointed in England and in India.

32. The distribution of higher appointments between the two classes of officers was apparently fixed on certain *à priori* presumptions based on the place of recruitment and is carried out by the arrangement into "services." It is based neither on the principle of giving promotion to those who have been found most worthy of it after trial in service, nor on the nature of qualifications required. The majority of the Commissioners dealing with this matter find that there is scope for higher and lower class of work in these departments. So there is. But they seem to have overlooked the relation subsisting between the two classes of work in the different departments which alone can furnish a guide on the question of making appointments for the performance of the two kinds of duties. On scrutinising the nature of the work involved and the practice that prevails in the various departments, the services fall into two distinct groups. The first group comprises the civil service (executive side), the police, the survey of India, the public works, railway (engineering) and telegraph (engineering) departments where the higher appointments known as "superior" or "major" charges are, and should be, open only to those who have proved their fitness by a substantial number of years' service in an "inferior" or "minor" charge. No outsiders are, or should be, appointed direct to a superior appointment in these departments. In the Indian civil service a permanent superior appointment is attained after 13 years, in the police after 12 years, and in the public works and railway (engineering) after 13 years. In these departments the administrative function of supervision and control is of importance in the higher ranks. The second group includes services in which the duties appertaining to the higher posts and the qualifications required in their incumbents are such that outsiders are and should be appointed direct to them without being required to undergo a period of service in an appointment of a lower class. To this group belong judicial appointments and appointments in the education, medical, agriculture, civil veterinary and also forest departments. In these departments the administrative aspect of the work is of minor importance.

33. Of the first group the provincial officials in the civil services, the police and the survey of India are, in the matter of promotion to the higher appointments, in status and official designation, treated on a different footing from provincial officials recruited for the public works, railway (engineering) and telegraph (engineering) departments. It cannot be denied that appointments of the lower class in all these departments, whether held by locally recruited officers or by officers recruited in England, are identical and interchangeable. In the public works, the railway (engineering) and telegraph (engineering) departments the provincial officers holding appointments of the lower class bear the same official designation, have the same status and are borne on the same list for purposes of promotion as the corresponding imperial service officers recruited in England, the differences made between them being in the matter of pay and pension. The lower appointments are so regulated in number with reference to the higher appointments available, that each officer whether belonging to the imperial or the provincial service reaches it after the number of years' service already specified. In the public works and railway (engineering) departments the percentage of superior appointments to inferior appointments is about 90 for both the imperial

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service and for the provincial service cadres and similarly the percentage of superior to inferior appointments in the telegraph (engineering) department is 155·6 for both classes of officers.

34. But in the civil service, the police and the survey of India, provincial officers engaged on the same duties of the lower class as their imperial colleagues are called by different official names; their status is lower and they are borne on a separate list from that of their imperial colleagues, a very small fraction of superior appointments being left open to them as “rewards for special merit.” Even these they attain only at an advanced age when very few years of official service are left to them before superannuation. The following table shows the chances of promotion of the imperial and the provincial officers in these services.

Services.				Number of appointments.		Percentage of col. 3 to col. 2.
				‘ Inferior.’*	“ Superior.”*	
1.				2.	3.	4.
Civil service	-	-	England—recruited (I.C.S.)	681	669	98·2
			India—recruited (P.C.S.)	2,572	61	2·4
Police	-	-	England—recruited (Imp.)	313	348	111·2
			India—recruited (Prov.)	255	10	3·9
Survey of India	-	-	England—recruited (Imp.)	24	27	112·5
			India—recruited (Prov.)	89	7	7·9

\* The terms “inferior” and “superior” are technically used with reference only to the Indian civil service and the imperial police, but here they are used to indicate posts to which recruits are appointed in the first instance and posts to which they are afterwards promoted.

35. It is stated in the majority report that the provincial services in the public works group are constituted on a different basis from those in the civil service, the police or the survey of India. That can only mean that the inferior and the higher appointments are distributed in the same proportions between the provincial services and the corresponding imperial services ensuring to a member of each service a superior appointment at the end of a certain number of years. This, no doubt, would not be possible in the civil service because of the number of lower appointments being much larger than the number of superior appointments available, and the same is true, though to a less extent, of the police and the survey of India. But that in itself is no justification for an arrangement by which the bulk of the higher appointments are reserved for one class of officers, and the bulk of the lower appointments for the other class of officers. The observation in the majority report that the provincial services in the civil service, the police and the survey of India are recruited for a lower class of work is only an ambiguous way of describing the present arrangement. The fact being that the higher appointments in these departments are such that it is necessary for the imperial service incumbents to serve for a substantial number of years in the lower appointments side by side with the provincial officers, the *prima facie* course to adopt would have been to place them all on the same list and promote those among them who have best shown their fitness for a higher appointment. The fact, however, that the superior appointments available are not sufficient for each one of the incumbents of the lower appointments would necessitate selection. No doubt there is no room for making selections for purposes of promotion, except to the extent of rejecting the unfit, in the public works and the railway (engineering) and telegraph (engineering) departments, having regard to the proportion of the lower to the higher posts; but this is apparently explained by the history of the provincial service in the public works department, which is considerably manned by domiciled Europeans and Anglo-Indians. It was not until after much agitation that they succeeded in securing a common list for all recruits whether obtained in England or in India; and the analogous provincial services in the railway and telegraph departments naturally followed suit.

36. In order to have a feasible scheme for a common list for purposes of promotion, in the services in question, it is in the first place necessary that the pay of the inferior appointments for recruits obtained in England should be a sufficient inducement for them, either by itself or combined with such chances of promotion as those recruits may reasonably rely on. It is doubtful whether this would be the case in the police or

the survey of India. In the latter department, however, the real difficulty would lie in the fact that the work of the department has partly a military purpose, for which a definite proportion of military officers in the higher rank might be required to be guaranteed. In these services, therefore, I have agreed with the majority that a proportion of higher appointments should be reserved for officers appointed in England and a proportion for officers recruited in India. Subject to that there will still be an advantage in placing all officers on one common list, and making no differentiation in the official designations of those engaged in the same duties. It will serve to remove all doubts about the official status of provincial service officers, and alleviate, to a great extent, the feeling of unequal treatment. A strong appeal was made to us especially by the provincial police officers on this subject; its justice cannot be doubted and it has been difficult to understand why it should have been refused by the majority.

37. With regard to the Indian civil service officers holding the lower class of appointments the scale of salary provided for them, including the different allowances, would, in my opinion, be sufficiently high to attract the same class of men as now, even if the higher appointments were not reserved exclusively for them, but filled by selection from among them and the locally recruited officers holding appointments of the same class. Considering their higher qualifications and other circumstances, the extreme probability is that only the clearly inefficient men among the officers recruited in England will not succeed in the competition for a superior appointment with the provincial service officers. The average pay of Indian civil service officers holding inferior appointments is Rs. 862 (including acting allowances), and of the 730 superior appointments which would be open to them, the average pay is Rs. 2,400 a month. The average salaries of all appointments in the education, the Indian finance, the military finance, the customs department, for which officers are recruited on qualifications similar to those of the Indian civil servants are Rs. 970, Rs. 978, Rs. 967 and Rs. 944 respectively.

38. The really serious objection to a common list for the civil services arises from the point of view of the Indian public. Indian public opinion has undoubtedly become extremely sensitive with regard to the working of selection as a mode of making public appointments whether in the first instance or by promotion. And it would be specially difficult to induce public confidence in an arrangement necessitating the making of selections on a large scale among European and Indian officers. A common list for the civil services being impracticable, it could not be fair to recruit in India only to a service containing mostly the lower appointments, reserving the bulk of the higher appointments for the service recruited in England. The one-sided character of such an arrangement was at the root of the failure of the "listed" system. The most practicable solution will be found in the establishment of direct recruitment in India for the Indian civil service by holding simultaneous examinations.

39. For the second group of services, viz., the judicial appointments and the education, the medical, agriculture, civil veterinary, and forest departments the division into a higher and a lower class must be regarded as being essentially on a different footing from the division into imperial and provincial in the civil service, the police, etc. For the former the qualifications required being of a differentiated character, the question of the personal merits of an officer at the time of his appointment has a larger significance than the co-ordination of different posts. Hence the question of promoting from one class of work to another should not to any substantial extent affect the organisation of these departments; the predominant aim should be to obtain the best men available whether from outside or from the lower class of officers.

40. The present arrangements in the education department have proved a failure because, in the first place, the principle of making appointments on the basis of specialised qualifications was hardly recognised, the whole department being practically organised under a rigid service system. In the second place, though the theory was that both the imperial and provincial services contained posts of equal importance, the salaries, etc., fixed for officers recruited in England and in India respectively were grossly unequal, giving rise to inequality in status, and, thirdly, because there was no promotion allowed from one service to the other. For this department an integral part of my recommendations is that a sufficient number of professorial chairs and

some other important educational appointments should be set apart for men who have already done valuable work and for the less important appointments my recommendation is that there should be a service recruited for in India. Officers of the former class should be obtained wherever available. For officers of the latter class there should be a liberal provision for study leave to enable them to carry on special studies and research in Europe. The proposals of the majority on the other hand are based on some "grounds of policy," which according to them necessitate the employment of young English graduates and a practical confirmation of the present close service system.

41. In the medical department, the civil assistant surgeons recruited from among the graduates of the Indian medical colleges, corresponding in status to provincial officers in other departments, hold at present 34 out of 492 superior appointments; of the rest, 372 are reserved for the reserve of a military service called the Indian medical service recruited in England, and 47 are allotted to a locally recruited subordinate military service. Few members of the latter service have even registrable qualifications. For this department I have recommended the formation of a civil medical service to be recruited mainly in India.

42. In the agriculture, civil veterinary and forest departments all the higher posts are at present filled by appointments made in England. I have agreed in the proposals made by the majority for the formation of a higher and a lower service, both to be recruited for in India, but until the educational facilities in India are fully developed I have proposed that promising Indian students be sent with scholarships to England to undergo a course of study in agriculture, civil veterinary work, geology and forestry. Those amongst them whose work is found to be sufficiently good by the authorities of the educational institutions concerned, and are not rejected by the selection committee of the India Office, should be appointed in preference to any other candidates. The recommendation of the majority in all these departments will not without some such arrangement produce the results contemplated. With regard to the forest department, I may observe that the officers recruited in England are put into the major charges at present after about one or two years' employment in a minor charge. Though I think that this period should be somewhat extended, there could be no doubt that this department whose work is essentially scientific of much the same character as in the agriculture department should be placed along with the others in the second group. *सकामेव नये*

#### *Employment of military officers in civil departments.*

43. Whatever might have been the necessity in the past for drawing upon the officers of the army for the performance of civil duties, the policy of discontinuing the practice has been steadily pursued for some time. This is undoubtedly wise, in the interests both of the civil administration and of the army. The majority of the Commissioners have proposed that only civilian officers should be employed in the future in the civil veterinary, military finance and assay departments, and that the military officers should be gradually withdrawn from employment in the civil service posts in those provinces where mixed cadres still exist. To this extent there is no difference of opinion. I agree further with them that there is a distinct military need for the employment to a certain extent of military officers in the survey of India. I have, however, been unable to accept the position that military officers must needs be employed in the railway and public works departments; but it is an economical advantage to employ some portion of the military engineering reserve in these departments, and from this point of view I have not recommended their withdrawal. On the most important of all questions, however, in this connection, namely, the employment in the civil department of officers of the Indian medical service, I am in absolute disagreement with them. The evidence in my opinion is clear to show that the growth of the medical profession in the country has now reached a stage when to allow the civil department any longer to depend on a military medical organisation would be doing a distinct disservice to the further growth of western medical and hygienic science in India, and is quite indefensible. I have therefore proposed a civil organisation for the performance of civil duties relating to medical relief, medical education, and sanitary work, but have

provided for the employment of a certain portion of the war reserve of the Indian medical service and the Indian subordinate medical department in such duties largely from considerations of economy. It will be seen from an examination of the concrete proposals made in the report, of the majority that their creation of a so-called self-contained civil department is a mere name and not a reality.

*Employment of members of the Indian civil service in special departments.*

44. In connection with this matter my recommendation is of a two-fold character. First from some of the smaller departments recruited in India I would withdraw the members of the Indian civil service altogether, providing for control either from within the department or from the provincial civil services. This policy has already been established with success in the registration department in the provinces of Madras, Bengal, and Bihar and Orissa and can easily be applied to that department in the other provinces with a certain re-adjustment of administrative arrangements. The other department to which the principle should be extended is the northern India salt revenue department, and the principle may also be kept in view in respect of the salt and excise, land records (Burma), and survey (Madras) departments. The advantages of management by locally-recruited officers are obvious, and it is difficult to believe that these departments or the provincial civil services cannot produce men fit for the purpose. Officers of the provincial civil services have been found successful as collectors of districts and as ministers of native states, and there could be no possible risk in handing over these smaller departments entirely to indigenous agency. In the larger of the special departments where members of the Indian civil services are introduced I would keep the same policy in view. I agree with the majority of the Commissioners that the directorship of agriculture and the inspector-generalship of police should be removed from the Indian civil service cadre.

CHAPTER IV.—THE DISABILITIES OF INDIANS.

45. The policy which I have endeavoured to keep in view in dealing with this question is that which has been repeatedly declared to the people of India in statutes of Parliament, in proclamations of the Crown made on solemn occasions and in other public documents of importance. To these declarations the people of India naturally attach the sanctity of pledges and no apology is, therefore, needed for citing the more important of them, although they may be well known. The statute of 1833 (13 & 14 Will. IV., cap. 85, s. lxxxvii), lays down that “no native of India nor any natural born subject of His Majesty resident therein shall, by reason only of his religion, place of birth, descent, colour, or any of them be disabled from holding any place, office, or employment under the said company.” In the dispatch of 1834 (No. 44 dated 18th December 1834), the court of directors explained that “whatever other tests of qualification might be adopted distinctions of race or religion should not be of the number,” and in another part (paragraphs 105 and 107) of the same document, after protesting against the presumption on which the authorities in India used to act, namely, that the average amount of native qualifications could only rise to a certain limit, they addressed them in these earnest words “To this rule it will be necessary that you should both in your acts and your language conform.” In fact their instructions required the Government of India to admit natives of India to places of trust as freely and extensively as their individual aptitudes justified. Then they proceed to suggest practical measures by which this policy could be fully carried out: “In every view it is important that the indigenous people of India or those among them who by their habits, character, or position may be induced to aspire to office should, as far as possible, be qualified to meet the European competitors. Hence there arises a powerful argument for the promotion of every design tending to the improvement of the natives, whether by conferring on them the advantages of education or by diffusing among them the treasures of science, knowledge, and moral culture.”

46. The words of the famous proclamation of Queen Victoria dated 1st November 1858 are equally clear and forcible: “We hold ourselves bound to the

“ natives of our said territories by the same obligations of duty which bind us to all our subjects. . . . And it is our further will that so far as may be our subjects of whatever race or creed be freely and impartially admitted to offices in our service, the duties of which they may be qualified by their education, ability, and integrity duly to discharge.” In the last paragraph it is added: “ It is our earnest desire to administer its Government for the benefit of all our subjects resident there. . . . ” King Edward VII.’s proclamation of 1st November 1908, after endorsing the general policy enunciated in the proclamation of 1858 and stating that steps were being taken to give effect to it, adds: “ Important classes among you, representing ideas that have been fostered and encouraged by British rule, claim equality of citizenship and a greater share in the legislation and Government. The political satisfaction of such a claim will strengthen, not impair, existing authority and power.” The principles of action here laid down are not carried out at present in the following respects.

47. In the most important services, the Indian civil service, and the imperial education, police, agriculture, forest, civil veterinary, geological survey, military finance and the medical service, the most serious disability of the Indians consists in the place of appointment being in London. In the imperial police, the Indians are not even admitted to the London examination, and hardly any appointments are made to it in India. I have recommended that the exclusion of Indians from the London examination, which is so manifestly unjust and is in fact a violation of the statute of 1833, should be abrogated. The majority of the Commission have proposed that for all Anglo-Indian and Indian candidates five years’ residence in England should be insisted on, and subject thereto they should be admitted. I have not been able to appreciate the necessity or the wisdom of the modification which might possibly help to keep clear of the letter of the statute, but would sanction the violation of its spirit. The present rule which debars the admission of Indians to the Bengal pilot service should also be abolished. In another place I have indicated the principles which should be followed in fixing the place or places of appointment.

48. In some important services recruited in India, such as the provincial service of the survey of India, the northern India salt revenue, the salt and excise, the post office, where the domiciled Europeans and Anglo-Indians come into competition, the limitation upon the employment of Indians arises at the present day from the fact that in many cases for the domiciled European and Anglo-Indian candidates a lower standard of educational qualifications than that required for Indian candidates is accepted, and that the general practice shows a marked tendency in these departments to favour domiciled European and Anglo-Indian candidates as against candidates of the Hindu, Muhammadan, Sikh and other Indian communities. Some idea can be formed of the extent to which the objectionable practice is carried from the facts stated in the annexures for these services. I have proposed in the first place that equality in the standard of qualifications should be strictly insisted on. The recommendation in the report of the majority of the Commissioners, that wherever a degree of a university is required for Indian candidates, for the Anglo-Indian candidates there shall be “ an examination of a corresponding standard in the European schools,” is calculated, as I have explained elsewhere, to admit the latter class on much easier terms than the former, and will not remedy the evil. There are also practical difficulties in the way of Indian candidates, arising from the fact that sufficient publicity is not given to the vacancies occurring in many of the special departments. I entirely agree in the recommendations made by the majority of the Commissioners on this point. The institution of selection committees with an adequate representation of Indians on them will also, it is hoped, be effective in preventing the practical enforcement of the general policy with respect to public appointments being constantly thwarted by the idiosyncrasies of individual heads of departments. I am at one with the majority in recognising the necessity for such a measure.

49. The disability as regards status is suffered by officers recruited in India when they are employed in the same capacity as officers recruited in England in the following classes of posts and in the following respects :—

(i) When holding a superior appointment ordinarily included in the Indian civil service, the education, the imperial police and the medical services they are in the

first place debarred from further promotion either by the nature of the rules themselves or in effect by reason of the advanced age in which they are appointed. The majority's recommendations in this respect remove the theoretical bar, but are not adequate to ensure any practical benefits. My recommendation is that in future officers promoted to a superior post from the locally recruited services should be promoted at about the same age as the officers recruited in England, that both should receive equal pay, and be borne on the same list for purposes of further promotion. The majority have generally recommended the last measure, and for the police they have also recommended that all incumbents of superior appointments should receive the same pay.

(ii) For the inferior appointments in the civil service, the police and the survey of India, I recommend that all the incumbents, wherever recruited and whether placed in the imperial service or in the provincial service, should bear the same official designation, and their official status in matters of official precedence, &c. should be the same. This is only carrying out in substance the recommendations of the Aitchison Commission of 1886-87 as they were formulated by them with special reference to the civil services. The report of the majority so far as it can be gathered would maintain the existing differentiation in these respects, which would only be justified if the officers were not employed in identically the same duties, as in fact they are. For the police and the survey of India there should be one list for all recruits, whether obtained in England or in India, but having regard mainly to the scale of pay of the minor appointments in these services, I have proposed that certain proportions of the higher appointments be ear-marked for the officers recruited in England and in India respectively. The majority of the Commissioners have held different views in all these respects.

50. The points of view from which the majority of the Commissioners and myself have approached the question of employment of Indians are substantially different. The question they have asked themselves is, what are the means to be adopted for extending the employment of Indians (*see* paragraphs 35-36). But the proper standpoint, which alone in my opinion furnishes a satisfactory basis to work upon, is that the importation of officials from Europe should be limited to cases of clear necessity, and the question therefore to be asked is, in which services and to what extent should appointments be made from England. The suggestion involved in the majority's point of view is that special measures are necessary for finding employment for Indians in the administration, and that the practical question, therefore, is how many or how few posts are to be handed over to them. On the other hand the view which, upon a review of the situation has forced itself on my conviction, is that if Indians have not established a footing in the higher ranks of administration, it is not through their own fault; it is due to barriers of many sorts that have been raised in their way. It will be sufficient if the disabilities be removed and the doctrine of equal opportunity and fair dealing be established as a practical measure. No special protection or favour will be necessary if the need for protection is guarded against. It will appear from the tables given in paragraph 34 of the majority report, that out of the existing 11,064 appointments on Rs. 200 a month and upwards, only 42 per cent. was held by Indians and Burmans of pure Asiatic descent on the 1st April 1913. Then, as we ascend higher up in the scale, the position grows much worse. Out of 4,984 posts carrying salaries of Rs. 500 a month and upwards, only 942, or 19 per cent., were filled by them as against 4,042, or 81 per cent., occupied by Europeans or Anglo-Indians. When we reach the salaries of Rs. 800 a month and upwards, which to a large extent, though not entirely, indicate the level of higher appointments of supervision and control—for there are some provincial appointments of a less important character which carry a salary of Rs. 800 and a few of Rs. 1,000—only 242, or 10 per cent., of the appointments were held by Indians as against 2,259, or 90 per cent., filled by Europeans and Anglo-Indians. Reference is made in paragraph 34 of the majority report to the progress made in this respect from 1887 to 1913. In the region of appointments carrying salaries of Rs. 200 and upwards, the percentage has risen from 34 to 42 since 1887, and in appointments of Rs. 500 and upwards from 12 to 19 per cent., and in those carrying a pay of Rs. 800 and upwards from 4 to 10 per cent. This during the space of a quarter of a century!

## CHAPTER V. : METHODS OF RECRUITMENT.

*Place of appointment.*

51. At present the Indian civil service, the Indian medical service, the railway finance department, the imperial services in the education, the police, the public works (including railway engineering), telegraph (engineering), agriculture, forest, civil veterinary, and survey of India departments and appointments in the geological survey, railway (locomotive, carriage and wagon), mines, and the mint and assay departments are all recruited for in England. They account for 3,426 officials with an average pay ranging from over Rs. 800 per mensem at the lowest to Rs. 1,587 per mensem, the latter figure representing the average pay of a member of the Indian civil service whose cadre consists of 1,350 officers. Out of this total of 3,426 officers only 269 are Indians, of whom 69 are officers promoted from the provincial services. The services recruited for almost entirely in India are the provincial civil service and the provincial services in the agricultural, civil veterinary, education, forest, police, telegraph (engineering), public works, the railways (engineering), and the survey of India departments, the local medical services (civil and military branches), and appointments in the railway (revenue, stores), northern India salt revenue, salt and excise, post office, telegraph (traffic), registration, the survey (Madras), and land records (Burma). The total number of officers is 5,502, of whom the majority are Indians. Among these services the average pay of officers in the provincial services in the public works, railway (engineering), and telegraph (engineering), and in the railway (stores) departments, which consist of 320 officers, and to a considerable extent recruited from the domiciled European and Anglo-Indian communities, ranges from Rs. 636 to Rs. 779 per mensem. For the remaining 5,182 officers in the other departments the average pay ranges from Rs. 190 to Rs. 500 a month: In the Indian finance, the customs, the pilots (Bengal), and railway (traffic) departments, consisting of 369 officers, the personnel is recruited for partly in India and partly in England, and in these departments the number of Indians is 59, or 16 per cent. of the total. The pilots have no fixed pay—the average of the others ranges from Rs. 713 to Rs. 978 a month. For the factory and boiler inspection, which is manned by 38 officers, no fixed rule seems to be observed with respect to the place of appointment; but they are all Europeans or Anglo-Indians, the average pay in the factory inspection branch being about Rs. 680 a month.

52. There is no question but that the appointments now recruited for in India should continue to be so recruited. For the great bulk of these the scale of salary is such that it bars European competition. The question arises with respect to the other services which absorb the most important classes of appointments in the civil administration. The general policy which is to be kept in view is that the public service of India should be recruited for in the country itself. Upon a survey of the situation, political and economic, and on examining the requirements of the different departments, I have come to the conclusion that the only proper classification of the services for determining the place of appointment, which will at the same time be consistent with the fundamental policy of not placing any limits upon the outlook of the people of India in the matter of public service of their own country, must be based on the nature of the work to be performed and the qualifications required for the purpose. The majority of the Commissioners in invoking "British responsibility for the good government of India" and "grounds of policy" as a basis of classification have, in my opinion, suggested a definite limitation to such outlook for important services like the Indian civil service, the police, the medical, the education, and the public works. This is inconsistent with the natural and constitutional rights of the people, and is not justified on any grounds that are mentioned in the report. If it is meant that the connection of the British people with the Government of India necessarily implies the perpetuation of British officers in certain civil services of the country, like the Indian civil service and the police, the theory mixes up the government of a country with its administrative personnel. Further, I can well understand the British people deciding in the best interests of both the countries to retain the government of India and gradually relinquishing all share in the civil administration. In fact this is understood by the Indian public to be the legitimate goal of the policy underlying the

proclamations and the statutes which declare that the Indians shall suffer no disabilities and limitations in the public service of their country. I am not here alluding to the demand for self-government on colonial lines which forms the chief item in the Indian political programme. That proposition, of course, goes further than any question of recruitment for the public service.

53. I recommend that the services be divided into two groups. In the first group should be placed the executive appointments in the Indian civil service and the appointments in the police ; in these the administrative aspect of the work is especially prominent and the recruitment is based on undifferentiated qualifications. From the very nature of such qualifications no one can be absolutely sure of the accuracy of any practicable estimate that may be made of their value, and there is no doubt a divergence between the English and the Indian points of view on the weight to be attached to the respective advantages which are secured in this respect by recruitment in England and in India. The only satisfactory solution which seems to me to be possible at present is that there should be recruitment in both the countries for these services, but that the recruitment in England and in India should be so adjusted with reference to each other that in practice full effect may be given to the right of the best qualified Indian candidates to an equal opportunity for appointment with the best available candidates in England.

54. In the second group should be placed appointments in which the administrative aspect of the work is more or less subsidiary and for which differentiated and specialised qualifications of a professional, scientific or technical character are required. As such qualifications are capable of being sufficiently definitely ascertained there is no good reason why in this class of appointments Indian candidates when properly qualified should not be appointed to the fullest extent available in India. It is only in their absence or deficiency that recourse should be had to England to supply the want. I would place in this group all the appointments not falling within the first group. This classification is practically in accordance with the principle suggested in an important despatch of the Government of India. Judicial appointments and appointments in the education, agriculture, civil veterinary, forest, geological survey, factory and boiler inspection, mines, mint and assay, pilots (Bengal), public works and railways, Indian finance, military finance, medical telegraph (engineering), and the survey of India departments will fall within the second group. Among these appointments there are some requiring a greater degree of specialised qualifications than the others. It should be recognised that the higher the standard of such qualifications required the narrower the circle of available candidates inevitably becomes, and hence for posts requiring the highest class of specialised qualifications, such as for professorships, the effort should be made to get the best men wherever available. As to the classification arrived at by the majority of the Commissioners, I must state my inability to appreciate the "grounds of policy" which induced them to separate appointments in the medical, public works, and the other departments which they have placed in their second group from those in their third group, which is composed of the scientific and technical departments like the Indian finance, agriculture, etc. It is also difficult to understand how efficiency is a special consideration for appointments of the former as contrasted with those of the last-mentioned class. Though I have placed the survey of India in the second group it stands on a somewhat special footing. Part at least of the work undertaken by the department is for a military purpose, and until that is completed or separated the question with respect to this department does not depend altogether on civil considerations, and the proposals submitted had therefore to be of a piecemeal character. What I have aimed to indicate by the classification which I have suggested is the general line of policy which should be followed in choosing the place for making appointments, but the actual proposals made, which should be carried out at present in furtherance of it, have had to be guided by various considerations of a practical character, *e.g.*, a proper estimate of the field of recruitment, the present practice, the state of existing facilities for suitable training for special branches of work, and so on. If that is also the purpose underlying the majority's classification, the appointments in the customs department should not have

been excluded from their third group on the ground that there exists a present necessity as they find of making part recruitment in Europe. It is difficult to see how the customs department differs in respect of the actual recommendations made by them from appointments in the agriculture, forests, civil veterinary, and other departments of that group. As regards the military finance I venture to think that they have not been justified by the evidence in abstaining from making definite recommendations on the question of employment of Indians.

55. On the necessity of improving the facilities that now exist in India for giving higher education and training in agriculture and forestry, and of making a determined effort to provide and develop educational opportunities for geological survey, mines, and civil veterinary work, I am in agreement with the recommendations of the majority. I would further urge the claims of Thomason engineering college at Rurki to be regarded as standing on a high plane of efficiency, and would lay emphasis on the need for improving the other engineering colleges at Sibpur, Madras, and Poona, and for developing and expanding the existing facilities for training in electrical engineering.

*The question of proportions for recruitment in India and in England.*

56. The question of fixing proper proportions for recruitment in the two countries does not by its nature admit of a satisfactory or final solution. Such questions should be confined within as narrow limits as possible and be treated as a temporary device to be replaced by the enforcement of broad principles of recruitment as soon as practicable. The question has been principally raised in connection with the Indian civil service and the police. If for both these services the examinations by which entry is obtained were held simultaneously in England and in India the question of proportions would be obviated. I have found that it will be advisable to hold simultaneous examinations for the Indian civil service. But apart from that it will be useful to bear in mind certain general considerations bearing on the subject. Wherever there is to be a proportion, the number to be recruited in India should in the first place be substantial enough to appeal to the imagination of the educated youths of the country. It should be large enough to bring about a change in the feeling of an Indian officer from one of helpless isolation in the midst of a foreign agency into a consciousness that he and his Indian comrades bear a substantial part of the responsibility for efficient administration. The educated classes generally should be able to realise that they have an effective part in guiding and controlling the administration for the benefit of the country. Unless the number reaches this point the throwing open of a few more posts will solve no problem.

*Limitations to the application of a close service system.*

57. A particularly noteworthy feature of the Indian official system is the extent to which a close service organisation is relied upon for filling public offices of the country without sufficient allowance being made for the nature of the responsibility or the specialised character of the functions of certain important classes of appointments. Thus even heads of local Governments, members of the executive councils of the viceroy and the provincial governors, judges, and professors are recruited for in some service or other. Historically the practice seems to have been inherited from the monopolist days of the East India Company to which is to be traced the origin of the Indian civil service, the senior and the most influential public service of India. This service, as is well known, is the successor of the junior and senior merchants of the East India Company, whose trading occupations gradually developed into functions of administrators and rulers as the privileges of collecting the revenues and of administering justice were acquired under the grant of the Mogul emperor. In its constitution the Indian civil service is still the same simple machinery of the eighteenth century, and on its constitution the official arrangements in the other departments of civil Government have been consciously or unconsciously modelled.

58. The prevalent service system of India may usefully be shortly described here. The appointments have been grouped into a number of services both in the general civil administration and in special departments such as education, medical, etc., and to

fill them an adequate supply of young men of suitable education is obtained. These recruits, after undergoing special training for a period varying from one to two years, begin at the bottom of the official list of the service to which they have been admitted and are thereafter employed in the successive classes of appointments included in that service; and in a few instances are also promoted to appointments in a higher service. Where there is a body of official work to be performed for which the necessary training and experience are not easily available outside Government employment and there exists a reasonable degree of relation between its different stages the ordinary service method of engaging young men of promise on the strength of initial educational qualifications is justifiable in the interests both of economy and of efficiency. I have not therefore proposed to disturb this form of recruitment for the following classes of appointments—in the civil services, for executive appointments, and generally in the police, customs, post office, salt and excise.

59. To such a service system, however, there are certain natural limitations. In the first place there is no adequate justification for treating as the appanage of a civil service such high offices of the state as lieutenant-governorships of the United Provinces, the Punjab, Bihar and Orissa, and Burma, chief commissionerships of Central Provinces and Assam, memberships of the executive councils of the viceroy and of the governors of Madras, Bombay, and Bengal, and of the lieutenant-governor of Bihar and Orissa. In their incumbents, who exercise the privileges and functions of legislators, rulers, and ministers, the gifts and the sympathies of a statesman are needed rather than the training of a departmental official. The enlightened public opinion of India would like these positions to be generally filled by men who are in no way fettered by traditions of a service. I have come to the conclusion that in the present circumstances of India it has become extremely desirable that the choice of the Crown in these cases should be absolutely free and in no way be confined to a few civil servants who in the ordinary course of promotion have reached the higher ranks of the service. In the next place I have arrived at the conclusion that the principle of excluding judicial appointments from the Indian civil service should be fully recognised, though it may be advisable for a time to come to draw a certain number of judges from this service. Judicial work in India at the present time requires a highly specialised training, and as I have endeavoured to explain in the civil service annexure the organisation of that service, having regard to the constitution of the Indian courts and the procedure prevalent therein, does not well admit of its members receiving an adequate and proper training in the service itself within reasonable limits of cost and consistently with the interests of a large body of poor litigants. The majority of the Commissioners have recommended that some district judgeships should be filled from the bar, but their proposals in this connection are, in my opinion, not only inadequate but hardly well calculated to advance a practice which experience shows has been found so successful in England (on whose model the Indian judicial procedure is essentially founded) and also in India as far as it has been established there. I have not only proposed that a larger number of appointments should be made from the bar, but that the policy should be kept steadily in view of removing the judiciary from the cadre of the Indian civil service. I have further proposed that such members of the Indian civil service as may yet be chosen for judicial work should be trained and employed from the commencement of their official career purely on such work, being promoted as they gradually qualify themselves from courts of lower to courts of higher jurisdiction.

60. I have proposed the exclusion of all professorial chairs whether in the ordinary arts colleges or in special institutions like the medical colleges from the cadre of any service. To fill these appointments for which men of original powers of mind and thought with distinguished work to their credit are wanted, it is obviously inexpedient, as the facts disclosed in the evidence have amply shown, that the authorities should be required, or ordinarily expected, to confine their choice to the limited personnel of a service. The ordinary service conditions are not always favourable to the growth of such men and cannot at least be depended upon to ensure an adequate supply. I have therefore recommended that for all appointments of a professorial status the practice should be to secure men of achievement wherever found for the more important subjects of study and research, and that the state should offer them such reasonable terms as will be suitable in each

case. I have shown in the appropriate annexures that the report of the majority has failed to give full recognition to this obviously sound principle from fear of causing injury to the Indian educational service and the Indian medical service. While this apprehension of theirs is unfounded, their proposals show an inadequate appreciation of the real needs of general, professional and technical education in India at the present day.

*The standard of qualifications required.*

61. Dealing as we are with the higher branches of the public service it is not disputed that the standard of qualifications required should be fixed high. The present rule and practice in this respect are suitable and satisfactory except in the following respects. For judicial appointments now in the cadre of the Indian civil service the need for professional qualifications should be recognised as I have proposed; similarly for the professorial appointments in the education and medical departments, and for other specialist appointments, a distinctly higher grade of qualifications has become necessary. The evidence shows that the standard of qualifications for appointments made in India has gradually been raised, the degree of a university being mostly insisted on. The general standard has, however, been purposely lowered in some departments to suit domiciled European and Anglo-Indian candidates. This has been a source not only of great injustice to candidates of pure Asiatic descent but has often impaired the efficiency of administration, as is shown in the history of Indian finance and the customs. This should be avoided in future. It has not been possible for me to approve of the vague and uncertain attitude adopted by the majority of the Commissioners in their recommendations on this important point with respect to the provincial civil services (executive branch), the provincial police, the post office, and the salt and excise department. In paragraph 44 of the report after having recommended the degree of a university as a suitable test for Indian candidates they provide as an alternative for Anglo-Indian candidates an examination of a corresponding standard to be prescribed by Government for the European Schools. The European school course which mostly ends in Cambridge junior local and Cambridge senior local examinations or in the senior school certificate is ordinarily completed at or about the age of 18, while the degree of an Indian university cannot be attained earlier than 20. The comparative merits of the two standards are clear from the regulations of the Calcutta university, which in this respect are not likely to differ from those of the other universities. They lay down that candidates who have passed the Cambridge senior local examination will be considered to have passed the examination equivalent to the matriculation examination of the Calcutta university. Candidates who have passed the Cambridge senior local examination with honours or have pursued the further course of study for one year in a school recognised for the senior school certificate would be considered to have passed an examination equivalent to the intermediate examination of the Calcutta university. If it be borne in mind that it is only two years after the matriculation examination that an intermediate examination can be passed and after a course of another two years again that a candidate can sit for a degree examination of an Indian university, the disparity between the standard of a university degree and the highest examination possible for European schools becomes apparent. In paragraph 41 of the report emphasis is laid on the fact that Anglo-Indians have a special school course of their own and it is alleged that the curriculum differs materially from that followed in the ordinary schools, both as an argument against the establishment of competitive examination in India and also for not insisting on a university degree or its equivalent in the case of an Anglo-Indian candidate. I have not been able to find any weight in this argument. Anglo-Indian students are admitted into ordinary schools and colleges, though the door of the European schools—maintained, as they are, out of India's revenues to which Anglo-Indians contribute extremely little—is shut to Indian boys. There seems to be no difficulty for Anglo-Indian boys who aspire to Government service on finishing their school course, say at 18, to join a college affiliated to a university to complete their education as some of them now do. They might if they so wanted take Latin or a modern European language for the study of which proper provision is available in some college or other in the larger cities where Anglo-Indian population is mostly

centred. As regards the alleged difference in the curriculum no attempt was made through any expert witness to examine it with reference to the standard of ordinary schools and colleges, and so far as I have been personally able to make the comparison the chief point of difference is that in the European schools Latin and modern European languages like French take the place of Sanskrit, Arabic and Persian as optional subjects.

*Direct recruitment and promotion.*

62. In considering this subject the question of promotion from a lower appointment to a higher appointment should not be mixed up with the question of promotion from one service to another. For posts to which direct appointments are not made at all, such as the superior appointments in the civil service, the police, the public works, the railways (engineering), and telegraph (engineering), the question of promotion mainly consists in the elevation of an officer from an inferior to a superior appointment, whether the holder of the former class of appointments is entered in a provincial service or in an imperial service. The imperial service officers are *all* directly appointed in minor appointments, while of the holders of minor appointments in the provincial services the greater number are directly appointed, the rest being promoted from a subordinate appointment. In the above departments, therefore, the question under discussion must be understood with reference to the arrangement into services, while in the other departments, such as the education, civil medical, and agriculture, the question of direct appointment and promotion has reference mainly to the class of work to be performed. From any point of view, the general policy should be to establish direct recruitment as far as possible. Bearing this in mind, the concrete points on which I have disagreed with the majority relate to the post office and the telegraph (traffic) department. In these departments I have found in favour of giving much greater recognition to direct appointment than they are prepared to do. In fact, so far as telegraph (traffic) is concerned, they have practically approved of the effacement of direct recruitment.

*Scholarships.*

63. The question presents different aspects with respect to different services. So far as recruitment for the Indian civil service and the imperial police, for both of which the means of entry is by examination in London, a system of scholarship for those wanting to sit at the London examination would not be regarded as an adequate arrangement in the interests of India. The right policy to pursue is to look to India for recruitment to Indian public services generally, and to the extent and for the time that it is considered necessary to go to England, all that has to be insisted on is that the few Indians who offer themselves as candidates in England for those services which are recruited on the basis of general educational qualifications should have the same opportunity as other subjects of His Majesty. But for services requiring a scientific or technical qualification for which educational opportunities have not yet been fully developed in India, it is right and proper that while every step should be taken by the state without delay to develop the educational institutions, it is also necessary, till the institutions are in proper working order, that the state should subsidise selected Indian students desiring to proceed to England with a view to qualifying themselves for such appointments. It has to be made clear to the scholar, as a condition of such award, that he will be eligible for appointment only when he satisfies the authorities of the institution where he has studied that he has fully qualified himself, and if the committee of the India office charged with the duty of making selections for the department in question sees no sufficient reasons for rejecting him as not being up to the required standard. That some scholars will fail now and then to come up to the expectations formed and will have to be disappointed is not a good reason, as suggested in paragraph 35 of the majority report, for discarding a system which will clearly be of benefit to the general community, and has been recognised as sound in principle by almost every civilised state in similar circumstances.

How largely and with what entirely beneficial results the Government of India itself has utilised the system of subsidising the pursuit of particular branches of useful sciences and professions is perhaps best illustrated in the history of the growth of western medical science in India. If out of the applicants for such scholarships the most promising students are selected, the facts connected with the scholarships hitherto awarded by the state show that the disappointments will be few. I have proposed that scholarships be granted for the purpose of enabling Indians to qualify themselves for the agricultural, geological survey, civil veterinary and forest departments until it is found that India has become self-reliant in these matters. Unless this measure is adopted these departments will not for a long time to come be manned by Indians, as desired by the majority of the Commissioners, and their recommendations in this connection will largely remain empty of fulfilment, just as the wishes of the Secretary of State and the Government of India expressed at the time the departments were first founded have hitherto remained barren of result for want of practical and definite measures for carrying them out.

*Competitive examination as a means of recruitment.*

64. The practical question before us has been limited to how far the process of competitive examination, which has found so much recognition in England, should be extended to the recruitment of Indian services. It has not been claimed for the competitive system that it is anything like infallible in determining the respective merits of two candidates separated by a few marks. The distinctive feature which has established it most in popular favour is the decisive safeguard which it provides against the danger of partiality in the exercise of state patronage. Its other advantages are that it tends mechanically to maintain the highest standard of educational qualifications, provides a healthy impetus to schools and colleges, stimulates the habit of self-reliance in young men, and, what is also very important, it enables the state to ascertain from the response made from time to time to the demands of a particular class of public service, what change in the venue of recruitment or in the condition for service is called for. The system is also capable of being more easily adapted to the needs of a particular department of work than can be expected of an ordinary school or university examination. But what is of preponderating importance is that recourse to such a method of recruitment enables the Government to save itself from no inconsiderable odium which is inseparable from any form of nomination affecting the careers of a large body of young aspirants to public office, while it improves its chances of securing efficient candidates. I have been particularly impressed by the unanimous condemnation by Indian opinion of the system of pure nomination as it is now worked in the country. It will be an undoubted advantage to the Indian Government to substitute for it, as soon as possible the system of selection by properly constituted committees as recommended by the majority of the Commissioners. Indians should be adequately represented on such committees both in England and in India.

65. It is true that the competitive system has a certain tendency to encourage cramming, but the evidence of very competent authorities shows that a skilful examiner can effectively expose such a habit. There can also be little doubt that unless an examination is adapted to the subjects of study pursued at the educational institutions from which the candidates are drawn, it may prove a disturbing factor in the development of education in the country. But where an examination, such as that of the Indian civil service, is based on a group of optional subjects with a view to attracting students who have shown an aptitude in the different departments of study, the area of recruitment to which such an examination can be applied becomes wider. If the syllabus of the civil service examination be looked into, it will be seen that some of the important groups entirely fit in with the courses followed at the Indian universities. I have therefore come to the conclusion that so far as this aspect of the matter is concerned there is no objection to the holding of simultaneous examinations in England and in India for the Indian civil service.

66. Stress has also been laid on the fact that in the present circumstances of India, when the spread of education amongst the different communities and in different

provinces is uneven, drawback of the competitive system is that the successful candidates are likely to be drawn largely, if not entirely, from some particular classes and localities. The fact is not disputed, but it is important to appreciate its proper bearing on the question as it affects the different services. Generally speaking, the principle which has commended itself to me, and which is in accord with practically unanimous opinion of representative Indians of all communities and provinces, is that it is inadvisable as it is unsound and unnecessary to emphasise the question of communal or provincial representation in the superior services. The personnel required for these services must be possessed of the highest qualification available and any narrow contraction of the area of recruitment should be avoided.

67. There are services, however, for which a moderate standard of qualifications is all that is needed and in which the official's work brings him into close and direct relation with all sections of the people such as in the provincial civil service, the provincial police, the post office and salt and excise. So far as these are concerned, I agree with the majority that while insisting on adequate qualifications it is advisable both on political grounds and in the interests of the future growth of the communities less advanced in western education, that the doctrine of representation which has always been recognised by the Government should be affirmed. It must be pointed out that this present state of representation of communities on the public services leaves much to be desired. That the Anglo-Indians, with a total population of about 102,000, should hold 26 per cent. of the posts above Rs. 200 a month, while the Muhammadans, who count more than 66 millions (of whom  $2\frac{1}{2}$  millions are literate and 180,000 literate in English) should hold 13 per cent. of such appointments, and the Sikhs, whose population is 3 millions (of whom 201,000 are literate and about 12,000 literate in English), should hold 1 per cent. of these appointments, hardly needs comment. The number enjoyed by the Anglo-Indians is no less than half of that held by the Hindus, whose population is 219 millions (of whom 12 millions are literate and 1 million literate in English). From the point of view of proper representation of the communities, the Anglo-Indians appear to have obtained an enormous advantage which, from the facts elicited during the inquiry, cannot at all be attributed to superiority in qualifications; and it is here that there is much room for the authorities to apply the principle of holding the balance evenly between the communities.

68. It is at the same time both possible and desirable that in the locally recruited services a substantial recognition should be given wherever practicable to the general advantages of the system of competition. I have therefore proposed that half the vacancies in the provincial civil services should be filled by competition and the other half by selection. I am in agreement with the majority that examination should be maintained for the survey of India and the northern India salt revenue departments. I have further proposed that appointments in the survey (Madras) should also be made on the results of a competitive examination.

#### CHAPTER VI.—PROBATION AND TRAINING.

69. With reference to the question which is discussed in paragraphs 47–48 of the majority report, it is in my opinion unjustifiable to fix the period of probation—that is, the time that elapses between selection and definite appointment—with a view to enable the candidate to complete his general education. Selections ought to be made on the basis of the requisite standard of educational qualifications and the period that elapses before the selected candidate is definitely appointed as being fit to take up his official duties should be devoted to the necessary “special” training. For appointments such as those included in the Indian civil service for which the highest educational equipment of a liberal nature is admittedly required, it is undesirable that the candidates should be selected before their education has been completed and that the state should bear the expense and the risk of their finishing it after they have been practically enrolled in the service. The majority's recommendation for three years' probation for the Indian civil service recruits consequent upon their proposal

to reduce the age of the candidates from 22-24 to 17-19 is opposed to the true purpose of probation and contrary to well understood usage. The combined result of their proposals will be that for the most important administrative service of India young men of a distinctly incomplete type of western education, much the same as for the police and lower than that for the education, agriculture, geological survey, forest, medical and other like departments, will be enlisted in England, while the three years' probation will not help them to become either lawyers or oriental scholars, nor enable them to acquire familiarity with a single vernacular language to any greater extent than at present. If, as I have recommended, the present age be reduced by one year, that is to 21-23, which will still enable the graduates of the British universities to qualify for the civil service, a two years' probation in England may be devoted to special studies instead of one as at present. In the history of the civil service, or, I believe, of any other Indian service, a period of two years has been the highest limit of probation in England. It should be the aim by attaching somewhat greater importance to oriental subjects in the syllabus for the open examination to draw those young Englishmen for whom the "magic of the east" is not entirely computable in salaries and pensions, instead of attempting to achieve "a more pronounced orientation" during the period of probation. As for acquiring an Indian vernacular, it is best for all parties to recognise frankly from the lessons of prolonged experience the limits to which such acquisition can ordinarily be carried by an English official and also to rely for this purpose more on an Indian civilian's training in India during the first two years of his career. This also is practically an added period of probation though not so regarded with reference to salary, pension and other privileges of service.

70. If for the English recruits it is important that they should be initiated in the conditions of official work in India, it is equally desirable that the Indian recruits to the Indian civil service obtained in India should pass a probationary period in England. This has been provided by the majority of the Commissioners in the civil service annexure though with reference to a scheme different from mine for that service. For them the subject of special study should be not oriental classics or vernacular but economics, European history, constitutional law, the growth and working of municipalities, county councils and other similar institutions. Here it is my duty to draw attention to the evidence of educational authorities from Oxford, Cambridge and Edinburgh, from which it appears that Indian students generally are nowadays meeting with difficulties which they did not experience before. It is not necessary that the matter should be discussed here in detail, as I understand that the whole question is receiving serious consideration at the hands of the Secretary of State for India. All that I wish to express clearly is that in common fairness, so long as any source of recruitment of Indian officials exists in England, the English door must be open to Indians as well, not merely in theory to satisfy the letter of the statute, but effectively. And I could not reasonably have recommended, as in fact I have done, that for certain important Indian services recruitment in England should continue to a substantial extent if I did not feel convinced that the authorities here would be in a position to remove any special limitations that may have been imposed on the opportunity of Indian students to receive education and training in those centres of education which claim the privilege of catering for the Indian service and other services. The entire basis of recruitment in England for the Indian public services being that western education and training is best developed here, it cannot be either reasonable or just that Indian students should not have the fullest facilities for education in Great Britain. Besides it is a fundamental right of British citizenship that facilities for imbibing the culture which England offers should be fully available to Indians in the centre of the empire.

#### CHAPTER VII.—CONDITIONS OF SALARY.

71. The question of the suitability of the terms offered by the state to its employees is one of a complex character determined by a number of circumstances: the financial resources of the country, the nature and variety of demands made upon them, and

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the proper ratio which they should bear to one another, the character of work to be performed, the state of competition for the type of officers required, and the position they are expected to represent in the public life of the country. The value of these terms is to be appraised, not merely on the actual sums of money that go into the officer's pocket, but upon the aggregate of the provisions, arrangements and conditions relating to his employment as measured by their cost to the state. For instance, in India the following items have to be reckoned: (i) salary, (ii) allowances in addition to salary, (iii) frequency of leave, (iv) the amount of leave allowance, (v) passage and outfit money, (vi) the period of probation and training, (vii) payments during that period, (viii) the extra cost involved in paying a higher rate of salary while employed during the period of training on work which other officers paid on a lower scale ordinarily perform, (ix) rewards to an officer for certain examinations in order to fit himself for future work, (x) contribution by the state to family and other provident funds, (xi) free medical attendance, (xii) favourable rates of exchange, (xiii) exchange compensation allowance, (xiv) the age at which pension is earned, (xv) the amount of the pension. The cost under each item varies in different services; it is always much higher for officers recruited in England than those recruited in India, the highest point being reached in the Indian civil service.

72. The allowances mentioned as given in addition to the fixed pay of the post are :—

acting allowance,	conveyance allowance,	presidency allowance,
personal allowance,	town allowance,	frontier allowance,
special allowance,	house rent,	Sind allowance,
settlement allowance,	travelling allowance,	Baluchistan allowance,
charge allowance,	tentage allowance,	outpost allowance,
deputation allowance,	Burma allowance,	Pushtu allowance.
horse allowance,		

The amounts ordinarily range from Rs. 100 to Rs. 300—the acting allowances in the Indian civil service, however, may amount to more than the pay and sometimes come up to over Rs. 800 a month. These allowances do not enter into calculation in fixing the basis of the salaries and are not generally mentioned among the terms on which officers are recruited. We have not been furnished with the cost of them, but they cannot be inconsiderable, specially for the officers recruited in England.

73. The cost involved by leave is to be measured not merely by the allowances which the officer on leave receives, which ranges up to 800% per annum (1,000% in the case of the Indian civil service and military officers in civil employ), but also by the number of officers required to take their places, the necessary cost of transfers, &c. How expensive these leaves are, especially under the European service rules, may be judged from the fact that in the most highly paid service, the Indian civil service, the leave reserve is 40 per cent. of the superior appointments, that is for the work of five superior officers the state has to engage permanently two additional officers. Generally speaking after three years' continuous service an officer can take leave up to two years, and on medical certificate it may be extended to three years. The intermission of work during leaves is in addition to what is caused by the vacations and the numerous public holidays of the official Indian calendar. The different kinds of leave available are privilege leave, furlough, special leave, extraordinary leave without allowances, leave on medical certificate, study leave, and subsidiary leave.

74. Favourable rates of exchange are allowed for payments made in England from the Indian exchequer either on account of leave allowances, deputation allowances or pensions. These are rates above the market rate, for instance, one shilling and sixpence, one shilling and ninepence, while the normal rate is one shilling and fourpence. Exchange compensation allowance was first instituted to compensate English officers when there were violent fluctuations in the rate of exchange, but it is continued even now in favour of such officers after the rates have been regulated by the

Indian Government and practically fixed. In the services in which there has been a revision of pay the Secretary of State has generally ordered the merging of these allowances into pay.

75. In most superior services the period of probation is generally one or two years. The "period of training" during which an officer in the Indian civil service, Indian police and similar services is employed in work of minor importance generally performed by locally recruited officers of provincial services varies in different cases. In the Indian civil service this period is in theory eight years, and the work on which a civilian is then employed is the ordinary magisterial, revenue, and executive work, by far the greater part of which is done by the provincial service officers. The average pay of a provincial civil service officer is Rs. 440, while the average pay which the Indian civil servant, holding the same post, receives is about Rs. 700, the loss in excessive payment being Rs. 260 for every civilian officer during eight years. Officers thus "under training" form more than one-fourth of the entire civil service cadre whose total strength is 1,411. During the probationary period in England and for some portion of the training period in India—for an Indian civil servant the first two years—an officer is expected to pass certain examinations in the vernacular. In addition there are rewards offered, varying from Rs. 500 to Rs. 5,000 for various degrees of proficiency in the oriental languages.

76. *Age for pension.*—One very important item to be taken into account in calculating the cost is the age when an officer becomes entitled to retire on pension as it affects both the total of non-effective charges and the number of fresh recruits required. Take again the Indian civil service for illustration. Here an officer is entitled to retire after twenty-five years' gross and twenty-one years' active service; on the present age of recruitment he is then about 49 years old. If the age be reduced as proposed by the majority of the Commissioners to 17-19, he will be entitled to retire at the age of 46. This, for an officer whose services from the day of his landing in India as a young "unpassed assistant" are valued at Rs. 1,587 per mensem, equivalent to 1,270*l.* a year. In the public works an officer can retire at the age of 44, in the geological survey at the age of 46.

77. During his service an officer is entitled to medical attendance free of charge, and where there are family pension funds the state makes a certain contribution to insure the officers' wives and children against his premature death.

78. There is hardly a service which has not asked for increase of pay, higher pensions, more frequent furloughs, more allowances, shorter age for pensions, and so forth, some emphasizing their demands under certain heads more than the others. The general principles by which I have been guided in dealing with these questions are, first, that the case for an increase must be made out clearly; secondly, except where real hardship of a general applicability is shown arising from some unforeseen special circumstances, the desire of officers actually in service to secure for themselves better pay or pension than those which were in vogue when they joined cannot be allowed to affect the question. A contract entered into with the Government is not to be respected less than one with a private individual.

79. A number of considerations have entered into this part of our enquiry:—

(a) *The quality of recent recruits.*—If this is satisfactory it is a fair indication, though not quite conclusive, that the terms are suitable, and vice versâ. On this point, I have come to the conclusion that so far as officers recruited in England are concerned there has been a discernable falling off in the candidature for appointments in the Indian education and in the Indian medical services. For educational appointments the falling off is due largely to the fact that education as a career has been growing less popular with young Englishmen generally whether for England or outside. But so far as recruitment in England for this department is concerned, the aim should be to attract men who have established a reputation for original work on special terms which will necessarily be higher than the ordinary service pay. The unpopularity of the Indian medical service in the medical schools of Great Britain has been chiefly brought about by a set agitation started by some members

of the service who have taken upon themselves the responsibility of creating an impression in the minds of English students prejudicial to recruitment.\* Much of this impression is not in accordance with the real facts of the situation. As I have proposed the formation of a civil medical service to be composed mainly of civilian officers and that a certain proportion only of the superior appointments should be held by the reserve of the Indian medical service, the question whether that service should have a higher pay or not must, in my view, be left mainly to the military authorities to consider. As regards the appointments which are made in England in the other services, there has been no appreciable deterioration in the quality of recruits, who are of the type which India can reasonably expect to get ; and the findings in the majority report are not different, with reference to the Indian civil service,† the police,‡ the public works,§ forest and military finance departments. So far as they have suggested otherwise with respect to the agricultural, geological survey and civil veterinary departments, I have not been able to agree with them. With regard to the services recruited in India, the general position is that having regard to the paucity of careers open to educated young men, practically all the services into which we have inquired are able to draw a sufficiently well qualified class of candidates. As some of the witnesses expressed it before us, their case is one of Hobson's choice. The considerations that have weighed with me and also with the majority of the Commissioners in their case are of a different character and of serious importance.

80. (b) *Comparison with officers in another department of work.*—This can only be useful for ascertaining the pay sufficient to attract recruits of similar initial qualifications, and not to make it a ground for raising the pay of the lower paid department to the level of the higher paid department. For so far as the work and other conditions of the service are concerned, they must differ in different departments. The average pay of an Indian civil servant is Rs. 1,587 a month, and the average salaries of officers recruited on similar qualifications in the education, Indian finance, military finance and customs departments do not amount to Rs. 1,000 a month.

81. (c) *Comparison with officers in the same department of work but employed in a different province.*—Here again it seems to be unjustifiable to take the highest standard of pay in vogue in a particular presidency and raise up to that scale the pay of appointments in the others. This is specially wrong in the case of posts of supervision and control. The conditions of work vary so much in India, with the climate of a presidency, the characteristics of its population, the varieties of the spoken dialects, the means of communication, the competence of the provincial staff, the political condition of the people, the growth of public opinion and public spirit, the state of the laws and so on, that I have no hesitation in holding that the increases based on this ground in the Indian civil service, as proposed in the majority report, are wholly unjustifiable.

82. (d) *Recent revision of pay by the Government.*—This has taken place in most of the services recruited in England. This consideration has afforded a good ground for hesitating, except in a very clear case, to propose a further addition. But the absence of such revision does not necessarily mean, except perhaps in the case of the humbler services which are not represented at the headquarters, that a particular service has been overlooked. This must specially be borne in mind in the case of the Indian civil service which is constantly and most strongly represented on the Government of India.

83. (e) *Comparison with the prospects of officers employed in England and the British colonies.*—This of course is only relevant with respect to services recruited in England. The Indian civil service which is recruited on the same examination as the home civil service and the colonial civil service, is best compared with them. The data for a complete comparison are insufficient, but judging from the initial and the maximum salaries, it appears that the Indian civil service is by far the best off.

\* Volume XII., 58477, 58474, 58478, 58534, 58535.

† See Annexure X., paragraph 4.

‡ See Annexure XVI., paragraph 4.

§ See Annexure XVIII., paragraph 11.

## MINUTE BY MR. ABDUR RAHIM—(continued)—REPORT.

The pay of the other officers recruited in England also compares very favourably with that of officers of a similar class employed in the crown colonies.

	Initial salary per annum.	Maximum salary per annum.
Home civil service :—	£	£
Home office - - - - -	200	2,000
Foreign office - - - - -	200	2,000
Colonial civil service.—Ceylon - - - - -	300	2,000
Indian civil service :—		
Madras - - - - -	340	4,266 $\frac{2}{3}$
Bombay - - - - -	340	4,266 $\frac{2}{3}$
Bengal - - - - -	340	4,266 $\frac{2}{3}$
United Provinces - - - - -	340	6,666 $\frac{2}{3}$
Punjab - - - - -	340	6,666 $\frac{2}{3}$
Burma - - - - -	340	6,666 $\frac{2}{3}$
Bihar and Orissa - - - - -	340	6,666 $\frac{2}{3}$
Central Provinces - - - - -	340	4,133 $\frac{1}{3}$
Assam - - - - -	340	3,733 $\frac{1}{3}$

The average pay of 124 superior appointments above the ranks of collectors and district and senior judges is 2,900 $\frac{1}{2}$ .

INDIA.		CEYLON.	
Departments and appointments	Salary per annum.	Departments and appointments	Salary per annum.
<i>Custom department :—</i>	£	<i>Customs department :—</i>	£
Collectors - - -	1,640 rising to 2,000	Principal collector - -	1,050 rising to 1,200
<i>Public works department :—</i>		<i>Public works department :—</i>	
Chief engineer - -	2,000 rising to 2,200	Director - - -	1,250 rising to 1,400
Superintending engineer -	1,200 rising to 1,600	Deputy director - -	1,000
Executive engineer - -	304 rising to 1,000	Provincial engineer -	650 rising to 900
Assistant engineer - -		District engineer - -	300 rising to 600
<i>Survey department :—</i>		<i>Survey department :—</i>	
Surveyor general - -	2,550	Surveyor general - -	1,012 $\frac{1}{2}$
Superintendents, deputy superintendents and assistant superintendents	296 rising to 1,800	Deputy surveyor general -	850
		Superintendents - -	450 rising to 750
		Assistant superintendents	300 rising to 400
<i>Post office and telegraphs :—</i>		<i>Post office and telegraphs :—</i>	
Postmaster general -	1,000 rising to 2,000	Postmaster general and Director general of telegraphs.	1,050 rising to 1,200
<i>Education department :—</i>		<i>Education department :—</i>	
Director - - -	Ranging from 1,000 to 2,000.	Director - - -	1,050 rising to 1,200
Inspectors - - -	425 rising to 1,487 $\frac{1}{2}$	Inspectors - - -	200 rising to 600
<i>Department of agriculture :—</i>		<i>Department of agriculture :—</i>	
Director (I.C.S.) - -	Ranging between 1,275 and 2,125.	Director - - -	1,000
Officer agricultural dept.	320 rising to 800	Botanist and mycologist -	600 rising to 750
		Assistant botanist and mycologist.	300 rising to 500
<i>Forest department :—</i>		<i>Forest department :—</i>	
Conservator - - -	1,200 rising to 1,520	Conservator - - -	1,050 rising to 1,200
Deputy conservator -	304 rising to 1,000	Deputy conservator -	600 rising to 900
Assistant conservator -		Assistant conservator -	233 $\frac{1}{2}$ rising to 450

## MINUTE BY MR. ABDUR RAHIM—(continued)—REPORT.

INDIA.		CEYLON.	
Departments and appointments.	Salary per annum.	Departments and appointments.	Salary per annum.
	£		£
<i>Medical department :—</i>		<i>Medical department :—</i>	
Inspector general - -	Ranging between 1,700 and 2,125.	Inspector general - -	1,400
Civil surgeons - -	Ranging between 382½ and 1,232½	Provincial surgeons -	480 rising to 640
<i>Veterinary department ;—</i>		<i>Veterinary department :—</i>	
Officer, civil vety. dept. -	425 rising to 1,020	Vetertinary surgeon -	525
<i>Police department :—</i>		<i>Police department :—</i>	
Inspector general - -	Ranging between 1,600 to 2,400.	Inspector general - -	1,050 rising to 1,200
Deputy inspector general	1,200 rising to 1,440		

84. (f) *Cost of living.*—The result of the enquiry into prices in India shows that there has been an enormous rise within recent times in the prices notably of foodstuffs and also of other raw commodities, wages of servants and house-rents. This has admittedly affected the members of the poorly paid services more than those of the higher paid services. These items bear but a small proportion to the total expenditure of men of larger incomes than that of a man of smaller means, while in the consumption of articles of comfort and luxury, which to the greater extent are imported from Europe, and the expenditure on the various amenities of life the proportion is reversed in the two cases. Therefore in the case of higher paid appointments, in the services recruited in Europe or in the higher ranks of departments recruited in India, this consideration does not substantially affect the question. The evidence, however, has convinced me that the services recruited in India have indeed been hard hit. Signs of considerable stress are specially noticeable in the post office, provincial civil, education, medical, police, agricultural and civil veterinary services. The standard which I have had in contemplation for these officers is one which would suffice to keep an Indian of the middle classes in efficient mental and bodily condition, enable him to give his children a suitable education, and to meet those social and religious obligations which in the east still largely take the place of those amenities of life which among Europeans have come to be regarded as indispensable. Unless this standard—which again has to be adjusted to the requirements of particular departments having regard to the qualifications wanted, the conditions of service, the responsibility and prestige of the office and other similar considerations—is kept in view, there would be an appreciable danger of Government service suffering in reputation and esteem with the Indian public. From this standpoint I regard the general scale proposed by the majority of the Commissioners, viz., Rs. 250—40/3—450—50/3—500, with a number of selection posts appropriate to each department, as the minimum which should be granted to the lower branches of the appointments recruited in India, viz., post office, provincial civil, police, agricultural and civil veterinary services. Under this scale an officer will begin on about 200l. a year after the probationary period and reach 400l. a year after 18 years. I also think that the scale of Rs. 300—50/2—500—50—1,050 for the higher branches of the public service to be recruited in India with a suitable number of selection posts for the Indian finance and similar departments as proposed in the majority report is generally appropriate. This will enable an officer requiring high educational, scientific and technical qualifications to attain a salary of Rs. 500 per mensem after eight years' service, and the maximum after eighteen years.

85. (g) *Comparison with locally-recruited officers engaged in the same duties.*—This raises the question of the desirability of giving the same rate of pay to all employees of the Government doing the same work, which has been the subject of acute controversy. From the point of view of individual officers recruited in India, the obvious justice of giving them equal terms along with their other colleagues

cannot be denied. But that standpoint has to be subordinated to some extent in an adjustment of the official personnel of the country founded on a broad conception of the national aims and interests. The conclusions which I have arrived at will be most conveniently stated with reference to the division of appointments into those to which direct appointments are made, and appointments which are filled by the promotion of officers from a lower sphere of duty.

86. As incidental to my scheme for the appointment of direct recruits to the higher class of services in my second group (agricultural, civil veterinary, customs, education, forest, and geological survey departments) for which recruitment in Europe wherever retained for the present must be regarded as temporary, the scale of pay should, as suggested in the majority report, be on a purely Indian basis sufficient to attract Indian candidates of the required qualifications. For officers who will be appointed in the meantime from England, an adequate scale of allowances should be provided in addition to the proposed salaries.

87. In the first group of services, the civil services and the police, where direct appointments are made solely to the "minor" charges both in England and in India, the disparity between the pay of officers recruited in Europe and in India is much greater in the civil services than in the police. In both the departments the officers nominated in either England or in India are obtained on undifferentiated qualifications. In the police the English recruits are enlisted at the end of their school course, while the direct Indian recruits are largely drawn from among the graduates of an Indian university. In the civil services both the English and the Indian recruits are mostly graduates of their respective universities, but the standard of the former's educational qualification is generally higher by reason of their being selected on the result of a difficult competitive test. The remarkable difference in the salaries of the two classes of officers holding the lower appointments in the civil services is due first to the fact that the salaries of the civil servants recruited in England were originally based on a scale which would approximately correspond to the earnings of the agents and factors of the East India Company, while the low scale of pay for the locally-recruited officers of the civil services is accounted for by the fact that the supply of ordinary Indian graduates is in excess of the demand. The large cost which any proposal to bring the salaries of officers of this class to a reasonable proximity to those drawn by their English colleagues would make such attempt impracticable.

88. For the higher posts to which no direct appointments are made but which are filled by promotion, the doctrine of equal pay should be enforced. The majority of the Commissioners agree to this for what are technically called the administrative grades and selection posts, but not for what are called the executive or district charges which are just below the administrative grades. In the police equal pay is conceded for executive charges by the majority of the Commissioners, so the difference of opinion between them and myself relates mainly to the case of officers promoted from the provincial civil service to district and sessions judgeships and district collectorships or to posts of equivalent rank in the civil services, to executive engineers in the public works and railway (engineering) departments, and to deputy superintendents in the survey of India department promoted from the ranks of locally-recruited assistants. I have been convinced that while considerations of economic necessity may justify the Government in resisting the full demand for equality of pay, human nature being as it is, the officers recruited in India will always feel the inequality of treatment when they are given less pay than those recruited in England. The utmost limits to which such differentiation can be carried without substantially impairing the efficiency of the public services should not go beyond the ranks of the grades of first appointment. The evidence amply shows that the feeling engendered by the differentiation in the higher ranks of the service is so tense that it should no longer be permitted to embarrass the administration. The expediency of this reform is perhaps even more cogent in the case of locally recruited collectors and district and sessions judges than similar officers in the public works and survey of India departments. The collector is the executive head of the district and as such an administrative officer of a high rank, in fact his importance in the administrative machinery of India is hardly equalled; the district and sessions judge exercises unlimited jurisdiction both in civil and criminal matters. A differential

treatment in the case of such officers is administratively indefensible. It may be true that when a locally recruited officer is promoted from a minor appointment to one of these posts the rise in his emoluments is rather abrupt, but it will be remembered that he will have been selected on his merits from among a large number of officers after a full trial in responsible work. Further, his increase of salary will usually be less abrupt than that of several locally recruited district and sessions judges who have been elevated to the high court. In such cases the principle should be that as the officer selected has deserved his promotion the salary suitable to the post should not be grudged to him.

89. The majority of the Commissioners have no doubt proposed a substantial improvement in their pay, and so far as the present incumbents or their immediate successors are concerned the improvement will be duly appreciated, but the pinch of the differentiation will soon be felt again and it is undoubtedly an advantage to adopt the obvious remedy which alone will meet the evil. In paragraph 55 of the majority report an estimate of the cost of giving equal pay to all alike is given as amounting to Rs. 22,00,000 or more a year, but that must be taken to refer to a scheme for giving equal pay throughout. Under their scheme the difference in the cost of giving equal pay to the officers whom I have specified will be only Rs. 7,65,000.

90. Among officers recruited in England any differentiation in pay between Indians and others would be regarded as based solely on grounds of nationality. No such distinction has yet been made, and its adoption as a principle, as has been suggested by some, will, I feel sure, be politically inexpedient in its results. It will be regarded as a retrograde measure carrying the stamp of a lower status, which even the Commission of 1886-87 did not think to be fair or feasible. There should be no new departure in this respect, the salaries therefore should, as hitherto, be the same for all officers appointed in England without regard to their "descent" or "place of origin."

#### CHAPTER VIII.—CONDITIONS OF SERVICE.

91. Under this heading the following subjects have been considered in the majority report:—

- (i) strength of the cadre of the services and the calculations for recruitment ;
- (ii) travelling allowances, allowances on transfer, house accommodation, local allowances and passage allowances ;
- (iii) compulsory retirement of inefficient officers, and
- (iv) the age for superannuation.

With reference to (ii), (iii) and (iv), I have no particular observations to offer upon the general proposals made. The first question, that is the one relating to the appropriate strength of the cadres, is, however, of great practical significance, and also raises important points of principle. While saying in paragraph 61 that it did not fall within their province to make a definite recommendation for increasing the staff of any particular department, the majority of the Commissioners have at the same time distinctly suggested that in some of the departments they have found signs of overstrain on the present staffs. In the annexures, especially of the civil services, the police, agricultural and educational departments, the suggestion has assumed the form of emphatic recommendations, though necessarily made in general terms. Except for certain vague and wide statements on the part of a few officials, particularly in the departments for which appointments are made in England, there is not a shred of evidence which would justify us in giving the lead to the authorities to increase the number of officers. In order to appraise the truth of any alleged overstrain, and before suggesting an increase in the number of officers to be employed, one would have liked to know whether officers have to work systematically beyond the normal hours, and if so, whether it is due to the fault of procedure capable of being remedied or to deficiency in the staff, whether such deficiency, if it exists, is in the higher ranks or the lower ranks, and many other such factors. It must be borne in mind that the addition of a single post means an increase of recurring expenditure, which would be considerable in the case of posts filled by officers appointed in England.

92. I wish especially to record my emphatic dissent from the general observations which the majority of the Commissioners have thought fit to make in paragraph 39 of their civil service annexure and paragraph 10 of the police department annexure, showing the desirability of partitioning districts or otherwise adding to the number of district civil service and police officers. These questions have raised keen controversy in India, and well they might—considering their effect on the financial resources of the country and the alterations in the administrative arrangements which they must produce, entailing considerable pecuniary loss to many people and a disturbance of their occupations, social habits and customs. As regards arguments based on the area and population of a district, it must be remembered that, in the civil administration or in the police, the chief function of a district officer consists in supervising the work of his assistants and subordinates, and in proportion as the subordinate agency has improved in efficiency there should be less and not more need for supervision. That there has been a great improvement in their efficiency since 1886-87 does not admit of denial. The Aitchison Commission was in a position to recommend even at that date that recruitment in Europe for the Indian civil service, which then amounted to 1,003 officers, should be substantially curtailed so that the members might be reduced to a *corps d'elite*, and it appears to me almost incredible that now, when the number has been gradually and steadily swelled to 1,300 odd, there should still be a cry for more and more. My recommendation is that there should be no further addition to the Indian civil service or the Imperial police force. If the work of the administration requires more officers they should be obtained entirely in the country.

93. *Rules for regulating recruitment.*—The principles upon which recruitment is made in England for the Indian civil service and the police and the public works departments are that the officers are required and expected to fill the “superior” posts after a certain number of years’ training or experience in “inferior” appointments. It is also arranged in most services that for filling temporary vacancies caused by the permanent incumbents proceeding on leave or being placed on deputation for special work, there should be a reserve of officers. Hence to the number required for filling the superior posts is added the number required for the leave and deputation reserves, and, in the more important services, also training reserves. The rate of decrement through retirement or death has been ascertained for a number of years for some of the services, and in its light the proper proportions between the substantive posts and the reserves, and the annual rate of recruitment are ascertained. For the Indian civil service the reserve for one hundred superior posts has been laid down at 94·5; thus for one hundred required superior officers a strength of 194·5 is maintained, and an annual recruitment of 4·17 has been laid down. Similar calculations have been made for the police service recruited in Europe and a tendency to introduce this method of calculation is apparent also in other departments. That the Indian civil service and the police service should be recruited in England on the basis of the superior appointments alone is admitted. But there has been much laxity in defining a superior post resulting in considerable increase of unnecessary cost, in blocks of promotion and in an encroachment on the province of officers recruited in India. The 4·17 per cent. as the annual rate of recruitment in the Indian civil and in the imperial police services is apparently too high.

94. But the most important point is that the definition of a superior appointment in the civil service should be modified as I have suggested in its annexure so that it should include only such appointments as are the objective of every civil service officer, the lowest being a collectorship or an office of similar independent responsibility and control. It must be one from which the bulk of the officers are expected to retire. The result of so altering the definition will be that about 83 appointments will be classed as inferior instead of superior, with the effect that for so many appointments there need not be any training and deputation reserves and a much smaller leave reserve. A corresponding number of minor appointments so set free could well be merged in the provincial civil services. The saving in cost will be about 12 lacs of rupees per annum.

95. I have agreed with the majority that the annual rate of recruitment should be recalculated. The evidence clearly shows that it is to over-recruitment that blocks in promotion are mostly due; and these have often to be redressed by

the grant of allowances. But what is still more serious is that they have a tendency to originate pressure for the creation of more highly paid appointments.

96. In this connection I would further recommend with regard to the leave reserves for the services recruited in England, that the reserve necessary for filling short vacancies of seven months or less should be placed in the cadre of the locally recruited service. This matter has both an economic and administrative aspect. If the principle of appointing a locally recruited senior officer on the spot to officiate in short vacancies as collectors and district judges in preference to a junior civil servant available in the district, as laid down by the Government of India after mature and prolonged consideration, be recognised in similar departments such as the police and further extended within reasonable limits, it will not only save considerable administrative dislocation, but to some extent reduce expensive reserves. Such a measure will also have an appreciable effect in improving the efficiency and outlook of provincial officers.

97. *Confidential reports.*—There is one matter of considerable importance to the provincial service officers, specially in the civil service and the police and the public works departments, which appears to have been overlooked in the majority report, viz., the system of confidential reports of which loud and repeated complaints were made to us during enquiry. The substance of the complaint is that the career of these officers is often prejudicially affected by such reports without their being given a chance of knowing what is alleged against them, except in the rare cases when a more or less formal charge of official misconduct entailing immediate punishment is formulated. This, of course, is a subject on which it is not possible to suggest any hard-and-fast rule; but the existence of such widespread feeling shows that the matter is serious enough to deserve the attention of the Government. It should not be forgotten that the officers affected are men entrusted with highly responsible duties, and nothing can be more injurious to the public service than a feeling that they are not dealt with in a fair and square manner. *Primâ facie*, the system of confidential reports is, in the hands of some superior officers, carried too far; and much undeserved suspicion would be saved if it could be done away with or substantially modified.

#### CHAPTER IX.—CONDITIONS OF LEAVE.

98. The most important proposal on this subject is that contained in paragraph 80 of the majority report, to the effect that officers governed by the European service leave rules should be permitted to commute furlough up to two years in all into leave on full pay, but not for more than six months at a time. In this matter I entirely sympathise with the attitude of the Government of India which, before agreeing to the demand, insisted on the condition that such commutation should not involve any extra expenditure by leading to an increase in the leave reserve, and that there should be no modification in the system by which officers receive officiating allowances when their seniors are on leave. As regards the leave reserve, in the Indian civil service for example, it already amounts to 40 per cent. of the superior posts, and any suggestion which might have the effect of increasing it still more would hardly seem to me a serious proposition. The officiating allowances are paid on the basis that the officer on furlough draws less than his full pay, the difference being made available for extra remuneration to the junior officer. If, however, the senior on furlough received full pay as proposed, it would be an additional expense to the state to pay to his successor an officiating allowance. The majority of the Commissioners, while recommending commutation of furlough for officers under the European service leave rules, would not extend the privilege to those governed by the Indian service leave rules, apparently because they are not under the necessity of coming to Europe. But there is another aspect to this: the evidence has clearly revealed the fact that provincial service officers very seldom take furlough, and it is well known that they grievously suffer in health through overwork and want of rest. This is, undoubtedly, because of the inadequacy of their furlough allowances, for these cannot exceed half their pay, which is pitched on a much lower scale than that of the appointments governed by the European service rules. Perhaps, in their case, commutation up to three months would be sufficient and it would probably not cost much. But on the whole I am not prepared to make a definite recommendation to

that effect. Liberal provision should be made for study leave to officers recruited in India for the education and similar departments.

99. I am satisfied that the permission to accumulate privilege leave up to four months, as recommended in the majority report, and the privilege of combining privilege leave with furlough, and the simplification of the leave rules generally, as drafted by the Government of India, will amount to a very substantial concession to officers coming under European service as well as the Indian service leave rules.

100. As regards the adjustment of the ratio between the sterling and the rupee payment of the furlough allowances recorded in paragraph 81 of the majority report, I see the logic in the basis on which it is placed. But in the absence of any estimate I am unable to express any definite opinion.

#### CHAPTER X.—PENSIONS.

101. *Pensions and annuities.*—The general rule which regulates the amount of pension is that an officer after so many years' service is entitled to so many sixtieths of the average pay which he has been drawing during the last three years, not exceeding  $\frac{30}{60}$ ths, or one half, but subject to a certain maximum limit. A maximum limit had to be laid down, otherwise the pension in the case of incumbents of certain highly paid classes of posts would have been extravagant from the point of view of the state. In making an estimate of what is adequate to maintain a retired officer in that degree of comfort and ease which is normally prevalent in the class to which he belongs, the standard must necessarily be sought in the country of the officer's birth and retirement. Considerations arising from the official position held in India, and the necessity for maintaining a certain approximation to that position does not complicate the question in their case; while the significance of the fact that they drew larger salaries in India than the officials here or in the colonies of corresponding qualifications, and engaged in similar duties, would only show that they had a wider margin left to save upon. In judging of the appropriateness of the amount of a pension or retiring annuity, a most important point for consideration is the age at which it is earned. An Indian civil servant is entitled to retire on an annuity of 1,000*l.* a year after a service of twenty-five years, of which amount 250*l.* is contributed by himself, while a home civil servant cannot retire at that age unless invalided. If he is invalided at that age he gets a pension of less than 500*l.* a year, taking into account any bonus that is due. Officers belonging to the Indian civil service have also the advantage of a family pension fund.

102. *Civil service annuities.*—The estimate given in chapter XI. of the majority report of the cost of the proposals under the head of pensions does not take into account the effect of their recommendation to abolish the 4 per cent. contribution which members of the Indian civil service have to make out of their salaries to earn the annuity of 1,000*l.* a year after 25 years' gross service and 21 years' active service. This is dealt with in annexure X. apparently because it is capable of being technically distinguished from ordinary superannuation pension, but I have not followed this arrangement as it has the disadvantage of entailing a partial presentation of the effect of the recommendations on the subject. Under the present age of recruitment a civil servant becomes entitled to this annuity at the age of about 50, while the age for superannuation in India is 55 years.

103. The 4 per cent. contribution accounts for about 250*l.* a year only of the total annuity of 1,000*l.*, the remaining 750*l.* being contributed by the Indian exchequer. Every member of the service is entitled to this amount and no more, whatever the nature of the appointment which he held when he completed his 25 years' service. The history of the annuity system shows that it was mainly because of its effect in facilitating the retirement of senior officers, and thus securing a large flow of promotion that the system has been retained in this service and is still so popular. The majority of the Commissioners have suggested the broad lines of a scheme of superannuation pension for the Indian civil service by which its members without any contribution would be able to earn a pension of 1,000*l.* a year, and a number of them who would reach the administrative rank might obtain even more. They think

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that the scheme will be entirely in the interests of the service, and I have no doubt that they would not have suggested it if it was not. But as its members during our inquiry expressed their partiality for the annuity system, the report of the majority is satisfied with definitely recommending that the 4 per cent. contribution to the annuity be abolished, the state bearing the entire cost of 1,000*l.* a year. This entails an extra cost to the state of no less than 9 lacs a year, and the equivalent gain to the members of the Indian civil service.

104. The only ground apparently for the concession, as it is called, is that it is demanded by the members of the service. I do not consider the demand to be reasonable, having regard to the large salaries which they are given while on active service, the age at which the officers become entitled to the annuity, and consequently the length of time during which they are likely to enjoy it, and the fact that the state has already been paying 250*l.* more than what was originally fixed as the limit of payment by the state. When the system of 4 per cent. annuity deductions was first introduced it was contemplated that the contribution by the officers would provide an annuity of 500*l.* and thus secure to them a total amount of 1,000*l.* per annum, including the Government pension. But with the fall in the rate of exchange and in the rate of interest the 4 per cent. contribution by the officers is now equivalent to an annuity of 250*l.*, so that the state is at present paying the deficit of 250*l.* per annum in addition to the 500*l.* which it had originally undertaken to pay. I think, therefore, that the Indian exchequer should not be asked to pay for more than 750*l.* a year of the annuity. If it be remembered that every one of the 1,350 members of the Indian civil service is entitled to the annuity at the end of 25 years' service, this service would seem to be as much better off in this respect than officers of a similar class in Great Britain or the colonies as in the salaries which they receive. It should also be remembered that the state contributes substantially to the Indian civil service family pension fund the terms of which (*see* paragraph 49 of the majority report) seem to make liberal provisions for the widows and children of the members. The Secretary of State has recently decided to assume responsibility for all charges incidental to the management of the fund, and these are estimated at 41,000*l.*, or more than Rs. 6,00,000 a year.

105. Except in the Indian civil service and the Indian medical service where annuities or pensions are reckoned in sterling, the other retiring or superannuation allowances are fixed in rupees, and are converted into sterling for those who draw them in a gold-using country at what are called favourable rates of exchange. The prevalent rupee rate reckoned by the Government of India is 1*s.* 4*d.*; for the payment of pensions to retired officers in England it is reckoned at 1*s.* 9*d.* a rupee. I take no objection to this differentiation having regard to the difference in the cost of living in India and in England which is still appreciable, though the extent of it has substantially diminished within late years. It should be mentioned that the present rupee maximum of Rs. 5,000 a year is only attained by officers filling the higher appointments to which are attached salaries of Rs. 833½ a month or more, and fall to the lot of few Indian officers at present. If reference be made to the third table in paragraph 4 of the majority report, and if it is also borne in mind that the calculations are made on the average pay for the last three years, out of a total of 2,259 officers, most of whom would be presumed to draw a pension of at least Rs. 4,800 a year at the rate of thirty-sixtieths of their pay, hardly 242 Indian officers would draw that pension, and still fewer would draw Rs. 5,000 a year. Of the Indian officers who receive a salary of Rs. 800 a month, a fair proportion do not enjoy that salary for three years.

106. I think that there is a good case made out for increasing the maximum limits of pensions, but in my opinion Rs. 5,500, instead of Rs. 6,000, proposed in the majority report, would be adequate. This will involve an extra cost of about 4½ lacs, instead of 9½, the cost of the majority's proposals. This estimate does not, however, include the increase proposed in the amount of special pensions, which now represent Rs. 1,000 or 87*l.* 10*s.* a year in addition to the ordinary maximum of Rs. 5,000, or 437*l.* 10*s.* a year. These are now given to heads of certain special departments, and to other officers of corresponding rank. Their number is not given, but will probably come to about 150, and under the majority report about 150 or more officers would be added to the list of those entitled to draw additional pension up to 131*l.* 5*s.* a

year, the extra cost of which is estimated at  $2\frac{3}{4}$  lacs a year. I have failed to see any justification for this increase in the amount of special pensions, or for the addition to the list of officers entitled to it.

107. At present many services have no family pension fund. Such funds should be organised and placed on a self-supporting basis.

## PART II.—ANNEXURES.

### ANNEXURE I.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES.

108. *The constitution of the civil service of India and the duties attached to them.*—It is necessary in order to understand the discussion relating to the civil services of India that one should realise their constitution and the general nature of the duties which devolve on the officers holding different classes of appointments. Both in the Indian civil service, which is recruited in England, and the provincial civil services which are recruited in India, there are two distinct groups of appointments, (i) executive and magisterial, and (ii) judships.

109. In the first group the lowest class of appointments falling within the zone of our inquiry is that to which all officers of the Indian civil service, and the bulk of those of the locally recruited provincial executive service, are first appointed, numbering in all 2,183 of which 656 are placed in the Indian civil service and 1,527 are placed in the provincial (executive) civil services. Officers holding these appointments if members of the Indian civil service are called assistant magistrates, assistant collectors, assistant magistrates and collectors, joint-magistrates and collectors, sub-collectors, junior collectors and assistant commissioners, and if they are members of the provincial (executive) civil service, they are called deputy magistrates, deputy collectors, deputy magistrates and collectors and extra assistant commissioners. In the Indian civil service these appointments are regarded as "minor" or "inferior" charges and technically treated as "training" reserves, because their holders are all permanently promoted after thirteen years' service to higher appointments which in this relation are called "superior" appointments or "major" charges. But appointments of the lower category are the normal sphere of the provincial service officers.

110. The main duties attached to the lower appointments are the assessment and collection of land and other revenues, the charge of the district treasury, general executive duties connected with the police, local boards administration, &c., and magisterial work. Often an officer is employed both in magisterial work and in the revenue and general executive work, and sometimes only in magisterial work, and he is always liable to be shifted from one kind of work to the other. These officers in a district are placed under one chief called the district magistrate or collector, the head of the executive administration of the district. One of the questions which have been raised before us, namely, that of the separation of the executive and the judicial functions, mainly refers to the propriety of mixing up magisterial duties with ordinary executive work and of placing magistrates under the control of the district magistrate who, as the executive head, is the officer responsible for the executive administration and the peace of the district. The members of the provincial services and the junior members of the Indian civil service are employed in the headquarters as well as in the interior in a sub-division, which is a smaller unit of the district. As sub-divisional officers they have control of members of the subordinate civil service and other officers placed under them, and exercise, within that area, functions similar to those of the collector, but under his control.

111. On the executive side there are altogether 537 superior appointments, of which 509 are reserved for members of the Indian civil service, the remaining 28 being "listed" as open to members of the provincial (executive) civil service and are held by them. Collectorships of districts form the bulk of the superior appointments. Above collectors are commissioners of divisions, members of boards of revenue, chief commissioners of provinces like Assam and the Central Provinces, members of the executive councils of the viceroy, lieutenant-governors of the United Provinces, the Punjab, Burma, Bihar and Orissa, and members of the executive councils of the governors of Madras, Bombay, Bengal and of the lieutenant-governor of Bihar and Orissa. Then there are the secretaries to Governments and boards.

112. Collectorships are filled by promotion from among the incumbents of inferior appointments. As the chief executive officer the collector's main duty is to supervise the general executive administration, he looks after the work of the police officers of his district, the working of the municipalities, district boards, the forest department and so on. He is not only a magistrate himself, but has entire administrative control over other magistrates of the district. The actual work of general administration is performed under his control by members of the provincial civil service and the junior members of the Indian civil service. Superior appointments above the collectors are filled by promotion from among the collectors, and so on in gradation. The commissioner of a division supervises the administration of several districts, and the board of revenue is the final arbiter in all revenue matters. The members of the executive councils of the viceroy and of the governors are legislators and high political officers, dividing with the viceroy and the governors the responsibility of the supreme and the local Governments.

113. In the second group there are three grades of judges, excluding the judges of the high courts. The lowest in rank are the munsiffs (called subordinate judges, second class, in Bombay); above them are the subordinate judges. They are members of the judicial branches of the provincial civil services, whose total cadre is 1,045. Above both are the district and sessions judges, numbering about 146. All munsiffs are recruited for in the country in the provincial judicial services from the junior ranks of the legal profession. The senior munsiffs are promoted to subordinate judgeships. Of the district and sessions judgeships 113 are held by Members of the Indian civil service, and about 33 are held by members of the provincial judicial services. Members of the Indian civil service are promoted to district and sessions judgeships on the strength of the same training as that of their colleagues who become collectors on the executive side, namely, in revenue, magisterial, and executive work.

114. A munsiff's jurisdiction is limited to suits of a certain pecuniary value, varying, generally speaking, from Rs. 1,000 to Rs. 2,000 (*i.e.*, 67*l.* to 133*l.*), but otherwise he tries practically all kinds of civil actions. A subordinate judge's jurisdiction is unlimited, and he also hears and disposes of appeals from certain classes of decrees passed by the munsiffs. It is after long experience as a munsiff that an officer reaches the rank of a subordinate judge. The great bulk of civil litigation is disposed of by these judges. The district and sessions judge's original jurisdiction is unlimited both in civil and criminal actions. Appeals from the judgments of subordinate judges in suits up to certain pecuniary limits lie to him, he is further vested with jurisdiction in probate, administration, insolvency, and divorce proceedings. On the criminal side, he holds sessions trials, either with juries or assessors, and is empowered to pass the sentence of death subject to confirmation by the high court. He also hears appeals from the sentences of magistrates. He has administrative control over the establishments of the munsiffs and subordinate judges.

115. *The Statutes relating to the Indian civil service.*—There are several statutes which apply to appointments in the civil service. It is principally by the Government of India act of 1858 and the India civil service act of 1861, redolent of the days of monopoly, that the higher appointments in civil administration are reserved for the Indian civil service. The act of 1870 was passed to empower the Government of India to make appointments to any of the posts contained in the schedule to the statute of 1861, and it is by the exercise of this power that Indians were appointed in India under the rules of 1879, and the recommendations of the Commission of 1886–87 were given effect to. It has been doubted whether, taking the provisions of the statutes together, the officers who are appointed in India or those who have not been admitted into the Indian civil service by an examination conducted by the civil service commissioners could be placed in the same "service." It is desirable that there should be no doubt on the point that officers employed on the same duties should have the same status. Otherwise the proposals regarding this service, specially those relating to appointments to be made from the bar and the provincial civil services, or through "the King-Emperor's cadets" would again be open to some of the objections now urged against the

“listed” posts. I have been unable to agree with the majority that the appointments in the non-regulation provinces which are not at present governed by the statute of 1861 should be brought within it. In my opinion this would be a retrograde measure. I do not see why the suggested policy of “protection” is necessary at the present day for this class of appointments. On the other hand, the policy ought to be to retain a free hand for the authorities, and my recommendation is that the statutes should be revised with that object in view and opportunity be taken to remove all traces of monopoly.

116. *The recruitment of judges from the Indian civil service should be materially curtailed and then gradually abandoned.*—The removal of judicial appointments from the cadre of the Indian civil service is now overdue and should be fully recognised. The old conditions under which that service was drawn upon for filling a number of judicial appointments has long been obsolete. The object of employing such officers was primarily to help in placing the organisation of judicial administration in India on a systematic basis, the actual work of administering the laws being left at first entirely in the hands of Indian judges and lawyers trained in the Muhammadan and Hindu systems. The law of the land was then largely derived from the Muhammadan code and was partly based on the Hindu shastras and customs. When English was introduced as the language of the courts, and the class of Indian lawyers capable of conducting business through its medium began to grow, and as side by side with it the principles of English equity and common law became more and more established by the rulings of the judicial committee of the privy council and by the enactments of the legislature, the sphere of the Muhammadan and Hindu lawyers was narrowed and the employment of qazis, muftis, moulvis and pundits gradually ceased. The Indian judges who came in under the new system were naturally at a disadvantage for some time in having to transact business in a foreign language and in mastering the principles of foreign jurisprudence; and thus the Indian civil service district and sessions judges who have always been highly educated men, though not trained lawyers, played a very useful part: on the one hand in interpreting in the provinces the Indian acts and the rules of English equity and common law as laid down by the high court and the privy council, and on the other hand by helping in spreading a knowledge of the customs, habits and usages of the people. It was, therefore, thought necessary when the sudder courts and the superior courts were merged into high courts that there should be some judges drawn from officers of the Indian civil service who had acted as district and sessions judges. But the situation has radically changed. The profession of law has steadily and rapidly grown both in numbers and efficiency all over India not only in the presidency towns but also in the provinces. In the larger provinces—Madras, Bengal and Bombay—the indigenous element of the profession has become so strong that the predominance of English barristers, who until recently led the bar, has entirely disappeared from the first two provinces and is on the point of disappearing from the other. The keen competition that now exists in the profession has had its natural effect in enhancing the average standard of efficiency; while the leaders of the Indian bar to-day would stand comparison in learning and ability with their confrères in other countries. That the higher branches of the profession consisting of the barristers, the vakils of the high courts and chief courts, advocates and pleaders to-day offer a very ample field for recruitment of the judiciary in India does not admit of any real doubt. This fact is now receiving proper recognition so far as the highest tribunals, viz., the high courts, are concerned, where senior barristers and pleaders are being appointed in increasing numbers, and it might be presumed that their services would have been still more largely utilised, but for the statute which requires that one-third at least of the number of judges of the high courts must be members of the Indian civil service. The junior members of the profession have always been employed in the provincial judicial services and try the great bulk of the suits in the district. The reputation won by Indian judges of all grades recruited from the profession is high and has not been questioned before us. On the other hand, the constitution of the Indian civil service and the conditions of its recruitment are such that it has not afforded sufficient opportunity to its members to keep pace with the vast development of the Anglo-Indian legal system or with the growth of specialised knowledge and aptitude in the profession which has taken place within the last 30 years.

117. Not the least of the objections to the method of filling district and sessions judgeships from the Indian civil service is the cost of the training which it involves. A civil servant will have for at least eight years to do the work of a less important appointment either as a magistrate and executive officer as at present, or as a munsiff and a subordinate judge. The average pay of provincial service officers who fill the great bulk of magisterial and executive appointments of the same class is Rs. 434 a month, and the munsiff's and subordinate judge's average pay is Rs. 424, while the average pay of the Indian civil servant holding a similar appointment is Rs. 862 a month, including acting allowances. There are at present 153 Indian civil service judicial posts, and the total cost of the minor appointments which have to be reserved for their training is about 8 lacs, and the difference in cost in filling these minor appointments by Indian civil servants and by provincial service officers is about 4 lacs a year. So much additional expenditure would only be justified by a clear and substantial gain in efficiency; far from that, the Indian civil service organisation is ill-suited for recruitment of the judiciary.

118. The defects of the Indian civil service system in ensuring the qualification needed for judges have long agitated the minds of the Indian authorities and have been growing more and more manifest with time, until after an active correspondence which went on between the Government of India and the Secretary of State from 1903 to 1907 the Government of India (Lord Minto, Lord Kitchener, H. Earle Richards, law member, E. N. Baker, of the Indian civil service, C. H. Scott, military member, and J. F. Finlay, of the Indian civil service; J. O. Miller, of the Indian civil service, and H. Adamson, of the Indian civil service dissentients) recorded its opinion of the situation in these emphatic terms:—"It would be difficult to exaggerate the political dangers of the present situation or the importance of effecting a material improvement in the capacity, training and status of the Indian civil service judges. It is impossible at any rate in the advanced provinces to justify a system under which a gentleman who has no knowledge of civil law and who has never been inside a civil court in his life can be and often is at one step promoted to be a judge of appeal in civil cases, and to hear appeals from subordinate judges who are trained lawyers with years of legal experience." Then in another paragraph they observe, "If, however, we contrast the circumstances of the present day with those of a generation back, the considerations at once suggest themselves that the law which the modern civilian is called upon to administer is far more complicated, while the legal profession has vastly increased in numbers and has attained a far higher standard of training. At the same time the knowledge of law possessed by the natives of India generally, and their disposition to appeal has gone through a remarkable development. . . . It is most frequently in criminal matters that the native newspapers attack our administration of justice, and that errors and irregularities have been a subject of public criticism. It is in such cases in all countries that miscarriage of justice attracts most attention, but in civil and revenue cases affecting private rights it can scarcely be doubted that similar errors occur, and the departmental proceedings which come before us frequently disclose surprising ignorance . . . . Incompetent men cannot retain their position in the face of a well founded criticism which is becoming more and more searching as time goes on. On public grounds it is imperative that drastic steps should be taken to remove this blot on our administration."\*

119. It should be pointed out that these observations must have had reference to the work of men most of whom had been admitted to the service prior to 1892, i.e., when the probation was for two years. Very few of those who were admitted to the service after that year, when probation was reduced to one year, could have been district and sessions judges for any length of time during the period of 1903-1907, so the effort which was made by Sir Harvey Adamson and repeated before us by the Indian civil service witnesses to explain the position with reference to the period of probation has nothing in its support.

120. The history of the service shows that the reluctance of its members to adopt a judicial career has been increasing with time, so that it became necessary to offer the inducement of increased pay. Even then the tradition has persisted that the executive department is more sought after by the best men than the other branch.

\* Letter from Government of India to Secretary of State No. 16, dated Simla, 4th July 1907.

Not only has the freer atmosphere of revenue and executive work more attractions for them, but there is a feeling that as a judge they would be like square pegs made to fit round holes. That feeling was very graphically described to us by an able member of the local civil service of Madras.

121. A civilian judge who has never been behind the scenes, never drafted a plaint or a written statement nor examined or cross-examined a witness in his life, must be at a considerable disadvantage in arriving at the true and important facts of a case. He can but dimly realise the value of interlocutory proceedings in bringing issues to a head, and his control over the conduct of the trial in court must tend to be weak and uncertain. Not the least formidable of his difficulties is the inevitable lack of understanding and sympathy which must ordinarily be between him and the bar. Supposing he has had the opportunity, which he has not, to bring to the bench a sufficient stock of knowledge of the law, he will have realised on the first day of his judicial career that the really difficult task for which he had no preparation was to apply the right law to the facts before him. That is not capable of being learned except by years' experience and training. It is not learned by passing an examination however difficult. It is possible to acquire it on the bench, but only at a great cost to the litigant public. There have been civil service judges who surmounted all these difficulties and made the continuance of the system possible for so long. But the system itself is unsound, and the authorities should, I think, be prepared to discard it. The proposals for its improvement should be regarded only as a provisional measure. The only reform which is worth trying in the Indian civil service system as a recruiting field for judges would be by effecting a bifurcation immediately after the open competitive examination. From this stage their special training must be regulated with a view entirely to the requirements of a judicial officer. This was the proposal made by Lord Kitchener, and approved by Lord Minto and the members of his executive council except Sir Harvey Adamson and Mr. Miller. It should be understood that any time diverted to executive work is not only lost but must retard the growth of a habit of mind which is best described as the judicial as contradistinguished from the executive manner of doing things. I would, to that extent, modify the recommendation of the majority on this point made in paragraph 32 of annexure X.

122. I am aware that some members of the service told us that in their opinion the best training for a judge in India was ensured by his employment for a sufficiently long time in executive duties. On the other hand the Indian public opinion, both lay and professional, strongly expressed before us, was to the reverse effect; the thing they deprecated most was what they called executive bias. I have not the least doubt that judges drawn from the Indian civil service are as free from conscious bias of any kind as the other judges; but the standard to be kept in view is that there should be no occasion for misgivings in the mind of the public, and I cannot subscribe to any suggestion that there should be any other standard for the administration of justice in India.

123. The training of a civil service judge will have to be graduated as far as it is possible having regard to the constitution of the courts in India. There are two grades of civil courts under a district judge; that of munsiffs (in Bombay called subordinate judge, class II.), and of subordinate judges, already described. It would be necessary for a civilian recruit to act for at least four years as a munsiff and for another four years as a subordinate judge before being appointed to officiate with any degree of permanency as a district and sessions judge. It might also be arranged that while a civil servant is working as a munsiff he should have the powers of a magistrate and try some criminal cases.

124. I may as well notice here the argument urged before us in favour of appointing judges from the civil service that some such system prevails in several continental countries, notably Germany and France, where it has been found to work satisfactorily. We were not, however, furnished with any data which would enable us to say how far the analogy holds good. It would be necessary to know, for instance, how many grades of jurisdiction there are, how the procedure is adjusted to each class of court, whether the judges sit singly or in bench, whether the judges or the juries find facts, what are the provisions for rectifying errors, the nature of the litigation, whether the law is codified, how far the rulings of the court are regarded

as authoritative on questions of law, how many systems of law have they to administer and so on. The pecuniary limits of courts of civil jurisdiction in India are high enough to cover the great bulk of civil suits, they are not limited to any particular class of actions, and the judges have to find facts as well as to apply the law. They also exercise summary jurisdiction which precludes appeals and have frequently to dispose of difficult and complicated questions of law and procedure. The judges of all grades have to be familiar with the Hindu law and the Muhammadan law, with numerous acts of the Indian legislature, the rulings of the high courts and the privy council and they must have a good grasp of the principles of the English common law and equity law. A man without initial legal training and experience of proceedings in the courts will have to find his way very slowly indeed, and it is not expected that an Indian civil servant sitting as a munsiff or a subordinate judge will be able to cope with much work. Apart from anything else the mass of vernacular documents and accounts he will have to deal with every day will be a serious difficulty to him.

125. The other sources from which to obtain district or sessions judges are (i) the bar in India and in England and (ii) the munsiffs and subordinate judges. The advantages of appointing from the bar are obvious. You get a man who is already trained, and the expense of training which is considerable in the case of a member of the Indian civil service is saved ; and provided the field of selection is large enough the chances of making a mistake should be very little. It has been said that in India the competent barristers and pleaders are too rich to accept a district judgeship and the rest are not competent. Such a form of reasoning hardly needs refutation. My estimate is that, in the larger provinces specially, barristers and pleaders of considerable attainments and practice would be available in sufficient numbers to fill all the district judgeships and more. The Aitchison Commission in 1886-87 recommended that some appointments to district and sessions judgeships should be made from the bar, and it is remarkable that, though the recommendation was accepted by the Government, it has not yet been given effect to. The growth of the profession in the meantime, in numbers and efficiency, has on the other hand been phenomenal. Similarly in England we were told by the master of the rolls and Lord Justice Swinfen Eady that considering the salary of the district judges (which is on the average Rs. 2,300 a month) there would be so many candidates of the standing of the county court judges that the difficulty would lie in making a selection. I feel sure that such men would be welcomed by the profession. If after they have been selected in England they are allowed say six months to master the rudiments of the vernacular of the province to which they will be posted and another six months in India to acquire a certain amount of familiarity with the spoken dialect and with the procedure of the Indian courts, they will have little difficulty in grasping the essentials of Indian legal business. If the civil servant judge having been longer in the country has some advantage in the matter of knowing the people better—though that knowledge is much exaggerated—that will be more than counterbalanced by the superior training of the barrister judge. Besides it should be remembered that in most district and sessions judges' courts there are interpreters and translators, the arguments are conducted in English and there is always the bar to be relied upon in matters of difficulty. The great advantage which a trained barrister from England would bring to bear upon the administration of justice in the districts will be a habit of mind inspired by the best traditions of the English courts. I would suggest that a beginning at least be made with, say, ten appointments throughout India, and when experience has been acquired, the number of judges from England for the district courts may be substantially increased.

126. The main source of appointment should at present be the Indian bar, including barristers and pleaders practising in the high courts or the district courts. The majority of the Commissioners looking at the matter from a different point of view have proposed that forty appointments be made from the profession in India. The total really superior judicial appointments in the Indian civil service cadre are about 173. Of these, about 33 are held by members of the provincial judicial service. I would leave them where they are. For the rest my recommendation is that 58 appointments or one-third of the total should continue to be filled by members of the civil service, partly having in regard the legitimate expectations of those already in the service and partly because of the advisability of not making the change seem too sudden. From the Indian bar

appointments should be made to 72 district judgeships and for the present 10 appointments should be made from the English bar. The responsibility for making selections in India should devolve on the high courts and chief courts, all the judges acting as the committee as is the practice at present in the high court of Madras for appointing munsiffs. The mistake of leaving nominations to be made by a single individual, however eminent, should be avoided here as elsewhere. With this safeguard the chances of unsuitable selections being made, as has undoubtedly happened in the past in making similar appointments, will be eliminated. For appointments to be made in England there ought to be a small selection committee which will be expected to seek the advice of the English judges and be guided by it in submitting their recommendations to the Secretary of State.

127. As an inevitable result of this proposal the Indian high courts act of 1861 will have to be amended by doing away with the reservation of one-third of the offices for the Indian civil service and perhaps it would be advisable to remove the provision of minima altogether from that statute, so that all the appointments will be equally open to barristers, pleaders of the high court, and to judicial officers of the rank of district and sessions judges, subordinate judges and judges of courts of small causes.

128. *Promotion of provincial service officers to superior executive posts.*—Of the superior executive appointments included in the Indian civil service, 28 are held by officers promoted from the provincial civil services (executive branch). There should be no change in this respect. But they should be promoted at as nearly the same age as the officers of the Indian civil service.

129. *Simultaneous examinations.*—This important question relating to the problem of giving Indian candidates an opportunity of competing on substantially equal terms with the English candidates, for the Indian civil service is disposed of in paragraph 16 of annexure X. to the majority report. What is asked for is that the open competitive examination which is now held solely in England should be held simultaneously in England and in India on the same papers and conducted by the civil service commissioners, the results being embodied in one common list. There is hardly any other demand in connection with the Indian public services to which Indian public opinion attaches so much importance; it has formed the subject of persistent agitation, and its refusal hitherto is cited as a glaring illustration of the wide divergence that still exists between declarations of policy as made by British statesmen and their enforcement in actual practice by those immediately concerned with the Indian administration. The main object of the proposal is to remove the otherwise insurmountable handicap against Indian candidates which now artificially secures for British candidates a virtual monopoly of the most important and best paid civil appointments. It is based on the principle that appointments to public office in India must be settled on the test of qualifications and not on presumptions arising from race or place of birth. If the desire to secure what is mildly called a "British minimum," but which, in the contemplation of the majority of the Commissioners, really means 80 per cent. or more of these posts is to be given precedence over the test of qualifications, that can only be justified on *a priori* considerations of racial superiority. This, according to the Indian view, should be regarded as inadmissible. Their contention is that the test of an examination such as that conducted by the civil service commissioners should be supreme, and the advantages which racial characteristics or training give to British candidates ought to, and will in fact, find expression in the results of the examination. The English candidates have the advantage of the language and of a more efficient system of training and education; that ought to suffice—as all Indian witnesses think it will—to secure for such of them as are of average intellectual gifts a predominance in the service. Only those British candidates whose mental powers are below the average will fail in the competition. Any arrangements which would secure men of the latter class, far from ensuring the British character of the administration, would only do serious disservice to it as well as to the prestige of the British people.

130. It is suggested that the institution of simultaneous examinations in India will in some way or other retard the development of Indian education. The truth, however, is that it will considerably help such development. The history of western education in India amply justifies this belief. As regards the examination

in its present form fitting the Indian university curriculum, there can be no real doubt about it, if one compares the subjects of study in the Indian university calendars with the syllabus of the civil service examination. The system of options provides ample room for the different subjects of liberal education. Similarly as regards the age, either 22-24 as at present, or 21-23 as I have proposed, will suit the periods of Indian university courses just as well as those of the British universities. Certain practical difficulties in the way of applying the simultaneous system in "totally different longitudes and on separate continents" are also vaguely hinted at. These in my opinion are more imaginary than real; the hours can be easily so adjusted as to enable some of the civil service commissioners to conduct the examination here at the same time that the examination will be held in India, without giving any opportunity to persons feloniously inclined to telegraph the questions to England for the benefit of the candidates here or *vice versa*.

131. As far back as 1860 an influential committee appointed by the Secretary of State for India to consider the subject of the employment of Indians in the Indian civil service reported in favour of adopting simultaneous examinations "as being the " fairest and the most in accordance with the principles of the general competition " for a common object." In June 1893 the question was raised in the House of Commons and a resolution was passed that all open competitive examinations held in England alone for appointments to the chief services of India should henceforth be held simultaneously in India and England. And yet the majority of the Commissioners would, at the present day, reject this obvious method of justice essentially on racial grounds, in the teeth of evidence which showed that in making this demand all the different communities of India (excepting, of course, the Europeans and the Anglo-Indians) and all the provinces were united and practically unanimous. His Highness, the Agha Khan, in supporting the demand said, "I am in favour of a " simultaneous examination in England and India. I would give full effect to the " House of Commons' resolution of June 1893. . . . It will do away with any " feeling of discontent that may exist at the idea that the Indian civil service has " been kept as a preserve for Englishmen and that the children of the soil are shut " out from their proper and legitimate share in controlling the administration of the " country." In my opinion, in the interests both of justice and political expediency simultaneous examinations should be conceded for the Indian civil service proper.

132. *Separate recruitment in India proposed in the majority report and the question of proper proportions.*—The application of the doctrine of proportions to any public service is unsatisfactory and becomes specially difficult in the case of such coveted appointments as are included in the cadre of the Indian civil service. But as the recommendations of the majority are entirely founded on this basis and the question from any point of view requires consideration, it is necessary that I should indicate my views on the point.

133. The majority of the Commissioners have fixed twenty-five per cent. of the superior posts, including judicial and executive, which will amount to about 297 appointments out of the proposed total of 1,376, for recruitment in India, through examination, by the nomination of "King-Emperor's cadets," from the bar and by promotion from the provincial civil services. 168 appointments will be made by examination, 48 through King's cadets, 41 by promotion from the provincial civil services and 40 district or sessions judges will be appointed from the bar. This gives about 21 per cent. or so of the total cadre of the Indian civil service. The justification for such a low proportion is mainly sought in the present strength of the statutory natives of India in the civil service which amount altogether to 127. They do not attach much weight to the previous history of the matter, the proportion that was sanctioned as far back as 1879 and recruited for several years; nor, apparently, to the great progress which India has made since 1879. If the present position of Indians in the civil service is so unsatisfactory, it is so owing to the admitted unsoundness of the procedure followed by the Government both in 1878 and in 1886-87. It seems, therefore, hardly fair to adopt what is rightly considered an injury, as a standard for future arrangements. Another serious objection to their recommendations is that they are not based, as far as it appears, on a consideration of the nature of qualifications required for different kinds of

work or upon any estimate of the respective fields of recruitment with reference to such qualifications. To my mind, a fraction such as that proposed by the majority will solve no administrative or political problem. Why Indians are most needed on the executive side is to give them a substantial opportunity for effective co-operation in the higher administration and this purpose will not be achieved with a proportion like that recommended. From this point of view the recommendations of the Aitchison Commission were in some respects better conceived; they specifically provided for the appointment of Indians to a proportion of the higher posts in the administration such as commissionerships of divisions and memberships of the board of revenue. These are very few in number and if the proportion of Indians in the Indian civil service be no more than 25 per cent. of superior posts, their chances of attaining any of them under the scheme of the majority will be very problematical indeed. I am convinced that the proportions recommended by the majority for recruitment in India will be received with feelings of absolute disappointment. In my opinion a fair and reasonable proportion of appointments on the executive side for recruitment in India will be one-third of the total including the listed executive posts. Nothing less than this will be regarded as an adequate compensation for denying Indians an equal opportunity along with the British candidates for competing for this service, which they would have if the examination was held simultaneously in their own country as well as in England. The Government of Madras, as far back as 1893, was of opinion that one-third of the civil service appointments could well be recruited for in India and Mr. Barrow, a senior civil servant of Bombay, expressed the same opinion before us. So far as the method of separate recruitment in India is concerned the proposal in the majority report based on a system of competitive examination supplemented by the the "King Emperor's cadets" is appropriate. But the "King Emperor's cadets" should be chosen in fair proportions from all important communities, such as the Muhammadans, the Sikhs and the non-Brahmins in Madras, which may not be well represented in the examination, and there could be no justification for singling out the Anglo-Indian community as has been done for special mention in this connection. I have already stated my recommendations for filling judicial appointments and have no doubt that a fair proportion of them will go to non-Indian members of the bar. So long as proper selections are made on equitable and sound administrative principles the Indian public will have no objection to such appointments.

134. *Age*.—One of the most important questions in connection with recruitment for the Indian civil service is that of the age for open competition. The majority of the Commissioners have recommended that the age for the examination should be reduced from 22–24, the present age, to 17–19. This to my mind would be a retrograde measure directly in contravention of the best university opinion of Great Britain and of the unanimous views of the Indian witnesses. If the present one year's probation is too short, which possibly it is, it can well be made into two years by making the age 21–23, which will still enable men who have won university distinctions to compete for the service. I am unable to follow how it is possible to allege administrative necessity for the change in the face of decided Indian opinion to the contrary. If in 1886–87 the Secretary of State and the Government of India agreed with the finding of the Aitchison Commission that having regard to the large powers, magisterial and executive, which an Indian civil servant exercises soon after arrival in India, the age of 17–19 to which it is now proposed to revert was too low, it is difficult to understand how at the present day when the powers which they exercise are not less and the complexities of the situation have much increased, it is feasible to recruit schoolboys for the service. As regards the theory about tastes and aptitudes being set and so forth I do not think it can bear analysis. On the other hand it is not very difficult to understand that a civil servant's education and training which has to be completed at least two years earlier must be defective to that extent, while the three years' probation will entail unjustifiable expenditure to the state.

135. Another serious objection to the reduction of the age is that it will have the effect practically of closing the London door of entry to the Indians. This apprehension is considerably borne out by the fact that only 2·5 per cent. of the places offered were secured by Indian candidates between 1878 and 1891, when the age was 17–19, while the proportion of successful Indians increased to 5·6 per cent. between 1892 and 1912, when the limits of age were either 21 to 23 or 22 to 24. If the majority's

proposal for reducing the age be considered in conjunction with their other proposal to make it a condition precedent for admission to the London examination that the candidate must produce a certificate that for a continuous period of three years before the examination he has been pursuing his studies in certain schools to be named by the civil service commissioners, it being left entirely to their discretion whether to dispense with the production of such certificate in the "exceptional circumstances" of candidates coming from India, Indian public opinion will be justified in inferring that the London examination, by which eighty per cent. of the civil service appointments are to be filled under the scheme of the majority report, will in future be closed to Indian candidates. The so-called compensation which is spoken of is that about twenty per cent. of the appointments will be filled in India. This is but little more than what was laid down and enforced for some years under the rules of 1879. The only part of the scheme which has some claim to be regarded as an advance upon the past is the institution in India of examination for a portion of the cadre; but this change of method however welcome cannot mitigate the serious aspects of their other proposals. I am convinced that even if the compensation were far more substantial and much ampler Indian public opinion would refuse, and in my opinion rightly, to assent to a virtual effacement of their right to a free and equal opportunity for appointment to the premier civil service of their country. I am unable to conceive that advanced political bodies in India like the Indian national congress, representing the constitutional school of politics who have for years been agitating for simultaneous examinations for the Indian civil service, will now, when the slower moving Muhammadans and the others have supported the demand, should accept an arrangement so diametrically opposed to its main principle that Indian candidates should not be limited to a fixed proportion of the civil service appointments. My proposal is that the age for the open examination should be reduced to 21-23 years with two years' probation in England.

136. *The syllabus of the open competitive examination.*—The only amendment I propose to the present syllabus is that Persian should be added as a modern language, and that Sanskrit and Arabic should be marked on the same scale as Greek and Latin. It should be pointed out that for many years Arabic has hardly been attempted by the candidates and complaint was made to us that a far too difficult standard was required. This is a matter to which the attention of the civil service commissioners should be drawn. I do not accept the theory that the study of Sanskrit, Arabic and Persian as part of the equipment of an English university graduate would not be of considerable value to him as a man of culture, or that it would in any way detract from his efficiency in the careers open to him in this country. On the other hand, considering the place which belongs to India in the British Empire, and which must be of great importance in the near future, it is the duty of this Commission to give the lead in securing a proper place for the oriental classics in the British world of learning. To treat them as special subjects in a course for special training for probationers as suggested in the majority's scheme is to regard the matter from a wholly different and inadequate point of view.

137. *Calculation of the cadre.*—In this connection one important question has arisen, whether the present definition of the "superior" post as one to which a salary of above Rs. 1,000 is attached is sound. There can be no doubt that it is not, and under the scheme of the majority report it would be absolutely untenable, as they propose to grant a salary of more than Rs. 1000 to all holders of "inferior" appointments from the ninth year upwards in addition to officiating allowances which they have fixed at Rs. 350. The Government of India in adopting the definition was conscious that it was not in accordance with the basis of Indian civil service recruitment, but they resorted to it because the Governments of Madras and Bombay were desirous of retaining a larger number of junior members of the Indian civil service than would be available if district collectorships or appointments of the same or higher rank and responsibility were alone regarded as superior. The civil service recruitment formula being that for every hundred "superior" appointments the leave, deputation and training reserves should consist of 94·5 junior officers, the more comprehensive is the definition of a "superior" appointment the greater will be the number of junior officers. In Madras and Bombay there were 30 officers below the rank of collector who were paid more than Rs. 1,000, so the definition on a money basis provided for nearly an equal number of junior officers as understudies for them.

138. The recognised principle of recruitment for the Indian civil service is that every recruit expects to hold a post of independent responsibility and control, and that expectation is regarded as the basis of the Indian civil service system. It supplies the professed justification for recruitment in England; otherwise the bulk of the magisterial and executive work of the class attached to "inferior" appointments is performed by officers recruited in India, and on administrative and political as well as economic grounds must be so performed. The theory is that for administrative appointments of independent responsibility and control, recruitment in England is necessary, but having regard to the nature of their work, the training necessary for it has to be acquired by a service of at least 8 years in the inferior appointments. A permanent superior appointment is not attained until after 13 years' service. It is evident that, according to the prevalent formula, only those posts should be reckoned as "superior" which are of independent responsibility and control, being either collectorships, district and sessions judgeships, or posts of similar status and rank or higher, one at least of which each member of the Indian civil service expects to hold, as his ordinary objective. Once this essential test is abandoned we depart from the important rule as to the proper sphere of civil service recruitment and encroach *pro tanto* upon the sphere of the locally recruited services. So judged there are at present 83 appointments as shown in schedule I. which cannot be regarded as superior. No member of the Indian civil service could be asked to retire after holding one of them. When employed in these appointments he expects to be promoted in ordinary course to a collectorship or a district and sessions judgeship or some other appointment of equally independent responsibility and control. The evil of reckoning a really inferior post as superior is not only that it is an encroachment on Indian recruitment, but it involves the exchequer in heavy unnecessary cost, and inevitably retards promotion to the proper superior posts in the Indian civil service itself. The cost saved to the state by merging these 83 posts, now wrongly reckoned as "superior," into the class of "inferior" posts would be about 12 lacs per annum. Even a more serious result of the present state of things appears in its tendency to encourage the creation of more superior appointments. A reading of the despatches clearly brings home this lesson.

139. The attitude of the majority on this point does not seem to be very clear or logical. At one place they seem fully to recognise the evil; but as for the remedies, they suggest allowances, readjusting the cadre as between the different provinces and other devices of a more or less subsidiary character. They do not seem to recognise the necessity of properly defining a superior post as I have suggested. On the other hand the present practice is confirmed in the schedule to their annexure, where the posts to which I have referred are still treated as superior. It may as well be pointed out here that these appointments are held by junior officers of varying seniority, but they are all held on the way to the proper objective of the Indian civil service, namely, a collectorship, a district and sessions judgeship or an appointment of a like status. The present rule is that after eight years a civil servant ordinarily expects to officiate with practical permanency in an appointment which carries a salary of more than Rs. 1,000 a month. With a few exceptions they all do that, and many officiate much before the eighth year. Considering the responsibility of the lowest of the superior appointments, a collectorship or a district and sessions judgeship, it should be an understood rule that officers under eight years' standing should not be allowed to act in such vacancies, save in exceptional circumstances. When no member of the Indian civil service of the required standing is available in the district when a temporary vacancy has occurred, or without dislocating arrangements elsewhere, a senior and experienced member of the locally recruited civil service should be appointed. I disagree with the view of the majority that a civil servant should expect to act as a collector, and necessarily also as a district and sessions judge at the age of 30. This may well be in the interests of the officers but not of the administration.

140. At present a collectorship or a district and sessions judgeship is not permanently attained until after 13 years at the earliest as in Bengal and Bihar and Orissa, and after 17 years at the latest as in Madras and Bombay. It is not possible to fix the exact period for a permanent appointment for it depends upon casualties. But having in view the rate of decrement, the number of recruits should be so regulated that they should generally attain a superior post neither too young nor when they are past the line of full vigour. That age, in my opinion,

will be near about 40 which, if the age for recruitment as I have proposed, be 21–23 years with probation in England for two years, will have been reached generally after 14 or 15 years' service. My recommendation, therefore, is that the rate of recruitment should be calculated on the following basis :—

(i) A superior post to be defined as a collectorship, a district and sessions judgeship, or any other post of independent responsibility and control of a like or a higher status.

(ii) officers under eight years' service, save in exceptional circumstances, should not officiate in a superior post ;

(iii) a superior post should ordinarily be permanently reached after 14 to 16 years of service ; and

(iv) short vacancies, *i.e.*, up to seven months, should ordinarily be filled by an officer of the same district ; and if no member of the Indian civil service of a sufficient standing is available a senior and experienced member of the provincial civil service should be appointed.

141. *Age for the promotion of officers from the provincial civil services.*—The present practice of promoting the provincial senior officers at an advanced age, which is one principal unsatisfactory feature of the present "listed" system, should be discontinued, and they should be promoted at about the age of 40 like the others.

142. *Strength of the cadre.*—In paragraph 39 of annexure X. to the majority report, general suggestions have been made whose effect would be to increase the number of appointments in the civil service cadre. As I have pointed out in paragraphs 91 and 92, these suggestions are not justified.

143. The lieutenant-governorships, chief commissionerships, and memberships of executive councils of the Imperial and local governments should not be recruited for in the cadre of the Indian civil service (*vide* paragraph 59).

144. *Salaries.*—I have already shown that the Indian civil servant receives a salary far in excess of any other class of officers of similar qualifications, either in India or Great Britain or the colonies, and that there can be no good ground for complaint. For junior officers the majority have proposed a scale which entails an increased cost of 3 lacs a year after taking into account the adjustment of numbers by which 35 inferior charges are transferred from the imperial to the provincial services. No attempt is made to show in any way that they are not receiving the emoluments which they are entitled to expect according to the terms of the service. In paragraph 36 of the report it is alleged that nothing less than the terms proposed will suffice "to re-establish the attractiveness of this service," but apparently it is overlooked that in paragraph 5 they found that, "taken as a whole, the personnel now recruited has not "in any way deteriorated, and that India has been obtaining men who are keeping "up the high level and best traditions of the service." It is difficult to reconcile the two findings. If the latter conclusion is correct, then the fact that some recruits have preferred the home service can be of no concern to India. It is stated that the scale proposed is that which has been accepted in the Indian political department for members of the service who are employed there. But the political department was altogether excluded from our inquiry, and we had, therefore, no opportunity of coming to any conclusion as to how the scale in question came to be adopted there. If that scale was really based on a calculation of what members of the Indian civil service drew in the provinces then there need not be any extra cost at all. I propose a time scale of Rs. 450–50–700–100–900–150–1,050 which will not be in excess of the present cost for the inferior appointments. In paragraph 34 of annexure X. to the majority report, under the headings "absorption of special appointments . . ." and "equalisation of conditions of salary . . .," extra expenditure is proposed of nearly 4½ lacs. I have been unable to appreciate the necessity for this increase, and I do not think it ought to be incurred. I have no objection to items (i), (iv), (vi), and (vii) of that paragraph. As for the pay of the promoted provincial civil service officers, my recommendation is that they should receive the pay attached to the posts and not less. The district and sessions judges appointed from the bar should also receive the same salaries as the others.

145. *Pensions.*—In the report I have dealt with the question of annuities for the Indian civil service, and my recommendation is that the four per cent. contribution now made by the officers towards the 1,000l. annuity should not be abolished. As suggested in the majority report special rules as to the service after which pensions

should be granted and the rates of such pensions should be framed for the district and sessions judges to be appointed from the bar, having regard to the class of men to be attracted.

146. *Separation of judicial and executive functions and the recruitment of magistrates.*—I have already referred to the despatch of 1907 in which the Government of India observed: "It is most frequently in criminal matters that the native newspapers attack our administration of justice and that errors and irregularities have been a subject of public criticism. It is in such cases in all countries that miscarriage of justice attracts most attention." These observations were made with particular reference to the shortcomings in the training of the Indian civil service officers for the performance of judicial duties generally. But there is another cause not dealt with in that despatch that has materially contributed to the unsatisfactory state of the administration of justice in criminal matters, namely, the combination of judicial and executive functions in the present organisation of the civil services. This question for the purpose of our inquiry was formulated (Nos. 88 and 18 respectively in the lists of questions for the Indian civil service and the provincial civil services) in these words: "To what extent are the functions of the officers of the executive and judicial branches of the Indian civil service differentiated? Is any change desirable, and, if so, in what directions?" Considerable evidence was collected in every province and the Indian public opinion showed itself keenly interested in the subject. It was not until a late stage in the inquiry that it was even suggested that the matter fell outside the terms of our reference. I do not think the suggestion is well founded. In inquiring into the methods of recruitment and training it was necessary that we should keep in view not only the nature of the work to be done, but the conditions of employment of the officers. It could hardly have been contemplated that if we found that the official arrangements under which particular classes of officers were employed in the performance of certain duties were not conducive to efficiency, we should be precluded from drawing the attention of the authorities to the matter or from making appropriate suggestions for rectifying the arrangements. Nor can there be any doubt that by the interrogatories as we framed them, we intended to elicit opinions on the well-known subject of separation of judicial and executive functions which has long agitated the public mind and not the separate recruitment of judicial officers. The subject is dealt with in paragraphs 71 to 75 of annexure X. to the majority report, and with all deference to the majority, I must freely express my opinion that their treatment of it shows a very inadequate comprehension of the real issues. Nor has it been possible for me to understand clearly the drift of their conclusions as stated in paragraph 75. If what is meant to convey is that the evils arising from the combination of the functions are more theoretical than real, and that a differentiation of the functions is being evolved, then the conclusion is based on a misconception of the situation.

147. The principal points in the complaint refer to the office of the district magistrate and collector which is a "strange union of the functions of constable and magistrate, public prosecutor and criminal judge, revenue collector and appeal court in revenue cases." It is this officer who has the entire administrative control of the subordinate magistrates who are also employed under him in the discharge of revenue and general executive duties. What has been asked for is that magistrates should form a separate class of officers from the executive and revenue officers. Their duties are different and often clash with each other; their training and the administrative arrangements for their employment must be separate and suitable to each class of work. Magistrates should not be liable to be employed in revenue and executive work, nor should revenue and executive officers be employed in magisterial work. The officer responsible for the peace of the district and for its general executive and revenue administration should have no authority and control over the magistrates. The present state of things does not satisfy these conditions, and there can be no doubt as put by Sir Harvey Adamson the then home member of the Government of India in his speech on the budget delivered in 1908 that "the inevitable result of the present system is that criminal trials affecting the general peace of the district are not always conducted in the atmosphere of cool impartiality which should pervade a court of justice. Nor does this completely define the evil, which lies, not so much in what is done, as in what may be suspected to be done; for it is not enough that the administration of

“ justice should be pure ; it can never be the bedrock of our rule unless it is also “ above suspicion.” Gross miscarriages of justice have also often arisen as a result of the combined system, and the applications and the allegations that are constantly made to the high courts bear indubitable testimony to the fact that confidence in the magisterial trial of cases is much weakened by the present arrangements. To quote again from the same speech : “ The exercise of control over the subordinate magistrates “ by whom the great bulk of criminal cases are tried is the point where the present “ system is defective. . . . But if the control is exercised by the officer who “ is responsible for the peace of the district there is the constant danger that the “ subordinate magistracy may be unconsciously guided by other than purely judicial “ considerations.” The main, if not the only argument advanced in support of the system is that if the district officer is deprived of his magisterial powers and of his authority over the subordinate magistracy his prestige will suffer. One would have thought that his position as the chief revenue and executive officer, and in fact the local representative of the Government, was sufficiently important and did not require any further enhancement by the addition of magisterial functions. On the other hand, I have no hesitation in stating my belief that the prestige of the Government in all the advanced provinces distinctly suffers in the public estimation by keeping up a system by which its administration of criminal justice is subject to suspicion. It is for a long time that the system has been condemned, not merely by the press and the political bodies of India, but by eminent judges and the legal profession generally, whose knowledge of its evils is direct and first hand.

148. Having regard to the importance of the question and the fact that it has been growing in acuteness I shall here set out a memorial which was addressed to the Secretary of State for India in July 1899 by Lord Hobhouse, Sir Richard Garth, who had recently retired as chief justice of Bengal, Sir Richard Couch who also had been chief justice, Sir Charles Sargent who had been chief justice of Bombay and by other retired judges and high officials.

To the Right Honourable Lord George Francis Hamilton, M.P.,  
Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for India, India Office, Whitehall, S.W.

MY LORD,

WE, the undersigned, beg leave to submit to you, in the interests of the administration of justice the following considerations in favour of the separation of judicial from executive duties in India. The present system, under which the chief executive official of a district collects the revenue, controls the police, institutes prosecutions, and at the same time exercises large judicial powers, has been, and still is, condemned not only by the general voice of public opinion in India, but also by Anglo-Indian officers, and by high legal authorities. The state of Indian opinion with reference to the question is so well known as to require neither proof nor illustration. The separation of judicial and executive functions has been consistently urged throughout a long series of years alike by the Indian press and by public bodies and individuals well qualified to represent Indian public opinion. We propose, however, to refer briefly to some of the numerous occasions upon which the principle of separation has been approved by official authorities; next, to explain the nature of the existing grievance, and the proposed remedy; and, finally, to discuss objections which have been or may be advanced against alteration of the present system. This memorial, therefore, consists of three sections, which it may be convenient to indicate as follows :

- (a) An historical retrospect (paras. 2 to 10) ;
- (b) The existing grievance, and the remedy (paras. 11 to 14) ; and
- (c) Answers to possible objections (paras. 15 to 18).

(a) *An historical retrospect.*

2. So long ago as 1793 the Government of India, under Lord Cornwallis, recognised the dangers arising from the combination, in one and the same officer, of revenue with judicial duties. Section 1 of regulation II., 1793, contained the following passage :—

“ All questions between Government and the landholders respecting the assessment and collection of the public revenue, and disputed claims between the latter and their rayats, or other persons concerned in the collection of their rents, have hitherto, been cognisable in the courts of *maal adawlut*, or revenue courts. The collectors of the revenue preside in these courts as judges, and an appeal lies from their decision to the board of revenue, and from the decrees of that board to the Governor-General in council in the department of revenue. The proprietors can never consider the privileges which have been conferred upon them as secure whilst the revenue officers are vested with these judicial powers. Exclusive of the objections arising to these courts from their irregular, summary and often *ex parte* proceedings, and from the collectors being obliged to suspend the exercise of their judicial functions whenever they interfere with their financial duties, it is obvious

that if the regulations for assessing and collecting the public revenue are infringed, the revenue officers themselves must be the aggressors, and that individuals who have been wronged by them in one capacity can never hope to obtain redress from them in another. Their financial occupations equally disqualify them for administering the laws between the proprietors of land and their tenants. Other security, therefore, must be given to landed property and to the rights attached to it before the desired improvements in agriculture can be expected to be effected. Government must divest itself of the power of infringing in its executive capacity the rights and privileges which, as exercising the legislative authority, it has conferred on the landholders. The revenue officers must be deprived of their judicial powers. All financial claims of the public, when disputed under the regulations, must be subjected to the cognisance of the courts of judicature superintended by judges who, from their official situations and the nature of their trusts, shall not only be wholly uninterested in the result of their decisions, but bound to decide impartially between the public and the proprietors of land, and also between the latter and their tenants. The collectors of the revenue must not only be divested of the power of deciding upon their own acts, but rendered amenable for them to the courts of judicature, and collect the public dues subject to a personal prosecution for every exaction exceeding the amount which they are authorised to demand on behalf of the public, and for every deviation from the regulations prescribed for the collection of it. No power will then exist in the country by which the rights vested in the landholders by the regulations can be infringed, or the value of landed property affected."

3. These observations aptly anticipated the basis of the criticisms which during the succeeding century have so often been passed, as well by individuals as by public bodies of the highest authority, upon the strange union of the functions of constable and magistrate, public prosecutor and criminal judge, revenue collector and appeal court in revenue cases. In 1838 a committee, appointed by the Government of Bengal to prepare a scheme for the more efficient organisation of the police, issued its report. As a member of that committee, Mr. F. J. Halliday (after Sir Frederick Halliday, sometime Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, and member of the council of the Secretary of State) drew up an important minute in which, after citing at length the considerations that had been urged in favour of separating police from judicial duties in London, he stated that they applied with double force in India. The passage quoted with approval by Mr. Halliday declared that there was no more important principle in jurisprudence than the separation of the judicial from the executive ministerial functions; that a scheme to combine the duties of judge and sheriff, of justice of the peace and constable in the same individuals would be scouted as absurd as well as mischievous; that a magistrate ought to have no previous knowledge of a matter with which he had to deal judicially; and that the whole executive duty of preventing and detecting crimes should be thrown upon the police. In support of the proposition that these remarks applied with double force to India, Mr. Halliday wrote:—"In England" a large majority of offenders are, as "here, tried and sentenced by the magistrates; but in the former country the cases so tried are comparatively of a trivial and unimportant nature. In India the powers of the magistrates are much greater; their sentences extend to imprisonment for three years, and their jurisdiction embraces offences which, both for frequency and importance, are by far the weightiest subjects of the criminal administration of the country. The evil which this system produces is twofold: it affects the fair distribution of justice and it impairs at the same time the efficiency of the police. The union of magistrate with collector has been stigmatised as incompatible, but the junction of thief-catcher with judge is surely more anomalous in theory and more mischievous in practice. So long as it lasts, the public confidence in our criminal tribunals must always be liable to injury, and the authority of justice itself must often be abused and misapplied. For this evil—which arises from a constant and unavoidable bias against all supposed offenders—the power of appeal is not a sufficient remedy: the danger to justice, under such circumstances, is not in a few cases, nor in any proportion of cases, but in every case. In all, the magistrate is constable, prosecutor, and judge. If the appeal be necessary to secure justice in any case, it must be so in all; and if—as will follow—all sentences by a magistrate should properly be revised by another authority, it would manifestly be for the public benefit that the appellate tribunal should decide all cases in the first instance. It is well known, on the other hand, that the judicial labours of a magistrate occupy nearly all his time, that which is devoted to matters strictly executive being only the short space daily employed in hearing *thana* reports. But the effectual management of even a small police force and the duties of a public prosecutor ought to occupy the whole of one man's time, and the management of the police of a large district must necessarily be inefficient which, from press of other duties, is slurred over in two hasty hours of each day. I consider it, then, an indispensable preliminary to the improvement of our system that the duties of preventing crime and of apprehending and prosecuting offenders should, without delay, be separated from the judicial function."

4. Mr. Halliday's opinions on this subject were substantially approved by two other members of the committee appointed by the Government of Bengal—Mr. W. W. Bird and Mr. J. Lewis. Mr. Bird, who was president of the committee, stated that he had no objection to the disunion of executive from judicial functions. He added that he had invariably advocated the principle alike in the revenue and the judicial departments, but as it was at that time pertinaciously disregarded in one department it could not very consistently be introduced into the other. Mr. Lewis characterised Mr. Halliday's proposals as "systematic in plan, complete in detail, and sound in principle." With reference to Mr. Bird's observation, just cited, Mr. Lewis said that it was fallacious "to aver that a departure from right principle in one branch of administration requires, for the sake of consistency, a departure from it in another." It is true that Mr. Halliday, 18 years later, held a different view, and thought that British administration should conform

## MINUTE BY MR. ABDUR RAHIM—(continued)—ANNEXURE I.

to the oriental idea of uniting all powers into one centre. But his personal change of opinion does not affect the force of his former arguments.

5. Again, in 1854, in the course of a letter to the Government of India, Mr. C. Beadon, secretary to the Government of Bengal, wrote :—"The only separation of functions which is really desirable is that of the executive and judicial, the one being a check upon the other ; and if the office of magistrate and collector be reconstituted on its former footing I think it will have to be considered whether . . . the magistrates should not be required to make over the greater portion of their judicial duties to qualified subordinates, devoting their own attention chiefly to police matters and the general executive management of their districts." In November of the same year, as a member of the council of the Governor-General, the Hon. (afterwards Sir) J. P. Grant recorded a minute in which he said that the combination of the duty of the superintendent of police and public prosecutor with the functions of a criminal judge was objectionable in principle, and the practical objections to it had been greatly aggravated by the course of legislation which had raised the judicial powers of a magistrate six times higher than they were in the days of Lord Cornwallis. "It ought," Mr. Grant continued, "to be the fixed intention of the Government to dis sever as soon as possible the functions of criminal judge from those of thief-catcher and public prosecutor, now combined in the office of magistrate. That seems to me to be indispensable as a step towards any great improvement in our criminal jurisprudence."

6. Two years later—in September 1856—a despatch of the court of directors of the East India Company (No. 41, judicial department) on the reorganisation of the police in India pointed out that "to remedy the evils of the existing system, the first step to be taken is, wherever the union at present exists, to separate the police from the administration of the land revenue. . . . In the second place, the management of the police of each district should be taken out of the hands of the magistrate."

7. In February 1857 a further minute was recorded by the Hon. J. P. Grant, member of the council of the Governor-General, upon the "union of the functions of superintendent of police with those of a criminal judge." Mr. Grant, in whose opinions Mr. (afterwards Sir Barnes) Peacock generally concurred wrote :—"The one point for decision, as it appears to me, on which alone the whole question turns, is this—in which way is crime more certainly discovered, proved, and punished, and innocence more certainly protected—when two men are occupied each as thief-catcher, prosecutor, and judge, or when one of them is occupied as thief-catcher and prosecutor, and the other as judge? I have no doubt that the principle of division of labour has all its general advantages, and an immense preponderance of special and peculiar advantages, when applied to this particular case ; and I have no doubt that if there is any real difference between India and Europe in relation to this question, the difference is all in favour of relieving the judge in India from all connection with the detective officer and prosecutor. The judicial ermine is, in my judgment, out of place in the byeways of the detective policeman in any country, and those byeways in India are unusually dirty. Indeed, so strongly does this feeling operate, perhaps unconsciously, upon the English minds of the honourable body of men from whom our magistrates are chosen, that in practice the real evil of the combination is, not that a judge, whose mind has been put out of balance by his antecedents in relation to the prisoner, tries that prisoner, but that the superintendent of police, whose nerve and honesty are indispensable to the keeping of the native police officers in order, abandons all real concern with the detection of crime, and the prosecution of criminals, in the mass of cases, and leaves this important and delicate duty almost wholly in fact to the native *darogahs*. . . . If the combination theory were acted upon in reality—if an officer, after bribing spies, endeavouring to corrupt accomplices, laying himself out to hear what every tell-tale has to say, and putting his wit to the utmost stretch, for weeks perhaps, in order to beat his adversary in the game of detection, were then to sit down gravely as a judge, and were to profess to try dispassionately upon the evidence given in court the question of whether he or his adversary had won the game, I am well convinced that one or two cases of this sort would excite as much indignation as would save me the necessity of all argument *a priori* against the combination theory." Unfortunately the theory has been acted upon in reality. Actual cases—more than one or two—have excited the vehement indignation against which Mr. Grant sought in 1857 to provide. Mr. Grant added that the objections to separation of judicial and police functions seemed to him, after the best attention he could give them, to be founded on imaginary evils. He refused to anticipate "such extreme antagonism between the native public officer and the native judge as would be materially inconvenient." "Under a moderately sensible European magistrate, controlled by an intelligent commissioner, who would not talk or act as if police *peons* and *darogahs* were infallible, and dispassionate judges were never right, I cannot see why there should be any such consequences."

8. These and similar expressions of opinion were not lost upon the Government of India, as the history of the legislation which was undertaken immediately after the suppression of the mutiny shows. In 1860 a commission was appointed to inquire into the organisation of the police. It consisted of representative officers from the North-West Provinces, Pegu, Bengal, Madras, the Punjab, and Oudh—"all," in the words of Sir Bartle Frere, "men of ripe experience, especially in matters connected with police." The instructions issued to the commission contained the following propositions :—"The functions of a police are either protective and repressive or detective, to prevent crime and disorder, or to find out criminals and disturbers of the peace. These functions are in no respect judicial. This rule requires a complete severance of the police from the judicial authorities, whether those of higher grade or the inferior magistracy in their judicial capacity. When, as is often the case in India, various functions are combined in the hands of one

“magistrate, it may sometimes be difficult to observe this restriction; but the rule should always be kept in sight that the official who collects and traces out the links in the chain of evidence in any case of importance should never be the same as the judicial officer, whether of high or inferior grade, who is to sit in judgment on the case. . . . It may sometimes be difficult to insist on this rule, but experience shows it is not nearly so difficult as would be supposed, and the advantages of insisting on it cannot be overstated.” Again: “The working police having its own officers exclusively engaged on their own duties in preventing or detecting crime, the question is at what link in the chain of subordination between the highest and lowest officers in the executive administration is the police to be attached, and so made responsible as well as subordinate to all above that link in the chain? The great object being to keep the judicial and police functions quite distinct, the most perfect organisation is, no doubt, when the police is subordinate to none but that officer in the executive Government who is absolved from all judicial duty, or at least from all duty involving original jurisdiction, so that his judicial decisions can never be biased by his duties as a superintendent of police. . . . It is difficult to lay down any more definite rule as to the exact point where the subordination should commence than by saying that it should be so arranged that an officer should never be liable to try judicially important cases got up under his own directions as a police officer. . . . This raises the question—who is to be responsible for the peace of the district? Clearly that officer, whoever he may be, to whom the police are immediately responsible. Under him it is the duty of every police officer and of every magisterial officer of whatever grade, in their several charges, to keep him informed of all matters affecting the public peace and the prevention and detection of crime. It is his duty to see that both classes of officers work together for this end; as both are subordinate to him, he ought to be able to ensure their combined action. The exact limits of the several duties of the two classes of officers it may be difficult to define in any general rule; but they will not be difficult to fix in practice if the leading principles are authoritatively laid down, and, above all, if the golden rule be borne in mind that the judicial and police functions are not to be mixed up or confounded, that the active work of preventing or detecting crime is to rest entirely with the police, and not to be interfered with by those who are to sit in judgment on the criminal.”

9. The Police Commission in their report (dated September 1860) expressly recognised and accepted this “golden rule.” Paragraph 27 of their report was as follows:—“That as a rule there should be complete severance of executive police from judicial authorities; that the official who collects and traces out the links of evidence—in other words, virtually prosecutes the offender—should never be the same as the officer, whether of high or inferior grade, who is to sit in judgment on the case, even with a view to committal for trial before a higher tribunal. As the detection and prosecution of criminals properly devolve on the police, no police officer should be permitted to have any judicial function.” But although the commission adopted without question the general principle that judicial and police functions ought not to be confounded, they proposed, as a matter of practical and temporary convenience, in view of “the constitution of the official agency” then existing in India, that an exception should be made in the case of the district officer. The commission did not maintain that the principle did not, in strictness, apply to him. On the contrary, they appeared to have stated expressly that it did. But they recommended that, in his case true principle should, for the time being, be sacrificed to expediency. They reported:—“That the same true principle, that the judge and detective officer should not be one and the same, applies to officials having by law judicial functions, and should, as far as possible, be carefully observed in practice. But, with the constitution of the official agency existing in India, an exception must be made in favour of the district officer. The magistrates have long been, in the eye of the law, executive officers, having a general supervising authority in matters of police, originally without extensive judicial powers. In some parts of India this original function of the magistrates has not been widely departed from: in other parts extensive judicial powers have been superadded to their original and proper function. This circumstance has imported difficulties in regard to maintaining the leading principle enunciated above, for it is impracticable to relieve the magistrates of their judicial duties; and, on the other hand, it is at present inexpedient to deprive the police and public of the valuable aid and supervision of the district officer in the general management of police matters.” The commission recognised that this combination of judicial with police functions was open to objection, but looked forward to a time when improvements in organisation would, in actual practice, bring it to an end. “That this departure from principle will be less objectionable in practice when the executive police, though bound to obey the magistrate’s orders *quoad* the criminal administration, is kept departmentally distinct and subordinate to its own officers, and constitutes a special agency having no judicial function. As the organisation becomes perfected and the force effective for the performance of its detective duties, any necessity for the magistrate to take personal action in any case judicially before him ought to cease.”

10. The recommendations of the Police Commission were adopted by the Government of India, and, in accordance with them, Sir Bartle Frere introduced in the legislative council on September 29, 1860, a bill for the better regulation of police. The debate on the second reading of this measure, which afterwards became act V. of 1861, and is still in force, is important as showing that the Government of India regarded the exceptional union of judicial with police functions in the district officer as a temporary compromise. Sir Barnes Peacock, the vice-president of the council, stated that he “had always been of opinion that a full and complete separation ought to be made between the two functions,” while in reply to Mr. A. Sconce, who had argued that some passages in the report of the Police Commission were at variance with the principle of separation, Sir Bartle Frere said: “It was one thing to lay down a principle, and another to act on it at once,

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“and entirely when it was opposed to the existing system, to all existing forms of procedure, and to prejudice of long standing. Under such circumstances it was often necessary to come to a compromise. . . . He hoped that at no distant period the principle would be acted upon throughout India as completely as his hon. friend could desire. The hon. member had called the bill a ‘half-and-half’ measure. He could assure the hon. gentleman that nobody was more inclined that it should be made a whole measure than he was, and he should be very glad if his hon. friend would only induce the executive Governments to give it their support so as to effect a still more complete severance of the police and judicial functions than the bill contemplated.” The hope expressed by Sir Bartle Frere in 1860 has yet to be fulfilled. It might have been realised in 1872, when the second code of criminal procedure was passed. But the Government and the Legislature of the day were still under the dominion of the fallacy that all power must be centred in the district magistrate, and the opportunity of applying the sound principle for which Sir Bartle Frere had contended was unfortunately rejected. In 1881 the code of criminal procedure was further revised, and the select committee, in their report on the criminal procedure bill, said: “At the suggestion of the Government of Bengal we have omitted section 38, conferring police powers on magistrates. We consider that it is inexpedient to invest magistrates with such powers, or to make their connexion with the police more close than it is at present.”

(b) *The existing grievance, and the remedy.*

11. The request which we have now the honour of urging is, therefore, that—in the words used by Sir J. P. Grant in 1854—the functions of criminal judge should be dissevered from those of thief-catcher and public prosecutor, or—in the words used by Sir Barnes Peacock in 1860—that a full and complete separation should be made between judicial and executive functions. At present these functions are to a great extent combined in India, especially in the case of the officers who, in the districts of regulation provinces, are known as collector-magistrates, and in the non-regulation provinces are known as deputy commissioners. The duties of these officers are thus described by Sir W. W. Hunter\* :—“As the name of collector-magistrate implies, his main functions are twofold. He is a fiscal officer, charged with the collection of the revenue from the land and other sources; he also is a revenue and criminal judge, both of first instance and in appeal. But his title by no means exhausts his multifarious duties. He does in his smaller local sphere all that the home secretary superintends in England, and a great deal more; for he is the representative of a paternal and not a constitutional government. Police, jails, education, municipalities, roads, sanitation, dispensaries, the local taxation, and the imperial revenues of his district, are to him matters of daily concern.” It is submitted that, just as Lord Cornwallis’s Government held a century ago, that the proprietors of land could never consider the privileges which had been conferred upon them as secure while the revenue officers were vested with judicial powers, so also the administration of justice is brought into suspicion while judicial powers remain in the hands of the detective and public prosecutor.

12. The grounds upon which the request for full separation is made are sufficiently obvious. They have been anticipated in the official opinions already cited. It may, however, be convenient to summarise the arguments which have been advanced of late years by independent public opinion in India. These are to the effect—

- (i) that the combination of judicial with executive duties in the same officer violates the first principles of equity;
- (ii) that while a judicial officer ought to be thoroughly impartial and approach the consideration of any case without previous knowledge of the facts, an executive officer does not adequately discharge his duties unless his ears are open to all reports and information which he can in any degree employ for the benefit of his district;
- (iii) that executive officers in India, being responsible for a large amount of miscellaneous business, have not time satisfactorily to dispose of judicial work in addition;
- (iv) that, being keenly interested in carrying out particular measures, they are apt to be brought more or less into conflict with individuals, and, therefore, that it is inexpedient that they should also be invested with judicial powers;
- (v) that under the existing system collector-magistrates do in fact neglect judicial for executive work;
- (vi) that appeals from revenue assessments are apt to be futile when they are heard by revenue officers;
- (vii) that great inconvenience, expense, and suffering are imposed upon suitors required to follow the camp of a judicial officer who in the discharge of executive duties, is making a tour of his district; and
- (viii) that the existing system not only involves all whom it concerns in hardship and inconvenience, but also, by associating the judicial tribunal with the work of the police and of detectives, and by diminishing the safeguards afforded by the rules of evidence, produces actual miscarriage of justice, and creates, although justice be done, opportunities of suspicion, distrust, and discontent which are greatly to be deplored.

There is, too, a further argument that the separation, which arises out of the very nature of the work incidental to the judicial office, and which of itself might well be regarded as conclusive in the matter. It is no longer open to us to content ourselves with the pleasant belief that to an Englishman of good sense and education, with his unyielding integrity and quick apprehension

\* “The Indian Empire,” p. 513 (3rd edition).

of the just and the equitable, nothing is easier than the patriarchal administration of justice among oriental populations. The trial in Indian courts of justice of every grade must be carried out in the English method, and the judge or magistrate must proceed to his decision upon the basis of facts to be ascertained only through the examination and cross-examination before him of eye-witnesses testifying each to the relevant facts observed by him and nothing more. It is not necessary for us to dwell on the importance of this procedure, nor is it too much to say that with this system of trial no judicial officer can efficiently perform his work otherwise than by close adherence to the methods and rules which the long experience of English lawyers has dictated, and of which he cannot hope to acquire a practical mastery, unless he makes the study and practice of them his serious business. In other words, it is essential to the proper and efficient, and we might add impartial, administration of justice that the judicial officer should be an expert specially educated and trained for the work of the court.

13. In appendix B\* to this memorial summaries are given of various cases which, it is thought, illustrate in a striking way some of the dangers that arise from the present system. These cases of themselves might well remove, to adopt Sir J. P. Grant's words, "the necessity of argument *a priori* against the combination theory." But the present system is not merely objectionable on the ground that from time to time it is, and is clearly proved to be, responsible for a particular case of actual injustice; it is also objectionable on the ground that so long as it exists the general administration of justice is subjected to suspicion, and the strength and authority of the Government are seriously impaired. For this reason it is submitted that nothing short of complete separation of judicial from executive functions by legislation will remove the danger. Something, perhaps, might be accomplished by purely executive measures. Much, no doubt, might be accomplished by granting to accused persons in important cases the option of standing their trial before a sessions court. But these palliatives fall short of the only complete and satisfactory remedy, which is, by means of legislation, to make a clear line of division between the judicial and the executive duties now often combined in one and the same officer. So long as collector-magistrates have the power themselves to try or to delegate to subordinates within their control cases as to which they have taken action or received information in an executive capacity the administration of justice in India is not likely to command complete confidence and respect.

14. It would be easy to multiply expressions of authoritative opinions in support of the proposed reform. But, in view of the opinions already cited, it may be enough to add that, in a debate on the subject which took place in the House of Lords on May 8th, 1893, Lord Kimberley, then Secretary of State for India, and his predecessor, Lord Cross, showed their approval of the principle of separation in no ambiguous terms. Lord Cross said, on that occasion, that it would be, in his judgment, an "excellent plan" to separate judicial from executive function, and that it would "result in vast good to the Government of India." It was in the same spirit that Lord Dufferin, as viceroy of India, referring to the proposal for separation put forward by the Indian national congress, characterised it as a "counsel of perfection." Appendix A\* to the present memorial contains, *inter alia*, the favourable opinions of the right hon. Sir Richard Garth, late chief justice of Bengal, the right hon. Lord Hobhouse, legal member of the viceroy's council, 1872-77, the right hon. Sir Richard Couch, late chief justice of Bengal, Sir J. B. Phear, late chief justice of Ceylon, Sir R. T. Reid, Q.C., M.P., attorney-general, 1894-5, Sir William Markby, late judge of the high court, Calcutta, and Sir Raymond West, late judge of the high court, Bombay. These opinions were collected and compiled by the British committee of the Indian national congress, and among other important indications of opinions prevalent in India, we beg to refer you to the series of resolutions adopted by the Indian national congress—which Lord Lansdowne, as viceroy, referred to in 1891 as a "perfectly legitimate movement" representing in India "what in Europe would be called the more advanced liberal party." In 1886, the congress adopted a resolution recording "an expression of the universal conviction that a complete separation of executive and judicial functions had become an urgent necessity," and urging the Government of India "to effect this separation without further delay." Similar resolutions were carried in 1887 and 1888, and the proposal formed in 1889, 1890, and 1891 the first section of an "omnibus" resolution affirming the resolutions of previous congresses. In 1892 the congress again carried a separate resolution on the question, adding to its original resolution a reference to "the serious mischief arising to the country from the combination of judicial and executive functions." In 1893 the resolution carried by the congress was as follows:—"That this congress, having now for many successive years vainly appealed to the Government of India to remove one of the gravest stigmas on British rule in India, one fraught with incalculable oppression to all classes of the community throughout the country, now hopeless of any other redress, humbly entreats the Secretary of State for India to order the immediate appointment, in each province, of a committee (one-half at least of whose members shall be non-official natives of India, qualified by education and experience in the workings of the various courts to deal with the question) to prepare each a scheme for the complete separation of all judicial and executive functions in their own provinces with as little additional cost to the state as may be practicable, and the submission of such schemes, with the with the comments of the several Indian Governments thereon, to himself, at some early date which he may be pleased to fix." A similar resolution was carried in 1894, 1895, and 1896. During recent years, also, practical schemes for separation have been laid before the congress.

(c) *Answers to possible objections.*

15. The objections which, during the course of a century, have been urged against the separation of judicial and executive functions are reducible, on analysis, to three only: (i) that the

\* Not reprinted.

system of combination works well, and is not responsible for miscarriage of justice; (ii) that the system of combination, however indefensible it may seem to western ideas, is necessary to the position, the authority, and, in a word, to the "prestige" of an oriental officer; and (iii) that separation of the two functions, though excellent in principle, would involve an additional expenditure which is, in fact, prohibitive in the present condition of Indian finances.

16. It is obvious that the first objection is incompatible with the other two objections. It is one thing to defend the existing system on its merits; it is another thing to say that, although it is bad it would be too dangerous or too costly to reform it. The first objection is an allegation of fact. The answer—and, it is submitted, the irresistible answer—is to be found in the cases which are set forth in appendix B. to this memorial. These cases are but typical examples taken from a large number. It may be added that, among the leading advocates of separation in India, are Indian barristers of long and varied experience in the courts who are able to testify, from personal knowledge, to the mischievous results of the present system. Their evidence is confirmed, also from personal knowledge, by many Anglo-Indian judges of long experience.

17. The second objection—that the combination of judicial and executive functions is necessary to the "prestige" of an oriental officer—is perhaps more difficult to handle. For reasons which are easy to understand, it is not often put forward in public and authoritative statements. But it is common in the Anglo-Indian press, it finds its way into magazine articles written by returned officers, and in India it is believed, rightly or wrongly, to lie at the root of all the apologies for the present system. It has been said that oriental ideas require an officer entrusted with large executive duties the further power of inflicting punishment on individuals. If the proposition were true, it would be natural to expect that the existing system would be supported and defended by independent public opinion in India, instead of being—as it is—deplored and condemned. It is not reasonable to assume that the Indian of to-day demands in the responsible officers of a civilised Government a combination of functions which at an earlier time an arbitrary despot may have enforced. The further contention that a district magistrate ought to have the power of inflicting punishment because he is the local representative of the sovereign appears to be based upon a fallacy and a misapprehension. The power of inflicting punishment is, indeed, part of the attributes of sovereignty. But is not, on that ground, any more necessary that the power should be exercised by a collector-magistrate who is head of the police and the revenue system, than that it should be exercised by the sovereign in person. The same reasoning, if it were accepted, would require that the viceroy should be invested with the powers of a criminal judge. But it is not suggested that the viceroy's "prestige" is lower than the "prestige" of a district judge because the judge passes sentences upon guilty persons and the viceroy does not. It is equally a misapprehension to assume that those who urge the separation of judicial from executive duties desire the suppression or extinction of legitimate authority. They ask merely for a division of labour. The truth seems to be that the somewhat vague considerations which are put forward in defence of the existing system on the ground that it is necessary to the due authority of a district magistrate had their origin in the prejudices and the customs of earlier times, revived, to some extent, in the unsettled period which followed the Indian mutiny. We venture to submit that these considerations are not only groundless and misplaced, but that the authority of Government, far from being weakened by the equitable division of judicial and executive duties, would be incalculably strengthened by the reform of a system which is at present responsible for many judicial scandals.

18. The financial objection alone remains, and it is upon this objection that responsible authorities appear to rely. When Lord Dufferin described the proposal for separation as a "counsel of perfection," he added that the condition of Indian finance prevented it, at that time, from being adopted. Similarly, in the debate in the House of Lords on May 8, 1893, to which reference has already been made, Lord Kimberley, then Secretary of State, said: "The difficulty is simply this, that if you were to alter the present system in India, you would have to double the staff throughout the country," and his predecessor, Lord Cross, said: "It [the main principle raised in the discussion] is a matter of the gravest possible importance, but I can only agree with what my noble friend has stated, that in the present state of the finances of India it is absolutely impossible to carry out that plan, which to my mind would be an excellent one, resulting in vast good to the Government of India." The best answer to this objection is to be found in the scheme for separation drawn up in 1893 by Mr. Romesh Chandra Dutt, C.I.E., late commissioner of the Orissa division (at that time district magistrate of Midnapur) and printed in appendix A to this memorial.\* In these circumstances it is not necessary to argue either (i) that any expense which the separation of judicial from executive duties might involve would be borne, and borne cheerfully, by the people of India; or (ii) that it might well be met by economies in certain other directions. Mr. Dutt shows that the separation might be effected by a simple rearrangement of the existing staff, without any additional expense whatsoever. Mr. Dutt's scheme refers specially to Bengal, the presidency, that is, for which the reform had been described as impracticable on the ground of cost. Similar schemes for other presidencies and provinces have been framed, but it was understood that the most serious financial difficulty was apprehended in Bengal.

19. In view of the foregoing considerations, we earnestly trust that you will direct the Government of India to prepare a scheme for the complete separation of judicial and executive functions, and to report upon this urgently pressing question at an early date.

We have the honour to be, sir,

Your obedient servants,  
HOBHOUSE,  
RICHARD GARTH,  
RICHARD COUCH,  
CHARLES SARGENT,  
WILLIAM MARKBY,

JOHN BUDD PHEAR,  
J. SCOTT,  
W. WEDDERBURN,  
ROLAND K. WILSON,  
HERBERT J. REYNOLDS.

1st July 1899.

149. My recommendation is that there should be a complete separation of the judicial and executive functions. This already exists in the presidency towns, and the arrangements which obtain there could easily be adjusted to the district conditions. The collector should have no control over the magistracy, and should have no magisterial powers greater than those possessed, for instance, by the commissioners of police in the presidency towns. The magistrates should be a separate class of officers, and for the purposes of administrative arrangement of business one of the magistrates at the headquarters should have the same powers as the chief presidency magistrates possess in Calcutta and other presidency towns. At present the junior members of the Indian civil service and officers of the provincial civil services are employed partly in magisterial work and partly in revenue and executive work. The result of differentiating the functions will be that some of them will have to be allotted purely to magisterial work and the others to executive and revenue work. It will be for the administration to determine the number necessary for each department. For provincial service officers who would be recruited for magisterial duties the aim should be to require a degree in law as their qualification.

150. *Recruitment of the provincial civil services, executive side.*—For reasons already stated in the report, I propose that a part of the cadre in each province should be recruited by open competitive examination, the standard of which should be the bachelor's degree of the local university. In the larger provinces it should be possible to recruit half the cadre in this way, but the exact number has, in each province, to be determined by the local Governments. The remainder of the cadre should be recruited by nomination on selections made by selection committees as proposed. It would be undesirable to admit Anglo-Indians into the service who are not graduates of the university or who have not passed an examination of the same standard. The committees, in making the selections, should, subject to the fulfilment of required qualifications, bear in mind the importance of securing a fair representation of the more important communities.

151. *Recruitment of the provincial services, judicial side.*—For recruitment of the judicial branch of the provincial service I am unable to agree in the proposal to do away with the requirement of three years' practice at the bar. It is proposed to substitute instead two years' probation. No probationary course of training is suggested, and I am inclined to think that nothing will be gained by this expenditure of public money. On the other hand it is possible, by insisting on the candidates producing proper proofs that they have been usefully utilising their time after joining the profession, to secure candidates who have acquired some experience of the conduct of trials in civil and criminal cases. The present hardships, which they suffer in the matter of earning their pensions, should be obviated by allowing those who are appointed after the age of 30 to add up to five years' service towards pension as is the rule at present in the educational department. The selection ought to be made by the entire body of judges sitting as a committee, as is the practice in Madras.

152. *Salaries.*—I regard as suitable the scale of Rs. 250-40/3-450-50/3-500 with selection posts equal to 15 per cent. of the total strength on Rs. 600-40-800 and a further selection grade on Rs. 1,000 for 2 per cent. of each service, which has been proposed in the majority report for the provincial (executive) civil service. The magistrates in the provincial service should also have the same pay. I also regard as suitable the scale of pay proposed by the majority for the judicial branch of the provincial service, namely, Rs. 300-40/3-500 for the munsiffs, and for the subordinate judges at the rate of Rs. 600-40-800 a month with a further grade of Rs. 1,000 for 2 per cent. of the service.

#### *Cost.*

153. The cost of my above proposals will altogether be about Rs. 10,00,000 as against Rs. 41,24,743 proposed in the majority report, including the cost of abolishing the annuity contributions.

MINUTE BY MR. ABDUR RAHIM--(continued)—ANNEXURES I. AND II.

## SCHEDULE I.

LIST OF APPOINTMENTS in the CADRE of the INDIAN CIVIL SERVICE, below the rank of COLLECTORS (Deputy Commissioners) or DISTRICT and SESSIONS (or Divisional) JUDGES, at present classed as "SUPERIOR" but which ought to be reckoned as "INFERIOR."

Province.	Designation.	Number.
Madras - - - -	Secretary to Commissioner Land Revenue - - -	1
	" " Salt and Abkari Revenue - - -	1
	Private Secretary - - - - -	1
	Sub-Collectors - - - - -	19
	Registrar, High Court - - - - -	1
Bombay - - - -	Private Secretary - - - - -	1
	Deputy Commissioner, Upper Sind frontier - - -	1
	Under secretaries - - - - -	2
	Talukdari settlement officer - - - - -	1
	Assistant Commissioner in Sind - - - - -	1
	Manager Sind encumbered estates - - - - -	1
	Superintendent, Land Records - - - - -	1
	Registrar, Co-operative credit societies - - -	1
	Assistant Collectors - - - - -	5
	Registrar, High Court - - - - -	1
	Assistant Remembrancer of Legal Affairs - - -	1
Bengal - - - -	Private Secretary - - - - -	1
	Deputy Chairman, Calcutta Corporation - - -	1
	Registrar, High Court - - - - -	1
United Provinces - - -	Settlement officers - - - - -	4
	Deputy director of Land Records - - - - -	1
	Registrar, Co-operative credit societies - - -	1
	Superintendent, Dehra Dun - - - - -	1
	Deputy Commissioner, Nainital - - - - -	1
	" " Gharwal and Almora - - - - -	2
	Registrar, High Court - - - - -	1
	Sessions and subordinate judges - - - - -	4
Punjab - - - -	Registrar, Chief Court - - - - -	1
	Judge, small cause court - - - - -	1
Burma - - - -	Deputy Director of Land Records - - - - -	1
	Secretary to Financial Commissioner - - - -	1
	Settlement officers - - - - -	6
	Registrar, Co-operative credit societies - - -	1
	District judges - - - - -	8
	Registrar, Chief Court - - - - -	1
Central Provinces - - -	Settlement officers - - - - -	4
	Director of Agriculture - - - - -	1
	Registrar, Co-operative credit societies - - -	1
	Total - - - - -	83

## ANNEXURE II.—AGRICULTURAL DEPARTMENT.

154. *General features.*—In this department, in so far as it came within our inquiry, there are 62 imperial service officers appointed in England, of whom two are Indians, and 56 provincial service officers appointed in India. Since it was first established in 1871 the department has undergone several revisions, and in its present form the organisation dates from 1905. The work aimed at is (i) education, (ii) research and (iii) propaganda. The principal establishments maintained are the colleges and schools with laboratories and experimental farms at Pusa, Sabour, Lahore, Coimbatore, Poona, Lyallpore and Cawnpore. Of these Pusa is the central institute, its director is the senior officer of the department and agricultural adviser to the Government. It was established in 1903 and is the best equipped of all the institutions. In the original scheme of Pusa education bulked largely, but it has gradually drifted into the background and research is now regarded as the main vocation of the Pusa institute.

155. *Evidence as to the work accomplished.*—Much evidence was adduced before us as to the value of the work hitherto accomplished at the different institutions, and the comparative merits of the Pusa institute and the provincial establishments. Summarised it comes to this: With reference to the work at Pusa, Mr. Butler, the director of the institute, after describing the lines on which it was developing, says “It may be said with some show of truth that it would be impossible in the present state of our knowledge to write an elementary text-book of Indian agriculture, similar to those of which there is a plentiful supply in Europe, which would not soon be shown to contain glaring mis-statements of fact in regard to crop physiology and similar fundamental matters as applied to India. The demand which is coming from the provincial colleges for further information before the teaching of even elementary agriculture can be satisfactorily carried out is thus easily comprehensible.” I may observe that in the light of this admission, the suggestion made by some of the witnesses that Indians are best suited for teaching Indian agriculture, and should be kept to that work, while the research work and the management of experimental farms should be the province of English recruits, seems hardly reasonable. The Sabour college, which caters for Bihar and Bengal, is admittedly a failure; the evidence of Mr. Woodhouse, the principal, shows that research work has not produced good results, only certain isolated methods for agricultural improvement have been evolved, not sufficient to furnish any material for teaching a post-graduate course in practical farming, and that there was no scope for capitalist or tenant farming, and very little for propaganda work in Bengal and Bihar. The last-mentioned difficulties arise from the conditions of land tenure in these two provinces; the land is parcelled out into very small plots amongst the ryots or peasants, who have a practically permanent right to the holdings, and the land available to the zemandar or landholder for his own cultivation is also generally small in quantity and mostly scattered in isolated plots. As regards the Punjab, the evidence is that the agricultural college had not as yet been able to any great extent to win the confidence of the cultivating classes. The most encouraging accounts come from Bombay, where the Poona college seems to have been full for the last five or six years and there is a demand for its successful students from the landowners. The Coimbatore college of Madras and the Central Provinces institution also claim some success.

156. *Findings.*—My conclusions are that the department is engaged in experiments from which good results may well be hoped for. The success hitherto achieved has not been of a conspicuous character commensurate with the amount of money that has been spent. The work should, however, be persevered in, but its expansion must proceed on cautious and well-thought-out lines. And above all, the department should be handed over to a competent indigenous agency which will understand the conditions of the work better and cost less to the state. The right policy to be pursued is obviously the one stated by the Government of India in 1910.\* “We adhere firmly to our frequently declared policy that that service” (meaning the agricultural service) “should ultimately be manned mainly by Indians, and that the object to be kept steadily in view is to reduce to a minimum the number of experts appointed from England, and to train up indigenous talent so as to enable the country to depend on its own resources for the recruitment of its agricultural staff in the higher branches.” It cannot be said that the policy has been carried out so far; Indians have hitherto been relegated entirely to subordinate work. The higher work is such that there should be no difficulty in finding Indians capable of doing it. They have been carrying on valuable researches in chemistry, physics and in other domains of scientific work, and there is no reason to doubt that if they were afforded a fair chance they would do equally well in agriculture. On the other hand, there have been cases of Indians, highly qualified for the higher agricultural work, who had done excellent research, but who did not find sufficient scope in the department and had to seek elsewhere for a proper field of employment.†

157. *Recommendations.*—I entirely agree therefore in the decision arrived at by the majority of the commissioners that definite steps should now be taken to make

\* See despatch No. 21 of 1910 to the Secretary of State for India.

† See volume XV., paragraphs 68079 and 68131.

MINUTE BY MR. ABDUR RAHIM—*continued*—ANNEXURES II. AND III.

India self-contained with respect to the requirements of this department. I support their recommendation that the educational and training facilities at Pusa and the other institutions should be improved, that it should be announced from the outset that not less than half the vacancies should be filled by appointment in India of competent statutory natives of India, that the appointments so made should not be confined to half, but that there should be no limit to the appointment of Indians, and that the goal to be steadily kept in view should be to meet the normal requirements, of both the research and the agricultural work, in India within a reasonable time. But I would add a further recommendation that the pace of progress in the desired direction should be so regulated that after five years at the most recruitment from England should cease. I therefore propose that until the facilities for training in India are fully developed scholarships should be instituted with a view to enabling well-qualified students to receive their training in Europe. These scholars should have a preferential claim to being appointed in the next vacancy provided their work has given complete satisfaction to the authorities of the institution where they have been educated and they are not rejected by the committee of selection at the India Office as being unsuitable. It will be sufficient to award one scholarship in each year. Study leave should also be granted to members of the provincial service to carry on special studies in Europe and America. The evidence shows that even now there are several members of the provincial services, especially in Bombay, who are fit for appointment to the higher service.

158. *The appointment of a rural commissioner.*—I have been unable to agree to the proposal of the majority for the creation of a post of rural commissioner and I am not satisfied that it will really serve any useful purpose. On the other hand, there is evidence forthcoming in this department that there has been a tendency to over-organise on the administrative basis with undesirable results.

159. *Salaries.*—I agree with the majority that the salaries should be on an Indian basis, and I would give suitable allowances, say Rs. 150, to those Europeans whose services may still be required. I am not satisfied that sufficient grounds have been shown for increasing the present salaries of the European officers as proposed in the majority report. The scale of salaries which I propose is Rs. 300-30-600-50-1,000. According to my recommendations the savings will be about Rs. 72,000 instead of Rs. 31,284 as shown in the majority report. Besides, the effect of the majority's recommendation to increase the pay of the European officers will be to cause considerable increase over the present cost for the next twenty years.

#### ANNEXURE III.—CIVIL VETERINARY DEPARTMENT.

160. *General features.*—This is a small department. Its higher staff consists of 34 officers, all Europeans, and appointed in England with an average pay of Rs. 947 a month; and the local staff consists of 36 officers, mostly Indians, with an average salary of Rs. 307 per mensem. The department undertakes teaching as well as practical work. Its educational and training establishments have not, however, been much developed, and the department has failed to appeal to Indian candidates possessing the higher educational qualifications. This is largely due to the nature of the prospects held out to the Indians in the Government service and the incomplete character of the existing facilities for training.

161. *Recommendations.*—It is agreed that this is one of those departments with respect to whose personnel India should be self-reliant. Having regard to the number of officers required and the nature of the work to be done there should be no difficulty in training Indians at once for filling the few vacancies as they will occur in this department. The development of the training institutions in India will no doubt require some time; but in the meantime students should be sent to England to qualify themselves. This is also the recommendation of the majority report. But it appears to me that there is no good reason for clogging the proposal with a condition that the scholars should not have a preferential claim to being appointed even if they are found to be fully qualified and suitable. The proper condition ought to be as has been suggested by me for the holders of scholarships for the agricultural service. It may be that candidates with higher qualifications than those of the scholars will be

available in England ; but if that were to be the proper determining factor it would be difficult to carry out the principle that India should be self-reliant for this or any other service. Subject to this modification I am in general agreement with the proposals of the majority.

162. *Salaries.*—I accept the Indian scale proposed by the majority of the Commissioners. But I do not agree to the increase in the pay of the European officers as proposed by them. To those European officers whose services may still be required, the Indian scale of pay with an allowance of Rs. 150 should be granted.

#### ANNEXURE IV.—CUSTOMS DEPARTMENT.

163. *General features.*—In this department six members of the Indian civil service are employed, three as assistant collectors and three as collectors. Besides these we have inquired into twenty appointments ; out of them eleven are filled by officers recruited in India, only two of whom are Indians, the other nine being domiciled Europeans or Anglo-Indians ; the remaining nine officers out of the twenty were appointed in England, and are all Europeans. The average pay is Rs. 944 a month, not taking into account the pay of the Indian civil service officers. The position of Indians in this department is extremely unsatisfactory, not only at the top, but even in the lower ranks. It appears that out of a total of 246 posts, carrying a salary of Rs. 200 and over, 27 only are held by Indians and 219 by Europeans and Anglo-Indians. As far as the appointments other than the 26 we have investigated are concerned, all that is possible to do is to draw the attention of the authorities to the matter for such action as they may think fit to take.

164. *Findings and recommendations.*—The work in this department is mainly appraising and preventive, and it would appear that the former—including other indoor work, such as accounts, statistics and so on—bulks more largely in the duties of the higher officers. There can be no doubt that the personnel of this department, which does not require in its officers any technical qualifications not available in India, should be obtained in the country as far as possible. As regards the suitability of Indians for the work, it was found by the Aitchison Commission, as far back as 1886-7, that no ground existed for excluding them if properly qualified, and they further pointed out that the Brahman preventive officer of Madras was admittedly efficient and experienced no difficulty owing to his race. The allusion here is to the alleged difficulty of an Indian in performing preventive duties which must necessarily bring him into contact with the European members of the mercantile community. That difficulty to my mind, if it exists, is much exaggerated, and should not in my case be a ground for suggesting a limitation in the employment of Indians in the department. The European commercial community in India have to deal every day with Indians, both officials and non-officials, and the wiser policy seems to be to proceed on the assumption that in the customs department, as in any other, the European merchants, no less than the other merchants, will conform to the laws and regulations of the department. Besides a study of the history of the department indicates that it was mainly the absence of insistence on a proper standard of qualifications for its recruits in India that led to the shifting of recruitment to England. There is nothing in the facts which show that there was any difficulty in obtaining properly qualified men among the Indians, and the few Indians that were employed apparently did well. The great bulk of the employees have always been domiciled Europeans and Anglo-Indians, and it was because there were not available in that community a sufficient number of properly qualified men for employment in the department that it was decided to go to England. It is now clearly desirable that recruitment should again be made solely in India, a higher standard of qualifications being insisted on for all candidates, whether domiciled Europeans, Anglo-Indians or Indians.

165. I agree in the recommendation of the majority that the qualifications should be of the same order as for the Indian finance department. But instead of half, as proposed by them, the entire cadre should be recruited for in India. The vacancies should be properly advertised and the selection of direct recruits should be made by a committee as proposed. It should be provided that not more than one-third of these appointments be filled by promotion. Two-thirds of the appointments should therefore

be filled by direct appointment. As a part of this scheme the employment of the six Indian civil service officers may be maintained.

166. *Salary.*—The salary will be entirely on the Indian basis on the same scale as for the Indian finance department, and the Indian civil service officers employed will, as proposed in the majority report, be given suitable allowances in addition to their substantive pay. The effect of these proposals will be a saving of Rs. 36,000 as against Rs. 19,078 per annum in the majority report.

#### ANNEXURE V.—EDUCATION DEPARTMENT.

167. *General features.*—In this department our inquiry covered 585 posts, of which 199 are recruited for in England and 386 in India. The former class of officers form the Indian educational service with an average pay of Rs. 970 per mensem, not including the directors who are the heads of the department in the several provinces. The officers appointed in India are placed in the provincial educational services with an average pay of Rs. 354 per mensem. There are only three or four Indians in the service recruited in England, the rest being Europeans; the locally recruited services are manned mostly by Indians. The services are regarded as parallel to the extent that no locally appointed officer is promoted to the service manned by officers recruited in England, both classes of officers being engaged on the same class of work. The staff is divided into collegiate and administrative. Officers belonging to the collegiate staff are called professors, lecturers, teachers and demonstrators, whose function is to teach students, mostly Indians, at the different stages of an Indian university course. The administrative side mainly consists of inspectors and assistant inspectors whose duty is to inspect schools, English as well as vernacular, those of the latter category being naturally the largest in number.

168. The evidence discloses what was naturally to be expected, that for the higher class of collegiate work which lies mostly among students of the M.A. classes and those who take honours, a body of men is now wanted who would be able to diffuse a true academic spirit in the colleges and guide the more capable young minds in the pathway of learning and research. For the rest of the work the objective should be to enlist the services of the young men in the country who have obtained academic distinctions and are able to understand the students, sympathise with their aspirations, and exert healthy influence in the formation of their character.

169. The ordinary work on the administrative side similarly requires an intimate knowledge of the people, their traditions and habits, ability to appreciate the temperament and requirements of the Indian schoolboys in their own environments, and a mastery of the vernacular languages spoken and written. There is also scope for one or two men in each province who have made a study of the various types of schools in Europe, possess a capacity for organising, and are able to adapt their ideas to the conditions of the country.

170. In perhaps no other department have the defects of the artificial division into imperial and provincial, obvious enough wherever it exists, led to such deplorable results. The chief cause has been the gross disparity of pay, which has naturally resulted in the officers drawing the larger salaries assuming a superior status. In administrative services like the Indian civil service and the police it is possible for the head of the department to allege that the administrative ability of officers of the service to which they themselves belong is of a higher order than that of the personnel of the locally recruited service, which is mostly engaged in the less important duties. But in assessing the respective merits of men in a department like that of education, which give scope and opportunity to the officers to achieve work whose value can be appreciated by the world at large, the departmental judgment counts for very little. That Dr. P. C. Roy the well-known chemist, Mr. Sircar the historian, and some others who could be named should be condemned to the service of a lower status, while an average young English graduate is appointed to a service with more than double the emoluments and with a higher status is a sufficient proof of the unsoundness of the arrangement. It was by a hairbreadth chance that the famous physicist Dr. J. C. Bose has escaped being treated as a member of the lower service, and if Rabindra Nath

Tagore the poet had chosen an educational career in the Government service he also would probably have found himself in the provincial service.

171. The Aitchison Commission recommended in 1886-87 :—

- (a) that the recruitment of young men in England for a close educational service should be largely modified or entirely discontinued—the reason given was that they were not above the average graduates of British universities and in no case specialists ;
- (b) recruitment in England should be only for (i) principalships of colleges, (ii) professorships in branches of learning in which European standards of knowledge had not been reached in India, and (iii) a considerably reduced number of inspectorships, as in their opinion local agency might be substituted without loss of efficiency ;
- (c) recruitment of professors should ordinarily be of specialists ; and
- (d) the remuneration of officers recruited in England should be with reference to the attainments required and the duties to be performed.

These recommendations have not only not been carried out as admitted by Mr. Sharpe the joint secretary to the Government of India, but the practice of the department has proceeded in an opposite direction. In 1886-87 the number of officers appointed in England was 103, it is now 199 or nearly double. Indians used then to be appointed to the higher branch and received two-thirds of the pay. They are now appointed only to one branch, the pay of which is less than half of the English branch. The failure of a close service system for the higher work which was noted by the Commission has become even more marked with time.

172. The majority, as I understand their recommendations, would continue the present system with certain modifications of the nomenclature, they would not only maintain the same number of young English graduates but have also provided for their increase. They would further considerably add to their emoluments. Side by side with this they have no doubt made similar recommendations for Indian graduates. What is most needed, however, is the enforcement of a broader line of policy such as that contemplated by the Commission of 1886-87, which would provide for the higher developments of education in India through the agency of a select body of specialists and would insure its fullest expansion through an economical indigenous agency.

173. I give below the main outlines of a scheme for this service which had the support of our late colleague Mr. Gokhale :—

There shall be no recruitment of untried Englishmen, fresh from the universities, for educational work in India. However carefully the first selection of such men might be made, a certain number of them are bound to disappoint expectations, and there is no room now for such failures in our educational service. In any other department, an Englishman who fails merely lowers the efficiency of that department. In the education department, he is apt to prove a political danger by challenging in young minds comparison between himself and Indians, possibly superior to him in capacity and attainments, occupying inferior positions. For Englishmen, however, who have distinguished work to their credit, there is and will long remain ample room in India, but for obvious reasons their number cannot be a large one. Such men should be secured for any reasonable salary that may be necessary to induce them to go out to India.

174. There are altogether 585 posts in the Indian and the provincial educational services. Of these nine are directorships of public instruction. Omitting them, we have a service of 576 posts. Out of this number, roughly, 90 posts should be put aside and filled by the appointment of specialists who have already done original work of a high order, and also of a good few who have shown conspicuous ability in governing young men and influencing their minds. These men should be paid from Rs. 1,000 to Rs. 1,750 a month, and in a few cases I would not mind going up to Rs. 2,000. The remaining 486 posts should be thrown into a cadre which will be constituted on an entirely Indian basis, being recruited from among the best Indian graduates available. The starting salary for this cadre should be fixed at Rs. 250, rising by increments of Rs. 50 every two years to Rs. 500. After that I would have the first selection grade of Rs. 500 to Rs. 750, amounting to fifteen per cent. of the

cadre, and another selection grade, amounting to five per cent. above that of Rs. 750, to Rs. 1,000. Officers promoted from the cadre to be principals of first-grade colleges on the score of special fitness will be given special allowances over and above the maximum cadre-pay of Rs. 1,000, and men doing distinguished original work would be appointed to any of the 90 posts which they might be considered specially fit to hold. Two years' study-leave should be given to officers so recruited in India to enable them to proceed for special study at a European university, after they have served at least three years in the department.

175. I am convinced that no scheme less radical than this will adequately meet the present requirements of India, combining economy with a great incentive to our best men to devote their lives to the highest educational work. This is to my mind the only way to create a true academic atmosphere in India and steadily raise the general level of learning in the country, enabling India ultimately to take her proper place among the nations of the world as a contributor to the stock of human knowledge.

176. The extra cost per annum of this proposal will amount to about 6½ lacs, against nine lacs and ten thousand the cost of the majority's proposal.

177. I agree in the recommendation of the majority of the Commissioners that in the administrative branch of the education service effort should be made to secure a proper representation of the more important communities. But I would suggest further that with a view to help forward the progress of western education amongst the Muhammadans an officer should be appointed in each province whose main function will be to assist the director of public instruction in dealing with the special educational problems in regard to that community. Such an officer has already been appointed in Bengal, and a strong appeal has been made to us on behalf of the Punjab, the United Provinces, and the presidency of Madras.

178. The question of women's education is of growing importance in India and, in my opinion, the most feasible way of promoting it is to enlist in the cause the services of educated Indian women as far as possible. There are several classes at present in India, such as the Brahmos, the Indian Christians and the Parsis, from whom it will be easy to secure useful officers for this work. Some of them should be sent with scholarships to Europe for further education and training.

सत्यमेव जयते

#### ANNEXURE VI.—FACTORY AND BOILER INSPECTION DEPARTMENTS.

179. The organisations of these two departments are different and have to be separately considered.

##### *Factory Inspection Department.*

180. *General features.*—Of the officers employed on this work 14 have come within the limits of our enquiry. They were mostly appointed in India, but not one of them is an Indian. The average pay is Rs. 680 a month. The mills in connection with which the inspecting staff is employed are to be found principally in Bombay and Bengal. The operatives are naturally all Indians in both the provinces. In Bombay the large majority of mills are owned by Indians, and the majority of the engineers in the mills are also Indians, 78 per cent. of the foremen and managers are Indians and only 22 per cent. are Europeans. In Bengal the position is reversed: 350 factories employing 300,000 hands are managed by Europeans and 55 factories employing about 14,000 hands are managed by Indians.

181. *Findings and recommendations.*—It is primarily the protection of the mill hands that is provided for by this department. The *prima facie* presumption is that Indian inspectors of suitable technical qualifications, if available, would be in the best position to ascertain in what directions the interests of the operatives are injured. It is not difficult to realise that the European inspecting staff must be at a great disadvantage with respect to the language of the Indian labourer and in winning his confidence. The Indian inspector would not be handicapped by such difficulties. For the candidates generally, whether Europeans, Anglo-Indians or Indians, it is necessary that the general educational qualifications of the officers

should be sufficiently high to exclude men who are not likely to appreciate the responsibilities of their position. The present standard of salaries is sufficient to attract a good class of men and it is difficult to understand why the services of Indians have not hitherto been utilised. There is also no doubt that qualified Indians are available as found by the majority of the Commissioners. That being so I not only agree with the general recommendations of the majority that appointments should be made entirely in India but would add that the employment of Indians in this department should be specially encouraged. Further this is a department where it will, I am sure, be found useful to lay down a proper minimum for Indians of pure Asiatic descent as an additional guarantee that the principle underlying the general recommendations may not be overlooked. I am unable to agree that the fact that the majority of the mills in Bengal are owned and managed by Europeans is a good ground for hesitating to employ Indian inspectors there. It is the interests of the labourer that should be primarily kept in view. If proper Indian candidates are not available in Bengal or in any other particular province where the vacancy occurs there should be no difficulty in appointing suitably qualified Indians from Bombay or elsewhere. My recommendation is that the minimum of Indians of pure Asiatic descent should for the present be one half.

182. *Salaries.*—The scale of salaries proposed on the Indian basis is, I think, suitable, and as the appointments will be made in India, it will apply to all officers alike. No case has been made out for increasing the present cost of the salaries of the Europeans, and the adjustments, if necessary, should be made within the present limits. The salaries in the department have only recently been fixed as a result of careful investigation of the recent factory commission, the final orders on their report being passed only in 1912.

*Boiler inspection department.*

183. *General features.*—This department contains 24 whole-time officers, not one of whom, so far as it appears, is an Indian.

184. *Findings and recommendations.*—My recommendations are that, as suggested by the representative of the Bombay mill owners' association, the appointments should be open, without regard to nationality, to engineers of the royal Indian marine, engineers of the mercantile marine and to land engineers holding first class certificates.

ANNEXURE VII.—INDIAN FINANCE DEPARTMENT.

185. *General features.*—This is the only department in which all officers, whether recruited in England or in India, are treated alike in every respect. They are all on one list, receive the same pay, all are equally eligible for promotion, and all enjoy the same status. The qualifications ordinarily insisted on are high, and a substantial portion of the cadre is recruited by competitive examination. The results, judged from the state of efficiency of the department, as contributed to by the Indian element in its personnel, are highly satisfactory. The Indian public naturally points to this department as showing the high level of responsible work which Indians can achieve in the administration if a fair scope is given to their well-qualified men, and they are not hampered by artificial restrictions and galling distinctions. Indian members of the department are often selected to conduct special statistical and other similar inquiries, and much value is evidently attached to their work. The history of the department points another moral, how dangerous it is for the interests of the country to look to any particular community alone for the supply of officers when that community is unable to produce sufficiently well-qualified men. Formerly the department used to be recruited in India from among domiciled Europeans and Anglo-Indians; but when the duties grew more complex with time and the Anglo-Indian community was no longer able to supply well-qualified officers the field of recruitment had to be shifted. Since, a more liberal policy has now been adopted, and Indians of a suitable class have been admitted, the success of Indian recruitment is no longer in doubt.

186. There are 172 officers, of whom 52 are Indians and the rest Europeans and Anglo-Indians. The present ordinary scale of salaries is Rs. 300–50–1,250–50/2–1,500 and applies to all, except that an Indian officer for the first two years gets Rs. 200 and

Rs. 300, while the European gets Rs. 300 and Rs. 350. From the third year they are all on the same footing. There are also some selection posts with special salaries. There are seven appointments, including three accountant-generalships, which are reserved for members of the Indian civil service.

187. *Findings and recommendations.*—The recommendation of the majority that the department should, in the future, be entirely recruited for in India is fully justified and has my cordial concurrence. The reasons are briefly summarised in paragraph 3 of the annexure to the report, and it is not necessary to add to them, except, perhaps, to point out that apart from the more general considerations the effect of the change will be a net saving to the Indian exchequer of more than three lacs a year. I also agree in the other recommendations of the majority.

#### ANNEXURE VIII.—MILITARY FINANCE DEPARTMENT.

188. *General features.*—Until 1909 the superior staff of the department was recruited from officers of the Indian army, but in that year it was decided by the Secretary of State for India that it should in future be manned by civilians appointed in England. The cadre inquired into by us consists of 57 officers, among whom there is no Indian. The average pay is Rs. 967 a month.

189. *Findings and recommendations.*—The work is similar in character to that of the Indian finance department and the same kind of qualifications is required for its officers. It is observed in paragraph 4 of annexure VII. to the majority report that no Indian is at present employed on the superior staff, presumably for military reasons. I find no foundation for this presumption. In the next sentence it is pointed out that the military accountant-general expressed his view that now that the department had been based on a civilian basis the time had come for making the experiment of appointing Indians. The reasons for the absence of Indians in the higher ranks of the department are obvious. Indian civilians were not appointed for the same reasons which precluded the appointment of English civilians, that is because the appointments were held by officers of the army. The Indian officers of the army were apparently not appointed because they are mostly men who have been promoted from the ranks and are not sufficiently educated to discharge the duties of the department. The evidence shows that there are several Indian officers in the subordinate ranks of the department who are fit for promotion to the superior staff, and only in last May an Indian officer of the Finance department, Mr. Mitra, was appointed as controller of war accounts. My recommendation is that one-fourth of the cadre should be filled by officers appointed in India partly by promotion and partly by direct recruitment until the time comes for amalgamating this department with the Indian finance department. The qualifications of the direct recruits should be the same as for the Indian Finance.

190. *Salaries.*—The scale of salaries proposed for the Indian finance department will be suitable for the Indian officers in the ranks of military accountants second class. For the other appointments, I agree to the proposals of the majority. The effect of my proposals will be a net saving of Rs. 20,000 per annum, instead of an extra expenditure of about Rs. 5,000 as shown in the majority report.

#### ANNEXURE IX.—FOREST DEPARTMENT.

191. *General features.*—The personnel of this department which fell within our cognisance is divided into an imperial branch of 213 officers recruited in England and receiving an average pay of Rs. 924 a month, and a provincial branch of 208 officers recruited in India with an average pay of Rs. 505 a month. All the officers appointed in England are employed on the upper controlling staff in what are called the major charges, after they have served for a time in the minor charges. The provincial officers ordinarily form the lower controlling staff and are employed in the minor charges, but 49 of the major charges out of 216 are open to members of this service; of these, 41 have been filled. There is also a large subordinate staff in this department consisting of about 1,300 men.

192. There are two Indians in the imperial service, and of 41 officers promoted from the locally-recruited service only 14 are Indians, and the rest, 27, are

domiciled Europeans or Anglo-Indians. Proceeding on the basis of salary, there are 96 Indians out of 397 officers on a salary of Rs. 200 and above, 26 Indians out of 239 officers on a salary of Rs. 500 and above, and 6 Indians out of 128 officers on a salary of Rs. 800 and above.

193. *Findings and recommendations.*—When the forest department was instituted and for a long time afterwards, both the Government of India and the Secretary of State, expressed the opinion that it was a special department in which the services of Indians should be utilised as largely as possible. In the beginning the facilities for training for this service did not exist in India, and when the Dehra Dun school was established, its standard was developed to meet the requirements only of the lower staff, and no attempt was made to institute higher instruction with a view to training Indians of good educational qualifications for the upper branch of the service. The result has been a practical exclusion of Indians from the higher posts in the department. The time, however, has now come when the original policy should be carried out by practical measures.

194. That it should not be necessary to import officers from England for the work of the department is recognised in the majority report, and their recommendations are, on the whole, calculated to secure this result. I agree in the proposal that full use should be made of the facilities which have been established at Dehra Dun for giving higher instruction in forestry, and the course of training should be levelled up to the highest European standard. Only bachelors of science should be admitted to the advanced courses, and the Government should announce that not less than half the recruits to the imperial service will be chosen from the statutory natives of India who have successfully gone through the higher course of training. But if there are other competent Indian candidates available, there should be no hesitation in appointing them to the full requirements of the service. The vacancies should be properly advertised, and the selections should be made by a committee on which there should be at least two Indians as proposed in the majority report. But I propose in addition that two scholarships should be awarded every year to promising Indian students to study forestry in Europe, and the understanding with the scholars should be that they will be appointed to the service if they attain the required standard of qualifications and are not rejected as unsuitable by the selection committee to be constituted in England as suggested by the majority of the Commissioners. It is advisable that the steps necessary to enable the department being conducted solely by Indian officers should be taken with reasonable promptitude, so that it may be expected that after, say, 10 years at the latest, it will no longer be necessary to employ outside agency for the work.

195. *Salaries.*—I agree to the Indian scale of salaries proposed by the majority for deputy and assistant conservators, and to such officers as may be appointed in Europe there should be given an additional allowance of Rs. 100. The salaries proposed in the majority report for the conservators upwards involve an additional annual expenditure of about Rs. 30,000, but I do not find sufficient grounds for recommending it.

#### ANNEXURE X.—GEOLOGICAL SURVEY OF INDIA DEPARTMENT.

196. *General features.*—The work undertaken by this department is of considerable importance having for its aim the development of the mineral resources of the country and geological research. Its higher personnel which has come within our cognisance consists of 21 officers with an average pay of Rs. 821. Of these 19 are Europeans, one an Anglo-Indian, and one an Indian. The department is entirely recruited for in England and the recruits are generally young men of 25 or 26. The rules require that they should have a good general education combined with a sound education in geology and one or two years' practical training in technical laboratories or in the mines. On the average about one appointment is made in the year.

197. *Findings and recommendations.*—The teaching of geology in India has not yet reached a high standard. It is taught in Calcutta, where there is a well-equipped laboratory and a museum, and also in Bombay and Madras. It is true that the plains of lower Bengal do not offer facilities for geological study, but the hills of Shillong,

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which are within an easy distance, are said to be an ideal field for the purpose, and excursions are already organised not only to Shillong but to Mussoorie and even to Kashmir. There is no reason whatever why the training for geologists should not be fully available in India, and Indian geology must, of course, be studied in the country itself. I therefore support the recommendation in the majority report that the facilities for training in geological work should be fully developed and that appointments to the department should ordinarily be made in India. It is only after exhausting all the means suggested for securing a suitable candidate that application should be made to England. My further recommendation is that if in England there happens to be a well qualified statutory native of India who is available for employment in this department he should be appointed in preference to other candidates. It is of the utmost importance for the development of the mineral resources of India that there should be an adequate number of Indians trained in geology, so that the country may not have to rely on outside agency. The evidence fully demonstrates the value of this proposition. The present rules, made with a view to suit the conditions for recruitment in Europe, give option to the officers to retire with a pension after 20 years' service; this has enabled more than one officer to come back to Europe at the age of about 46 and obtain lucrative occupation there. Thus the experience and skill of a highly valuable character acquired in the Indian service is lost to the country. This will necessarily be the case more or less when European officers are employed. On the other hand, by the employment of Indians the Government will secure for the country a gradual and steady accumulation of most useful geological knowledge and experience. I also propose that, until geological teaching in India is sufficiently advanced, a scholar should be sent every year to England for the purpose of the department on the same conditions as I have proposed for the agricultural and civil veterinary departments.

198. *Salaries.*—The salaries of the department were revised and considerably increased in 1906; they are evidently higher than in England and in America, and I have been quite unable to agree in the majority's recommendation to increase the salaries of European officers by 22·8 per cent. The extra expenditure proposed is not justified, the fact being, not that good candidates are not attracted to the department, but that some of them take advantage of the rule giving option to retire after 20 years' service. Besides, the proposal of the majority is calculated to delay the making of India self-supporting in this department of work. The salaries should be on an Indian scale of Rs. 300—30—600—50—1,000, the same as for the agricultural and civil veterinary departments; and the three superintendents will get Rs. 1,050—50—1,250. The director's pay will be the same as at present. The result of these proposals will be a saving of about Rs. 11,000 per annum upon the present expenditure, instead of an extra expenditure of Rs. 8,048, which will be the effect of the proposal made in the majority report. The increase of salary recommended by the majority to the officers recruited in England will lead to considerable extra expenditure until the department is entirely manned by Indians.

199. *Pensions.*—My recommendation is that the conditions of pension for this department should be assimilated with the other departments to be recruited for in India, without, of course, affecting the officers who joined under the present rules.

## ANNEXURE XI.—LAND RECORDS (BURMA) DEPARTMENT.

200. *General features.*—Exclusive of the appointments of deputy director and commissioner, which are filled by officers of the Burma Commission, the cadre consists of 48 officers, of whom only 8 were persons of unmixed Asiatic descent. The average pay is Rs. 432 a month.

201. *Findings and recommendations.*—I agree with the majority's findings that the number of officers of pure Asiatic descent is unduly low and I accept the proposal which they have made in this connection; only it should be clearly understood that the Burmans or Indians should not be limited to only a certain proportion of the appointments.

202. *Salaries.*—The scale of salaries proposed is suitable.

## ANNEXURE XII.—MEDICAL SERVICES.

203. *General features.*—In this part of the inquiry, which has been confined to the civil medical department, we have had to deal principally with three services—the Indian medical service, the Indian subordinate medical department (military assistant surgeons) and the provincial medical services (civil assistant surgeons). The first two are purely military services, the Indian medical service being recruited by a competitive examination held in England for supplying the medical needs of the Indian troops; and the Indian subordinate medical department officers form a service subordinate to the Royal army medical corps and are organised primarily to minister to the medical wants of the privates in the British army in India. Indians are not admitted to the subordinate medical department, which is manned by Anglo-Indians educated and trained entirely at the expense of the state. The qualifications of these subordinate medical officers, whose training lasts for three years, are not registrable in Great Britain. The officers of the Indian medical service and the Indian subordinate medical department employed on civil work are described as the war reserve. The civil assistant surgeons, who are mostly Indians, are graduates of the Indian universities; they have to undergo a five years' course in the Indian medical colleges and their qualifications are registrable in Great Britain. The independent medical profession of India is also largely drawn from the medical graduates of the Indian universities. The civil assistant surgeons form the bulk of the entire civil element that there is in the civil medical department. The rest of the civil element consists of a few officers who do not belong to either of these three categories. There is also a class of subordinate Indian medical officers, called sub-assistant surgeons, who are employed in a subordinate capacity in the Indian army and also in the civil department, but we have not inquired into this service.

204. The officers who have come within our inquiry are employed in the following departments of work:—(i) as civil and assistant surgeons in the administration of medical relief in hospitals and dispensaries; (ii) in medical education as professors and teachers in the medical colleges and schools; (iii) in research work in the bacteriological department; (iv) as chemical examiners; (v) in the sanitary department; (vi) in charge of lunatic asylums; and (vii) as jail superintendents. They have also other departmental duties to perform, such as attendance on the Government servants entitled to free medical attendance, doing medico-legal work, examining recruits for the army and the police, and issuing health certificates to Government servants.

205. *Inferior appointments.*—The civil assistant surgeons, who are recruited from the Indian medical colleges, are employed at present almost entirely in what are called inferior or minor appointments. They are 723 in all, and the military assistant surgeons, members of the subordinate medical department, are employed in 98 such posts. The main question that arose with regard to these appointments related to the pay of the civil assistant surgeons, which ranges from Rs. 100 to 350. Admittedly this is entirely inadequate, and the majority report has proposed considerable improvement. The important questions which we have been asked to consider and on which a strong feeling exists in India, next in acuteness only to that relating to the Indian civil service, have arisen with respect to the higher civil medical appointments which are now absorbed in the cadre of the Indian medical service.

206. *Superior appointments.*—In all the departments mentioned there are 492 higher appointments called "superior." Of these, 372 are allotted to the Indian medical service, giving employment to 446 of its officers (including 74 leave reserve), 47 are held by officers of the Indian medical subordinate department, 32 by civil assistant surgeons, and 41 by other civil officers. Thus, as shown in paragraph 1 of annexure XII. of the majority report, out of 566 officers (including 74 leave reserve for the Indian medical service) employed in the superior appointments, 493 officers (446 from the Indian medical service and 47 from the subordinate medical department), or 87 per cent., are military, and only 73, or 13 per cent., civil officers. The administrative appointments in all the departments are held by the Indian medical service men. Out of 37 professorial chairs 33 are filled from that service, only four of the scientific chairs being left free; all the 27 appointments in the bacteriological department, which

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provides facilities for important research work, are ordinarily occupied by the Indian medical service, the charges of all the big hospitals are in their hands, and the great majority of the district surgeoncies are filled by members of that service. They also hold the majority of the appointments in the sanitary and the jail departments. This military service, in fact, has the monopoly of the entire civil medical department in its higher ranks. Its sanctioned strength is given as 748, its actual strength is 772 officers, of which no less than 475, or 62 per cent., are engaged on civil duties, and it has been suggested that the whole of this is the war reserve. There are 19 Indians in the Indian medical service in civil employ.

207. *Employment of the war reserve in the civil medical department.*—The principal question before us is, should the war reserves of the Indian medical service and of the subordinate medical department be employed in civil duties? In considering this matter we have been much handicapped by the fact that these being purely military services, their organisation is dominated by considerations with which we were not in a position to deal. The conditions of the services as to pay, pension, furlough, the basis on which the cadre is calculated, how the war reserve is arrived at, are all matters in which we have practically no information. Nor do we know if there are any special military considerations affecting the Indian army or of any other kind which bear upon the method of recruitment of these services, especially those of the Indian medical service. No military witness was examined, and we have received no information from the military authorities. The only logical and reasonable position apparently is that the administration should consider the needs of the civil medical department primarily from the civil point of view, and then ask itself how far and to what extent it is desirable to admit to the civil department military medical officers whose services may be spared by the military authorities in ordinary times. The military authorities alone can determine what the war reserve should be, if any, and we can make no competent suggestion on the point.

208. *Views of the majority.*—The position taken up in the majority report is, that, subject to what is called a minimum of civil officers, but by which is evidently meant a maximum of 62 in the superior posts if the present size of the reserve is maintained, the rest of the appointments should be retained, as now, for the war reserve. Then it is said that the experience of the present war may lead to a recalculation of the cadre. But if the military authorities be told, as the majority report proposes to tell them, that it would be to the advantage of the civil administration to fill all the available civil posts with the war reserve except to the extent of a small fraction, it is difficult to conceive how the result of the present war will in any way induce the military authorities to reduce the existing reserve. One has only to look at the schedules to annexure XII. of the majority report to realise that no real change in the situation is intended, and that appointments in the proposed civil medical service will remain as much the monopoly of the officers of the Indian medical service as they are at present, with this difference, that they will adopt a different official designation. In my opinion this recommendation fails to meet the requirements of the situation.

209. *Findings.*—That the Indian medical service in the past has done good work is not denied, nor is it denied that it contains able men. The services rendered by it in developing medical education in India are fully appreciated by educated Indians. But we have now a body of Indian medical practitioners whose average efficiency is of a high level, and not a few among them have acquired distinction in the pursuit of their profession as surgeons, physicians, gynæcologists and so on. It is through these Indian practitioners that the blessings of the modern medical sciences have begun to be realised by the people of India. But there are, however, still numerous classes of the population who do not benefit by western medicine and with whom it has yet to be popularised, and this will only be effected if and as the strength of the indigenous medical profession increases. The total strength of Indian practitioners with registrable qualifications is about 1,500, and their number must be enormously increased before it will be possible to combat with any degree of success the various diseases of which India is at present the victim. Having regard to the still very limited character of the classes which offer a lucrative field for the practice of western medicine, the practical exclusion of Indians from those valuable inducements and opportunities which the civil medical department offers is naturally keenly felt. Its inevitable effect will be to check the growth of the medical profession; of all the professions in

India medicine is pre-eminently the one to which it ought not to be said "thus far and no farther!"

210. The chief specific complaints made against the present system are : first, that qualified Indians do not find proper scope in civil medical work in the country ; secondly, the exclusive control by officers of the Indian medical service, of the civil hospitals almost all of which are under the management of the Government and also of the bacteriological department, practically means the exclusion of the members of the independent medical profession from hospital work and from the opportunities of laboratory research. On this point, what could be gathered during the inquiry was that it was not possible for experienced and competent members of the independent profession—apart from the question of post-graduate training—to have a fair and honourable sphere of work, especially in the hospitals, side by side with members of the Indian medical service. Thirdly, it was a general complaint that the employment of this military service in the civil department is producing all the injurious effects of subsidised competition. Fourthly, that the reservation for this service of professorial chairs, both scientific and clinical, has in a number of instances led to unsatisfactory appointments. The evidence shows that all these points in the complaint are well-founded, and indeed the facts being as they are it could hardly be otherwise.

211. The last-mentioned allegation was warmly contested in India by members of the service, but the evidence of the eminent medical authorities in this country who gave us their opinion upon the facts placed before them has left no doubt in the matter. Of the professorial chairs, the clinical are the most important, and also the most lucrative, as they generally carry a large practice with them, but these are the very chairs which, in the interests of medical education, should be filled by the best men available, whether in the service or otherwise. The effect of the recommendations of the majority of Commissioners will be that they should continue to be filled from the Indian medical service, while their recommendation that the scientific chairs should not be reserved for the Indian medical service can make no practical difference in the present practice, as they have not proposed the reduction of officers of the war reserve employed in the civil department. If the number of officers so employed remains the same as now, the scientific chairs must also necessarily be occupied by them. I think it is a just demand that all professorial appointments and also the directorships of the larger laboratories in the bacteriological department should be filled only by men who have distinguished original work to their credit, and should not be treated as prizes for a close service. The incumbents of such posts should be sought in the open market, but if the best man available for a particular post is to be found in the Indian medical service, or in the locally recruited services, there will be no objection to his being appointed. I should also mention here that the head of the Indian medical service himself admitted that there were a great many Indians "who would do extremely well as professors." That men like Dr. Rau of Bombay, Dr. S. P. Sarbadhiary, Dr. Nilratan Sirkar, and Dr. Kedar Nath Das of Calcutta, and Dr. T. M. Nair of Madras, to mention only a few prominent names, should be precluded by the present arrangements from professorial appointments in their special subjects and from hospital work altogether is in itself a sufficient condemnation of the present system. Our attention has been drawn to the fact that the number of Indians holding the higher qualifications of M.D. or fellowships is smaller than of the members of the Indian medical service. But there can be no doubt that the growth in the number of such men is seriously affected by the lack of opportunities in the civil medical department ; and all that is asked for is that the limitations upon such opportunities should be done away with.

212. The effect of the war is shown in the figures supplied to us. Altogether 286 officers have been recalled to military duty. In consequence, 188 civil surgeoncies out of 192 and 8 professorial chairs out of 33 occupied by members of the Indian medical service had to be vacated and provided for otherwise. Fifteen officers were also withdrawn from plague duty. Of the total number vacated 75 civil surgeoncies have been filled by the promotion of civil assistant surgeons, 13 by the promotion of military assistants, 15 by the appointment of private practitioners, and 8 by retired members of the Indian medical service. The civil surgeoncies of 31 districts had to be placed in charge of officers in the neighbouring districts and 11 in collateral charge

of military officers. The dislocation has thus been considerable but was inevitable. The very fact that officers of the war reserve are employed in the civil department contains possibilities of dislocation, and the larger the reserve so employed the greater is that possibility. The proper lesson to derive, therefore, is that in addition to the other equally important or even more important considerations of a general character this fact also illustrates the necessity of confining the employment of the war reserve to a small area of civil employment.

213. Stress was laid before us upon the necessity of providing European doctors for the families of the European employees of the Government as they do not like to be treated by Indian practitioners. Undoubtedly the prejudice alluded to exists; at the same time I believe that it is somewhat exaggerated. We were told by more than one Indian practitioner that there were always some Europeans who felt no difficulty in calling in the assistance of Indian medical men for their families and it may be taken that the number will grow and not decline. However that may be, if the argument on the European side is sought to be pushed to this length that because there happens to be one or two European officials in a district, the state must provide them with a European doctor or a member of the Indian medical service it is *prima facie* unreasonable and cannot be admitted to override the larger interests of the country and of the general population. The demand must be limited to more reasonable proportions. If it be so limited and the following facts are borne in mind, namely:—(i) that in all large cities there are always some European medical practitioners, (ii) the rapid growth of the medical mission, which often works in the district, (iii) the number of military stations where there are military medical officers, (iv) the spread of railway communications, (v) the fact that the families of European officials often spend the unhealthy part of the year in hill stations and a number of them live in Europe, (vi) the number of districts which are likely to be manned by Indian officials, the real requirements would be fully met by a small fraction of the number of Indian medical service officers now employed in the civil departments. The number which I am proposing taking also into account the number of Anglo-Indian doctors who will be available will amply meet the requirements.

214. *Indians in the Indian medical service.*—It appears that during the last two years there has been an increase in the number of successful Indian candidates. In 1913, out of 24 appointments, 8 fell to Indian candidates and in 1914, out of 35 appointments competed for, 14 were secured by Indians. This success has not escaped comment and it has been suggested that it was due partly to the examination not being of a more practical nature and partly to the number of competitors being small. It also appears that some of the medical graduates of the Indian universities succeeded in the London examination only after a few months residence and study in the country. It was alleged that in some of the Indian hospitals there was not sufficient material for the students being trained in gynaecological work. A suggestion is conveyed in paragraph 9 of annexure XII. of the majority report, apparently supporting a proposal made to us by some witnesses, that Indian medical graduates should not be allowed to sit for the Indian medical service examination, unless they have been doing hospital work in this country for some time. As regards hospital work in India, I accept the view of Dr. Das of Calcutta, a distinguished practitioner in midwifery and gynaecology, that the gynaecological material available in the Calcutta medical college hospital is ample, but at present not properly managed. In Madras and Bombay there are admittedly no such difficulties. But whatever that may be, there is no objection to the examination being improved and made more practical, but in the light of facts which have been brought to our notice, it is hardly a fair suggestion that it should be made a condition precedent to a candidate appearing for the examination, that he should have attended one of the hospitals in Great Britain for a certain number of years. It cannot be denied that Indian students are finding great difficulties nowadays in working in the larger hospitals, and any such restriction as contemplated, would practically mean shutting the door against Indian candidates for the Indian medical service.

215. *Recommendations.*—The principal points in the scheme for the civil medical service which I propose are that the bulk of the superior appointments should be filled by civil officers, some of whom will be directly appointed from the profession in India, and some by promoted civil assistant surgeons. The officers of the Indian medical

service would be admitted to 162, or about one-third of the superior appointments and a certain number of similar appointments, about 30, will be recruited from among the military assistant surgeons, provided they possess registrable qualifications. The specialist appointments will be recruited for in the open market. The occupants of the scientific chairs will not be allowed private practice, and the holders of clinical chairs should be confined to consulting practice. As regards the minor appointments, I am in general agreement with the proposals made in the majority report. The administrative organisation which will be best suited to the scheme which I propose, would have to be determined by the Government. Probably a provincial organisation will be most convenient. The director-general under my proposals will naturally be of the entire service, and not as at present solely of the Indian medical service; that is if the present all-India organisation is retained.

216. *Indian civil medical service.*—Of the 292 appointments, excluding the 10 administrative posts, 82 will be filled by officers directly appointed in India, 82 by promoted civil assistant surgeons, 98 (or one-third of the total) will be held by officers of the Indian medical service and 30 by promoted military assistant surgeons. The director-Generalship and the nine other administrative appointments are to be open to all officers of the service. The director-general to be called director-general of the medical services. The administrative officers will receive the same pay as at present but the exchange compensation allowances will be merged into pay. The rates of pay of the inspectors-general, Central Provinces and Assam are to be interchanged. The Indian medical service officers are to receive only their military pay. Those among them who will be debarred from private practice are to be granted suitable allowances. Other officers, whether directly appointed or promoted, will draw Rs. 500—50/2—800—50/3—900—50/4—1,000, with suitable allowances for those debarred from private practice.

217. *Local civil medical service.*—As proposed in annexure XII. of the majority report.

218. *Professorships, chemical examinerships and alienist appointments.*—All professorships and chemical examinerships should be filled by specialists who have established a reputation for original work. They need not be selected from any service but should be the best men available in India or in England. Their salaries should range between Rs. 1,000 and Rs. 2,000. Of the six superintendentships of lunatic asylums four should be filled by recruitment in India and such officers should receive Rs. 500—50/2—800—50/3—900—50/4—1,000 a month. The remaining two will be filled by Indian medical service officers who will draw their military pay plus an allowance of Rs. 200.

219. *Bacteriological department.*—The directors of the four larger laboratories should receive salaries ranging from Rs. 1,000 to 2,000. These appointments like professorships will be open to officers in the department and to outsiders alike. Of the remaining 23 appointments 15 will be made in India either directly or by promotion and the officers will receive Rs. 500—50/2—800—50/3—900—50/4—1,000; eight (i.e., one-third) will be filled by Indian medical service officers who will draw their military pay plus an allowance of Rs. 200.

220. *Sanitary department.*—Of the 58 appointments (excluding the nine administrative posts) two-thirds are to be recruited for in India and the officers holding them would draw Rs. 500—100/2—600—100/3—700—100/4—1,000, and 19 are to be held by Indian medical service officers on their military pay plus an allowance of Rs. 200. The administrative appointments will be open to all. Their pay will remain the same but exchange compensation allowances will be merged into pay.

221. *Jail department.*—Twenty (two-thirds of 30) first class superintendentships and three (two-thirds of five) second class superintendentships are to be held by Indian medical service officers on their military pay plus allowances of Rs. 200 and Rs. 100 respectively. Ten first class superintendentships should be filled in India and these officers will draw Rs. 600—50—1,000. The two second class superintendents appointed in India will draw Rs. 550—50—700 and 450—30—600 as at present. All administrative appointments are to be open equally to all officers. Their salaries

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should be the same as at present but exchange compensation allowance will be merged into pay.

222. *Salaries of the Indian medical service officers.*—Paragraph 19 of annexure XII. of the majority report contains proposals for increasing the pay of the Indian medical service officers, in the administrative ranks as well as of the general body, the cost of which amounts altogether to Rs. 7,68,434. What is said with reference to the increases proposed in the pay of administrative officers is "We think, however, that we shall be on safe ground in proposing definite increases of emoluments for the higher administrative officers." This does not seem to be a sufficient reason. The present salaries of these officers range from Rs. 2,000 to Rs. 3,000 a month and the increases proposed are an addition of Rs. 500 a month to the director general and Rs. 250 to each of the others. I have been unable to agree to the proposal. For the rest of the officers the proposal is that for the present they should receive allowances amounting to 12½ per cent. of the present emoluments in addition to the exchange compensation allowance. The reason given is that they have lost much of their private practice and the proposed increase would merely compensate them for the loss. It is, however, admitted by the majority, that the question of pay of the Indian medical service officers did not come within our province, it being a matter for the military authorities to decide. That being so, all that the civil administration which wishes to employ any such officers has to see is whether they cannot secure them on the present terms for civil work. The evidence shows that the officers are as keen as ever for coming into the civil department in spite of the general complaint that their private practice is not as remunerative as it used to be. As to the decline in private practice, there has evidently been some, but the evidence did not satisfy me that it was considerable. The figures given did not cover all the appointments. Great emphasis is laid on the fact that there has been a falling off in the number of competitors at the examination. But my conclusion is that this is to a considerable extent due to the agitation carried on by certain members of the service whose vague and general statements created an impression in the medical schools and hospitals which was not quite in accordance with the facts.

223. *Cost.*—The cost of my proposals will amount to an extra expenditure of about Rs. 6,00,000 against Rs. 14,25,700 proposed in the majority report.

#### ANNEXURE XIII.—INDIAN MINES DEPARTMENT.

224. There are only five appointments which fell within our enquiry. The officers are all Europeans appointed in Europe, the average salary being Rs. 1,094 per mensem. At present no facilities exist in India for acquiring technical qualifications for the work, and I am in entire agreement with the recommendation of the majority, that a school should be established for giving adequate mining education. In addition to the requirements of the department, the general advantages which will accrue by the establishment of such an institution are obvious. All that can be laid down with regard to the employment of Indians is that if a suitable candidate is forthcoming he should be given a trial.

#### ANNEXURE XIV.—MINT AND ASSAY DEPARTMENT.

225. In both these departments we have only enquired into seven appointments. I agree with the majority of the Commissioners that the selection of mint officers should not be confined to Royal engineers, but that all persons, whether Europeans or Indians, possessing the necessary qualifications should be eligible for appointment.

#### ANNEXURE XV.—PILOT SERVICE (BENGAL).

226. In this department there are 55 officers, of whom 39 are Europeans and 16 Anglo-Indians. They are paid from fees, and their earnings vary between 600 and Rs. 2,000 or more a month. The present rules exclude Indians of pure Asiatic descent, and I agree in the recommendation of the majority that the bar should be removed. This, however, will have no practical results unless the Government of Bengal sees its way to provide facilities for the training of Indian youths for the work. There is at present a class of Muhammadans in Bengal who would be extremely well-suited for pilot's duties if trained. Many of them have proved them-

selves excellent navigators on the difficult rivers in eastern Bengal and on the Hugli. In fact, the inland navigation of Bengal is mostly managed by them. They are generally self-trained, and their educational qualifications are of a rudimentary character. But boys of this community, if trained, would supply very efficient material for the service.

#### ANNEXURE XVI.—POLICE DEPARTMENT.

227. *General features.*—The appointments which came within our cognisance in this department are distributed into two services, the imperial and the provincial. In the former service, which is wholly recruited in England, there are 671 appointments, with an average pay of Rs. 726 per mensem; and the provincial service recruited for in India contains 255 appointments with an average pay of Rs. 405 a month. There are 358 officers holding higher appointments, that is, of superintendents of police and upwards, of whom eight are Indians, the rest being Europeans or Anglo-Indians who, with very few exceptions, were recruited in England. Officers holding the less important appointments are 568 in number, of whom 313 are Europeans appointed in England and belong to the imperial service; the remaining 255 being Indians and Anglo-Indians appointed in India. As in the Indian civil service, so in the police, there has, since 1886-7, been a remarkable increase in the number of officers appointed in England, the figures having gone up from 370 to 671.

#### *Findings and recommendations.*

228. *London examination.*—The first question that has arisen is whether the rule laid down as a condition of eligibility to sit for the competitive examination held in England for the imperial service, that “every candidate must be a British subject of European descent, and at the time of his birth his father must have been a British subject either natural born or naturalised in the United Kingdom,” should not be abrogated. I have no hesitation in answering in the affirmative. This is also the view recently expressed by the Government of India, who, among other things, rightly points out that there can be no sufficient ground for excluding Indians from the examination, when they are admitted to the Indian civil service examination. I am content to put it on the broad ground that this rule is inconsistent with the rights of Indians as citizens of the British empire, and is apparently a direct violation of the statute of 1833. The majority report proposes a modification to the effect, that such Indian and Anglo-Indian candidates should be admitted to the examination as have been educated for five years in the United Kingdom. Having regard to the fact that the examination is held at the age of 17-19, the majority’s proposal, whether it has or has not the effect of getting round the letter of the statute, secures a virtual maintenance of the present bar, so far at least as Indians are concerned. Even apart from considerations arising from the age for examination, a restriction of the character proposed seems to me quite indefensible. In fact, no reasons are given in justification of such a measure. My recommendation is that the London examination should be open to Indian candidates without any special restrictions.

229. *Promotion and status of officers appointed in India.*—The next question is, how should the officers recruited in India be treated in the matter of promotion to the higher appointments and what should be their official status. The question has been discussed in its general aspects in the report. My finding is that the evidence is clear and unanimous to show that these officers are recruited for the purpose of discharging the same duties as the recruits from England, *i.e.*, mainly to supervise and control the work of the investigating staff, under the guidance of the superintendents of police. There is hardly another department of the Indian Government whose work is subjected to such constant criticisms as the police, and it was in accordance with one of the main recommendations of the Police Commission of 1902, which last reported on the subject, that a superior police service should be formed, to be locally recruited in India, that the provincial police service was founded. It was contemplated that these officers were to have “the same departmental status”—to use their own words—“as assistants,” *i.e.*, the recruits from England, and were to supply

the additional number of "assistants" required. The duties of both classes of officers were to be identical, namely, to help the superintendent "in the discharge of the duties of control and supervision and to relieve them of the routine of office work." They were to be drawn from the same class of men as the members of the provincial civil service, and it was hoped that the employment in this sphere of work of educated Indians would secure much beneficial result. This was a new experiment and hence the Police Commission, as far as the question of the promotion of this class of officers to higher appointments was concerned, satisfied themselves from the experience gained of similar officers in the provincial civil service, with expressing their belief in the probability that the selected officers among that class might prove fully qualified for the charge of the police of a district.

230. The evidence shows without a doubt that the provincial police officers have proved a valuable asset to the force; and their efficiency has not been questioned in any province. It has also to be borne in mind that they have displayed great courage and devotion to duty in unravelling the anarchists' plots. Whatever other valuable qualities an European policeman may possess, he is naturally handicapped by insurmountable difficulties in the detection of crime and in supervising the work of the investigating staff. It will be in my opinion nothing but a sheer set-back to reforms in the police administration if the class of educated young Indians who were attracted to this service by the encouraging terms of the Police Commission's report should be told that though engaged in the same class of duties as the officers recruited in England they were not to have substantial chances of promotion and must be satisfied with a lower status. There are distinct signs of disappointment in the provincial force, and some of the young recruits have already left it.

231. Disagreeing with the findings and recommendations of the majority, I submit the following proposals. The appointments now in the cadre of the imperial police and the provincial police should be added together. Of these 358 higher appointments, *i.e.*, of superintendents and upwards, will be placed in class I., and the rest of the appointments, 568, will be placed in class II., consisting of officers recruited in England and in India. They will all be on one list, and all officers in class II. will be called assistant superintendents of police. The pay of officers of class II. appointed in England and India will be as proposed in the majority report for assistant superintendents and deputy superintendents as they are now designated. Having regard to the scale of pay in this department, it is desirable to earmark a certain proportion of superior appointments for officers recruited in England and in India respectively, otherwise recruitment in England will be likely to suffer. For assistants recruited in England I would reserve 75 per cent. of the superior posts, and for those appointed in India the remaining 25 per cent. The recruitment in England, should, as now, proceed on the basis that after eight years' service as assistant superintendent, an officer should ordinarily expect to officiate with practical permanency in one of the superior appointments. The number of officers to be locally recruited must be determined with reference to the needs of the department, and their promotion will inevitably be made by selection. Their departmental status should be the same as that of the assistants appointed in England. There shall be no difference in the pay of superintendents of police and other higher appointments when filled by assistants appointed in India, which is also the recommendation of the majority report. I am unable to agree with their recommendation which proposes an increase of the salaries of deputy inspectors general.

232. The selections for appointments to be made to class II. of the service shall be made by a selection committee, as proposed in paragraph 19 of annexure XVI. of the majority report. In paragraph 20, the majority of the Commissioners have suggested an increase in the number of officers appointed in England, which has already swelled to almost double since the report of 1886-7. I have discussed the matter fully in the main report (*see* paragraphs 91-2). All that I would add here is that the inquiry did not place us in a position to make any responsible suggestions on the point, and that the suggestion of the majority, as far as it goes, enunciates a wrong policy.

233. *Cost.*—The cost of my proposals will be a net saving of about Rs. 2,50,000 per annum instead of a total extra expenditure of more than one lakh per annum, the result of the majority's proposals.

## ANNEXURE XVII.—POST OFFICE OF INDIA AND TELEGRAPH DEPARTMENT.

234. *General features.*—Since our inquiry the two departments have been amalgamated under orders of the Government passed on the 6th March 1914, but the Secretary of State for India held over the question of recruitment pending the report, and gave only his provisional approval to the methods suggested for the recruitment of the telegraph department (engineering and traffic branches).

*The post office.*

235. The post office is the only large department which is recruited for almost entirely in India. The superior staff, which alone was the subject of inquiry, consists of 247 officers with an average pay of Rs. 489 a month, not including the postmasters. This is exclusive of members of the Indian civil service employed in the department. In the entire department, out of 277 officers drawing a salary of Rs. 200 and above, the Indians hold 132, or 48 per cent., and out of 46 appointments on Rs. 500 and over, Indians hold only 5, or 11 per cent., and out of 25 posts on a salary of Rs. 800 and more, the Indians hold only 2 posts, amounting to 8 per cent. These figures are especially instructive, having regard to the fact that the appointments are all made in India.

236. *Findings and recommendations.*—This entirely unsatisfactory position of the Indians cannot be said to be due to the fact that they are not suitable for the work of the department. The reasons are different. In the first place, ten per cent. of the appointments are reserved for Europeans, then the standard of qualifications required of the recruits is kept low enough for the reach of an ordinary Anglo-Indian school-boy, and the higher appointments being largely filled by promotions made from the subordinate ranks, a tradition has grown up that the department offers a lucrative career for Anglo-Indians and domiciled Europeans with inferior educational qualifications. A tendency has, no doubt, been apparent within recent times to break through this tradition, and it is time that it was replaced by a juster and sounder policy. In the first place, the standard of qualifications should not be lower than that of the bachelor's degree of a university, and it is only within the limits of the candidates able to produce such qualifications that the selection committee should be authorised to secure a fair representation of the more important communities. The majority report seems to evince, in this connection, a special anxiety for Anglo-Indian competitors, and for them they propose that the passing of an examination of "a corresponding standard prescribed for the European schools" should be accepted in the place of a university degree. So far as I have been able to gather, these words are not intended to convey that by such an examination the same standard of qualifications will be secured as that of an Indian university degree. In fact, it would not be possible to apply that standard to an examination meant for the European schools, as I have pointed out in the report. My recommendation is that for such Anglo-Indian candidates as are not graduates an examination should be held by competent examiners appointed by the Government, and that its standard should be equivalent to that of a degree of an Indian university. It should also be borne in mind, in making the selection that the Anglo-Indian community is a very small community compared with the Hindus, the Muhammadans, the Sikhs, the Parsis, and they are not entitled to ask for any special considerations.

237. In the next place the evidence points to the necessity of developing the practice of making direct appointments to the posts of superintendents, as well as of the gazetted postmasters. At present the practice is to fill half the superintendencies by the appointment of direct recruits, and I suggest that the proportion for such appointments should be two-thirds. To the posts of gazetted postmasters, the practice of appointing outsiders with proper educational qualifications, and after a due period of probation, has been recently started. Having regard to the inadequate educational qualifications of the subordinate ranks of post office employees, the practice should be persevered with, and half the number of these posts should be filled by direct appointment.

238. *Salaries.*—I am in agreement with the majority in their recommendations relating to the salaries of the administrative officers, the superintendents and the postmasters.

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 MINUTE BY MR. ABDUR RAHIM—(continued)—ANNEXURES XVII AND XVIII.
 

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*Telegraphic (engineering and traffic).*

239. Before amalgamation there was one common staff for both engineering and traffic with five-eighths of the officers recruited in England and placed in the imperial service with an average salary of Rs. 974 a month and the remaining three-eighths were provincial officers on an average pay of Rs. 661 per mensem. Under the amalgamation scheme the engineering and the traffic branches have been separated, 46 officers have been allotted to the engineering branch and 40 to the traffic branch. It has been proposed that of the officers in the engineering branch one-half will be appointed in England and one-quarter of the whole will be appointed in India from the electrical engineering class at Rurki and one-quarter by promotion from the subordinate staff. On the traffic side three-fourths of the cadre will be filled by promotion from the subordinate ranks and the remaining one-fourth by appointments made in England.

240. The effect of these proposals is that recruitment from the Indian college for telegraph work will be considerably reduced and the superior staff so far as it will be recruited in India will be manned by promoted officers. This measure seems to follow a direction contrary to that well established in other departments. The present tendency evolved by experience is that direct appointments to the higher service should be encouraged as far as possible, for it is by making such appointments that the standard of qualification can be kept sufficiently high and the Indians will be given the chance of a fair career in the higher ranks of Government service. The first obvious result of the proposed course will be to injure the special electrical class at Rurki, which has recently been founded and given good results as far as can be gathered from the evidence. There is a great need in India for developing technical education in electrical engineering and it is bound to receive a set-back as an effect of the proposal in question. I have not been able to gather that the officers trained at the Rurki College were wanting in efficiency.

241. My next objection is to the proposal to fill three-quarters of the appointments on the traffic side by promotion of officers from the upper subordinate staff. The objection is based upon the conditions of recruitment of the subordinate employees. They begin their career on entirely elementary qualifications in posts carrying Rs. 30 or Rs. 50 a month; it takes them about 20 years to become telegraph masters, and about ten years more to be deputy superintendents second class. Thus by the time that an upper subordinate is likely to be selected he will be rather advanced in age, and there will be very few years of service left for him to look forward to. Besides, he would not be a man of such educational qualifications as are needed for the incumbents of posts of supervision and control. The majority of the Commissioners do not seem to have expressed any clear view on this point. The suggestion that promoted men will, by virtue of their departmental experience, be better fitted for traffic work loses sight of the peculiar conditions of the department in India to which I have alluded. Besides, it does not appear from the evidence that the officers recruited from the Rurki college have been found wanting. The recommendation which I make is that not less than half of the staff of the engineering and traffic branches should be recruited for by direct appointment from the Rurki college and not more than one-quarter of the two cadres may be filled by promotion of upper subordinates. The remaining appointments will be made from outside.

242. *Salaries.*—I have no separate proposals to make under this head.

ANNEXURE XVIII.—PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT AND RAILWAY DEPARTMENT  
(ENGINEERING ESTABLISHMENT).

243. *General features.*—During inquiry the cadre consisted of a total of 928 officers, made up of 70 royal engineers, 578 officers belonging to the imperial service recruited in England and 280 officers belonging to the provincial service recruited in India. The average pay of imperial service officers, excluding royal engineers, is Rs. 986, and that of the provincial service is Rs. 636. Under the present rules, as interpreted in practice, ten per cent. of the appointments made in England are allotted to Indian candidates and the rest to English candidates. The annual recruitment, which is at the rate of about 37 or 38 a year, is distributed as follows:—

20 in England, 9 and 10 in alternate years from the Indian engineering colleges, 5 and 4 in alternate years by promotion of subordinates and 3 royal engineers. In all, there appear to be 203 Indian officers in the department. On the railway establishment the number of Indians is 16 out of a total of 180.

244. *Findings and recommendations.*—The work of the public works department is divided into two principal sections, one connected with irrigation and the other with the construction, repair and maintenance of roads, buildings and bridges. It is difficult to imagine why the ordinary requirements of this department should not, within a reasonable time, be met in India. Indians could not have entirely lost that aptitude for the engineering art which found such wonderful expression in their architecture and schemes of irrigation, relics of which are still extant. The Indian engineering colleges, notably the Thomason college at Rurki, are admittedly efficient institutions, and it seems to me that the proper policy to pursue in this department would be to look entirely to these colleges to supply the engineering needs of the country. For the present, however, I am satisfied with the proposal made in the majority report that the percentage of recruitment from Indian colleges should be raised from about 30 to 50 per cent. With regard to the recruitment of Indians in England, my view is that the ten per cent. rule in England may be abolished, but on the ground that it has been interpreted as indicating the maximum. The drift, however, of the observations in paragraph 10 of the majority report seems to be that Indian students who come to Europe to study modern engineering should not be encouraged to expect being appointed in this department. If such be the suggestion, I wish entirely to dissociate myself from it. On the other hand, there should be no hesitation in appointing as many Indians as are found to be well qualified. I agree in the recommendation for shortening the period of service in the minor appointments from ten to eight years, and increasing the number of subordinate officers for the manning of subdivisional charges.

245. *Salaries.*—The scale of salaries which I propose for the assistant engineers appointed in India is Rs. 300-50/2-500, and for the assistant engineers appointed in England I propose a scale of Rs. 380-40-700. For executive engineers there should be one scale of pay for all, namely, Rs. 750-50-1,250. I do not agree in the proposals of the majority, which have the result of increasing the pay of the superintending and the chief engineers by nearly Rs. 83,000 a year.

246. *Cost.*—The cost of my proposals will be about Rs. 7,22,573 per annum, which will mean a net saving of about Rs. 10,41,000 per annum; the net saving effected by the majority's recommendations is about Rs. 12,80,000.

#### ANNEXURE XIX.—RAILWAY DEPARTMENT (REVENUE ESTABLISHMENTS).

247. The enquiry has been confined to the establishments of the three state-managed railway lines, namely, the North Western, the Eastern Bengal, and the Oudh and Rohilkund. The departments with which we have been concerned are the management, engineering, traffic, locomotive, carriage and wagon and stores. There are 7 appointments in the management, 119 in the traffic, 60 in the locomotive, 17 in the carriage and wagon, and 18 in the stores establishment, altogether 221. There are ten Indian officers at present in the traffic department, and I agree in the recommendation of the Commission that the number should be increased. It is specially important that there should be an adequate number of Indian officers in the traffic establishment as it may be expected that their knowledge of the customs and habits of the people will contribute materially to the smooth working of the passenger traffic on the railways. There is one Indian officer in the stores but none in the other departments. In the locomotive, carriage and wagon departments facilities should, as recommended by the majority, be provided for the training of the statutory natives of India for the work. In fact the aim in view should be that the revenue establishment of the railway should be entirely recruited for in India.

#### ANNEXURE XX.—REGISTRATION DEPARTMENT.

248. *General features.*—The duty of the officers of the registration department is to register various kinds of documents. Its organisation varies in the different provinces and seems to be best developed in Madras and next in Bengal and Bihar and Orissa.

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249. *Findings and recommendations.*—I agree in the proposals made in the majority report regarding the department. The only other recommendation which I wish to make is that the practice of appointing an officer of the provincial civil service as the inspector-general of registration which obtains in Madras, Bengal, and Bihar and Orissa should be followed in the other provinces as well. This ought to be feasible in Bombay with certain incidental administrative adjustments, and the policy should be kept in view in the other provinces wherever there is a sufficiently large staff of whole time registration officers.

ANNEXURE XXI.—NORTHERN INDIA SALT REVENUE DEPARTMENT.

250. *General features.*—Forty-five officers of the department with an average pay of about Rs. 400 a month were embraced in our enquiry. Of these only nine were Indians and the rest either domiciled Europeans or Anglo-Indians. The department is recruited for entirely in India except that the commissioner—the head of the department—is appointed from the Indian civil service.

251. *Findings and recommendations.*—In the first place it appears that for a department like this it is not necessary to have a member of the Indian civil service at its head, and my recommendation is that the commissioner should be an officer selected from among the higher personnel of the department.

252. With regard to recruitment, it is necessary that a higher educational qualification, as proposed in the majority report, be required from the candidates than is now the case. The standard of a university degree is suitable for the purpose, and Anglo-Indian candidates should not be admitted on a lower standard of qualifications. When the standard of qualifications is so fixed there will be no further necessity for selecting the candidates before allowing them to sit for the examination, as the number will automatically be reduced. It is also difficult to understand why it should be suggested, as it is in the majority report, that “at least one in every three” of the candidates nominated to sit for the examination should be an Indian of “unmixed Asiatic descent.” This is likely to be understood as conveying that one-third of the appointments is a reasonable proportion for Indians to expect, and I need hardly say that I cannot bring myself to agree to such an outlook. The examination should be unrestrictedly open to candidates of all communities who can produce the necessary educational qualifications. I may mention that my view of the evidence is that within recent times the number of Anglo-Indian candidates has declined, and the number of successful Indian candidates has shown a tendency to grow larger. That does not, to my mind, show that recruitment has suffered so far as the quality of the new recruits is concerned, or that there is a necessity for adopting special measures to restrict the natural flow of candidates.

253. *Salaries.*—As I have proposed that the post of commissioner should be filled from among the officers of the department it is not necessary to maintain the present rate of Rs. 2,500, which is intended for members of the Indian civil service, and I think that Rs. 2,000 would be an adequate and reasonable salary for the post. For the rest of the personnel the scale proposed in the majority report is suitable.

ANNEXURE XXII.—SALT AND EXCISE DEPARTMENT.

254. *General features.*—With the exception of the five distillery experts who are obtained from Europe, the rest of the department is recruited for in India. There were 338 officers on a pay of Rs. 200 a month and over, of whom 130, or 38 per cent. were Indians; out of 50 posts with a pay of Rs. 500 and upwards, only five were held by Indians, and of 22 officers with a salary of Rs. 800 and upwards only two were Indians; the others were Europeans or Anglo-Indians. The average pay in the provinces of Madras, Bombay, and Burma varies from Rs. 436 to 479.

255. *Findings and recommendations.*—In this department, as in some others already noted, a marked preference is shown by some heads of the department for Anglo-Indian over Indian candidates. It was sought to be justified on the ground that officers of the latter class are less suitable for work of the department which required considerable physical endurance, than officers of the former class. But the reasons did not bear the test of close scrutiny.\* In the lower ranks of the service,

\* See Volume XVIII., paragraphs 78079–81.

the conditions of which tell more upon an officer's health, it is the Indians that are mostly employed; the domiciled Europeans and Anglo-Indians are appointed to higher grades where the conditions are less exacting. The result naturally is that among the few Indian officers who at a late period of service reached the higher appointments a larger proportion showed signs of strain and breakdown or retired earlier than the domiciled European or Anglo-Indian officers of the same rank. This only reflects discredit on the arrangements and not on the stamina of Indian officers.

256. The appointments should be filled by nomination on selections made by a committee as proposed. The committee in making the selections will have due regard to the claims of the different communities and not merely of the Anglo-Indians. The standard of qualifications should be a degree of a university, and for the Anglo-Indian candidates, the passing a special examination of an equivalent standard. I agree in the recommendation of the majority that the domiciled Europeans and Anglo-Indians should not be appointed in the first instance to a higher grade than the others. All must begin at the same grade.

257. *Salaries.*—The proposals put forward in this connection seem to be suitable.

#### ANNEXURE XXIII.—SURVEY OF INDIA DEPARTMENT.

258. *General features.*—In this department the services are divided into imperial and provincial. The former consists of 51 officers drawn from the royal engineers and the officers of the Indian army with an average pay of Rs. 1,230 a month, and the provincial service is composed of 96 officers, recruited for in India, on an average pay of Rs. 469 a month. There are 34 "superior" posts, of which 27 are filled by officers of the imperial service and seven by officers of the provincial service; the rest are inferior posts. All the direct recruits, whether in the imperial or the provincial service, are appointed to an inferior charge. Those, however, who belong to the imperial service are all promoted to a superior charge after about nine years' service in an inferior charge as in the Indian civil service and the police. Here, also, less important posts, when held by members of the imperial service, are regarded as "training posts." Officers of the provincial service, however, are normally confined to the "inferior" appointments, only seven superior posts being open to 96 officers. The duties appertaining to all inferior appointments, as well as to the superior appointments whether held by one class of men or the other, are identical. The difference in the pay of the two classes of men varies not only in the inferior appointments but also in the superior appointments, so that the pay of even the seven promoted officers of the locally recruited service is much less than that of the other officers. There are 181 posts in the department on Rs. 200 a month, of which 28 are held by Indians; of the 76 posts above Rs. 500 a month only one is held by an Indian, and in the posts above Rs. 800 there is no Indian. The rest of the appointments are all held by Europeans and Anglo-Indians.

259. The main work of the department is the preparation of topographical maps required not only for military purposes, but by the civil administrations such as the public works and forest departments and also by the general public. The headquarters is at Calcutta, and the head of the department is the surveyor-general, who is a military officer. The organisation of the department has undergone many changes and it is estimated that the present topographical survey, which is mainly revisional, will be completed in 1931. It is expected that thereafter a reconstruction of the department may be necessary.

260. *Findings and recommendations.*—As in the case of the police, my proposal is that there should be one common list for imperial and provincial officers. The grouping of officers on the list will be according to the class of appointments held by them and not by services as proposed by the majority. Class I. will be made up of all officers holding superior appointments, and class II. of all officers holding the other appointments, some of which are now technically called inferior in connection with the imperial service cadre. Of the class I. cadre, I would, as proposed in the majority report, reserve 24 for officers drawn from the Royal engineers and the army, and ten for officers locally recruited and holding posts in class II. This antecedent distribution of superior posts is no doubt artificial, but has appeared to be the most practicable, having regard specially to the fact that the work of the department has a distinctly military purpose. The calculation of the cadre of the military

officers will be fixed, as now, on the basis of the superior posts and that of the locally recruited officers partly on the basis of the superior posts, but largely on the requirements of the inferior posts. The pay proposed in the majority report for the locally recruited officers of class II. is suitable. But all holders of the superior posts should be paid alike, and not on separate scales as proposed by the majority. The feeling of dissatisfaction which is generally prevalent among promoted officers in all departments where they are paid less than their colleagues is also noticeable in this department.

261. *Employment of Indians.*—The evidence discloses that the few Indian officers mostly Muhammadans, that have been admitted to the department and the majority of whom under the present arrangements had to rise from the ranks, have done excellent service especially in the work of boundary commissions on the frontier or in the foreign territories of Asia. As Colonel Burrard, the surveyor-general himself says, "it is the individual that counts, not his class; the individual counts more than the class." Then how is it that the position of the Indians in the department is so deplorable? If it be remembered that the Indians are admitted only to the provincial service at the highest I will give the explanation in Colonel Burrard's own words: "Admission to the provincial service was by competitive test. The rule was also laid down that three-quarters of the vacancies should go to the domiciled community and one-quarter to Indians. There was one examination for all candidates . . . ; supposing that there were four vacancies the first three Anglo-Indians were selected and the first Indian. If the rule were abolished it would lead to a large increase in the number of Indians recruited. One or two Indians had almost always to be knocked out. The three-quarters rule was not justified on the score of efficiency but by other reasons." Then he goes on to add, "it had to be remembered that the survey department had to work from Baluchistan to Siam and required men who are willing to go anywhere. The Indian had a fixed home, he married early, had strong family ties and preferred to serve in his own province, whereas the Anglo-Indian had no home and was willing to go anywhere." This general statement could hardly have been put forward as the real explanation of the practice because in the first place Indians who loved to stay at home were not likely to join the service and in the next place the facts show that the Indian officers have been at least as enterprising as any other members of the service. In the list put forward by Mr. J. O. Grieff out of 25 provincial officers who did specially good work in war and trans-frontier service no less than seven—a number much larger than their proportion in the service—are Indians, six Muhammadans and one, apparently, Sikh. They seem to have been engaged in most of the difficult operations.

262. The tradition of this department in the matter of differential treatment seems to be peculiarly unfortunate. It appears to have been even worse in the past as will be evident from the following very frank utterances of Colonel DuPre, a previous surveyor-general quoted in the supreme legislative council by Mr. Gokhale in supporting his motion for the appointment of this Commission. "I may here remark incidentally that my numerous late inspections show me that the tendency of the European surveyors is to stand and look on while the natives are made to do the drawing and hand printing, as if they thought themselves quite above that sort of thing. This is a mistake and cannot be permitted for the future, besides it is suicidal for the Europeans to admit that natives can do any one thing better than themselves. They should claim to be superior in *everything*, and only allow natives to take a secondary or subordinate part. In my old parties I never permitted a native to touch a theodolite or original computation on the principle that the triangulation and scientific work was the prerogative of the highly paid European, and this reservation of the scientific work was the only way by which I could keep a distinction so as to justify the different figures respectively drawn by the two classes—the European in office time and the native who ran him so close in all the office duties as well as in field duties. Yet I see the natives commonly do the computation work and the European some of the inferior duties."

263. The recommendation of the majority that the practice of rejecting Indian candidates who have secured a higher place in the competitive examination for the provincial service in favour of Anglo-Indian candidates should be put a stop to, and that the result of the examination should be the sole test has my entire support. I

also accept the standard proposed as suitable. It may, however, be apprehended that the proposal that of the candidates to be selected to sit at the examination, at least half should be Indians might be taken to suggest a definite proportion as between Indian and Anglo-Indian candidates for, as it has often happened, a minimum laid down for Indian employment is apt to be treated as the maximum limit. So long as this is clearly understood there is perhaps no particular objection to the suggestion. But it seems to me that the proper provision to lay down would be that the selection should be made with a view to rejecting those who are physically unfit and have no chance of success at the examination, and to limit the number of candidates within manageable compass. The vacancies, in this as for other departments, should be duly advertised.

264. *Salaries*.—Except that the officers promoted from class II. to class I. should all be paid alike, I agree in the recommendation of the majority report regarding the salaries. The effect of my proposal will be, that instead of Rs. 1,60,221 shown as net annual saving under the majority's recommendations, the savings will be about Rs. 1,35,387, i.e., Rs. 24,834 less per annum.

#### ANNEXURE XXIV.—MADRAS SURVEY DEPARTMENT.

265. *General features*.—The department is wholly recruited in India and its main function is the production of village or field maps for the purposes of revenue administration. The officers are engaged partly on survey work and partly on the maintenance of land records. Twenty-three appointments came within the limits of our enquiry. There are 16 gazetted officers, of whom six are Indians. The average pay is Rs. 480 a month.

266. *Findings and recommendations*.—I am in agreement with the majority that a proposal made to us for obtaining some officers from England is not sound and should not be entertained. As regards the method of recruitment, I think it will be for the benefit of the department if the appointments are made on the results of a suitable competitive examination. In any event the proposal of the majority, that for Anglo-Indian candidates the passing of an examination to be instituted "for the European schools" should be accepted in the place of a degree of a university required for the Indian candidates, is objectionable. If there is to be a special examination for Anglo-Indian candidates, its standard should be as high as that of a degree of an Indian university. The further suggestion that a division of the appointments into one-half for domiciled Europeans and Anglo-Indians and the other half for Indians, is equally open to objection.

267. *Salaries*.—The scale of pay proposed seems to be suitable.

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### PART III.—SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

268. The important changes which I have recommended and the main points on which I have dissented from the majority of Commissioners are summarised below :—

#### A—REPORT.

- (i) The division of services into imperial and provincial in many departments is not suitable and the recommendations of the Aitchison Commission have generally proved inadequate to meet the requirements of the situation (paragraphs 28–30).
- (ii) Wherever there is a higher and a lower kind of work to be done the arrangement for recruitment ought to take into account the relation subsisting between the two classes of work and the qualifications and training required for each. From this point of view the appointments are divisible into two groups—in the first will be the appointments in services like the civil services (executive side), the police, the survey of India, public works and telegraph (engineering), where direct appointments are made only to the inferior posts and the superior posts are

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- filled by promotion ; the other group should consist of appointments, like judicial appointments and posts in departments like civil medical, agricultural, educational departments, where direct appointments from outside are and should be made to both the higher and the lower posts (paragraph 32).
- (iii) The policy of withdrawing military officers from civil employ should be steadily pursued. In the civil medical department only a proportion of the appointments should be available for the officers of the Indian medical service and the Indian subordinate medical department so that there may be a real civil medical service and not one merely in name as would be the effect of the majority's recommendations (paragraph 43).
  - (iv) The general rule should be that the special departments should be self-contained and that officers of the Indian civil service should gradually be withdrawn from them (paragraph 44).
  - (v) The policy as laid down in the statute of 1833 and the proclamation of 1858 of employing Indians freely and extensively in the public service without any limitations except such as arise from their inability to qualify themselves should be enforced in practice. The present disabilities, arising from place of appointment and departmental rules and practice, and differentiation in matters of status, should be removed (paragraphs 45-50).
  - (vi) The rules prohibiting the admission of Indians to the pilot service (Bengal) and to the examination held in London for the imperial police service should be abrogated (paragraph 47).
  - (vii) The practice which obtains in certain departments like the survey of India, salt and excise and post office, of making a differentiation in favour of domiciled European and Anglo-Indian candidates should be discontinued. Full publicity should be given to the vacancies as they occur (paragraph 48).
  - (viii) Officers of locally-recruited services promoted to superior appointments should have the same status and the same pay as the others (paragraph 49).
  - (ix) The locally-recruited officers in the police and the survey of India departments should have the same official designation and be on the same list as the imperial service officers holding minor appointments (paragraph 49).
  - (x) The broad policy should be recognised that the requirement of public service in India should be met by recruitment in the country itself. It is wrong and unsound to lay down, as is done in the majority report, that "British responsibility for the good governance of the country" or "grounds of policy" require that appointments in the Indian civil service and the police and in the education, public works, railways, medical, military finance, telegraph (engineering) and survey of India departments should be made to a large or substantial extent in England (paragraph 52).
  - (xi) The classification, for practical purposes, should be based on a consideration of the nature of qualifications required, a proper estimate of the field of recruitment and the present practice. The services should, therefore, be divided into two groups. In one group should be the Indian civil service (executive side) and the imperial police service for which there will be substantial recruitment in England and in India. For the other services the policy should be to confine recruitment to India for the normal requirements of the departments concerned. But in some of the latter departments such as survey of India, military finance, public works, railways, a proportion will be recruited, for a time, in England (paragraphs 52-54).
  - (xii) The appointment of officers of the following categories should not be confined to the cadre of an ordinary service organisation : lieutenant-governors, chief commissioners, members of the executive councils of the imperial and local Governments, judges, professors (paragraphs 59 and 60).

- (xiii) The standard of qualifications required should be fixed with reference to the work of each department. For services like the provincial civil service (executive), the post office, salt and excise, the standard should be the degree of a university; and no lower standard should be accepted for candidates belonging to the domiciled European and Anglo-Indian communities as would be the effect of the majority's recommendation. For such of these candidates as are not graduates, a special examination should be instituted, the standard of which will be equivalent to that of a bachelor's degree (paragraph 61).
- (xiv) Direct appointment to the higher services should be promoted as far as possible. A different policy should not be pursued in the post office and telegraph departments as contemplated in majority report (paragraph 62).
- (xv) Scholarships should be granted to promising Indian students to complete their education and training in Europe for services like the agricultural, civil veterinary, forests and geological survey, but only so long as the educational facilities for these departments are not fully developed in India. Such scholars should be appointed if they are found to have attained adequate qualifications (paragraph 63).
- (xvi) Competitive examination as a means of recruitment should receive greater recognition in India than at present. For the Indian civil service the examination should be held in India simultaneously with the examination in England. For the provincial civil service (executive) half the cadre, generally speaking, should be recruited for by examination, and appointments to the Madras survey department should also be made on the results of an examination. Examination should be maintained for the survey of India and northern India salt revenue departments (paragraphs 64-65 and 68).
- (xvii) For services for which a very high standard of educational qualifications is not needed, and in which the officials' work brings him into close and direct relation with all sections of the people, such as in the provincial civil service, the provincial police, the post office, salt and excise, attempt should be made to secure a due representation of the provinces and the more important communities (paragraph 67).
- (xviii) The present system of nomination under which the duty of making selections is practically left to the individual heads of departments should be abandoned and selection committees should be constituted as proposed in the majority report for those services which are not recruited for by examination. Indians should be adequately represented on such committees, both in India and in England (paragraph 64).
- (xix) The period of probation in England for Indian civil servants should be two years and not three years as proposed by the majority, and recruits obtained in India for the Indian civil service should, along with the others, undergo probationary training in England (paragraphs 69-70).
- (xx) The salaries of officers recruited in India are much in need of improvement. For services for which the qualification of an ordinary degree is required the scale of Rs. 250-40/3-450-50/3-500 with proper selection posts should be regarded as the minimum which should be granted; for departments requiring higher degrees of qualification the scale of Rs. 300-50/2-500-50-1,050 with suitable selection posts would be appropriate (paragraph 84).
- (xxi) For the higher services in the agricultural, civil, veterinary, forest, and similar departments, the pay should be on an Indian basis and to officers that may still be required from Europe suitable allowance where necessary should be given in addition (paragraph 86).
- (xxii) The locally-recruited officers promoted to a superior appointment such as in the civil services, police, survey of India, and public works, should receive the same pay as the others (paragraph 88).

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- (xxiii) For all officers recruited in England the salary should, as now, be the same whether they are Indians or Europeans (paragraph 90).
- (xxiv) The question whether the present staff of officers is adequate for the work of a particular department did not come within the scope of our enquiry and was not investigated by us. There should have been no general recommendation on the point as made in the majority report. The policy to be kept in view should be to supply the further needs of the administration by local recruitment (paragraphs 91 and 92).
- (xxv) In the Indian civil service a superior post should be defined as a post of independent responsibility and control, being either a collectorship or a district and sessions judgeship or appointment of like status and rank, and not on the basis of salary as at present. The annual rate of recruitment both in the Indian civil service and the imperial police should be carefully revised. The leave reserves should as far as practicable be reduced so that the reserve for shorter leaves should be placed in the locally recruited services (paragraphs 94–96).
- (xxvi) The practice of making confidential reports should be kept within very narrow bounds, and the general rule should be that if there is any allegation against an officer he should be informed and given a proper opportunity of explaining (paragraph 97).
- (xxvii) There should be no commutation of furlough into leave on full pay up to six months as proposed in the majority report (paragraph 98).
- (xxviii) Liberal provisions should be made for granting study leave to officers recruited in India for the education and similar departments (paragraph 98).
- (xxix) The four per cent. contribution now made by the Indian civil service officers to their annuity of 1,000*l.* a year should not be abolished as proposed by the majority of the commissioners (paragraph 104).
- (xxx) The ordinary maximum pension for officers of other services, except those of military officers which are regulated by military rules, should be increased to Rs. 5,500 per annum instead of Rs. 5,000 at present, and not to Rs. 6,000 as proposed by the majority. There is no justification for any increase in the amount of special pensions or for making additions to the list of officers entitled to such pensions, as recommended by the majority (paragraph 106).
- (xxxi) Family pension funds should be established for services for which there is no such provision at present. They should be on a self-supporting basis (paragraph 107).

### B.—ANNEXURES.

#### *Indian and provincial civil services.*

- (xxxii) The policy should be to withdraw all judicial appointments from the Indian civil service, but for the present there will be recruitment of judges from the Indian civil service for not exceeding one-third of the number of such appointments. Of the remaining judicial appointments 33 should be filled by promotion from the provincial judicial service, 10, for the present, by the appointment of barristers from England and the rest from the Indian bar including barristers and pleaders (paragraphs 116 and 126).
- (xxxiii) The superior posts in the Indian civil service now open to members of the provincial executive service should remain at their present number (paragraph 128).
- (xxxiv) The examination for the Indian civil service should be held simultaneously in India and in England (paragraph 131).
- (xxxv) For such officers of the Indian civil service as would be employed in judicial posts, there should be a bifurcation after the open competition and on arrival in India their training should be in purely judicial work (paragraphs 121 to 123).

- (xxxvi) As regards separate recruitment in India proposed by the majority, the proportion recommended by them is altogether inadequate. No less than two-thirds of the judicial appointments and one-third of the total cadre of the Indian civil service (executive branch) should be filled in India (paragraph 133).
- (xxxvii) The age for the open examination for the Indian civil service in both countries should be 21–23, instead of 22–24 as at present, and not 17–19 for candidates in England and 20–22 for candidates in India, as proposed by the majority (paragraphs 134 and 135).
- (xxxviii) Persian should be added to the list of subjects and treated on the same basis as modern European languages; and Sanskrit and Arabic should be marked like Greek and Latin (paragraph 136).
- (xxxix) The calculation of the cadre should be on the principle suggested in paragraphs 94 and 96 (paragraph 138).
- (xl) The general recommendation of the majority to increase the Indian civil service cadre is not justified (paragraph 142).
- (xli) Lieutenant-governors, chief commissioners, and members of executive councils of the imperial and local Governments should not be recruited for in the Indian civil service cadre (paragraph 143).
- (xlii) The scale of salary for the “minor” appointments in the Indian civil service should be Rs. 450–50–700—100–900—150–1,050. Pay of the promoted provincial service officer and judges recruited from the bar should be the same as of the others. The increases involved under items (ii) and (iii) in paragraph 34 of annexure X. to the majority report should not be allowed (paragraph 144).
- (xliii) There should be a complete separation of the judicial and executive functions. The magistrates should form a separate class of officers and should not be placed under the administrative control of the collectors. The system in vogue in presidency towns should be followed as far as possible (paragraphs 146 to 149).
- (xliv) The four per cent. contribution to the Indian civil service annuity of 1,000*l.* should not be abolished as proposed (paragraph 145).
- (xlv) Half the cadre of the provincial civil service (executive branch) should be recruited by examination and the other half by selection by committees as proposed by majority. In making selections due regard should be had to representation of important communities (paragraph 150).
- (xlvi) The rule requiring 3 years’ practice at the bar for appointments to the provincial judicial service should not be done away with. Those who are appointed after the age of 30 should be allowed to add up to 5 years’ service towards pension (paragraph 151).
- (xlvii) Salaries proposed in the majority report for the provincial civil services are suitable (paragraph 152).

*Agricultural, civil veterinary, forest and geological survey departments.*

- (xlviii) For the normal requirements of the higher work in these departments, India should be made self-reliant and for attaining this purpose the facilities for education and training should be developed to the necessary standard and it should be announced that at least half of the cadre of the agricultural, civil veterinary and forest departments will be recruited from Indian colleges. Scholarships should also be instituted in the meantime to enable promising students to complete their training in England and such of them as have attained adequate qualifications should be appointed (paragraphs 157, 161, 193, 194 and 197).
- (xlix) The proposal for the appointment of a rural commissioner, made by the majority, for the agricultural and civil veterinary departments is not warranted (paragraph 158).

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- (l) The salary for the agricultural and civil veterinary departments should be on the same scale, and that for the geological survey should be on the same lines, as stated. In the forest department the scale of pay proposed by the majority is suitable except that the increase of pay to conservators, chief conservators and inspector-general is not justified (paragraphs 159, 195, 198).
- (li) For European officers who might still be appointed, a suitable allowance in addition to the Indian scale of pay except to the administrative grade would suffice. There is no necessity for raising their pay as proposed in the majority report (paragraphs 159, 195).

*Indian finance and customs departments.*

- (lii) I have agreed with the majority that the Indian finance department should be entirely recruited in India. I would extend this system also to the customs department, instead of limiting Indian recruitment to one half. The rates of salary as fixed on Indian basis by the majority are suitable (paragraphs 164–166, 187).

*Education department.*

- (liii) Excluding the directorships of public instruction and 90 appointments for work of the higher order, all the other appointments in the present Indian and provincial education services should be amalgamated and formed into a service to be entirely recruited for in India. The 90 posts will be filled by specialists who have already done original work of a higher order and a good few who have shown conspicuous ability in governing young men. They will be paid at special rates suitable to each case. The bulk of the other officers will receive Rs. 250–500/2–500 with a selection grade of 15 per cent. on Rs. 500–50–750 and another five per cent. on Rs. 750–50–1,000 (paragraphs 173, 174).
- (liv) Attempt should be made to secure for the administrative branch proper representation of the important communities. A special officer should be appointed in each province to help the directors of public instruction in dealing with special problems relating to Muhammadan education (paragraph 177).
- (lv) To promote female education the services of educated Indian women should be utilised as far as possible. Some of them should be given scholarships to complete their education in England (paragraph 178).

*Factory and boiler inspection departments.*

- (lvi) Indians should be appointed in these departments whenever available. The scale of pay on an Indian basis proposed by the majority is suitable (paragraphs 181, 182).

*Military finance department.*

- (lvii) Indians should be employed in the department at least to the extent of 25 per cent. The rates of pay proposed by the majority are suitable (paragraphs 189 and 190).

*Burma land records department.*

- (lviii) The appointment of Indians should not be limited to any definite proportion (paragraph 201).

*Medical services.*

- (lix) A civil medical service composed mainly of civil officers should be formed. Officers of the Indian medical service should be admitted to only about one-third of the total strength. Officers of the Indian

- subordinate medical department should not hold more than 30 superior appointments. The rest of the appointments should be filled partly by direct recruitment from the independent profession, and partly by promotion of civil assistant surgeons (paragraph 216).
- (lx) Professorships of medical colleges and directorships of the larger bacteriological laboratories should not be reserved for any service, but recruited from the best men available anywhere. Chemical examinerships should also be similarly treated. They should carry pay at rates ranging from Rs. 1,000 to Rs. 2,000 a month (paragraphs 218 and 219).
  - (lxi) Only one-third of the superintendentships of lunatic asylums, and of the superior appointments in the sanitary and bacteriological departments should be filled from officers of the Indian medical service. Of the superior appointments in the jail department two-thirds will be held by Indian medical service officers. The rest of the appointments should be recruited for in India (paragraphs 218–221).
  - (lxii) Administrative appointments whether in the civil medical service, sanitary department, or jail department, will be open to all officers (paragraphs 216, 220, and 221).
  - (lxiii) The pay of administrative appointments should not be raised, and no recommendation should have been made for increasing the pay of Indian medical service officers. Officers of the Indian medical service will draw their military pay plus suitable allowances while employed in posts in the alienist, sanitary and jail departments. Civil officers and officers promoted from the Indian subordinate medical department to the civil medical, bacteriological, and alienist departments, will draw Rs. 500–50/2–800–50/3–900–50/4–1,000. Civil officers in the sanitary department will retain their present scale of pay; civil superintendents of jails (first class) will draw Rs. 600–50–1,000. Officers in the civil medical service, debarred from private practice, should be given suitable allowances. The rates of pay proposed for civil and military assistant surgeons by the majority are suitable (paragraphs 216, 218–222).
  - (lxiv) It should not be made a condition of the Indian candidates being allowed to sit for the Indian medical service examination in London, that they should have attended at one of the hospitals in Great Britain for a certain number of years, as suggested in the majority report (paragraph 214).

*Police department.*

- (lxv) The rule for the examination in London requiring that every candidate must be a British subject of European descent, should be abrogated and not modified as proposed by the majority (paragraph 228).
- (lxvi) The appointments in the present imperial and provincial services taken together should be divided into two classes—class I. composed of superior appointments, and class II. of minor appointments (paragraph 231.)
- (lxvii) The locally-recruited and England-recruited officers holding minor appointments should be placed on the same list, and bear the same official designation; but for purposes of promotion 75 per cent. of the superior appointments will be earmarked for the officers recruited in England, and 25 per cent. for the others (paragraph 231).
- (lxviii) The rates of pay proposed by the majority are suitable; but no increase in pay should be granted to the deputy inspectors general (paragraph 231).
- (lxix) I agree in the recommendation that equal pay should be given to superintendents of police whether recruited in India or in England (paragraph 231).

*Post office and telegraph department.*

- (lxx) The proportion of direct recruitment in the Post office should be two-thirds of the vacancies in the administrative branch, and one-half in the case of gazetted postmasters (paragraph 237).
- (lxxi) In the telegraph (traffic and engineering) half the recruitment should be from Indian colleges, not more than one-fourth by promotion, and the rest should be recruited from England (paragraph 241).
- (lxxii) The rates of pay proposed by the majority are suitable (paragraph 242).

*Public works department and railway department (engineering establishment).*

- (lxxiii) I accept the recommendation that 50 per cent. of the appointments should be recruited for in India. Indians, however, should be eligible for appointment in England (paragraph 244).
- (lxxiv) No increase of pay should be allowed to chief and superintending engineers as proposed in the majority report. Executive engineers appointed in India should receive the same scale of pay as those appointed in England. The scale of pay for such officers should be Rs. 750-50-1,250. Assistant engineers recruited in Europe should draw Rs. 380-40-700 and those recruited in India Rs. 300-50/2-500 (paragraph 245).

*Railway department (revenue establishment).*

- (lxxv) The aim should be that this department should be wholly recruited for in India. Special emphasis should be laid on the employment of Indians in the traffic branch. Facilities for training for the work of the locomotive, carriage, and wagon department should be provided in India (paragraph 247).

*Registration department.*

- (lxxvi) The only special recommendation apart from that made by the majority which I have made is that the practice of appointing an officer of the provincial civil service as the inspector-general of registration, which obtains in Madras, Bengal, and Bihar and Orissa, should be followed in the other provinces (paragraph 249).

*Northern India salt revenue department.*

- (lxxvii) I accept the recommendation of the majority that appointments to this department should be by examination, but I do not see any necessity for making selection before the examination or laying down any proportion for candidates of the different communities (paragraph 252).
- (lxxviii) The post of commissioner should be filled from amongst the officers of the department and he should draw a salary of Rs. 2,000. The scales of pay proposed for the others are suitable (paragraphs 251 and 253).

*Salt and excise departments.*

- (lxxix) I generally agree in the recommendation of the majority regarding this department. But domiciled Europeans and Anglo-Indians should not be admitted on qualifications lower than those required of the others. All recruits, from whatever community they may be drawn, should begin in the same grade (paragraph 256).

*Survey of India department.*

- (lxxx) The service should be divided into two classes—class I. containing the superior appointments and class II. the minor appointments held by the present imperial and provincial branches. Officers of both the

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- classes wherever recruited should be on the same list and bear the same official designation, but for purposes of promotion 24 out of the 34 superior appointments should be reserved for military officers and the other 10 for the locally recruited officers. The scales of pay proposed by the majority are suitable, except that I would allow equal pay to all officers holding class I. (or superior) appointments (paragraph 260).
- (lxxxix) The entrance to the locally recruited service should be by examination amongst selected candidates and the standard of qualification should be substantially raised (paragraph 263).
- (lxxxii) The practice of rejecting Indian candidates who have secured a higher place in the competition in favour of an Anglo-Indian candidate lower in the list should be discontinued (paragraph 263).
- (lxxxiii) There should be no particular proportion fixed for candidates from the Anglo-Indian and Indian communities (paragraph 263).

*Madras survey department.*

- (lxxxiv) I agree in the recommendation that the suggestion made to us that some officers of the department should be obtained in England should not be entertained. The appointments in the department should be thrown open to competition (paragraph 266).

*Mines, mint and assay, and pilot service (Bengal).*

- (lxxxv) I generally accept the recommendations of the majority with respect to these departments.

**COST OF PROPOSALS.**

269. The following table shows the annual extra expenditure involved in my proposals as compared with that proposed by the majority of the Commissioners :—

Department or service.	Net increase or decrease of expenditure per annum under the recommendations made by the majority of the Commissioners.	Net increase or decrease of expenditure per annum under my recommendations.
<i>Salaries :—</i>	Rs.	Rs.
Indian and provincial civil services	32,24,743	10,00,000
Agricultural department	7,514	— 33,202
Civil veterinary department	— 66,258	— 66,258
Customs department	— 19,078	— 36,000
Education department	9,51,188	6,89,712
Factory and boiler inspection departments	6,652	6,652
Indian finance department	— 3,11,319	— 3,11,319
Military finance department	4,953	— 20,000
Forest department	— 1,60,382	— 1,90,382
Geological survey department	8,048	— 11,000
Land records (Burma) department	30,159	30,159
Medical services	14,25,701	6,00,000
Mines department	— 6,277	— 6,277
Mint and assay departments	— 49	— 49
Pilots (Bengal) service	—	—
Police department	1,16,477	— 2,50,000
Post office and telegraph	1,12,893	80,000
Public works department, including railway (engineering)	— 10,80,900	— 8,41,000
Railway (revenue) department	— 900	— 900
Registration department	246	246
Northern India salt revenue department	49,283	44,483
Salt and excise departments	86,015	86,015
Survey of India department	— 1,60,222	— 1,35,387
Survey (Madras) department	7,273	7,273
Total salaries	42,25,760†	6,42,766

\* In working out this estimate the present and proposed cost of lieutenant-governors, chief commissioners, and members of council have been taken into account, although for purposes of calculation of cadre I have suggested their exclusion from the Indian civil service.

† This does not include the extra expenditure involved in the recommendations of the majority of the commissioners to grant increased rates of pay to officers recruited in Europe in services in which the scales of pay have been laid down on an Indian basis.

MINUTE BY MR. ABDUR RAHIM—(continued)—PART III.—SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS  
AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

Department or service.	Net increase or decrease of expenditure per annum under the recommendations made by the majority of the Commissioners.	Net increase or decrease of expenditure per annum under my recommendations.
	Rs.	Rs.
<i>Pensions and annuities :—</i>		
Indian civil service - - - - -	9,00,000	—
Other services—ordinary pensions - - - - -	9,25,000	4,50,000
” ” additional ” - - - - -	2,75,000	—
Total pensions - - - - -	21,00,000	4,50,000
Grand total - - - - -	63,25,760	10,92,766

ABDUR RAHIM.

Dated the 14th day of August 1915.



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## APPENDIX I.

*(Referred to in paragraph 2 of the Report.)*

## ITINERARY of the ROYAL COMMISSION between December 1912 and June 1914.

Place.	Date.	Remarks.
Madras - -	December 31st, 1912, to January 20th, 1913.	The Commission sat to hear evidence on January the 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, and 17th, and held a conference with the local Government on the 18th.
Calcutta - -	January 22nd to February 1st	The Commission sat to hear evidence from Bengal on the 23rd, 24th, 25th, 27th, 28th, 29th, 30th, and 31st.
Rangoon - -	February 4th to 10th -	The Commission sat to hear evidence on the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th, and held a conference with the local Government on the 10th.
Calcutta - -	February 13th to 19th -	The Commission sat to hear evidence from Assam on the 17th and 18th, and of one Bengal witness on the 18th; and on the 19th held two conferences, one with the local Government of Bengal, and one with the Chief Commissioner, Assam.
Delhi - -	February 21st to 26th -	The Commission sat to hear the evidence of one Bengal witness on the 22nd, and held a conference with the Government of India on the 26th.
Bombay - -	February 28th to March 12th.	The Commission sat to hear evidence on the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 7th, 10th, 11th, and 12th.
Nagpur - -	March 14th to 21st - -	The Commission sat to hear evidence on the 15th, 17th, 18th, 19th, and 20th, and also held a conference with the Chief Commissioner, Central Provinces and Berar, on the 19th.
Bankipur - -	March 23rd to 29th - -	The Commission sat to hear evidence on the 24th, 25th, 26th, 27th, and 28th, and also held a conference with the local Government on the 28th.
Lucknow - -	March 30th to April 8th -	The Commission sat to hear evidence on March the 31st and on April the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 5th, and 7th, and held a conference with the local Government on the 6th.
Lahore - -	April 9th to 16th - -	The Commission sat to hear evidence on the 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 14th, and 15th, and held a conference with the local Government on the 16th.
London - -	July 2nd to 18th - -	The Commission sat to hear evidence on the 2nd, 3rd, 9th, 10th, 11th, 15th, 16th, 17th, and 18th.
Delhi - -	November 3rd to 29th -	The Commission sat in sections* to hear evidence on the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 10th, 11th, and 29th. The full Commission sat to hear evidence on the 13th, 14th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 21st, 22nd, 24th, 25th, 27th, 28th, and 29th.
Calcutta - -	December 13th, 1913, to January 23rd, 1914.	The full Commission sat to hear evidence on December the 13th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, and 20th, 1913, and on January the 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 12th, 13th, 14th, and 16th, 1914. The Commission sat in sections to hear evidence on January the 19th, 20th, 21st, 22nd, and 23rd, 1914.
Madras - -	January 26th to February 6th.	The Commission sat in sections to hear evidence on January the 26th and 27th. The full Commission sat to hear evidence on January the 28th and 30th and on February the 2nd, 3rd, 5th, and 6th.
Bombay - -	February 9th to 24th -	The Commission sat in sections to hear evidence on February the 9th, 10th, and 11th. The full Commission sat to hear evidence on February the 13th, 16th, 17th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 23rd, and 24th.
London - -	May 4th to June 17th -	The Commission sat to hear evidence on May the 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th and on June the 11th and 17th.

\* During the 1913-14 season in India the evidence relating to the education, medical, public works, and railway departments was taken in full Commission. Otherwise the evidence was heard in two sections. One dealt with the agricultural, civil veterinary, customs, Indian finance, military finance, forest, mint and assay, pilots (Bengal), survey of India and survey (Madras) departments. The other dealt with the factory and boiler inspection, geological survey, land records (Birma), mines, police, post office and telegraph, registration, Northern India salt revenue, and salt and excise departments.

## APPENDIX II.

(Referred to in paragraph 2 of the Report.)

STATEMENT to show the NUMBER of WITNESSES examined by the ROYAL COMMISSION in each PROVINCE in INDIA, and in LONDON, between January 1913 and June 1914.

A.—Presidency or Province. B.—Service or Department.	Number of witnesses examined.				Total.
	Officials.		Non-officials.		
	Europeans or Anglo-Indians.	Indians or Burmans.	Europeans or Anglo-Indians.	Indians or Burmans.	

A.—BETWEEN JANUARY AND JULY 1913.										
Madras -	-	-	-	-	-	7	13	3	19	42
Bengal -	-	-	-	-	-	10	8	8	9	35
Burma -	-	-	-	-	-	5	6	4	5	20
Assam -	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	1	2	7
Bombay -	-	-	-	-	-	10	6	2	12	30
Central Provinces and Berar -	-	-	-	-	-	5	5	1	6	17
Bihar and Orissa -	-	-	-	-	-	5	4	3	5	17
United Provinces -	-	-	-	-	-	8	4	2	10	24
Punjab -	-	-	-	-	-	6	3	1	10	20
London -	-	-	-	-	-	5	—	21	—	26
Total -	-	-	-	-	-	63	51	46	78	238

B.—BETWEEN NOVEMBER 1913 AND JUNE 1914.					
Agricultural - . . . . .	10	4	—	—	14
Civil veterinary - . . . . .	7	1	2	—	10
Customs - . . . . .	4	2	2	—	8
Education - . . . . .	27	18	2	8	55
Factory and boiler inspection - . . . . .	4	1	—	—	5
Indian finance - . . . . .	7	4	—	—	11
Military finance - . . . . .	8	—	—	—	8
Forest - . . . . .	16	7	3	—	26
Geological survey - . . . . .	1	2	1	—	4
Land records (Burma) - . . . . .	1	1	—	—	2
Medical (including jail and sanitary) - . . . . .	31	12	6	9	58
Mines - . . . . .	1	—	—	—	1
Mint and assay - . . . . .	2	—	—	—	2
Pilots (Bengal) - . . . . .	4	—	—	—	4
Police - . . . . .	20	5	—	—	25
Post office and telegraph - . . . . .	20	5	—	—	25
Public works - . . . . .	27	9	1	4	41
Railway - . . . . .	16	—	2	—	18
Registration - . . . . .	—	4	—	—	4
Northern India salt revenue - . . . . .	2	—	—	—	2
Salt and excise - . . . . .	8	3	—	—	11
Survey of India - . . . . .	6	1	—	—	7
Survey (Madras) - . . . . .	2	1	—	—	3
Total - . . . . .	224	80	19	21	344
Total of statement A above - . . . . .	63	51	46	78	238
Grand total - . . . . .	287	131	65	99	582

**APPENDIX III.***(Referred to in paragraph 2 of the Report.)*

STATEMENT to show the NUMBER of OFFICIALS, NON-OFFICIALS, and ASSOCIATIONS who  
 (1) at the special request of, and (2) in response to a general notification  
 issued by, the ROYAL COMMISSION, furnished WRITTEN STATEMENTS  
 of their VIEWS, but who were not orally examined.

*Number of Statements.*

A.—Presidency or Province. B.—Service or Department.	By Special Request.				In response to a General Notification.				Grand total.
	Officials.	Non-officials.	Associations.	Total.	Officials.	Non-officials.	Associations.	Total.	
A.—RELATING TO THE INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES.									
Madras (cf. Vol. II., App. I. & II.)	24	18	6	48	4	17	1	22	70
Bengal (cf. Vol. III., App. VII. & VIII.)	25	12	8	45	29	13	11	53	98
Burma (cf. Vol. IV., App. I. & II.)	30	12	3	45	7	3	5	15	60
Assam (cf. Vol. V., App. III. & IV.)	7	5	3	15	10	1	—	11	26
Bombay (cf. Vol. VI., App. VII. & VIII.)	34	25	5	64	13	18	4	35	99
Central Provinces and Berar (cf. Vol. VII., App. III. & IV.)	16	14	—	30	2	2	1	5	35
Bihar and Orissa (cf. Vol. VIII., App. III. & IV.)	23	18	3	44	39	6	1	46	90
United Provinces (cf. Vol. IX., App. II. & III.)	21	19	4	44	14	8	3	25	69
Punjab (cf. Vol. X., App. IV. & V.)	23	10	2	35	50	14	1	65	100
Total	203	133	34	370	168	82	27	277	647
B.—RELATING TO SERVICES OTHER THAN THE INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES.									
Agricultural (cf. Vol. XV., p. 277)	—	—	—	—	14	—	—	14	14
Civil veterinary (cf. Vol. XV., p. 342)	—	—	—	—	8	—	1	9	9
Customs (cf. Vol. XVIII., p. 131)	—	—	—	—	3	4	1	8	8
Education (cf. Vol. XX., p. 294)	—	—	—	—	23	12	1	36	36
Factory and boiler inspection (cf. Vol. XVIII., p. 203).	—	—	—	—	6	—	1	7	7
Indian finance (cf. Vol. XIV., p. 64)	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	1
Military finance (cf. Vol. XIV., p. 113)	—	—	—	—	11	—	—	11	11
Forest (cf. Vol. XV., p. 158)	—	—	—	—	23	—	—	23	23
Geological survey (cf. Vol. XVIII., p. 236)	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	1
Land records (Burma) (cf. Vol. XV., p. 438)	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	1
Medical (including jail and sanitary) (cf. Vol. XII., p. 380).	—	—	—	—	80	10	10	100	100
Mines	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Mint and assay (cf. Vol. XIV., p. 133)	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	1
Pilots (Bengal)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Police (cf. Vol. XIII., p. 183)	—	—	—	—	9	6	1	16	16
Post office and telegraph (cf. Vol. XVII., p. 99).	—	—	—	—	6	2	—	8	8
Public works (cf. Vol. XVI., p. 275)	—	—	—	—	8	8	—	16	16
Railway (cf. Vol. XIX., p. 110)	—	—	—	—	8	2	—	10	10
Registration (cf. Vol. XIII., p. 243)	—	—	—	—	13	2	1	16	16
Northern India salt revenue (cf. Vol. XVIII., p. 16).	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	2	2
Salt and excise (cf. Vol. XVIII., p. 91)	—	—	—	—	2	1	—	3	3
Survey of India (cf. Vol. XV., p. 396)	—	—	—	—	26	—	—	26	26
Survey (Madras) (cf. Vol. XV., p. 423)	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	1	1
Total	—	—	—	—	245	49	16	310	310
Total of Statement A above	203	133	34	370	168	82	27	277	647
Grand total	203	133	34	370	413	131	43	587	957

**APPENDIX IV.***(Referred to in paragraph 2 of the Report.)*

STATEMENT to show the NAMES of the ASSISTANT COMMISSIONERS who were co-opted in each PROVINCE or CENTRE.

**A.—INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES.**

Presidency or Province.	Names of the Assistant Commissioners		
	Representing the Indian Civil Service.	Representing the Provincial Civil Services	
		Executive Branch.	Judicial Branch.
Madras - - -	F. duP. Oldfield, Esq., I.C.S., Acting Judge of the High Court of Judicature, Madras.	M.R. Ry. Diwan Bahadur R. Ramachandra Rao Avargal, Collector, Nellore.	M.R. Ry. V. Subrahmanyam Pantulu Garu, District Judge, Cuddapah.
Bengal - - -	C. H. Bompas, Esq., I.C.S., Chairman of the Calcutta Improvement Trust.	Rai Bahadur Priya Nath Mukherji, Inspector General of Registration.	Saroda Prasad Sen, Esq., Additional Sessions Judge, Sylhet.
Burma - - -	H. Thompson, Esq., C.S.I., I.C.S., Officiating Financial Commissioner, Burma.	Maung Ngwe Kaing, K.S.M., A.T.M., Subdivisional Officer, Pyapon Kyailkat.	Maung Kyaw Nyein, K.S.M., A.T.M., Additional Judge, Henzada District Court, and Senior Magistrate.
Assam - - -	J. C. Arbuthnot, Esq., C.I.E., I.C.S., Commissioner, Surma Valley and Hill Districts.	Khan Bahadur Maulvi Muhib-ud-din Ahmed, Under Secretary to the Chief Commissioner.	
Bombay - - -	J. J. Heaton, Esq., I.C.S., Judge of the High Court of Judicature, Bombay.	Rao Bahadur Ramchandra Narayan Joglekar, Assistant to Commissioner, Central Division, Poona.	Raghunath Gangadhar Bhadbhade, Esq., Judge of the Small Cause Court, Poona.
Central Provinces and Berar.	B. P. Standen, Esq., C.I.E., I.C.S., Officiating Commissioner, Berar.	Mahdi Hasan, Esq., I.S.O., Extra Assistant Commissioner, Jubbulpore.	Rao Bahadur Kasinath Keshab Thakur, I.S.O., District and Sessions Judge, West Berar Division.
Bihar and Orissa -	W. Maude, Esq., I.C.S., Member of the Board of Revenue.	Khan Bahadur Ashfaq Hussain, Deputy Magistrate and Deputy Collector.	Narendra Krishna Datta, Esq., B.L., Officiating District and Sessions Judge, Shahabad.
United Provinces -	W. Tudball, Esq., I.C.S., Judge of the High Court of the North Western Provinces.	Khan Bahadur Maulvi Muhammad Fasih-ud-din, Deputy Collector, Kashi-pur, Naini Tal.	Rai Bahadur Pandit Kanhaiya Lal, M.A., LL.B., Second Additional Judicial Commissioner, Oudh.
Punjab - - -	Sir F. A. Robertson, I.C.S., Judge of the Chief Court of the Punjab.	Rai Bahadur Pandit Hari Kishan Kaul, C.I.E., Superintendent of Census Operations, Lahore.	Khan Sahib Shaikh Amir Ali, Extra Judicial Assistant Commissioner.

**B.—SERVICES OTHER THAN THE INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES.**

Service or Department.	Presidency, Province, or Centre.	Names of the Assistant Commissioners.
Agricultural -	Delhi - - -	B. C. Burt, Esq., Deputy Director of Agriculture, Central Circle, Cawnpore.
	Madras - - -	L. E. Buckley, Esq., I.C.S., Commissioner of Revenue Settlement Madras.
	Bombay - - -	V. H. Gonehalli, Esq., Extra Deputy Director of Agriculture, Bombay.
Civil veterinary -	Madras - - -	L. E. Buckley, Esq., I.C.S., Commissioner of Revenue Settlement, Madras.
Customs - - -	Calcutta - - -	W. W. Nind, Esq., Assistant Collector of Customs, Calcutta.
	Bombay - - -	R. F. L. Whitty, Esq., I.C.S., Collector of Customs, Bombay.
Education - - -	Madras - - -	R. G. Grieve, Esq., Deputy Director of Public Instruction.
		M. R. Ry. Kameswara Rao Pantulu Garu, Acting Inspector of Schools, II, Circle, Guntur.

## APPENDIX IV. (continued).

## B.—SERVICES OTHER THAN THE INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—continued.

Service or Department.	Presidency, Province, or Centre.	Names of the Assistant Commissioners.
<b>Education—cont.</b>	Bombay - -	F. B. P. Lory, Esq., Educational Inspector, Southern Division. S. R. Bhandarkar, Esq., Professor of Sanscrit, Elphinstone College. V. B. Joshi, Esq., Principal, Training College, Dharwar.
	Bengal, and Bihar and Orissa.	E. E. Biss, Esq., Principal, Dacca Normal College. Jogendra Nath Das Gupta, Esq., Professor, Presidency College, Calcutta.
	United Provinces - Punjab - -	J. G. Jennings, Esq., Principal, Muir Central College. M. Crosse, Esq., Inspector of Schools, Lahore. Khan Bahadur Maulvi Umar-ud-din, Inspector of Schools, Rawalpindi Division.
	Burma - -	S. W. Cocks, Esq., Inspector of Schools, Rangoon. G. F. Munro, Esq., Officiating Inspector of Schools, Pegu Circle.
	Central Provinces Assam - -	A. C. Sells, Esq., Principal, Government College, Jubbulpore. F. B. Wilkins, Esq., Inspector of Schools, Surma Valley and Hill Districts Circle. Srijut Durga Dhar Barkataki, Special Assistant to the Director of Public Instruction.
<b>Factory and boiler inspection.</b>	Bombay - -	E. L. Sale, Esq., I.C.S., Collector of Bombay.
<b>Indian finance -</b>	- - -	None.
<b>Military finance -</b>	- - -	None.
<b>Forest - - -</b>	Delhi - -	M. Hill, Esq., Chief Conservator of Forests, Central Provinces. G. T. Wrafter, Esq., Extra Deputy Conservator of Forests, Dehra Dun.
	Calcutta - -	J. W. A. Grieve, Esq., Deputy Conservator of Forests. E. A. C. Modder, Esq., Extra Assistant Conservator of Forests.
	Madras - -	H. B. Bryant, Esq., Conservator of Forests, Madras. M. R. Ry. V. Subrahmanya Ayyar Avargal, Extra Deputy Conservator of Forests, Madras.
	Bombay - -	C. E. Marjoribanks, Esq., Deputy Conservator of Forests, Bombay. V. D. P. Rebeirz, Esq., Extra Deputy Conservator of Forests, Bombay.
<b>Geological survey of India.</b>	Delhi - - } Calcutta - - }	G. H. Tipper, Esq., Assistant Superintendent, Geological Survey Department.
<b>Land records (Burma).</b>	- - -	None.
<b>Medical (including jail and sanitary).</b>	Madras - -	Lieut.-Colonel G. G. Giffard, C.S.I., I.M.S., Principal, Medical College, Madras. A. P. Fernandez, Esq., Civil Surgeon.
	Bombay - -	Lieut.-Colonel C. T. Hudson, I.M.S., Civil Surgeon. D. E. Kothawala, Esq., Civil Surgeon. Captain H. A. Lafond, I.S.M.D., Governor's Staff.
	Bengal, and Bihar and Orissa.	Lieut.-Colonel W. J. Buchanan, C.I.E., Inspector-General of Prisons, Bengal. Rai Bahadur Bihari Lal Pande, Officiating Civil Surgeon, United Provinces.
	United Provinces -	Lieut.-Colonel W. Young, I.M.S., Civil Surgeon. Rai Bahadur Behari Lal Pande, Officiating Civil Surgeon.
	Punjab - -	Lieut. N. S. Harvey, I.S.M.D. Colonel C. J. Bamber, M.V.O., I.M.S., Inspector General of Civil Hospitals. Rai Sahib Pandit Balkishen Kaul, Civil Assistant Surgeon.
	Burma - -	Major P. Dee, I.M.S., Civil Surgeon. Y. Subramaniam, Esq., Civil Assistant Surgeon.
	Central Provinces Assam - -	Lieut. P. McCarthy, I.S.M.D., Superintendent, Central Jail, Henzada. Major W. H. Kenrick, I.M.S., Civil Surgeon. Lieut.-Colonel H. E. Banatvala, I.M.S., Inspector-General of Civil Hospitals.
<b>Mines - - -</b>	- - -	None.
<b>Mint and assay -</b>	- - -	None.
<b>Pilots (Bengal)</b>	Calcutta - -	J. H. Lindquist, Esq., Branch Pilot.
<b>Police - - -</b>	Madras - -	None.
	Bombay - -	P. A. Kelly, Esq., Assistant to the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Criminal Investigation Department. Rao Bahadur Damodardas Vrijbhukhandas, Deputy Superintendent of Police.
	Bengal - - -	F. C. Daly, Esq., C.I.E., Deputy Inspector-General of Police.
	United Provinces -	H. G. Richardson, Esq., Superintendent of Police.
	Punjab - -	S. E. Wallace, Esq., Deputy Inspector-General of Police. Khan Bahadur Agha Ali Raza Khan, Deputy Superintendent of Police.
	Burma - -	H. C. Gadsden, Esq., Officiating Principal, Police Provincial Training School, Mandalay. C. W. Hill, Esq., Deputy Superintendent of Police.
	Bihar and Orissa -	E. Ryland, Esq., Deputy Inspector-General of Police. Maulvi Shahab-ud-Dint Khuda Bakhsh, Deputy Superintendent of Police.

## APPENDIX IV. (continued).

## B.—SERVICES OTHER THAN THE INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES—continued.

Service or Department.	Presidency, Province, or Centre.	Names of the Assistant Commissioners.
Police— <i>cont.</i>	Central Provinces Assam - - -	K. W. Deighton, Esq., Officiating Deputy Inspector-General of Police. A. E. H. Shuttleworth, Esq., Superintendent of Police. Ahmad Muhammad, Esq., Deputy Superintendent of Police.
Post office and telegraph— (a) Post office -	Delhi - - - Calcutta - - -	N. H. Hutchinson, Esq., I.C.S., Postmaster-General, Punjab. G. R. Clarke, Esq., I.C.S., Deputy Director-General of the Post Office.
(b) Telegraph -	Madras - - - Bombay - - - Delhi - - - Calcutta - - - Madras - - - Bombay - - -	J. C. Sheridan, Esq., Postmaster-General, Madras. S. C. W. Rose, Esq., Officiating Deputy Postmaster-General, Bombay. H. C. Styant, Esq., Director of Telegraphs, Punjab Circle. J. M. Coode, Esq., Director, Traffic Branch, Central Circle. S. C. Maulik, Esq., Superintendent of Telegraphs, Vizagapatam Division. G. W. Talbot, Esq., Superintendent of Telegraphs, Central Telegraph Office, Bombay.
Public works -	Madras - - - Bombay - - - Bengal, and Bihar and Orissa. United Provinces Punjab - - - Burma - - - Central Provinces Assam - - -	S. D. Pears, Esq., Acting Secretary to Government, Public Works Department. S. Bhaskara Ayyar, Esq., Executive Engineer. R. J. Kent, Esq., Executive Engineer. J. H. Advani, Esq., Executive Engineer. H. H. Green, Esq., Superintending Engineer, Bengal. Shashi Bhushan Mazumdar, Esq., Executive Engineer, Bengal. W. P. Housden, Esq., Superintending Engineer. E. W. Clarke, Esq., Executive Engineer. D. W. Aikman, Esq., Superintending Engineer. J. W. B. Loughran, Esq., Executive Engineer. B. M. Samuelson, Esq., Executive Engineer. C. C. S. Clark, Esq., Secretary to Chief Commissioner, Public Works Department. J. M. Vaccha, Esq., Executive Engineer. W. McM. Sweet, Esq., Chief Engineer. H. Watkins, Esq., Assistant Engineer.
Railway - - - Registration - - -	- - - Bombay - - -	None. C. N. Seddon, Esq., I.C.S., Inspector-General of Registration, Bombay.
Northern India salt revenue.	Delhi - - -	G. F. Buckley, Esq., Deputy Commissioner, Northern India Salt Revenue Department.
Salt and excise -	Madras - - - Bombay - - -	T. R. Barter, Esq., Deputy Commissioner of Salt, Abkari and Separate Revenue, Madras. W. C. Shepherd, Esq., Collector of Salt Revenue, Bombay.
Survey of India -	Delhi - - -	S. D. Smith, Esq., Assistant Collector of Excise, Bombay. Col. O. T. F. B. Renny-Tailyour, C.S.I., R.E., Superintendent, Southern Circle.
Survey (Madras) -	Madras - - -	L. E. Buckley, Esq., I.C.S., Commissioner of Revenue Settlement, Madras.

## APPENDIX V.

(Referred to in paragraphs 33 and 34 of the Report.)

STATEMENTS OF the CIVIL APPOINTMENTS on Rs. 200 a month and over held by EUROPEANS, ANGLO-INDIANS, and INDIANS, on the 1st April 1913, showing:—

A.—Total Statement for the whole of India:

(i) General distribution of posts—actual and proportionate—also aggregate and average pay;

(ii) Number of posts of each class;

(iii) Proportion of posts of each class.

B.—Details by Provinces:

(i) Proportional distribution of total posts and posts over and under Rs. 1,000;

(ii) Number of posts of each class;

(iii) Proportion of posts of each class.

A.—TOTAL STATEMENT FOR THE WHOLE OF INDIA.

(i) General Distribution of Posts—actual and proportionate—also Aggregate and Average Pay.

1.	Europeans.	Anglo-Indians.	Hindus (including Sikhs and Parsis).										Muhammadans.	Indian Christians.	Buddhists.	Totals.		
			Brahmans (including Shenvis).	Kshatriyas.	Kayasthas (including Prabhus).	Banyas and Vaisyas.	Sudras.	Other Hindus (i.e., other than those shown in columns 4 to 8).	Total Hindus (columns 4 to 9).	Sikhs.	Parsis.	Total Hindus, Sikhs, and Parsis (cols. 10 to 12).				Europeans and Anglo-Indians.	Indians.	All Classes.
	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.	17.	18.	19.
Total number of Government posts.	4,898	1,593	1,455	220	725	218	154	427	3,199	67	159	3,425	771	179	198	6,491	4,573	11,064
Percentage . . .	44	14	13	2	7	2	1	4	29	1	1	31	7	2	2	58	42	—
Percentage of posts on Rs. 200—300 -	12	24	20	3	9	4	2	6	44	1	2	47	12	2	3	36	64	28
" 300—400 -	19	19	20	4	10	3	2	5	44	—	2	46	11	2	3	38	62	14
" 400—500 -	36	15	17	2	8	2	2	4	35	1	1	37	8	2	3	51	49	13
" 500—600 -	58	11	9	1	6	1	1	3	21	—	1	22	6	1	2	69	31	12
" 600—700 -	54	10	11	2	7	1	2	4	27	1	2	30	4	1	1	64	36	5
" 700—800 -	78	8	5	—	2	—	—	2	9	—	1	10	3	1	—	86	14	6
" 800—900 -	73	6	6	1	5	1	—	4	17	—	1	18	2	1	—	79	21	4
" 900—1,000 -	92	4	1	—	2	—	—	—	3	—	1	4	—	—	—	96	4	3
Posts on less than Rs. 1,000:																		
Number . . .	3,330	1,524	1,407	216	703	210	152	409	3,037	65	151	3,313	757	166	196	4,854	4,432	9,286
Percentage . . .	36	16	15	2	8	2	2	4	33	1	2	36	8	2	2	52	48	84
Posts on Rs. 1,000 and over:																		
Number . . .	1,568	69	48	4	22	8	2	18	102	2	8	112	14	13	2	1,637	141	1,778
Percentage . . .	88	4	3	—	2	—	—	1	6	—	—	6	1	1	—	92	8	16
Aggregate pay of total posts. Rs.	45,68,984	6,20,591	5,28,242	79,652	2,76,825	79,062	56,363	1,70,038	11,90,182	24,181	68,516	12,82,879	2,69,480	76,048	66,723	51,89,575	16,95,130	68,84,705
Average pay of total posts. Rs.	933	390	363	362	382	363	366	398	372	361	431	375	350	425	337	800	371	622

Filled by

APPENDIX V. (continued).

A.—TOTAL STATEMENT FOR THE WHOLE OF INDIA—continued.

(ii) Number of Posts of each Class.

Pay.	Number of Employés in each Grade or Class.																
	Total.	Europeans.	Anglo-Indians.	Hindus (including Sikhs and Parsis).										Muhammadans.	Indian Christians.	Buddhists	
				Brahmans (including Shênvis).	Kshatryus.	Kaiyasthas (including Prabhus).	Baniyas and Vaisyas.	Sudras.	Other Hindus (i.e., other than those shown in cols. 5 to 9).	Total Hindus (cols. 5 to 10).	Sikhs.	Parsis.	Total Hindus, Sikhs, and Parsis (cols. 11 to 13).				
1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.	17.	
Rs.																	
200—300	3,088	380	743	625	92	289	102	62	183	1,353	37	57	1,447	360	71	87	
300—400	1,534	289	287	310	57	153	42	34	78	674	7	36	717	163	36	42	
400—500	1,458	538	212	241	30	121	34	26	62	514	9	19	542	115	25	26	
500—600	1,314	759	139	112	19	68	17	13	43	272	5	17	294	73	17	32	
600—700	544	294	55	60	12	36	8	12	22	150	5	9	164	20	6	5	
700—800	625	485	51	29	—	12	3	3	7	54	2	6	62	17	8	2	
800—900	419	306	25	26	5	18	4	2	14	69	—	5	74	9	3	2	
900—1,000	304	279	12	4	1	6	—	—	—	11	—	2	13	—	—	—	
1,000—1,200	414	339	24	22	—	9	5	1	6	43	1	1	45	2	3	1	
1,200—1,400	364	295	28	17	2	5	2	—	4	30	—	3	33	1	6	1	
1,400—1,600	242	218	7	6	2	2	—	—	—	10	—	3	13	2	2	—	
1,600—1,800	111	97	4	2	—	2	—	1	—	5	—	—	5	5	—	—	
1,800—2,000	183	173	1	1	—	1	—	—	3	5	1	1	7	1	1	—	
2,000—2,500	230	219	4	—	—	2	—	—	4	6	—	—	6	1	—	—	
2,500—3,000	137	131	—	—	—	1	1	—	1	3	—	—	3	2	1	—	
3,000—3,500	33	32	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
3,500—4,000	25	25	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
4,000 & over	39	39	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Total	11,064	4,898	1,593	1,455	220	725	218	154	427	3,199	67	159	3,425	771	179	198	

(iii) Proportion of Posts of each Class, i.e., Number per Cent. of Employés.

Rs.																
200—300	23	12	24	20	3	9	4	2	6	44	1	2	47	12	2	3
300—400	14	19	19	20	4	10	3	2	5	44	—	2	46	11	2	3
400—500	13	36	15	17	2	8	2	2	4	35	1	1	37	8	2	2
500—600	12	58	11	9	1	6	1	1	3	21	—	1	22	6	1	2
600—700	5	54	10	11	2	7	1	2	4	27	1	2	30	4	1	1
700—800	6	78	8	5	—	2	—	—	2	9	—	1	10	3	1	—
800—900	4	73	6	6	1	5	1	—	4	17	—	1	18	2	1	—
900—1,000	3	92	4	1	—	2	—	—	—	3	—	1	4	—	—	—
1,000—1,200	4	82	6	6	—	2	1	—	2	11	—	—	11	—	1	—
1,200—1,400	3	81	8	4	1	1	1	—	1	8	—	1	9	—	2	—
1,400—1,600	2	90	3	2	1	1	—	—	—	4	—	1	5	1	1	—
1,600—1,800	1	87	3	2	—	2	—	1	—	5	—	—	5	5	—	—
1,800—2,000	2	94.5	5	5	—	5	—	—	2	3	5	5	4	5	5	—
2,000—2,500	2	95	2	—	—	1	—	—	2	3	—	—	3	—	—	—
2,500—3,000	1	95	—	—	—	1	1	—	1	3	—	—	3	1	1	—
3,000—3,500	—	97	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3,500—4,000	—	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
4,000 & over	—	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	100	44	14	13	2	7	2	1	4	29	1	1	31	7	2	2

NOTE.—Decimal figures have been used in those cases in which it was not possible to follow the general principle of using whole numbers.

## APPENDIX V. (continued).

## B.—DETAILS BY PROVINCES.

## (i) Proportional Distribution of Total Posts and Posts over and under Rs. 1,000 a month.

1.	Filled by																	Totals.	
	Europeans.	Anglo-Indians.	Hindus (including Sikhs and Parsis).										Muhammadans.	Indian Christians.	Buddhists.	Europeans and Anglo-Indians.	Indians.		
			Brahmans (including Shenvis).	Kshatriyas.	Kalyasthas (including Prabhus).	Baniyas and Vaisyas.	Sudras.	Other Hindus (i.e., other than those shown in columns 4 and 8).	Total Hindus (cols. 4 to 9).	Sikhs.	Parsis.	Total Hindus, Sikhs, and Parsis (cols. 10 to 12).							
2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.	17.	18.			
INDIA (IMPERIAL).																			
Percentage of total posts - - -	44	39	4	1	2	1	1	2	11	1	2	14	2	1	—	83	17		
" of posts on Rs. 1,000 and over.	86	8	2	1	1	—	—	1	5	—	—	5	—	1	—	94	6		
" of posts on less than Rs. 1,000.	37	44	5	1	3	1	1	2	13	—	2	15	3	1	—	81	19		
MADRAS.																			
Percentage of total posts - - -	43	9	30	—	—	—	7	3	40	—	—	40	4	4	—	52	48		
" of posts on Rs. 1,000 and over.	90	1	3	—	—	1	1	—	5	—	1	6	1	2	—	91	9		
" of posts on less than Rs. 1,000.	33	10	35	1	—	—	8	4	48	—	—	48	4	5	—	43	57		
BOMBAY.																			
Percentage of total posts - - -	44	4	24	2	2	4	1	4	37	—	8	45	4	3	—	48	52		
" of posts on Rs. 1,000 and over.	89.5	.5	5.5	.5	—	.5	—	1	7.5	—	1	8.5	1	.5	—	90	10		
" of posts on less than Rs. 1,000.	37	5	27	3	3	4	1	4	42	—	9	51	4	3	—	42	58		
BENGAL.																			
Percentage of total posts - - -	32	6	19	—	19	1	2	12	53	—	—	53	8	1	—	38	62		
" of posts on Rs. 1,000 and over.	72	7	3	—	4	1	—	5	13	—	—	13	1	—	—	86	14		
" of posts on less than Rs. 1,000.	25	5	21	—	22	2	2	13	60	—	—	60	9	1	—	30	70		
BIHAR AND ORISSA.																			
Percentage of total posts - - -	35	7	13	1	19	3	1	7	44	—	—	44	12	2	—	42	58		
" of posts on Rs. 1,000 and over.	87	2	3	—	5	—	—	1	9	1	—	10	1	—	—	89	11		
" of posts on less than Rs. 1,000.	26	8	14	1	21	4	1	8	49	—	—	49	14	3	—	34	66		
UNITED PROVINCES.																			
Percentage of total posts - - -	47	5	11	3	9	5	—	3	31	—	—	31	16	1	—	52	48		
" of posts on Rs. 1,000 and over.	92	1	2	—	1	—	—	—	3	—	1	4	2	1	—	93	7		
" of posts on less than Rs. 1,000.	38	6	13	4	10	6	—	3	36	—	—	36	19	1	—	44	56		
PUNJAB.																			
Percentage of total posts - - -	54	5	2	10	1	3	—	2	18	5	—	23	16	2	—	59	41		
" of posts on Rs. 1,000 and over.	88	5	1	1	1	1	—	1	5	—	—	5	1	1	—	93	7		
" of posts on less than Rs. 1,000.	47	5	3	12	1	3	—	2	21	6	—	27	19	2	—	52	48		
BURMA.																			
Percentage of total posts - - -	50	26	1	—	1	1	—	—	3	—	—	3	1	2	18	76	24		
" of posts on Rs. 1,000 and over.	94.5	3.5	.5	—	—	.5	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	1	98	2		
" of posts on less than Rs. 1,000.	41	30	2	—	1	1	—	—	4	—	—	4	1	2	22	71	29		
CENTRAL PROVINCES AND BERAR.																			
Percentage of total posts - - -	50	8	20	2	5	1	1	2	31	—	2	33	8	1	—	58	42		
" of posts on Rs. 1,000 and over.	89	—	5	—	2	—	—	—	7	—	3	10	—	1	—	89	11		
" of posts on less than Rs. 1,000.	42	9	23	2	6	1	2	2	36	—	3	39	9	1	—	51	49		
ASSAM.																			
Percentage of total posts - - -	54	5	11	—	12	2	—	8	33	—	—	33	7	1	—	59	41		
" of posts on Rs. 1,000 and over.	95	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	100	—		
" of posts on less than Rs. 1,000.	47	6	12	—	14	2	—	10	38	—	—	38	8	1	—	53	47		

NOTE.—Decimal figures have been used in those cases in which it was not possible to follow the general principle of using whole numbers

## APPENDIX V. (continued.)

## INDIA (IMPERIAL).\*

## (ii) Number of Posts of each Class.

Pay.	Number of Employéés in each Grade or Class.															
	Total.	Europeans.	Anglo-Indians.	Hindus (including Sikhs and Parsis).										Muhammadians.	Indian Christians.	Buddhists.
				Brahmans (including Shenvis).	Kshatriyas.	Kaiyasthas (including Prabhus).	Baniyas and Vaisyas.	Sudras.	Other Hindus (i.e., other than those shown in cols. 5 to 9).	Total Hindus (cols. 5 to 10).	Sikhs.	Parsis.	Total Hindus, Sikhs, and Parsis (cols. 11 to 13).			
1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.	17.
Rs.																
200—300	788	159	486	36	12	21	5	5	10	89	6	11	106	29	8	—
300—400	308	85	140	23	6	12	4	3	8	56	1	8	65	15	3	—
400—500	250	116	77	14	6	13	2	1	6	42	1	7	50	7	—	—
500—600	192	101	64	10	2	2	—	1	7	22	—	4	26	1	—	—
600—700	96	64	18	6	—	3	—	1	2	12	1	—	13	1	—	—
700—800	82	55	16	2	—	4	1	—	1	8	1	2	11	—	—	—
800—900	80	60	10	3	2	1	—	—	3	9	—	—	9	1	—	—
900—1,000	62	48	9	2	1	1	—	—	—	4	—	1	5	—	—	—
1,000—1,200	108	89	11	3	—	1	—	—	2	6	1	—	7	—	1	—
1,200—1,400	89	71	11	3	1	1	1	—	—	6	—	—	6	—	1	—
1,400—1,600	53	48	2	1	1	1	—	—	—	3	—	—	3	—	—	—
1,600—1,800	29	25	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,800—2,000	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2,000—2,500	33	32	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—
2,500—3,000	10	10	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3,000—3,500	5	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	2,187	970	848	103	31	61	13	11	39	258	11	33	302	54	13	—

## (iii) Proportion of Posts of each Class, i.e., Number per Cent. of Employees.

Rs.																
200—300	36	20	62	4	1	3	1	1	1	11	1	1	13	4	1	—
300—400	14	28	45	7	2	4	2	1	2	18	—	3	21	5	1	—
400—500	11	46	31	6	2	6	1	—	2	17	—	—	20	3	—	—
500—600	9	52	33	5	1	1	—	1	4	12	—	2	14	1	—	—
600—700	5	67	19	6	—	3	—	1	2	12	1	—	13	1	—	—
700—800	4	67	20	3	—	5	1	—	1	10	1	2	13	—	—	—
800—900	4	75	13	4	2	1	—	—	4	11	—	—	11	1	—	—
900—1,000	3	77	15	3	2	2	—	—	—	7	—	1	8	—	—	—
1,000—1,200	5	82	10	3	—	1	—	—	2	6	1	—	7	—	1	—
1,200—1,400	4	80	13	3	1	1	1	—	—	6	—	—	6	—	1	—
1,400—1,600	2	91	3	2	2	2	—	—	—	6	—	—	6	—	—	—
1,600—1,800	1	86	14	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,800—2,000	—	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2,000—2,500	2	97	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2,500—3,000	—	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	3	—	—	—
3,000—3,500	—	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	100	44	39	4	1	2	1	1	2	11	1	2	14	2	1	—

\* Appointments directly under the Government of India. (Members of the Indian civil or police service serving under the Government of India have been included in the statements of the provinces to whose cadre they substantively belong.)

## APPENDIX V. (continued.)

## MADRAS.

## (ii) Number of Posts of each Class.

Pay.	Number of Employés in each Grade or Class.															
	Hindus (including Sikhs and Parsis).															
	Total.	Europeans.	Anglo-Indians.	Brahmans (including Shenvais).	Kshatryas.	Kalyasthas (including Prabhus).	Baniyas and Vaisyas.	Sudras.	Other Hindus (i.e., other than those shown in cols. 5 to 9).	Total Hindus (cols. 5 to 10).	Sikhs.	Parsis.	Total Hindus, Sikhs, and Parsis (cols. 11 to 13).	Muhammadians.	Indian Christians.	Buddhists.
1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.	17.
Rs.																
200—300	295	26	31	144	3	—	1	27	25	201	—	—	201	17	20	—
300—400	187	32	33	77	—	—	1	20	4	102	—	—	102	11	9	—
400—500	170	49	20	67	1	1	—	14	4	87	—	1	88	5	8	—
500—600	123	65	9	30	—	—	—	9	2	41	—	—	41	4	4	—
600—700	51	30	4	10	1	—	1	5	—	17	—	—	17	—	—	—
700—800	75	58	1	9	—	1	—	1	—	11	—	—	11	2	3	—
800—900	35	27	1	4	—	—	1	1	—	6	—	—	6	1	—	—
900—1,000	43	38	2	1	—	2	—	—	—	3	—	—	3	—	—	—
1,000—1,200	38	35	—	1	—	—	—	1	—	2	—	—	2	—	1	—
1,200—1,400	64	55	2	4	—	—	—	—	—	4	—	1	5	—	2	—
1,400—1,600	22	19	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	2	—	1	—
1,600—1,800	9	7	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	1	—	—
1,800—2,000	13	13	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2,000—2,500	28	28	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2,500—3,000	21	19	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	1	—
3,000—3,500	6	5	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3,500—4,000	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
4,000 & over	6	6	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	1,188	514	104	350	5	4	5	78	36	478	—	2	480	41	49	—

## (iii) Proportion of Posts of each Class, i.e., Number per Cent. of Employés.

Rs.																
200—300	25	9	11	49	1	—	—	9	9	68	—	—	68	6	6	—
300—400	16	17	18	41	—	—	1	11	2	55	—	—	55	6	4	—
400—500	14	29	11	39	1	1	—	8	2	51	—	1	52	3	5	—
500—600	10	53	8	24	—	—	—	7	2	33	—	—	33	3	3	—
600—700	4	59	8	19	2	—	2	10	—	33	—	—	33	—	—	—
700—800	6	77	2	12	—	1	—	1	—	14	—	—	14	3	4	—
800—900	3	77	3	11	—	—	3	3	—	17	—	—	17	3	—	—
900—1,000	4	88	5	2	—	5	—	—	—	7	—	—	7	—	—	—
1,000—1,200	3	92.5	—	2.5	—	—	—	2.5	—	5	—	—	5	—	2.5	—
1,200—1,400	5	86	3	6	—	—	—	—	—	6	—	2	8	—	3	—
1,400—1,600	2	86	—	9	—	—	—	—	—	9	—	—	9	—	5	—
1,600—1,800	1	78	—	11	—	—	—	—	—	11	—	—	11	11	—	—
1,800—2,000	1	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2,000—2,500	2	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2,500—3,000	2	90	—	—	—	—	5	—	—	5	—	—	5	—	5	—
3,000—3,500	1	83	17	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3,500—4,000	—	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
4,000 & over	1	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	100	43	9	30	—	—	—	7	3	40	—	—	40	4	4	—

NOTE.—Decimal figures have been used in those cases in which it was not possible to follow the general principle of using whole numbers.

## APPENDIX V. (continued.)

## BOMBAY.

## (ii) Number of Posts of each Class.

Pay.	Number of Employés in each Grade or Class.															
	Total.	Europeans.	Anglo-Indians.	Hindus (including Sikhs and Parsis).										Muhammadans.	Indian Christians.	Buddhists.
				Brahmans (including Shenvis).	Kshatryas.	Kaiyasthas (including Prabhus).	Baniyas and Vaisyas.	Sudras.	Other Hindus (i.e., other than those shown in cols. 5 to 9).	Total Hindus (cols. 5 to 10).	Sikhs.	Parsis.	Total Hindus, Sikhs, and Parsis (cols. 11 to 13).			
1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	16.	16.	17.
Rs.																
200—300	425	66	28	161	20	16	32	2	20	251	—	42	293	24	14	—
300—400	160	30	9	57	4	2	5	2	10	80	—	27	107	8	6	—
400—500	149	63	5	40	2	7	6	2	6	63	1	6	70	7	4	—
500—600	150	89	—	19	3	5	2	—	7	36	1	10	47	6	3	—
600—700	56	32	3	7	1	1	—	1	1	11	—	6	17	—	4	—
700—800	59	50	—	4	—	—	1	1	1	7	—	1	8	—	1	—
800—900	55	37	3	5	—	—	2	—	2	9	—	5	14	—	1	—
900—1,000	35	35	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,000—1,200	40	36	—	3	—	—	1	—	—	4	—	—	4	—	—	—
1,200—1,400	37	29	—	6	1	—	—	—	1	8	—	—	8	—	—	—
1,400—1,600	14	11	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	2	—	—	—
1,600—1,800	15	15	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,800—2,000	29	26	—	1	—	—	—	—	1	2	—	—	2	—	1	—
2,000—2,500	27	26	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—
2,500—3,000	12	11	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—
3,000—3,500	8	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3,500—4,000	5	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
4,000 & over	8	8	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	1,279	572	54	303	31	31	49	8	49	471	2	99	572	47	34	—

## (iii) Proportion of Posts of each Class, i.e., Number per Cent. of Employés.

Rs.																
200—300	33	16	7	38	5	4	7	—	5	59	—	9	68	6	3	—
300—400	13	19	5	36	3	1	3	1	6	50	—	17	67	5	4	—
400—500	12	42	3	27	1	5	4	1	4	42	1	4	47	5	3	—
500—600	12	59	3	13	2	3	1	—	5	24	1	7	32	4	2	—
600—700	4	57	5	12	2	2	—	2	2	20	—	11	31	—	7	—
700—800	5	84	—	6	—	—	2	2	2	12	—	2	14	—	2	—
800—900	4	67	5	9	—	—	4	—	4	17	—	9	26	—	2	—
900—1,000	3	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,000—1,200	3	90	—	7	—	—	3	—	—	10	—	—	10	—	—	—
1,200—1,400	3	78	—	16	3	—	—	—	3	22	—	—	22	—	—	—
1,400—1,600	1	79	7	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	14	14	—	—	—
1,600—1,800	1	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,800—2,000	2	89.5	—	3.5	—	—	—	—	3.5	7	—	—	7	—	3.5	—
2,000—2,500	2	96	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2,500—3,000	1	92	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	8	—	—
3,000—3,500	—	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3,500—4,000	—	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
4,000 & over	—	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	100	44	4	24	2	2	4	1	4	37	—	8	45	4	3	—

NOTE.—Decimal figures have been used in those cases in which it was not possible to follow the general principle of using whole numbers.

## APPENDIX V. (continued.)

## BENGAL.

## (ii) Number of Posts of each Class.

Pay.	Number of Employés in each Grade or Class.																
	Total.	European.	Anglo-Indians.	Hindus (including Sikhs and Parsis).										Muhammadans.	Indian Christians.	Buddhists.	
				Brahmans (including Shenvis).	Kshatryas.	Kaiyasthas (including Prabhus).	Baniyas and Vaisyas.	Sudras.	Other Hindus (i.e., other than those shown in cols. 5 to 9).	Total Hindus (cols. 5 to 10).	Sikhs.	Parsis.	Total Hindus, Sikhs, and Parsis (cols. 11 to 13).				
1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.	17.	
Rs.																	
200—300	467	21	36	123	4	124	7	14	72	344	1	—	345	60	5	—	
300—400	245	28	14	60	—	69	7	7	32	175	—	—	175	25	3	—	
400—500	213	57	9	51	—	45	5	5	25	131	—	—	131	15	1	—	
500—600	146	75	1	21	—	23	—	—	17	61	—	1	62	8	—	—	
600—700	78	28	3	13	1	13	—	3	13	43	—	2	45	2	—	—	
700—800	77	55	4	6	—	5	—	1	3	15	—	—	15	2	1	—	
800—900	46	27	3	4	—	7	—	—	4	15	—	—	15	1	—	—	
900—1,000	39	37	—	1	—	1	—	—	—	2	—	—	2	—	—	—	
1,000—1,200	49	32	6	4	—	3	2	—	2	11	—	—	11	—	—	—	
1,200—1,400	28	16	6	2	—	2	—	—	2	6	—	—	6	—	—	—	
1,400—1,600	27	26	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	
1,600—1,800	14	10	—	—	—	2	—	1	—	3	—	—	3	1	—	—	
1,800—2,000	22	19	1	—	—	1	—	—	1	2	—	—	2	—	—	—	
2,000—2,500	39	33	2	—	—	—	—	—	4	4	—	—	4	—	—	—	
2,500—3,000	24	22	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	—	1	1	—	—	
3,000—3,500	5	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
3,500—4,000	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
4,000 & over	7	7	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Total	1,528	500	85	285	5	295	21	31	176	813	1	3	817	115	11	—	

## (iii) Proportion of Posts of each Class, i.e., Number per Cent. of Employés.

Rs.																
200—300	30	4	8	26	1	27	2	3	15	74	—	—	74	13	1	—
300—400	16	12	6	24	—	28	3	3	13	71	—	—	71	10	1	—
400—500	14	27	5	24	—	21	2	2	12	61	—	—	61	7	—	—
500—600	10	51	1	14	—	16	—	—	12	42	—	1	43	5	—	—
600—700	5	35	4	17	1	17	—	4	17	56	—	2	58	3	—	—
700—800	5	71	6	8	—	6	—	1	4	19	—	—	19	3	1	—
800—900	3	59	6	9	—	15	—	—	9	33	—	—	33	2	—	—
900—1,000	3	94	—	3	—	3	—	—	—	6	—	—	6	—	—	—
1,000—1,200	3	65	13	8	—	6	4	—	4	22	—	—	22	—	—	—
1,200—1,400	2	57	22	7	—	7	—	—	7	21	—	—	21	—	—	—
1,400—1,600	2	96	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	—
1,600—1,800	1	72	—	—	—	14	—	7	—	21	—	—	21	7	—	—
1,800—2,000	1	86.5	4.5	—	—	4.5	—	—	4.5	9	—	—	9	—	—	—
2,000—3,500	3	85	5	—	—	—	—	—	10	10	—	—	10	—	—	—
2,500—3,000	2	92	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	4	—	—	4	4	—	—
3,000—3,500	—	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3,500—4,000	—	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
4,000 & over	—	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	100	32	6	19	—	19	1	2	12	53	—	—	53	8	1	—

NOTE.—Decimal figures have been used in those cases in which it was not possible to follow the general principle of using whole numbers.

## APPENDIX V. (continued).

## BIHAR AND ORISSA.

## (ii) Number of Posts of each Class.

Pay.	Number of Employés in each Grade or Class.															
	Total.	Europeans.	Anglo-Indians.	Hindus (including Sikhs and Parsis).										Muhammadans.	Indian Christians.	Buddhists.
				Brahmans (including Shenvais).	Kshatriyas.	Kaiyasthas (including Prabhus).	Baniyas and Vaisiyas.	Sudras.	Other Hindus (i.e., other than those shown in cols. 5 to 9).	Total Hindus (cols. 5 to 10).	Sikhs.	Parsis.	Total Hindus, Sikhs, and Parsis (cols. 11 to 13).			
1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.	17.
Rs.																
200—300	230	19	13	51	3	59	17	5	19	154	—	—	154	38	6	—
300—400	122	19	13	20	3	29	2	—	8	62	—	—	62	24	4	—
400—500	111	28	13	11	1	28	1	1	9	51	—	—	51	15	4	—
500—600	91	42	6	4	—	14	1	2	7	28	—	—	28	12	3	—
600—700	43	12	3	7	—	11	3	—	4	25	—	—	25	3	—	—
700—800	41	32	4	2	—	1	—	—	—	3	—	—	3	1	1	—
800—900	25	14	1	3	—	1	—	1	4	9	—	—	9	1	—	—
900—1,000	16	15	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—
1,000—1,200	20	14	—	3	—	3	—	—	—	6	—	—	6	—	—	—
1,200—1,400	13	10	2	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—
1,400—1,600	16	15	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—
1,600—1,800	3	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,800—2,000	14	12	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	1	—	2	—	—	—
2,000—2,500	15	15	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2,500—3,000	13	12	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—
3,000—3,500	3	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3,500—4,000	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
4,000 & over	6	6	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total -	784	273	55	101	7	149	24	9	52	342	1	—	343	95	18	—

## (iii) Proportion of Posts of each Class, i.e., Number per Cent. of Employés.

Rs.																
200—300	29	8	6	22	1	26	7	2	8	66	—	—	66	17	3	—
300—400	16	16	11	16	2	24	2	—	7	51	—	—	51	19	3	—
400—500	14	25	12	10	1	25	1	1	8	46	—	—	46	14	3	—
500—600	12	46	7	5	—	15	1	2	8	31	—	—	31	13	3	—
600—700	5	28	7	16	—	26	7	—	9	58	—	—	58	7	—	—
700—800	5	79	10	5	—	2	—	—	—	7	—	—	7	2	2	—
800—900	3	56	4	12	—	4	—	4	16	36	—	—	36	4	—	—
900—1,000	2	94	—	—	—	6	—	—	—	6	—	—	6	—	—	—
1,000—1,200	3	70	—	15	—	1	—	—	—	30	—	—	30	—	—	—
1,200—1,400	2	77	15	—	—	8	—	—	—	8	—	—	8	—	—	—
1,400—1,600	2	94	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	6	—	—
1,600—1,800	—	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,800—2,000	2	86	—	—	—	—	—	—	7	7	7	—	14	—	—	—
2,000—2,500	2	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2,500—3,000	2	92	—	—	—	8	—	—	—	8	—	—	8	—	—	—
3,000—3,500	—	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3,500—4,000	—	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
4,000 & over	1	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total -	100	35	7	13	1	19	3	1	7	44	—	—	44	12	2	—

## APPENDIX V. (continued).

## UNITED PROVINCES.

## (ii) Number of Posts of each Class.

Pay.	Number of Employés in each Grade or Class.															
	Total.	Europeans.	Anglo-Indians.	Hindus (including Sikhs and Parsis).										Muhammadans.	Indian Christians.	Buddhists.
				Brahmans (including Shenvis).	Kshatryas.	Kaiyasthas (including Prabhus).	Baniyas and Vaisyas.	Sudras.	Other Hindus (i.e., other than those shown in cols. 5 to 9).	Total Hindus (cols. 5 to 10).	Sikhs.	Parsis.	Total Hindus, Sikhs, and Parsis (cols. 11 to 13).			
1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.	17.
Rs.																
200—300	326	38	29	61	16	36	25	4	11	153	2	—	155	99	5	—
300—400	182	33	9	31	12	27	16	—	7	93	1	—	94	43	3	—
400—500	177	66	13	21	7	20	13	—	5	66	—	—	66	31	1	—
500—600	174	106	6	14	2	15	10	—	1	42	—	—	42	19	1	—
600—700	55	27	—	8	2	4	3	1	2	20	—	—	20	8	—	—
700—800	86	75	4	2	—	1	—	—	1	4	—	1	5	2	—	—
800—900	63	45	1	4	1	7	1	—	1	14	—	—	14	3	—	—
900—1,000	23	23	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,000—1,200	47	39	—	3	—	2	—	—	1	6	—	—	6	2	—	—
1,200—1,400	49	42	2	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	1	2	1	2	—
1,400—1,600	16	15	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—
1,600—1,800	18	17	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—
1,800—2,000	31	29	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	1	—	—
2,000—2,500	33	32	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2,500—3,000	21	21	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3,000—3,500	6	6	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3,500—4,000	3	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
4,000 and over	6	6	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	1,316	623	65	146	40	112	68	5	29	400	3	3	406	210	12	—

## (iii) Proportion of Posts of each Class, i.e., Number per Cent. of Employés.

Rs.																
200—300	25	12	9	10	5	11	8	1	3	47	1	—	48	30	1	—
300—400	14	18	5	17	7	14	9	—	4	51	1	—	52	23	2	—
400—500	13	37	7	12	4	11	7	—	3	37	—	—	37	18	1	—
500—600	13	61	3	8	1	8	6	—	1	24	—	—	24	11	1	—
600—700	4	49	—	15	4	7	5	1	4	36	—	—	36	15	—	—
700—800	7	87	4	3	—	1	—	—	1	5	—	1	6	3	—	—
800—900	5	71	2	6	2	11	2	—	2	23	—	—	23	4	—	—
900—1,000	2	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,000—1,200	4	83	—	7	—	4	—	—	2	13	—	—	13	4	—	—
1,200—1,400	4	86	4	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	2	4	2	4	—
1,400—1,600	1	94	—	6	—	—	—	—	—	6	—	—	6	—	—	—
1,600—1,800	1	94	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	6	—	—
1,800—2,000	2	94	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	3	3	—	—
2,000—2,500	3	97	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2,500—3,000	2	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3,000—3,500	—	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3,500—4,000	—	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
4,000 and over	—	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	100	47	5	11	3	9	5	—	3	31	—	—	31	16	1	—

## APPENDIX V. (continued).

## PUNJAB.

## (ii) Number of Posts of each Class.

Pay.	Number of Employés in each Grade or Class.																
	Total.	Europeans.	Anglo-Indians.	Hindus (including Sikhs and Parsis).									Muhammadans.	Indian Christians.	Buddhists.		
				Brahmans (including Shenvis).	Kshatriyas.	Kaiyasthas (including Prabhus).	Baniyas and Vaisyas.	Sudras.	Other Hindus (i.e., other than those shown in cols. 5 to 9).	Total Hindus (cols. 5 to 10).	Sikhs.	Parsis.				Total Hindus, Sikhs, and Parsis (cols. 11 to 13).	
1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.	17.	
Rs.																	
200—300	178	19	7	6	31	4	8	—	6	55	24	—	79	69	4	—	
300—400	107	21	12	5	26	4	6	1	3	45	5	—	50	21	3	—	
400—500	110	44	8	3	12	—	5	—	2	22	7	—	29	26	3	—	
500—600	133	94	3	3	12	—	1	—	1	17	4	—	21	14	1	—	
600—700	55	36	2	2	7	—	1	—	—	10	4	—	14	3	—	—	
700—800	73	60	2	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	1	—	2	7	2	—	
800—900	37	31	1	—	2	1	—	—	—	3	—	—	3	1	1	—	
900—1,000	35	34	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	—	—	
1,000—1,200	34	26	3	1	—	—	2	—	1	4	—	—	4	—	1	—	
1,200—1,400	36	31	2	1	—	1	—	—	1	3	—	—	3	—	—	—	
1,400—1,600	32	26	3	1	1	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	2	1	—	—	
1,600—1,800	9	7	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	
1,800—2,000	24	24	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
2,000—2,500	24	23	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
2,500—3,000	13	13	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
3,000—3,500	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
3,500—4,000	5	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
4,000 and over	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Total	908	497	44	22	91	10	24	1	14	162	45	1	208	144	15	—	

## (iii) Proportion of Posts of each Class, i.e., Number per Cent. of Employés.

Rs.																
200—300	19	11	4	4	17	2	4	—	4	31	13	—	44	39	2	—
300—400	12	20	11	5	24	4	5	1	3	42	4	—	46	20	3	—
400—500	12	40	7	3	11	—	4	—	2	20	6	—	26	24	3	—
500—600	14	71	2	2	9	—	1	—	1	13	3	—	16	11	—	—
600—700	6	65	4	4	13	—	2	—	—	19	7	—	26	5	—	—
700—800	8	82	3	—	—	—	1.5	—	—	1.5	1.5	—	3	9	3	—
800—900	4	83	3	—	5	3	—	—	—	8	—	—	8	3	3	—
900—1,000	4	97	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	3	—	—	—
1,000—1,200	4	76	9	3	—	—	6	—	3	12	—	—	12	—	3	—
1,200—1,400	4	86	5	3	—	3	—	—	3	9	—	—	9	—	—	—
1,400—1,600	4	82	9	3	3	—	—	—	—	6	—	—	6	3	—	—
1,600—1,800	1	78	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	22	—	—
1,800—2,000	3	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2,000—2,500	3	96	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2,500—3,000	1	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3,000—3,500	—	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3,500—4,000	1	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
4,000 and over	—	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	100	54	5	2	10	1	3	—	2	18	5	—	23	16	2	—

NOTE.—Decimal figures have been used in those cases in which it was not possible to follow the general principle of using whole numbers.

APPENDIX V. (continued).

BURMA.

(ii) Number of Posts of each Class.

Pay.	Number of Employés in each Grade or Class.																
	Total.	Europeans.	Anglo-Indians.	Hindus (including Sikhs and Parsis).										Muhammadians.	Indian Christians.	Buddhists.	
				Brahmans (including Shenvis).	Kshatryas.	Kaiyasthas (including Prabhus).	Baniyas and Vaisyas.	Sudras.	Other Hindus (i.e., other than those shown in cols. 5 to 9).	Total Hindus (cols. 5 to 10).	Sikhs.	Parsis.	Total Hindus, Sikhs, and Parsis (cols. 11 to 13).				
1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.	17.	
Rs.																	
200—300	255	23	105	9	1	4	4	3	1	22	4	2	28	5	7	87	
300—400	122	27	46	2	1	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	3	—	4	42	
400—500	153	69	53	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	2	1	2	26	
500—600	186	110	35	1	—	—	1	—	—	2	—	—	2	2	5	32	
600—700	61	38	14	—	—	2	—	—	—	2	—	—	2	—	2	5	
700—800	78	55	20	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	2	
800—900	41	34	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	2	
900—1,000	22	21	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
1,000—1,200	49	44	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	
1,200—1,400	32	29	1	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	1	
1,400—1,600	30	28	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	
1,600—1,800	7	7	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
1,800—2,000	23	23	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
2,000—2,500	17	17	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
2,500—3,000	14	14	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
3,000—3,500	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
3,500—4,000	4	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
4,000 and over	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Total	1,097	546	284	14	2	6	6	3	1	32	4	4	40	8	21	198	

(iii) Proportion of Posts of each Class, i.e., Number per Cent. of Employés.

Rs.																
200—300	23	9	41	4	—	2	2	1	—	9	1	1	11	2	3	34
300—400	11	22	38	1	1	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	2	—	3	35
400—500	14	45	35	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	1	1	17
500—600	17	59	18	1	—	—	1	—	—	2	—	—	2	2	2	17
600—700	6	62	23	—	—	3	—	—	—	3	—	—	3	—	3	9
700—800	7	70	26	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	3
800—900	4	83	10	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	5
900—1,000	2	95	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,000—1,200	4	90	8	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2
1,200—1,400	3	91	3	—	—	—	3	—	—	3	—	—	3	—	—	3
1,400—1,600	3	94	3	3	—	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	3	—	—	—
1,600—1,800	1	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,800—2,000	—	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2,000—2,500	2	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2,500—3,000	1	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3,000—3,500	—	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3,500—4,000	—	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
4,000 and over	—	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	100	50	26	1	—	1	1	—	—	3	—	—	3	1	2	18

## APPENDIX V. (continued).

## CENTRAL PROVINCES AND BERAR.

## (ii) Number of Posts of each Class.

Pay.	Number of Employés in each Grade or Class.															
	Total.	Europeans.	Anglo-Indians.	Hindus (including Sikhs and Parsis).									Muhammadans.	Indian Christians.	Buddhists.	
				Brahmans (including Shenvis.	Kshatryas.	Kaiyasthas (including Prabhus.	Baniyas and Vaisyas.	Sudras.	Other Hindus (i.e., other than those shown in cols. 5 to 9).	Total Hindus (cols. 5 to 10).	Sikhs.	Parsis.				Total Hindus, Sikhs, and Parsis (cols. 11 to 13).
1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.	17.
Rs.																
200—300	57	1	4	20	2	11	—	2	2	37	—	2	39	11	2	—
300—400	73	8	9	28	5	5	1	1	4	44	—	1	45	11	—	—
400—500	85	25	9	31	1	3	1	2	2	40	—	3	43	7	1	—
500—600	82	54	8	9	—	3	1	1	—	14	—	2	16	4	—	—
600—700	31	12	8	6	—	1	—	1	—	8	—	1	9	2	—	—
700—800	38	30	—	2	—	—	—	—	1	3	—	2	5	3	—	—
800—900	30	25	1	2	—	1	—	—	—	3	—	—	3	1	—	—
900—1,000	17	17	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,000—1,200	22	17	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	4	—	1	5	—	—	—
1,200—1,400	12	10	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	1	—
1,400—1,600	21	19	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	—	1	2	—	—	—
1,600—1,800	7	6	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—
1,800—2,000	17	17	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2,000—2,500	7	6	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—
2,500—3,000	6	6	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3,000—3,500	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3,500—4,000	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
4,000 and over	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	511	259	39	103	8	26	3	7	9	156	—	14	170	39	4	—

## (iii) Proportion of Posts of each Class, i.e., Number per Cent. of Employés.

Rs.																
200—300	11	1.5	7	35	3.5	19.5	—	3.5	3.5	65	—	3.5	68.5	19.5	3.5	—
300—400	15	11	12	39	7	7	1	1	6	61	—	1	62	15	—	—
400—500	17	29	11	37	1	4	1	2	2	47	—	4	51	8	1	—
500—600	16	66	10	11	—	4	1	1	—	17	—	2	19	5	—	—
600—700	6	39	26	20	—	3	—	3	—	26	—	3	29	6	—	—
700—800	8	79	—	5	—	—	—	—	3	8	—	5	13	8	—	—
800—900	6	84	3	7	—	3	—	—	—	10	—	—	10	3	—	—
900—1,000	3	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,000—1,200	5	77	—	18	—	—	—	—	—	18	—	5	23	—	—	—
1,200—1,400	3	84	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	8	8	—	8	—
1,400—1,600	4	90	—	—	—	5	—	—	—	5	—	5	10	—	—	—
1,600—1,800	1	86	—	14	—	—	—	—	—	14	—	—	14	—	—	—
1,800—2,000	3	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2,000—2,500	1	86	—	—	—	14	—	—	—	14	—	—	14	—	—	—
2,500—3,000	1	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3,000—3,500	—	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3,500—4,000	—	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
4,000 and over	—	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	100	50	8	20	2	5	1	1	2	31	—	2	33	8	1	—

NOTE.—Decimal figures have been used in those cases in which it was not possible to follow the general principle of using whole numbers.

## APPENDIX V. (continued.)

## ASSAM.

## (ii) Number of Posts of each Class.

Pay.	Number of Employés in each Grade or Class.															
	Total.	Europeans.	Anglo-Indians.	Hindus (including Sikhs and Parsis).										Muhammadians.	Indian Christians.	Buddhists.
				Brahmins (including Shenvis).	Kshatriyas.	Kaiyasthas (including Prabhus).	Baniyas and Vaisyas.	Sudras.	Other Hindus (i.e., other than those shown in cols. 5 to 9).	Total Hindus (cols. 5 to 10).	Sikhs.	Parsis.	Total Hindus, Sikhs, and Parsis (cols. 11 to 13).			
1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.	17.
Rs.																
200—300	67	8	4	14	—	14	3	—	16	47	—	—	47	8	—	—
300—400	28	6	2	7	—	5	—	—	2	14	—	—	14	5	1	—
400—500	40	21	5	3	—	4	1	1	3	12	—	—	12	1	1	—
500—600	37	23	2	1	—	6	1	—	1	9	—	—	9	3	—	—
600—700	18	15	—	1	—	1	—	—	—	2	—	—	2	1	—	—
700—800	16	15	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—
800—900	7	6	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—
900—1,000	12	11	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—
1,000—1,200	7	7	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,200—1,400	4	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,400—1,600	11	11	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,800—2,000	8	8	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2,000—2,500	7	7	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2,500—3,000	3	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
4,000 and over	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	266	144	15	28	—	31	5	1	22	87	—	—	87	18	2	—

## (iii) Proportion of Posts of each Class, i.e., Number per Cent. of Employés.

Rs.	25	12	6	21	—	21	4	—	24	70	—	—	70	12	—	—
200—300	25	12	6	21	—	21	4	—	24	70	—	—	70	12	—	—
300—400	10	21	7	25	—	18	—	—	7	50	—	—	50	18	4	—
400—500	15	53	13	8	—	10	2	2	8	30	—	—	30	2	2	—
500—600	14	62	5	3	—	16	3	—	3	25	—	—	25	8	—	—
600—700	7	82	—	6	—	6	—	—	—	12	—	—	12	6	—	—
700—800	6	94	—	6	—	—	—	—	—	6	—	—	6	—	—	—
800—900	3	86	—	14	—	—	—	—	—	14	—	—	14	—	—	—
900—1,000	4	92	—	—	—	8	—	—	—	8	—	—	8	—	—	—
1,000—1,200	3	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,200—1,400	2	50	50	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,400—1,600	4	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,800—2,000	3	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2,000—2,500	3	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2,500—3,000	1	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
4,000 and over	—	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	100	54	5	11	—	12	2	—	8	33	—	—	33	7	1	—

## APPENDIX VI.

(Referred to in paragraphs 33 and 34 of the Report.)

STATEMENT to show for (a) 1887, (b) 1897, (c) 1903, and (d) 1913, the GENERAL DISTRIBUTION of Posts (Actual and Proportionate), carrying Salaries of Rs. 200 a Month and upwards as between EUROPEANS, ANGLO-INDIANS, HINDUS (including SIKHS, PARSIS, BUDDHISTS, and INDIAN CHRISTIANS), and MUHAMMADANS.

[Note.—The actual posts enumerated in 1913 differ to some extent from those enumerated in 1887, 1897, and 1903.]

(a) 1887.

	Filled by						
	Euro-peans.	Anglo-Indians.	Hindus (including Sikhs, Parsis, Buddhists, and Indian Christians).	Muham-madans.	Totals.		
					Euro-peans and Anglo-Indians.	Indians.	All Classes.
Total number of Government posts - - - - -	4,836	1,001	2,595	408	5,837	3,003	8,840
Percentage - - - - -	55	11	29	5	66	34	—
Percentage of posts on Rs. 200—300 - - - - -	26	19	47	8	45	55	34
"    "    300—400 - - - - -	42	19	35	4	61	39	15
"    "    400—500 - - - - -	39	12	41	8	51	49	10
"    "    500—600 - - - - -	75	5	18	2	80	20	12
"    "    600—700 - - - - -	73	4	21	2	77	23	5
"    "    700—800 - - - - -	91	2	6	1	93	7	5
"    "    800—900 - - - - -	88	1	10	1	89	11	4
"    "    900—1,000 - - - - -	97	1	2	—	98	2	3
Posts on less than Rs. 1,000 :—							
Number - - - - -	3,829	1,001	2,571	405	4,830	2,976	7,806
Percentage - - - - -	49	13	33	5	62	38	88
Posts on Rs. 1,000 and over :—							
Number - - - - -	1,007	—	24	3	1,007	27	1,034
Percentage - - - - -	98	—	2	—	98	2	12
Post on Rs. 500 and over :—							
Number - - - - -	3,163	83	376	51	3,246	427	3,673
Percentage - - - - -	86	2	11	1	88	12	42
Posts on Rs. 800 and over :—							
Number - - - - -	1,637	7	69	8	1,644	77	1,721
Percentage - - - - -	96	—	4	—	96	4	19

(b) 1897.

Total number of Government posts - - - - -	4,822	1,376	3,149	533	6,198	3,682	9,880
Percentage - - - - -	49	14	32	5	63	37	—
Percentage of posts on Rs. 200—300 - - - - -	20	20	52	8	40	60	35
"    "    300—400 - - - - -	37	25	33	5	62	38	16
"    "    400—500 - - - - -	45	15	34	6	60	40	11
"    "    500—600 - - - - -	67	7	23	3	74	26	9
"    "    600—700 - - - - -	66	5	26	3	71	29	4
"    "    700—800 - - - - -	82	4	12	2	86	14	5
"    "    800—900 - - - - -	87	2	10	1	89	11	5
"    "    900—1,000 - - - - -	86	3	8	3	89	11	2
Posts on less than Rs. 1,000 :—							
Number - - - - -	3,595	1,365	3,093	520	4,960	3,613	8,573
Percentage - - - - -	42	16	36	6	58	42	87
Posts on Rs. 1,000 and over :—							
Number - - - - -	1,227	11	56	13	1,238	69	1,307
Percentage - - - - -	94	1	4	1	95	5	13
Posts on Rs. 500 and over :—							
Number - - - - -	3,065	119	488	83	3,184	571	3,755
Percentage - - - - -	82	3	13	2	85	15	39
Posts on Rs. 800 and over :—							
Number - - - - -	1,829	25	122	25	1,854	147	2,001
Percentage - - - - -	92	1	6	1	93	7	20

## APPENDIX VI. (continued).

(c) 1903.

	Filled by				Totals.		
	Euro-peans.	Anglo-Indians.	Hindus (including Sikhs, Parsis, Buddhists, and Indian Christians).	Muham-madans.	Euro-peans and Anglo-Indians.	Indians.	All Classes.
Total number of Government posts - -	4,933	1,540	3,503	577	6,473	4,080	10,553
Percentage - - - - -	47	15	33	5	62	38	—
Percentage of posts on Rs. 200—300 - -	18	22	52	8	40	60	34
"      "      300—400 - -	34	23	37	6	57	43	17
"      "      400—500 - -	45	15	35	5	60	40	12
"      "      500—600 - -	68	7	20	5	75	25	9
"      "      600—700 - -	67	6	25	2	73	27	5
"      "      700—800 - -	83	4	11	2	87	13	4
"      "      800—900 - -	80	2	16	2	82	18	4
"      "      900—1,000 - -	90	1	7	2	91	9	2
Posts on less than Rs. 1,000 :—							
Number - - - - -	3,670	1,525	3,432	556	5,195	3,988	9,183
Percentage - - - - -	40	17	37	6	57	43	87
Posts on Rs. 1,000 and over :—							
Number - - - - -	1,263	15	71	21	1,278	92	1,370
Percentage - - - - -	92	1	5	2	93	7	13
Posts on Rs. 500 and over :—							
Number - - - - -	3,114	140	508	98	3,254	606	3,860
Percentage - - - - -	81	3	13	3	84	16	37
Posts on Rs. 800 and over :—							
Number - - - - -	1,792	26	151	34	1,818	185	2,003
Percentage - - - - -	90	1	7	2	91	9	19

(d) 1913.

Total number of Government posts - -	4,898	1,593	3,802	771	6,491	4,573	11,064
Percentage - - - - -	44	14	35	7	58	42	—
Percentage of posts on Rs. 200—300 - -	12	24	52	12	36	64	28
"      "      300—400 - -	19	19	51	11	38	62	14
"      "      400—500 - -	36	15	41	8	51	49	13
"      "      500—600 - -	58	11	25	6	69	31	12
"      "      600—700 - -	54	10	32	4	64	36	5
"      "      700—800 - -	78	8	11	3	86	14	5
"      "      800—900 - -	73	6	19	2	79	21	4
"      "      900—1,000 - -	92	4	4	—	96	4	3
Posts on less than Rs. 1,000 :—							
Number - - - - -	3,330	1,524	3,675	757	4,854	4,432	9,286
Percentage - - - - -	36	16	40	8	52	48	84
Posts on Rs. 1,000 and over :—							
Number - - - - -	1,568	69	127	14	1,637	141	1,778
Percentage - - - - -	88	4	7	1	92	8	16
Posts on Rs. 500 and over :—							
Number - - - - -	3,691	351	809	133	4,042	942	4,984
Percentage - - - - -	74	7	16	3	81	19	45
Posts on Rs. 800 and over :—							
Number - - - - -	2,153	106	219	23	2,259	242	2,501
Percentage - - - - -	86	4	9	1	90	10	23

APPENDIX VII.

(Referred to in the footnote to paragraph 33 of the Report.)

STATEMENT, with DETAILS by PROVINCES, of the CIVIL APPOINTMENTS on Rs. 200 a Month and over, held by EUROPEANS, ANGLO-INDIANS, and INDIANS on the 1st April 1913 in the INDIAN CIVIL SERVICE.

TOTAL STATEMENT.\*

Pay.	Number of Employés in each Grade or Class.															
	Total.	Europeans.	Anglo-Indians.	Hindus (including Sikhs and Parsis).										Muhammadians.	Indian Christians.	Buddhists.
				Brahmans (including Shenvis).	Kshatryas.	Kaiyasthas (including Prabhus).	Baniyas and Vaisyas.	Sudras.	Other Hindus (i.e., other than those shown in cols. 5 to 9).	Total Hindus (cols. 5 to 10).	Sikhs.	Parsis.	Total Hindus, Sikhs, and Parsis (cols. 11 to 13).			
1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.	17.
Rs.																
400—500	97	93	—	2	—	—	—	—	1	3	—	—	3	1	—	—
500—600	338	319	1	4	—	4	1	—	3	12	—	3	15	1	2	—
600—700	14	14	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
700—800	150	138	—	2	—	2	—	—	2	6	—	2	8	2	2	—
800—900	8	8	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
900—1,000	78	73	—	1	—	4	—	—	—	5	—	—	5	—	—	—
1,000—1,200	47	45	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	2	—	—	—
1,200—1,400	39	38	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,400—1,600	95	92	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	1	1	—
1,600—1,800	19	19	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,800—2,000	143	135	—	1	—	1	—	—	3	5	—	1	6	1	1	—
2,000—2,500	151	146	1	—	—	—	—	—	4	4	—	—	4	—	—	—
2,500—3,000	101	95	—	—	—	1	1	—	1	3	—	—	3	2	1	—
3,000—3,500	27	26	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3,500—4,000	25	25	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
4,000 & over	39	39	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	1,371	1,305	3	12	1	12	2	—	14	41	—	6	47	9	7	—

DETAILS BY PROVINCES.

I.—Madras.

Rs.																
400—500	14	13	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—
500—600	28	27	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
700—800	24	20	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	2	—	2	—
900—1,000	17	14	—	1	—	2	—	—	—	3	—	—	3	—	—	—
1,000—1,200	4	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,200—1,400	20	20	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,400—1,600	4	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,600—1,800	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,800—2,000	7	7	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2,000—2,500	24	24	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2,500—3,000	18	16	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	1	—
3,000—3,500	6	5	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3,500—4,000	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
4,000 & over	6	6	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total -	176	164	1	4	—	2	1	—	—	7	—	—	7	—	4	—

\* Including military and uncovenanted members of Commissions.

## APPENDIX VII. (continued).

## II.—Bombay.

Number of Employés in each Grade or Class.

Pay.	Total.	Europeans.	Anglo-Indians.	Hindus (including Sikhs and Parsis).										Muhammadans.	Indian Christians.	Buddhists.
				Brahmans (including Shenvys).	Kshatryas.	Kalyasthas (including Prabhus).	Baniyas and Vaisyas.	Sudras.	Other Hindus (i.e., other than those shown in cols. 5 to 9).	Total Hindus (cols. 5 to 10).	Sikhs.	Parsis.	Total Hindus, Sikhs, and Parsis (cols. 11 to 13).			
1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.	17.
Rs.																
400—500	10	9	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	—	1	—	—	—
500—600	53	47	1	—	—	1	—	—	1	2	—	2	4	1	—	—
700—800	19	18	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	—	1	—	—	—
900—1,000	12	12	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,000—1,200	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,200—1,400	9	9	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,400—1,600	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,600—1,800	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,800—2,000	23	20	—	1	—	—	—	—	1	2	—	—	2	—	1	—
2,000—2,500	21	21	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2,500—3,000	7	6	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—
3,000—3,500	3	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3,500—4,000	5	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
4,000 & over	8	8	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total -	176	164	1	1	—	1	—	—	4	6	—	2	8	2	1	—

## III.—Bengal.

Rs.																
400—500	14	14	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
500—600	31	29	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	2	—	—	2	—	—	—
700—800	18	16	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	2	—	—	2	—	—	—
900—1,000	17	16	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—
1,000—1,200	3	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,200—1,400	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,400—1,600	14	13	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
1,600—1,800	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,800—2,000	16	14	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	2	—	—	2	—	—	—
2,000—2,500	28	23	1	—	—	—	—	—	4	4	—	—	4	—	—	—
2,500—3,000	19	17	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	—	1	1	—	—
3,000—3,500	4	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3,500—4,000	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
4,000 & over	7	7	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total -	175	160	1	—	—	5	—	—	7	12	—	—	12	1	1	—

## IV.—Bihar and Orissa.

Rs.																
400—500	7	7	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
500—600	24	24	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
700—800	10	10	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
900—1,000	10	9	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—
1,000—1,200	3	2	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—
1,200—1,400	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,400—1,600	10	10	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,600—1,800	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,800—2,000	11	10	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	—	1	—	—	—
2,000—2,500	12	12	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2,500—3,000	11	10	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—
3,000—3,500	3	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3,500—4,000	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
4,000 & over	6	6	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total -	111	107	—	1	—	2	—	—	1	4	—	—	4	—	—	—

## APPENDIX VII. (continued.)

## V.—United Provinces.

Pay.	Number of Employés in each Grade or Class.															
	Total.	Europeans.	Anglo-Indians.	Hindus (including Sikhs and Parsis.										Muhammadians.	Indian Christians.	Buddhists.
				Brahmans (including Shenvis).	Kshatriyas.	Kalyasthas (including Prabhus).	Baniyas and Vaisyas.	Sudras.	Other Hindus (i.e., other than those shown in cols. 5 to 9).	Total Hindus (cols. 5 to 10).	Sikhs.	Parsis.	Total Hindus, Sikhs, and Parsis (cols. 11 to 13).			
1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.	17.
Rs.																
400—500	21	20	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—
500—600	57	52	—	3	—	1	—	—	—	4	—	—	4	—	1	—
700—800	24	22	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	1	2	—	—	—
800—900	7	7	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,000—1,200	19	18	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—
1,200—1,400	7	6	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—
1,400—1,600	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,600—1,800	11	11	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,800—2,000	29	27	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	1	—	—
2,000—2,500	28	28	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2,500—3,000	18	18	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3,000—3,500	6	6	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3,500—4,000	3	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
4,000 & over	6	6	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	238	226	—	4	—	1	—	—	1	6	—	2	8	3	1	—

## VI.—Punjab.\*

Rs.																
400—500	10	10	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
500—600	46	45	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	—	1	—	—	—
700—800	22	21	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—
800—900	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
900—1,000	12	12	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,000—1,200	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,200—1,400	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,400—1,600	21	19	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	1	—	—
1,800—2,000	18	18	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2,000—2,500	16	16	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2,500—3,000	10	10	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3,000—3,500	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3,500—4,000	5	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
4,000 & over	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	167	163	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	2	—	—	2	2	—	—

## VII.—Burma.†

Rs.																
400—500	7	7	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
500—600	54	52	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	2	—	—	2	—	—	—
600—700	14	14	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
700—800	16	16	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,000—1,200	13	13	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,400—1,600	23	23	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,800—2,000	17	17	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2,000—2,500	13	13	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2,500—3,000	11	11	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3,000—3,500	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3,500—4,000	4	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
4,000 & over	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	175	173	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	2	—	—	2	—	—	—

\* Including military members of the Punjab Commission.

† Including military and uncovenanted members of the Burma Commission.

## APPENDIX VII. (continued.)

## VIII.—Central Provinces and Berar.

Pay.	Number of Employés in each Grade or Class.															
	Total.	Europeans.	Anglo-Indians.	Hindus (including Sikhs and Parsis).										Muhammadians.	Indian Christians.	Buddhists.
				Brahmans (including Shenvis).	Kshatriyas.	Kaiyasthas (including Prabhus).	Baniyas and Vaisyas.	Sudras.	Other Hindus (i.e., other than those shown in cols. 5 to 9).	Total Hindus (cols. 5 to 10).	Sikhs.	Parsis.	Total Hindus, Sikhs, and Parsis (cols. 11 to 13).			
1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.	17.
Rs.																
400—500	10	9	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	—	—
500—600	34	32	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	—	1	2	—	—	—
700—800	14	12	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	1	—	—
900—1,000	5	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,400—1,600	12	12	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,600—1,800	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,800—2,000	14	14	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2,000—2,500	3	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2,500—3,000	5	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3,000—3,500	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3,500—4,000	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
4,000 & over	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	105	100	—	1	—	1	—	—	—	2	—	2	4	1	—	—

## IX.—Assam.†

Rs.																
400—500	4	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
500—600	11	11	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
700—800	3	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
900—1,000	5	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,000—1,200	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,400—1,600	7	7	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,800—2,000	8	8	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2,000—2,500	6	6	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2,500—3,000	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
4,000 & over	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	48	48	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

\* Including one uncovenanted member of the Central Provinces Commission and certain uncovenanted (European) and military members of the Berar Commission.

† Including military members of the Assam Commission.

## APPENDIX VIII.

(Referred to in the footnote to paragraph 33 of the report and in paragraph 55 of Annexure X.)

STATEMENT, with DETAILS by PROVINCES, of the CIVIL APPOINTMENTS on Rs. 200 a Month and over, held by EUROPEANS, ANGLO-INDIANS, and INDIANS on the 1st April 1913 in the PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES.

**TOTAL STATEMENT.\***  
*Executive and Judicial Branches.*

Pay.	Number of Employés in each Grade or Class.															
	Total.	Europeans.	Anglo-Indians.	Hindus (including Sikhs and Parsis).										Muhammadians.	Indian Christians.	Buddhists.
				Brahmans (including Shenvis).	Kshatriyas.	Kaiyasilthas (including Prabhus).	Baniyas and Vaisyas.	Sudras.	Other Hindus (i.e., other than those shown in cols. 5 to 9).	Total Hindus (cols. 5 to 10).	Sikhs.	Parsis.	Total Hindus, Sikhs, and Parsis (cols. 11 to 13).			
1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.	17.
Rs.																
200—300	719	11	23	263	26	124	30	25	56	524	8	6	538	132	13	2
300—400	552	10	34	157	25	97	17	15	38	349	1	5	355	105	19	29
400—500	524	13	47	163	11	91	21	24	40	350	2	2	354	74	18	18
500—600	314	7	22	78	9	52	15	10	25	189	3	3	195	53	12	25
600—700	149	2	11	41	6	31	5	7	14	104	4	3	111	18	3	4
700—800	46	5	7	12	—	2	2	1	—	17	1	1	19	11	2	2
800—900	72	5	6	18	3	16	2	2	9	50	—	2	52	7	1	1
1,000—1,200	28	3	2	9	—	4	3	1	1	18	—	1	19	2	1	1
1,200—1,400	10	—	1	2	1	2	—	—	2	7	—	—	7	—	1	1
1,400—1,600	9	—	—	4	—	1	—	—	—	5	—	2	7	1	1	—
1,600—1,800	9	—	—	2	—	2	—	—	—	4	—	—	4	5	—	—
Total	2,432	56	153	749	81	422	95	85	185	1,617	19	25	1,661	408	71	83

*Executive Branch.*

Rs.																
200—300	450	11	23	151	22	59	19	7	25	283	8	3	294	109	11	2
300—400	334	10	30	73	17	40	10	7	20	167	1	4	172	85	16	21
400—500	320	13	41	73	8	59	12	11	25	189	1	2	192	53	9	12
500—600	234	7	22	45	6	38	10	9	23	131	1	2	134	43	10	18
600—700	77	2	11	16	4	12	2	4	6	44	3	2	49	10	3	2
700—800	39	5	7	10	—	2	2	1	—	15	—	—	15	9	2	1
800—900	25	5	5	3	2	2	—	—	2	9	—	1	10	4	1	—
1,000—1,200	13	1	2	4	—	—	1	1	1	7	—	1	8	1	1	—
1,200—1,400	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
1,400—1,600	6	—	—	1	—	1	—	—	—	2	—	2	4	1	1	—
1,600—1,800	4	—	—	1	—	1	—	—	—	2	—	—	2	2	—	—
Total	1,503	54	141	377	59	214	56	40	103	849	14	17	880	317	54	57

*Judicial Branch.*

Rs.																
200—300	269	—	—	112	4	65	11	18	31	241	—	3	244	25	2	—
300—400	218	—	4	84	8	57	7	8	18	182	—	1	183	20	3	8
400—500	204	—	6	90	3	32	9	13	14	161	1	—	162	21	2	6
500—600	80	—	—	33	3	14	5	1	2	58	2	1	61	10	2	7
600—700	72	—	—	25	2	19	3	3	8	60	1	1	62	8	—	2
700—800	7	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	1	1	4	2	—	1
800—900	47	—	1	15	1	14	2	2	7	41	—	1	42	3	—	1
1,000—1,200	15	2	—	5	—	4	2	—	—	11	—	—	11	1	—	1
1,200—1,400	9	—	1	2	1	2	—	—	2	7	—	—	7	—	1	—
1,400—1,600	3	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	3	—	—	—
1,600—1,800	5	—	—	1	—	1	—	—	—	2	—	—	2	3	—	—
Total	929	2	12	372	22	208	39	45	82	768	5	8	781	91	17	26

\* Including statutory civilians and members of the provincial civil service holding "listed" posts.

## APPENDIX VIII. (continued).

## DETAILS OF PROVINCES.

## I.—MADRAS.\*

## (a) Executive Branch.

Pay.	Number of Employés in each Grade or Class.																
	Total	Europeans.	Anglo-Indians.	Hindus (including Sikhs and Parsis).										Muhammadians.	Indian Christians.	Buddhists.	
				Brahmans (including Shenvis).	Kshatriyas.	Kaiyasthas (including Prabhus).	Baniyas and Vaisyas.	Sudras.	Other Hindus (i.e., other than those shown in cols. 5 to 9).	Total Hindus (cols. 5 to 10).	Sikhs.	Parsis.	Total Hindus, Sikhs, and Parsis (cols. 11 to 13).				
1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.	17.	
Rs.																	
200—300	30	—	3	15	—	—	1	5	—	21	—	—	21	4	2	—	—
300—400	28	—	3	15	—	—	—	4	—	19	—	—	19	4	2	—	—
400—500	31	—	1	21	—	—	—	6	—	27	—	—	27	—	—	—	—
500—600	28	—	2	13	—	—	—	7	—	20	—	—	20	3	3	—	—
600—700	8	—	1	3	—	—	1	3	—	7	—	—	7	—	—	—	—
700—800	5	—	1	3	—	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	3	1	—	—	—
800—900	2	—	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	—
1,000—1,200	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	—
1,400—1,600	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—
1,600—1,800	2	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	1	—	—	—
Total	136	—	12	72	—	—	2	26	—	100	—	—	100	16	8	—	—

## (b) Judicial Branch.

Rs.																
200—300	64	—	—	49	—	—	—	12	—	61	—	—	61	1	2	—
300—400	31	—	1	23	—	—	1	4	—	28	—	—	28	1	1	—
400—500	33	—	1	19	—	—	—	8	—	27	—	—	27	—	5	—
500—600	9	—	—	8	—	—	—	1	—	9	—	—	9	—	—	—
600—700	5	—	—	4	—	—	—	1	—	5	—	—	5	—	—	—
800—900	4	—	—	3	—	—	—	1	—	4	—	—	4	—	—	—
1,200—1,400	2	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	1	—
1,400—1,600	2	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	2	—	—	—
Total	150	—	2	109	—	—	1	27	—	137	—	—	137	2	9	—

## II.—BOMBAY.

## (a) Executive Branch.†

Rs.																
200—300	102	—	—	79	2	5	8	1	2	97	—	2	99	1	2	—
300—400	27	—	1	11	1	1	2	1	2	18	—	3	21	3	2	—
400—500	20	—	—	6	—	4	2	2	1	15	—	1	16	2	2	—
500—600	21	—	—	8	1	—	2	—	3	14	—	2	16	3	2	—
600—700	6	—	1	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	1	3	—	2	—
700—800	3	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	2	—	—	2	—	1	—
800—900	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	—	—
1,400—1,600	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2†	2	—	—	—
Total	182	—	2	106	4	10	15	5	8	148	—	12	160	9	11	—

## (b) Judicial Branch.\*

Rs.																
200—300	39	—	—	15	4	4	7	—	5	35	—	3	38	1	—	—
300—400	24	—	—	17	—	—	1	—	3	21	—	1	22	1	1	—
400—500	25	—	—	17	—	2	2	—	2	23	1	—	24	—	1	—
500—600	14	—	—	8	1	3	—	—	1	13	1	—	14	—	—	—
600—700	7	—	—	4	—	1	—	—	1	6	—	1	7	—	—	—
800—900	7	—	—	4	—	—	1	—	1	6	—	1	7	—	—	—
1,000—1,200	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,200—1,400	2	—	—	1	1	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	2	—	—	—
Total	119	1	—	66	6	10	11	—	13	106	2	6	114	2	2	—

\* This statement includes provincial civil service officers holding "listed" posts.

† Including mamlatdars

† Statutory civilians holding "listed" posts.

## APPENDIX VIII. (continued).

## III.—BENGAL.\*

## (a) Executive Branch.

Pay.	Number of Employés in each Grade or Class.																
	Total.	Europeans.	Anglo-Indians.	Hindus (including Sikhs and Parsis).										Indian Christians.	Buddhists.		
				Brahmans (including Shenvis).	Kshatriyas.	Kaiyasthas (including Prabhus).	Baniyas and Vaisyas.	Sudras.	Other Hindus (i.e., other than those shown in cols. 5 to 9).	Total Hindus (cols. 5 to 10).	Sikhs.	Parsis.	Total Hindus, Sikhs, and Parsis (cols. 11 to 13).				
1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.	17.	
Rs.																	
200—300	74	3	3	16	—	20	—	1	12	49	—	—	49	17	2	—	
300—400	74	2	2	19	—	13	3	2	10	47	—	—	47	20	3	—	
400—500	73	2	5	20	—	22	2	1	13	58	—	—	58	8	—	—	
500—600	46	2	—	12	—	14	—	—	13	39	—	—	39	5	—	—	
600—700	15	—	—	3	1	5	—	1	4	14	—	—	14	1	—	—	
700—800	8	—	—	4	—	2	—	—	—	6	—	—	6	1	1	—	
800—900	5	2	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	2	—	—	2	1	—	—	
1,000—1,200	2	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	2	—	—	—	
1,600—1,800	2	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	1	—	—	
Total	299	11	10	76	1	78	5	5	53	218	—	—	218	54	6	—	

## (b) Judicial Branch.

Rs.																
200—300	102	—	—	34	—	37	1	6	20	98	—	—	98	4	—	—
300—400	70	—	—	19	—	35	—	4	10	68	—	—	68	2	—	—
400—500	61	—	—	27	—	16	3	4	9	59	—	—	59	2	—	—
500—600	12	—	—	7	—	5	—	—	—	12	—	—	12	—	—	—
600—700	24	—	—	8	—	8	—	2	6	24	—	—	24	—	—	—
800—900	12	—	—	3	—	6	—	—	3	12	—	—	12	—	—	—
1,000—1,200	6	—	—	2	—	2	2	—	—	6	—	—	6	—	—	—
1,200—1,400	2	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	2	—	—	2	—	—	—
1,600—1,800	1	—	—	—	—	1†	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—
Total	290	—	—	100	—	111	6	16	49	282	—	—	282	8	—	—

## IV.—BIHAR AND ORISSA.\*

## (a) Executive Branch.

Rs.																
200—300	59	4	4	7	3	16	1	—	3	30	—	—	30	18	3	—
300—400	57	5	8	9	2	13	1	—	3	28	—	—	28	12	4	—
400—500	55	4	7	6	—	20	—	—	5	31	—	—	31	10	3	—
500—600	38	—	4	3	—	9	1	1	7	21	—	—	21	11	2	—
600—700	13	—	1	5	—	4	—	—	2	11	—	—	11	1	—	—
700—800	6	2	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	2	—	—	—
800—900	4	—	1	2	—	—	—	—	1	3	—	—	3	—	—	—
1,000—1,200	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—
1,400—1,600	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1†	—	—
Total	234	15	27	35	5	62	3	1	21	127	—	—	127	53	12	—

## (b) Judicial Branch.

Rs.																
200—300	31	—	—	6	—	15	—	—	4	25	—	—	25	6	—	—
300—400	20	—	—	2	—	9	—	—	2	13	—	—	13	7	—	—
400—500	17	—	—	4	—	6	—	—	2	12	—	—	12	4	1	—
600—700	11	—	—	1	—	7	1	—	—	9	—	—	9	2	—	—
800—900	6	—	—	1	—	1	—	1	2	5	—	—	5	1	—	—
1,000—1,200	2	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	2	—	—	2	—	—	—
1,200—1,400	1	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—
Total	88	—	—	14	—	41	1	1	10	67	—	—	67	20	1	—

\* This statement includes a statutory civilian and provincial civil service officers holding "listed" posts.

† Statutory civilian.

## APPENDIX VIII. (continued).

## V.—UNITED PROVINCES.\*

## (a) Executive Branch.

Pay.	Number of Employés in each Grade or Class.																
	Total.	Europeans.	Anglo- Indians.	Hindus (including Sikhs and Parsis).										Muhammadians.	Indian Christians.	Buddhists.	
				Brahmans (including Shenvis).	Kshatriyas.	Kaiyasthas (including Prabhus).	Banyias and Vaisyas.	Sudras.	Other Hindus (i.e., other than those shown in cols. 5 to 9).	Total Hindus (cols. 5 to 10).	Sikhs.	Parsis.	Total Hindus, Sikhs, and Parsis (cols. 11 to 13).				
1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.	17.	
Rs.																	
200—300	85	—	4	19	5	9	6	—	3	42	—	—	42	38	1	—	
300—400	50	—	1	9	5	7	3	—	3	27	—	—	27	21	1	—	
400—500	43	—	4	6	3	7	5	—	3	24	—	—	24	15	—	—	
500—600	29	—	4	2	1	7	5	—	—	15	—	—	15	10	—	—	
600—700	9	—	—	1	1	1	1	—	—	4	—	—	4	5	—	—	
700—800	4	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	
800—900	3	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	1	—	—	
1,000—1,200	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	—	1	1	—	—	
Total	225	—	16	37	15	32	20	—	10	114	—	—	114	93	2	—	

## (b) Judicial Branch.

Rs.																
200—300	33	—	—	8	—	9	3	—	2	22	—	—	22	11	—	—
300—400	35	—	—	9	1	11	4	—	2	27	—	—	27	7	1	—
400—500	32	—	—	11	1	7	4	—	—	23	—	—	23	8	1	—
500—600	21	—	—	5	—	6	4	—	1	16	—	—	16	5	—	—
600—700	13	—	—	3	1	3	2	—	1	10	—	—	10	3	—	—
800—900	14	—	—	4	1	5	1	—	1	12	—	—	12	2	—	—
1,000—1,200	3	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	2	1	—	—
1,400—1,600	1	—	—	1†	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—
1,600—1,800	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1†	—	—
Total	153	—	—	43	4	41	18	—	7	113	—	—	113	38	2	—

## VI.—PUNJAB.\*

## (a) Executive Branch.

Rs.																
200—300	53	—	4	4	11	2	2	—	2	21	8	—	29	19	1	—
300—400	26	—	5	—	7	1	1	—	—	9	1	—	10	11	—	—
400—500	24	—	2	1	5	—	2	—	—	8	1	—	9	11	2	—
500—600	14	—	1	1	4	—	1	—	—	6	1	—	7	6	—	—
600—700	6	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	2	3	—	5	1	—	—
700—800	4	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	1	3	—	—
800—900	4	—	1	—	2	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	2	1	—	—
1,000—1,200	4	—	1	1	—	—	1	—	—	2	—	—	2	—	1	—
1,400—1,600	1	—	—	1†	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—
Total	136	—	14	8	31	3	8	—	2	52	14	—	66	52	4	—

## (b) Judicial Branch.

Rs.																
300—400	12	—	2	—	7	—	1	—	—	8	—	—	8	2	—	—
400—500	12	—	4	—	1	—	—	—	1	2	—	—	2	6	—	—
500—600	11	—	—	2	2	—	—	—	—	4	1	—	5	5	1	—
600—700	5	—	—	1	1	—	—	—	—	2	1	—	3	2	—	—
700—800	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	1	2	—	—
800—900	1	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—
1,200—1,400	2	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	—	1	—	—	—
1,600—1,800	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2†	—	—
Total	48	—	7	3	11	1	1	—	2	18	3	—	21	19	1	—

\* This statement includes statutory civilians and provincial civil service officers holding "listed" posts.

† Statutory civilian.

## APPENDIX VIII. (continued).

## VII.—BURMA.\*

## (a) Executive Branch.

Pay.	Number of Employés in each Grade or Class.															
	Total.	Europeans.	Anglo-Indians.	Hindus (including Sikhs and Parsis).										Indian Christians.	Buddhists.	
				Brahmanas (including Shenvis).	Kshatryas.	Kaiyasthas (including Prabhus).	Baniyas and Vaisyas.	Sutras.	Other Hindus (i.e., other than those shown in cols. 5 to 9).	Total Hindus (cols. 5 to 10).	Sikhs.	Parsis.	Total Hindus, Sikhs, and Parsis (cols. 11 to 13).			Muhammadians.
1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.	17.
Rs.																
200—300	4	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2
300—400	35	3	8	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	21
400—500	36	6	17	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	12
500—600	36	5	9	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	18
600—700	10	1	6	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	2
700—800	5	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
800—900	3	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
1,000—1,200	2	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1,200—1,400	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
Total	132	19	46	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	9	57

## (b) Judicial Branch.

Rs.																
300—400	9	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	8
400—500	7	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	6
500—600	8	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	7
600—700	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2
700—800	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
800—900	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
1,000—1,200	2	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
Total	30	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	26

## VIII.—CENTRAL PROVINCES AND BERAR.

## (a) Executive Branch †

Rs.																
200—300	24	—	1	8	1	4	—	—	—	13	—	1	14	9	—	—
300—400	24	—	1	8	2	2	—	—	1	13	—	1	14	9	—	—
400—500	25	—	4	10‡	—	2	—	1	2	15	—	1	16	4	1	—
500—600	13	—	2	6	—	2	—	1	—	9	—	—	9	2	—	—
600—700	7	1	2	1	—	1	—	—	—	2	—	1	3	1	—	—
700—800	3	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—
800—900	2	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—
1,000—1,200	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1§	1	—	—	—
1,400—1,600	1	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—
Total	100	3	10	33	3	12	—	2	3	53	—	5	58	28	1	—

## (b) Judicial Branch.\*

Rs.																
300—400	17	—	—	14	—	2	—	—	1	17	—	—	17	—	—	—
400—500	17	—	1	12	1	1	—	1	—	15	—	—	15	1	—	—
500—600	5	—	—	3	—	—	—	1	—	4	—	1	5	—	—	—
600—700	5	—	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	4	1	—	—
700—800	3	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	1	3	—	—	—
800—900	2	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—
1,000—1,200	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—
1,600—1,800	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—
Total	51	—	2	37	1	4	1	1	1	45	—	2	47	2	—	—

\* This statement includes provincial civil service officers holding "listed" posts.

† This statement includes one statutory civilian holding a "listed" post and three members of the Berar Commission on whose retirement three posts will be thrown open to members of the provincial civil service.

‡ One of these is a member of the Berar Commission.

§ Member of Berar Commission.

|| A statutory civilian.

## APPENDIX VIII. (continued).

## IX.—ASSAM : EXECUTIVE BRANCH.\*

Pay.	Number of Employés in each Grade or Class.															
	Total.	Europeans.	Anglo-Indians.	Hindus (including Sikhs and Parsis).										Muhammadans.	Indian Christians.	Buddhists.
				Brahmins (including Shervais).	Kshatriyas.	Kaiyasthas (including Prabous).	Baniyas and Vaisyas.	Sudras.	Other Hindus (i.e., other than those shown in cols. 5 to 9).	Total Hindus (cols. 5 to 10).	Sikhs.	Parsis.	Total Hindus, Sikhs, and Parsis (cols. 11 to 13).			
1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.	17.
Rs.																
200—300	19	4	2	3	—	3	1	—	3	10	—	—	10	3	—	—
300—400	13	—	1	2	—	3	—	—	1	6	—	—	6	5	1	—
400—500	13	1	1	3	—	4	1	1	2	11	—	—	11	—	—	—
500—600	9	—	—	—	—	6	1	—	—	7	—	—	7	2	—	—
600—700	3	—	—	1	—	1	—	—	—	2	—	—	2	1	—	—
700—800	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—
800—900	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	59	6	4	10	—	17	3	1	6	37	—	—	37	11	1	—

\* The Judicial Branch forms part of the Bengal cadre.

## APPENDIX IX.

(Referred to in paragraph 43 of the Report.)

MEMORANDUM ON APPOINTMENTS made by the SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA IN COUNCIL to certain BRANCHES of the GOVERNMENT SERVICE in INDIA, dated 4th February 1914.

A.—The Departments to which appointments are regularly made by the Secretary of State in Council on the advice of a Selection Committee are :—

- (1) The Indian Educational Service,
- (2) The Indian Finance Department,
- (3) The Indian Finance (Military) Department,
- (4) The Indian Customs Department,
- (5) The Indian Public Works and State Railways Departments (Engineering Branch),
- (6) The Indian State Railways Department (Traffic Branch),
- (7) The Indian Forest Service.

## (1) The Indian Educational Service.

Under the existing procedure, which has been in force since March 1910, the duty of recommending candidates for appointment to the Indian Educational Service is entrusted to a Selection Committee which is made up as follows :—

- (i) The Director of Special Inquiries and Reports at the Board of Education as Chairman, and the Assistant Director as Secretary, of the Committee;
- (ii) A permanent representative of the India Office, usually the Secretary in the Judicial and Public Department, and in his absence the Assistant Secretary or a senior member of that Department;
- (iii) A permanent representative of the Scotch Education Department;
- (iv) An occasional member selected on account of his local knowledge, e.g., a member of the Indian Educational Service or Indian Civil Service who is on leave or recently retired (on occasion, a member of the Council of India); and

- (v) An occasional member or members selected by the Board of Education on account of special knowledge of the branch of education with which the particular appointment is concerned.

As regards (iv) Governments in India have occasionally, in notifying vacancies, given the names of experts with local knowledge who can be asked to join the Selection Committee; and among those who have acted in this capacity may be mentioned Lord Sydenham and the following Directors of Public Instruction on leave or recently retired :—

Mr. E. Giles, C.I.E. (Bombay).  
Sir A. Bourne, K.C.I.E. (Madras).

Mr. S. C. Hill (Central Provinces).

Mr. A. G. Wright (Central Provinces).

Among the experts included under head (v) may be mentioned :—

Mr. Gregory Foster (Provost of University College, London).

Sir Edward Thorpe, C.B., D.Sc., of the Imperial College of Science and Technology (Chemistry).

Professor J. B. Farmer, D.Sc., F.R.S. (Botany), and

„ Cormack (Engineering).

„ M. J. Hill (Mathematics).

„ Foxwell (Political Economy).

„ Muirhead (Mental and Moral Philosophy).

„ Trouton (Physics).

„ J. Adams (Education).

„ Carveth Read (Logic).

„ Pollard (History).

„ Minchin (Zoology), and many others.

His Majesty's Inspectors have also frequently served on the Committee.

The meetings of the Committee are held at the Board of Education.

## APPENDIX IX. (continued).

(2-4) *The Indian Finance Department, the Indian Finance (Military) Department, and the Indian Customs Department.*

These three Departments are grouped together for the purpose of dealing with candidates' applications.

Previous to 1909 vacancies in the Indian Finance Department were filled by direct nominations by the Secretary of State. A list of candidates was kept by the Private Secretary. In 1909, as a consequence of the decision to recruit from England civilian accountants for the Military Accounts Department, the name of which was changed to Indian Finance (Military) Department, it was decided to recruit candidates for the two Departments together, and, in view of the increased number of appointments, to entrust the investigation of their claims to a small committee, who should recommend selected candidates for nomination by the Secretary of State. It was also decided that the Committee should deal at the same time with recruitment for the Indian Customs Department. The Selection Committees have been constituted as follows:—

1909 and 1910:—

Sir T. Raleigh, K.C.S.I.	} Members of the Council of India.
General Sir C. C. Egerton, G.C.B., D.S.O.	
Sir S. W. Edgerley, K.C.V.O.	

1911. Two Committees:—

(1) Sir T. Raleigh, K.C.S.I.	} Members of the Council of India.
Sir T. Morison, K.C.I.E.	
Sir T. W. Holderness, K.C.S.I.	

(2) Sir T. Raleigh, K.C.S.I.	} Members of the Council of India.
General Sir C. C. Egerton, G.C.B., D.S.O.	
Sir S. W. Edgerley, K.C.V.O.	

1912:—

Sir T. Raleigh, K.C.S.I.	} Members of the Council of India.
Sir S. W. Edgerley, K.C.V.O.	
General Sir Beauchamp Duff, G.C.B., K.C.S.I.	

1913:—

Sir S. W. Edgerley, K.C.V.O.	} Members of the Council of India.
Sir T. Morison, K.C.I.E.	
General Sir Beauchamp Duff, G.C.B., K.C.S.I.	

Mr. Enthoven, C.I.E., I.C.S.	Secretary to Government of India, Commerce and Industry Department.
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(5) *Indian Public Works Department and Indian State Railways (Engineering Branch).*

The present system of recruitment was adopted in 1905 after the closing of the Royal Indian Engineering College, Coopers Hill.

The appointments are widely advertised in the Press, and the selection of candidates is made by a Committee of three persons appointed for the purpose each year by the Secretary of State.

This Committee has on each occasion consisted of (1) the Member of the Council of India who is Chairman of the Public Works Committee; (2) Colonel Sir John Ottley, K.C.I.E., formerly President of the Royal Indian Engineering College, Coopers Hill; and (3) one member nominated by the Council of the Institution of Civil Engineers.

In 1910, 1911, 1912, and 1913, the Committee consisted of (1) Sir Hugh Barnes, K.C.S.I., K.C.V.O.; (2) Colonel Sir John Ottley, K.C.I.E., R.E.; and (3) Sir Alexander Binnie, Kt.

(6) *Indian State Railways (Assistant Traffic Superintendents).*

For these appointments recruitment is made three-fifths in England and two-fifths in India,

The recruitment in England is not undertaken at fixed periods, but on a specific demand from India for a stated number of men.

When such a demand is received a Selection Committee (consisting generally of the Member of the Council of India who is Chairman of the Public Works Committee, the Government Director of Indian Railway Companies, and the Secretary of the Public Works Department, India Office) is appointed by the Secretary of State. The Selection Committee consider any applications which may have been made since the last recruitment, and are awaiting the occurrence of further vacancies, and further invite by special letter (a) the principal railway companies in the United Kingdom to make known the appointment to any suitable candidate with sufficient railway experience, and (b) the Appointments Committees of Oxford and Cambridge, and any other University that may apply to be furnished with such notices to suggest suitable University candidates. When all the applications have been received every candidate who is qualified under the regulations and is not *prima facie* quite unsuitable is invited to an interview with the Committee, who then make their selections. There is no rule as regards the relative proportions of men with railway experience and University men appointed, but the Committee are guided, in the absence of an expressed wish on the part of the Government of India, by the relative suitability of the candidates who present themselves.

Recent Selection Committees have been constituted as follows:—

Sir H. S. Barnes, K.C.S.I., K.C.V.O., Chairman of the Public Works Committee of the Council of India	} August 1911. " 1912. January 1913
A. Brereton, Esq., C.S.I., Go- vernment Director of Indian Railway Companies	
H. A. Haines, Esq., Secretary, Public Works Department, India Office	
Sir James Thomson, K.C.S.I., Acting Chairman of Public Works Committee	
A. Brereton, Esq., C.S.I.	} August 1913.
H. A. Haines, Esq.	

(7) *Indian Forest Service.*

The Selection Committee has since 1910 consisted of (i) a representative of the Secretary of State; (ii) the Director of Indian Forest Studies; (iii) a person appointed by the Secretary of State who is not connected with the India Office; (iv) a person nominated by the Government of India. The Committee has been composed as follows:—

1911 and 1912:—

- (i) Sir James La Touche, K.C.S.I., Member of the Council of India.
- (ii) Mr. A. M. Caccia, M.V.O.
- (iii) Sir E. Stafford Howard, K.C.B., Commissioner of Woods and Forests.
- (iv) Sir S. H. Eardley Wilmot, K.C.I.E., late Inspector-General of Forests in India.

1913:—

- (i) Sir James La Touche, K.C.S.I.
- (ii) Mr. A. M. Caccia, M.V.O.
- (iii) Mr. T. H. Middleton, C.B., Assistant Secretary, Board of Agriculture and Fisheries.
- (iv) Mr. F. Beadon Bryant, C.S.I., late Inspector-General of Forests in India.

Only holders of a University degree with Honours in Natural Science, or equivalent degree, are admitted as candidates to appear before the Selection Committee. The regulations provide that "should there be more candidates considered to be qualified in every respect than vacancies to be filled, the Secretary of State reserves the right to require them to pass a competitive examination conducted by the Civil

APPENDIX IX. (*continued*).

" Service Commissioners, on the results of which their " final selection would depend." Up to the present no competitive examination has been held.

**B.—Appointments not made on the advice of a formally constituted Selection Committee.**—The appointments included under this heading have two characteristics in common. They belong to comparatively small services, in which the rate of recruitment is low and irregular, and they require candidates with specialised or technical training, having some practical experience in the field, mine, laboratory, workshop, etc.

*Indian Agricultural Service.*

The authorities of the various centres of Agricultural Education are informed of vacancies as they occur, and are invited to make them known and to suggest the names of suitable candidates. As regards posts for which all-round agriculturists and agricultural chemists are required, Mr. T. H. Middleton, C.B. (Assistant Secretary, Board of Agriculture, and formerly for some years Professor of Agriculture at an Indian College), has in recent years assisted in examining applications and interviewing candidates, with the Revenue Secretary at the India Office. Mr. J. W. Mollison, C.S.I., Inspector-General of Agriculture in India, and his successor, Mr. B. Coventry, C.I.E., have acted in co-operation with Mr. Middleton when home on leave. Where qualifications of a more special nature have been required, assistance has been obtained from Sir David Prain, O.M.G., C.I.E., F.R.S. (Director, Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew, and formerly Director of the Botanical Survey of India), Major A. T. Gage, I.M.S. (Director of the Botanical Survey of India), when on leave, Mr. H. Maxwell-Lefroy (Professor at the Imperial College of Science and formerly Imperial Entomologist in India), and other authorities.

*Indian Civil Veterinary Department.*

The authorities of the various Veterinary Colleges are informed of vacancies, and invited to make them known and to suggest names of suitable candidates having post-graduate training. Applications are considered, and candidates interviewed, by Lieutenant-Colonel A. E. Queripel (formerly Inspector-General, Civil Veterinary Department in India), in consultation with the Revenue Secretary.

*Geological Survey.*

Recent appointments have been made on the joint recommendation of Sir Thomas Holland, K.C.S.I., F.R.S. (late Director of the Geological Survey of India), Dr. J. J. H. Teall, F.R.S. (late Director of the Geological Survey in this country), and the Revenue Secretary.

*Bengal Covenanted Pilot Service.*

Appointments are usually made on the recommendation of the authorities of the training ships *Worcester* and *Conway*.

*The European Gardeners' Service.*

Appointments are made on the recommendation of the Director of the Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew.

*Government Presses in India.*

Messrs. Waterlow and Sons are the expert advisers consulted in filling vacancies for Superintendents and Overseers in Government Presses.

*Miscellaneous Public Works Appointments.*

The India Office is occasionally called upon to engage other persons for special appointments in Indian Service.

Thus within the last five years Consulting Architects have been engaged for the Governments of Bombay, Bengal, Eastern Bengal and Assam, Burma, and the United Provinces. It has been the practice to request the President of the Royal Institute of British Architects to nominate suitable candidates for these appointments. Assistant Architects have also been engaged for several of the Local Governments in India, the selection of candidates being, at the request of the India Office, made by the President of the Architectural Association. There are also from time to time requests from India for the engagement of Electrical Engineers or other engineers with special qualifications. The method of filling such appointments depends on the circumstances of each case and a suggestion as to the method of recruitment not infrequently accompanies the demand. Public advertisement is made when necessary.

Applications for special appointments of this kind are recorded in the Public Works Department of the India Office, and on occurrence of a vacancy for which the applicant is *prima facie* suitable, care is taken to see that his application is considered along with those of other candidates. Appointments such as Electrical Inspectors, Experts for supervising water-borings, Plumbers, Mechanics, Foremen, Electricians are occasionally made. The expert advisers consulted in such cases vary according to the nature of the appointments.

*Miscellaneous Railway Appointments.*

Appointments of Assistant Locomotive and Carriage Superintendents, Engine Drivers, and Mechanics are occasionally made. The Consulting Engineer for Railways, Sir A. M. Rendel, K.C.I.E., is the expert adviser consulted in making these appointments.

*Other Miscellaneous Appointments.*

In other cases the arrangements made depend on circumstances and requirements. Thus, appointments to the Factory Inspection staff have been made, in consultation with the Home Office, from among candidates who have obtained or competed for appointments under that Office. Architects have been selected for appointment to the Archaeological Survey in consultation with Sir Thomas Jackson, Bart., one of the leading architects. In connection with engineering appointments (sanitary and agricultural engineers), advice has been obtained from Sir Alexander Rendel, K.C.I.E. (Consulting Engineer to the Secretary of State), and the Local Government Board. The Royal Society and the Lister Institute have assisted in connection with scientific posts such as those in the Meteorological Department and the bacteriological laboratories. A Consulting Surveyor was selected by an informal committee consisting of Sir Robert Thompson, Kt. (late Chief Valuer, Inland Revenue Department), the Secretary of the Surveyors' Institution, and the Revenue Secretary. Other miscellaneous appointments have been similarly filled, the experts consulted varying according to the circumstances of the particular cases.

APPENDIX X.

(Referred to in paragraph 41 of the Report.)

STATEMENT, prepared in 1913, to show the NUMBER of STUDENTS belonging to the various COMMUNITIES in INDIA who took (i) the B.A., B.Sc., M.A., and M.Sc. DEGREES of an INDIAN UNIVERSITY in the last Three Years at the Ages of 19-20 and under, 20-21, 21-22, 22-23, 23-24, 24-25 and above; (ii) the B.A., B.Sc., M.A., M.Sc., LL.B., and B.L. DEGREES during the last Ten Years.

TOTAL STATEMENT.

Communities.	Number of Students who took their B.A. Degree in the last Three Years at the Age of						* Number of Students who took their B.Sc. Degree in the last Three Years at the Age of						Number of Students *† who took their M.A. and M.Sc. Degrees in the last Three Years at the Age of						Number of Students who took in the last Ten Years the following Degrees.*†							
	19-20 and under.	20-21.	21-22.	22-23.	23-24.	24-25 and above.	Total.	19-20 and under.	20-21.	21-22.	22-23.	23-24.	24-25 and over.	Total.	Under 21.	21-22.	22-23.	23-24.	24-25.	25 and over.	Total.	B.A.	B.Sc.	M.A. and M.Sc.	LL.B. or Total.	
Brahmans (including Shenvis).	465	635	584	525	379	605	3,193	88	47	73	51	19	21	299	28	33	85	69	55	110	380	8,232	475	847	2,765	12,319
Kayasthas (including Prabhus).	226	211	215	147	78	76	953	65	40	35	24	10	10	184	13	13	46	38	32	31	173	2,125	263	305	824	3,517
Other Hindus -	393	399	380	300	203	276	1,951	120	71	70	36	17	15	329	30	39	84	69	47	62	331	5,375	483	669	2,278	8,805
Sikhs -	5	16	11	4	4	2	42	1	2	3	2	1	1	8	2	2	2	1	1	1	8	116	10	18	29	173
Brahmos -	6	6	3	2	1	2	20	8	2	3	1	1	1	15	2	3	1	1	3	5	14	63	16	25	17	121
Muhammadans	119	157	134	98	63	52	623	8	16	7	4	3	2	40	6	10	11	15	8	19	69	1,545	48	157	358	2,108
Parsis -	21	24	39	19	20	18	141	1	1	3	1	3	1	9	4	7	5	3	6	—	25	501	26	84	182	793
Indian Christians.	19	37	53	48	39	134	330	2	—	3	2	2	1	10	1	1	4	1	4	4	15	693	18	50	98	859
Europeans and Anglo-Indians.	15	9	8	4	4	14	54	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	2	—	—	5	8	195	3	16	6	220
Buddhists	5	8	8	7	5	2	35	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	64	—	—	4	4	72
Jains -	2	1	3	—	—	2	8	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	31	—	3	16	50
Jews -	1	3	1	—	—	—	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	13	—	2	5	20
Total	1,277	1,506	1,439	1,154	796	1,183	7,355	294	179	197	120	55	50	895	87	108	241	197	155	240	1,028	18,953	1,342	2,180	6,582	29,057

\* The university calendars show that in Madras there is no B.Sc. or M.Sc. examination, and that in Bombay the M.Sc. examination was to have been held for the first time in November 1913.

† As the Punjab university furnished amalgamated figures for the two examinations, they have been combined in this totalled statement. Of the total of 1,028 students who took their M.A. and M.Sc. degrees in the last three years (i.e., 1911-13), 79 were students of the Punjab university. Of the balance of 949 students, 820 took the M.A. and 129 took the M.Sc. Similarly, of the total of 2,180 students who took the M.A. and M.Sc. degrees during the last ten years, 205 were students of the Punjab university. Of the balance of 1,975 students, 1,814 took the M.A. and 161 the M.Sc.

APPENDIX X. (continued).

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY.

Communities.	1911-13.											1904-1913.																						
	Number of Students who took their B.A. Degree in the last Three Years at the Age of							Number of Students who took their B.Sc. Degree in the last Three Years at the Age of							Number of Students who took their M.Sc. Degree in the last Three Years at the Age of							Number of Students who took in the last Ten Years the following Degrees.												
	19-20 and under.	20-21.	21-22.	22-23.	23-24.	24-25 and over.	Total.	19-20 and under.	20-21.	21-22.	22-23.	23-24.	24-25 and over.	Total.	B.A.	B.Sc.	M.A.	M.Sc.	B.L.	Total.														
Brahmans (including Shenvis).	241	182	143	113	73	57	809	67	23	38	14	11	10	163	16	18	51	36	14	43	178	2	7	9	5	2	32	2,023	221	403	40	894	3,581	
Kayasthas (including Prabhus).	196	129	138	95	51	47	656	57	25	24	15	4	6	131	10	10	33	25	24	21	123	3	2	8	1	—	23	1,348	159	216	23	502	2,248	
Other Hindus	268	152	150	95	62	76	803	105	43	55	20	12	12	247	15	27	38	39	26	35	180	4	4	14	1	6	41	2,159	328	379	44	1,021	3,931	
Sikhs.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Brahmos.	6	5	2	2	1	2	18	7	2	3	1	1	—	14	1	—	—	1	2	5	9	—	2	1	—	—	4	56	14	20	4	17	111	
Muhammadians.	48	31	40	34	21	16	190	6	4	2	1	—	—	13	2	1	2	6	4	3	18	—	—	—	—	1	1	380	15	50	1	92	538	
Parsis.	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	3	5	
Indian Christians.	4	6	12	7	3	6	38	1	—	—	2	1	—	4	1	—	3	—	1	2	7	—	—	—	—	—	—	97	4	14	—	15	130	
Europeans and Anglo-Indians.	9	—	2	—	1	3	15	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	67	2	3	—	—	72	
Buddhists.	5	7	8	7	5	2	34	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	63	—	4	—	4	71	
Total	778	512	495	353	217	209	2,564	244	97	122	53	29	28	573	45	56	127	107	71	114	520	9	15	30	31	8	8	101	6,195	743	1,089	112	2,548	10,687

APPENDIX X. (continued).

UNIVERSITY OF MADRAS.

Communities.	Number of Students who took their B.A. Degree in the last Three Years at the Age of							Number of Students who took their M.A. Degree in the last Three Years at the Age of							Number of Students who took in the last Ten Years the following Degrees.			
	19-20.	20-21.	21-22.	22-23.	23-24.	23-25 and above.	Total.	Under 21.	21-22.	22-23.	23-24.	24-25.	25 and above.	Total.	B.A.	M.A.	L.B. or B.L.	Total.
Brahmans (including Shenvis).	175	267	229	213	180	387	1,451	6	5	8	7	9	22	57	3,676	123	945	4,744
Kayasthas	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
(including Prabhus).	29	38	56	64	65	120	372	—	—	3	1	1	3	8	1,151	14	289	1,454
Other Hindus	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Sikhs .	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Brahmos	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Buddhists	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Muhamma- dans.	3	7	4	5	1	7	27	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	75	1	8	84
Parsis .	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	—	1	4
Indian Christians.	5	23	32	29	28	108	225	—	—	—	1	1	—	2	445	13	54	512
Europeans	—	2	1	—	3	4	10	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	53	—	—	53
and Anglo- Indians.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Jains .	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	2
Jews .	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	1
Total .	212	337	322	311	277	627	2,086	6	5	11	10	11	25	68	5,405	152	1,297	6,854

NOTE.—This university does not confer the B.Sc. or M.Sc. degree.

APPENDIX X. (continued).

UNIVERSITY OF BOMBAY.

Communities.	1910-12.							1910-12.							1903-12.				
	Number of Students who took their B.A. Degree in the last Three Years at the Age of							Number of Students who took their B.Sc. Degree in the last Three Years at the Age of							Number of Students who took in the last Ten Years the following Degrees.				
	19-20.	20-21.	21-22.	22-23.	23-24.	23-24 and over.	Total.	19-20.	20-21.	21-22.	22-23.	23-24.	24-25 and over.	Total.	B.A.	B.Sc.	M.A.	LL.B.	Total.
1. Brahmans (including Shenvis).	28	96	105	117	81	97	524	3	1	5	18	2	7	36	1,535	70	164	498	2,267
2. Kayasthas (including Prabhus).	4	17	11	9	3	8	52	—	1	1	—	—	—	2	155	2	15	66	238
3. Other Hindus	20	88	81	67	42	52	350	1	1	6	3	2	3	16	930	24	97	508	1,559
4. Sikhs	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
5. Brahmans	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
6. Buddhists	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
7. Muhammadians	1	7	6	5	6	6	31	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	89	—	12	35	135
8. Parsis	20	24	38	18	20	18	138	1	1	3	—	3	1	9	488	26	83	172	769
9. Indian Christians	5	3	3	6	4	11	32	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	64	4	8	23	99
10. Europeans and Anglo-Indians.	1	1	1	—	1	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	12	—	3	—	15
11. Jews	1	2	1	—	—	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	12	—	2	5	19
Total	80	238	246	222	157	192	1,135	6	4	15	21	7	11	64	3,285	126	384	1,307	5,102

## APPENDIX X. (continued).

## ALLAHABAD UNIVERSITY.

Communities.	Number of Students who took their B.A. Degree in the last Three (1911 to 1913) Years at the Age of							Number of Students who took their B.Sc. Degree in the last Three (1911 to 1913) Years at the Age of							Number of Students who took their M.A. Degree in the last Three (1911 to 1913) Years at the Age of							Number of Students who took their M.Sc. (or 2nd D.Sc.) Degree in the last Three (1911 to 1913) Years at the Age of							Number of Students who took in the last Ten (1904 to 1913) Years the following Degrees.				
	19-20 and under.	20-21.	21-22.	22-23.	23-24.	24-25 and over.	Total.	19-20 and under.	20-21.	21-22.	22-23.	23-24.	24-25 and over.	Total.	19-20.	20-21.	21-22.	22-23.	23-24.	24-25 and over.	Total.	B.A.	B.Sc.	M.A.	M.Sc. or 2nd D.Sc.	L.L.B.	Total.						
Brahmans (including Shenvis).	13	75	94	69	38	59	348	15	23	29	19	6	4	96	—	—	4	4	8	9	25	819	177	69	25	391	1,481						
Kayasthas (including Prabhus).	21	60	62	39	21	18	221	8	14	10	9	6	4	51	—	—	3	—	5	5	13	547	101	30	13	248	989						
Other Hindus	12	46	49	37	21	17	182	8	19	9	12	3	—	51	—	—	4	5	3	5	17	440	101	35	8	209	793						
Sikhs	—	2	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	2	6					
Brahmos	—	1	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	5	1	—	—	—	—	1					
Buddhists	—	1	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—					
Jains	—	1	3	—	—	1	7	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	30	—	2	—	16	48						
Muhammadians.	45	86	57	46	27	17	278	1	11	4	3	3	2	24	—	—	4	6	3	8	21	685	30	34	3	166	918						
Parsis	—	—	1	1	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	8	—	1	—	6	15						
Indian Christians.	3	3	3	5	3	6	23	—	—	2	—	1	1	4	—	—	—	—	1	2	3	50	5	8	—	5	68						
Europeans and Anglo-Indians.	5	5	4	3	—	5	22	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	3	4	60	—	10	6	76							
Total	101	280	273	200	110	123	1,087	32	67	54	43	19	11	236	—	—	16	16	20	32	84	2,647	415	189	49	1,047	4,347						

APPENDIX X. (continued).

PUNJAB UNIVERSITY.

Communities.	Number of Students who took their B.A. Degree in the last Three Years at the Age of					Number of Students who took their B.Sc. Degree in the last Three Years at the Age of							Number of Students who took their M.A. and M.Sc. Degrees in the last Three Years at the Age of						Number of Students who took in the last Ten Years the following Degrees.				
	19-20.	20-21.	21-22.	22-23.	23-24.	24-25 and over.	Total.	19-20.	20-21.	21-22.	22-23.	23-24.	24-25.	25 and over.	Total.	B.A.	B.Sc.	M.A. and M.Sc.	D.Sc.	L.L.B.	Total.		
Brahmans (including Shenvis).	8	15	13	13	7	5	61	3	—	1	—	—	—	1	4	179	7	23	—	37	246		
Kayasthas (including Prabhus).	5	5	4	4	3	3	24	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	2	75	1	8	—	8	92		
Other Hindus	64	75	44	37	13	11	244	6	8	—	1	—	—	—	38	695	30	92	—	251	1,068		
Sikhs -	5	14	11	4	4	2	40	1	2	3	2	—	—	1	8	114	10	18	—	29	171		
Brahmos -	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	2	1	1	—	—	4		
Buddhists -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—		
Muhammads.	22	26	27	8	8	6	97	1	1	1	4	1	1	3	20	316	3	56	—	57	432		
Parsis -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		
Indian Christians.	2	2	3	1	1	3	12	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	2	37	5	7	—	1	50		
Europeans and Anglo-Indians.	—	1	—	1	—	1	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	3	1	—	—	—	4		
Total .	106	138	103	68	36	31	482	12	11	6	3	—	—	6	32	1,421	58	205	—	383	2,067		

## APPENDIX XI.

*(Referred to in paragraph 2 of annexure X. to the Report.)*

RULES made under SECTION 6 of the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT, 1870, for regulating the APPOINTMENT OF NATIVES OF INDIA :—

- (i) To OFFICES, PLACES, and EMPLOYMENTS ordinarily held by MEMBERS of the INDIAN CIVIL SERVICE (Notification No. 1128, Home Department, dated the 26th August 1910); and
- (ii) In the OFFICES of ACCOUNTANT-GENERAL (Notification No. 1120, Home Department, dated the 26th August 1910).

*(i) Notification No. 1128.*

In exercise of the power conferred by section 6 of the Government of India Act, 1870 (33 Vict. c. 3), and in supersession of the rules published in the Home Department Notification No. 2159 (Public), dated the 2nd November 1892, the Governor-General in Council has been pleased to make the following rules, which have been sanctioned by the Secretary of State in Council, with the concurrence of a majority of the members present :—

- (1) The local Government may appoint any member of the Provincial Civil Service subordinate to it, who is a native of India, and of proved merit and ability, to any of the offices, places, and employments ordinarily held by members of the Civil Service of His Majesty in India, to fill which it has been declared by such local Government (by notification in the Official Gazette) that members of such Provincial Civil Service can properly be appointed.
- (2) The local Government may at any time appoint any native of India of proved merit and ability to any of the offices, places, and employments specified by such local Government in any such notification as in Rule 1 is mentioned; provided that not more than one-fourth of the offices, places, and employments so specified shall at any one time be held by natives of India not members

of the Provincial Civil Service subordinate to the local Government; but this proviso shall not apply to or include any native of India (not a member of a Provincial Service) who has, prior to the making of these rules, been appointed under section 6 of the Government of India Act, 1870 (33 Vict. c. 3), to an office, place, or employment in the Civil Service of India.

- (3) In addition to appointments made under Rules 1 and 2, the local Government may, whenever the exigencies of the public service render it necessary, appoint to any of the offices, places, or employments ordinarily held by members of the Civil Service of His Majesty in India, for a period not exceeding three months, any native of India of proved merit and ability; provided that the appointment of any such officer shall not involve his transfer from another district.
- (4) The local Government may declare any appointment to be made on probation only, and may prescribe the terms on which it is made and the conditions with which the person appointed must comply before he can be confirmed.
- (5) The local Government may at any time suspend and remove any person appointed by such local Government under these rules.

*(ii) Notification No. 1120.*

In exercise of the power conferred by section 6 of the Government of India Act, 1870 (33 Vict. c. 3), the Governor-General in Council has been pleased to make the following rules for regulating the employment of natives of India in the offices of Accountant-General, which rules have been sanctioned by the Secretary of State in Council with the concurrence of a majority of the members present :—

- (1) The Government of India may appoint any member of the enrolled list of the Finance Department of that Government, not being a member of the Civil Service of His Majesty, who is a native of India and of proved merit and ability, to the office of an Accountant-General, provided that the number of natives of India so employed together shall not exceed the proportion of the offices of Accountants-General which the Secretary of State may from

time to time fix as tenable by members of the enrolled list, not being members of the Civil Service of His Majesty in India.

- (2) In addition to appointments made under Rule 1 the Government of India may, whenever the exigencies of the public service require, appoint to the office of Accountant-General, for a period not exceeding three months, any member of the enrolled list of the Finance Department of that Government, not being a member of the Civil Service of His Majesty in India, who is a native of India and of proved merit and ability.
- (3) The Government of India may declare any appointment made under these rules to be made on probation only, and may prescribe the terms on which it is made, and the conditions with which the person appointed must comply before he can be confirmed.
- (4) The Government of India may at any time suspend and remove any person appointed under these rules.